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Continuous Crisis Committee Guide

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21 views31 pages

Continuous Crisis Committee Guide

Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

BACKGROUND

GUIDE

CONTINUOUS
CRISIS COMMITTEE
INDEX
LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD.…………………...…1

CRISIS APPENDIX…………………………………………...……..3
WHAT IS A MUN……………………………………………...…..3
WHAT IS A CRISIS……………………………………...……...…4
COMMITTEE BASICS………………………………………...…...6
DIRECTIVES : FORMAT……………………………………….......9​
DIRECTIVES : SAMPLES………………………………………...10

THE AGENDA……………………………………………….……..14
​ GENERAL INFORMATION………………………………………..14
​ HISTORICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT……………………14
PRELUDE TO THE 1965 WAR……………………………………..16
OUTBREAK AND COURSE OF THE 1965 WAR…………………….17​

FINAL NOTES AND COMMENTS……………………..…………29

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER FROM THE
EXECUTIVE BOARD
Dear Delegates, It is with great excitement, admiration, and anticipation that we
welcome you to the Continuous Crisis Committee (CCC) at TSA MUN 2025. This
committee will be unlike any other dynamic, unpredictable, and intellectually
demanding. As delegates, you will be called upon not only to represent your
portfolio with clarity and conviction but also to act under pressure, think critically,
and respond swiftly to the unfolding crises.

What makes CCC truly special is its pace, unpredictability, and the way it blurs the
line between diplomacy and decision-making. Here, you are not merely reacting to
the world, you are reshaping it. Every press release, directive, or midnight cabinet
meeting has the power to rewrite the course of the committee. It is a space that
demands agility, strategy, and authenticity all at [Link] matter your experience,
whether you are a seasoned crisis delegate or stepping into this format for the first
time, you belong here. Each of you brings a different perspective, and that diversity
is what breathes life into crisis.

Our hopes are high, for we know each of you has the power to exceed them. We
encourage you to come thoroughly prepared, not merely with facts and data, but
with a rich appreciation of the historical, social, and economic contexts that inform
the agenda before us. All arguments you make should be based on the firm ground
of verified, credible sources, demonstrating a commitment to accuracy and integrity
upon which productive dialogue [Link] are not just expecting competence; we
are hoping for boldness, creativity, and courage. And we believe you are more than
capable of delivering all three.

Our role as the Executive Board is not just to moderate debate or escalate the crisis.
We are here to challenge you, guide you, and—most importantly—support you. We
want this committee to be a space where bold ideas are respected, every delegate
feels heard, and growth is inevitable. Whether this is your first crisis committee or
your tenth, we promise to make it engaging, fair, and [Link]
remember: It’s absolutely OK to take calculated risks, provided that you have a good
reason to do it. CCC is not only about who speaks loudest, but also who thinks the
deepest.
TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 1
Stay true to your role, remain flexible to change, and embrace collaboration even
when the stakes seem impossibly high.

As your Executive Board, we commit to creating an environment that is equitable,


engaging, and nurturing, where each and every delegate can meaningfully
contribute. We do not just moderate, but we mentor, so that every time spent in
committee is a chance to learn, discover, and excel. . Raise your rhetoric to the
occasion; phrase your arguments with intent, clarity, and ardor. Amid the whirlwind
of views, claim your distinctive voice, and then use it to argue uncompromisingly
for the causes you hold. Remember that true leadership emerges not from silence or
complacency, but from the courage to speak up, to listen actively, and to engage with
empathy and respect.

We encourage you to arrive with thorough research, a clear command of your


character or role, and an open mind. The days ahead will test your endurance and
imagination, but we believe you’re more than ready. We look forward to seeing
history rewritten by none other but you.

MOHAMMED FURQAN​
CHAIRPERSON​

RAHUL R KALPATHI​
VICE CHAIRPERSON​

PARVATHI PREM​
MODERATOR

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 2


CRISIS APPENDIX

WHAT IS A MUN?​
Model United Nations, also known as Model UN or MUN, is an extra-curricular
activity in which students typically roleplay delegates to the United Nations and
simulate a UN committee.
Participants in Model United Nations conferences, known as delegates, are placed in
committees and assigned countries to represent, or occasionally other organizations
or political figures, where they represent members of that body. Delegates are
assigned countries before the conference, along with receiving a topic, or topics, that
their committee will discuss.
They conduct research before conferences regarding their agenda (topic), their
unique country/portfolio and prepare speeches and other documents that they will
then debate with their fellow delegates in the committee, staying true to the actual
position of the portfolio they represent (this is called foreign policy, please research
this on your own time). At the end of a conference, the delegates will vote on written
policies, called “draft resolutions”, with the goal of passing them with a majority
vote.
The best-performing delegates in each committee, as well as delegations, are
recognized with awards based on how well they did in committee, with a Number of
factors determined by the Executive Board, who moderate committee and serve as
adjudicators Delegates must remain formal and composed throughout committees, ,
and refer to themselves and other delegates in third person (the delegate of India
asks the delegate of Pakistan how…..) We are largely following UNA-USA ROP.
Please research this on your own as well. RoP will be explained in detail during a
separate call exclusively for first timers as well.
The committee is advanced by a ‘motion’. The committee is first started by raising a
motion to start the committee. There is a way to phrase motions - The delegate
would like to raise a motion to start a committee. Similar motions are also raised to
introduce debate. Debate during committee is divided into formal and informal
debate. In this committee we will not be entertaining normal formal debate (ie
GSL’s), instead replacing it with a Secondary Speakers List or SSL, which functions
the same as a GSL.

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 3


We will only have informal debate of two types - moderated caucus and
unmoderated caucus. Moderated caucus is as the name indicates, moderated. It is on
a specific topic. There are a specific number of speakers, and a specific time limit
for each speaker. It is started by raising a motion - The delegate of....would like to
raise a motion to start a moderated caucus on the topic ...... for a total time of ...
minutes with an individual time limit of .... An unmoderated caucus is a break,
[Link] chair exits the committee and delegates are free to informally discuss among
each other.
This is an ample time to draft directives. Crises normally come after an unmod. In
short, the committee switches between mod and unmod. During the entirety of the
committee, you are expected to write directives, which are explained later.
There are points (questions/clarification) that can be raised in committee . The 4
points are -
1) Point of information - raised on crisis update or after a delegate's speech. Asking
a pertinent question.
2) Point of order - raised after a delegate’s speech to correct factual inaccuracies in
the speech.
3) Point of personal privilege - raised after or during a delegate’s speech. Eg - speak
louder, speak slower, could you repeat, my internet has a problem etc.. Please do not
interrupt a speaker unless absolutely necessary (you’re not able to hear him or
something).
4) Point of parliamentary enquiry - question to the chair regarding RoP. Do not
interrupt a speaker with this. Our committee, a crisis committee, has several unique
aspects that will be explained now.

WHAT IS A CRISIS?
A crisis committee is a unique type of MUN committee in which delegates have the
ability to take direct action throughout the committee in response to ‘crises’. A crisis
is an update on developments in committee. It is an active news style update on
developments. For example, a crisis might say that the UK has been struck with a
cholera outbreak or that there has been a bomb blast in London.
Delegates must now respond to such a crisis through a document known as a
directive. Delegates are expected to respond to crises through directives. A response
should be comprehensive, and effectively solve the crises. For example - a crisis
where Pakistan invades India should be responded with a comprehensive military
plan from the delegate of India.

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 4


(in a committee where this is relevant) A directive is the delegate exercising his
powers. He/she has certain powers unique to his portfolio. For example, the minister
of finance is responsible for all government action regarding the economy, and
through directives, can do anything that the real life minister of finance could do.
The same is true for a minister of defence, or a commander of the army. They each
have specific powers related to that portfolio. Certain portfolios will have wider and
unique powers, which is explained later. The delegate may only pass directives on
his own behalf. Directives come to the chair first and if I find it detailed and
reasonable enough, then I will pass it, bringing it into action.
Think of it as getting approval from the head of the government. If I find that a
directive is not acceptable for whatever reason, then I will fail it, i.e. it is not going
to be implemented and the delegate will receive no points for it. Directives can also
be passed to further a delegate’s powers. These are unprompted from a crisis and we
encourage this.
This means that these are not in response to any crises, but rather the delegate does
something to bolster his own position in committee. Many of these directives will
reflect in the crises as well. For example - an Iranian military general may pass a
directive that wants to perform a military coup.
If the directive is passed, then the next crisis will elaborate on the same.
These types of directives are highly encouraged and carry more weightage in some
ways. You are encouraged to prepare detailed comprehensive directives that are
unprompted before the committee and give them to us once the committee starts.
A certain level of detail is expected from directives. A directive is not just a piece of
paper that says ‘India attacks Pakistan’. Elaborating on that example, a very
comprehensive attack plan would be required from India, detailing the number of
troops, artillery, troop movements and strategies. Some directives will be longer than
others.
Directives must also be reasonable, i.e. it should be something that would be
realistic to achieve in real life. The more unrealistic a directive is, the less I am
compelled to pass it. Some directives will require more detail than others. Directives
can be covert (secret) or overt.

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 5


Overt directives may be read out to the committee. Only make covert operation
covert directives, do not make each and every directive covert for the sake of it. An
overt directive indicates cooperation and trust.
Directives are of three types - individual, joint and committee directives.
Individual directives are authored by only one delegate and uses his unique powers.
A joint directive is authored by several delegates, who pool in their resources and
creativity, it is usually created with allies and is highly effective. Joint directives and
the next type of directive are especially encouraged in a committee like ours as a
cabinet is full of allies who must collaborate with each other to do substantial
actions.
A committee directive is authored by a few important ‘sponsors’ but a majority of
the committee supports it and are aware of it. Committee directives are voted upon
by the whole committee. They tackle several crises at once, the whole committee is
responsible for it.
These are very important in a cabinet.

COMMITTEE BASICS
1. What is Foreign Policy?
●​ Foreign policy is what your country or character aims to achieve in relation to
others. It guides your decisions, diplomacy, and strategies. Everything you say
or propose should align with your portfolio’s interests.
●​ Where to find it: Government statements, speeches, press releases, past UN or
official meetings, defence policies, and leadership speeches.
2. What are Portfolio Powers?
●​ In a crisis committee, you represent a specific role like a military leader,
diplomat, or intelligence chief. Your powers define what actions you can take.
For example, military leaders can order troop movements but cannot negotiate
treaties unless authorized.
●​ Stay within your powers to keep your actions realistic and effective.

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 6


3. What is Verbatim?
●​ Verbatim means the exact words you must use to raise formal motions, points,
or to quote rules and legality in committee. Using the correct wording is
essential for your actions and speeches to be recognized officially.
4. What is a Directive?
●​ Directives are written requests to take action within the crisis. They can
involve military operations, diplomatic outreach, propaganda, or covert
activities. Directives must be approved by the committee(or the Executive
board) to take effect.
5. What is the Freeze Date?
●​ The freeze date is the fixed point in time when the committee starts. For, The
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 this is 4th August 1965. All knowledge, events,
and decisions must stay consistent with this timeline. No future knowledge
beyond the freeze date can be used.
6. What are Frontroom and Backroom?
●​ Frontroom means speeches, debates, and interactions in committee. Backroom
refers to documentation, planning, and drafting directives behind the scenes.
Both are crucial and success depends on strong public diplomacy and solid
private strategy.
7. What are Sources?
●​ Sources are those which must be used to prove something you state in your
speech or when raising a point of order against someone. For example, if a
delegate states that troops moved to Delhi, but in fact they moved to Nepal in
the Crisis update, the source is where you found out that the troops moved to
Nepal, in this case the crisis update.
8. What is a Crisis Update?
●​ A Crisis Update is the result of actions taken by delegates through directives.
They represent events that have taken place in real time and direct the flow of
the committee moving forward. They will be taken as fact unless specified
otherwise. For example, if it stated that this has been crosschecked and could
not be verified, then speculation is allowed.

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 7


9. What is a communique?
●​ A communique is a chit written to a delegate who is currently not present in
committee. If a delegate wishes to contact a person outside, they will mark it
as a communique, and the Executive Board will take up the role of that person.
10. What is a press release?
●​ A press release is something you wish to disclose to the whole committee, and
also to the whole world. It will be similar to a news story breaking out, where
you are the journalist. These will be considered part of a crisis update, if
pertinent enough. The authenticity of the information cannot be questioned,
only questions on the content is allowed.
11. What is a portfolio request?
●​ A portfolio request is a document sent by a delegate, to find out information
about topics which are not readily available or the success/failure of a
directive. For example, if you wish to know the number of spies in a certain
location, and you have the power, we will give you a number, which is
realistic, no further modifications will be allowed to the number provided.
12. What are Crisis notes?
●​ Crisis notes are all documentation that is found only in a crisis committee,
they are Directives, Communiques. Press releases and portfolio requests. They
are collectively called crisis notes which are sent during the line of
communication or LOC.
13. What is Line of Communication(LOC):
●​ The LOC, or directive window, is when the submission of all crisis notes is
allowed, with the only exception being press releases. These will open at the
EB’s discretion.
14. What is yielding?
●​ Yielding is when a delegate gives their remaining time to another party, or to
questions
A.​Yield to Points of Information
–) Allowed others to question the delegate on their speech

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 8


B.​Yield to the Executive Board (EB)
–) Remaining time is yielded to the EB.
–) The usage of this time is at the discretion of the EB and is usually deemed
elapsed.

DIRECTIVES : FORMAT​

FORMAT 1 : INDIVIDUAL/JOINT DIRECTIVE




The Emergency Imperial Council
Joint/Individual Directive
Covert/Overt

Authored by -
Aim - (the objective of the directive. Not more than two lines)
Resources required - (comprehensive list of resources needed. Not more than a few
lines).
Plan of action - (should be detailed. Break it up into points)
Expected outcome - (outcome the delegate is hoping for. Minimum of one line and a
maximum of one paragraph)

FORMAT 2 : COMMITTEE WIDE DIRECTIVE

The Emergency Imperial Council Committee Directive


Committee Directive

Sponsors - (maximum of 3 or 4, minimum of 2)


Signatories - (minimum of 4 or 5, no maximum)
Aim- (up to two paragraphs)
TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 9
Resources each country is providing
Plan of Action - (limited to maximum of 5 pages)

DIRECTIVES : SAMPLES
SAMPLE A - Crisis - There has been a bombing in Times Square. Casualties and
perpetrators are unknown at this point in time.

(Committee Name)
Overt Directive
Individual

Aim - to mitigate the damage of the bombing and investigate the cause

Resources required - several ambulances and medical crew, bomb squad, (later on)
Homeland Security and FBI.

Plan of action -
1) Several ambulances and medical crew will be rushed to the site of the explosion.
2) If there is any fire, the fire department shall be called. 3) All victims will be
rescued and taken to hospitals.
3) All victims will be rescued and taken to hospitals.
4) Once all victims are secured, the area will be closed off from the public.
5) The bomb squad shall search the area for the source of the explosion.
6) FBI and Homeland Security will start an investigation trying to find the criminal
in charge of the bombing.
7) The mayor shall hold a press conference condemning the act and promising to
bring justice.

Signed - Delegate of USA.

A directive should have at least as much detail as is given above.

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 10


Note-these next set of directive are written by a very good delegate. This level of
detail or content is not expected. It is given mainly for inspiration. These were all
unprompted. It's ok if you don't understand some of it. Some aspects of format are
different, in our committee you will follow the format given above.

SAMPLE B - Crisis - N/A

Directive [326 words]

From: Libya
Type: Covert

Aim: To set up a Libyan Marine Fish Market in Jerry Island, Famagusta which shall
be used by Libyan troops to enter Famagusta on the guise of them being workers

Plan of Action
1. A meeting shall be scheduled between the Zliten Marine Company (ZMC) and
Ismail Arter the mayor of Famagusta on 28/10/2020
2. 2 Ambassadors from the Zliten Marine Company (ZMC) would travel from
Mirata (Libya) to 350718.9″N 33°57'19.9"E (Jerry Beach)
3. The meeting on 28/10/2020 shall discuss the following
a)​ The opening of a marine trade expo and a housing facility at Jerry Island (seen
in the map) that sells freshwater fish
b)​ Permission to use the fort of Famagusta for the delivery of these Libyan fish
and construction materials
c)​ Work permits for a total of 120 construction workers and 50 workers who shall
be employed in the fish market
4. Once permission is granted, the construction of the marine expo and the housing
facility shall commence.
5. The marine fish market/expo shall be tented and shall take an estimated 2 weeks
to finish
6. The housing facilities for the workers should also take 2 weeks.

Extra Points:
1. The mayor of Famagusta is likely to accept this meeting because:
a)​ Cyprus is now dependent on imports of fish, veal and mutton to meet domestic
needs after its agriculture collapsed as a result of the European Union Customs
Union Agreement (that placed high tariffs on imports of agricultural projects)
TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 11
b)​ Libya enjoys friendly ties with Turkey and thus by extension, the TRNC as
well

Conclusion:
1. The Turkish Cypriots grant the Zliten Marine Company (ZMC) permission to
establish a fish expo in Jerry Island
2. The 120 number of construction workers are given work permits for a 2-week
interval
3. The construction of the housing facility and the fish market shall commence and
start with immediate effect The Fish Market is Outside the Forbidden Zone The
Forbidden Zone is uninhabited and completely deserted

SAMPLE C : Crisis - N/A

Directive [342 words]


From: Libya
Type: Covert
Aim: To make Libyan troops parachute into Famagusta

Plan of Action:
1. The 5 spies shall move to the warehouse (refer Directive 2) and stock it with a
week's worth of food supplies and Butane stoves lanterns
2. The spies shall place a MOTO safety OBD GPS Tracker on the arms warehouse
using which they get the accurate location of the warehouse in the form of
coordinates
3. These coordinates shall be shared with the Tripoli Brigade and the Libyan Air
Force in the form of an encrypted AES 256-bit cypher with a randomly
computerised key
4. The 5 spies shall create a landing platform using leftover cloth from putting up the
fish market tent
5. Once the Tripoli Brigade receives these coordinates 50 soldiers of the Tripoli
Brigade will assemble at the Tripoli Airport and board Libyan Airlines at 9: 30 am.
6. After the 50 troops beard the plane, the pilot will be instructed to inform the 50
troops when the plane flies over Larnaca (34.9003 N33.6232°E)
7. Once the plane reaches Larnaca, the 50 troops shall attach parachutes to their
vests. Larnaca is a few minutes away from their destination.

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 12


[Link] 50 troops shall parachute off the plane when the plane flies over specific
coordinates sent by the spies.
9. After parachuting off the plane, the 50 troops shall all safely land on the landing
platform in the arms warehouse.

Extra Points :
1. It is impossible to pinpoint the exact coordinate since the only ones who know the
coordinates are the spies, the Libyan Air Force and the Tripoli Brigade. However, an
estimate of the coordinates would be 35.1059 N33.9555°E
2. Food supplies shall be given to these troops weekly
3. The paratroopers will not be spotted for 2 reasons
a)​ It will be pitch black when they jump
b)​ Varosha is uninhabited, so no there will be one near the landing spot

Conclusion:
1. With over 100 troops and weapons, Varusha's forbidden zone becomes a de facto
Libyan military base

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 13


THE AGENDA​
“Indo Pak War 1965​
FREEZE DATE : 4th AUGUST 1965”

GENERAL INFORMATION
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, also called the Second Kashmir War, was a major
armed conflict between India and Pakistan over the disputed region of Jammu &
Kashmir It lasted from August 5, 1965 until a UN-mediated ceasefire on September
22, 1965. The war began when Pakistan launched a covert infiltration (Operation
Cibraltar) into Indian-held Kashmir to provoke an insurgency. India retaliated with
large-scale offensives along the India-Pakistan border, opening fighting in the
Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan sectors. The fighting involved thousands of
casualties on both sides and some of the largest tank battles since World War II. In
the end, international pressure (especially a UN Security Council ceasefire
resolution) forced both countries to halt fighting and withdraw troops. The 1965 war
ended inconclusively, neither side achieved all its aims, and the Kashmir dispute
remained unresolved.

HISTORICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT


a) The Legacy of Partition and Kashmir Dispute:

When British India was partitioned in 1947 into the two new states of India and
Pakistan, the status of the Muslem majority princely Mate of Kasheur became hotly
contested Kashmir's Hindu ruler acceded to India, but Pakistan disputed the
decision, leading to the First Indo-Pakistan War (1947-48) A UN-brokered ceasefire
in 1949 established a ceasefire line (later called the Line of Control), but no final
settlement was reached Since then, Kashmir was the focal point of repeated crises.
India retained control of about two-turds of the region (including the Kashmir
Valley, Jammu and Ladakh), while Pakistan administered the remaining western and
northern parts.

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 14


Beyond Kashmir, other legacies of partition fueled tensions. Millions of people had
been displaced and killed in the partition violence. The two countries clashed over
other border areas (eg. the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat) and major river waters.

Pakistan saw itself as the champion of the Muslim population, while India
emphasized secular unity. Both built up large armies under new leaderships-India
under Prime Ministers Nehru (until 1964) and then Lal Bahadur Shastri, Pakistan
under President Ayub Khan - but the military balance shifted over time. After
Pakistan signed defense pacts with the United States (SEATO in 1954, CENTO in
1955), Pakistan's army received substantial US equipment and aid. By the early
1960s, Pakistan's air force and armored units were often qualitatively superior to
India's older World-War-Il-era tanks and planes However, India had the advantage of
larger population and territory, and India maintained a policy of nominal
non-alignment, even as it accepted Soviet military help after the 1962 Sino-Indian
border war

b) Cold War Alignments:

The Indo-Pak conflict was deeply entwined with Cold War politics. Pakistan aligned
itself with the Western bloc; it joined American-led alliances (SEATO CENTO) and
hosted US military bases, seeing the United States as a counterweight to India. The
US and UK supplied arms to Pakistan through the 1950s. India, while formally
non-aligned, tilted toward the Soviet Union after being rocked by China's 1962
invasion. The USSR became India's main arms supplier in the 1960s, and India also
maintained good ties with France and Britain (both former colonial rulers)

China, emerging from its own 1962 war with India, became a close friend of
Pakistan and a bitter rival of India. By 1965 China had secretly promised Pakistan
that it would "bear responsibility" for consequences if India pressed into West
Pakistan, warning India not to open a second front on the Sino-Indian border. In
short, when the Kashmir conflict reignited in 1965, the two sides had opposite Cold
War patrons. India with the USSR (and tacit Western support) and Pakistan with the
US/China bloc. These alignments would shape arms flows and diplomatic responses
during the war.

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 15


PRELUDE TO THE 1965 WAR
a) Border Skirmishes Early 1965:

Tensions had been rising for months before the full-scale war. In early 1965,
Pakistani and Indian border troops sparred repeatedly Most notably, from January to
June 1965 India and Pakistan fought small battles in the Rann of Kutch (a marshy
region in Gujarat). In April 1965 Pakistan launched Operation Desert Hawk to probe
India's defenses in Kutch. After intense fighting, a British-brokered ceasefire on July
1, 1965 ended the Kutch skirmishes Meanwhile, Pakistan and India continued to
disagree over Kashmir's status and local insurgent incidents. By mid-1965,
Pakistan's military leadership believed it could change the status quo in Kashmir
Pakistan's plans had two elements first, to infiltrate troops into Indian-held Kashmir
to spark an insurgency, second, if needed, to launch a major offensive to seize key
positions. Pakistan also strengthened its ties with China for support. (In March 1965
Ayub Khan visited Beijing and secured Chinese pledges of and in case of Indian
aggression, India, for its part, had been busy rebuilding its forces after the 1962
China war India had acquired some Soviet MiG-21 jets and began modernizing its
army, but much of India's equipment was still older (like British Centurion tanks and
French Mystère fighters) Nevertheless, India was determined to defend Kashmir as a
matter of national honor.

b) Key Pre-War Events (1965):

Jan-June 1965: Ongoing skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani border forces in
Gujarat and along the ceasefire line (Kashmir).

Apr 24, 1965: Pakistan launches Operation Desert Hawk in the Rann of Kutch
(Western India)

Jul 1, 1965: British-mediated ceasefire ends the Rann of Kutch clashes

Late July 1965: Pakistan prepares secret plans for action in Kashmir (Operation
Gibraltar) and for an offensive (Operation Grand Slam)

TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 16


OUTBREAK AND COURSE OF THE 1965 WAR
a) Operation Gibraltar (Kashmir Offensive, August 1965) :
On August 5, 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar: thousands of Pakistani
troops (estimates range 7,000–30,000) crossed into Indian-administered Kashmir in
specially trained irregular units and regular army detachments. Their goal was to
incite the Muslim population of Kashmir to revolt against Indian rule, cutting off
Indian forces and territory. This infiltration took place in difficult mountain terrain
and attracted international notice. (In fact, a declassified US diplomatic letter from
the time confirmed reports of “hundreds of infiltrators” in Kashmir

India quickly discovered the infiltrations and retaliated. By late August, Indian
troops had driven the infiltrators back, recaptured forward posts, and on August 28
seized the strategic Haji Pir Pass (a key route in Kashmir) from Pakistan Pakistan’s
plan had failed to spark a general uprising, and in early September Pakistan diverted
forces to try a more direct attack.

b) Operation Grand Slam and Indian Counter-Attacks (September 1965) :


On September 1, 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam, a major offensive
aimed at capturing the vital town of Akhnur in Kashmir via the Haji Pir Pass.
However, India diverted reinforcements to blunt this attack and also opened new
attacks elsewhere. On September 6, India struck back on the western front: Indian
Army units crossed into Pakistan in the Punjab sector, attacking near Lahore and
Sialkot, and also attacked in Sindh near Karachi and in Rajasthan. This broader
Indian offensive was intended to relieve pressure on Kashmir by threatening
Pakistani territory.

The result was a multi-front war. In the Punjab sector (near Lahore and Sialkot),
some of the war’s largest tank battles occurred. For example, the Battle of Asal Uttar
(September 8–10, 1965) saw India’s 2nd Armoured Brigade hold off the advance of
Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division. Indian forces deployed older Churchill and
Sherman tanks in a defensive horseshoe formation; Pakistani forces attacked with
superior American-made Patton tanks. Despite Pakistan’s technical advantage, the
Indians ambushed the advance and destroyed nearly 97 Pakistani tanks for the loss
of only about 10 Indian tanks. This decisive Indian defensive victory halted
Pakistan’s push toward Amritsar. (The wreckage of burned Patton tanks littered the
battlefield so completely that the area became known to soldiers as “Patton Nagar”
TSAMUN 2025 CCC BACKGROUND GUIDE Page 17
In the Lahore sector, India’s attack included armored thrusts into suburbs of Lahore
and attempts to cut off the city. Pakistani troops fought back fiercely, and the
fighting in this sector (including the Battle of Burki, September 8–12) was very
heavy on both sides. By mid-September, no breakthrough was achieved. Likewise,
in the Rajasthan/Sindh sector India feinted toward Karachi while Pakistan mounted
a limited offensive into Rajasthan. None of these moves decided the war. In the
Kashmir sector, Indian forces consolidated earlier gains (including Haji Pir) and held
new forward positions.

Throughout September, the fighting reached a stalemate. Both armies held territory
the other had captured: India held roughly 740 square miles of Pakistani land
(around Lahore, Sialkot, Kashmir fronts) while Pakistan held several hundred square
miles in the desert and northern Kashmir (Chumb sector). Casualties were high:
India suffered roughly 3,712 killed and 7,638 wounded, while Pakistan had about
1,500 killed and 4,300 wounded. Civilians on both sides also suffered, especially in
border villages and towns like Lahore and Amritsar that came under fire. The war’s
conduct foreshadowed even larger battles to come: in air combat, India’s small
Folland Gnat fighters, nicknamed “Sabre Slayers,” achieved local successes against
Pakistan’s F-86 Sabres, and the air war was the first large-scale jet air war between
India and Pakistan since 1947. Naval operations were minimal, though Pakistan’s
navy bombarded the Indian coastal radar station at Dwarka on September 7 (a
symbolic raid that did little strategic damage).

Image: Captured Pakistani M-48A1 Patton tank at an Indian museum. Pakistani


forces employed many American M47/M48 Patton tanks in 1965, but battles like
Asal Uttar saw India destroy dozens

c) International Ceasefire (September 1965) :


By mid-September both sides were worn out and the risk of wider escalation loomed
(even China had hinted it might intervene if India advanced too far west. India
turned to the United Nations to halt the fighting. On September 20, 1965, the UN
Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 211, calling immediately for a
ceasefire and a return to pre-war positions. The United States and United Kingdom
co-sponsored the resolution and simultaneously imposed an arms embargo on both
India and Pakistan. The embargo hit Pakistan harder (since Pakistan’s forces were
more dependent on US-supplied ammunition). Under international pressure, India
accepted the ceasefire on September 21 and Pakistan on September 22. Fighting

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stopped on the night of September 22-23, 1965, with each army holding some
disputed ground.
Negotiations then began under Soviet auspices. India and Pakistan both agreed to
Soviet offers to host talks, and the two sides met in Tashkent (Uzbek SSR) in
January 1966. On January 10, 1966, Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub
Khan signed the Tashkent Declaration, brokered by the USSR, agreeing to withdraw
all forces to the original ceasefire line The war’s formal end thus came with that
agreement, but its immediate effect was simply a return to status quo antebellum.

d) Key Figures and Positions :

❖ India (Democratic Republic) – Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri: Succeeded


Nehru in June 1964. Shastri led India through the 1965 war and was a firm defender
of India’s claim to Kashmir. He pursued a combination of military resistance and
international diplomacy. After the war, he (briefly) became a hero in India for
repelling the invasion. Shastri died of a heart attack in Tashkent hours after signing
the peace declaration. India’s army commander was General J.N. Chaudhuri; Chief
of Air Staff was Air Marshal Arjan Singh.

❖ Pakistan (Republic) – President Ayub Khan: A military ruler who had overthrown
the civilian government in 1958. Ayub initiated the Gibraltar and Grand Slam plans
to change the Kashmir status quo. He relied on Pakistani army generals (like Akhtar
Hussain Malik) to carry out operations. Pakistan’s foreign policy was pro-Western
and pro-China at the time, contrasting with India’s Soviet ties. Pakistan’s army
deployed Patton tanks and was supported by an air force of North American Sabres.

❖ Soviet Union (USSR) – Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev: The USSR


maintained an official stance of neutrality in the war, though it had a “Treaty of
Friendship” with India from 1971. In 1965 Soviet diplomacy was busy defusing
tensions. The Kremlin offered to mediate the conflict and hosted the Tashkent talks.
Soviet strategy was to gain influence in South Asia, and it avoided aligning publicly
with either side.

❖ United States – President Lyndon B. Johnson: The US was Pakistan’s


longstanding military patron but by 1965 was deeply involved in Vietnam. In
September 1965 the Johnson administration imposed an embargo on arms shipments
to both India and Pakistan. Officially, the US claimed neutrality after September

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1965. Washington’s goal was to prevent the regional war from spiraling or driving
India fully into the Soviet camp.

❖ United Kingdom – Prime Minister Harold Wilson: Britain, tied by


Commonwealth to both India and Pakistan, joined the US in pushing a UN ceasefire.
British diplomats (e.g. at the Commonwealth Heads Conference) acted for peace,
and Britain followed the US lead in the arms embargo. (Earlier, in July 1965 Britain
had helped broker the Rann of Kutch ceasefire)

❖ China – Chairman Mao Zedong / Premier Zhou Enlai: China was a key backer of
Pakistan in 1965. Chinese media condemned India’s “aggression”, and Beijing
warned India not to open a second front. The Chinese leadership apparently
promised military support if India invaded West Pakistan, though by late 1965 China
stayed in the background. (Pakistan actually declined some Chinese arms offers after
the war, fearing international fallout.)

❖ France – President Charles de Gaulle: France had become a major supplier of


arms to India (for example, the Dassault Mystère and earlier Ouragan fighters).
During the war, France joined the US in a formal arms embargo on both sides but
quietly continued servicing Indian equipment. France lifted its embargo by March
1966.

❖ West Germany – Chancellors Ludwig Erhard (to Oct ’63) / Kurt-Georg Kiesinger
(after Dec ’66): West Germany was allied with the West and nominally joined the
embargo. (Secretly, it would later admit to selling Cobra anti-tank missiles to
Pakistan in this period.)

❖ East Germany – Chairman Walter Ulbricht: Aligned closely with the USSR, East
Germany followed the Soviet lead (neutral mediator) and condemned India’s
“aggression” in sympathetic state-run press, though it had no direct role.

❖ North Vietnam / South Vietnam: Both were engulfed in the Vietnam War by
1965. North Vietnam, aligned with the communist bloc, would have ideologically
sympathized with any anti-imperialist appeal of India, but it had no direct
involvement. South Vietnam (anti-communist US ally) was preoccupied with
defending against the Viet Cong; it welcomed any US push for global stability (such
as UN ceasefires). The Vietnam War drew major US attention away from South

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Asia.

❖ Middle Eastern and Muslim States: Pakistan sought support from fellow
Muslim-majority countries. Turkey and Iran (both pro-Western, but culturally
aligned with Pakistan) provided jet fuel, equipment and even naval assets. Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf states gave financial aid. Indonesia (under Sukarno) and
Malaysia (then in a confrontation with Singapore) vocally backed Pakistan;
Indonesia even sent warships in the Indian Ocean as a show of support. (Indonesia’s
support for Pakistan was seen as a major setback for India in the Non-Aligned
Movement). Egypt (Gamal Abdel Nasser) and other Arab states officially called for
peace, but Muslim solidarity generally favored Pakistan. In practice, the
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) did not yet exist (it was founded in 1969),
but Pakistan did raise the issue in forums of Islamic countries and the
Commonwealth.

e) Kashmir and the Human Dimension :


The 1965 war is often called a “Kashmir War” because both countries cited Kashmir
as the pretext. Much of the fiercest fighting occurred in Kashmir and the Punjab
plains adjoining it. Hundreds of villages on both sides of the ceasefire line were
attacked or changed hands. Civilians suffered from shelling, air attacks, and
displacement. The war also saw reports of atrocities: for example, on September 21
a Pakistani air attack killed 8 members of the Balwant Rai Mehta family in Gujarat,
and both sides accused each other of mistreating prisoners. Overall, however, both
governments attempted to portray their cause as righteous: India emphasized
defending Indian Kashmir from secessionist turmoil, while Pakistan claimed to be
supporting a Kashmiri revolt (though the revolt never materialized).

The human cost was high. Thousands of soldiers were killed or wounded on each
side (roughly 1,500 Pakistani fatalities vs. 3,700 Indian ). In addition, civilian
casualties numbered in the hundreds or more. Refugees streamed out of frontline
areas, especially in Kashmir and near Lahore/Sialkot. Hospitals were overwhelmed,
and war damage strained the economies and infrastructure of both young nations.
The Indian press called Shastri a hero for “saving Mother India’s honor,” while in
Pakistan the government celebrated “Defense Day” (September 6) to commemorate
holding off the invaders. Decades later, both nations remember 1965 with a mix of
pride and unresolved grievance.

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f) International Reactions and Diplomacy :
The Indo-Pak conflict drew swift international attention. India appealed to the
United Nations, recalling that the first Kashmir dispute was ended by UN mediation.
The Security Council’s unanimous Resolution 211 (Sept 20, 1965) declared an
immediate ceasefire and urged both sides to withdraw to the pre-war lines. The US
and UK supported this resolution and, for diplomatic leverage, announced
embargoes on arms shipments to both India and Pakistan. Pakistan, which had
expected Western backing, felt particularly betrayed when the embargo cut off its
critical American ammunition. (In fact, Pakistan had informed the US that Indian
troops were using U.S.-made weapons in Kashmir, violating the Mutual Security
Act; this spurred the US to clamp down on aid). India also suffered from the
embargo, but its shorter supply lines and alternative arms sources made it less
vulnerable.

Even before the UN ceasefire, the great powers maneuvered. The Soviet Union
publicly remained neutral and called for peace talks. Behind the scenes, the USSR
quietly used its “good offices” to bring the two sides together. In January 1966,
Moscow hosted the Tashkent negotiations; Soviet Premier Kosygin mediated
meetings between Shastri and Ayub. The United States, busy with Vietnam, largely
abdicated influence and left mediation to the Soviets, even as it maintained contact
with both governments. China, allied with Pakistan, issued warnings to India not to
threaten Pakistani territory. France played a moderating role: it joined the embargo
but signaled continued friendship with India (even covertly supplying spare parts).
West Germany and other European NATO members gave diplomatic support to the
ceasefire and closely followed the US line, while East Germany followed the
Soviets.

Within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which both India and Pakistan were
founding members of, the war was a setback. India had expected moral support from
NAM countries but got little. In fact, Indonesia (a NAM founder) sided with
Pakistan, causing considerable embarrassment to India. The NAM summit in
September 1965 did not prevent war; later, in 1966 NAM leader Yugoslavia even
expressed neutrality and urged calm. Arab and Muslim states did offer Pakistan
logistical aid, but they stopped short of military intervention. Overall, international
opinion leaned toward stability: most countries quietly applauded the ceasefire call
to avoid a larger regional war.

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g) Timeline of Key Events (1965) :

❖ January–June 1965: Low-level border clashes in Rann of Kutch (Gujarat) and


along Kashmir’s ceasefire line. (Probing and minor incursions by both sides.)

❖ April 24, 1965: Pakistan launches Operation Desert Hawk in the Rann of Kutch.

❖ July 1, 1965: UK-brokered ceasefire ends the Rann of Kutch fighting.

❖ August 5, 1965: Pakistan initiates Operation Gibraltar. Thousands of troops


infiltrate Indian Kashmir to incite rebellion.

❖ August 28, 1965: Indian troops capture the strategic Haji Pir Pass in Kashmir.

❖ September 1, 1965: Pakistan launches Operation Grand Slam, a major offensive


toward Akhnur in Kashmir (via Haji Pir).

❖ September 6, 1965: India counterattacks on the western front (Punjab and


Rajasthan). Indian forces cross into Pakistan near Lahore, Sialkot and in Rajasthan.

❖ September 8–10, 1965: Battle of Asal Uttar – Pakistan’s 1st Armored Div.
(Command: Maj. Gen. Nasir Khan) attacks Khem Karan (Punjab). India’s 2nd
Independent Armoured Brigade counterattacks. Result: ~97 Pakistani tanks
destroyed vs. ~10 Indian tanks. Major Indian victory blunts the Punjab offensive.

❖ September 8–12, 1965: Heavy fighting around Lahore (Burki sector) and on the
border; neither side gains decisive advantage.

❖ September 10–20, 1965: Continued skirmishes and local battles (e.g. Chawinda,
Phillora). Both armies dig in.

❖ September 20, 1965: UN Security Council passes Resolution 211, demanding


immediate ceasefire. US/UK enforce arms embargo.

❖ September 21–22, 1965: India (Sep 21) and Pakistan (Sep 22) agree to cease fire.
Active hostilities cease by night of Sept 22.

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❖ January 10, 1966: Tashkent Declaration signed by Shastri and Ayub under Soviet
mediation, formally ending the war. Both sides agree to withdraw to pre-August
positions.

h) International Positions (Summaries) :

❖ United States & United Kingdom: Frustrated by the conflict, quickly moved to
end it. Co-sponsored UN ceasefire, imposed embargo, and declared neutrality. (Both
had been providing military aid to Pakistan before 1965; in June 1962 they sent
aircraft to help India against China, reflecting shifting concerns.)

❖ Soviet Union: Officially neutral, eagerly played mediator. Offered “good offices”
for peace. Invited India and Pakistan to Tashkent talks, showing no bias (despite
India’s suspicion that USSR still preferred India, and U.S. suspicion it favored
Pakistan). In the UN, the Soviets vetoed resolutions seen as one-sided (this was
more evident during the 1971 war, but even in 1965 Moscow implied Pakistan must
make concessions).

❖ China: Publicly backed Pakistan. Chinese leaders condemned India’s war as


“naked aggression” and warned India that China would consider intervening if
Pakistan were seriously threatened. (China quietly assured Pakistan of help, but
stopped short of military intervention in 1965.) Beijing’s stance was as much about
checkmating India (after their 1962 clash) as about Muslim solidarity.

❖ France: Voted for the UN ceasefire. France had sold jets to India (Dassault
Mystère fighters flew in 1965). During the war Paris joined the US embargo but
continued to service Indian equipment. It quietly lifted its embargo in March 1966,
sooner than the US/UK.

❖ West Germany: Followed Western lead (endorsed UN resolution, embargo).


(Later disclosed arms sales include Cobra missiles to Pakistan.)

❖ East Germany: Echoed Soviet neutrality and hosted Indian-Pakistani student


events. No independent policy beyond bloc solidarity.

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❖ Turkey/Iran/Saudi Arabia: These Muslim-majority US-allied states sent Pakistan
material aid (vessels, ammunition, jet fuel) and moral support. They refrained from
direct military action but celebrated Pakistan’s cause in the press.

❖ Indonesia: Sukarno’s Indonesia strongly backed Pakistan (naval sendings were


reported). This was a blow to India, as Indonesia was a Non-Aligned founder.

❖ Pakistan: Sought international support for its “Kashmir liberation” narrative.


Bought arms from China and clandestinely from Europe. Worked through the
Commonwealth and Organization of Islamic Countries to rally opinion.

❖ India: Claimed it was defending its territorial integrity. Worked the UN and
Non-Aligned forums hard, urging a peace settlement. Notably, India viewed the
war’s end (and Shastri’s restrained diplomacy) as necessary to avoid Chinese
involvement.

i) Consequences and Legacy :


The 1965 war ended in what most historians call a military and political stalemate.
India had succeeded in repelling Pakistani infiltrators and had proven its army was
battle-hardened, but it failed to force Pakistan to cede Kashmir or inflict a knock-out
blow. Pakistan had failed in Kashmir objectives and suffered heavy equipment
losses, but it succeeded in gaining worldwide attention for its Kashmir claims. Both
nations claimed victory: India on defense and territorial gains, Pakistan on surviving
the “big war.”

In purely territorial terms, a few hundred square miles changed hands (e.g. Indian
forces occupied some Pakistani Punjab countryside; Pakistan briefly held some
Indian desert villages), but the post-war boundary was rolled back to largely pre-war
lines by the Tashkent agreement. The disputed region of Kashmir remained divided
exactly as before August 1965, undiminished in importance.

Thousands of soldiers and civilians on both sides had been killed or wounded.
Indian military losses in the war (3,712 killed, 7,638 wounded) were roughly double
Pakistan’s (1,500 killed, 4,300 wounded), but both countries felt strain. The war
proved that conventional armies could not decide the Kashmir issue, nor could either
achieve quick dominance. It led India to rebuild and modernize its forces (eventually
with massive Soviet support) and Pakistan to diversify its suppliers (turning

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especially to China). In diplomatic terms, the war pushed India closer to the Soviet
Union; India’s frustration with US/UK unwillingness to side with it would shape
Indo-US relations for years.

For Kashmir, the conflict entrenched the division. Siachen, Kargil and future
flare-ups (1969 skirmishes, 1971 war over Bangladesh, etc.) would all be rooted in
the unresolved 1947–48 and 1965 disputes. The UN observer force (UNMOGIP)
remained on the ceasefire line in Kashmir, though its future became more uncertain.
Both countries resumed nationalist posturing, each celebrating “victory” (India for
defending honor, Pakistan for defying India).

j) Key Terms and Concepts :

❖ Partition of 1947 – The division of British India into India and Pakistan, which
triggered the first Kashmir conflict.

❖ Kashmir Conflict – The long-running dispute over Jammu & Kashmir. Root
cause of the 1965 war.

❖ Line of Control (LOC) – Ceasefire line in Kashmir (established 1949) separating


Indianand Pakistani-controlled areas.

❖ Operation Gibraltar – Pakistan’s August 1965 plan to infiltrate Kashmir and


incite rebellion. ❖ Operation Grand Slam – Pakistan’s September 1965 armored
offensive aimed at Akhnur in Kashmir.

❖ Battle of Asal Uttar – A key tank battle (Sept 8–10, 1965) in Punjab where India
ambushed and destroyed dozens of Pakistani tanks.

❖ UNSC Resolution 211 – The UN ceasefire resolution of Sept 20, 1965, which
halted the war.

❖ Tashkent Declaration (1966) – USSR-brokered peace agreement signed Jan 10,


1966, in Tashkent, USSR, ending the war diplomatically.

❖ SEATO/CENTO – US-led anti-communist pacts in which Pakistan participated


(PESCO in 1954).

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❖ Non-Alignment – India’s and Pakistan’s official Cold War stance, membership in
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Notably, NAM countries stayed mostly out of
the conflict.

❖ Balance of Power – Cold War concept; each global bloc had reasons to seek a
ceasefire to prevent wider war (especially USSR vs. US).

k) Implications for the Crisis Committee :


For delegates in a continuous crisis simulating late 1965, this background provides
the historical facts up to the freeze date (Sept 1965). You should assume knowledge
of all events above, but no foreknowledge beyond 1965. In a crisis scenario,
delegates playing country representatives or international bodies can propose actions
and react to developments as if in real time. For example, you might debate whether
to renew hostilities after the historical ceasefire, propose new military or diplomatic
initiatives, or handle crisis events (refugee flows, political upheavals, etc.).

Bear in mind the real-world constraints: alliances, military capabilities, and


leadership goals as of 1965. A delegate from the USSR would be aware of Soviet
neutrality and interest in mediation; a Pakistani delegate would remember US
embargo fallout and Chinese assurances; an Indian delegate would recall India’s
successes in Punjab and its appeal to the UN. Historically, both sides were pulled
back from full-scale victory by international pressure. In crisis play, you are not
bound to history’s outcome, but your proposals should remain plausible to 1965
observers.

Remember also the human dimension. The war caused suffering for soldiers and
civilians alike. Humanitarian concerns (prisoners of war, refugees from Kashmir,
food shortages) could become part of the crisis. Use this background to inform your
country’s motives, objectives and red lines. For instance, Pakistan’s goal was to
internationalize the Kashmir issue (having been supported by many Muslim states),
while India’s goal was to defend its territory and international reputation. Both had
to consider the possibility of superpower intervention (China for Pakistan, USSR for
India) if the conflict escalated.

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FINAL NOTES AND
COMMENTS
1) Note on Crisis and Directives: You may not always be directly involved in the
crisis. Despite this, you can still help other delegates combat the crisis through joint
directives. You can also make your own crises by passing directives. For example, if
the German Ambassador is not involved in a crisis, he can still pass a directive
inviting Germany to intervene militarily in the conflict. This will make them the
centre of a new crisis. Such directives will be lauded.
2) NOTE THAT OUR COMMITTEE IS HISTORIC!!! We have had many bad
experiences with delegates showing up to a historical committee and talking about
the aftermath of wars that haven’t occurred yet. Please don’t do this. Prepare
speeches and directives, looking at the freeze date at that time.
3) THE FREEZE DATE (4th August 1965) - This means that any events after our
freeze date have not occurred. Do not refer to them, mention them or act on their
existence. Pretend as though you are in 1965.
4) MAINTAINING SECULAR AND RESPECTFUL DISCOURSE- Given the
sensitive nature of the agenda (The 1965 Indo-Pak War) delegates are expected to
exercise utmost discretion and responsibility in their rhetoric. While acknowledging
the historical and political dimensions of the conflict, it is imperative to avoid:
Religious chanting or symbolism within committee proceedings, inflammatory or
extreme language that targets or glorifies any religion, and framing the conflict
solely through a religious lens, which undermines the complex political, military,
and diplomatic realities of the time.
The committee reaffirms secularism as a guiding principle of diplomatic discourse
and urges delegates to maintain historical accuracy and mutual respect. Any attempt
to communalize the debate or propagate extremist viewpoints will result in strict
consequences, including negative reflection on the final evaluation and marksheet.
This is a humble yet firm request to all delegates: uphold the decorum and dignity of
the committee, and engage in constructive, historically grounded debate.

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5) This background guide is NOT exhaustive, please expand your research and try to
understand the very catalysts of this confusing era and ensure you study the
geography and history well. Without context, you are powerless. Do not refer to in
speeches or in directives events that have not occurred yet. Kindly study ahead as
well, since crisis updates progress with time, you will have to deal with new world
conditions at future dates.
6) FPV – Foreign Policy violations will be looked down upon harshly. Stick to your
role and perform well. We are not saying you must emulate each and every action
according to history, as that will, of course, dampen the creative spirit of the
committee. You have leeway to create your own paths of history, but do not deviate
so wildly as to support your historical enemy, not without good reason anyway.
7) Any appointments or change in positions after the freeze date are to be considered
void and did not happen and there will be no changes in the position of the crisis
unless special circumstances specify it.
8) Assassination attempts, while tolerated, cannot be entertained to such an extent as
to remove the rights of a delegate to participate in committee. Do not expect your
directives to be so successful as to remove a delegate from the committee entirely. In
short, you can assassinate non – committee targets. You can attempt assassinations
on committee targets and they will have consequences, but not the death and
removal of that delegate
9) Delegates are strictly advised to refrain from communalizing the debate; any
religious extremism or violation of secular norms will attract penalties and impact
the final assessment.
10) Use this guide to understand each side’s position, military situation, and
diplomatic context. Delegate actions in the crisis should be rooted in 1965 reality
(arms stocks, international law, political tensions) but may creatively reshape the
course of events. Historical facts act as guideposts, not straightjackets: in crisis
committees, the scenario can evolve beyond history, but always with an eye to
authenticity.
GOOD LUCK AND GODSPEED

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