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LLDA vs. CA: Ecology Protection Case

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)

14 views147 pages

LLDA vs. CA: Ecology Protection Case

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Rowell Serrano

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Tab 1

LLDA vs. CA, 231 SCRA 292

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Facts:

● Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the open garbage dumpsite due to its
harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content
of the surrounding area.
● The LLDA personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open
dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), and clearance from LLDA.
● After a public hearing, the LLDA acting on the complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite,
found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably
affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria,
other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling.
● LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and
desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin
dumpsite.
● The dumping operation was forthwith stopped. However, the dumping operation was resumed
after a meeting held which failed to settle the problem.
● LLDA issued another order reiterating its former order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist
Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the
Camarin area.
● City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for
the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts:
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Appeals promulgated its
Court of Caloocan City issued a decision holding that: (1) the
temporary restraining order enjoining the Regional Trial Court has no
LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and
order. decide the action for annulment of
LLDAs cease and desist order,
including the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary
injunction in relation thereto, since
appeal therefrom is within the
exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of
LLDA vs. CA, 231 SCRA 292

the Court of Appeals.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments) As an administrative agency which was City Government of Caloocan sought
granted regulatory and adjudicatory to be declared as the sole authority
powers and functions by Republic Act empowered to promote the health
No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, and safety and enhance the right of
Presidential Decree No. 813 and the people in Caloocan City to a
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, balanced ecology within its territorial
it is invested with the power and authority jurisdiction.
to issue a cease and desist order
pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f),
and (g) of Executive Order No. 927
series of 1983 .

ISSUE/S: W/N the LLDA, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory
powers and functions is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order.

Ruling of SC:

YES.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into
the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation
over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The
relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and
comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the
police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the
exercise of police power.

The immediate response to the demands of the necessities of protecting vital public interests gives
vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the
1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment.
This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state to protect and promote the right to health
of the people and instill health consciousness among them. It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines
is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978
which recognize health as a fundamental human right.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure
LLDA vs. CA, 231 SCRA 292

under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter
and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by
the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been
necessary.

Minors vs. DENR / OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for certiorari under Rule 65

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

The right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear
as the DENR's duty -- under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192
and the Administrative Code of 1987 – to protect and advance the said right.

Facts:
● Petitioners, who are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a
civil case before the RTC against then Secretary of the DENR. The complaint was instituted as
a taxpayer’s class suit, and that petitioners are entitled to the full benefit, use, and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical rainforests.
● The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource. They further assert that they “represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn.
● Petitioners specifically alleged that defendant Secretary of DENR’s predecessors have granted
timber license agreements (TLAs) to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89
million hectares for commercial logging purposes. The continued allowance by defendant of
TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs – especially plaintiff minors and their successors.
Minors vs. DENR / OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

● Petitioners further alleged that plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
● Defendant Secretary Factoran Jr. filed a Motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question.

Ruling of RTC
Lower Granted the motion to dismiss.
Courts: The RTC ruled that the defendant’s claim that the complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question was sustained. It further ruled that the
granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Argument contend that the complaint clearly and aver that the petitioners failed to allege
s) unmistakably states a cause of action as it in their complaint a specific legal right
contains sufficient allegations concerning their violated by the respondent Secretary
right to a sound environment based, among for which any relief is provided by law.
others, on Section 16, Article II of the 1987 They see nothing in the complaint but
Constitution recognizing the right of the people vague and nebulous allegations
to a balanced and healthful ecology. concerning an "environmental right"
which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the
state in its capacity as parens patriae."
Such allegations, according to them,
do not reveal a valid cause of action.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment” of
Philippine rainforests and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital life-support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth.

Ruling of SC:

YES. The Court did not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of
the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.

Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them."
Minors vs. DENR / OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of
the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation -- aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners -- the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10
June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 1 thereof stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's
being subject to law and higher authority.

Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

Even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to
the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty -- under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 – to protect and advance the
said right.

Valmonte v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 74930/ 2/13/1989

Topic: Right to Access to Information (Art. 3, Sec. 7)

Type/Nature of Action: Special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction
Valmonte v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 74930/ 2/13/1989

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

…the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to information is
limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest,"
and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."

Facts:
● Ernesto Valmonte, a newspaperman, requested from GSIS the list of Batasang Pambansa
members who allegedly secured ₱2M “clean loans” and asked for certified true copies of the
related documents.
● GSIS, through its Deputy General Counsel, denied the request, citing borrower confidentiality
and claiming disclosure could not be made without a court order.
Petitioners filed a case, invoking their constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern and the freedom of the press.
● GSIS countered, arguing that the loans were private transactions, protected by the right to
privacy, and that GSIS, as a GOCC engaged in proprietary functions, was not obliged to
disclose such records.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts: N/A N/A

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
The request to access the list of A confidential relationship exists
Batasang Pambansa members who between the GSIS and its borrowers.
allegedly obtained ₱2M “clean loans” GSIS has a duty to its customers to
from GSIS is anchored on Article IV, preserve this confidentiality; and that
Section 6 of the Freedom Constitution, it would not be proper for the GSIS to
which guarantees the people’s right to breach this confidentiality unless so
information on matters of public concern. ordered by the courts.

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether or not the information sought is a matter of public concern.

Ruling of SC:

YES.

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of
various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public
character.

Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost
prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations.

Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is
therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the
end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees.
Valmonte v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 74930/ 2/13/1989

Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS
performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its transactions were above board.

In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged
borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119/5/29/1987

Type/Nature of Action: Mandamus

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to
reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on
the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of
such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any
whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its
performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

Facts:
Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119/5/29/1987

● The Petitioner requested the information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
● These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly
represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
● The respondents denied this request.
● Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts:

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)

ISSUE/S: WON the CSC must disclose to the petitioner the information regarding the eligibilities of the
sanitary officers

Ruling of SC:

YES. Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized
may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act
of the Legislature.

On the applicability of Mandamus

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It
is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil
service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is a vague reference to an
unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject
(Petition, Rollo, p. 3).

But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public
right. It has been held that:

whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest
in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36).

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.

On the Agencies’ Authority to Regulate the Right to Information

The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to
prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or
access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be
afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the
Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government
agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised
solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with the
duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same
constitutional right by other persons shall be assured.

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ
of mandamus in a proper case.

Right to Information is NOT Absolute

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not
open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers,
etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law
may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting
national security (Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24,
1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to
a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being
of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public concern.

The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government
employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. In the
instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite
any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who
are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the
civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions,
are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this
case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119/5/29/1987

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty
of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the
position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.

REGALIAN DOCTRINE

Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil., 890

Type/Nature of Action: Appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in
the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.

Facts:

● Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which
they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1890.
● Oh Cho applied for the registration of said parcel of land. The Director of Lands opposed the
application because, among other grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring
public or private agricultural lands.
● Applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the
case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts:
Court First Instance of Tayabas,
overruled the opposition without must
Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil., 890

explanation and decreeing the

registration prayed for the applicant.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
Opposition of the Director of Lands is
based on the applicant's lack of title
to the lot, and on his disqualification,
as alien, from acquiring lands of the
public domain.

ISSUE/S:

(1) WON Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration. (NO)

(2) WON Oh Cho is entitled to decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).

Ruling of SC:

(1) The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired
the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and
decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory
information under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant belong to the public domain. An exception
to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of
his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest. (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53
Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of
the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.

(2) As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public
Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or
classifications of the sought to be registered.

It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate
predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they
applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his
immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have
been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such
benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had
been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in
interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which
was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of
the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified
Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil., 890

person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.

It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a
suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be
necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where
the vendors do not even object to the application filed by the vendee.

The Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112567, February 7,
2000

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the
possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required period to constitute a grant from the State.

Facts:

Private respondent Aquilino Cariño filed a petition for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land originally
owned by his mother, Teresa Lauchangco, and after her death administered by him in behalf of his
brothers and sisters. In 1949, he and his brother Severino became co-owners by extra-judicial partition;
The Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112567, February 7,
2000

and By virtue of another deed of extrajudicial settlement dated July 26, 1963, sole ownership of Lot No.
6 was adjudicated to him.

The Land Investigator’s report disclosed that the land is agricultural in nature. Respondent claims that
the improvements consists of sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees, and one house of
the tenant; that the land is free from claim and conflict, not covered by any existing public land
application, and no patent or title has been issued; and that the they have been in continuous, open
and exclusive possession of the land thru inheritance from his deceased mother.

Private respondent appeared as lone witness for his petition, opposed only by the Director of Lands.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts:
Granted the petition. Affirmed the decision of RTC.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
The petitioner sought review on
certiorari, arguing that private respondent
failed to prove fee simple title and had
not overcome the presumption that the
land is part of the public domain
belonging to the State.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the respondent established proof of his muniment of title to merit registration
of land in his favor.

Ruling of SC: NO.

In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the benefit
resulting from the issuance of certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him
(petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least (30) thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title.

Here, the subject lot is under the Land Registration Act, and he who alleges in his petition or
application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as
a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con al estado or
adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and "informacion possessoria" or
"possessory information title", which would become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title.

The private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject parcel of land to the year 1949,
when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement and partition. Assuming
that such a partition was truly effected, the private respondent has possessed the property thus
partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the registration
thereof.
The Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112567, February 7,
2000

The private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single muniment of title to substantiate
his claim of [Link] Court has therefore no other recourse, but to dismiss private respondent's
petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496.

Republic vs. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain. It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

Facts:
● Tri-plus Corporation, through its President, Euclid, filed with the MTC an Application for Registration of Title over
2 parcels of land alleging, among others that it is in actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful
possession of the subject properties in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, including that of its
predecessors-in-interest.
● The Republic filed an opposition alleging, inter alia, that the subject parcels of land are portions of the public
domain belonging to the State and are not subject to private appropriation.
● MTC ruled in favor of Tri-Plus. CA affirmed. Hence, the petition.

Ruling of Lower CA - affirmed.

Courts: MTC - Declared Tri-plus as the exclusive and absolute
owner of Lot 1061
The totality of the evidence, both documentary and
testimonial, of the applicant clearly shows that it and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, public,
exclusive and continuous possession in concept of owner
of the parcels of land above-mentioned for no less than
thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the instant petition for
registration of its imperfect title. This being so, the
applicant is entitled that its title be confirmed under the
provisions of the Torrens System of Registration

PARTIES Petitioner: As to the first assigned error, petitioner Respondent: Respondent contends
(Arguments) contends that the CA erred in relying on the original that it was able to prove the identity of
survey plan approved by the Lands Management Services Lot 1061 with certainty. While it admits
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources the discrepancy in the bearings and
(DENR) when it ruled that the applicant was able to duly distances which form the boundary
establish the identity of Lot 1061. This reliance, petitioner between Lot 1061 and the adjoining Lot
Republic vs. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91

argues, is mistaken considering that the Report of the 1058, respondent contends that such
Director on Registration of the LRA pointed to a discrepancy is merely technical in
discrepancy in the bearings and distances of the nature because Lots 1058 and 1061
boundaries which separate Lot 1061 from an adjoining remain the same and that there is
land, Lot 1058. This discrepancy, petitioners submit, casts neither an increase nor decrease in the
doubt on the identity of the land subject of the application area of the subject lot sought to be
for registration. Petitioner then concludes that if there is titled; and that what was required by
uncertainty in the metes and bounds of the property the LRA in its Report was for the
sought to be titled, the trial court cannot acquire applicant to correct and adjust the
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Hence, the bearings and distances of Lot 1061 in
proceedings before the trial court, including its decision order to conform to the boundaries of
granting the application for registration, are void. Lot 1058.
As to the second assignment of error, petitioner argues Respondent also argues that the
that the CA erred in holding that the applicant was able to notations appearing in the survey plans
prove that the subject properties are alienable and of the subject properties serve as
disposable lands of the public domain. Petitioner contends sufficient proof that these lands are
that a mere notation appearing in the survey plans of the alienable and disposable. Respondent
disputed properties showing that the subject lands had asserts that the survey plans were duly
been classified as alienable and disposable on June 25, approved by the DENR, Lands
1963 is not sufficient to establish the nature and character Management Services whose official
of these lands. Petitioner asserts that there should be a acts are presumed to be in accordance
positive act on the part of the government, such as a with law.
certification from the DENR, to prove that the said lands Lastly, respondent argues that its
are indeed alienable and disposable. Petitioner further predecessor-in-interest's continuous,
contends that even if the subject properties were classified actual, adverse and peaceful
as alienable and disposable on June 25, 1963, the law, possession of the subject properties in
nonetheless, requires that such classification should have the concept of an owner for a period of
been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier. more than 30 years, coupled with the
Anent the last assigned error, petitioner contends that fact that they declared these lands in
since the applicant failed to discharge the burden of their name, gives a strong presumption
proving that the subject properties are alienable and in respondent's favor that the subject
disposable, there is no basis for the CA to rule that these properties no longer form part of the
properties are private lands. public domain.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON the identity of the land remains uncertain (NO)
2. WON respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving that the property is alienable and disposable (YES)
3. WON CA erred in not finding that respondent is disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain (YES)

the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the classification and reclassification of public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the
Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. It must be
stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable.
Here, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in
the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind
of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In
the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the
DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to
do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from
the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
As to the second requirement, testimonial evidence were presented to prove that respondent's
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject lots in the concept of an owner for the period required by
law. The first witness was Thelma Pilapil who claims to be the daughter of Constancia Frias from whom respondent
bought Lot 1061. Pilapil testified that her family has been in possession of Lot 1061 since her birth. When her testimony
was offered on October 7, 1997, she was 40 years old. Deducting 40 years from 1997, it means that her family started
possession of Lot 1061 only in 1957. The second witness who was presented was Tomas Frias from whom respondent
bought Lot 1062. Frias testified that he was 67 years old at the time that his testimony was taken on October 7, 1997. He
claims that he started owning the subject lot when he was 17 years old and had been in possession of the same since
then. Hence, by simple arithmetic, the testimony of Frias proves that he came to possess Lot 1062 only in 1947.
While he testified that Lot 1062 was previously owned by his father and that he inherited the property from his parents,
no evidence was presented to show that the latter indeed previously owned the said property and that they had been in
possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945. Moreover, other pieces of evidence presented by respondent to
prove the period of its possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest show that the subject properties were declared
for taxation purposes beginning only in 1961. This date may be considered as relatively recent considering that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest claim to have been in possession of the subject properties as early as 1947. While
belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes does not necessarily negate the fact of possession, tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are, nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner,
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual, or at least, constructive
possession. Here, respondent failed to explain why, despite the claim of its predecessors-in interest that they possessed
the subject properties in the concept of an owner as early as 1947, it was only in 1961 that they started to declare the
same for purposes of taxation. From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent and its predecessors-in-interest failed to
prove that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject properties under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, as required by law.

3. YES, there would be no basis that the subject lands have already become private because respondent failed to
prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable. The presumption remains that said properties
remain part of the inalienable public domain and, therefore, could not become the subject of confirmation of
imperfect title. Finally, while it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable
public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent
safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national
patrimony. The Court must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative to the registration of imperfect
titles. Hence, the petition is GRANTED.
Secretary of DENR vs. Yap, G.R. No. 167707 and 173775, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Facts:
● On 1978, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, as tourist zones and marine reserves. Later, PTA Circular 3-82 was
issued to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
On G. R No. 167707
● Claiming that P.N. 1801 and PTA Circular 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC alleging that the
subject law and circular raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.
● They declared that they themselves had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation in Boracay since time immemorial. They also contend that P.N.
1801 did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since it was classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership
● OSG opposed the petition and countered that Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available
for disposition.
On G.R. No 173775
● During the pendency of G. R No. 167707, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064
classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of
agricultural land
● Petitioners-claimants and other landowners in Boracay filed a petition for prohibition,
mandamus and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on their “prior
vested rights” over portions of Boracay. That there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying
Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral or timber land, the island is
Secretary of DENR vs. Yap, G.R. No. 167707 and 173775, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164

deemed agricultural pursuant to the Public Land Act

● OSG argued that there is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for
disposition.

Ruling of Lower RTC (On G. R No. 167707) CA

Courts:
Ruled in favor of respondents-claimants Affirmed in toto the RTC decision and
and upheld their right to have their held that respondents-claimants
occupied lands titled in their name. It could not be prejudiced by a
ruled that neither PN 1801 nor the declaration that the lands they
circular mentioned that lands in Boracay occupied since time immemorial
were inalienable or could not be the were part of a forest reserve.
subject of disposition. The Circular itself
recognized private ownership of lands.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
Boracay was an unclassified land of the They declared that they themselves
public domain. It formed part of the mass had been in open, continuous,
of lands classified as “public forest,” exclusive and notorious possession
which was not available for disposition. and occupation in Boracay since time
immemorial. They also contend that
P.N. 1801 did not place Boracay
beyond the commerce of man. Since
it was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership.

ISSUE/S: WON private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

Ruling of SC:
NO. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conversion of such
patrimony. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In fact, Sec. 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been “officially delimited and classified.” to
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation , EO, administrative action, or statute was presented to the
Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied
by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh controvertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Valiao vs. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011

Type/Nature of Action:
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed
to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.

Facts:
- Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed with
the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of land
with an area of 504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of
Ilog, Negros Occidental.
- Private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed their Motion to Dismiss the application
on the following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been declared alienable and
disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for registration; and (3) the
application has no factual or legal basis.
- The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the application for registration on the following grounds, among others: that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniment/s of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payments/receipts of
applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do/es not constitute competent and
Valiao vs. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011

sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of owner, since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto; that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging
to the Republic, which is not subject to private appropriation; and that the present action is
barred by a previous final judgment in a cadastral case prosecuted between the same parties
and involving the same parcel of land.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts: Granted petitioners' application for
registration of the subject property Reversed the trial court's findings in
its Decision dated June 23, 2005. The
CA ruled that the classification of
lands of the public domain is an
exclusive prerogative of the executive
department of the government and in
the absence of such classification,
the lands remain as unclassified until
it is released therefrom and rendered
open to disposition. Further, there
exists a prior cadastral case involving
the same parties herein and the same
Lot No. 2372, which ruled that Lot No.
2372 belongs to the Republic. The
CA held that such judgment
constitutes res judicata that bars a
subsequent action for land
registration. It also ruled that the
subject property is part of the
inalienable land of the public domain
and petitioners failed to prove that
they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land in
question since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
They acquired the subject property in
1947, upon the death of their uncle
Basilio Millarez (Basilio), who purchased
Valiao vs. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011

the land from a certain Fermin Payogao,

pursuant to a Deed of Sale5 dated May
19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish
language. Basilio possessed the land in
question from May 19, 1916 until his
death in 1947. Basilio's possession was
open, continuous, peaceful, adverse,
notorious, uninterrupted and in the
concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's
death, the applicants as co-heirs
possessed the said land until 1966,
when oppositor Zafra unlawfully and
violently dispossessed them of their
property, which compelled them to file
complaints of Grave Coercion and
Qualified Theft against Zafra.

ISSUE/S:

WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG CADASTRE IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

Ruling of SC:

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.

No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove
that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same
as still inalienable public domain.

The petitioners fail to prove that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain, they failed to demonstrate that they by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier
as mandated by the law.

It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim
Valiao vs. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011

and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of
possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature
as a party would actually exercise over his own property.

The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their own and their predecessors-in-interest's possession
and ownership over the subject lot fail to convince Us. Petitioners claim that Basilio was in possession
of the land way back in 1916. Yet no tax declaration covering the subject property, during the period
Basilio allegedly occupied the subject property, i.e., 1916 to 1947, was presented in evidence. Other
than the bare allegations of Nemesio and Pacifico that Basilio allegedly introduced improvements on the
subject property, there is nothing in the records which would substantiate petitioners' claim that Basilio
was in possession of Lot No. 2372 since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the period of possession required by
law. Hence, petitioners' assertion that Basilio possessed the property in question from 1916 to 1947 is,
at best, conjectural and self-serving.

As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could only
support the same with a tax declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can only prove
possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession
by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
LBP vs. Republic, GR No. 150824, Feb. 4, 2008

Type/Nature of Action: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: FOREST lands are outside the commerce of man and unsusceptible of
private appropriation in any form.

It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as
forest, timber or mineral lands. Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an
alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled. The rule must stand no matter how harsh it
may seem. Dura lex sed lex.

Facts:

● Angelito Bugayong was granted a piece of land through a sales patent. From that, OCT No.
P-2823 was issued in his name, covering more than 41,000 square meters of land in Bocana,
Kabacan, Davao City. The land was unusual – a former river bed, marshy, and even went
underwater during high tide.
● Bugayong had the land subdivided into four smaller lots and later sold them to different buyers.
One of those lots, Lot 4159-A, went to the spouses Lourdes and Candido Du. The Dus, in turn,
divided their portion again: one part they sold to the spouses Felix and Guadalupe Dayola, and
the other they kept for themselves. Later, the Dus transferred their retained land to a company
they owned, Lourdes Farms, Inc., which then mortgaged the property to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) in 1980.
● For years, nobody questioned the validity of the titles. But by 1981, trouble began when local
residents along Bolton Diversion Road raised doubts about Bugayong’s original title. They went
to the Bureau of Lands, asking for an investigation.
● The Bureau discovered some troubling facts:
1. When Bugayong got his sales patent in 1969, the land was still classified as forest land. It only
became alienable and disposable in 1981 – twelve years later.
2. The land was swampy and submerged during high tide, not the kind typically disposed of for
private ownership.
3. Bugayong himself was never in actual possession of the property.
● Because of these findings, the Bureau concluded that the Director of Lands had no authority to
grant Bugayong the land in the first place. His sales patent and title were void from the start.
● Following this recommendation, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a case in the RTC Davao. The government sought to cancel all
titles stemming from Bugayong’s OCT and to have the land reverted back to the public domain.
● Caught in the middle were not only Bugayong and later buyers, but also Lourdes Farms, Inc.
and its mortgagee, LBP. Land Bank defended itself, saying it was a mortgagee in good faith—it
accepted the land as collateral without knowing of the land’s defective origin. LBP argued that if
Lourdes Farms’ title were to be annulled, then Lourdes Farms must still pay its outstanding
loan or replace the property with another collateral.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts: The RTC ruled that OCT No. P-2823 in The CA affirmed the RTC ruling,
the name of Bugayong was void ab initio holding that OCT No. P-2823 and all
for covering forest land, and since the derivative titles were void ab initio
mother title was void, all derivative TCTs since the land was still forest land
were likewise nullified and the land was when patented, the State is not
LBP vs. Republic, GR No. 150824, Feb. 4, 2008

ordered reverted to the public domain. barred by indefeasibility, prescription,

or estoppel from seeking reversion,
and mortgagees like LBP have no
protection and must instead proceed
against their mortgagors.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments) Land Bank defended itself, saying it was Bureau of Lands resolved that the
a mortgagee in good faith—it accepted sales patent in favor of Bugayong
the land as collateral without knowing of was improperly and illegally issued
the land’s defective origin. LBP argued and that the Director of Lands had no
that if Lourdes Farms’ title were to be jurisdiction to dispose of the subject
annulled, then Lourdes Farms must still land
pay its outstanding loan or replace the
property with another collateral.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as a mortgagee in good faith and for value,
has a valid and subsisting mortgage right over the land covered by TCT No. T-57348.

2. Whether or not LBP’s mortgage right over the subject land is protected by the constitutional
guarantee against impairment of contracts.

Ruling of SC:

1. LBP has no valid and subsisting mortgagee's interest over the land covered by TCT No.
T-57348.

The contention that LBP has an interest over the subject land as a mortgagee has no merit. The
mortgagor, Lourdes Farms, Inc. from which LBP supposedly obtained its alleged interest has never
been the owner of the mortgaged land. Acquisition of the subject land by Lourdes Farms, Inc. is legally
impossible as the land was released as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981. Even at
present, no one could have possessed the same under a claim of ownership for the period of thirty (30)
years required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as [Link], LBP acquired
no rights over the land.

Even assuming that LBP was able to obtain its own TCT over the property by means of its mortgage
contract with Lourdes Farms, Inc., the title must also be cancelled as it was derived from OCT No.
P-2823 which was not validly issued to Bugayong. Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. It
is not registerable whether the title is a Spanish title or a Torrens title. It is well settled that a certificate
of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber or mineral land.
Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for
value shall be cancelled.

2. There is no impairment of contract but a valid exercise of police power of the State.
LBP vs. Republic, GR No. 150824, Feb. 4, 2008

the importance of forests to the nation, the State's police power has been wielded to regulate the use
and occupancy of forest and forest reserves. Preservation of our forest lands could entail intrusion upon
contractual rights as in this case but it is justified by the Latin maxims Salus populi est suprema lex and
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit
of the greater number.

TANO vs. SOCRATES, GR No. 110249, August 21, 1997

Type/Nature of Action: Special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

State policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.

Facts:
TANO vs. SOCRATES, GR No. 110249, August 21, 1997

● On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinance No. 15-92, which bans the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto
Princesa City.
● To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23,
Series of 1993, directing the inspection of cargoes containing live fish and lobster being
shipped out from Puerto Princesa, and to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the
required Mayor’s Permit.
● On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan
enacted Resolution No. 33, prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and
shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms… for a period of five (5) years in and
coming from Palawan waters.
● The respondents implemented the said ordinances, thereby depriving all the fishermen of the
whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood
and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from
performing their lawful occupation and trade.
● Petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari, Injunction with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, with
Prayer for TRO, praying that the Court declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92 of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23 issued by Acting
Mayor Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 of the
Sangguaninang Panlalawigan of Palawan.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts:

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
First, the Ordinances deprived them of Public respondents Governor
due process of law, their livelihood, and Socrates and Members of the
unduly restricted them from the practice Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
of their trade. Palawan defended the validity of
Ordinance No. 2 as a valid exercise
Second, Office Order No. 23 contained of the Provincial Government’s power
no regulation nor condition under which under the general welfare clause,
the Mayor’s permit could be granted or and its specific power to protect the
denied. environment and imposes
appropriate penalties for acts which
Third, Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of endanger the environment such as
Palawan took away the right of dynamite fishing and other forms of
petitioners-fishermen to earn their destructive fishing. They claimed that
livelihood in lawful ways; and were in the exercise of such powers, the
unduly prevented from pursuing their Province of Palawan had “the right
vocation. and responsibility… to insure that the
remaining coral reefs, where fish
dwell, within its territory remain
healthy for the future generation.
TANO vs. SOCRATES, GR No. 110249, August 21, 1997

ISSUE/S: W/N THE PETITIONERS ARE CONSIDERED AS SUBSISTENCE OR MARGINAL

FISHERMEN and HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS

Ruling of SC:

NO.

Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms subsistence or marginal
fishermen, they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an
individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by
existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish, while a
subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. Section
131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual engaged in
subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or
marine products produced by himself and his immediate family. It bears repeating that nothing in the
record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions.

Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources,
but of their protection, development, and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question
are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment by
the people may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to
come.

The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is
not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State,
and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration,
development and utilization shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Moreover, their
mandated protection, development, and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the
Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone.

Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. What the provision merely
recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Our survey of the statute books reveals
that the only provision of law which speaks of the preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149
of the LGC of 1991

The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and to
impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives,
noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and
to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan,
the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for
the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that
protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment
such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ... and such other activities which result
in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.
REPUBLIC vs. DAVAO, GR No. 148622, Sept. 12, 2002

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the people’s
right to a balanced ecology. Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, can not claim exemption
from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the
duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.

Facts:
● Respondent City of Davao filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its
proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environment Management
Bureau (EMB), Region XI.
● The EMB Region XI denied the application after finding that the proposed project was within an
environmentally critical area and ruled that, pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree No.
1586, otherwise known as the Environmental Impact Statement System, in relation to Section 4
of Presidential Decree No, 1151, also known as the Philippine Environment Policy, the City of
Davao must undergo the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed with the construction of its
project.
● Respondent City of Davao filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the RTC. It
alleged that its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an
environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system. Hence, it was the
ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of
respondent upon submission of the required documents.

Ruling of Lower RTC

Courts: ruled in favor of respondent City of Davao.
REPUBLIC vs. DAVAO, GR No. 148622, Sept. 12, 2002

The trial court ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151
and Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the
EIA system), which requires local government units (LGUs) to comply with the
EIS. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including
government owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations,
firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed
projects which have significant effect on the quality of the environment. A local
government unit, not being an agency or instrumentality of the National
Government, is deemed excluded.

The trial court also declared that the site of the Artica Sports Dome was not
within an environmentally critical area. Neither was the project an
environmentally critical one. It therefore becomes mandatory for the DENR,
through the EMB Region XI, to approve respondent’s application for CNC after it
has satisfied all the requirements for its issuance.
Accordingly, petitioner can be compelled by a writ of mandamus to issue the
CNC, if it refuses to do so.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not respondent City of Davao is exempt from the coverage of the EIS law.

Ruling of SC:

NO. The Court held that the trial court erred in declaring local government units as exempt from the
coverage of the EIS law. The Court held that local government units, as part of the machinery of
the government, cannot be deemed as outside the scope of the EIS system.

Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that “no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or
operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.”
The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political subdivisions,
i.e., the local government units are juridical persons. Undoubtedly therefore, local government units are
not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.

Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to implement the policy of the state to
achieve a balance between socio-economic development and environmental protection, which are the
twin goals of sustainable development.

The foregoing arguments, however, presuppose that a project, for which an Environmental Compliance
Certificate is necessary, is environmentally critical or within an environmentally critical area. In the case
at bar, respondent has sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports Dome will not have a significant
negative environmental impact because it is not an environmentally critical project and it is not located
REPUBLIC vs. DAVAO, GR No. 148622, Sept. 12, 2002

in an environmentally critical area.

The trial court, after a consideration of the evidence, found that the Artica Sports Dome is not
within an environmentally critical area. Neither is it an environmentally critical project.

The Environmental Impact Statement System, which ensures environmental protection and regulates
certain government activities affecting the environment, was established by Presidential Decree No.
1586.

Under Article II, Section 1, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 1586, the declaration of
certain projects or areas as environmentally critical, and which shall fall within the scope of the
Environmental Impact Statement System, shall be by Presidential Proclamation, in accordance with
Section 4 of PD 1586 quoted above.

Pursuant thereto, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued on December 14, 1981, proclaiming the following
areas and types of projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of the Environmental
Impact Statement System established under PD 1586.

Section 5 of PD 1586 expressly states:

Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. — All other projects, undertakings and areas not declared by the
President as environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not be required to
submit an environmental impact statement. The National Environmental Protection Council, thru the
Ministry of Human Settlements may however require non-critical projects and undertakings to provide
additional environmental safeguards as it may deem necessary.

Therefore, the said project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an

environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate
of Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled by
writ of mandamus.

Bangus Fry Fisherfolk vs. Lanzanas, GR No.131442, July 10, 2003

Topic: General Environment Laws (DAO 96-37)

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for Review

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

The patent illegality of an act exempts a party from complying with the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not absolute.

● Petitioners, local bangus fry fisherfolk from Minolo, opposed the ECC, claiming that Minolo
Cove is a declared eco-tourism zone and a breeding ground for bangus fry.
● After their plea for reconsideration was denied, they filed a case before the RTC of Manila,
seeking the cancellation of the ECC, a writ of injunction, and demolition of the mooring
structures already built.
● Respondents moved to dismiss, arguing that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, that the Manila RTC lacked territorial jurisdiction, and that under P.D. 1818, courts
cannot enjoin NAPOCOR’s infrastructure projects.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts: Dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies by not appealing to the DENR Secretary, that it
lacked jurisdiction to issue injunctions over acts outside
Manila, and that under P.D. 1818 and related issuances,
courts are barred from stopping NAPOCOR projects.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments) 1) NAPOCOR, in applying for the ECC, did not submit to
the DENR Region IV Office the documents proving the
holding of consultations and the issuance of a
locational clearance or zoning certificate. Petitioners
assert that this omission renders the issuance of the
ECC patently illegal.

2) Petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately

seeking judicial recourse because NAPOCOR is guilty
of violating the conditions of the ECC, which requires
it to secure a separate ECC for the operation of the
power barge. The ECC also mandates NAPOCOR to
secure the usual local government permits, like zoning
and building permits, from the municipal government
of Puerto Galera.

ISSUE/S:
(1) WON the issuance of the ECC patently illegal.
(2) WON NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the conditions of the ECC.

Ruling of SC:
(1) NO.

While such documents are part of the submissions required from a project proponent, their
mere absence does not render the issuance of the ECC patently illegal. To justify
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies due to the patent illegality of the ECC, the public
officer must have issued the ECC "[without any] semblance of compliance, or even an attempt
to comply, with the pertinent laws; when manifestly, the officer has acted without jurisdiction or
has exceeded his jurisdiction, or has committed a grave abuse of discretion; or when his act is
clearly and obviously devoid of any color of authority."

Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe acted with full authority pursuant to DENR
regulations. Moreover, the legal presumption is that he acted with the requisite authority. This
clothes RED Principe's acts with presumptive validity and negates any claim that his actions
are patently illegal or that he gravely abused his discretion. While petitioners may present proof
to the contrary, they must do so before the proper administrative forum before resorting to
judicial remedies.

(2) NO.

The fact that NAPOCOR's ECC is subject to cancellation for non-compliance with its conditions
does not justify petitioners' conduct in ignoring the procedure prescribed in DAO 96-37 on
appeals from the decision of the DENR Executive Director. Petitioners vigorously insist that
NAPOCOR should comply with the requirements of consultation and locational clearance
prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically, petitioners themselves refuse to abide with the procedure
for filing complaints and appealing decisions laid down in DAO 96-37.

DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address complaints for the
cancellation of an ECC. Under Article IX of DAO 96-37, complaints to nullify an ECC must
undergo an administrative investigation, after which the hearing officer will submit his report to
the EMB Director or the Regional Executive Director, who will then render his decision. The
aggrieved party may file an appeal to the DENR Secretary, who has authority to issue cease
and desist orders. Article IX also classifies the types of violations covered under DAO 96-37,
including projects operating without an ECC or violating the conditions of the ECC. This is the
applicable procedure to address petitioners' complaint on NAPOCOR's alleged violations and
not the filing of the instant case in court.

Special People Inc., Foundation vs. Nestor Canada, et al., GR No. 160932, Jan. 14, 2013

Type/Nature of Action: Mandamus (original) and Certiorari

Special People Inc., Foundation vs. Nestor Canada, et al., GR No. 160932, Jan. 14, 2013

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: The CNC is a certification issued by the EMB certifying that a project is not
covered by the Environmental Impact Statement System (EIS System) and that the project proponent is
not required to secure an ECC. The EIS System was established by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1586 pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) that required all entities
to submit an EIS for projects that would have a significant effect on the environment. P.D. No. 1586
exempted from the requirement of an EIS the projects and areas not declared by the President of the
Philippines as environmentally critical
It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an
administrative concern should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative
processes. The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily
taken away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency the opportunity to
dispose of the issues upon due deliberation.

Facts:

● The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in

Barangay Jimilia-an in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and
purifying of water from the Loboc River, and the distribution of the purified water to the
residents of Loboc and six other municipalities.
● The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Region 7, seeking to be exempt from the requirement of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586
● Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the project,
respondent Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his findings in a letter
dated December 4, 2001, as follows:
1) The project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial Environmental Examination is
required.
2) The project is socially and politically sensitive therefore proof of social acceptability should
be established. Proper indorsement from the Protected Area Management Bureau or PAMB
should be secured.2 (Emphasis supplied)
● On January 11, 2002, the petitioner appealed Canda’s findings to respondent EMB Region 7
Director Bienvenido L. Lipayon (RD Lipayon), claiming that it should also be issued a CNC
because the project was no different from the Loboc-Loay waterworks project of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) that had recently been issued a CNC.
● Later on, RD Lipayon informed the petitioner that an Initial Environmental Examination
document was required for the project due to its significant impact in the area.
● After thorough review of your submitted certifications, it was found out that the area was
subjected to an earthquake of Intensity VII in the adapted Rossi-Forel scale

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

construction of a unit spring box intake

and pump house, and the DENR issued
a cease and desist order relative to the
DPWH’s additional project to put up a
water filtration plant therein; (3) the
determination of whether an area was
environmentally critical was a task that
pertained to the EMB; (4) the assignment
of a control number by the EMB to the
petitioner’s application did not mean that
the application was as good as
approved; (5) the RTC would not
interfere with the primary prerogative of
the EMB to review the merits of the
petitioner’s application for the CNC; and
(6) there was already a pending appeal
lodged with the DENR Secretary.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)

ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER PETITIONER’S DUE COMPLIANCE WITH THE

REQUIREMENTS MANDATED BY RESPONDENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
NON-COVERAGE (CNC) APPLIED FOR BY PETITIONER, IT IS NOW THE RIPENED DUTY OF
RESPONDENTS, THROUGH RESPONDENT EMB REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TO ISSUE SAID
DOCUMENT IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER;

Ruling of SC:

NO. There is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the requirement to
submit the needed certifications. For one, it submitted no certification to the effect that the project site
was not within a critical slope. Also, the PHIVOLCS’s certification showed that the project site had
experienced an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, a fact that sufficed to place the site in the category of
"areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities." Clearly, the petitioner failed to
establish that it had the legal right to be issued the CNC applied for, warranting the denial of its
application.

The CNC is a certification issued by the EMB certifying that a project is not covered by the
Environmental Impact Statement System (EIS System) and that the project proponent is not required to
secure an ECC. The EIS System was established by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1586 pursuant to
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) that required all entities to submit an
EIS for projects that would have a significant effect on the environment, thus:

Section 4. Environmental Impact Statements. – Pursuant to the above enunciated policies and goals,
all agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities shall prepare, file and include
in every action, project or undertaking which significantly affects the quality of the environment a
detailed statement on–

(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking

Special People Inc., Foundation vs. Nestor Canada, et al., GR No. 160932, Jan. 14, 2013

(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented

(c) alternative to the proposed action

(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are consistent with the
maintenance and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the same; and

(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or non-renewable resources, a finding must be
made that such use and commitment are warranted.

xxxx

P.D. No. 1586 exempted from the requirement of an EIS the projects and areas not declared by
the President of the Philippines as environmentally critical, thus:

Section 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. - All other projects, undertakings and areas not
declared by the Presidents as environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not
be required to submit an environmental impact statement. The National Environmental Protection
Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may however require non-critical projects and
undertakings to provide additional environmental safeguards as it may deem necessary.

The foregoing considerations indicate that the grant or denial of an application for ECC/CNC is not an
act that is purely ministerial in nature, but one that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion
by the EMB Director or Regional Director, who must determine whether the project or project area is
classified as critical to the environment based on the documents to be submitted by the applicant.

On the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an
administrative concern should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative
processes. The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily
taken away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency the opportunity to
dispose of the issues upon due deliberation.

The records show that the petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies. At
the time RD Lipayon denied the petitioner’s application for the CNC, Administrative Order No. 42 dated
November 2, 200219 had just vested the authority to grant or deny applications for the ECC in the
Director and Regional Directors of the EMB. Notwithstanding the lack of a specific implementing
guideline to what office the ruling of the EMB Regional Director was to be appealed, the petitioner could
have been easily guided in that regard by the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that the
Director of a line bureau, such as the EMB,20 shall have supervision and control over all division and
other units, including regional offices, under the bureau. Verily, supervision and control include the
power to "review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units."
Accordingly, the petitioner should have appealed the EMB Regional Director’s decision to the EMB
Director, who exercised supervision and control over the former.

Moreover, the petitioner states in its pleadings that it had a pending appeal with the DENR
Secretary.1âwphi1 However, the records reveal that the subject of the appeal of the petitioner was an
undated resolution of the DENR Regional Director, Region VII, denying its application for the CNC, not
the decision of RD Lipayon. Nonetheless, even assuming that the pending appeal with the DENR
Secretary had related to RD Lipayon’s decision, the petitioner should still have waited for the DENR
Secretary to resolve the appeal in line with the principle of exhaustion of administrative
Special People Inc., Foundation vs. Nestor Canada, et al., GR No. 160932, Jan. 14, 2013

remedies. Its failure to do so rendered its resort to mandamus in the RTC premature. The
omission is fatal, because mandamus is a remedy only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Republic vs. O.G. Holdings Corp., GR No. 189290, Nov. 29, 2017

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review (Rule 45 petition)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

● The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort must first be made
with the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under
their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts for review. O.G. Holdings failed
to abide by this doctrine. Administrative remedies existed against the suspension of the subject
ECC, made available via DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 2003 (A.O. No. 30),
which was prevailing at the time of the suspensive orders.
● It is wrong to suppose that an application for the registration of a man-made island, as
reclaimed land, may substitute for a foreshore lease agreement or permit. This same
observation holds true even if the substitution sought involved the approved registration.

Facts:
Republic vs. O.G. Holdings Corp., GR No. 189290, Nov. 29, 2017

● O.G. Holdings Corporation owns and operates the Panglao Island Nature Resort, a beach
resort situated in Bohol.
● EMB-Region 7 issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) to the resort authorizing
the project subject to certain conditions aligned with PD No. 1586.
● ECC required compliance with various conditions including securing necessary permits for
developments in the foreshore area (Condition No. 2.2), submission of marine studies
(Condition No. 6), establishment of an Environmental Guarantee Fund (Condition No. 3), and
restrictions on expansion without further EIA requirements.
● EMB-Region 7 monitored the project for compliance and found violations of the ECC pertaining
to (a) the failure to secure a foreshore lease or permit, (b) failure to create the Environmental
Guarantee Fund, and (c) failure to submit a marine study within the primary impact area.
Consequently, notices of Violations were issued.
● At the conference, O.G. Holdings disclosed difficulties in securing a foreshore lease. It stated
that Municipal Ordinance No. 03-1991 prohibited development on the shorelines. Nonetheless,
it committed to file "appropriate documents" on the lease and marine study.
● A marine study was submitted complying with Condition No. 6; however, securing the foreshore
lease remained unresolved. EMB noted violations of the foreshore lease condition and received
a complaint from the Bingag Little Fishermen's Organization that O.G. Holdings was cordoning
the shoreline, affecting the fisherfolk’s right of way.
● EMB-Region 7 sent O.G. Holdings a Notice of Violation. O.G. Holdings explained compliance
with the foreshore lease condition was impossible due to local government obstruction. Instead,
it applied with the Philippine Reclamation Authority for special registration of its man-made
island, requesting the application be considered substantial compliance.
● EIA Division recommended suspension of the ECC issued to Panglao Island, and EMB-Region
7 suspended the ECC. O.G. Holdings moved for reconsideration, pleading that suspension
would hinder its PRA application, as it required an existing ECC for special registration of the
man-made island.
● EMB-Region 7 visited the site. Fisherfolk reported a foundation of a finished guardhouse and
cordoning of seawater. EMB clarified the guardhouse would not proceed but cordoning would
continue for guest security.
● EMB issued a second suspensive order noting ongoing violations, including the unauthorized
guardhouse construction, and reiterated the need for a tenurial instrument for the foreshore
area.
● O.G. Holdings then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion
by EMB-Region 7 and Officer-in-Charge Arranguez in suspending the ECC and claiming that
they had imposed "an impossible condition [to be complied with] within an impossible (72)
hours.”
● CA nullified and set aside EMB’s suspension orders, relieved O.G. Holdings from complying
with Condition No. 2.2, and allowed submission of PRA registration as substitute compliance.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

lease or permit may be dispensed

with and observed that securing a
lease or permit would still not be
possible, given the municipal
proscription against such
developments. On O.G. Holding's
application with the PRA, the CA
then declared that such application
was made in 0.G. Holding's "desire to
comply" with Condition No. 2.2. CA
concluded that it was "unjust and
inequitable" to insist on a foreshore
lease for the beach resort project
even after its ECC had been
suspended. Finally, the CA stressed
that millions of pesos had been spent
on the Panglao Island Nature Resort.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
Condition No. 2.2 came into play only
I. A writ of certiorari will not lie in the when there were construction or
absence of grave abuse of discretion. development activities within the
beach resort project's foreshore area.
II. Factual Issues are not proper in a Thus, the petition now contended
petition for certiorari. that, first, the resort's man-made
island was the only reason why
EMB-Region 7 and Arranguez were
insisting on a foreshore lease; and,
second, the man-made island was
not a construction or development
activity on the foreshore area, but a
reclamation project located "some
ninety (90) meters offshore from the
resort."44 Hence, there was no basis
to require a foreshore lease for the
man-made island and the entire
beach resort project. And even if it
were assumed, arguendo, that a
foreshore lease was required for the
man-made island, it was illogical and
unjust of EMB-Region 7 and
Arranguez to have ordered the
stoppage of the operations of the
entire beach resort project
considering that its other components
were located outside its foreshore
area.

The petition went on to claim that

O.G. Holdings attempted in good
Republic vs. O.G. Holdings Corp., GR No. 189290, Nov. 29, 2017

faith to substantially comply with

Condition No. 2.2, by applying for the
special registration, as reclaimed
land, of the man-made island.

ISSUE/S: WON the CA reversibly erred in ruling that EMB-Region 7 and Arranguez had acted in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in suspending the subject ECC,
effectively disallowing the operations and further development of the Panglao Island Nature Resort.
(YES)

Ruling of SC:

The petition for review is impressed with merit. There are obvious errors in the assailed ruling.

The CA erred in granting 0. [Link]' petition when there was a failure to move for
reconsideration before seeking certiorari.

- A motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort
to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The CA erred in granting 0. G. Holdings' petition when they had failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies before seeking certiorari.

- The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort must first be made
with the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under
their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts for review. This doctrine closely
echoes the reason behind the rule providing that before resort to the special civil action of
certiorari is allowed, a motion for reconsideration should first be filed with the public respondent
concerned.

O.G. Holdings failed to abide by this doctrine. Administrative remedies existed against the
suspension of the subject ECC, made available via DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series
of 2003 (A.O. No. 30), which was prevailing at the time of the suspensive orders.

O.G. Holdings thus had the opportunity to file an administrative appeal on the suspension of
the beach resort project's ECC, beginning with the Office of the EMB Director. Indeed, the
administrative machinery afforded even an appeal to the Office of the President, but O.G.
Holdings did not avail of such.

The CA erred in making factual findings in a certiorari proceeding.

- Factual issues are not a proper subject for certiorari, which is limited to the issue of jurisdiction
and grave abuse of discretion.

CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
suspension of the subject ECC.

same observation holds true even if the substitution sought involved the approved registration.
Incidentally, it bears mentioning that O.G. Holdings' application for the man-made island was made
under PRA Administrative Order No. 2005-1, or the Rules and Procedures for Special Registration of
Unauthorized/Illegal Reclamation Projects.77

Certainly, the supposition would be acceptable were there a law or regulation authorizing such a
substitution. Unfortunately for O.G. Holdings, it failed to plead such law or regulation in its petition for
certiorari.

Second. Even if it were to be assumed, arguendo, that such law or regulation existed, it is wrong to
suppose that EMB-Region 7 and Arranguez had acted in grave abuse of discretion simply because
they had practically rejected O.G. Holdings' proposed substitution for Condition No. 2.2. Indeed, the
acceptance of the proposed substitution still lay within the sound discretion of EMB-Region 7 and
Arranguez.

Here, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of EMB-Region 7 and Arranguez when they
suspended the ECC for the Panglao Island Nature Resort Corporation. Indeed, we cannot even find
mere abuse of discretion in the act, as it came on the heels of a recommendation from the EIA Division
and was provoked by O.G. Holdings' continuous noncompliance with Condition No. 2.2 of the ECC.
Such noncompliance is a violation that the National Environmental Protection Council, now the
Environmental Management Bureau, was authorized to penalize under P.D. No. 1586.

In fine, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari despite O.G. Holdings' unjustified
failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies for the suspension of its beach resort
project's ECC.
CASE TITLE: Boracay Foundation Inc. v. Prov. of Aklan, GR No. 196870, June 26,2012

PARTIES: Petitioner Respondent:

(Arguments)
● Respondent Province considers the
● Petitioner alleges that the instant petition premature for lack of
NOTE: Revised Procedural Manual, cause of action due to petitioner’s
Petitioner Boracay which merely requires an EIS failure to fully exhaust administrative
Foundation, Inc. for Group II projects, is remedies before seeking judicial
(petitioner) is a duly patently ultra vires and that relief. It argues that the petition
registered, non-stock respondent DENR-EMB RVI assails the decision of respondent
domestic corporation. committed grave abuse of DENR-EMB RVI in granting the
discretion since P.D. Nos. ECC for the 2.64-hectare project
Respondent Province 1151 and 1586 and and seeks its cancellation for
of Aklan (respondent Proclamation No. 2146 clearly alleged lack of proper
Province) is a political state that projects in ECAs documentation, which grounds can
subdivision of the are immediately considered be addressed within administrative
government environmentally critical. processes. The petition is anchored
on a wrong premise resulting in
Respondent ● respondent Province applied unfounded fears, as the
Philippine only for an ECC for Phase 1, 2.64-hectare reclamation project is
Reclamation unlawfully evading the a "stand alone project," separate
Authority (respondent requirement that co-located from the 40-hectare "future
PRA) projects within ECAs must development plan," which is still
submit a PEIS and/or a subject to funds, study, ECC
PEPRMP, and fraudulently application, and PRA approval.
Respondent classified and misrepresented
Department of the project as a Non-ECP in
Environment and an ECA and as a single
Natural Resources – project instead of a co-located ● Respondent Province claims full
Environmental one. The impact assessment compliance with ECC requirements;
Management Bureau was patently erroneous, the expansion to 40 hectares is only
(DENR-EMB), wrongly-premised, and a future plan. The ECC covers 2.64
Regional Office VI designed to avoid a hectares, intended to rehabilitate
(respondent comprehensive impact and expand the Caticlan jetty port,
DENR-EMB RVI), is assessment. classified under DENR DAO
the government agency 2003-30 as Minor Reclamation
in the Western Visayas ● respondent DENR-EMB RVI Projects, Group II – Non ECP in an
Region authorized to willfully disregarded its duty ECA. It stresses that the project is
issue environmental by only superficially reviewing not a component of the 40-hectare
compliance certificates outdated data from the 1990s, area, as it has no plan or funds for
regarding projects that ignoring the environmental Boracay. The Caticlan project and
require the impact to Boracay, including Boracay site are separated by a
environment’s coastline changes affecting strait; hence, not co-located. As a
protection and the sand of Caticlan and "stand alone project," DENR-EMB
management in the Boracay. RVI required an EPRMP per DAO
region. 2003-30.
● Petitioner insists reclamation
at Caticlan will adversely
affect Boracay, whose
CASE TITLE: Boracay Foundation Inc. v. Prov. of Aklan, GR No. 196870, June 26,2012

popularity depends on its ● Respondent Province concludes

white-sand beaches, while the petitioner’s allegation of a
project’s declared objective is "co-located project" is premature, as
to exploit Boracay’s tourist the bigger reclamation remains
trade. conceptual. An ocular survey
confirmed work within ECC limits.
● Petitioner alleges that On petitioner’s claim of lacking LGU
respondent PRA required endorsement, Province argues
respondent Province to consultations are merely advisory,
secure LGU endorsements not approval powers. Respondent
under the Local Government PRA issued the NTP limited to the
Code but the Province failed 2.64 hectares, emphasizing that
proper consultations, violating other phases would still require
EIS laws and the Code. The ECCs. PRA, mandated to regulate
Liga ng mga Barangay-Malay reclamations, asserts its duty to
Chapter expressed strong evaluate all projects.
opposition, and although
Secs. 26 and 27 require
consultations, the Province
ignored LGU opposition since ● Respondent DENR-EMB RVI states
2008 and belatedly held mere issuance of the ECC certifies
"project presentations" in compliance with the EIA process,
2010 after an ECC and MOA addressing environmental impacts.
were issued. While petitioner insists the project
involves 40 hectares, DENR-EMB
● Petitioner concludes that RVI found the ECC covered only
respondent Province’s 2.64 hectares and could not
intended purposes do not comment on excess areas. It admits
prevail over its duty to protect that as a "Non ECP in ECA," the
the environment and believes 2.64-hectare project is not
rehabilitation of the Jetty Port co-located but merely an expansion
may be done through other of the Caticlan Jetty Port with an
means. existing ECC, thus requiring only an
EPRMP, not a PEIS or PEPRMP.

Type/Nature of Action: original petition for the issuance of an Environmental Protection Order in the nature of
a continuing mandamus under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, promulgated on April 29, 2010.

Facts:

Boracay, known as the premier domestic and international tourist destination in the Philippines for its distinctive
powdery white-sand beaches, became the focus of development when respondent Province, after building the
Caticlan and Cagban Jetty Ports, conceptualized in 2008 the expansion of port facilities due to congestion and
the increasing influx of tourists.

Despite opposition from the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Municipality of Malay against
respondent Province’s foreshore lease and reclamation plans, Governor Marquez pursued the "Marina Project"
involving reclamation, renovation, and expansion of Caticlan Jetty Port, initially covering 2.64 hectares and later
expanded to 40 hectares, funded through ₱260,000,000.00 "Caticlan Super Marina Bonds." Respondent PRA
approved the reclamation project, and DENR-EMB issued an ECC in April 2010 for Phase 1.
CASE TITLE: Boracay Foundation Inc. v. Prov. of Aklan, GR No. 196870, June 26,2012

Public consultations were belatedly conducted, with petitioner and Malay Municipality reiterating strong
opposition, citing environmental concerns and lack of proper consultations. Nonetheless, respondent Province,
supported by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and RDC-VI, proceeded, with studies from UPMSI indicating the
2.64-hectare project would not significantly affect Boracay’s beaches. Petitioner, however, filed a Petition for
Environmental Protection Order on June 1, 2011, prompting the Court to issue a TEPO on June 7, 2011, after
which respondent Province ordered a cease and desist of construction activities.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts
N/A N/A

ISSUE/S:

I. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic (NO)
II. Whether or not the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing this case (NO)
III. Whether or not respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA as required by laws and regulations based
on the scope and classification of the project
IV. Whether or not respondent Province complied with all the requirements under the pertinent laws and
regulations
V. Whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project (NO)

Ruling of SC:

On the issue of whether or not the Petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and
academic

A close reading of the two LGUs’ respective resolutions reveals that they are not sufficient to render the petition
moot and academic, as explicit conditions were imposed on respondent Province. Resolution No. 003, series of
2012, of the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan states that "any vertical structures to be constructed shall be
subject for barangay endorsement," clearly endorsing only the reclamation and not the entire project including
the commercial building, wellness center, and other tourism-related facilities. Petitioner’s objections pertain not
only to the reclamation per se but also to the building and the project’s perceived ill effects to the environment.

Resolution No. 020, series of 2012, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay specifies that while the project may
generate income and employment, it will take its toll on the environment, especially Boracay, and may displace
local transportation operators/cooperatives. The Resolution requires transparency and faithful commitment from
the Provincial Government of Aklan and imposes conditions, namely: (1) allocate office space to LGU-Malay
within the building; (2) convene the Cagban and Caticlan Jetty Port Management Board before resumption of
the project; (3) limit the reclamation project to 2.6 hectares in Barangay Caticlan; (4) ensure local transportation
operators/cooperatives will not be displaced; and (5) conduct a simultaneous comprehensive study on the
environmental impact, with mitigating measures. It further states that failure to comply will result in revocation of
the endorsement.

Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay imposed explicit conditions, including the need for an environmental
impact study, which is the heart of the petition. Therefore, the two resolutions do not support respondent
Province’s conclusion that the endorsements addressed all issues and rendered the petition moot and
academic.
CASE TITLE: Boracay Foundation Inc. v. Prov. of Aklan, GR No. 196870, June 26,2012

On the issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies

The new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a relief for petitioner
under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law"and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO "as an
auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself."

The writ of continuing mandamus "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision" and, in order to do this, "the court
may compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of
other means to monitor compliance with its decision."

Here, It has been established by the facts that petitioner was never made a party to the proceedings before
respondent DENR-EMB RVI. Petitioner was only informed that the project had already been approved after the
ECC was already granted. Not being a party to the said proceedings, it does not appear that petitioner was
officially furnished a copy of the decision, from which the 15-day period to appeal should be reckoned, and
which would warrant the application of Section 6, Article II of DENR DAO 2003-30.

Although petitioner was not a party to the proceedings where the decision to issue an ECC was rendered, it
stands to be aggrieved by the decision, because it claims that the reclamation of land on the Caticlan side
would unavoidably adversely affect the Boracay side, where petitioner’s members own establishments engaged
in the tourism trade.

On the substantive issues, whether, based on the scope and classification of the project, a full EIA is
required by laws and regulations, and whether respondent Province complied with all the requirements
under the pertinent laws and regulations

Petitioner argues that the reclamation project was misclassified as a single project instead of co-located, and
improperly classified by respondent Province as a mere expansion of the jetty port when project descriptions
show commercial establishments, thus it should be a new project. Petitioner also assails the circumvention of
DENR-EMB RVI requirements by connecting it with the 1999 project and claiming it as expansion.

Respondent Province manifested that the ECC covered 2,691 sq m, its 40-hectare application with respondent
PRA was conditioned on documents within 120 days, and failure indicated waiver, limiting the project to 2.64
hectares. Respondent PRA confined the project to 2.64 hectares. The Court held the case is not moot since
compliance with environmental laws must be checked.

DENR has the power to review EIA reports and issue ECCs, but DENR-EMB RVI’s evaluation was problematic:
(1) approval of expansion classification instead of new project; (2) classification as single instead of co-located;
(3) lack of public consultations and LGU approval; (4) lack of comprehensive environmental studies. The EIA
process requires predicting likely impacts and preventive measures, which were not adequately done.

The project involves reclamation over five times the original: Phase 1 (₱260M) includes 3,000 sq m jetty port
expansion, 13,500 sq m buildable area, terminal annex, 2-storey commercial building, health center, access
road, parking and facilities, and rehabilitation of jetty port. Succeeding phases (₱785M) include commercial
center, bay walk, staff building, ferry terminal, cable car system, and wharf marina, totaling ₱1B. A large portion
is commercial, while only 3,000 sq m is jetty port expansion. These impacts were not covered by 1999 studies.
CASE TITLE: Boracay Foundation Inc. v. Prov. of Aklan, GR No. 196870, June 26,2012

Impacts on Boracay cannot be ignored given its proximity and tourism value. Under PD 1586 and RA 7160,
LGUs have the duty to ensure environmental quality and are not exempt from ECC requirements. PD 1586
seeks balance between socio-economic development and environmental protection.

The Court remands to DENR-EMB RVI for proper study, requires respondent Province to address issues and
submit correct EIA, and directs submission of a report within three months justifying why the ECC should not be
canceled.

On Lack of prior public consultation

The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in the maintenance of
ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and approval of local government
units for the projects described therein.

In the case before us, the national agency involved is respondent PRA. Even if the project proponent is the
local government of Aklan, it is respondent PRA which authorized the reclamation, being the exclusive agency
of the government to undertake reclamation nationwide. Hence, it was necessary for respondent Province to go
through respondent PRA and to execute a MOA, wherein respondent PRA’s authority to reclaim was delegated
to respondent Province. Respondent DENR-EMB RVI, regional office of the DENR, is also a national
government institution which is tasked with the issuance of the ECC that is a prerequisite to projects covered by
environmental laws such as the one at bar.

In Lina, Jr. v. Paño,we held that Section 27 of the Local Government Code applies only to "national programs
and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community" and that it should be read in
conjunction with Section 26.

Two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of
local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior
approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the
project’s implementation is illegal.

Here, the information dissemination conducted months after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient
to comply with this requirement under the Local Government Code. Had they been conducted properly, the prior
public consultation should have considered the ecological or environmental concerns of the stakeholders and
studied measures alternative to the project, to avoid or minimize adverse environmental impact or damage. In
fact, respondent Province once tried to obtain the favorable endorsement of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay,
but this was denied by the latter.
Tab 2
RIGHT TO HEALTH

LLDA vs. CA, 231 SCRA 292

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.

Facts:

● Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking
to stop the operation of the open garbage dumpsite due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility
of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
● The LLDA personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB),
and clearance from LLDA.
● After a public hearing, the LLDA acting on the complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected
from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it
indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or
handling.
● LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their
contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste
matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
● The dumping operation was forthwith stopped. However, the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held which
failed to settle the problem.
● LLDA issued another order reiterating its former order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City
Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.
● City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of the
cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no
enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the
desist order. action for annulment of LLDAs cease and desist
order, including the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within
the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

As an administrative agency which was granted City Government of Caloocan sought to be
regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by declared as the sole authority empowered to
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, promote the health and safety and enhance the
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. right of the people in Caloocan City to a
927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.
authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant
to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Executive
Order No. 927 series of 1983 .

ISSUE/S: W/N the LLDA, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions is
invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order.

Ruling of SC:
LLDA vs. CA, 231 SCRA 292

YES.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because
stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot
be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including
multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution
control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to
protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to
the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.

The immediate response to the demands of the necessities of protecting vital public interests gives vitality to the statement on ecology
embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with
the declared policy of the state to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. It
is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration
of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the
case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued
by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have
been necessary.

RIGHT TO BALANCED ECOLOGY

Minors vs. DENR / OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for certiorari under Rule 65

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

The right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty -- under its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 – to protect and advance
the said right.

Facts:
● Petitioners, who are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a civil case before the RTC
against then Secretary of the DENR. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayer’s class suit, and that petitioners are entitled to
the full benefit, use, and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical rainforests.
● The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource. They
further assert that they “represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
● Petitioners specifically alleged that defendant Secretary of DENR’s predecessors have granted timber license agreements
(TLAs) to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes. The
continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs – especially plaintiff minors and their successors.
● Petitioners further alleged that plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
● Defendant Secretary Factoran Jr. filed a Motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs have no cause of
action against him and the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question.

Ruling of RTC
Lower Courts: Granted the motion to dismiss.
The RTC ruled that the defendant’s claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a
Minors vs. DENR / OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

political question was sustained. It further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments) contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their
cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning complaint a specific legal right violated by the
their right to a sound environment based, among others, on respondent Secretary for which any relief is
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of
action.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment” of Philippine rainforests and
“arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.

Ruling of SC:

YES. The Court did not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal
right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.

Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature."
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation -- aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners -- the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions
of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon
C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper
use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may
be provided for by law.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Section 1 thereof stresses "the
necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the
same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the
agency's being subject to law and higher authority.

Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

Even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the
present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's
Minors vs. DENR / OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

duty -- under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 –
to protect and advance the said right.

RIGHT TO ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Valmonte v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 74930/ 2/13/1989

Topic: Right to Access to Information (Art. 3, Sec. 7)

Type/Nature of Action: Special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

…the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern,"
and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."

Facts:
● Ernesto Valmonte, a newspaperman, requested from GSIS the list of Batasang Pambansa members who allegedly secured
₱2M “clean loans” and asked for certified true copies of the related documents.
● GSIS, through its Deputy General Counsel, denied the request, citing borrower confidentiality and claiming disclosure could not
be made without a court order.
Petitioners filed a case, invoking their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern and the freedom of the
press.
● GSIS countered, arguing that the loans were private transactions, protected by the right to privacy, and that GSIS, as a GOCC
engaged in proprietary functions, was not obliged to disclose such records.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts: N/A N/A

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
The request to access the list of Batasang A confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its
Pambansa members who allegedly obtained borrowers. GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this
₱2M “clean loans” from GSIS is anchored on confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to
Article IV, Section 6 of the Freedom breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
Constitution, which guarantees the people’s
right to information on matters of public
concern.

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether or not the information sought is a matter of public concern.

Ruling of SC:

YES.

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for
the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character.

Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with
the pertinent laws or rules and regulations.

Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of
the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured
government employees.
Valmonte v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 74930/ 2/13/1989

Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS
and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its
transactions were above board.

In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information
sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119/5/29/1987

Type/Nature of Action: Mandamus

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public
records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the
discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise
of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a
proper case.

Facts:

● The Petitioner requested the information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City.
● These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
● The respondents denied this request.
● Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts:

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)

ISSUE/S: WON the CSC must disclose to the petitioner the information regarding the eligibilities of the sanitary officers

Ruling of SC:

YES. Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119/5/29/1987

and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people
upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature.

On the applicability of Mandamus

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted that, the instant
Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas,
At most there is a vague reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the
subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3).

But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held that:

* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people
are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has
any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36).

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement
of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which
possesses the right.

On the Agencies’ Authority to Regulate the Right to Information

The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be
made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the
manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which
only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency charged with the
custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records
may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the
same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured.

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the
part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional
duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

Right to Information is NOT Absolute

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all
information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art.
III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those
affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986
Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed
by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public concern.

The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil
service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who
are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is
nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through
any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access
to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119/5/29/1987
REGALIAN DOCTRINE

Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil., 890

Type/Nature of Action: Appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the municipality of
Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in
interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.

Facts:

● Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and
adversely possessed since 1890.
● Oh Cho applied for the registration of said parcel of land. The Director of Lands opposed the application because, among other
grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring public or private agricultural lands.
● Applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for
the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts:
Court First Instance of Tayabas, overruled the
opposition without must explanation and
decreeing the registration prayed for the
applicant.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
Opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's
lack of title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from
acquiring lands of the public domain.

ISSUE/S:

(1) WON Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration. (NO)

(2) WON Oh Cho is entitled to decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain (sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).

Ruling of SC:

(1) The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to
show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
under the laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information
under the Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of
an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the
earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.

(2) As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary
to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or classifications of the sought to be registered.

it, the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by
him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the
condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which
they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do.
They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it
may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a
qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.

It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a suit between vendor and
vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It
is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not even object to the application filed by the vendee.

The Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112567, February 7, 2000

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the occupant can
prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required period to constitute a grant from the State.

Facts:

Private respondent Aquilino Cariño filed a petition for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land originally owned by his mother, Teresa
Lauchangco, and after her death administered by him in behalf of his brothers and sisters. In 1949, he and his brother Severino
became co-owners by extra-judicial partition; and By virtue of another deed of extrajudicial settlement dated July 26, 1963, sole
ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to him.

The Land Investigator’s report disclosed that the land is agricultural in nature. Respondent claims that the improvements consists of
sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees, and one house of the tenant; that the land is free from claim and conflict, not
covered by any existing public land application, and no patent or title has been issued; and that the they have been in continuous, open
and exclusive possession of the land thru inheritance from his deceased mother.

Private respondent appeared as lone witness for his petition, opposed only by the Director of Lands.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts:
Granted the petition. Affirmed the decision of RTC.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
The petitioner sought review on certiorari,
arguing that private respondent failed to
prove fee simple title and had not overcome
the presumption that the land is part of the
public domain belonging to the State.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the respondent established proof of his muniment of title to merit registration of land in his favor.
The Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112567, February 7, 2000

Ruling of SC: NO.

In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the benefit resulting from the issuance of
certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him (petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least (30) thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title.

Here, the subject lot is under the Land Registration Act, and he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must
present muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a
composicion con al estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and "informacion possessoria" or
"possessory information title", which would become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title.

The private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to
him by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private respondent has
possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the registration thereof.

The private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single muniment of title to substantiate his claim of [Link] Court
has therefore no other recourse, but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496.
Republic vs. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. It must be stressed that
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

Facts:
● Tri-plus Corporation, through its President, Euclid, filed with the MTC an Application for Registration of Title over 2 parcels of
land alleging, among others that it is in actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject
properties in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-interest.
● The Republic filed an opposition alleging, inter alia, that the subject parcels of land are portions of the public domain
belonging to the State and are not subject to private appropriation.
● MTC ruled in favor of Tri-Plus. CA affirmed. Hence, the petition.

Ruling of Lower CA - affirmed.

Courts: MTC - Declared Tri-plus as the exclusive and absolute owner
of Lot 1061
The totality of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial,
of the applicant clearly shows that it and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, public, exclusive
and continuous possession in concept of owner of the parcels of
land above-mentioned for no less than thirty (30) years prior to
the filing of the instant petition for registration of its imperfect title.
This being so, the applicant is entitled that its title be confirmed
under the provisions of the Torrens System of Registration

PARTIES Petitioner: As to the first assigned error, petitioner contends Respondent: Respondent contends that it
(Arguments) that the CA erred in relying on the original survey plan approved was able to prove the identity of Lot 1061
by the Lands Management Services of the Department of with certainty. While it admits the
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) when it ruled that discrepancy in the bearings and distances
the applicant was able to duly establish the identity of Lot 1061. which form the boundary between Lot 1061
This reliance, petitioner argues, is mistaken considering that the and the adjoining Lot 1058, respondent
Report of the Director on Registration of the LRA pointed to a contends that such discrepancy is merely
discrepancy in the bearings and distances of the boundaries technical in nature because Lots 1058 and
which separate Lot 1061 from an adjoining land, Lot 1058. This 1061 remain the same and that there is
discrepancy, petitioners submit, casts doubt on the identity of the neither an increase nor decrease in the
land subject of the application for registration. Petitioner then area of the subject lot sought to be titled;
concludes that if there is uncertainty in the metes and bounds of and that what was required by the LRA in its
the property sought to be titled, the trial court cannot acquire Report was for the applicant to correct and
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Hence, the adjust the bearings and distances of Lot
proceedings before the trial court, including its decision granting 1061 in order to conform to the boundaries
the application for registration, are void. of Lot 1058.
As to the second assignment of error, petitioner argues that Respondent also argues that the
the CA erred in holding that the applicant was able to prove that notations appearing in the survey plans of
the subject properties are alienable and disposable lands of the the subject properties serve as sufficient
public domain. Petitioner contends that a mere notation proof that these lands are alienable and
appearing in the survey plans of the disputed properties showing disposable. Respondent asserts that the
that the subject lands had been classified as alienable and survey plans were duly approved by the
disposable on June 25, 1963 is not sufficient to establish the DENR, Lands Management Services whose
nature and character of these lands. Petitioner asserts that there official acts are presumed to be in
should be a positive act on the part of the government, such as a accordance with law.
certification from the DENR, to prove that the said lands are Lastly, respondent argues that its
indeed alienable and disposable. Petitioner further contends that predecessor-in-interest's continuous, actual,
even if the subject properties were classified as alienable and adverse and peaceful possession of the
disposable on June 25, 1963, the law, nonetheless, requires that subject properties in the concept of an
Republic vs. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91

such classification should have been made on June 12, 1945 or owner for a period of more than 30 years,
earlier. coupled with the fact that they declared
Anent the last assigned error, petitioner contends that since these lands in their name, gives a strong
the applicant failed to discharge the burden of proving that the presumption in respondent's favor that the
subject properties are alienable and disposable, there is no basis subject properties no longer form part of the
for the CA to rule that these properties are private lands. public domain.

Ruling of SC:
1. NO, the subject lands were properly identified. While the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is
the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands Management Services of the DENR), blueprint copies
and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification. In the present case, respondent submitted in evidence a
blueprint copy of the Advance Plan of Lot 1061 and a Technical Description thereof, both of which had been duly certified and
approved by the Lands Management Services of the DENR. The Court finds these pieces of evidence as substantial
compliance with the legal requirements for the proper identification of Lot 1061. The discrepancy in the common boundary
that separates Lot 1061 from Lot 1058, as contained in the LRA Report does not cast doubt on the identity of the subject lot.
As the CA correctly held, the discrepancy is not substantial because it does not unduly increase or affect the total area of the
subject lot and at the same time prejudice the adjoining lot owner. It is only when the discrepancy results to an unexplained
increase in the total area of the land sought to be registered that its identity is made doubtful.
2. YES, respondent failed to prove the first requirement that the properties sought to be titled forms part of the
alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the classification and reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is
embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain. It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
Here, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance
Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands
applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands
Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and
has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from
the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
As to the second requirement, testimonial evidence were presented to prove that respondent's predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the subject lots in the concept of an owner for the period required by law. The first witness was Thelma Pilapil who
claims to be the daughter of Constancia Frias from whom respondent bought Lot 1061. Pilapil testified that her family has been in
possession of Lot 1061 since her birth. When her testimony was offered on October 7, 1997, she was 40 years old. Deducting 40
years from 1997, it means that her family started possession of Lot 1061 only in 1957. The second witness who was presented was
Tomas Frias from whom respondent bought Lot 1062. Frias testified that he was 67 years old at the time that his testimony was taken
on October 7, 1997. He claims that he started owning the subject lot when he was 17 years old and had been in possession of the
same since then. Hence, by simple arithmetic, the testimony of Frias proves that he came to possess Lot 1062 only in 1947.
While he testified that Lot 1062 was previously owned by his father and that he inherited the property from his parents, no evidence
was presented to show that the latter indeed previously owned the said property and that they had been in possession of the same on
or before June 12, 1945. Moreover, other pieces of evidence presented by respondent to prove the period of its possession and that
of its predecessors-in-interest show that the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes beginning only in 1961. This date
may be considered as relatively recent considering that respondent's predecessors-in-interest claim to have been in possession of the
subject properties as early as 1947. While belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes does not necessarily negate the fact
of possession, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are, nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept of an
owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual, or at least, constructive possession.
Here, respondent failed to explain why, despite the claim of its predecessors-in interest that they possessed the subject properties in
the concept of an owner as early as 1947, it was only in 1961 that they started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. From the
foregoing, it is clear that respondent and its predecessors-in-interest failed to prove that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject properties under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, as required by
law.

3. YES, there would be no basis that the subject lands have already become private because respondent failed to prove that the
Republic vs. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91

subject properties are alienable and disposable. The presumption remains that said properties remain part of the inalienable
public domain and, therefore, could not become the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. Finally, while it is an
acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in
line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into
the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony. The Court must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards
relative to the registration of imperfect titles. Hence, the petition is GRANTED.
Secretary of DENR vs. Yap, G.R. No. 167707 and 173775, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Facts:
● On 1978, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, as tourist
zones and marine reserves. Later, PTA Circular 3-82 was issued to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
On G. R No. 167707
● Claiming that P.N. 1801 and PTA Circular 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC alleging that
the subject law and circular raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.
● They declared that they themselves had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since time immemorial. They also contend that P.N. 1801 did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since
it was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership
● OSG opposed the petition and countered that Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the
mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition.
On G.R. No 173775
● During the pendency of G. R No. 167707, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into 400
hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land
● Petitioners-claimants and other landowners in Boracay filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. That there is no need
for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral or timber land, the island is
deemed agricultural pursuant to the Public Land Act
● OSG argued that there is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

Ruling of Lower RTC (On G. R No. 167707) CA

Courts:
Ruled in favor of respondents-claimants and Affirmed in toto the RTC decision and held that
upheld their right to have their occupied lands respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a
titled in their name. It ruled that neither PN declaration that the lands they occupied since time
1801 nor the circular mentioned that lands in immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Boracay were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition. The Circular itself
recognized private ownership of lands.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
Boracay was an unclassified land of the They declared that they themselves had been in open,
public domain. It formed part of the mass of continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
lands classified as “public forest,” which was occupation in Boracay since time immemorial. They also
not available for disposition. contend that P.N. 1801 did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man. Since it was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership.

ISSUE/S: WON private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

Ruling of SC:
NO. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land and charged with the conversion of such patrimony. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In fact, Sec. 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands
only to those lands which have been “officially delimited and classified.” to prove that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation , EO, administrative action, or statute was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation
that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh controvertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification
Secretary of DENR vs. Yap, G.R. No. 167707 and 173775, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164

cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND CLASSIFICATION

Valiao vs. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011

Type/Nature of Action:
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.

Facts:
- Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed with the RTC of Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 504,535 square meters, more or less,
situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.
- Private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the following grounds: (1)
the land applied for has not been declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for
registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.
- The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for
registration on the following grounds, among others: that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniment/s of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payments/receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or
alleged in the application, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land
applied for or of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of owner, since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic,
which is not subject to private appropriation; and that the present action is barred by a previous final judgment in a cadastral
case prosecuted between the same parties and involving the same parcel of land.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts: Granted petitioners' application for
registration of the subject property Reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision dated June
23, 2005. The CA ruled that the classification of lands of the
public domain is an exclusive prerogative of the executive
department of the government and in the absence of such
classification, the lands remain as unclassified until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Further, there exists a prior cadastral case involving the
same parties herein and the same Lot No. 2372, which ruled
that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. The CA held that
such judgment constitutes res judicata that bars a
subsequent action for land registration. It also ruled that the
subject property is part of the inalienable land of the public
domain and petitioners failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
Valiao vs. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011

exclusive and notorious possession of the land in question

since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
They acquired the subject property in 1947,
upon the death of their uncle Basilio Millarez
(Basilio), who purchased the land from a
certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed
of Sale5 dated May 19, 1916 entirely
handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio
possessed the land in question from May 19,
1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's
possession was open, continuous, peaceful,
adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the
concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death,
the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said
land until 1966, when oppositor Zafra
unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of
their property, which compelled them to file
complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified
Theft against Zafra.

ISSUE/S:

WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG CADASTRE IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.

Ruling of SC:

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.

No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been classified as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as
alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.

The petitioners fail to prove that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain, they failed to
demonstrate that they by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the subject land since
June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by the law.

It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.

evidence. Other than the bare allegations of Nemesio and Pacifico that Basilio allegedly introduced improvements on the subject
property, there is nothing in the records which would substantiate petitioners' claim that Basilio was in possession of Lot No. 2372
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the period of possession required by law. Hence, petitioners' assertion that Basilio possessed the
property in question from 1916 to 1947 is, at best, conjectural and self-serving.

As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the same with a tax
declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can only prove possession since said date. What is required is open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
LIMITS OF FOREST LANDS

LBP vs. Republic, GR No. 150824, Feb. 4, 2008

Type/Nature of Action: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: FOREST lands are outside the commerce of man and unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form.

It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest, timber or mineral lands.
Any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled. The rule
must stand no matter how harsh it may seem. Dura lex sed lex.

Facts:

● Angelito Bugayong was granted a piece of land through a sales patent. From that, OCT No. P-2823 was issued in his name,
covering more than 41,000 square meters of land in Bocana, Kabacan, Davao City. The land was unusual – a former river
bed, marshy, and even went underwater during high tide.
● Bugayong had the land subdivided into four smaller lots and later sold them to different buyers. One of those lots, Lot 4159-A,
went to the spouses Lourdes and Candido Du. The Dus, in turn, divided their portion again: one part they sold to the spouses
Felix and Guadalupe Dayola, and the other they kept for themselves. Later, the Dus transferred their retained land to a
company they owned, Lourdes Farms, Inc., which then mortgaged the property to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in
1980.
● For years, nobody questioned the validity of the titles. But by 1981, trouble began when local residents along Bolton Diversion
Road raised doubts about Bugayong’s original title. They went to the Bureau of Lands, asking for an investigation.
● The Bureau discovered some troubling facts:
1. When Bugayong got his sales patent in 1969, the land was still classified as forest land. It only became alienable and
disposable in 1981 – twelve years later.
2. The land was swampy and submerged during high tide, not the kind typically disposed of for private ownership.
3. Bugayong himself was never in actual possession of the property.
● Because of these findings, the Bureau concluded that the Director of Lands had no authority to grant Bugayong the land in
the first place. His sales patent and title were void from the start.
● Following this recommendation, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a case
in the RTC Davao. The government sought to cancel all titles stemming from Bugayong’s OCT and to have the land reverted
back to the public domain.
● Caught in the middle were not only Bugayong and later buyers, but also Lourdes Farms, Inc. and its mortgagee, LBP. Land
Bank defended itself, saying it was a mortgagee in good faith—it accepted the land as collateral without knowing of the land’s
defective origin. LBP argued that if Lourdes Farms’ title were to be annulled, then Lourdes Farms must still pay its
outstanding loan or replace the property with another collateral.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts: The RTC ruled that OCT No. P-2823 in the The CA affirmed the RTC ruling, holding that OCT No.
name of Bugayong was void ab initio for P-2823 and all derivative titles were void ab initio since the
covering forest land, and since the mother land was still forest land when patented, the State is not
title was void, all derivative TCTs were barred by indefeasibility, prescription, or estoppel from
likewise nullified and the land was ordered seeking reversion, and mortgagees like LBP have no
reverted to the public domain. protection and must instead proceed against their
mortgagors.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments) Land Bank defended itself, saying it was a Bureau of Lands resolved that the sales patent in favor of
mortgagee in good faith—it accepted the land Bugayong was improperly and illegally issued and that the
as collateral without knowing of the land’s Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of the subject
defective origin. LBP argued that if Lourdes land
Farms’ title were to be annulled, then Lourdes
Farms must still pay its outstanding loan or
replace the property with another collateral.

ISSUE/S:
LBP vs. Republic, GR No. 150824, Feb. 4, 2008

1. Whether or not the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as a mortgagee in good faith and for value, has a valid and subsisting
mortgage right over the land covered by TCT No. T-57348.

2. Whether or not LBP’s mortgage right over the subject land is protected by the constitutional guarantee against impairment of
contracts.

Ruling of SC:

1. LBP has no valid and subsisting mortgagee's interest over the land covered by TCT No. T-57348.

The contention that LBP has an interest over the subject land as a mortgagee has no merit. The mortgagor, Lourdes Farms, Inc. from
which LBP supposedly obtained its alleged interest has never been the owner of the mortgaged land. Acquisition of the subject land by
Lourdes Farms, Inc. is legally impossible as the land was released as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981. Even at
present, no one could have possessed the same under a claim of ownership for the period of thirty (30) years required under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as [Link], LBP acquired no rights over the land.

Even assuming that LBP was able to obtain its own TCT over the property by means of its mortgage contract with Lourdes Farms, Inc.,
the title must also be cancelled as it was derived from OCT No. P-2823 which was not validly issued to Bugayong. Forest lands cannot
be owned by private persons. It is not registerable whether the title is a Spanish title or a Torrens title. It is well settled that a certificate
of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber or mineral land. Any title issued covering
non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value shall be cancelled.

2. There is no impairment of contract but a valid exercise of police power of the State.
the importance of forests to the nation, the State's police power has been wielded to regulate the use and occupancy of forest and
forest reserves. Preservation of our forest lands could entail intrusion upon contractual rights as in this case but it is justified by the
Latin maxims Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual
interests to the benefit of the greater number.
PREFERENTIAL USE OF MARINE RESOURCES FOR SUBSITENCE FISHERMAN

TANO vs. SOCRATES, GR No. 110249, August 21, 1997

Type/Nature of Action: Special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

State policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Facts:

● On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92, which bans the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City.
● To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, directing the
inspection of cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa, and to ascertain whether the
shipper possessed the required Mayor’s Permit.
● On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33,
prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms…
for a period of five (5) years in and coming from Palawan waters.
● The respondents implemented the said ordinances, thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and
the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and
other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade.
● Petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari, Injunction with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, with Prayer for TRO, praying that the
Court declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office
Order No. 23 issued by Acting Mayor Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 of the
Sangguaninang Panlalawigan of Palawan.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts:

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
First, the Ordinances deprived them of due Public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity
restricted them from the practice of their of Ordinance No. 2 as a valid exercise of the Provincial
trade. Government’s power under the general welfare clause, and its
specific power to protect the environment and imposes
Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
regulation nor condition under which the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
Mayor’s permit could be granted or denied. destructive fishing. They claimed that in the exercise of such
powers, the Province of Palawan had “the right and
responsibility… to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where
Third, Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of
fish dwell, within its territory remain healthy for the future
Palawan took away the right of
generation.
petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood
in lawful ways; and were unduly prevented
from pursuing their vocation.

ISSUE/S: W/N THE PETITIONERS ARE CONSIDERED AS SUBSISTENCE OR MARGINAL FISHERMEN and HAS PREFERENTIAL
RIGHTS

Ruling of SC:

NO.

Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms subsistence or marginal fishermen, they should be
construed in their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or
reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the
fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. Section 131(p) of the LGC
(R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be
TANO vs. SOCRATES, GR No. 110249, August 21, 1997

limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family. It bears
repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions.

Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but of their protection,
development, and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our
marine resources to the end that their enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the
generations to come.

The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance
with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Moreover, their
mandated protection, development, and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain
restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone.

Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the
State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Our survey of the statute books
reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of the preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC of 1991

The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees or charges
therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and
other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the
sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ... and
such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.

GENERAL ENVIRONMENT LAWS

REPUBLIC vs. DAVAO, GR No. 148622, Sept. 12, 2002

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the people’s right to a balanced ecology.
Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, can not claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed
with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD
1586.

Facts:
● Respondent City of Davao filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao
City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environment Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI.
● The EMB Region XI denied the application after finding that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area
and ruled that, pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1586, otherwise known as the Environmental Impact Statement
System, in relation to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No, 1151, also known as the Philippine Environment Policy, the City of
Davao must undergo the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC), before it can proceed with the construction of its project.
● Respondent City of Davao filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the RTC. It alleged that its proposed project
was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the
EIS system. Hence, it was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of
respondent upon submission of the required documents.

Ruling of Lower RTC

Courts: ruled in favor of respondent City of Davao.
The trial court ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction No.
1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA system), which requires local government units
(LGUs) to comply with the EIS. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including
REPUBLIC vs. DAVAO, GR No. 148622, Sept. 12, 2002

government owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated
to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects which have significant effect on the quality of the
environment. A local government unit, not being an agency or instrumentality of the National Government, is
deemed excluded.

The trial court also declared that the site of the Artica Sports Dome was not within an environmentally critical
area. Neither was the project an environmentally critical one. It therefore becomes mandatory for the DENR,
through the EMB Region XI, to approve respondent’s application for CNC after it has satisfied all the
requirements for its issuance.
Accordingly, petitioner can be compelled by a writ of mandamus to issue the CNC, if it refuses to do so.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not respondent City of Davao is exempt from the coverage of the EIS law.

Ruling of SC:

NO. The Court held that the trial court erred in declaring local government units as exempt from the coverage of the EIS law. The
Court held that local government units, as part of the machinery of the government, cannot be deemed as outside the scope
of the EIS system.

Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the people’s right to a balanced ecology.
Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, can not claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed
with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD
1586.

Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that “no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his
duly authorized representative.” The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political subdivisions,
i.e., the local government units are juridical persons. Undoubtedly therefore, local government units are not excluded from the
coverage of PD 1586.

Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to implement the policy of the state to achieve a balance between
socio-economic development and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable development.

The foregoing arguments, however, presuppose that a project, for which an Environmental Compliance Certificate is necessary, is
environmentally critical or within an environmentally critical area. In the case at bar, respondent has sufficiently shown that the Artica
Sports Dome will not have a significant negative environmental impact because it is not an environmentally critical project and it is not
located in an environmentally critical area.

The trial court, after a consideration of the evidence, found that the Artica Sports Dome is not within an environmentally
critical area. Neither is it an environmentally critical project.

The Environmental Impact Statement System, which ensures environmental protection and regulates certain government activities
affecting the environment, was established by Presidential Decree No. 1586.

Under Article II, Section 1, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 1586, the declaration of certain projects or areas as
environmentally critical, and which shall fall within the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System, shall be by Presidential
Proclamation, in accordance with Section 4 of PD 1586 quoted above.

Pursuant thereto, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued on December 14, 1981, proclaiming the following areas and types of projects as
environmentally critical and within the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System established under PD 1586.

Section 5 of PD 1586 expressly states:

Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. — All other projects, undertakings and areas not declared by the President as environmentally
critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not be required to submit an environmental impact statement. The National
Environmental Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may however require non-critical projects and undertakings
to provide additional environmental safeguards as it may deem necessary.
REPUBLIC vs. DAVAO, GR No. 148622, Sept. 12, 2002

Therefore, the said project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area.
Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the
performance of which can be compelled by writ of mandamus.

Bangus Fry Fisherfolk vs. Lanzanas, GR No.131442, July 10, 2003

Topic: General Environment Laws (DAO 96-37)

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for Review

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

The patent illegality of an act exempts a party from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute.

Facts:
● DENR Regional Executive Director (RED) Antonio Principe issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate or “ECC” to
NAPOCOR, authorizing the construction of a temporary mooring facility at Minolo Cove, Puerto Galera, to dock its
14.4-megawatt power barge supplying electricity to Oriental Mindoro.
● Petitioners, local bangus fry fisherfolk from Minolo, opposed the ECC, claiming that Minolo Cove is a declared eco-tourism
zone and a breeding ground for bangus fry.
● After their plea for reconsideration was denied, they filed a case before the RTC of Manila, seeking the cancellation of the
ECC, a writ of injunction, and demolition of the mooring structures already built.
● Respondents moved to dismiss, arguing that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, that the Manila RTC
lacked territorial jurisdiction, and that under P.D. 1818, courts cannot enjoin NAPOCOR’s infrastructure projects.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts: Dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies by not appealing to the DENR Secretary, that it lacked
jurisdiction to issue injunctions over acts outside Manila, and that
under P.D. 1818 and related issuances, courts are barred from
stopping NAPOCOR projects.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments) 1) NAPOCOR, in applying for the ECC, did not submit to the
DENR Region IV Office the documents proving the holding
of consultations and the issuance of a locational clearance
or zoning certificate. Petitioners assert that this omission
renders the issuance of the ECC patently illegal.

2) Petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately

seeking judicial recourse because NAPOCOR is guilty of
violating the conditions of the ECC, which requires it to
secure a separate ECC for the operation of the power
barge. The ECC also mandates NAPOCOR to secure the
usual local government permits, like zoning and building
permits, from the municipal government of Puerto Galera.

ISSUE/S:
(1) WON the issuance of the ECC patently illegal.
(2) WON NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the conditions of the ECC.

Ruling of SC:
(1) NO.

While such documents are part of the submissions required from a project proponent, their mere absence does not render
the issuance of the ECC patently illegal. To justify non-exhaustion of administrative remedies due to the patent illegality of
the ECC, the public officer must have issued the ECC "[without any] semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply,
with the pertinent laws; when manifestly, the officer has acted without jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction, or has
Bangus Fry Fisherfolk vs. Lanzanas, GR No.131442, July 10, 2003

committed a grave abuse of discretion; or when his act is clearly and obviously devoid of any color of authority."

RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly authorized under DAO 96-37 to issue ECCs for projects located
within environmentally critical areas. RED Principe issued the ECC on the recommendation of Amelia Supetran, the Director
of the Environmental Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe acted with full authority pursuant to DENR regulations.
Moreover, the legal presumption is that he acted with the requisite authority. This clothes RED Principe's acts with
presumptive validity and negates any claim that his actions are patently illegal or that he gravely abused his discretion. While
petitioners may present proof to the contrary, they must do so before the proper administrative forum before resorting to
judicial remedies.

(2) NO.

The fact that NAPOCOR's ECC is subject to cancellation for non-compliance with its conditions does not justify petitioners'
conduct in ignoring the procedure prescribed in DAO 96-37 on appeals from the decision of the DENR Executive Director.
Petitioners vigorously insist that NAPOCOR should comply with the requirements of consultation and locational clearance
prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically, petitioners themselves refuse to abide with the procedure for filing complaints and
appealing decisions laid down in DAO 96-37.

DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address complaints for the cancellation of an ECC. Under
Article IX of DAO 96-37, complaints to nullify an ECC must undergo an administrative investigation, after which the hearing
officer will submit his report to the EMB Director or the Regional Executive Director, who will then render his decision. The
aggrieved party may file an appeal to the DENR Secretary, who has authority to issue cease and desist orders. Article IX
also classifies the types of violations covered under DAO 96-37, including projects operating without an ECC or violating the
conditions of the ECC. This is the applicable procedure to address petitioners' complaint on NAPOCOR's alleged violations
and not the filing of the instant case in court.

Special People Inc., Foundation vs. Nestor Canada, et al., GR No. 160932, Jan. 14, 2013

Type/Nature of Action: Mandamus (original) and Certiorari

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: The CNC is a certification issued by the EMB certifying that a project is not covered by the Environmental
Impact Statement System (EIS System) and that the project proponent is not required to secure an ECC. The EIS System was
established by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1586 pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) that
required all entities to submit an EIS for projects that would have a significant effect on the environment. P.D. No. 1586 exempted from
the requirement of an EIS the projects and areas not declared by the President of the Philippines as environmentally critical
It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative concern should first avail
himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative processes. The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency the opportunity to dispose of
the issues upon due deliberation.

Facts:

● The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in Barangay Jimilia-an in the
Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of water from the Loboc River, and the distribution of
the purified water to the residents of Loboc and six other municipalities.
● The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, seeking to be exempt from the requirement of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586
● Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the project, respondent Nestor M. Canda, then
Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his findings in a letter dated December 4, 2001, as follows:
1) The project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial Environmental Examination is required.
2) The project is socially and politically sensitive therefore proof of social acceptability should be established. Proper
indorsement from the Protected Area Management Bureau or PAMB should be secured.2 (Emphasis supplied)
● On January 11, 2002, the petitioner appealed Canda’s findings to respondent EMB Region 7 Director Bienvenido L. Lipayon
(RD Lipayon), claiming that it should also be issued a CNC because the project was no different from the Loboc-Loay
waterworks project of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) that had recently been issued a CNC.
● Later on, RD Lipayon informed the petitioner that an Initial Environmental Examination document was required for the project
due to its significant impact in the area.
● After thorough review of your submitted certifications, it was found out that the area was subjected to an earthquake of
Intensity VII in the adapted Rossi-Forel scale
Special People Inc., Foundation vs. Nestor Canada, et al., GR No. 160932, Jan. 14, 2013

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts:
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus
upon the following considerations, namely:
(1) PHIVOLCS certified that the project site
had been subjected to an Intensity VII
earthquake in 1990; (2) the CNC issued by
the EMB to a similar waterworks project of
the DPWH in the same area was only for the
construction of a unit spring box intake and
pump house, and the DENR issued a cease
and desist order relative to the DPWH’s
additional project to put up a water filtration
plant therein; (3) the determination of whether
an area was environmentally critical was a
task that pertained to the EMB; (4) the
assignment of a control number by the EMB
to the petitioner’s application did not mean
that the application was as good as
approved; (5) the RTC would not interfere
with the primary prerogative of the EMB to
review the merits of the petitioner’s
application for the CNC; and (6) there was
already a pending appeal lodged with the
DENR Secretary.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)

ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER PETITIONER’S DUE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS MANDATED BY
RESPONDENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-COVERAGE (CNC) APPLIED FOR BY PETITIONER, IT IS
NOW THE RIPENED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS, THROUGH RESPONDENT EMB REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TO ISSUE SAID
DOCUMENT IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER;

Ruling of SC:

NO. There is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the requirement to submit the needed certifications.
For one, it submitted no certification to the effect that the project site was not within a critical slope. Also, the PHIVOLCS’s certification
showed that the project site had experienced an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, a fact that sufficed to place the site in the category of
"areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities." Clearly, the petitioner failed to establish that it had the legal right to
be issued the CNC applied for, warranting the denial of its application.

The CNC is a certification issued by the EMB certifying that a project is not covered by the Environmental Impact Statement System
(EIS System) and that the project proponent is not required to secure an ECC. The EIS System was established by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1586 pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) that required all entities to submit an EIS
for projects that would have a significant effect on the environment, thus:

Section 4. Environmental Impact Statements. – Pursuant to the above enunciated policies and goals, all agencies and instrumentalities
of the national government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities
shall prepare, file and include in every action, project or undertaking which significantly affects the quality of the environment a detailed
statement on–

(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking

(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented

(c) alternative to the proposed action

(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are consistent with the maintenance and enhancement
of the long-term productivity of the same; and
Special People Inc., Foundation vs. Nestor Canada, et al., GR No. 160932, Jan. 14, 2013

(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or non-renewable resources, a finding must be made that such use and
commitment are warranted.

xxxx

P.D. No. 1586 exempted from the requirement of an EIS the projects and areas not declared by the President of the Philippines
as environmentally critical, thus:

Section 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. - All other projects, undertakings and areas not declared by the Presidents as
environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not be required to submit an environmental impact statement. The
National Environmental Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may however require non-critical projects and
undertakings to provide additional environmental safeguards as it may deem necessary.

The foregoing considerations indicate that the grant or denial of an application for ECC/CNC is not an act that is purely ministerial in
nature, but one that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion by the EMB Director or Regional Director, who must
determine whether the project or project area is classified as critical to the environment based on the documents to be submitted by the
applicant.

On the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative concern should first avail
himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative processes. The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency the opportunity to dispose of
the issues upon due deliberation.

The records show that the petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies. At the time RD Lipayon denied the
petitioner’s application for the CNC, Administrative Order No. 42 dated November 2, 200219 had just vested the authority to grant or
deny applications for the ECC in the Director and Regional Directors of the EMB. Notwithstanding the lack of a specific implementing
guideline to what office the ruling of the EMB Regional Director was to be appealed, the petitioner could have been easily guided in that
regard by the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that the Director of a line bureau, such as the EMB,20 shall have
supervision and control over all division and other units, including regional offices, under the bureau. Verily, supervision and control
include the power to "review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units." Accordingly, the petitioner
should have appealed the EMB Regional Director’s decision to the EMB Director, who exercised supervision and control over the
former.

Moreover, the petitioner states in its pleadings that it had a pending appeal with the DENR Secretary.1âwphi1 However, the records
reveal that the subject of the appeal of the petitioner was an undated resolution of the DENR Regional Director, Region VII, denying its
application for the CNC, not the decision of RD Lipayon. Nonetheless, even assuming that the pending appeal with the DENR
Secretary had related to RD Lipayon’s decision, the petitioner should still have waited for the DENR Secretary to resolve the
appeal in line with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Its failure to do so rendered its resort to mandamus
in the RTC premature. The omission is fatal, because mandamus is a remedy only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Republic vs. O.G. Holdings Corp., GR No. 189290, Nov. 29, 2017

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review (Rule 45 petition)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

● The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort must first be made with the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to
the courts for review. O.G. Holdings failed to abide by this doctrine. Administrative remedies existed against the suspension of
the subject ECC, made available via DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 2003 (A.O. No. 30), which was prevailing
at the time of the suspensive orders.
● It is wrong to suppose that an application for the registration of a man-made island, as reclaimed land, may substitute for a
foreshore lease agreement or permit. This same observation holds true even if the substitution sought involved the approved
registration.
Republic vs. O.G. Holdings Corp., GR No. 189290, Nov. 29, 2017

Facts:

● O.G. Holdings Corporation owns and operates the Panglao Island Nature Resort, a beach resort situated in Bohol.
● EMB-Region 7 issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) to the resort authorizing the project subject to certain
conditions aligned with PD No. 1586.
● ECC required compliance with various conditions including securing necessary permits for developments in the foreshore
area (Condition No. 2.2), submission of marine studies (Condition No. 6), establishment of an Environmental Guarantee Fund
(Condition No. 3), and restrictions on expansion without further EIA requirements.
● EMB-Region 7 monitored the project for compliance and found violations of the ECC pertaining to (a) the failure to secure a
foreshore lease or permit, (b) failure to create the Environmental Guarantee Fund, and (c) failure to submit a marine study
within the primary impact area. Consequently, notices of Violations were issued.
● At the conference, O.G. Holdings disclosed difficulties in securing a foreshore lease. It stated that Municipal Ordinance No.
03-1991 prohibited development on the shorelines. Nonetheless, it committed to file "appropriate documents" on the lease
and marine study.
● A marine study was submitted complying with Condition No. 6; however, securing the foreshore lease remained unresolved.
EMB noted violations of the foreshore lease condition and received a complaint from the Bingag Little Fishermen's
Organization that O.G. Holdings was cordoning the shoreline, affecting the fisherfolk’s right of way.
● EMB-Region 7 sent O.G. Holdings a Notice of Violation. O.G. Holdings explained compliance with the foreshore lease
condition was impossible due to local government obstruction. Instead, it applied with the Philippine Reclamation Authority for
special registration of its man-made island, requesting the application be considered substantial compliance.
● EIA Division recommended suspension of the ECC issued to Panglao Island, and EMB-Region 7 suspended the ECC. O.G.
Holdings moved for reconsideration, pleading that suspension would hinder its PRA application, as it required an existing
ECC for special registration of the man-made island.
● EMB-Region 7 visited the site. Fisherfolk reported a foundation of a finished guardhouse and cordoning of seawater. EMB
clarified the guardhouse would not proceed but cordoning would continue for guest security.
● EMB issued a second suspensive order noting ongoing violations, including the unauthorized guardhouse construction, and
reiterated the need for a tenurial instrument for the foreshore area.
● O.G. Holdings then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion by EMB-Region 7 and
Officer-in-Charge Arranguez in suspending the ECC and claiming that they had imposed "an impossible condition [to be
complied with] within an impossible (72) hours.”
● CA nullified and set aside EMB’s suspension orders, relieved O.G. Holdings from complying with Condition No. 2.2, and
allowed submission of PRA registration as substitute compliance.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts:
Agreed with O.G. Holdings that it would be unreasonable to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies in the case. It
characterized Condition No. 2.2 of the ECC as "presently
unattainable" and the suspension of the ECC as arbitrary. It
opined that the required foreshore lease or permit may be
dispensed with and observed that securing a lease or permit
would still not be possible, given the municipal proscription
against such developments. On O.G. Holding's application
with the PRA, the CA then declared that such application was
made in 0.G. Holding's "desire to comply" with Condition No.
2.2. CA concluded that it was "unjust and inequitable" to
insist on a foreshore lease for the beach resort project even
after its ECC had been suspended. Finally, the CA stressed
that millions of pesos had been spent on the Panglao Island
Nature Resort.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)
Condition No. 2.2 came into play only when there were
I. A writ of certiorari will not lie in the absence construction or development activities within the beach resort
of grave abuse of discretion. project's foreshore area. Thus, the petition now contended
that, first, the resort's man-made island was the only reason
II. Factual Issues are not proper in a petition why EMB-Region 7 and Arranguez were insisting on a
for certiorari. foreshore lease; and, second, the man-made island was not
a construction or development activity on the foreshore area,
but a reclamation project located "some ninety (90) meters
offshore from the resort."44 Hence, there was no basis to
Republic vs. O.G. Holdings Corp., GR No. 189290, Nov. 29, 2017

require a foreshore lease for the man-made island and the

entire beach resort project. And even if it were assumed,
arguendo, that a foreshore lease was required for the
man-made island, it was illogical and unjust of EMB-Region 7
and Arranguez to have ordered the stoppage of the
operations of the entire beach resort project considering that
its other components were located outside its foreshore area.

The petition went on to claim that O.G. Holdings attempted in

good faith to substantially comply with Condition No. 2.2, by
applying for the special registration, as reclaimed land, of the
man-made island.

ISSUE/S: WON the CA reversibly erred in ruling that EMB-Region 7 and Arranguez had acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in suspending the subject ECC, effectively disallowing the operations and further development of the
Panglao Island Nature Resort. (YES)

Ruling of SC:

The petition for review is impressed with merit. There are obvious errors in the assailed ruling.

The CA erred in granting 0. [Link]' petition when there was a failure to move for reconsideration before seeking
certiorari.

- A motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The CA erred in granting 0. G. Holdings' petition when they had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before
seeking certiorari.

- The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort must first be made with the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to
the courts for review. This doctrine closely echoes the reason behind the rule providing that before resort to the special civil
action of certiorari is allowed, a motion for reconsideration should first be filed with the public respondent concerned.

O.G. Holdings failed to abide by this doctrine. Administrative remedies existed against the suspension of the subject ECC,
made available via DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 2003 (A.O. No. 30), which was prevailing at the time of the
suspensive orders.

O.G. Holdings thus had the opportunity to file an administrative appeal on the suspension of the beach resort project's ECC,
beginning with the Office of the EMB Director. Indeed, the administrative machinery afforded even an appeal to the Office of
the President, but O.G. Holdings did not avail of such.

The CA erred in making factual findings in a certiorari proceeding.

- Factual issues are not a proper subject for certiorari, which is limited to the issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.

CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the suspension of the subject
ECC.

The flaws are two-fold. First. It is wrong to suppose that an application for the registration of a man-made island, as reclaimed land,
may substitute for a foreshore lease agreement or permit. This same observation holds true even if the substitution sought involved the
approved registration. Incidentally, it bears mentioning that O.G. Holdings' application for the man-made island was made under PRA
Administrative Order No. 2005-1, or the Rules and Procedures for Special Registration of Unauthorized/Illegal Reclamation Projects.77

Certainly, the supposition would be acceptable were there a law or regulation authorizing such a substitution. Unfortunately for O.G.
Holdings, it failed to plead such law or regulation in its petition for certiorari.

Second. Even if it were to be assumed, arguendo, that such law or regulation existed, it is wrong to suppose that EMB-Region 7 and
Arranguez had acted in grave abuse of discretion simply because they had practically rejected O.G. Holdings' proposed substitution for
Republic vs. O.G. Holdings Corp., GR No. 189290, Nov. 29, 2017

Condition No. 2.2. Indeed, the acceptance of the proposed substitution still lay within the sound discretion of EMB-Region 7 and
Arranguez.

Here, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of EMB-Region 7 and Arranguez when they suspended the ECC for the Panglao
Island Nature Resort Corporation. Indeed, we cannot even find mere abuse of discretion in the act, as it came on the heels of a
recommendation from the EIA Division and was provoked by O.G. Holdings' continuous noncompliance with Condition No. 2.2 of the
ECC. Such noncompliance is a violation that the National Environmental Protection Council, now the Environmental Management
Bureau, was authorized to penalize under P.D. No. 1586.

In fine, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari despite O.G. Holdings' unjustified failure to exhaust the available
administrative remedies for the suspension of its beach resort project's ECC.

CASE TITLE: Boracay Foundation Inc. v. Prov. of Aklan, GR No. 196870, June 26,2012

PARTIES: (Arguments) Petitioner Respondent:

● Respondent Province considers the

NOTE: ● Petitioner alleges that the instant petition premature for lack of
Petitioner Boracay Revised Procedural Manual, cause of action due to petitioner’s
Foundation, Inc. which merely requires an EIS for failure to fully exhaust administrative
(petitioner) is a duly Group II projects, is patently ultra remedies before seeking judicial relief. It
registered, non-stock vires and that respondent argues that the petition assails the
domestic corporation. DENR-EMB RVI committed grave decision of respondent DENR-EMB RVI
abuse of discretion since P.D. in granting the ECC for the 2.64-hectare
Respondent Province of Nos. 1151 and 1586 and project and seeks its cancellation for
Aklan (respondent Proclamation No. 2146 clearly alleged lack of proper documentation,
Province) is a political state that projects in ECAs are which grounds can be addressed within
subdivision of the immediately considered administrative processes. The petition is
government environmentally critical. anchored on a wrong premise resulting
in unfounded fears, as the 2.64-hectare
Respondent Philippine ● respondent Province applied only reclamation project is a "stand alone
Reclamation Authority for an ECC for Phase 1, project," separate from the 40-hectare
(respondent PRA) unlawfully evading the "future development plan," which is still
requirement that co-located subject to funds, study, ECC application,
projects within ECAs must submit and PRA approval.
Respondent Department a PEIS and/or a PEPRMP, and
of Environment and fraudulently classified and
Natural Resources – misrepresented the project as a
Environmental Non-ECP in an ECA and as a
● Respondent Province claims full
Management Bureau single project instead of a
compliance with ECC requirements; the
(DENR-EMB), Regional co-located one. The impact
expansion to 40 hectares is only a
Office VI (respondent assessment was patently
future plan. The ECC covers 2.64
DENR-EMB RVI), is the erroneous, wrongly-premised,
hectares, intended to rehabilitate and
government agency in the and designed to avoid a
expand the Caticlan jetty port, classified
Western Visayas Region comprehensive impact
under DENR DAO 2003-30 as Minor
authorized to issue assessment.
Reclamation Projects, Group II – Non
environmental compliance
ECP in an ECA. It stresses that the
certificates regarding ● respondent DENR-EMB RVI
project is not a component of the
projects that require the willfully disregarded its duty by
40-hectare area, as it has no plan or
environment’s protection only superficially reviewing
funds for Boracay. The Caticlan project
CASE TITLE: Boracay Foundation Inc. v. Prov. of Aklan, GR No. 196870, June 26,2012

and management in the outdated data from the 1990s, and Boracay site are separated by a
region. ignoring the environmental strait; hence, not co-located. As a
impact to Boracay, including "stand alone project," DENR-EMB RVI
coastline changes affecting the required an EPRMP per DAO 2003-30.
sand of Caticlan and Boracay.

● Petitioner insists reclamation at

Caticlan will adversely affect ● Respondent Province concludes
Boracay, whose popularity petitioner’s allegation of a "co-located
depends on its white-sand project" is premature, as the bigger
beaches, while the project’s reclamation remains conceptual. An
declared objective is to exploit ocular survey confirmed work within
Boracay’s tourist trade. ECC limits. On petitioner’s claim of
lacking LGU endorsement, Province
● Petitioner alleges that respondent argues consultations are merely
PRA required respondent advisory, not approval powers.
Province to secure LGU Respondent PRA issued the NTP
endorsements under the Local limited to the 2.64 hectares,
Government Code but the emphasizing that other phases would
Province failed proper still require ECCs. PRA, mandated to
consultations, violating EIS laws regulate reclamations, asserts its duty to
and the Code. The Liga ng mga evaluate all projects.
Barangay-Malay Chapter
expressed strong opposition, and
although Secs. 26 and 27 require
consultations, the Province
ignored LGU opposition since ● Respondent DENR-EMB RVI states
2008 and belatedly held mere issuance of the ECC certifies
"project presentations" in 2010 compliance with the EIA process,
after an ECC and MOA were addressing environmental impacts.
issued. While petitioner insists the project
involves 40 hectares, DENR-EMB RVI
● Petitioner concludes that found the ECC covered only 2.64
respondent Province’s intended hectares and could not comment on
purposes do not prevail over its excess areas. It admits that as a "Non
duty to protect the environment ECP in ECA," the 2.64-hectare project
and believes rehabilitation of the is not co-located but merely an
Jetty Port may be done through expansion of the Caticlan Jetty Port with
other means. an existing ECC, thus requiring only an
EPRMP, not a PEIS or PEPRMP.

Type/Nature of Action: original petition for the issuance of an Environmental Protection Order in the nature of a continuing
mandamus under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, promulgated
on April 29, 2010.

Facts:

Boracay, known as the premier domestic and international tourist destination in the Philippines for its distinctive powdery
white-sand beaches, became the focus of development when respondent Province, after building the Caticlan and Cagban
Jetty Ports, conceptualized in 2008 the expansion of port facilities due to congestion and the increasing influx of tourists.

Despite opposition from the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Municipality of Malay against respondent Province’s
foreshore lease and reclamation plans, Governor Marquez pursued the "Marina Project" involving reclamation, renovation,
and expansion of Caticlan Jetty Port, initially covering 2.64 hectares and later expanded to 40 hectares, funded through
₱260,000,000.00 "Caticlan Super Marina Bonds." Respondent PRA approved the reclamation project, and DENR-EMB
issued an ECC in April 2010 for Phase 1.

Public consultations were belatedly conducted, with petitioner and Malay Municipality reiterating strong opposition, citing
environmental concerns and lack of proper consultations. Nonetheless, respondent Province, supported by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and RDC-VI, proceeded, with studies from UPMSI indicating the 2.64-hectare project would not
significantly affect Boracay’s beaches. Petitioner, however, filed a Petition for Environmental Protection Order on June 1,
2011, prompting the Court to issue a TEPO on June 7, 2011, after which respondent Province ordered a cease and desist of
construction activities.
CASE TITLE: Boracay Foundation Inc. v. Prov. of Aklan, GR No. 196870, June 26,2012

Ruling of Lower Courts RTC CA

N/A N/A

ISSUE/S:

I. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic (NO)
II. Whether or not the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing this
case (NO)
III. Whether or not respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA as required by laws and regulations based on the scope
and classification of the project
IV. Whether or not respondent Province complied with all the requirements under the pertinent laws and regulations
V. Whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project (NO)

Ruling of SC:

On the issue of whether or not the Petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic

A close reading of the two LGUs’ respective resolutions reveals that they are not sufficient to render the petition moot and
academic, as explicit conditions were imposed on respondent Province. Resolution No. 003, series of 2012, of the
Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan states that "any vertical structures to be constructed shall be subject for barangay
endorsement," clearly endorsing only the reclamation and not the entire project including the commercial building, wellness
center, and other tourism-related facilities. Petitioner’s objections pertain not only to the reclamation per se but also to the
building and the project’s perceived ill effects to the environment.

Resolution No. 020, series of 2012, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay specifies that while the project may generate
income and employment, it will take its toll on the environment, especially Boracay, and may displace local transportation
operators/cooperatives. The Resolution requires transparency and faithful commitment from the Provincial Government of
Aklan and imposes conditions, namely: (1) allocate office space to LGU-Malay within the building; (2) convene the Cagban
and Caticlan Jetty Port Management Board before resumption of the project; (3) limit the reclamation project to 2.6 hectares
in Barangay Caticlan; (4) ensure local transportation operators/cooperatives will not be displaced; and (5) conduct a
simultaneous comprehensive study on the environmental impact, with mitigating measures. It further states that failure to
comply will result in revocation of the endorsement.

Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay imposed explicit conditions, including the need for an environmental impact study,
which is the heart of the petition. Therefore, the two resolutions do not support respondent Province’s conclusion that the
endorsements addressed all issues and rendered the petition moot and academic.

On the issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies

The new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a relief for petitioner under the writ of
continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically
enjoined by law"and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO "as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ
itself."

The writ of continuing mandamus "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful
implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision" and, in order to do this, "the court may compel the
submission of compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor
compliance with its decision."

Here, It has been established by the facts that petitioner was never made a party to the proceedings before respondent
DENR-EMB RVI. Petitioner was only informed that the project had already been approved after the ECC was already
granted. Not being a party to the said proceedings, it does not appear that petitioner was officially furnished a copy of the
decision, from which the 15-day period to appeal should be reckoned, and which would warrant the application of Section 6,
Article II of DENR DAO 2003-30.

Although petitioner was not a party to the proceedings where the decision to issue an ECC was rendered, it stands to be
aggrieved by the decision, because it claims that the reclamation of land on the Caticlan side would unavoidably adversely
affect the Boracay side, where petitioner’s members own establishments engaged in the tourism trade.
CASE TITLE: Boracay Foundation Inc. v. Prov. of Aklan, GR No. 196870, June 26,2012

On the substantive issues, whether, based on the scope and classification of the project, a full EIA is required by
laws and regulations, and whether respondent Province complied with all the requirements under the pertinent
laws and regulations

Petitioner argues that the reclamation project was misclassified as a single project instead of co-located, and improperly
classified by respondent Province as a mere expansion of the jetty port when project descriptions show commercial
establishments, thus it should be a new project. Petitioner also assails the circumvention of DENR-EMB RVI requirements
by connecting it with the 1999 project and claiming it as expansion.

Respondent Province manifested that the ECC covered 2,691 sq m, its 40-hectare application with respondent PRA was
conditioned on documents within 120 days, and failure indicated waiver, limiting the project to 2.64 hectares. Respondent
PRA confined the project to 2.64 hectares. The Court held the case is not moot since compliance with environmental laws
must be checked.

DENR has the power to review EIA reports and issue ECCs, but DENR-EMB RVI’s evaluation was problematic: (1) approval
of expansion classification instead of new project; (2) classification as single instead of co-located; (3) lack of public
consultations and LGU approval; (4) lack of comprehensive environmental studies. The EIA process requires predicting
likely impacts and preventive measures, which were not adequately done.

The project involves reclamation over five times the original: Phase 1 (₱260M) includes 3,000 sq m jetty port expansion,
13,500 sq m buildable area, terminal annex, 2-storey commercial building, health center, access road, parking and facilities,
and rehabilitation of jetty port. Succeeding phases (₱785M) include commercial center, bay walk, staff building, ferry
terminal, cable car system, and wharf marina, totaling ₱1B. A large portion is commercial, while only 3,000 sq m is jetty port
expansion. These impacts were not covered by 1999 studies.

Impacts on Boracay cannot be ignored given its proximity and tourism value. Under PD 1586 and RA 7160, LGUs have the
duty to ensure environmental quality and are not exempt from ECC requirements. PD 1586 seeks balance between
socio-economic development and environmental protection.

The Court remands to DENR-EMB RVI for proper study, requires respondent Province to address issues and submit correct
EIA, and directs submission of a report within three months justifying why the ECC should not be canceled.

On Lack of prior public consultation

The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological
balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and approval of local government units for the projects
described therein.

In the case before us, the national agency involved is respondent PRA. Even if the project proponent is the local
government of Aklan, it is respondent PRA which authorized the reclamation, being the exclusive agency of the government
to undertake reclamation nationwide. Hence, it was necessary for respondent Province to go through respondent PRA and
to execute a MOA, wherein respondent PRA’s authority to reclaim was delegated to respondent Province. Respondent
DENR-EMB RVI, regional office of the DENR, is also a national government institution which is tasked with the issuance of
the ECC that is a prerequisite to projects covered by environmental laws such as the one at bar.

In Lina, Jr. v. Paño,we held that Section 27 of the Local Government Code applies only to "national programs and/or
projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community" and that it should be read in conjunction with Section
26.

Two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by
the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal.

Here, the information dissemination conducted months after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to comply
with this requirement under the Local Government Code. Had they been conducted properly, the prior public consultation
should have considered the ecological or environmental concerns of the stakeholders and studied measures alternative to
the project, to avoid or minimize adverse environmental impact or damage. In fact, respondent Province once tried to obtain
the favorable endorsement of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay, but this was denied by the latter.
PD 705
CASE TITLE

Topic:

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Facts:

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S:

Ruling of SC:
POLICY DETERMINATION BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

YSMAEL vs. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR NO. 79538

Topic:POLICY DETERMINATION BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their
finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These
decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered
by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res iudicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by
competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.

Facts:
● Petitioner was granted a timber license agreement which allowed him to cut, collect and remove timber except
in prohibited species within a specified postio of public forest land.
● Subsequently, the Bureau of Forest Development cancelled all the logging concussion of petitioner and 9 other
concessionaires pursuant to presidential instructions.
● One year after,, a portion of the petitioner's former concession area was re-awarded to Twin Peaks
Development and Realty Corporation under TLA No. 356.
● Petitioner then sought reinstatement of its TLA and revocation of TLA No. 356 after the change of government
in 1986.
● The MNR (now DENR) denied the request, citing a total logging ban and the ongoing review of contracts.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S: WON the refusal of public respondents to reverse final and executory administrative orders constitute grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Ruling of SC: NO. It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of
res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same
had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res iudicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter
once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR)] dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration of a
memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983,
as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.
YSMAEL vs. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR NO. 79538

But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No.
705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its
letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR, requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau
actions, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned.

No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September 19, 1983 which petitioner claimed to
have sent to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53], seeking the reconsideration of the 1983
order issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be pointed out that the averments in this letter are entirely
different from the charges of fraud against officials under the previous resume made by petitioner in its letters to public
respondents herein. In the letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the list of
concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its record of selective logging and reforestation
practices in the subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to have been taken by petitioner
until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent scheme became apparent in 1984 as evidenced by the awarding
of the subject timber concession area to other entities in that year. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS v ABAD

Topic: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be
elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of cause of action which is
one of the grounds allowed in the Rules for the dismissal of the complaint.

However, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted
to immediately, such as: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;
(3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the
claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of the controversy is private land;
and (10) in quo warranto proceedings.

Facts:
● Petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA) covering hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del
Sur, for a period of ten years
● Herein private respondents filed a petition with the DENR for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of
serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. Same charges were
subsequently made in the RTC
● Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative
remedies, among others

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

Denied the motion to dismiss Affirmed the RTC ruling. Held that
the doctrine of exhaustion of
SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS v ABAD

administrative remedies was not

without exception and pointed to the
several instances approved by this
Court where it could be dispensed
with. The respondent court found
that in this case, the applicable
exception was the urgent need for
judicial intervention

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative Their complaint comes under the

remedies shall applu exceptions because forestry laws do
not require observance of the
doctrine as a condition precedent to
judicial action; the question they are
raising is purely legal; application of
the doctrine will cause great and
irreparable damage; and public
interest is involved

ISSUE/S: WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should apply in this case

Ruling of SC:

YES. Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative remedies, the
reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such reasons
were disregarded, there would stil be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and
function “to regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country’s forests” and “to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction” in the “management and disposition of all lands of the public domain, and in the Forest
Management Bureau the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws and regulations here claimed to have
been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule
in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.

The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents
have charged that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws
and regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence
is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the
rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review.

PAAT VS COURT OF APPEALS.

Topic: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review on Certiorari under rule 45.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
PAAT VS COURT OF APPEALS.

means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature
invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.

Facts:
- On May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from
San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR,
for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents
for the forest products found concealed in the truck.
- Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao,
Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15)
days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents,
however, failed to submit the required explanation.
- On June 22, 1989, Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's
action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No.
705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
- The case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents' statement
in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then "this letter
should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary."
- Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the
private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents.
- Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending,
inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Court of Appeals sustained the trial
court's order ruling that the question
involved is purely a legal question.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of Seek to avoid the operation of this
administrative remedies, petitioners aver that principle asserting that the instant
the trial court could not legally entertain the suit case falls within the exception of the
for replevin because the truck was under doctrine upon the justification that (1)
administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to due process was violated because
Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. they were not given the chance to be
277. heard, and (2) the seizure and
forfeiture was unlawful on the
grounds: (a) that the Secretary of
DENR and his representatives have
no authority to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting
illegal forest products, and (b) that
the truck as admitted by petitioners
was not used in the commission of
PAAT VS COURT OF APPEALS.

the crime.

Private respondents imputed the

patent illegality of seizure and
forfeiture of the truck because the
administrative officers of the DENR
allegedly have no power to perform
these acts under the law. They
insisted that only the court is
authorized to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting
illegal forest products as can be
gleaned from the second paragraph
of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as
amended by E.O. 277.

ISSUE/S:
May an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative
forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705,
as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?(NO)

Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?(YES)

Ruling of SC:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the Negative.

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to
one's cause of action.

This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the
issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is
irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was
forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through
PAAT VS COURT OF APPEALS.

the order of July 12, 1989.

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of
their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and
open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceedings.

Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the
protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be
given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents
constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative.

Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In
all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly
authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Emphasis ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the
authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of
the government.

JURISDICTION

REPUBLIC vs. CA & BERNABE, GR NO. L-40402

Type/Nature of Action: Petition to review

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Facts:

● On August 23, 2004, the Republic (through the OSG) filed a case for cancellation of title and reversion
against Ma. Teresita E. Bernabe.

● The Republic claimed that the land in dispute was part of the Fort Stotsenburg Military Reservation (now Clark
Air Base), reserved since 1908 for military use.

● Despite being inalienable public land, a portion (Lot No. 965, formerly Lot No. 42) was registered under the
name of Francisco Garcia in 1968, who later sold part of it. Eventually, Bernabe acquired the property and was
REPUBLIC vs. CA & BERNABE, GR NO. L-40402

issued TCT No. 107736.

● The Bureau of Lands’ investigation revealed that the land was inside the Clark Air Base target range and not
released as alienable and disposable land. Thus, Garcia’s registration was fraudulent, making all subsequent
titles, including Bernabe’s, void.

● In 2006, while the case was pending, Bernabe’s heirs mortgaged the property to CRBB (Cooperative Rural
Bank of Bulacan). This led the Republic to amend the complaint to include CRBB as a defendant.

● CRBB filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing:

-Only the Director of Lands, not the Republic, could initiate reversion cases.
-If BCDA (Bases Conversion and Development Authority) was the proper party, the complaint was
defective since its CEO (Atty. Arnel Casanova) was not authorized by the BCDA Board to sign the Verification
and Certification Against Forum Shopping.
-CRBB and Bernabe’s heirs acted in good faith as buyers/mortgagees relying on a Torrens title.

● The RTC dismissed the case (2014), holding that only BCDA had legal standing.

● On appeal, the Court of Appeals (2018) affirmed, ruling that:

-Under Proclamation No. 163 (1993), Clark lands were transferred to BCDA, making it the real party in
interest, not the Republic.
-The complaint’s Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping was defective since Atty.
Casanova signed without proof of Board authority.

●

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S: Whether the Republic, through the OSG, is the proper party to file the action for cancellation of title and
reversion over land located within the Fort Stotsenburg Military Reservation (Clark Air Base), or whether the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) as transferee of ownership under Proclamation No. 163 (1993) is the
real party in interest.

Ruling of SC:

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The resolution of the instant Petition rests mainly on the determination of whether the Republic is the real
party in interest to institute and prosecute the instant case for reversion and cancellation of title.

As defined in Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Section 2 adds
that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.
REPUBLIC vs. CA & BERNABE, GR NO. L-40402

To determine who is the real party in interest, the nature or character of the subject property and who has
present ownership thereof have to be inquired into.

As alleged by the Republic in its Second Amended Complaint, on July 31, 1908, the then Governor General of
the Philippines, James F. Smith, through an unnumbered Proclamation, issued an Executive Order wherein
"[certain] lands [were] reserved for the extension of the Camp Stotsenburg military reservation near Angeles,
Pampanga x x x as declared by Executive Order of September 1, 1903 (G.O. No. 34, War Department, October
13, 1903) xxx viz: [a]ll public lands x x x."[19] The September 1, 1903 Executive Order "reserved for military
purposes subject to private rights xxx [certain] tract of public land near Angeles, Pampanga."[20] Similar to the
initial reservation, the reservation for the extension of Camp Stotsenburg was subject to private rights since
the reservation was subject to the condition that "no private property shall be taken or destroyed without first
making payment therefor x x x."[21]

Under that unnumbered Proclamation of the then Governor General of the Philippines, James F. Smith, the
lands which were reserved for Camp Stotsenburg and its extension were all public lands subject to private
rights. Later, Camp Stotsenburg became Clark Air Base. As alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, during
the fact-finding investigation and relocation survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it was ascertained that
the subject property was inside the Fort Stotsenburg Military Reservation (now Clark Air Base), which was
being used as a target range by the Clark Air Force Military personnel, that it was never occupied nor
cultivated by the claimants thereof, and that there were no monuments or markers existing thereon.[22]

In 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through Proclamation No. 163,[23] series of 1993 (Proc. 163), created the
Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), which "shall cover the lands consisting of the Clark military
reservations, including the Clark Air Base[24] proper and portions of the Clark reverted baselands [(CAB
Lands)], and excluding the areas covered by previous Presidential Proclamations, the areas turned over to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and the areas in the reverted baselands reserved for military use."[25]
The total area of the CSEZ or CAB Lands is 28,041 hectares, more or less, subject to actual survey, covering
Clark Air Base proper and portions of the Clark reverted baselands.[26]

Proc. 163 also provides:

SECTION 2. Transfer of CSEZ Areas to the Bases Conversion and Development Authority. - The Clark Air Base
proper covering 4,440 hectares, more or less, and portions of the Clark reverted baselands covering 23,601
hectares, more or less, totalling 28,041 hectares declared as the total area of the CSEZ in accordance with
Section 1 hereof are hereby transferred to the BCDA.

These areas are approximate and subject to actual ground surveys.

The BCDA shall determine utilization and disposition of the above mentioned lands.

It will be recalled that Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7227[27] or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), "a body corporate x x x which shall have
the attribute of perpetual succession and shall be vested with the powers of a corporation."[28] One of the
BCDA's purposes is: "To own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station,
Wallace Air Station, O'Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station, Mt. Sta. Rita
Station (Hermosa, Bataan) and those portions of Metro Manila military camps which may be transferred to it by
the President."[29] Being a corporate entity, the BCDA is vested with the power, among others: "To succeed in
its corporate name, to sue and be sued in such corporate name and to adopt, alter and use a corporate seal
which shall be judicially noticed."[30] Section 9 of R.A. 7227 provides: "The powers and functions of the
Conversion Authority shall be exercised by a Board of Directors to be composed of nine (9) members

it may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have been classified into
governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant.' While public benefit and public welfare,
REPUBLIC vs. CA & BERNABE, GR NO. L-40402

particularly, the promotion of the economic and social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to
the operation of the BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary
in nature. The promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country's
goal for enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations
have been created by government to act as its agents for the realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS,
NAWASA and the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these entities, although performing
functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not government-function corporations
invested with governmental attributes. It may thus be said that the BCDA is not a mere agency of the
Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.

Having the capacity to sue or be sued [under Section 5 of R.A. 7227], it should thus be the BCDA which may
file an action to cancel petitioner's title, not the Republic, the former being the real party in interest. One
having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action
(Ralla v. Ralla, 199 SCRA 495 [1991]). A suit may be dismissed if the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party
in interest. If the suit is not brought in the name of the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed,
as was done by petitioner in this case, on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action (Tanpingco
v. IAC, 207 SCRA 652 [1992]).

Moreover, to recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in this case would set a bad; precedent as it
would allow the Republic to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled corporations, causes of
action which have already prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest against
whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been created merely as agents for the realization of
government programs.[31]
The dismissal of the complaint filed by the Republic in Shipside Incorporated was, however, "without prejudice
to the filing of an appropriate action by the Bases Development and Conversion Authority."[32]

Lagua vs. Cusi, Jr.

Topic:

Type/Nature of Action: petition for mandamus

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Facts:

● Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for defendants, issued a memorandum to the Chief Security
Guard of Defendant Eastcoast directing the latter to prevent the passage of Plaintiff Laguas hauling
trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel (there were no other trucks hauling logs at that time)
on the national highway loading towards where the vessel was berthed.
Lagua vs. Cusi, Jr.

● The security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other
equipments and effectively prevented their passage thereof while the vehicles and trucks of other
people were curiously not disturbed and were allowed passage on the same road.
● Upon representations made to Indalecio L. Aspiras, Acting Station Officer-in-Charge, BFD Lambajon
Forest Station, and in response to plaintiff Laguas' complaint, a letter dated 2 January 1976 was
addressed by Aspiras to the Resident Manager of Defendant Eastcoast with instructions to open and
allow Plaintiff Laguas' trucks and machineries to pass that road closed to them (but not to others) by
Defendant Eastcoast.
● When Plaintiffs Laguas were already resuming the hauling operations of their logs towards the
Japanese Vessel on 3 January 1976, again that same road, only the day before ordered by the BFD to
be opened for use and passage by plaintiffs, was closed to them by Defendant Eastcoast's security
men upon a radio message order of Defendant Maglana.
● Given no recourse in the face of the blatant and illegal closure of the road in defiance of BFD orders to
the contrary by the Defendant Eastcoast through the order of Defendant Maglana, Plaintiff Laguas had
to depart posthaste to Mati, Davao Oriental, from Baganga where the shipment and the road closure
were made, to seek the assistance of the PC Command thereat.
● Provincial Commander Alfonso Lumebao issued a directive to the PC Detachment Commander at
Baganga to lift the illegal checkpoint made by defendants.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

The Court agrees with the defendants that

under the law, the Bureau of Forest
Development has the exclusive power to
regulate the use of logging roads and to
determine whether their use is in violation of
laws.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

The petitioners maintain that since their The private respondents

action is for damages, the regular courts contended that as the acts
have jurisdiction over the same. According complained of by the petitioners
to them, the respondent court had no basis arose out of the legitimate
for holding that the Bureau of Forestry exercise of respondent Eastcoast
Development must first determine that the Development Enterprises, Inc.,'s
closure of a logging road is legal or illegal rights as a timber licensee, more
before an action for damages can be particularly in the use of its
instituted. logging roads, therefore, the
resolution of this question is
properly and legally within the
Bureau of Forest Development,
citing as authority Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705.
Lagua vs. Cusi, Jr.

ISSUE/S:

whether or not the road was illegally closed must first be determined by the Bureau of Forest Development.

Ruling of SC:

No.

P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such
determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint
instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road.
Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter
to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding.
It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of
a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity
inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.

HRS. OF AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, GR NO. L-127873

Topic: Jurisdiction

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Facts:

● Roque and Melquides filed an application for registration.

● Heirs of Amunategui filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquides and at the same time
prayed that the title to a portion of lot of Pilar Cadastre
● Director of Forestry also filed an opposition to the application for the registration of the title claiming that the
land was mangrove swamp which was still classified a forest land part of the public domain
● During trial, Roque sold his interest and rights to Angel which prompted the latter filed an opposition
HRS. OF AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, GR NO. L-127873

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz "IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision
adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio must have to be as it is hereby
Bereber and the reversed; the application as well as
all the
rest of the land containing 527,747 square
meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 oppositions with the exception of that
share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to of the Director of Forestry which is
Melquiades Borre. hereby sustained are dismissed; no
more pronouncement as to costs.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by On the other hand, another petition
the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that for review on certiorari was filed by
the disputed lot had Roque Borre and Encarnacion
been in the possession of private persons for Delfin, contending that the trial court
over thirty years and therefore in accordance committed grave abuse of discretion
with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still in dismissing their complaint against
be the subject of registration and confirmation the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The
of title in the name of a private person in Borre complaint was for the
accordance with Act No. 496 known as the annulment of the deed of absolute
Land Registration Act. sale of Lot No. 885 executed by
them in favor of the Heirs of
The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of Amunategui. The complaint was
the Court of Appeals in passing upon the dismissed on the basis of the Court
relative rights of the parties over the disputed of Appeals’ decision that the
lot when its final decision after all is to declare disputed lot is part of the public
said lot a part of the public domain classified as domain.
forest land.

ISSUE/S:

WON the subject lot is a public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants

WON CA erred in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is
to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land

Ruling of SC:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.

Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
HRS. OF AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, GR NO. L-127873

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption
that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.

We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public
forest land. There is no need for us to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion
Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by this finding.

REPUBLIC vs. NAGUIAT, GR NO. 134209

Topic: JURISDICTION

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review under Rule 45

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.

Facts:
● Applicant alleges that she is the owner of the four (4) parcels of land located in Zambales having acquired them
by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina
Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than
thirty (30) years.
● Applicant further alleges that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of
whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
● The Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto.
● The Republic further alleged that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of her open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of an owner.
The Republic alleged that the applicant’s claim of ownership in fee simply on the basis of Spanish title or grant
can no longer be availed of.
● The Republic further alleged that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

Rendered judgment for herein Affirmed. Petitioner Republic faults the
respondent Celestina Naguiat, appellate court on its finding respecting the
adjudicating unto her the parcels of land length of respondent’s occupation of the
in question and decreeing the property subject of her application for
registration thereof in her name. registration and for not considering the fact that
REPUBLIC vs. NAGUIAT, GR NO. 134209

she has not established that the lands in

question have been declassified from forest or
timber zone to alienable and disposable
property.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S: WON the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public
domain. (NO)

Ruling of SC:

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land
or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush.

Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e.,
from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the
court. Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation
reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. It calls for proof. Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical
descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property.
As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to
be registered forms part of the public domain.

It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in
land registration cases. For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of
forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express
and positive act from the government.

RAMOS v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, G.R. No. 13298, November 19, 1918

Topic: Jurisdiction

Type/Nature of Action: Appeal

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

The presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that land is agricultural in nature. One very apparent reason is that it
is for the good of the Philippine Islands to have the large public domain come under private ownership.

When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court
convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purpose.

But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory
RAMOS v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, G.R. No. 13298, November 19, 1918

evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.

Facts:
● Restituto Romero y Ponce gained possession of a considerable tract of land. He took advantage of the Royal
Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land, registered as Parcel No. 1.
● Parcel No. 1 was sold to petitioner Cornelio Ramos and wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
● Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
● Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the
Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was forest land.
● The trial court excluded Parcel No. 1 from registration.
● The Solicitor General claims that for land to come under the protective aegis of the Maura Law, it must have been
shown that the land was cultivated for six years previously, and it was not land which pertained to the “zonas
forestates.”

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the land in question could be considered “agricultural public land.”

Ruling of SC:

YES.

The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural public land. " The law affirms that the
phrase is defined by the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill, we
find in sections 13 to 18 thereof that three classes of land are mentioned. The first is variously denominated "public land"
or "public domain," the second "mineral land," and the third "timber land." Section 18 of the Act of Congress comes
nearest to a precise definition, when it makes the determination of whether the land is more valuable for agricultural or for
forest uses the test of its character.

In the case which gave most serious consideration to the subject (Mapa vs. Insular Government [1908], 10 Phil., 175), it
was found-that there does exist in the Act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands." It was said
that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as used in Act No. 926 means ''those public lands acquired from Spain which
are not timber or mineral lands."

The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal or mineral in nature and, if not so found, to
consider it to be agricultural land. Here, again, Philippine law is not very helpful.

But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory
evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
REPUBLIC vs. ANIMAS, GR NO. L-37682

Type/Nature of Action: Petition to review

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does
not lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest
or of a forest reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the
Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973.

Facts:

● The land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila Soria. Soria
transferred her rights to Isagani Du Timbol. Du Timbol then filed his application for the land as transferee.
● President of the Ph issued Free Patent then the Register of Deeds of issued an O.C.T in favor of Du Timbol.
● Republic, through the Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint to declare the free patent and certificate of title null
and void ab initio, order surrender and cancellation of the title, and decree reversion of the land to the public
domain.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC dismissed the complaint invoking the case CA
of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, holding that a
certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null
and void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in
misrepresenting that the land covered by the
application is part of the public domain when it
is not. Certificate of Title based on the patent
had became indefeasible in view of the lapse of
the one-year period prescribed under Section
38 of the Land Registration Act for review of a
decree of title on the ground of fraud.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S: WON the area covered by the patent and title is not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone
and, hence the patent and title thereto are null and void. (YES)

Ruling of SC: The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against
the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest
reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the Constitution of
1935 or the Constitution of 1973. Although the Director of Lands has jurisdiction over public lands classified as
agricultural under the constitution, or alienable or disposable under the Public Land Act, and is charged with the
administration of all laws relative thereto, mineral and timber lands are beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of
Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy
and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products
therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a
forest or timber land is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest Development that it is
within the portion of the area which was reverted to the category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7,
1958. When the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for free patent over the land in question on June 3,
1969, the area in question was not a disposable or alienable public land but a public forest. Titles issued to private
parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land covered thereby is not disposable public land but forest land are void ab
initio.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. VILLAREAL, GR NO. L- 32266

TYPE/ NATURE OF ACTION:

DOCTRINE: It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.
Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private property.'

Facts: The land in dispute consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several
persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the applicYNGSON vs. SEC.
OF AGRICULTURE, GR NO. L- 36847ynation was approved by the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari
claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the
registration be reversed. Both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. The bone
of contention between the parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims it is
forestal and therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue
before us is legal, not factual.

Ruling of Lower Courts RTC CA.

Arguments Petitioner Respondent

The petitioner claims it is forestal and The respondent insists it is
therefore not disposable. alienable as agricultural land.

ISSUE/S: WON mangrove swamps (manglares) are considered agricultural lands or forest lands under Philippine law,
specifically in relation to their alienability and susceptibility to private ownership?

Ruling of SC: YES

The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to
implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain. The legislature having made such
implementation, the executive officials may then administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty "to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed" and in accordance with the policy prescribed. The courts will step into the
picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. VILLAREAL, GR NO. L- 32266

being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and
achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources.

Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as
defined in Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917.

Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as
otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves
of whatever character

We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That
determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges
but to apply it. And so we shall.

DECISION IN AMUNATEGUI: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested
lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless
and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'

The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, to prove
that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not have the
effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it
is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the
Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than
forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership

Forest land cannot be owned by private persons, it is not registerable, and adverse possession cannot convert it into
private property. The private respondent’s proof of prescriptive possession is meager and lacking, with no convincing
evidence of the informacion posesoria and only tax declarations as basis, which are insufficient to vest ownership. The
private respondent has not established his right to registration. Mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public
forests of the Philippines and are not alienable until released and classified as alienable agricultural land.

YNGSON vs. SEC. OF AGRICULTURE, GR NO. L- 36847

Topic:

Type/Nature of Action:
YNGSON vs. SEC. OF AGRICULTURE, GR NO. L- 36847

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Facts:
● Several persons, including petitioner-appellant Yngson, filed their applications for fishpond permit with the
Bureau of Fisheries to utilize the mangrove swamps situated in Negros Accidental.
● The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates:
1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946
2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947
3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952
4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953
5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953
● However, when the applications were filed, said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same
was only released for said purpose on January 14, 1954.
● Thus, the claims were brought to the Director of Bureau of Fisheries who then awarded the whole are in favor
of Yngson and rejected the claims of respondents thus prompting them to appeal to the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources which set aside the order and caused the division of the area in question
into 3 portions giving each party an area of ⅓ of the whole area covered by their respective applications
● Appellant thus filed a petition for review which was dismissed by the OP and denied reconsideration.
● Mr. Yngson then filed a petition for certiorari with the CFI and asked that the orders of the public respondents
be declared null and void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be
reinstated.
● CFI dismissed. Hence, the appeal.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC - dismissed the petition on the ground that CA - elevated the appeal to SC for
plaintiff had not established such "capricious involving only pure questions of law
and whimsical exercise of judgment" on the part
of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Office of the President of
the Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion justifying review by the courts in a
special civil action.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S: Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development into fishponds
gravely abuse their discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules?

Ruling of SC: NO, the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development into
fishponds DID NOT gravely abuse their discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules.

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are
released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease,
grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes,
fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization
YNGSON vs. SEC. OF AGRICULTURE, GR NO. L- 36847

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part
of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or
other purposes.
All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another. The
priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of
the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given some kind of administrative
preferential treatment. Whether or not the administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is
not challenged in this case. The validity of paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly
not covered by the provision. His application was filed almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond
purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the one-year period, do not object to sharing the
area with the petitioner-appellant, inspite of the fact that the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases.
As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretary's order states that all three applications must be considered as having
been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the
66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They pray that the decision of
the lower court be affirmed in toto. Hence, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
UTILIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v MUNOZ

Topic: Utilization and Management

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Registration of titles by the owners of private woodlands with the Bureau of Forestry
results in an exemption "from the payment of forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial purposes."
If an owner fails to so register, he is obliged to pay forest charges, as prescribed in Sections 264 and 265 of the Tax
Code, because "he still retain(s) his rights of ownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code)." However, as provided in
Section 266 above-quoted, if an owner does not register his title, but he desires to cut, gather and remove timber and
other forest products from his land, he may "secure a license from the Director of Forestry in accordance with the
Forest Law and regulations." If he does not, under the same Section 266, his cutting, gathering and removing of timber
and other forest products "shall be considered as unlawful cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from
public forests and shall be subject to the charges prescribed in such cases." And this would bring into play Section 267,
where, as heretofore quoted, the charges on forest products "unlawfully cut and gathered in any public forest without
license, or, if under license, in violation of the terms thereof ... shall be increased by three hundred per centum.

Facts:
● Piadeco claims to be the owner of some hectares of land at Bulacan and Rizal. He applied for registration as
private woodland. A certificate was issued to Piadeco and pursuant to the registration certificate, Piadeco
conducted logging operations
● Acting Director of Forestry Rivera then cancelled the certificate and required Piadeco to surrender the original
certificate to him on the ground that it violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting trees within the Angat
and Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly calculated from the said certificate
● Piadeco was later requested to desist from conducting its logging operation inside or outside the area and to
refrain from removing logs already cut unless they have been scaled and properly invoiced by forestry officers.
The right of way was also revoked by NAWASA for an access road to its logging concession
● Offshoot of the foregoing is Piadeco’s petition for certiorari and prohibition with RTC against the Director of
Forestry
● Piadeco then applied for the renewal of its Certificate of Private Woodland Registration which would nearly
expire but it was denied. Piadeco was informed that its Titulo was not registrable under Forestry Administrative
Order No. 12-2. The expiration of its registration certificate and the non-renewal thereof notwithstanding,
Piadeco continued logging operations. It was about this time that illegal logging was denounced by some
members of Congress

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Piadeco’s title is registrable with the Bureau of Forestry
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v MUNOZ

Ruling of SC:

To recapitulate, registration of titles by the owners of private woodlands with the Bureau of Forestry results in an
exemption “from the payment of forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial purposes.” if an owner
fails to so register, he is obliged to pay forest charges because he still retains his right of ownership, among which are
his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. However, as
provided in Section 266 of the Tax Code, if an owner does not register his title, but he desires to cut, gather, and
remove timber and other forest products from his land, he may secure a license from the Director of Forestry in
accordance with the Forest Law and regulations. If he does not, his cutting , gather and removing of timber and other
forest products shall be considered as unlawful cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forests
and shall be subject to the charges prescribed in such cases.

But it should be stressed that all of the situations herein mentioned refer specifically to owners of private woodlands.
The position Piadeco has taken is a jump ahead of where it should be. We are not ready to grant the assumption that
Piadeco owns the forest land it seeks to register. Such unwillingness can come from even a superficial assessment of
Piadeco's pretensions of ownership based on the Titulo de Propiedad in question.

Even on the assumption that Piadeco's alleged title is registrable, said corporation cannot complain against the
cancellation thereof by the Director of Forestry on April 11, 1964. When the Director of Forestry cancelled Piadeco's
registration certificate, he only performed his duty as he saw fit. By Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, "the Director of
Forestry may cancel a certificate of registration for any violation of the provision of this Order or of the forest and
internal revenue laws and regulations or of the terms and conditions embodied in the certificate, or when found that the
area is no longer covered with forest, or upon failure of the landowner thereof, or of his representatives, to obey, follow
or implement instructions of the said Director of Forestry." To him, a condition expressly written into the registration
certificate was being violated. Piadeco was found to be cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed
Reservations in direct contravention of a specific prohibition in the certificate. And this, upon the basis of positive and
actual findings of qualified and competent forestry officers.

TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

Topic: Utilization and Management

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review under rule 65.

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

The power of control of the Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside
acts of subordinate officials . Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has the
authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry

Facts:
- The Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land
TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961. This public forest land,
consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of
timberland, which was turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine Government.
- Petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after paying the necessary fees
and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline
- Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to
be awarded to the most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the
Director of the Bureau of Forestry, which read as follows:

It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve for watershed
purposes. Prepare and submit immediately a draft of a proclamation establishing the said area as a watershed forest
reserve for Olongapo, Zambales. It is also desired that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of the
timber license in the area during the public bidding conducted last May 22, 1961 be rejected in order that the area may be
reserved as above stated. ...

(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA

- Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the findings and re comendations of the
Director of Forestry who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for
exploitation under certain conditions,"
- Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan by the Bureau of Forestry.
- The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon — who succeeded Secretary Cesar M.
Fortich in office — issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, Which is the delegation of authority
to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses.
- Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, replacing secretary
Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon assumption of office he Immediately promulgate on December 19, 19b3 General
memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General
Memorandum order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber licenses, which order took effect on the same day, December
19, 1963.
- On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963, Ordinary Timber License
No. 20-'64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director
of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On
January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry. It was not signed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by Order No. 60.
- Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that OTI No.
20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular,
anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.
- The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber License No.
20-'64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued by the Director of Forestry without
authority, and is therefore void ab initio.
- The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, acting on the separate appeals filed by Jorge Lao Happick and
Ravago Commercial Company, from the order of the Director of Forestry dated April 15, 1963, awarding to
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan the area under Notive No. 2087 ruled that in view of the observations of the Director of
Forestry just quoted, "to grant the area in question to any of the parties herein, would undoubtedly adversely affect
public interest which is paramount to private interests," and concluding that, "for this reason, this Office is of the
opinion and so holds, that without the necessity of discussing the appeals of the herein appellants, the said appeals
should be, as hereby they are, dismissed and this case is considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is
concerned".
- On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of Agriculture and
TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

Natural Resources, petitioner-appellant filed the instant case before tile court a quo (Court of First Instance, Manila).

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

The RTC dismissed.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

Petitioner-appellant claims that the The Director of Forestry in his
respondents-appellees "unlawfully, illegally motion to dismiss dated April 24,
whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted 1964, alleges the following grounds:
without or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or (1) that the court has no jurisdiction;
with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a (2) that the respondents may not be
valid and existing timber license without just sued without their consent; (3) that
cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the the petitioner has not exhausted all
equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of available administrative remedies;
his constitutional right to property without due (4) that the petition does not state a
process of law, and in effect, by impairing the cause of action; and (5) that purely
obligation of contracts" administrative and discretionary
functions of administrative officials
may not be interfered with by the
courts.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action?(YES)
Whether or not the ordinary timber license is void ab initio?(YES)
Whether or not petitioner exhausted administrative remedies? (NO)
Whether or not respondents may not be sued without their Consent? (YES)
Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources have the power to revoke the Timber License issued by
the director of Forestry?(YES)

Ruling of SC:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant's contentions are untenable. As already observed, this
case was presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the petition to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, on the ground that the timber license relied upon by the petitioner- appellant in his petition was issued by
the Director of Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab initio.
It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein answers were interposed and evidence
introduced. In the course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to introduce evidence in support of tile
allegations iii his petition, which he readily availed of. Consequently, he is estopped from invoking the rule that to determine
the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered.

On the Second issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

The area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license practically comprises the entire Olongapo watershed (. It is of
TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

public knowledge that watersheds serves as a defense against soil erosion and guarantees the steady supply of water. As a
matter of general policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the conservation and proper utilization of natural
resources, which includes the country's watershed. Watersheds in the Philippines had been subjected to rampant abusive
treatment due to various unscientific and destructive land use practices. Once lush watersheds were wantonly deforested
due to uncontrolled timber cutting by licensed concessionaries and illegal loggers.

Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We therefore take judicial notice of the fact that, on
April 30, 1964, the area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license has been established as the Olongapo Watershed
Forest Reserve by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238 by then President Diosdado Macapagal.

In the light of petitioner-appellant's arguments, it is readily seen that the whole controversy hinges on the validity or invalidity
of his timber license.

WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber license was signed and released without
authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio.

The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to December 19,
1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the
date of the release or issuance, and not the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant's timber
license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release,
no right is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any
authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right
under such void license.

On the third issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the Negative.

Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the
President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and
establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on
appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on
his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.

On the Fourth issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note that his action is a suit
against the State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to
be sued.

Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of the
State, representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. A private individual cannot issue a
timber license.

Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in the government losing a substantial part of its
timber resources. This being the case, petitioner-appellant's action cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be
sued.ℒαwρhi৷

On the fifth Issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director of Forestry. The utilization and disposition of forest resources is
directly under the control and supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest only upon license
from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of
TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who, therefore, may impose reasonable
regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer".

PEOPLE vs. QUE, GR NO. 120365

Topic:

Type/Nature of Action: : petition for review

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Facts:

● SPO1 Corpuz of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received information that a truck with plate
number PAD-548 was carrying illegal lumber.

● On March 8, 1994, police officers spotted the truck in Laoag City and stopped it at Marcos Bridge.

● The truck, owned by Wilson Que (accused-appellant), was loaded with coconut slabs. However, Que
admitted that sawn lumber was hidden underneath.

● When asked for proper documents (permits and certificates from the DENR), Que could only show a
certification for the coconut slabs, not for the lumber.

● Upon inspection with DENR personnel, the cargo was found to include 258 pieces of tanguile lumber, valued
at ₱93,232.50, hidden under the slabs.

● Que claimed the lumber came from a legal source, covered by permits of other persons (Cayosa and Sabal),
and was given to him as payment for hauling services.

● He also argued that the lumber should not be admitted as evidence because it was obtained through an illegal
search and that his admission was not made with counsel present.

● The RTC convicted Que, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered the confiscation of the lumber
and his truck.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

appellant argues that he cannot be

convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D.
705 because E.O. 277 which amended
PEOPLE vs. QUE, GR NO. 120365

Section 68 to penalize the possession of

timber or other forest products without the
proper legal documents did not indicate the
particular documents necessary to make the
possession legal. Neither did the other
forest laws and regulations existing at the
time of its enactment.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the warrantless search, seizure of the lumber, and the uncounselled admission of
accused-appellant Wilson Que were valid, and whether he can be held criminally liable for illegal
possession of forest products under Section 68 of P.D. 705 (as amended by E.O. 277).

Ruling of SC:

Appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides:

Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License. — Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers
are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation.

Appellant interprets the phrase "existing forest laws and regulations" to refer to those laws and regulations which
were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would
render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to
refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative
Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products.
Section 3 of the Administrative Order provides:

Section 3. Documents Required.

Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer, non-timber forest
products and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be covered with appropriate Certificates of
Origin, issued by authorized DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.

It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to transport one (1) truckload of coconut
slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing
plate number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly,
PEOPLE vs. QUE, GR NO. 120365

the lumber could not be seen from the outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the
coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.

Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much aware that he needed documents
to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the
same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police authorities by merely looking at the cargo.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant.

Aquino vs. People

Topic:

Type/Nature of Action: : petition for review

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Facts:

● On behalf of Teachers' Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers' Camp in
Baguio City.
● Before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Forest
Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an
inspection of the trees to be cut.
● Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the cutting of
14 trees subject to conditions.
● Forest Rangers received information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers' Camp without proper
authority. They proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger
from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto
Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing (Masing) on the site, together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas)
and Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab), who were also supervising the cutting of the trees. The forest rangers
found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit.
● An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 was filed against petitioner,
Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago.
Aquino vs. People

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

The trial court ruled that the trees cut Court of Appeals modified the trial
exceeded the allowed number of the trees court's Decision. The Court of
authorized to be cut. The trial court further Appeals ruled that as a forest
ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond guard or ranger of the CENRO,
the period stated in the permit. DENR, petitioner had the duty to
supervise the cutting of trees and
to ensure that the sawyers
complied with the terms of the
permit which only he possessed.
The Court of Appeals ruled that
while it was Teachers' Camp
which hired the sawyers,
petitioner had control over their
acts.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

Petitioner alleged that he was sent to

supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers'
Camp. He allegedly informed his superior,
Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the
trees covered by the permit. However, he
still supervised the cutting of trees without
procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in
the inspection of the trees to be cut. He
claimed that he could not prevent the
overcutting of trees because he was just
alone while Cuteng and Santiago were
accompanied by three other men.

ISSUE/S:

Whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.

Ruling of SC:

No.
Aquino vs. People

The provision of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of
the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation
of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers'
Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all
his co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more
than what was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could have informed his
superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make petitioner administratively
liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of PD 705.

TIGOY v. CA, G.R. No. 144640, June 26, 2006

Topic: Criminal offenses & penalties

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review under Rule 45

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law such as in the
present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously.

Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy may be
proven by circumstantial evidence. It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense is
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest. It is not even required that the participants have an agreement for an appreciable
period to commence it.

Facts:
● A Contract Transport construction materials was supposedly entered into between Ong and Bertodazo.
● Senior Inspector Tome, while escorting Provincial Director Coloma received a dispatch from the PNP Company
informing him that two trucks, a blue and green loaded with cement, that were going towards Ozamis City did
not stop at the checkpoint.
● The PNP chased the trucks and overtook the same. They blocked the road with their vehicle causing the two
trucks to stop.
● When he inquired what was loaded in the truck, the driver replied that there is “S.O.P.,” which means grease
money in street parlance. This raised the suspicion of Tome that the trucks were loaded with “hot items.”
● Upon inspection, the police officers discovered piles of sawn lumber beneath the cement bags in both trucks.
Tome inquired if the drivers had a permit for the lumber but the latter could not produce any.
● Consequently, the lumber and the vehicles were seized upon the order of the DENR Regional Executive
Director.
TIGOY v. CA, G.R. No. 144640, June 26, 2006

● An Information was filed against Nestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy for possession
of forest products without legal permit.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

found accused guilty beyond Modified the ruling of the lower court.
reasonable doubt of possession of It declared that “constructive
dipterocarp lumber without the legal possession” of unlicensed lumber is not
documents as required by existing within the contemplation of Section 68
laws and regulations, penalized as of P.D. No. 705, and for failure by the
qualified theft. prosecution to prove the complicity of
Ong.
Ong was acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence, while the conviction of Tigoy
is upheld.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

Maintains that he could not have
conspired with Lolong Bertodazo as
he did not know about the unlicensed
lumber in the trucks. He believed that
what he was transporting were bags of
cement in view of the contract
between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he
was not around when Bertodazo
loaded the trucks with the lumber
hidden under the bags of cement.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner Tigoy is guilty of conspiracy in possessing or transporting lumber without the necessary permit
in violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.

Ruling of SC:

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines, provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. – Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . .

There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other
forest products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest products without the required legal
documents.

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable under Section 68
of the Code. He, Sumagang and the rest of their companions were apprehended by the police officers in flagrante
delicto, as they were transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City.

Petitioner's actions adequately show that he intentionally participated in the commission of the offense for which he had
been charged and found guilty by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Finding that petitioner’s conviction was reached without arbitrariness and with sufficient basis, the Court upheld the
same.

MERIDA vs. PEOPLE, GR NO. 158182

Topic: CRIMINAL OFFENSES & PENALTIES

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for Review

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be
given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And in so far as possession of timber without the required
legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw and
processed timber.

Facts:
● Petitioner was charged for violation of Section 68, PD 705 (Forestry Code) for cutting a narra tree in private
land at Romblon.
● Private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco claimed ownership of the land where the tree stood.
● Tansiongco discovered the petitioner cut the tree and reported it to Barangay Captain Florencio Royo.
● In a barangay meeting, petitioner admitted cutting the tree, but claimed he had permission from Vicar Calix,
alleged buyer of the land under a pacto de retro sale in 1987. He showed Royo a written authorization signed
by Calix’s wife.
● Tansiongco reported to DENR forester Thelmo Hernandez, who confronted the petitioner. Petitioner reiterated
his claim of authority from Calix. Hernandez ordered him not to convert the felled tree into lumber.
● Tansiongco again reported that the petitioner cut the trunk into lumber. DENR officers saw the tree processed
into six lumber pieces. Lumber was seized and placed in Royo’s custody.
● Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause and filed an
Information.
● At trial: Prosecution presented six witnesses (including Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez). Petitioner
testified alone, and for the first time, denied participation in cutting.

Ruling of Lower RTC CA

Courts:
Dismissed petitioner's defense of denial Affirmed the trial court's ruling but ordered the
in view of his repeated extrajudicial seized lumber confiscated in the government's
admissions that he cut the narra tree in favor. It sustained the trial court's finding that
MERIDA vs. PEOPLE, GR NO. 158182

the Mayod Property with Calix's petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial

permission. With this finding and admissions of cutting the narra tree in the
petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut Mayod Property without any DENR permit.
the tree, the trial court held petitioner
liable for violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S:

1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based on a complaint
filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; (YES) and

2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. (YES)

Ruling of SC:

1) We held in People v. CFI of Quezon that the phrase "reports and complaints" in Section 80 refers to "reports
and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest officers or
employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations of
forest laws not committed in their presence."

Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized
officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a
private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not
conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report."
At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from
filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls
within its exclusive original jurisdiction.

2) Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts:

(1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land
without any authority;

(2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority; and

(3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations.

The lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property constitutes "timber" under Section 68 of PD 705,
as amended. PD 705 does not define "timber," only "forest product" (which circuitously includes "timber.")
Does the narra tree in question constitute "timber" under Section 68? The closest this Court came to defining
the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log." In other
jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions or certain "stand age" or "rotation
age."

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should
MERIDA vs. PEOPLE, GR NO. 158182

be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And in so far as possession of timber without the
required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction
between raw and procesed timber. Neither should we.

Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted the same into "several pieces of
sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111 board feet x x x."
These measurements were indicated in the apprehension receipt Hernandez issued to petitioner on 26
January 1999 which the prosecution introduced in evidence. Further, Hernandez testified that the larger
portion of the felled log left in the Mayod Property "measured 76 something centimeters [at the big end] while
the smaller end measured 65 centimeters and the length was 2.8 meters." Undoubtedly, the narra tree
petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls
under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

GALO MONGE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Topic: Criminal Offenses Punishable by PD 705

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct and separate offenses, namely: (a)
the cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other
forest products without the legal documents required under existing laws and regulations.

In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of forest
products are legal precisely because mere possession of forest products without the requisite documents
consummates the crime.

In other words, mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even
absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. It would therefore make no difference at all whether it was the petitioner
himself or Potencio who owned the subject pieces of lumber

Facts:

● Petitioner and Potencio were found by barangay tanods in possession of and transporting three pieces of
mahogany lumber
● When asked of the permit from DENR, the petitioner fled the scene in that instant whereas Potencio was
brought to the police station
● Later on petitioner was arrested and an Information was filed against him

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

The trial court found the petitioner guilty as The appellate court dismissed this
charged. Petitioner was imposed nine (9) years, challenge and affirmed the findings
four (4) months and one (1) day to ten (10) of the trial court. However, it
years and eight (8) months of prision mayor in modified the penalty to an
GALO MONGE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

its medium and maximum periods and ordered indeterminate prison sentence of six
to pay the cost (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to ten (10) years and eight
(8) months of prision mayor as
maximum

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

Petitioner did not contest the allegations,

except that it was not he but Potencio who
owned the lumber. He lamented that contrary to
what Potencio had stated in court, it was the
latter who hired him to bring the log from the
site to the sawmill where the same was to be
sawn into pieces.

ISSUE/S:

WON petitioner is guilty of the crime charged

Ruling of SC:

YES.

Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and thus in possession of, processed mahogany
lumber without proper authority from the DENR.

In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products
may be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial
whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of forest products are legal precisely because
mere possession of forest products without the requisite documents consummates the crime.

It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the subject mahogany lumber and their
subsequent failure to produce the requisite legal documents, taken together, has already given rise to criminal liability
under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the second act punished thereunder

P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As such, in prosecutions under
its provisions, claims of good faith are by no means reliable as defenses because the offense is complete and criminal
liability attaches once the prohibited acts are committed. In other words, mere possession of timber or other forest
products without the proper legal documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. It would therefore
make no difference at all whether it was the petitioner himself or Potencio who owned the subject pieces of lumber.
PALLADA vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 131270

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Possession of lumber requires the appropriate legal documentation, specifically a
Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO). Certificates of Timber Origin (CTO) are not sufficient. Public documents with patent
irregularities on their face are not entitled to the presumption of regularity.

As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to
be imposed should be six (6) years of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal

Facts:

● DENR office of Bukidnon received reports of illegally cut lumber being delivered to Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation's warehouse in Bukidnon.
● A raid, conducted under a warrant, revealed a large stockpile of lumber.
● Perfecto Pallada, the general manager, presented receipts from R.L. Rivero Lumberyard, but the DENR
officers disregarded them because the lumberyard's permit was suspended and the lumber was cut by
chainsaw, not a licensed sawmill.
● The seized lumber totaled 29,299.25 board feet, valued at P488,334.45.
● Pallada refused to acknowledge the seizure orders.
● Thereafter, Pallada, along with others, was charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
705, as amended, for illegal possession of lumber.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC convicted Perfecto Pallada and Francisco CA affirmed Pallada's conviction but
Tankiko. acquitted Tankiko. Pallada then filed
a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments
should have been considered in establishing the legality of the company's possession of the lumber. (NO)
2. WON the penalty imposed should be modified. (YES)

Ruling of SC:

Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and
their attachments should have been considered in establishing the legality of the company's possession of the
lumber. In support of his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.

The contention has no, merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore,
the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase "posses
timber or other forest products" in §68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who possess timber and forest products
without the documents required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the
PALLADA vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 131270

other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber.
Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products. 15 As already
noted, the opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of
origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to
have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."

Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial
court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and
defects found in the documents presented by the latter. According to the trial court:

Although the CTO marked Exh. "6" mentions 56 pieces of flitches, the supporting documents, like the Tally Sheet, the
Delivery Receipt from the lumber dealer and the Cash Voucher describe 463 pieces of lumber. . . .

In like manner, Exh. "7" and Exh. "9" mention 961 and 420 pieces of log, respectively. But the supporting documents
describe the forest product[s] as lumber.

The CTO marked Exh. "[8]" reveals a half-truth: it mentions 678 pieces of hand-sawn lumber. Its Auxiliary Invoice also
states the same load of lumber. Someone may have noticed the "mistake" of mentioning lumber in the Auxiliary Invoice
and so the words "flitches 87 pieces" were written down and enclosed in parenthesis.

The said exhibits also appear to be questionable, [t]hus[:]

The CTO marked Exh. "6" is consigned to "any buyer (sic) Cagayan de Oro", but its Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "6-A")
mentions Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation as the consignee. Moreover, the CTO states (at the back page) that the
same is covered by Auxiliary Invoice No. 00491; in fact, the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. 6-A) has invoice number 000488.

In the CTO marked Exhibit "7", the original typewritten name of the consignee was clearly erased and changed to
"Valencia, Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon". In the Auxiliary Invoice (Exh. "7-A") the blank space for
the name and address of the consignee was smudged with a typewriter correction fluid (the better to erase what was
originally typewritten in it?) and changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon".

The CTO marked Exh. "9" and its Auxiliary Invoice marked Exh. "9-A" [were] "doctored" in the same manner as Exh.
"[7]" and Exh. "[7-A]". 17

Additionally, all the Auxiliary Invoice were not properly accomplished: the data required to be filled are left in blank.

Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin in Exh. 7 bears no date, the dorsal side bears the
certification that the logs were "scaled on August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached to that Certificate is dated
February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list in sizes and volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the
company purchased cut lumber from the dealers, thus belying the testimony of petitioner that when the company
bought the forest products, they were still in the form of flitches and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the
company. 18

These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only questionable but invalid
and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same.

It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not be taken against petitioner because the
documents came from lumber dealers. In addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary Receipts, being public
documents, should be accorded the presumption of regularity in their execution. 20

This contention is untenable. What render these documents without legal effect are the patent irregularities found on
their faces. That petitioner may not have any responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the
PALLADA vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 131270

corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and
he should have taken steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as he is
concerned, the documents are regular and complete. 21

The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the
DENR officials concerned. The presumption invoked by petitioner applies only when the public accomplished.22
documents are, on their faces, regular and properly accomplished. 22

Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, made applicable to the
offense by P.D. No. 705, §68, provides:

Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium; periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
P12,000 pesos but does not exceed P22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the Case may be. . . .

WHEREFORE the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 1997, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that petitioner is sentenced to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
TAOPA vs. PEOPLE, GR NO. 184098

TYPE/ NATURE OF ACTION:

Facts:

On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck
loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca
fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco
as the owners of the seized lumber.

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705, as
amended, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The information against them read that on or about
the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning at Barangay Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province
of Catanduanes, the accused, with intent to possess, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally possess, transport in a truck forest products, particularly one hundred thirteen (113)
pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong species with an aggregate net volume of One Thousand
Six Hundred Eighty Four (1,684) board feet with an approximate value of Ninety-Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty
(Php99,120.00) Pesos, without any authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment.

Ruling of Lower Courtss RTC CA.

RTC found them guilty as charged Reversed decision with

beyond reasonable doubt. modification

Arguments Petitioner Respondent

In this petition, Taopa seeks his
acquittal from the charges against
him. He alleges that the prosecution
failed to prove that he was one of the
owners of the seized lumber as he
was not in the truck when the lumber
was seized.

ISSUE/S: WON Taopa is guilty for violating Section 68 of PD No. 705

TAOPA vs. PEOPLE, GR NO. 184098

Ruling of SC: YES

Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cuison's testimony proved Taopa's active
participation in the transport of the seized lumber. The RTC and the CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo
in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the
truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control over the
lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or
other forest products without the required legal documents. The fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere
sight of the police was largely indicative of guilt. Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.

However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed on Taopa.

Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft. The law treats cutting, gathering,
collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to
the felony of qualified theft.

Articles 309 and 310 read:

Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional
ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis supplied)

2. xxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
those respectively specified in the next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied).

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630. Following Article 310 in relation to Article
309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from
14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the excess of P47,630.

The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty next lower to that
prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years
and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium period of reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion
temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16 years, five months and 11 days of reclusion
temporal to 22 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE vs. CFI OF QUEZON & ARROZAL, GR NO. L- 46772

Topic: CRIMINAL OFFENSES & PENALTIES

PEOPLE vs. CFI OF QUEZON & ARROZAL, GR NO. L- 46772

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: The above cited provision covers two (2) specific instances when a forest officer may
commence a prosecution for the violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest
officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person who has committed or is
committing; in his presence, any of the offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an
offense described in the decree is not committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee and the commission
is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall
investigate the offender and file a complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation and file the necessary informations in court.

Facts:
● Private respondents Arrozal and Luis Flores were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and
punished under Sec.68 of PD705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
● the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form.
● The trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked and denied reconsideration.
● Hence, the petition.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC - dismissed and denied MR CA

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

On the first issue, the People alleged that,
contrary to the allegation of the private
respondents and the opinion of the trial court,
the information substantially alleged all the
elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs
as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it
was admitted that the information did not
precisely allege that the taking of the logs in
question was “without the consent of the state,”
nevertheless, said information expressly stated
that the accused “illegally cut, gather, take,
steal and carry away therefrom, without the
consent of said owner and without any authority
under a license agreement, lease, license or
permit, sixty (60) logs of different species x x x.”
Since only the state can grant the lease,
license, license agreement or permit for
utilization of forest resources, including timber,
then the allegation in the information that the
asportation of the logs was “without any
authority” under a license agreement, lease,
license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that
the taking of the logs was without the consent
of the state

ISSUE/S:
1) whether or not the information charged an offense; and
(2) whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
PEOPLE vs. CFI OF QUEZON & ARROZAL, GR NO. L- 46772

Ruling of SC:
1. YES, the information charged an offense. “SEC. 68 of PD 705 provides that, “Cutting, gathering and/or
collecting timber or other products without license. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber
or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from
private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of
qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code”
The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed
timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber of other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs
to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without
authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.
The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that
the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name
of complainant’s deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license
or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including
those produced in private woodlands.
Furthermore, Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus,
the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material, it was sufficient that it
alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.

2. YES, the trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
because the information was filed not pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as prescribed in Section 80
of P.D. 705.
Section 80 of Presidential Decree 705, provides:
“SEC. 80. Arrest: Institution of Criminal Actions. - A forest officer or employee of the Bureau shall arrest even without
warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He
shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense,
and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense. The arresting
forest officer or employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender
and the confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to, and file the proper complaint with, the appropriate official
designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in court.
“If the arrest and seizure are made in the forests, far from the authorities designated by law to conduct preliminary
investigations, the delivery to, and filing of the complaint with, the latter shall be done within a reasonable time sufficient
for ordinary travel from the place of arrest to the place of delivery. The seized products, materials and equipment shall
be immediately disposed of in accordance with forestry administrative orders promulgated by the Department Head.

“The Department Head may deputize any member or unit of the Philippine Constabulary, police agency, barangay or
barrio official, or any qualified person to protect the forest and exercise the power or authority provided for in the
preceding paragraph.

“Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not committed in the
presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be
investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon
receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.

“If there is a prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall file the
necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal
cases and file an information in Court.
The above cited provision covers two (2) specific instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for the
violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the Bureau
of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing; in his presence, any of the
offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an offense described in the decree is not
committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee and the commission is brought to his attention by a report
PEOPLE vs. CFI OF QUEZON & ARROZAL, GR NO. L- 46772

or a complaint. In both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint
with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary informations
in court.

The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705.
The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged commission
reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the complaint was brought by a private
offended party to the fiscal. Hence, the trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter because the information was filed not pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as prescribed in
Section 80 of P.D. 705. Hence, the petition is GRANTED.

TAN VS COURT OF APPEALS

Topic: CRIMINAL OFFENSES & PENALTIES

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Facts:
- On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and
Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck was driven by Petitioner Fred Moreno,
an employee of A & E Construction.
- Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989, this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino apprehended another
dump truck with Plate No. DEK-646 loaded with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E
Construction.
- Both motor vehicles, as well as the construction firm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no documents
showing legal possession of the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forest guards; thus, the pieces of lumber were confiscated.
- On March 16, 1990, Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo, caretaker and time keeper of A & E Construction, were charged by
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R. Rocero with violation of Section 68, PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277.
- In another Information,Tan and Ramilo, together with Crispin Cabudol, were also charged for the same violation in connection with the
October 30, 1989 incident.ℒαwρhi৷On April 26, 1990, all the accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned on the basis of the
aforementioned Informations; each pleaded not guilty. The cases were thence jointly tried, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

The trial court ruled that the confiscated pieces of The CA affirmed the Lower court’s
lumber which were admittedly owned by Accused Tan decision.
were not legitimate deliveries but aborted nocturnal
hauling. It convicted all the accused as charged, for
their failure to comply with the Forestry Reform Code,
which requires the following legal documents: (1) an
auxiliary invoice, (2) a certificate of origin, (3) a sales
invoice, (4) scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber dealer
permit.
TAN VS COURT OF APPEALS

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Section 68 of EO 277 is constitutional
Whether or not the treatment by the lower court of lumber as timber and/or forest product within the contemplation of PD 705
Whether or not EO 277 was retroactively applied.

Ruling of SC:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License.ℒαwρhi৷ — Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceeding on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.

One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. As Respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners were
not "charged with the [unlawful] possession of firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, 'the associated water' or fish"; thus, the
inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 "is absolutely of no concern" to petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which
they are entitled to a judicial determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of said provision. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks it
on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

The question of whether lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, has been settled in Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, in which this Court expressly ruled that "lumber is included in the term timber." We quote at length the Court's discussion:

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber of lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined
in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which
reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its
ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia,
as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither do we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
TAN VS COURT OF APPEALS

distinguire debemus.

On the third issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the Negative.

Petitioners insist that EO 277 is not applicable to them, because the seized lumber had been lawfully possessed by Cajidiocan Trading since
March 1987, while the amendatory law was issued only on July 25, 1987, and took effect fifteen days after publication.

This strained reasoning deserves scant consideration.

First, at no time during the apprehensions did petitioners claim that the lumber belonged to Cajidiocan Trading. In fact, Petitioner Ramilo and the
drivers openly claimed that the lumber and the trucks belonged to A & E Construction which was, in turn, owned by Petitioner Tan. It was only
during the course of the trial, through the testimony of Prisco Marin (characterized by the appellate court as "anything but credible"), that the
alleged ownership thereof by Cajidiocan Trading was brought out.

Second, the supposed sale of the subject lumber by Matzhou to Cajidiocan Trading, as evidenced by the auxiliary invoice, occurred in March 1987,
or more than two and a half years prior to the apprehension and seizure that gave rise to this case. It is highly doubtful if the lumber bought at
the earlier date was the very same lumber confiscated in October 1989. No evidence was presented to overcome this veritable doubt.

Third and most important, assuming that indeed they were the very same lumber, forest laws and regulations also require the following
documents: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) sales invoice, (3) delivery receipt, (4) tally sheet, and (5) certificate of transport agreement.30
None of these documents were proffered in court or elsewhere. Petitioners' unlawful possession of the subject lumber occurred in October 1989.

EO 277, which specifically included "possession" of timber and other forest products within the contemplation of PD 705, had already been
issued and in effect more than two years previous thereto.
DENR vs. DARAMAN, GR NO. 125797

Topic: CRIMINAL OFFENSES & PENALTIES

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for Review

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Facts:

● On November 30, 1993, a DENR forest ranger, Pablo Opinion, stopped a vehicle named St. Jude in San Jorge,
Samar.

● The vehicle, driven by Gregorio Daraman and owned by Narciso Lucenecio (Holy Cross Funeral Services), was
loaded with wood shavings and 72 pieces of assorted lumber.

● Daraman said the wood shavings were for the funeral parlor, while the lumber belonged to a certain Asan
Abing, owner of a furniture shop in Barangay Blanca Aurora, who asked him to deliver the lumber to Calbayog
City.

● When asked, Daraman admitted he had no papers for the lumber, only saying Asan told him the documents
were in his shop.

● The DENR seized the lumber and the vehicle. Later, in an administrative proceeding, the DENR ordered the
confiscation of both.

● In the criminal case before the RTC, the prosecution charged Daraman and Lucenecio with violation of Sec. 68
of P.D. 705 (illegal possession of forest products).

● The RTC acquitted both accused for lack of evidence, finding the lumber really belonged to Asan, not them. It
also ordered the return of the vehicle to Lucenecio.

● The DENR opposed, insisting the vehicle was already administratively confiscated and should not have been
returned.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

N/A

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

Petitioner alleges that the RTC
misinterpreted the law when it held that
Section 68-A, PD 705 contemplated a
situation in which the very owner of the
vehicle was the violator or was a
conspirator with other violators of that
law. Department Order No. 54, Series of
1993, provides that the proceedings for
the confiscation and the forfeiture of the
conveyance shall be directed against its
owner, and that lack of knowledge of its
illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.
DENR vs. DARAMAN, GR NO. 125797

ISSUE/S:
whether the trial court erred in ordering the return of the seized vehicle to its owner (Lucenecio), despite the
DENR’s prior administrative confiscation and forfeiture of the same vehicle for violation of Section 68 of P.D.
705 (Forestry Code), as amended.

Ruling of SC:

We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is immaterial, because what is
punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products without legal documents.
The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable
of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does not
clothe petitioner with that authority.

Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional trial courts the confiscation of
conveyances used in violation of forestry laws.1âwphi1 Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal
liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest
products without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal interpretation would lead to either an
absurdity or an injustice.

We also uphold petitioner’s argument that the release of the vehicle to private respondents would defeat the purpose
and undermine the implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the
urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future generations.
Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant enforcement and
implementation of our forestry laws. Strong paramount public policy should not be degraded by narrow constructions of
the law that frustrate its clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.

Momongan vs. Omipon

Topic:

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Momongan vs. Omipon

Facts:

● Police officers of the Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte apprehended Dionisio Golpe while he
was driving his truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck and logs were impounded.
● A complaint was filed against Basilio Cabig, the alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the
preliminary investigation, respondent Judge Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case exists
against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was
not charged in the complaint.
● Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
filed the instant complaint against respondent Judge alleging that his order releasing the truck used in
the transport of illegally cut forest products violated Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, Section 68 and 68-A and Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S: Whether the order to release the truck violated Presidential Decree No. 705 (as amended by
Executive Order No. 277) and Administrative Order No. 59 regarding the confiscation and disposition of
illegally obtained forest products and related conveyances.

Ruling of SC:

No.

We do not find that when respondent Judge released the truck after he conducted the preliminary investigation
and satisfied himself that there was no reason to continue keeping the truck, he violated Pres. Decree No. 705
and Adm. Order No. 59. The release of the truck did not render nugatory the administrative authority of the
DENR Secretary. The confiscation proceedings under Adm. Order No. 59 is different from the confiscation
under the Revised Penal Code, which is an additional penalty imposed in the event of conviction. Despite the
order of release, the truck can be seized again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to
include the truck owner/driver as co-accused, which complainant has done as manifested before the lower
court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12 thereof categorically states that "[t]he confiscation of the
conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to any criminal action which shall be filed
against the owner thereof or any person who used the conveyance in the commission of the offense."

Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No. 59, if the apprehension is not made by DENR field offices, deputized military
personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and their
conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices and turn over said forest products and conveyances
for proper action and disposition. A period of about two weeks lapsed from the time the seizure was made
Momongan vs. Omipon

before a complaint was filed. During this period, the apprehending policemen had enough time to turn over the
logs and the truck to the nearest DENR field office for proper action and disposition since the duty to turn over
the truck to the nearest DENR field office rests on the officials apprehending the illegal logs. There being no
mandatory duty on the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he should not be visited with
disciplinary sanction when he did not refer the same to the DENR field office in San Juan, Southern Leyte.

PEOPLE v. BAGISTA, G.R. No. 86218, September 18, 1992

Topic: Criminal offenses & penalties

Type/Nature of Action: Appeal

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a
search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure
of evidence in plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles
makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.

Facts:
● The Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office received information from one of its regular
informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly hair would be transporting marijuana
from up north.
PEOPLE v. BAGISTA, G.R. No. 86218, September 18, 1992

● Acting upon this piece of information, a civilian NARCOM agent proceeded and established a checkpoint and
flagged down all vehicles, both private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles
were carrying marijuana leaves on board.
● The NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus, which came from Lepanto, Benguet.
● Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right side of the last seat of the bus, with a
travelling bag with the black and orange stripes on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and discovered
three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were
confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she
was booked and investigated.
● The woman was then identified as accused-appellant.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

Concluded that the accused-appellant was
in the act of transporting marijuana at the
time of her arrest.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

Alleged that the court a quo erred in not
finding the warrantless search conducted
by the NARCOM agents as illegal and
unconstitutional, and in admitting the
illegally obtained evidences and convicting
her on the basis of said evidences.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in finding the warrantless search as illegal and unconstitutional and in admitting
the illegally obtained evidence and convicting her on the basis of said evidence.

Ruling of SC:

NO.

The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected to a
search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the
occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
states:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among
others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."

sought.

The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at
Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular informant that a woman
having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise
have probable cause to search accused-appellant's belongings since she fits the description given by the NARCOM
informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the
course of said search is admissible against accused-appellant.

At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-appellant in the court below on the inadmissibility of the evidence
against her on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. This amounts to a waiver of the
objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained therefrom. Amid a waiver, the
court is duty bound to admit the evidence.

Reviewing the evidence, the Court found the same sufficient to prove accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

FACTORAN vs. CA, GR NO. 93540

Topic: CRIMINAL OFFENSES & PENALTIES

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for Review

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. When a thing is in official custody of
a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it. Otherwise,
there would be interference with the possession before the function of law had been performed as to the process under
which the property was taken.

Facts:
● Two Marikina police officers intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber; driver
Jesus Sy was brought to the DENR.
● DENR investigation revealed discrepancies: (a) declared flitches but cargo was lumber; (b) mismatched plate
numbers; (c) wrong certificate issued; (d) consignee in documents inconsistent with log sale agreement.
● DENR issued a temporary seizure order, later confirmed by DENR Sec. Factoran on January 20, 1989,
ordering confiscation of the lumber and truck under Sec. 68, PD 705.
● No administrative appeal was filed; the lumber and truck were deemed forfeited to the government and
scheduled for auction..
● On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a civil case with prayer for replevin and injunction; RTC issued an
order stopping the auction.
● RTC granted a writ of replevin, ordering return of lumber, truck, and documents; writ of seizure issued, but
DENR refused compliance.
● DENR’s attempts to post a counterbond were denied by RTC due to procedural defects.
● Private respondents moved to cite DENR officials in contempt for non-compliance.
● DENR filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with CA.
FACTORAN vs. CA, GR NO. 93540

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

N/A dismissed the DENR’s petition. It declared that
as the complaint for replevin filed by private
respondents complied with the requirements of
an affidavit and bond under Secs. 1 and 2 of
Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of court, issuance
of the writ of replevin was mandatory.

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S:
1) WON replevin may issue despite lack of proper allegations of wrongful detention. (NO)
2) WON the DENR Secretary validly exercised authority to confiscate under Sec. 68-A, PD 705. (YES)
3) WON property confiscated under Sec. 68-A is in custodia legis and thus beyond replevin. (YES)
4) WON confiscation under Sec. 68-A is the same as confiscation in criminal cases under Sec. 68. (NO)

Ruling of SC:

1) In the case at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner Secretary
pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, to wit:

Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. — In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water,
or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter.

As the petitioner Secretary's administrative authority to confiscate is clearly provided by law, the taking of the
subject properties is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by private
respondents.

2) Issuance of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary was a valid exercise of his power under Sec. 68-A of
P.D. No. 705. By virtue of said order, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck of private respondents were held in
custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin.

Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. When a thing is in official
custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to
recover it. Otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of law had been
performed as to the process under which the property was taken.

3) Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct from
and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No.
705.

Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only "conveyances" but forest products
as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the "court" in a criminal action has long been
provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power of confiscation cannot be exercised
except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply put,
Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, . . . .43
FACTORAN vs. CA, GR NO. 93540

Sec. 68-A was added precisely to supplant the inadequacies and supplement criminal enforcement of forestry
laws.

4) Sec. 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the time
of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to
criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to administrative confiscation provided for in Section
68-A.

The title of Sec. 80 — "Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions" — bespeaks this intendment of the law. The fact,
too, that Secs. 68 and 80 were co-existing prior to the introduction of Sec. 68-A, proves that Sec. 80 applies to
the criminal prosecutions subject of Sec. 68 and not to the administrative confiscation subject of Sec. 68-A.
Sec. 68-A, therefore, should not be interpreted in relation to Sec. 80 as to require that criminal charges be filed
with and seized forest products be immediately delivered to, the fiscal in case of administrative confiscation, for
this renders nugatory the purpose sought to be achieved thereby. Statutes should always be construed in the
light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such
interpretation as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.

DAGUDAG vs. PEDARANGA, AM NO. RTJ-06-2017

Topic: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, states that possessing forest
products without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A states that the DENR Secretary or his duly
authorized representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product illegally cut, gathered, removed,
possessed, or abandoned

Facts:

● PNPRMG received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines was shipping container vans
containing illegal forest products from CDO to Cebu
● The team inspected the container vans and discovered the undocumented forest products
● The crew failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and other documents as required by DENR
● Since nobody claimed the forest products, DENR considered them as abandoned and the PENRTO issued a
seizure receipt to NMC
● DENR Forest Protection Officer Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted notices on the CENRO and PENRO bulletin boards
and at the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown owner about the administrative
adjudication
● In a complaint, dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma)
DAGUDAG vs. PEDARANGA, AM NO. RTJ-06-2017

prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to
deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral
damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
● On 29 March 2005, Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take
possession of the forest products.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S:

WON Judge Paderanga is correct in issuing the writ of replevin

Ruling of SC:

NO.

The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 states
that the DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper
use of the country's natural resources. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No.
277, states that possessing forest products without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A states
that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product
illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned.

In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal
documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products.

Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons.

First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies. In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative
remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to
review by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) courts
cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of
forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that members of DENR's Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over
DAGUDAG vs. PEDARANGA, AM NO. RTJ-06-2017

the forest products and brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should
have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may
have been commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright.

Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. There was a
violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in accordance with law.

DY vs. CA, GR NO. 121587

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for review

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to
the courts. In a long line of cases, we have consistently held that before a party may be allowed to seek the intervention
of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means afforded by the administrative
processes.

As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the
assailed orders of the trial court granting petitioner's application for a replevin writ and denying private respondent's
motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended, the lumber properly came under the
custody of the DENR and all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to that agency.

Facts:

● Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 93-01 creating Task Force Kalikasan to combat "illegal
logging, log smuggling or possession of and/or transport of illegally cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and
other forest products" in that city.
● The team was composed of personnel of the PNP, DENR and the Office of the City Mayor of Butuan.
Respondent Odel Bernardo Lausa, who was the acting chief of civilian security in the mayor's office, was a
member of the team.
● Task force received confidential information that two truckloads of illegally cut lumber would be brought to
Butuan City. Accordingly, the team set up a check-point.
● At around 10:00 pm two trucks loaded with lumber approached the checkpoint. They were flagged down by the
operatives but instead of stopping, they accelerated their speed hence, the task gave chase. They finally
caught up with the two vehicles and when requested by the operatives, Pulcita Lucero, caretaker in charge of
the compound could not produce any document as proof of the legality of the origin/possession of the forest
products.
● Forester Maxilom of the DENR issued a temporary seizure order and a seizure receipt for the two vehicles and
their cargo consisting of several pieces of lumber of different sizes and dimensions, but Lucero, the caretaker
of the compound refused to accept them. The seized lumber and vehicles were then taken to the City motorpol
DY vs. CA, GR NO. 121587

and placed in the custody of respondent Lausa.

● The next day, Maxilom submitted a memorandum-report to the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) on the seizure of the lumber and the two vehicles. the CENRO issued a notice of
confiscation.
● For lack of claimants, DENR Regional Technical Director Geollegue recommended to the Secretary the
forfeiture of the lumber and the two vehicles. DENR Regional Director De la Rosa ordered the CENRO to issue
the requisite forfeiture orders, which CENRO Orcasitas issued.
● More than two months after the lumber had been forfeited, petitioner, claiming to be the owner of the lumber,
filed a suit for replevin in the RTC for its recovery. The next day, trial court issued a preliminary writ of replevin.
● Respondent Lausa filed a motion for the approval of a counterbond. Before the court could act on his motion,
he moved to dismiss and/or quash the writ of replevin on the ground that the lumber in question, having been
seized and forfeited by the DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended (Revised Forestry Code), was under
its custody and, therefore, resort should first be made to the DENR.
● Trial court denied respondent Lausa's application for the approval of the counterbond as well as his motion to
dismiss and/or quash the suit for replevin.
● Respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA in which he sought the approval of his counterbond and the
nullification of two orders, granting petitioner's prayer for a preliminary writ of replevin and denying his Motion to
Dismiss Case and/or Quash Writ of Replevin. RTC grated. Hence, the petition which was initially referred by
the SC to CA. CA however denied said petition for lack of merit.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S: WON RTC could in fact take cognizance of the replevin suit, considering that the object was the recovery of
lumber seized and forfeited by law enforcement agents of the DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705 (Revised Forestry Code),
as amended by Executive Order No. 277. (NO)

Ruling of SC: The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In a
long line of cases, we have consistently held that before a party may be allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it
is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means afforded by the administrative processes. Hence,
if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
even opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
before a court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly,
absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. 13

Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:

Sec. 8. Review. — All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any
person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty
(30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance
Executive Order No. 19, series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

In Paat v. Court of Appeals, 14 where, as in the case at bar, the trial court issued a writ of replevin against the DENR,
thus allowing the claimant to obtain possession of the conveyance used in transporting undocumented forest products,
this Court stated:

Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper cause of action by the lower court instead of assuming
jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies
DY vs. CA, GR NO. 121587

in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and more importantly,
being an element of private respondents' rights of action is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court. 15

The appellate court's directive to the trial court judge to allow the respondent agent of the DENR to file a counterbond
in order to recover custody of the lumber should be disregarded as being contrary to its order to dismiss the replevin
suit of petitioner. For, indeed, what it should have done was to dismiss the case without prejudice to petitioner filing her
claim before the Department of Natural Resources (DENR).

MAMANTEO vs. DEPUTY SHERIFF MAGUMUN, AM NO. P 98-1264

TYPE/ NATURE OF ACTION:

Facts:

On 12 April 1996 forestry employees of the DENR, Cordillera Administrative Region, Tabuk, Kalinga, intercepted a San
Miguel Corporation van loaded with narra flitches wrapped in nylon sacks and covered with empty beer bottles and
cartons. Villamor Martinez, driver of the van, could not produce any legal permit, hence the vehicle and its load were
confiscated.

On 24 May 1996 a criminal complaint against Villamor Martinez was filed for violation of Sec. 78 of P.D. 705. On 24
July 1996, after notice and hearing, an order of forfeiture of the vehicle and its load was issued by the DENR Regional
Office.

San Miguel Corporation thereafter filed a case for recovery of personal property and damages with application for writ
of replevin with the Regional Trial Court, which issued a warrant of seizure. On 1 August 1996 Deputy Sheriff Manuel
M. Magumun, with police escort, went to the DENR office but forestry employees refused to release the van, invoking
forfeiture. Despite this, on 7 August 1996 Magumun, with another sheriff and twenty persons, took the van without
permission. On 13 August 1996 the vehicle was delivered to Aimardo V. Interior, agent of SMC.

Deputy Sheriff Magumun explained that it was his ministerial duty to execute the warrant and that the question of
forfeiture was too technical for him to resolve. On 20 October 1997 the complaint was referred to the OCA. The OCA
observed that while Rule 60 was silent on what should be done when the sheriff is informed that the property has been
forfeited and is already in custodia legis, Deputy Sheriff Magumun should not have insisted on seizing the property.
The appropriate action should have been to inform his judge by way of partial Sheriff’s Return and wait for instructions.
MAMANTEO vs. DEPUTY SHERIFF MAGUMUN, AM NO. P 98-1264

For such ignorance of proper procedure the OCA recommended that Sheriff Magumun be penalized in the amount of
P5,000.00.

Ruling of Lower Courtss RTC CA.

Arguments Petitioner Respondent

ISSUE/S: WON the sheriff has the prerogative to enforce a replevin of forestry items in favor of the government.

Ruling of SC: NO.

Respondent was placed in a difficult situation where the vehicle subject of the warrant of seizure had already been
confiscated by another government agency and forfeited in favor of the government. However, the novelty of his
predicament did not call for him to use his discretion and justify his insistence on taking the property subject of the
warrant without waiting for instructions from his judge. A sheriff's prerogative does not give him the liberty to determine
who among the parties is entitled to the possession of the attached property, much less does he have any discretion to
decide which agency has primary jurisdiction and authority over the matter at hand.

When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate. However, the prompt
implementation of a warrant of seizure is called for only in instances where there is no question regarding the right of
the plaintiff to the property. Where the plaintiff has shown by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of the
property; that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant; that the same has not been taken for tax
assessment or seized under execution or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, then the
executing officer has no other recourse but to execute the warrant or writ expeditiously.

In the instant case, Deputy Sheriff Magumun has been informed that the property had been impounded due to violation
of forestry laws and an order for its forfeiture had already been issued by the DENR. Moreover, he was advised that
the proper remedy for SMC, owner of the vehicle, was to appeal the order of forfeiture to the Secretary of the DENR.
The prudent recourse then for respondent was to desist from executing the warrant and convey the information to his
judge and to the plaintiff. Instead, Deputy Sheriff Magumun carried out the implementation of the warrant of seizure
with undue haste as evidenced by the mere 6-day lapse from the time he first served the warrant of seizure on the
DENR officials to the time of his precipitate seizure of the van. A warrant could be returned within a period of not less
than ten (10) days nor more than sixty (60) days after its receipt by the executing officer. Within this time frame, Deputy
Sheriff Magumun should have conferred with his judge and thereafter execute the warrant judiciously and with more
certainty.

True, sheriffs must comply with their mandated ministerial duty to implement writs promptly and expeditiously, but
equally true is the principle that sheriffs by the nature of their functions must at all times conduct themselves with
propriety and decorum and act above suspicion. There must be no room for anyone to conjecture that sheriffs and
deputy sheriffs as officers of the court have conspired with any of the parties to a case to obtain a favorable judgment
or immediate execution. The sheriff is the front line representative of the judiciary and by his act he may build or
destroy the institution.

As observed by the OCA, the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their
chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of
the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in
this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of
replevin. Hence, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs, as agents of the law, are called upon to discharge their duties with due
care and utmost diligence because in serving the court's writs and processes and implementing the orders of the court,
MAMANTEO vs. DEPUTY SHERIFF MAGUMUN, AM NO. P 98-1264

they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice.

ALMUETE v PEOPLE

Topic: Criminal cases and penalties

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, provides that: Sec. 68. Cutting,
Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

Facts:
● Almuete, Ila Ila and Lloren were charged before the RTC with violation of Sec 68 of P.D. 705, otherwise known
as the “Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines”
● RTC promulgated its decision finding the accused Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt
● Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the validity of the promulgation, the
factual and legal bases of their conviction, and the correctness of the penalty imposed. This was denied by the
RTC
● Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which acquitted Almuete
● The People elevated the case to the SC. The SC reversed petitioner’s acquittal and reinstated the RTC’s

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC CA

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S: WON the penalty imposed must be modified.

Ruling of SC:

YES. Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, provides that: Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or
collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber
or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code.
ALMUETE v PEOPLE

On the other hand, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state that:

Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed[s] the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for
each additional ten thousand pesos,

Perusal of the records would show that the trial court imposed the penalty as prescribed in Article 310 which is two
degrees higher than those specified in Article 309. This is erroneous considering that the penalty prescribed in Article
310 would apply only if the theft was committed under any the following circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or
with grave abuse of confidence, or b) f the stolen property is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the property is taken
on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance. None of these circumstances is present in the instant case. Thus, the proper imposable penalty should be
that which is prescribed under Article 309. In this case, the amount of the timber involved is P57,012.00. Since the
amount
exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods should be imposed in its
maximum period[58] plus an additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000 pesos in excess of P22,000.00 or
three more Years. Thus, the correct imposable maximum penalty is anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal.

CALUB vs. CA, GR NO. 115634

Topic: Criminal offenses and penalties

Type/Nature of Action: Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction
and/or a Temporary Restraining Order

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent
documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved
vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Note that property that is
validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit.

Facts:
● The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles for being loaded with illegally sourced
lumber.
● Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or
licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the
DENR-PENR.
● the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting
DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda
which was, however, dismissed by the Public prosecutor
● One of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again apprehended by a composite team of
DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray,
Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products. Thus, Calyv filed a criminal complaint for violation of
Sec.68 of PD705. however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
CALUB vs. CA, GR NO. 115634

● Subsequently, private respondents Babalcon, the vehicle owner and Abuganda the driver, filed a complaint for
recovery of possession of the 2 impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners
before the RTC of Catbalogan. RTC granted. Hence, the petition which was initially referred by SC to CA. CA
denied said petition for lack of merit.

Ruling of RTC CA - denied The Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It
Lower ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority
Courts: granted by Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not
automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the
appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his
duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of
illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is
not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or
policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative
Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said.
For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of
conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized under Section 68
of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277. Additionally, it noted that the
petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative
Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the
seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the
vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and recommendations to the
Secretary. Moreover, petitioners’ failure to comply with the procedure laid
down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by
the admission of petitioners’ counsel that no confiscation order has been
issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit.
Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court,
the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis.

Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners’ claim that

private respondents’ complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.
Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of
state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had
not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover,
according to respondent appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability
nor loss of property that could ensue against the government. It reasoned that
a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his
authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a public
officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the
property of another.

Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on

the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody
because they were contradicted by its own findings. Their petition was found
without merit.

PARTIES Petitioner: Respondent:

(Arguments)

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
CALUB vs. CA, GR NO. 115634

Ruling of SC: YES, the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in
violation of Section 78. Section 78 states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. – Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used
in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents
unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the
seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly
presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68
[78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were
not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.

The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of
Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as follows:
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. -- In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or
his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.

Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau [Department] or any
personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who
has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense... [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code,
as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. -- All conveyances used in the transport of any forest
product obtained or gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents, found spurious or irregular in
accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.

Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The Secretary or his duly authorized representative such as the
forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are authorized to seize said
conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel and officials of other
agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field
offices, and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the
apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED
Office as the case may be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence
title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed
under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Hence, the petition is GRANTED.

Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of
1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written
CALUB vs. CA, GR NO. 115634

notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the
seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the
motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the
seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents
immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon
their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or
notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the
subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property
lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. Hence, the petition
is GRANTED.

RUZOL VS SANDIGANBAYAN.

Topic: Criminal offenses and penalties

Type/Nature of Action:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

The burden of protecting the environment is placed not on the shoulders of DENR alone––each and every one of us, whether in
an official or private capacity, has his or her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is not only a
responsibility but also a right for which a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest denudation,
environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural resources, each of us is now obligated to contribute and share in
the responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural resources.

Facts:
- Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly composed of civil society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of
regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar.
- Among those present in the organizational meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO)
Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and
Chairperson of TIPAN, an environmental non-government organization that operates in the municipalities of General Nakar,
Infanta and Real in Quezon province. During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests
products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the
municipal treasurer.
- Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged forest products were issued to
various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178)
were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.
- On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for
Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria, docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.(SANDIGANBAYAN)

Ruling of Lower Courts: SANDIGANBAYAN. CA

RUZOL VS SANDIGANBAYAN.

After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered

on December 19, 2008 a Decision, acquitting Sabiduria
but finding Ruzol guilty as charged.

The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the

postulate that the authority to issue transport permits
with respect to salvaged forest products lies with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and that such authority had not been devolved
to the local government of General Nakar

PARTIES (Arguments) Petitioner: Respondent:

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest product is solely with the DENR, and
no one else.
Whether or not the subject permits to transport were valid.
Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions.

Ruling of SC:

On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled affirmative.

The LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate
salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.

While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for
the protection of the environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such
authority. While the law has designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not the intention of the
law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word
"primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192
suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the exclusion of all other government instrumentalities, i.e.,
LGUs.

On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the
1987 Constitution in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the Negative..

There is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and regulation of salvaged forest products through the issuance of appropriate
permits is a shared responsibility which may be done either by DENR or by the LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30, in fact, says as much, thus:
the "LGUs shall share with the national government, particularly the DENR, the responsibility in the sustainable management and
development of the environment and natural resources within their territorial jurisdiction."
RUZOL VS SANDIGANBAYAN.

However, an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer the subject permits with validity. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the
power to levy fees or charges under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an appropriate ordinance
wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed. Needless to say, one of the fundamental principles of local fiscal
administration is that "local revenue is generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance."

In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakar’s Revised Municipal Revenue Code and Municipal Environment
Code reveals that there is no provision unto which the issuance of the permits to transport may be grounded. Thus, in the absence of an
ordinance for the regulation and transportation of salvaged products, the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are infirm.

On the third issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the Negative.

First, this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only government
instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official
functions that properly belong to the DENR.

But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the
transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such
authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood
Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor
and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made
representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery
Permit from the DENR.

Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith.

In dismissing Ruzol’s claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan reasoned as follows:

If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized under R.A. 7160 to issue the subject permits, why did he have to secure the
approval of the various NGOs, People’s Organizations and religious organizations before issuing the said permits? He could very well have
issued subject permits even without the approval of these various organizations if he truly believed that he was legally empowered to do
so considering that the endorsement of these organizations is not required by law. That Ruzol had to arm himself with their endorsement
could only mean that he actually knew that he had no legal basis for issuing the said permits; thus he had to look elsewhere for support
and back-up. (Emphasis Ours.)

We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither legal basis nor established doctrine to draw a conclusion that good faith
is negated when an accused sought another person’s approval. Neither is there any doctrine in law which provides that bad faith is
present when one seeks the opinion or affirmation of others.

Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that the conduct of the public consultation was not a badge of bad faith,
but a sign supporting Ruzol’s good intentions to regulate and monitor the movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and
occurrence of untoward illegal logging. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to transport was not Ruzol’s decision
alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a result of the collective decision of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly. As
attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, it was the participants who agreed that the subject permits be issued by the Office of the
Mayor of General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latter’s authority as local chief executive.

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