Letter from the Executive Board
Greetings delegates,
It is our pleasure to preside over this United Nations General Assembly at RIS
Zestè Model United Nations 2023.
This guide was created with the intention of briefing you on the issues at hand
and providing an appropriate starting point for further research. As a result, we
ask that you not view it as a means to an end in terms of preparation. Going
beyond and beyond the boundaries of this guide during preparation is not only
recommended, but also required if you want to perform well.
We shall bring in a wide range of information to your notice, ranging from
official statements to scholarly views however the responsibility of prioritising
what to focus on and not is totally yours. When we talk of prioritising
information, what we mean is not to prioritise information according to what
you think should be focused, but prioritising information according to what your
country thinks should be focused.
Before coming for the conference, it is very important to break the larger
agenda into smaller subtopics and ask questions to yourself about the agenda. It
is also crucial to enhance your leadership skills and lobbying capacity since we
would give equal importance to overall participation in the committee.
We shall, to the best of our abilities, ensure that a fair simulation is conducted
and there is ample scope for fruitful and meaningful discussion which paves the
way for a nuanced learning experience. Reiterating, it is important that you use
this document only as a reference point and make your own opinion based upon
your portfolio along with the research and analysis done.
In case of any queries feel free to contact us.
Regards,
Executive Board
CREDIBLE SOURCES OF PROOF
1) News Sources
All the news sources shall have equally debatable credibility, where acceptance
may vary from state to state.
2) Government Reports
These reports can be used in a similar way as the State Operated News Agencies
reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another country. However, a
nuance is that the Executive Board can still accept a report, as credible
information, that is being denied by a certain country.
3) UN Reports
All UN Reports are considered as credible information or evidence. They may
be from:
• UN Bodies like the UNSC or UNGA
• UN Affiliated bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency, World
Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Committee of the Red Cross
etc.
• Treaty Based Bodies like the Antarctic Treaty System,
• International Criminal Court
NOTE: Under no circumstances will sources like Wikipedia, Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch or newspapers like the Guardian etc. be
accepted as PROOF/EVIDENCE.
But they can be used for better understanding of any issue or even be brought
up in debate if the information given in such sources is in line with the beliefs of
a government.
ABOUT THE COMMITTEE
The United Nations General Assembly is a prominent and paramount forum of
the international community, comprising all 193 Member States of the United
Nations. Established under the UN Charter, this deliberative body convenes
annually in New York City to deliberate on and decide upon a broad spectrum
of global issues.
As one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, the General Assembly
is granted immense authority to review and coordinate the world's political,
economic, and social concerns. With its unique role as the world's most
representative and democratic forum, the General Assembly serves as the
platform for Member States to voice their opinions, debate on issues, and form a
consensus on significant international issues.
The UN General Assembly is the only universally representative body of the
United Nations. The other major bodies are the Security Council, the Economic
and Social Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice. As
delineated in the Charter of the United Nations, the function of the General
Assembly is to discuss, debate, and make recommendations on subjects about
international peace and security, including development, disarmament, human
rights, international law, and the peaceful arbitration of disputes between
nations.
It elects the non-permanent members of the Security Council and other UN
bodies, such as the Human Rights Council (HRC), and appoints the secretary-
general based on the Security Council’s recommendation. It considers reports
from the other four organs of the United Nations, assesses the financial
situations of member states, and approves the UN budget, its most concrete role.
The General Assembly's decision-making process is based on the principle of
sovereign equality of all Member States. Each Member State, irrespective of its
size or power, is entitled to one vote, and decisions on most issues require a
two-thirds majority. However, some issues, such as budgetary matters and the
election of non-permanent members of the Security Council, require only a
simple majority.
Over the years, the General Assembly has tackled a broad range of global
challenges, from conflict resolution to sustainable development to climate
change. It has played an instrumental role in shaping the global agenda and
advancing the principles of peace, justice, and equality.
ABOUT THE AGENDA
Non-State Military Organisations/Violent Non-State Actors (NSMOs or
VNSAs) often referred to as ‘terrorist groups’, have been greatly increasing in
number over the past two decades and have become the core of many problems
throughout various nations, particularly those that lack serious monetary
strength or powerful influential governments. These groups often react to what
they consider authoritarian regimes; good examples of such organisations are
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Taliban. These
groups generally have complex relationships with the general population,
sometimes seen as a representation of a threat, and other times representational
of the views of the people. The issue is widespread across the globe, and even
countries that do not possess major ‘Violent Non-State Actors' are often directly
threatened by them, and it is imperative that members of the General Assembly
address this issue appropriately.
In many instances, these organisations are complex and sometimes maintain
state sponsorship links outside of the nation-state itself. Furthermore, well-
equipped militias and quasi-governmental frameworks provide services to the
local populace in order to broaden the violent non-state organisation’s political
influence in the area. In fact, some incidents indicate that the populace often
depends solely upon these organisations for their fundamental needs to include
food, water, sanitation, and security. Understanding this evolving process,
however, and the mechanisms that lead to the existence of these groups is
critical in formulating adequate responses and effectively countering the
influential growth of these organisations.
In contemporary times, violent non-state actors have become a pervasive
challenge to nation-states. In Europe, jihadist terrorist organisations have carried
out well- publicized attacks in Madrid and London and have only been
prevented from further actions by proactive intelligence and law enforcement. In
Mexico, drug-trafficking organisations are challenging the Mexican state in a
particularly brutal manner. In the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, drug
traffickers and militias provide rudimentary forms of governance in urban areas
where the state is absent. In Central America and the United States, youth gangs
such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) have a massive and highly-disruptive
presence. In Colombia, the state has beaten back the political challenge from the
FARC insurgency but the guerrillas have largely been transformed into a major
drug-trafficking organisation that in some regions, cooperates with former right-
wing paramilitary organisations turned drug traffickers. In Albania and Italy,
criminal organisations not only intimidate businesses, corrupt politicians and
launder their proceeds, but also engage in a variety of activities that challenge
and undermine state sovereignty. In many African countries as well as Central
Asia and Afghanistan, individuals who are a part of these groups are major
players in the political system and the economy. In Iraq, insurgents, terrorists,
militias and criminal organisations operate in a common opportunity space,
intersecting and overlapping in ways that make the restoration of a legitimate
and effective central state particularly difficult. In short, in many parts of the
world, the state is under siege from non-state military organisations.
Despite their divergent forms, these non-state violent actors share certain
characteristics. Moreover, some efforts have been made to identify the major
actors themselves. As one study observed, “they are only the beginning of what
appears to be growing awareness that armed groups are no longer minor players
in a world once dominated by states.”
Defining Terrorist Groups/Non-State Actors
Violent non-state security threats have emerged from, but are not limited to civil
rebellions, insurgency, liberation movements, and failed governments. These
threats have historically shown varying levels of orderliness, with certain violent
non-state actors functioning as loose associations and others operating as active
terrorist establishments. Major factors in the difference of non-state actors often
emerge from ideology, objective, strategy, financial support, and purpose. Those
non-state actors that are viewed as imposing the largest threat to society are the
ones whose main tactic for acquiring power is by disrupting society in a manner
that instil fear within the civilian population.
This action of non-state actors to implement violent tactics is often referred to as
terrorism. Terrorism has an ever-changing definition, because there is no one
defining characteristic, tactic or organisation for this behaviour. It is ever
changing because behaviours have different meanings and varying impacts upon
society in different parts of the world. The most congruent ideology behind
those who use terrorism is that they possess the opinion that creating fear upon
the general masses will prompt favourable results.
Despite this ideology, there is no single definitive aim or focus that unifies all
terrorists. Most commonly the term terrorist describes the individuals who are
aspiring to carry out a threat with the aim of disrupting society and instilling
fear. The definition of terrorism usually stands as the calculated use of violence
or threat thereof against civilian populations, typically in an attempt to gain
political, economic, or religious footing.
And hence we understand that there does not exist a standardised and accepted
definition of terrorism because the terms which are usually used to define armed
non-state actors is often intensely political and controversial, as to followers of
their beliefs they can be known as ‘liberation movements’, ‘freedom fighters’ or
‘revolutionaries’ while to others (specifically the government of the country) the
same groups are labelled as ‘rebels’, ‘insurgents’, or ‘terrorists’.
A general definition often used by the United Nations is: “Non- State armed
groups are defined as groups that have the potential to employ arms in the use of
force to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; are not within the
formal military structures of States, State-alliances or intergovernmental
organisations and are not under the control of the State(s) in which they operate.
It includes, but is not limited to, the following groups:
a. Local militias
b. Insurgents
c. Rebel opposition groups
d. Terrorists
e. Guerrillas
f. Paramilitary groups and civil defence forces (when they are clearly
beyond state control)
Do note that these categories are fluid, and a particular group may receive a
different classification over time due to variables such as leadership, structure
and functions, ideological beliefs and objectives, among other things.
Yet, keep in mind that non-state actors share certain characteristics. Here are
some of them are listed below:
- Have a group identity, and act in pursuit of their objectives as a group;
- Members of an armed group will be strongly influenced by group
conformity pressures such as depersonalization of victims; perceptions of
impunity; moral disengagement and obedience to group authority;
- Are not within the formal military structures of States, State-alliances or
intergovernmental organisations.
- Are not under the command or control of the State(s) in which they
operate.
- Armed groups may not be under the command or control of the State(s) in
which they operate, but they may receive direct/indirect support of the
host government or other States, or may be provided with a safe haven in
certain countries;
- Are subject to a chain of command (formal or informal).This is an
important attribute of armed groups, because it means (at least in theory)
that there is some degree of centralised command and control, however
limited, over the actions of group members .
States and Non-State Actors
During the 20th century, non-state actors were relatively insignificant, dwarfed
by the process of state consolidation and the contest among powerful nation-
states. NSAs became a critical part of the decolonization process, but this was
essentially because they wanted to control the state themselves rather than being
subservient to foreign and distant rulers.
In the 21st century, however, VNSAs appear to be a major challenge to the
states. Although they have re-emerged in large part because of the growing
weakness of many states, they seek to perpetuate and intensify this weakness.
When there are multiple dimensions along which the state is weak, the prospects
for the rise of VNSAs are considerably increased. Moreover, where states with
low capacity are unable to meet the demands of their citizenry for security and
other public goods, other actors fill the gap. When there is a security deficit in
particular, VNSAs come into existence to provide security or, where they
already exist, become more important, in the provision of security. The
difficulty is that often such groups are not only protective but also predatory.
Global flows of arms, for example, are no longer under the exclusive control of
states. Illicit arms dealers have become important transnational players. In a
similar vein, VNSAs develop what might be termed transnational social capital
and to create alliances and generate support outside the immediate area of their
operations. Along with the rise of the illicit global economy, illicit trade has also
provided funding opportunities for VNSAs.
Funding of Non-State Actors
Violent Non-State actors commit crimes and activities which take place in many
different forms ranging from isolated acts to planned activities of organised
groups. The forms of financing of terrorism therefore vary accordingly. It
comprises not only the financing of these groups acts as such, but also any
support to the criminal network. Terrorist organisations require significant
funding, both for the actual undertaking of violent acts, but also for other
associated purposes such as to maintain the functioning of the organisation, to
provide for its basic technical necessities etc. and hence the source of funding
varies from case to case.
The financing may originate from illegal activities, ranging from low-scale
criminality to organised crime (e.g. trafficking in drugs or weapons). The origin
of the funds might, however, also be legitimate, being provided for example by
the members of the organisation or obtained through the abuse of non-profit
organisations. New funding techniques have been identified by the multiple
states and relevant international organisations, for example given the way of its
functioning, the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) recurred to new
methods of funding which could be considered more inherent for a state, such as
levering taxes or exploiting natural resources (such natural gas and oil),
meaning exploiting state owned resources for fulfilling a NSA’s requirements.
Financing through Cryptocurrencies
Terrorism's grip on the cyber domain is rapidly expanding. Non-State Actors
have discovered highly innovative means of supporting themselves through
such platforms, ranging from online radicalization efforts to the propagation of
extremist ideologies. Over the last decade, funding operations that were
formerly carried out with cash or bank transfers have evolved into crypto
money. Crypto currency is a type of virtual or digital currency that is built on a
network that is dispersed across many computers. This type of currency is not
issued by any central government or authority and is not legal tender.
Despite the fact that international bodies like the International Monetary Fund
the the Financial Action Task Forces have developed a number of AML/CTF
programmes, the development of financial judicial supervision in different
countries has been uneven, and there is a problem of inconsistent supervision
due to differences in the development of their financial systems. Countries'
cryptocurrency rules and regulations are currently inconsistently enforced.
Inconsistency in cryptocurrency legislation impedes the crackdown on illicit
acts that exploit the technology.
A number of countries around the world have created separate departments to
oversee cryptocurrency regulation. Most countries, however, have yet to take
any action against cryptocurrencies. These flaws in the worldwide regulatory
framework allow terrorists to exploit cryptocurrencies. At the moment,
regulatory control in the United States, Europe, and China makes obtaining
Cryptocurrency anonymously through transactions impossible. However,
present oversight is constrained to some extent. The supervision of the digital
currency bitcoin is loose in nations with relatively weak financial institutions
and poor anti-terrorism financing procedures. Furthermore, even in countries
with strong oversight, there is a proliferation of terrorist financing due to
inconsistencies in legal standards.
FATF’s work on Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrency is an excellent tool for money laundering, terrorist financing,
and corruption, yet existing cryptocurrency compliance measures in various
countries are ineffectual. The FATF announced a one-year review of the guide
to risk-based techniques for virtual assets and virtual asset service providers in
July 2020. The review discovered that 19 of the 54 reporting jurisdictions had
yet to incorporate the guidelines' standards in their domestic laws.
The Financial Action Task Force distinguishes between centralised and
decentralised virtual money, which is a distributed, open-source, mathematical
point-to-point virtual currency. FATF has been paying particular attention to the
emergence of virtual currencies in recent years. In response to the advent of
virtual currency and its related payment mechanism, the FATF published
multiple supporting documents which defined essential terms such as virtual
currency and investigated its potential financial hazards such as those of the
‘Virtual Currency: Key Definition and Potential AML/CFT Risk’.
FATF proposed the concept of a "virtual asset," which refers to any digital
value representation that may be traded in, transferred, or utilised as payment. It
lacks a numerical representation of legal tenders. The relevant recommendations
on virtual assets in Article 15 of the guidelines referred to above clearly indicate
that countries should identify, assess, and understand the risks of money
laundering and terrorist financing arising from the activities or operations of
virtual assets and virtual asset service providers, according to the latest revised
international standards on combating money laundering and terrorist financing
and proliferation in October 2020. Furthermore, it is recommended that all
countries take proactive steps to guarantee that they follow AML/CTF
regulations in order to limit the danger of money laundering and terrorism
financing.
Case Based Analysis
Terrorist financing methods are becoming more diverse and intricate as the
global economy and technology advance. Terrorist organisations frequently
adopt a variety of tactics based on the real development of the region to improve
the secrecy of terrorist fundraising and lower the risk of financing.
Hezbollah’s Case
Terrorist organisations rely heavily on government funding. Hezbollah has been
primarily reliant on Iranian state finance, augmented by proceeds from illegal
foreign activities and charitable donations. During the US sanctions against
Iran, the national funds provided by Iran to Hezbollah decreased, but after the
sanctions were lifted i.e. after the end of 2018, the funds provided by Iran to
Hezbollah recovered, and terrorist organisations can also raise funds through
legal businesses, donations from individuals and non-profit organisations,
charitable donations, and illegal cultural relics trafficking. And hence we
understand how terrorist finance methods are not uniform, but rather diverse.
When traditional funding techniques continue to play a key role in stability and
are not seriously hampered, terrorist organisations' ability to fund themselves
using cryptocurrencies will be reduced.
And as governments continue to closely regulate bitcoin, numerous locations
utilised for cryptocurrency trading have been severely damaged, resulting in the
loss of some users' cash. When the computer system is attacked and destroyed,
the capital becomes more exposed to loss. In recent years, particularly during
Bitcoin's early development, there have been numerous cases of computer
viruses 'stealing' bitcoins, and users may only bear the repercussions of loss by
themselves.
Hamas Case
Hamas, which has been designated as a terrorist organisation by the United
States, the European Union, and Israel, has been raising funds in
cryptocurrencies supposedly since 2019. Hamas first used conventional
cryptocurrency wallets, but eventually switched to non-custodial wallets.
Recently, Hamas implemented sophisticated software that generates a unique
address for each new donation. In 2021, intelligence suggested that Hamas
initiated a social media fundraising effort seeking cryptocurrency donations. In
July 2021, state governments associated crypto wallets affiliated with Hamas'
military branch as part of this fundraising. These designations involved more
than 20 different types of Cryptocurrencies and were seemingly untrackable due
to limited information.
Case of Russia & Ukraine
The extent of pro-Russian digital currency use has been increasingly clear over
the past few months. According to multiple sources, 54 pro-Russian
paramilitary and other organisations in Ukraine have collected more than $2.2
million in cryptocurrency, predominantly Bitcoin and Ether to fund their
operations, with the majority of the funds raised through crowdfunding
campaigns. The crypto donations given to these organisations have reportedly
been used to fund everything from pro-Russian propaganda sites to the
acquisition of military equipment such as drones, weapons, protective vests,
communication devices, and numerous other supplies.
After implementing a mechanism to identify and ban wallets soliciting cash for
the Russian army, the Security Service of Ukraine reported in 2022 that it had
seized $19,500 from a crypto wallet that was being used to pay a Russian
organisation. According to the release, the funds were obtained through social
media crowdfunding initiatives directed at Russian supporters. The money was
used to acquire military weapons for Russia-backed rebel fighters in the
Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Many of the promoters of these Russian
fundraising campaigns were reportedly sanctioned by the United States
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control , including the Russian
Imperial Movement and a supporter of Project Terricon, which solicits
cryptocurrency donations to help Donbass militia groups.
Conclusion
The use of cryptocurrencies by terrorist organisations increases the international
community's commitment to combat terrorism financing. The anonymity of
cryptocurrencies and the lack of stringent state financial supervision provide an
incentive for terrorist organisations to use it. The value of cryptocurrency and
internal development mode, the strengthening of international organisations and
national supervision, and ongoing attacks are the reasons for diminishing the
use of cryptocurrency by terrorist organisations. Furthermore, established
avenues of terrorist financing have not been crippled and continue to function
efficiently in raising funds for terrorist organisations. As a result, terrorist
organisations' use of cryptocurrencies is limited.
However, we can anticipate that the advancement of digital currencies,
particularly the increase of anonymity, will make it very easy for terrorist
organisations to raise funding. The existing information indicates that terrorist
organisations' reliance on bitcoin is minimal, and the use of cryptocurrency for
terrorist financing is still in its early stages because it is not a mature technique
of terrorist financing. The evolution of cryptocurrency technology, on the other
hand, is unpredictable. Countries and international organisations must remain
cautious, enhance their own cryptocurrency regulatory mechanisms, and prevent
terrorist financing via different avenues. Given the current state of
cryptocurrency development, we propose the following recommendations.
Questions to Consider
1. In what way can member states derive a working and a comprehensive
definition of ‘Terrorism’ for effectively dealing with the violence
perpetuated?
2. How can member states limit access to national resources for illicit
funding of non-state actors?
3. If non-state actors are backed by state agencies, how do the concepts of
state responsibility align with previous efforts of the United Nations such
as those of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy?
4. Do any loopholes exist in the counter terrorism strategy that has been
adopted by the UN and member states at a domestic level? And if they
exist, how do we plan to curb them on both a policy and a ground root
level?
5. How can the integrity of digital currencies be preserved if utilised for
legitimate purposes as underlined by the International Monetary Fund?
6. What are possible ways for government agencies to track economic
transactions leading to financing of terrorism through cryptocurrency and
other virtual currencies?
7. Anonymity is one of the main components that make digital currency
attractive prospects to non-state actors. Can these criminal operations be
take care of without being invasive to citizens in the general social
sphere?
8. How can international organisations like the FATF curb and track illicit
activities facilitated by cryptocurrency through policy at the state level?