UNIT-III BNS, 2023

Chapter III – General Exceptions

General Defences in BNS, 2023 / IPC
1. Meaning
General defences are certain exceptions provided in
criminal law where, although the act committed
fulfils the definition of an offence, the criminal
liability is excused.
(IPC: Sections 76–106; BNS: Sections 14–44).
They include defences such as mistake of fact, judicial
acts, accident, necessity, infancy, unsoundness of
mind, intoxication, consent, good faith acts, private
defence, etc.
Need for General Defences
1. Principle of Natural Justice
o Law should not punish a person who acts
without mens rea (guilty mind) or under
circumstances beyond his control.
2. Recognition of Human Limitations
People may act under mistake, compulsion, or
incapacity (e.g., minor, unsound mind).
Criminal law must differentiate between
intentional wrongdoers and those who lack free
will or knowledge.
3. Balance between Rights of Individual & Society
While law protects society from crime, it must
also protect innocent individuals from wrongful
punishment.
4. Moral Blameworthiness
Punishment is based on the moral
blameworthiness of an act. If the actor is not
 blameworthy (e.g., accident in good faith),
criminal liability should not arise.
5. Rule of Law & Fairness
Ensures fairness by exempting acts done in
self-defence, necessity, or judicial duty, which
are essential for maintaining justice.
Significance
1. Protection of Innocent Persons
Prevents miscarriage of justice by
safeguarding those who act without criminal
intent.
2. Encouragement of Lawful Acts
Protects public officials, medical practitioners,
or citizens acting in good faith (e.g., surgeon
performing risky operation with patient’s
consent).
3. Deterrence with Humanity
Retains deterrent value of criminal law but
avoids harshness in exceptional circumstances.
4. Doctrine of Mens Rea
Reinforces the principle that actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make
one guilty unless the mind is guilty).
5. Public Policy
Permits necessary actions like private defence,
which supports public order and safety.
Cases
State of Orissa v. Ram Bahadur Thapa (1959) – Mistake
of fact defence allowed when accused killed a person
believing her to be a ghost.
 R v. Dudley & Stephens (1884) – Defence of
necessity was restricted; cannibalism in shipwreck
not excused.
Basdev v. State of Pepsu (1956) – Intoxication not a
defence unless involuntary or without knowledge.
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1962) –
Importance of grave provocation & mental state

The general exemption under IPC/BNS is divided into

two main categories:
Excusable and Justifiable Exceptions
I. Excusable Exceptions
This is the first category of general exceptions
where the law excuses certain acts events though it
constitutes an offence.
Here the act is excused for want of requirement of
mens rea.
It treats the actus reus as non-criminal because of
the absence of mens rea.
Eg: Act of infant or insane person.
These are exceptions to the crime in which the bad
character or evil intention of the person committing the
crime cannot be established. They are as follows:
Mistake of fact [ Sec.17]
Infancy [20,21]
Accident [18]
Insanity [22]
Intoxication.[23]
II. Justifiable Exceptions
 This is the second category of General Exceptions
where the acts committed, though are offences, are
held to be justifiable under certain circumstances.
Act done is justified on account of some other
meritorious considerations neutralising the
corresponding liability.
Eg: Act done out of necessity, act done in private
defence.
Those exceptions in which crimes committed are
wrongful under normal circumstances but were deemed
tolerable and acceptable to everyone are referred to as
justifiable exceptions. They are as follows:
Judicial act [15,16]
Necessity [19]
Consent [28]
Duress [30]
Communication [31]
Trifles [33]
Private defence
Section 14 – Act done by a person bound, or by mistake
of fact believing himself bound, by law.
Section 15 – Act of Judge when acting judicially.
Section 16 – Act done pursuant to the judgment or order
of Court.
Section 17 – Act done by a person justified, or by
mistake of fact believing himself, justified, by law.
Section 18 – Accident in doing a lawful act.
Section 19 – Act likely to cause harm, but done without
criminal intent, and to prevent other harm.
Section 20 – Act of a child under seven years of age.
Section 21 – Act of a child above seven and under twelve
of immature understanding.
Section 22 – Act of a person of unsound mind.
Section 23 – Act of a person incapable of judgment by
reason of intoxication caused against his will.
Section 24 – Offence requiring a particular intent or
knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated.
Section 25 – Act not intended and not known to be likely
to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent.
Section 26 – Act not intended to cause death, done by
consent in good faith for person’s benefit.
Section 27 – Act done in good faith for benefit of child or
person with unsound mind, by or by consent of
guardian.
Section 28 – Consent known to be given under fear or
misconception.
Section 29 – Exclusion of acts which are offences
independently of harm caused.
Section 30 – Act done in good faith for benefit of a
person without consent.
Section 31 – Communication made in good faith.
Section 32 – Act to which a person compelled by threats.
Section 33 – Act causing slight harm.
Right of Private Defence
Section 34 – Things done in private defence.
Section 35 – Right of private defence of the body and of
property.
Section 36 – Right of private defence against the act of a
person with unsound mind, etc.
Section 37 – Acts against which there is no right of
private defence.
Section 38 – When the right of private defence of the
body extends to causing death.
Section 39 – When such right extends to causing any
harm other than death.
Section 40 – Commencement and continuance of the
right of private defence of the body.
Section 41 – When the right of private defence of
property extends to causing death.
Section 42 – When such right extends to causing any
harm other than death.
Section 43 – Commencement and continuance of the
right of private defence of property.
Section 44 – Right of private defence against deadly
assault when there is risk of harm to innocent person.
The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, introduces
General Exceptions that provide legal protection in
specific situations where an individual may otherwise
face criminal liability. These exceptions ensure fairness
by considering the intentions, circumstances, and
mental state of the person committing the act
1. Section 14: Act Done by a Person Bound by Law or
Mistaken Belief This section protects individuals who
act under the belief that they are legally bound to
perform a particular action. It ensures that actions
taken in good faith, under lawful orders or under a
mistaken belief, do not attract criminal liability.
Example: A police officer dispersing a crowd under
the order of a superior officer, believing it to be a
lawful command, will not be held liable even if some
injuries occur.
Landmark Judgment: Naga People's Movement of
Human Rights v. Union of India (1997) – The Supreme
Court held that actions taken by the armed forces
under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)
must be justified by necessity and good faith,
 emphasizing the protection offered under this
section.
2. Section 15: Act of Judge When Acting
Judicially Judges are protected under this section
when they act within their judicial capacity. Even if
the court lacks jurisdiction, judges acting in good
faith are immune from liability.
Example: A judge who passes a sentence based on
evidence presented in court is protected, even if the
jurisdiction of the court is later questioned.
Landmark Judgment: Anwar Ali Sarkar v. State of
West Bengal (1952) – The Supreme Court observed
that judicial immunity protects judges from being
sued for actions conducted in their official capacity,
supporting the essence of Section 15.
3. Section 16: Act Done Pursuant to Judgment or Order
of Court Actions executed as per court orders or
judgments are Protected under this section. This is
crucial for maintaining the authority of the legal
system.
Example: A bailiff executing an eviction order, even
if the order is later found to be incorrect, is
protected from liability.
Landmark Judgment: R. v. Governor of Brockhill
Prison, ex parte Evans (2000) – While not from India,
this case illustrates that an officer acting on a lawful
order is not liable for wrongful detention when
following court instructions.
4. Section 17: Act Done by a Person Justified, or by
Mistake of Fact Believing Himself Justified, by
Law This provision applies to acts performed under
the justification of law or a mistaken belief of fact.
The section does not cover mistakes of law but of
fact
 Example: A shop owner detaining a person he
believes to be a shoplifter, based on mistaken
identity, is protected under this section.
Landmark Judgment: State of Orissa v. Kalia Rana
(1976) – The Supreme Court ruled that mistakes of
fact, if made in good faith, provide a defence against
criminal liability.

5. Section 18: Accident in Doing a Lawful Act.

Accidental acts that cause harm while performing
lawful duties are excusable under this section,
provided reasonable care was taken.
Example: A worker operating machinery accidentally
causes minor injuries to a bystander despite
following safety protocols.
Landmark Judgment: Chesebrough Ponds Inc. v.
Insecticides (India) Ltd. (1984) – The Court
acknowledged that accidental actions during the
lawful performance of work do not constitute
offenses.
6. Section 19: Act Likely to Cause Harm, But Done
Without Criminal Intent, to Prevent Other Harm
This provision protects individuals who, without
criminal intent, act to prevent or minimize harm.
Example: A driver swerves the vehicle onto a
sidewalk to avoid a head-on collision, unintentionally
causing minor injuries to pedestrians. Another
example: A person breaks the window of a parked
car to rescue a child locked inside on a hot day.
Though the act damages the car, it was done to
prevent harm to the child, without any criminal
intent.
Landmark Judgment: State of West Bengal v. Shew
Mangal Singh (1981) – The court emphasized the
absence of mens rea (criminal intent) as a key factor
for invoking this exception.
7. Section 20: Act of a Child Under Seven Years of Age.
[Doli incapax]
Children under seven years old are presumed
incapable of criminal intent and thus exempt from
liability for their actions.
Example: A six-year-old accidentally breaking a shop
window while playing is not liable for the damage.
Landmark Judgment: R v. JTB (2009) – Although from
the UK, it confirms the principle of "doli incapax,"
which asserts that very young children cannot be
held legally responsible for crimes.
8. Section 21: Act of a Child Above Seven and Under
Twelve of Immature Understanding Children between
seven and twelve can only be held responsible if it is
proven they have sufficient maturity to understand
their actions.
Example: A ten-year-old who sets off fireworks in a
crowded area without understanding the
consequences might be excused under this section.
Landmark Judgment: Mohan Singh v. State of M.P.
(1978) – The Supreme Court considered mental
maturity while dealing with juvenile offenses.
9. Section 22: Act of a Person of Unsound Mind
Actions by individuals unable to understand the
nature of their acts due to mental illness or
incapacity are protected under this section.
Example: A person with schizophrenia who assaults
someone during a psychotic episode may not be
criminally liable.
Landmark Judgment: Hari Singh Gond v. State of
Madhya Pradesh (2008) – The Court stated that
mental incapacity at the time of the offense negates
criminal intent.
 unsoundness of mind (insanity) and intoxication with
the McNaughten Rule and the Indian case Basdev v.
State of Pepsu (AIR 1956 SC 488).
McNaughten Rule (Insanity Defence)
Origin: R v M’Naghten (1843) 8 E.R. 718; (1843) 10
Cl. & F. 200, (House of Lords).
Facts
In January 1843, at the parish of Saint Martin,
Middlesex, Daniel M’Naghten took a pistol and shot
Edward Drummond, who he believed to the British Prime
Minister Robert Pell, wounding him fatally. Drummond
died five days later and M’Naghten was charged with his
murder. He pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.
At trial, evidence was given of the shooting of
Drummond and witnesses were called on the behalf of
the defendant, M’Naghten, to attest to the fact he was
not in a sound state of mind at the time of committing
the act. Some of the witnesses who gave this evidence,
had previously examined M’Naghten, whilst others had
not seen him prior to the trial and, and they formed
their opinion on hearing the evidence given by other
witnesses.
The medical evidence brought forward stated that
persons of otherwise sound mind, might be affected by
morbid delusions and that M’Naghten was so affected. A
person labouring under such delusion, might usually
possess a moral perception of right and wrong, but in
relation to acts connected to their delusion may be
carried beyond power of their own control leaving them
with no such perception.
Accordingly, M’Naghten was not capable of exercising
control over his acts whilst under his delusion. Due to
the nature of M’Naghten’s condition these delusions
went on gradually until they reached a climax, ending
with Drummond being shot. Evidence brought before
the Court about the condition from which M’Naghten
suffered stated that a man may go on for years quietly
whilst under the delusion’s influence, but had the
potential break out into extravagant and violent
paroxysms.
In relation to the charge against M’Naghten, Lord Chief
Justice Tindal stated that “the question to be
determined is, whether at the time the act in question
was committed, the prisoner had or had not the use of
his understanding, to know that he was doing a wrong
or wicked act. If the jurors should be of opinion that the
prisoner was not sensible, at the time he committed it,
that he was violating the laws both of God and man,
then he would be entitled to a verdict in his favour: but
if, on the contrary, they were of opinion that when he
committed the act he was in a sound state of mind, then
their verdict must be against him.”
M’Naghten was found not guilty.
Following this a panel of Judges attended the House of
Lords and had a series of hypothetical questions on the
topic of insanity put before them.
Issues
1. What is the law respecting alleged crimes
committed by persons afflicted with insane
delusion, in respect of one or more particular
subjects or persons: as, for instance, where at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, the
accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did
the act complained of with a view, under the
influence of insane delusion, of redressing or
revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of
producing some supposed public benefit?
2. What are the proper questions to be submitted to
the jury, when a person alleged to be afflicted with
insane delusion respecting one or more subjects or
persons, is charged with the commission of a crime
(murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a
defence?
 3. In what terms ought the question to be left to the
jury, as to the prisoner’s state of mind at the time
when the act was committed?
4. If a person under an insane delusion as to existing
facts, commits an offence in consequence thereof,
is he thereby excused?
5. Can a medical man conversant with the disease of
insanity, who never saw the prisoner previously to
the trial, but who was present during the whole
trial and the examination of all the witnesses, be
asked his opinion as to the state of the prisoner’s
mind at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner was
conscious at the time of doing the act, that he was
acting contrary to law, or whether he was labouring
under any and what delusion at the time?
Decision
In response to these questions the Judges formulated
the M’Naghten Rules (1843) 4 [Link].(N.S.) 847. These
provide the legal definition of insanity. They provide
that a defendant wishing to rely on the defence of
insanity must show that:
i. They laboured under a defect of reason
ii. Caused by a disease of the mind; so that either
iii. He did not know the nature and quality of his acts,
or that he did not know what he was doing was
wrong.
Rule: A person is not criminally responsible if, at
the time of committing the act, he was suffering
from such defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, that he:
1. Did not know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing, or
2. If he did know, he did not know that what he
was doing was wrong or contrary to law.
 Incorporated in India as Section 84, IPC (Act of a
person of unsound mind).
Unsoundness of Mind (Insanity) in Indian Law
Section 84 IPC:
“Nothing is an offence which is done by a person
who, at the time of doing it, by reason of
unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the
nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either
wrong or contrary to law.”
Defence of insanity/unsoundness of mind is available
only if the accused proves that, at the time of the
act, he was incapable of understanding
consequences due to unsoundness.
Intoxication in Indian Law
Section 85 IPC – Act of a person incapable of
judgment by reason of intoxication, caused against
his will (involuntary intoxication).
Defence available if intoxication was
administered without his knowledge or against
his will.
Section 86 IPC – Offences requiring specific intent
and knowledge when committed in intoxicated
state (voluntary intoxication).
If a man voluntarily drinks and commits a
crime, he is treated as if he had the same
knowledge as if he were sober.
Case: Basdev v. State of Pepsu (AIR 1956 SC 488)
The accused, an old man, attended a wedding.
It is a landmark Indian Supreme Court case concerning
the defence of voluntary intoxication in criminal law.
The ruling clarified that voluntary drunkenness is
generally not a defence, but if it causes an accused to
be completely incapable of forming the specific criminal
intent required for the crime, it may be a factor in
determining liability.
Facts of the case
 The incident: At a wedding in March 1954, the
appellant, Basudev, a retired military veteran, was
heavily intoxicated.
 The victim: During the midday meal, a teenage boy
named Maghar Singh refused to move to allow
Basudev to take a preferred seat.
 The crime: In response, Basudev drew a pistol and
shot the boy in the abdomen, killing him.
 Conviction: The Sessions Court convicted Basudev
of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC) but awarded the lesser punishment of
life imprisonment due to his intoxication and lack of
clear motive. The PEPSU High Court upheld this
conviction.
Issue before the Supreme Court
The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether
Basudev's extreme intoxication could reduce his offense
from murder (Section 302 IPC) to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder (Section 304 IPC), as per the
provisions of Section 86 of the IPC.
Judgment and legal principles
The Supreme Court dismissed Basudev's appeal and
upheld his murder conviction. The court's judgment
established key principles regarding intoxication as a
defence:
 Knowledge vs. intent: The court explained the
distinction between "knowledge" and "intention"
under Section 86 of the IPC. While the law
presumes an intoxicated person has the same
knowledge as a sober person, evidence of
intoxication can be considered to determine if they
had the necessary intent to commit the crime.
  Presumption of consequences: The court affirmed
that a person is presumed to intend the natural
consequences of their actions. This presumption
can be rebutted only if the intoxication was so
severe that it made the accused incapable of
forming the required intent.
 Incapacity vs. reduced inhibitions: The ruling
specified that intoxication that merely weakens
one's self-control or makes them more prone to
violence is not enough to negate the required
intent. The accused must prove they were incapable
of forming the specific intent needed for the
offense.
 Application to the facts: The court found that
Basudev, despite his drunkenness, acted with clear
intent when he pulled out a pistol and shot the boy
in the abdomen. His actions were not so obscured
by intoxication as to render him incapable of
forming the intention to cause bodily harm likely to
result in death.
Legacy of the case
 Intoxication defence: The Basudev v. State of
Pepsu judgment remains a cornerstone of Indian
criminal law, clarifying the limited scope of the
voluntary intoxication defense.
 Stricter standard: The case established a stricter
standard for applying the intoxication defense in
India than in English common law, requiring a high
degree of incapacitation rather than just being
under the influence.
 Deterrence: The decision has served as a deterrent
against using intoxication as an excuse for violent
crimes, reinforcing the principle that individuals are
responsible for their actions even if self-intoxicated
 He was drunk and while sitting with others, he
suddenly took out his pistol and shot a young boy.
 Defence: He claimed intoxication and lack of
intention.
Linking McNaughten Rule, Unsoundness of Mind &
Intoxication
Basdev
McNaughten
Aspec Intoxication / v. State
Rule / Sec.
t Sec. 85–86 IPC of
84 IPC
Pepsu
Involuntary
intoxication Voluntar
Disease of (complete y
Basis the mind → defence); intoxica
of incapacity to Voluntary tion →
Defen know intoxication not a
ce nature/wron (partial, only if complet
gness of act incapable of e
forming defence
intent)
Drunk,
but not
Ment Unsoundnes Intoxication to
al s of mind (self-induced extent
State (insanity) or forced) of
losing
intent
Sec. 85 →
Convicti
acquittal; Sec.
Acquittal if on
Resul 86 → liable if
conditions reduced
t intention/kno
satisfied to 304
wledge
IPC
present
Intoxication:
Involuntary = complete defence (Sec. 85 IPC).
Voluntary = no defence, except if so drunk that
intention could not be formed (Sec. 86 IPC).
 In Basdev v. State of Pepsu, voluntary intoxication
was not a full defence, but reduced liability from
murder to culpable homicide.
Section 22, BNS – Act of a person of unsound mind
“Nothing is an offence which is done by a person
who, at the time of doing it, by reason of
unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the
nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either
wrong or contrary to law.”
This is a direct replacement of Section 84 IPC (based
on the McNaughten Rule).
Defence applies only if unsoundness existed at the
time of the act.
Burden of proof is on the accused (Sec. 105,
Evidence Act).
Intoxication
Section 23, BNS – Act of a person incapable of
judgment by reason of intoxication, caused against
his will
If a person, by reason of intoxication, is incapable of
knowing the nature of the act or what he is doing is
wrong/contrary to law, and the intoxicant was
administered without his knowledge or against his
will, he is not liable.
This corresponds to Section 85 IPC (involuntary
intoxication).
Section 24, BNS – Intoxication in offences requiring
particular intent or knowledge.
Comparative Table (IPC vs. BNS)
IPC BNS
Concept
(Old) (New)
Unsoundness of
Sec. 84 Sec. 22
Mind
 IPC BNS
Concept
(Old) (New)
Involuntary
Sec. 85 Sec. 23
Intoxication
Voluntary
Sec. 86 Sec. 24
Intoxication
Case Law Application under BNS
McNaughten Rule → Now reflected in Sec. 22, BNS.
10. Section 23: Act of a Person Incapable of Judgment
by Reason of Intoxication Caused Against His Will
This section exempts individuals who unknowingly
consume intoxicants and commit an offense under
their influence.
Example: Someone forced to drink alcohol and then
involved in a scuffle would be protected under this
section.
Landmark Judgment: Director of Public Prosecutions
v. Majewski (1977) – Although a UK case, it highlights
the differentiation between voluntary and
involuntary intoxication in legal defences.
11. Section 24: Offense While Intoxicated If a crime
requiring specific intent is committed under the
influence of voluntary intoxication, the person is still
treated as sober under the law.
Example: A person who commits theft while drunk
remains liable since intoxication was voluntary.
Landmark Judgment: Basdev v. State of Pepsu
(1956) – The Court held that voluntary intoxication
does not absolve criminal responsibility.
12. Section 25: Act by Consent Not Intending Death
This provision allows for acts done with consent,
provided there is no intent to cause death or serious
injury.
 Example: Participants in a boxing match who cause
accidental injuries are protected under this
exception.
Landmark Judgment: R v. Brown (1993) – Although
from the UK, it is notable for distinguishing between
consensual acts and criminal offenses.
13. Section 26: Act for Person's Benefit Without
Intending Death
Acts performed with the intention of benefiting
someone, even if causing some harm, are protected
if done in good faith.
Example: A doctor performing emergency surgery to
save a life, which inadvertently leads to other
complications.
Landmark Judgment: Dr. Suresh Gupta v. Govt. of
NCT Delhi (2004) – The Supreme Court observed that
acts done in good faith for someone's benefit, like
surgeries, are not culpable unless there is gross
negligence.
14. Section 27: Acts for Child or Person with Unsound
Mind
Acts done for the benefit of a child or mentally
incapacitated person, with guardian consent, are
protected.
Example: Administering a vaccine to a child in the
absence of a guardian but with the intention to
protect the child's health.
Landmark Judgment: In re: A Child (2015) – The High
Court ruled in favour of a child's welfare when
determining guardianship and consent issues.
15. Section 28: Consent known to be given under fear
or misconception.
A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any
section of this Sanhita, ––
 (a) if the consent is given by a person under fear of
injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the
person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe,
that the consent was given in consequence of such
fear or misconception; or
[b) if the consent is given by a person who, from
unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to
understand the nature and consequence of that to
which he gives his consent; or
[c) unless the contrary appears from the context, if
the consent is given by a person who is under twelve
years of age.
16. Section 29; Exclusion of acts which are offences
independently of harm caused.
The exceptions in sections 21, 22 and 23 do not extend
to acts which are offences independently of any harm
which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be
known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the
consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given.
Illustration.
Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for
the purpose of saving the life of the woman) is
offence independently of any harm which it may cause
or be intended to cause to the woman. Therefore, it is
not an offence “by reason of such harm”; and the
consent of the woman or of her guardian to the
causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act.
17. Section 30; Act done in good faith for benefit of a
person without consent
Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it
may cause to a person for whose benefit it is done in
good faith, even without that person’s consent, if the
circumstances are such that it is impossible for that
person to signify consent, or if that person is incapable
of giving consent, and has no guardian or other person
in lawful charge of him from whom it is possible to
obtain consent in time for the thing to be done with
benefit:
Provided that exception shall not extend to––
[a) the intentional causing of death, or the attempting
to cause death.
(b) the doing of anything which the person doing it
knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other
than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the
curing of any grievous disease or infirmity.
(c) the voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to
cause hurt, for any purpose other than the preventing of
death or hurt.
(d) the abetment of any offence, to the committing of
which offence it would not extend.
illustrations.
(1) Z is thrown from his horse and is insensible. A, a
surgeon, finds that Z requires to be trepanned. A, not
intending Z’s death, but in good faith, for Z’s benefit,
performs the trepan before Z recovers his power of
judging for himself. A has committed no offence.
(2) Z is carried off by a tiger. A fire at the tiger knowing
it to be likely that the shot may kill Z, but not intending
to kill Z, and in good faith intending Z’s benefit. A’s
bullet gives Z a mortal wound. A has committed no
offence.
(3) A, a surgeon, sees a child suffer an accident which is
likely to prove fatal unless an operation be immediately
performed. There is no time to apply to the child’s
guardian. A performs the operation despite the
entreaties of the child, intending, in good faith, the
child’s benefit. A has committed no offence.
[4) A is in a house which is on fire, with Z, a child.
People below hold out a blanket. A drop the child from
the house top, knowing it to be likely that the fall may
kill the child, but not intending to kill the child, and
intending, in good faith, the child’s benefit. Here, even
if the child is killed by the fall, A has committed no
offence.
Explanation. —Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit
within the meaning of sections 21, 22 and 23.
18. Section 31; Communication made in good faith.
No communication made in good faith is an offence by
reason of any harm to the person to whom it is made, if
it is made for the benefit of that person.
Illustration. A, a surgeon, in good faith, communicates
to a patient his opinion that he cannot live. The patient
dies in consequence of the shock. A has committed no
offence, though he knew it to be likely that the
communication might cause the patient’s death.
19. Section 32; Act to which a person compelled by
threats.
Except murder, and offences against the State
punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is
done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats,
which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the
apprehension that instant death to that person will
otherwise be the consequence:
Provided the person doing the act did not of his own
accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to
himself short of instant death, place himself in the
situation by which he became subject to such
constraint.
Explanation 1. —A person who, of his own accord, or by
reason of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of
dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the
benefit of this exception, on the ground of his having
been compelled by his associates to do anything that is
an offence by law.
Explanation 2.—A person seized by a gang of dacoits,
and forced, by threat of instant death, to do a thing
which is an offence by law; for example, a smith
compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a
house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled
to the benefit of this exception.
20. Section 33: Act causing slight harm.
Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it
is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to
cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person
of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such
harm.
Right of Private Defence
Section 34 – Things done in private defence.
Section 35 – Right of private defence of the body and of
property.
Section 36 – Right of private defence against the act of a
person with unsound mind, etc.
Section 37 – Acts against which there is no right of
private defence.
Section 38 – When the right of private defence of the
body extends to causing death.
Section 39 – When such right extends to causing any
harm other than death.
Section 40 – Commencement and continuance of the
right of private defence of the body.
Section 41 – When the right of private defence of
property extends to causing death.
Section 42 – When such right extends to causing any
harm other than death.
Section 43 – Commencement and continuance of the
right of private defence of property.
Section 44 – Right of private defence against deadly
assault when there is risk of harm to innocent person.
These exceptions balance accountability with compassion,
recognizing that certain acts, though technically offenses,
might not deserve punishment due to the unique circumstances
under which they are committed. Indian courts have often dealt
with similar issues, highlighting the nuanced understanding of
these defences in various judgments.