KLE MUN 2025
Disarmament and International
Security Committee (DISEC)
Background Guide
Agenda: The Militarization of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous
Weapons Systems
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Table of Contents
Letter from the Executive Board………………………………………………………………………. 2
Introduction to DISEC……………………………………………………………………………………3
Introduction to the Agenda………………………………………………………………………………4
Definition of Key Terms…………………………………………………………………………………..6
Timeline of Key Events…………………………………………………………………………………..7
Subtopics within the Agenda…………………………………………………………………………….9
6.1 Definitions, Classifications and Levels of Autonomy in Weapons Systems
6.2 Legal and Ethical Challenges
6.3 Accountability and Attributions of Responsibility
6.4 Global Security and the Risk of an AI Arms Race
6.5 Proliferation Risks and Dual-Use Technologies
Analysis of the Current Situation in Developed and Developing States .....................................11
Questions a Resolution Must Answer…………………………………………………………………12
References and Further Reading………..…………………………………………………………….14
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Letter from the Executive Board
Dear Delegates,
It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Disarmament and International Security Committee
(DISEC), the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, at KLE MUN 2025. I am
honoured to serve as your Chair of this committee and to help guide our discussions on one of
the most pressing discussions of our time: The Militarization of Artificial Intelligence and Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).
In an era of technological advancement, the fusion of AI and warfare challenges the rules of
combat and questions the very foundations of international peace and security. As nations
invest heavily in developing autonomous military capabilities, we must ask: Where do we draw
the line between innovation and accountability? How do we ensure that emerging technologies
remain under human oversight? And most importantly, can our existing global frameworks adapt
to these evolving threats?
This committee will push you to think deeply and debate rigorously. While this background guide
will provide you a strong foundation, I expect you to go beyond it. Your success as a delegate
depends on independent research, critical thinking, and a nuanced understanding of your
assigned country’s stance and national interests.
Please remember: you are not here to voice your personal views. You are representing a
sovereign nation, its foreign policy, alliances, and diplomatic behavior. Make sure you
understand these thoroughly and can defend them convincingly.
I encourage you to explore a wide range of reputable sources, including official government
statements, UN documents, academic articles, and current affairs. The more informed you are,
the more meaningful and productive your contributions will be.
If you have any questions or need guidance as you prepare, please feel free to reach out at
[Link]@[Link]. I’m here to support you and help make your MUN journey enriching
and enjoyable.
I look forward to engaging with each of you and witnessing the impactful discussions you will
lead.
Wishing you all the very best!
Warm regards,
Siya BR
Chair, DISEC
KLE MUN 2025
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Introduction to DISEC
The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is the First Committee of the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). It plays a central role in addressing the most
pressing threats to international peace and security, particularly in the realms of disarmament,
arms control, and global military tensions. DISEC also engages with emerging challenges posed
by new technologies, including artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons, cyber warfare, and
the militarization of outer space. It serves as a critical platform for dialogue, negotiation, and
resolution-building on a wide array of international security issues.
DISEC operates under the mandate of the UN Charter to promote disarmament and reduce
global threats through peaceful cooperation and consensus. Although the resolutions passed by
DISEC are not legally binding, they hold significant diplomatic value and often shape
international norms. These resolutions frequently lay the groundwork for future treaties, guide
the work of specialized bodies such as the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
(UNODA), and reflect the evolving consensus of the international community on issues of war,
peace, and technological change.
One of DISEC’s defining features is its inclusivity and equal representation. As part of the
General Assembly, it comprises all 193 UN Member States, each with one equal vote. This
means that regardless of a country’s military power, political influence, or economic standing,
every nation has an equal opportunity to voice its concerns, express its position, and participate
in shaping the outcome of the committee.
The committee’s focus has traditionally centered on regulating weapons of mass destruction,
such as nuclear, chemical, and biological arms, as well as conventional weapons including
small arms and light weapons. However, in recent years, DISEC has expanded its attention to
include the growing risks associated with technological innovation in warfare. Topics such as the
development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), artificial
intelligence in combat, and cyber warfare have emerged as urgent and controversial issues
requiring the attention of the international community.
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Introduction to the Agenda
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is no longer a distant or futuristic concept. It already shapes many
aspects of everyday life, from virtual assistants and navigation apps to medical diagnostics and
industrial automation. In recent years AI has begun to play an increasingly significant role in
military affairs. This integration of AI into military systems presents new challenges to
international peace, security, and humanitarian law, particularly in the form of Autonomous
Weapons Systems (AWS).
Artificial intelligence in military contexts refers to the capacity of machines to perform functions
that would typically require human intelligence such as decision-making, pattern recognition,
and target acquisition. Autonomous Weapons Systems, especially Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems (LAWS), are military technologies that can identify, track, and engage targets
without further human intervention once activated. These systems vary widely, from loitering
munitions like Israel’s Harpy drone and Russia’s KUB-BLA, to experimental drone swarms and
missile systems being developed in the United States. While many of these technologies offer
enhanced speed, accuracy, and efficiency, they also raise critical questions about human
control, legal responsibility, and ethical conduct in warfare.
Supporters of military AI argue that these systems could make warfare more precise, reduce
mistakes, and limit harm to civilians. AI may also be faster at decision-making and more capable
of handling dangerous tasks without risking soldiers’ lives. Some believe it can improve
compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) by minimizing human error.
Weaponized AI technologies do not face the same barriers as human soldiers, allowing them to
traverse all kinds of terrain and be utilized in all areas of typical warfare. Additionally, as artificial
intelligence becomes more sophisticated, its ability to engage in atypical warfare, such as that in
space and cyberspace, continuously increases.
However, the use of AI in weapons also raises serious challenges. One major concern is
accountability: if an autonomous weapon breaks the law or causes unintended harm, who is
responsible—the operator, the programmer, the manufacturer, or the government? These
systems may act in unpredictable ways, especially if they use machine learning. This creates an
“accountability gap” in existing laws of war, which were written with human decision-makers in
mind.
Ethically, many worry that delegating life-and-death decisions to machines could dehumanize
warfare. Autonomous weapons might struggle to interpret complex human behaviors like
surrender or noncombatant status. There is also a risk of unintended escalation where
machines act too quickly or misinterpret data, possibly starting or worsening a conflict before
humans can intervene.
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Another major issue is strategic stability. Since these weapons are cheaper and more
accessible than nuclear arms, they could contribute to a new arms race, especially among
major powers. If states rush to deploy AI systems without strong safeguards, it might lead to
global instability. Non-state actors like terrorist groups could also gain access to commercial AI
technologies and adapt them for violence, increasing the risk of asymmetric warfare.
Organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Human Rights Watch,
and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots have called for strong rules or outright bans. They
argue that without “meaningful human control” over autonomous weapons, basic humanitarian
values and human dignity could be at risk.
So far, there is no binding international treaty that regulates or bans fully autonomous weapons.
The United Nations has been discussing the issue since 2014 under the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW), but agreement has been difficult. Some countries want to ban
these systems, while others do not and instead prefer regulation or rely on existing international
law.
This agenda asks you to find a balance between innovation, national defense, and international
peace. As representatives in DISEC, you are tasked with considering diverse national interests
while upholding the principles of international law and humanitarian protection.
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Definition of Key Terms
1. Artificial Intelligence (AI): The simulation of human intelligence processes by machines,
especially computer systems. In the military context, AI is used for tasks such as data analysis,
decision-making, targeting, and autonomous navigation.
2. Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS): Weapons that can independently identify, select,
and engage targets without human intervention once activated. Also referred to as "lethal
autonomous weapons" or "killer robots."
3. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS): A subset of AWS designed specifically to
use force or kill without human oversight. These raise ethical, legal, and humanitarian concerns
under international law.
4. Human-in-the-Loop: A model in which human operators retain full control over critical
functions of a weapon system, such as target selection and engagement. This is often
contrasted with semi- or fully autonomous systems.
5. Dual-Use Technology: Technologies that can serve both civilian and military purposes. AI,
for instance, can be used in both medical diagnostics and missile guidance, making regulation
more complex.
6. International Humanitarian Law (IHL): A set of rules that aim to limit the effects of armed
conflict, protecting those who are not participating in hostilities and restricting the means and
methods of warfare. Autonomous weapons must comply with IHL principles such as distinction,
proportionality, and military necessity.
7. Target Discrimination: The ability of a weapon system to distinguish between combatants
and non-combatants or between military objectives and civilian infrastructure which is a
requirement under international law.
8. Accountability Gap: The legal and ethical dilemma surrounding who is held responsible
when an autonomous weapon causes unlawful harm - the programmer, the commander, the
government, the manufacturer, or the machine?
9. Arms Race: A competitive buildup of weapons technology between nations, often driven by
the fear that rivals will gain a strategic advantage. The rise of AI in warfare has sparked
concerns about a new global AI arms race.
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Timeline of Key Events
Year Event Explanation
1954 Early Autonomous Initial research into automated military systems, such as
Concepts radar-guided weapons and missile defense systems.
1957 Sputnik Launch Marked the beginning of the space race, which led to
advancements in satellite and military navigation
technologies.
1969 ARPANET Launched Funded by the U.S. DoD, ARPANET was the precursor to
the internet — foundational for AI command and control
systems.
1980 Military Use of GPS GPS, developed by the U.S. military, became central to
Begins targeting and navigation in modern warfare.
1991 Persian Gulf War Marked the debut of smart bombs, GPS-guided missiles,
and early battlefield automation.
1999 Use of Drones in the NATO deployed UAVs for surveillance and limited
Balkans engagement during the Kosovo conflict.
2001 9/11 and Military Led to rapid investment in surveillance, AI-enabled
Tech Surge defense tech, and drone warfare.
2003 Iraq War and Modern Expansion of real-time battlefield data systems and
Tech advanced drone strikes.
2010 Stuxnet Cyberattack First known use of malware (by U.S. & Israel) targeting
physical infrastructure — Iran’s nuclear program — via
autonomous digital code.
2013 UN Special Christof Heyns warned LAWS could violate international
Rapporteur's humanitarian law (HRW).
Warning
2014 UN CCW Begins Formal discussions began under the Convention on
LAWS Talks Certain Conventional Weapons (UN).
2018 Working Group of Geneva meetings under the CCW to study legal, ethical,
Experts Formed and technical frameworks for LAWS.
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2020 No Consensus on UN CCW meetings acknowledged lack of agreement on
LAWS Regulation regulation or bans.
2024 UNSG’s Call for António Guterres urged a binding legal framework by 2026
(Aug) Treaty to prevent machine-led warfare (Stop Killer Robots).
2024 DISEC Resolution on The First Committee passed a resolution encouraging
(Nov 5) LAWS constraints and transparency in LAWS development
(Reuters).
2024 UNGA Resolution The UN General Assembly passed a non-binding
(Dec 2) Passed resolution supporting new international LAWS regulations
(Stop Killer Robots).
2025 UN Talks on Killer First dedicated New York session on military AI and
(May 12) Robots LAWS, referencing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza
(Reuters).
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Subtopics within the Agenda
6.1 Definitions, Classifications, and Levels of Autonomy in Weapons
Systems
Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) are military technologies that can operate without direct
human control after activation. These systems range from automated weapons (which follow
fixed rules) to semi-autonomous systems (where humans remain involved in critical decisions),
and fully autonomous systems, which can identify, select, and engage targets entirely on their
own. Countries define these differently, some consider combat drones or loitering munitions
autonomous, while others apply stricter definitions. A widely discussed term is “meaningful
human control”, which refers to keeping humans in charge of life-and-death decisions. However,
no global agreement exists on what this means in practice, making it hard to regulate these
weapons internationally (UNODA, 2021).
6.2 Ethical and Moral Implications of Delegating Lethal Decisions to
Machines
Allowing machines to decide who lives or dies raises serious ethical questions. Human
judgment, emotion, and accountability are central to decisions about using force. Machines lack
empathy and cannot understand human context, such as surrender or suffering. This debate
ties into the Martens Clause in international law, which protects basic human dignity even when
specific legal rules are missing. Critics believe autonomous weapons could dehumanize war
and lower the threshold for killing, while supporters argue that AI could reduce errors and save
lives by being more accurate than humans in certain tasks. So far, no ethical consensus has
been reached (ICRC, 2021; UNODA, 2021).
6.3 Accountability and Attribution of Responsibility
When an autonomous weapon makes a mistake or kills civilians unlawfully, it’s unclear who
should be held responsible. Is it the military commander, the software developer, the
manufacturer, or the state that deployed it? This is known as the accountability gap. Traditional
laws of war assume human decision-making and clear chains of command. But autonomous
systems, especially those that use machine learning, can act in ways that even their creators
don’t fully understand. This makes it difficult to apply current legal systems like the Geneva
Conventions or hold anyone criminally liable in international courts (UNIDIR, 2020).
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6.4 Impact on Strategic Stability and Global Power Dynamics
The use of AI in weapons could change the balance of global military power. Countries like the
United States, China, and Russia are already competing to develop faster and smarter
autonomous systems. Unlike nuclear weapons, these systems are easier to produce and deploy
quickly. This could lower the threshold for going to war, because countries may see these tools
as safer or less costly than sending troops. It also increases the risk of misunderstandings and
escalation—if one country mistakenly thinks it’s under attack by an autonomous weapon, it may
respond violently before checking facts. AI in warfare could therefore make global security less
stable (SIPRI, 2023; UNODA, 2023).
6.5 Proliferation Risks and Dual-Use Technologies
Many AI tools used in autonomous weapons are dual-use, meaning they can be developed for
civilian purposes but adapted for the military. For example, self-driving car technology or facial
recognition software can be used to make guided missiles or surveillance drones. As these
technologies become cheaper and more widely available, non-state actors (like terrorist groups
or rebel militias) could gain access to them. Weak export controls and cybersecurity systems,
especially in developing regions, make it harder to stop this spread. Regulating the use and sale
of AI systems is now a major challenge in preventing misuse and illegal development of such
weapons (SIPRI, 2021).
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Analysis of the Current Situation in Developed
and Developing States
The landscape of military AI and autonomous weapons is sharply divided between developed
and developing states, not only in technological capacity but also in policy stance, ethical
outlook, and strategic intent.
Developed States such as the United States, China, Russia, and members of the European
Union are at the forefront of research, development, and deployment of AI-enabled military
systems. These countries invest heavily in defense innovation, with programs like the U.S.
Department of Defense’s Project Maven and the UK’s Autonomous Warrior trials integrating AI
into surveillance, target identification, and combat operations. China’s “military-civil fusion”
strategy promotes the integration of commercial AI advances into military applications. Russia
has tested unmanned combat vehicles like the Uran-9 and actively incorporates AI in cyber and
electronic warfare.
Despite technical leadership, developed nations remain divided on regulation. The U.S. and
Russia oppose preemptive bans, favoring governance under existing international law, while
countries like Germany and Austria support new legally binding instruments. Concerns over
strategic advantage, verification challenges, and geopolitical rivalry often stall progress on
consensus.
Developing States, on the other hand, typically lack the resources to develop LAWS
independently but are increasingly impacted by their global proliferation. While some nations
like India, Brazil, and South Africa are building limited AI capacities for defense, the majority of
states in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia emphasize precautionary regulation. These
countries often highlight the humanitarian risks and the potential for unequal power dynamics.
There is growing fear that LAWS could be deployed in low-capacity regions without
accountability or used in asymmetric warfare where technological imbalance deepens instability.
Many developing nations also raise concerns about AI systems being trained on datasets
biased against their populations, or being tested in their territories without consent, further
exacerbating distrust.
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Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)
1. How should Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) be formally defined in
international terms?
2. What constitutes “meaningful human control,” and how should it be operationalized?
3. Do current international laws (e.g., International Humanitarian Law, Geneva
Conventions) adequately regulate LAWS, or is new legal architecture required?
4. What mechanisms should be established to assign accountability in cases where
autonomous weapons cause unlawful harm or violate human rights?
5. Should the international community pursue a complete ban, a partial restriction, or the
regulation of LAWS?
6. What categories of autonomous weapons, if any, should be prohibited or exempt (e.g.,
defensive systems, non-lethal systems)?
7. What transparency and verification mechanisms should be implemented to monitor the
development, testing, and deployment of LAWS?
8. Should an international registry or reporting system for autonomous weapons be
established?
9. How can the proliferation of LAWS to non-state actors, terrorist groups, or unauthorized
users be prevented?
10.What steps should be taken to safeguard AI technology from being weaponized outside
of regulated channels?
11.Should there be international guidelines for ethical research and development of military
AI?
12.How can dual-use technologies (civilian + military AI) be regulated without stifling
innovation?
13.Should a new legally binding international treaty be negotiated, or should the existing
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) be strengthened?
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14.What role should DISEC, the UN General Assembly, or a new specialized body play in
enforcing or reviewing compliance?
15.What support (technical, legal, financial) should be given to developing countries to
ensure they are not excluded from shaping or complying with LAWS governance?
16.How can equity and technological sovereignty be protected in a global framework?
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References and Further Reading
United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations.
United Nations. First Committee of the UNGA (Disarmament and International Security).
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2021). The impact of artificial intelligence on
disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2023). Report on developments in the field of
information and telecommunications in the context of international security.
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. (2019). The UN First Committee and the
development of disarmament norms.
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. (2020). The accountability gap on
autonomous weapons: A challenge for international law.
International Committee of the Red Cross. (2021). Autonomous weapon systems and
international humanitarian law: ICRC position paper.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2020). Artificial intelligence, strategic
stability and nuclear risk.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2021). Artificial intelligence, strategic
stability and nuclear risk: Euro-Atlantic perspectives.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2023). Trends in world military
expenditure, 2023.
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. UN General Assembly action on killer robots.
Future of Life Institute. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Pledge & Research on AI in Warfare.
Human Rights Watch. Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots.
RAND Corporation. The Role of AI in Future Military Operations.
Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict. Meaningful Human Control: Challenges
and Proposals.
Chatham House. Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare.
Center for a New American Security (CNAS). AI and the Future of Conflict.
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