1

The Congress !System3 in India+

RAJNI KOTHARI*

I n the study of party systems, attention has so far been given to

two opposite phenomena, the two-party or multi-party system
on the one hand and the ‘one party system’ on the other. Until
quite recently discussion in this field has been dominated by a
dichotomous (or trichotomous) division on these lines, the prin¬
cipal criterion employed being the availability of choice between
alternatives. The two-party system provides such a choice, and
so does the multi-party system, though in a more complicated
manner;1 the one-party system does not provide this choice. That,
at any rate, is the rationalization behind the widely prevalent
typology of party systems. To be sure, there is of late an attempt
to look more closely at the precise functioning of the various
party systems, especially in some of the new nations of Africa.

+ Asian Survey, vol. 4, no. 12, December 1964, pp. 1161-73.

* This article is a condensed form of a chapter in my book Politics in India
published by Little, Brown and Co. In writing it I have drawn freely from
the discussions I have had with Bashiruddin Ahmed, Henry Hart, Gopal
Krishna, and Ramashray Roy at the Centre for the Study of Developing
Societies, New Delhi. I am grateful to each of them. I am further grateful to
Bashiruddin Ahmed for reading through the draft manuscript and making
valuable suggestions and criticisms.
1 Sigmund Neumann has introduced other distinctions to differentiate the
multi-party system as it operates on the Continent in Europe. He distinguishes
between the party of action and the party of platform, depending upon the
degree of proximity to power. To this he adds a further distinction between
the party of programme and the party of personages, broadly approximating
to the distinction between institutional and personal government. See Sigmund
Neumann (ed.), Modem Political Parties (Chicago, IL: Chicago University
Press, 1956).
40 The Dominance and Decline of the Congress

There are also attempts at a ‘behavioural analysis’ of the American

and British party systems.2 These studies are giving rise to new
ways of looking at party phenomena and have made scholars aware
of the shortcomings of the present typology.
While such a discussion is going on, it might be useful to look
at the Indian experience with political parties, which is one of the
most successful party systems in operation and yet is a system that
cuts across the usual stereotype and also calls into question the
very criterion of political performance usually employed in the
analysis of party systems. That it is the function of politics to offer
choice between alternative sets of policies and personnel may
indeed be a gross oversimplification of political phenomena.
Politics is not always reducible to who gets what, when, and how.
We do not, however, intend to go into these more fundamental
questions in this paper. In what follows, we try to describe the
party system as it has been functioning in India.
While the availability of multiple parties and the freedom to
form parties gives an impression of similarity between India and
the West, and while there actually are some similarities as well as
an element of common heritage, two differences must be noted at
the outset. In the first place, the ‘Western’ model posits a criterion
of alternation or replacement—the ideal of a ‘choice between
alternatives’ and the assumption that the choice is exercised in that
manner—which is not the critical factor in the working of the party
system in India. Second, the western system implies a relationship
between the government and the party organization in which the
latter plays an instrumental and subsidiary role which is not true
of India.
The Indian system can be described as a system of one party
dominance (which, it may be noted, is very different from what
is generally known as a one party system). It is a competitive party
system but one in which the competing parts play rather dissimilar
roles. It consists of a party of consensus and parties of pressure. The
latter function on the margin and, indeed, the concept of a margin
of pressure is of great importance in this system. Inside the margin

2 Samuel J. Eldersveld, Party System: A Behavioral A nalysis (Rand McNally,

1964). R. Rose, ‘Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain’, Political Studies,
vol. 12, no. 1, February 1964.
3 Robert Mckenzie has popularized this formula. See his British Political
Parties, Second Edition (London: Fleineman, 1963).
 The Congress ‘System’ in India 41

are various factions within the party of consensus. Outside the

margin are several opposition groups and parties, dissident groups
from the ruling party, and other interest groups and important
individuals. These groups outside the margin do not constitute
alternatives to the ruling party. Their role is to constantly pres¬
surize, criticize, censure, and influence it by influencing opinion
and interests inside the margin, and, above all, exert a latent threat
that if the ruling group strays away too far from the balance of
effective public opinion, and if the factional system within it is not
mobilized to restore the balance, it will be displaced from power
by the opposition groups. Both the ideas of an in-built corrective
through factionalism within the ruling party, and the idea of a
latent threat from outside the margin of pressure are necessary
parts of the one party dominance system. It is an assumption of
the system that the party of consensus, which is presumably the
only legitimate instrument of power, is sensitive enough to public
pressures and demands, but a safeguard is nonetheless provided
through the operation of the latency factor, so that there is always
available an identifiable group or groups which can be called
into action for the preservation of competition and external con¬
trol, if the normal mechanism provided by competing elites within
the party fails to respond. The sensitivity of the entire system
depends on the sensitivity of the margin of pressure, its flexibility
and general responsiveness being a function of the elbow room
it provides to factions, dissident groups, and opposition parties
in the making of critical choices and decisions.
It is the consensus system which operates through the institu¬
tion of a party of consensus that is of central importance in this
scheme of politics. In India, the Congress, which is the party of
consensus, functions through an elaborate network of factions
which provides the chief competitive mechanism of the Indian
system. We have considered elsewhere in some detail the main
features of the factional system and the functions it performs.4

4 Rajni Kothari, ‘Party System’, The Economic Weekly, 3 June 1961; Rajni
Kothari, ‘India’s Political Take-Off’, The Economic Weekly, Special Number,
July 1962; also see Myron Weiner, ‘Political Leadership in West Bengal’,
The Economic Weekly, Special Number, July 1962; and W. H. Morris-Jones,
‘India’s Political Idiom’, in C. H. Phillips (ed.), Politics and Society in India
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963).
42 The Dominance and Decline of the Congress

We have shown there how political change takes place at each

level in this system, and how in the process not only new men
come to power but new kinds of men, bringing with them new
attitudes and orientations to power, and new states of ideology and
issue articulation. We can briefly recapitulate the arguments here.
In 1947, the Congress, which functioned as a broad-based nation¬
alist movement before independence, transformed itself into the
dominant political party of the nation. Although a number of
opposition parties came into existence, it was recognized that the
Congress was the chief party, representing a historical consensus
and enjoying a continuing basis of support and trust. Under the
circumstances, political competition was internalized and carried
on within the Congress. There developed an elaborate system of
factions at every level of political and governmental activity,
and a system of coordination between the various levels through
vertical ‘faction chains’.5 Originating on the basis of individual
competition between leaders, these factions were then built around
a functional network consisting of various social groups and
leader-client relationships. In the process, a system of patronage
was worked out in the countryside, traditional institutions of
kin and caste were gradually drawn and involved, and a structure
of pressures and compromises was developed. These were mediated
through two new tiers of political organization, a managerial
class of politicians occupying critical organizational positions in
the state and the district Congresses, and a class of ‘link men’ in
the field6 through whom they operated. It was in the course of
the working of this system that political competition was inten¬
sified, changes took place, new cadres of leadership drawn from a
more diffuse social basis came to power, and an intricate structure
of conflict, mediation, bargaining, and consensus was developed
within the framework of the Congress.
The system got aggregated at the state level where individuals
who had risen to power in the Congress organization sometimes
constituted the chief opposition to the government, provided
an alternative leadership, exercised controls and pressures on it, and
5 Rajni Kothari and Ghanshyam Shah, ‘Caste Orientation of Political
Factions: Modasa Constituency—A Case Study’, The Economic Weekly, Special
Number, July 1963.
6 F. G. Bailey, Politics and Social Change (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1963). Bailey uses the term ‘brokers’ to describe these men.
 The Congress ‘System’ in India 43

in many instances overthrew it from power and replaced it.7 In this

process, elections in the organization played an important role, but
also the general elections, and the selection of party candidates for
the general elections. Finally, the system of mediation and arbitra¬
tion as well as an inter-level coordination in the Congress8 ensured
active involvement of the 'central leadership in the factional
structure. More recently, starting some time before Mr Nehru’s
death, we find the operation of the same system at the top, through
the activization of the central executive of the party, and the latter’s
firm and successful mediation in the determination of governmen¬
tal succession after Nehru.9 The upshot of all this is the critical

7 The pattern of replacement of the government leaders by leaders con¬

trolling the party organization in the state began in Madras when Mr C.
Rajagopalachari was replaced as chief minister by Mr Kamaraj, the state
Congress President, in 1953. In Uttar Pradesh (UP) Mr C. B. Gupta first
acquired control of the PCC and then managed to win over support of a
majority of the members in the Legislature Party and brought about the fall
of Chief Minister Sampurnanand in 1961, much against the wishes of Prime
Minister Nehru. The Orissa Chief Minister Harekrushna Mahatab was simi¬
larly replaced by Mr Bijoyanand Patnaik in 1962, when the latter as chief of
the Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC) virtually organized an agitation
against the Congress-Gantantra coalition ministry that the former was head¬
ing and forced the central leadership to intervene in his favour. Likewise
in Gujarat and Mysore the leaders who had gained control of the PCC, took
over as chief ministers in 1963.
8 The Central leadership has been able to play a considerable role in the
rivalries between Congress factions in the states through such instrumentalities
as the Central Parliamentary Board, the sub-committees in the Working
Committee that are appointed from time to time to look after the affairs of
PCCs where the conflicts are acute, and through the system of the ‘observer’
appointed to supervise, on its behalf, the organizational elections in the states.
Possessing vast powers, ranging from the determination of the eligibility of
primary members to vote to the conduct of the poll for election of PCC office¬
bearers, the ‘observers’ have been able to help one or the other faction to gain
control of the organization at the state level. The High Command itself has
in a few cases been able to tilt the balance one way or the other, or bring about
a rapprochement between rival factions through direct intervention, usually
at the request of local groups.
9 Mr Kamaraj as Congress President played an important role in the
selection of the successor to Mr Nehru. With Lai Bahadur Shastri, Morarji
Desai, and Jagjivan Ram in the field, the task of determining the degree of
support each enjoyed among the members of Parliament (MPs), state chief
44 The Dominance and Decline of the Congress

importance of the party organization at all levels, the competitive

relationship between the organization and the government, and
between the factions within each of them.
Structurally, such a party system displays two features. There
is plurality within the dominant party which makes it more
representative, provides flexibility, and sustains internal competi¬
tion. At the same time, it is prepared to absorb groups and
movements from outside the party and thus prevent other parties
from gaining in strength. It is a system that concentrates strength
within the dominant party and then builds internal checks to limit
the use of this strength. In this way the party representing a
historical consensus also continues to represent the present consen¬
sus. This ensures the legitimacy of the system and of the institu¬
tional framework under which it operates.
The role of the Opposition in such a party system has already
been discussed. By posing a constant threat, it ensures the mobility
and life of the internal power structure of the Congress. On the
other hand, its own strength is continuously conditioned by the
strength of the Congress, gaining where the latter loses, and
sometimes gaining substantially when the latter has lost grip over
the situation or its internal thermostat has failed.10 Such a position
has its structural implications. Electorate-wise, the Opposition can
only hope to function effectively at the local and regional levels.
Legislature-wise, however, it also functions at the national level and
performs a very useful role in the maintenance of the system. It
should be noted here that thanks to the heritage of parliamentary
traditions, which are further reinforced by the conventions estab¬
lished by the leaders of the national movement in the Indian
Parliament, the Opposition is given an importance which is out
of proportion to its size. This, in turn, helps sustain the morale
and activity of the Opposition in spite of there being a slender
chance of its coming to power. Also, certain important leaders of

ministers, and PCC chiefs was entrusted to Mr Kamaraj. After meeting them
all informally he conveyed to the Parliamentary Party, over whose meeting
he was requested to preside, his finding that Mr Shastri enjoyed the support
of the majority among the MPs and among the other elements in the party.
The Parliamentary Party accepted this finding and elected Mr Shastri as its
leader by a unanimous vote.
10 The analogy with the thermostat underlines the absorbent, self-correc¬
tive, and flexibility functions of factionalism.
 The Congress ‘System’ in India 45

the Opposition are given considerable personal importance by the

ruling group in the Congress, thus preventing frustration and
bitterness from taking undesirable forms. At the same time, this
creates a wide gap between the leadership and the rank and file in
the Opposition, shielding and protecting the former from the
radicalism of the latter.
Apart from this relationship within the national political elite,
however, the Opposition in India is, for all practical purposes, a
regional phenomenon. Even the ‘national’ parties are loose
coalitions of state parties, which explain the great heterogeneity
within opposition parties, and the constant problem of enforcing
discipline from above. The second structural implication is that
the Opposition is fragmented and greatly divided. Because they
are basically not parties of consensus but parties of pressure,
they present an inchoate front. This is another important reason
why sectional parties, such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
(DMK), the different tribal parties and various language parties
and coalitions, and certain parties that are essentially sectional
such as the Communists in Kerala and earlier in Andhra, and
the Jana Sangh and Swatantra in certain areas, are much more
successful in opposition. Again, however, both the positive stimu¬
lation of parliamentary experience and the negative contribution
of Congress weakening in parts of the country has set up a
corrective trend to such a structure of pressure: the Opposition
parties too are found to contain a wide variety of social groups.
There is also a greater secular involvement of sectional groups
which will help in the articulation of the Opposition.11 But the
emergence of a second party of consensus is not anywhere in the
offing. We shall return to this point when we consider below the
emerging trends.
What we have discussed so far provides no more than a tentative
definition and description of the one party dominance system as
it operates in India. We do not propose in this paper to suggest
explanatory hypotheses for the emergence and development of
such a system as we are more concerned here with the logic of its
operation and its consequent impact on the framework in which

11 For an account of the movement in which caste associations are getting

involved in the total political process, see the article by Rajni Kothari and
Rushikesh Maru, ‘Caste and Secularism in India: A Case Study of the Gujarat
Kshatriya Sabha’, Journal of Asian Studies.
46 The Dominance and Decline of the Congress

political and institutional development is taking place. However,

we may touch briefly upon the historical and environmental
context in which the system has developed, as this may help in
bringing out its more peculiar elements.
It is important to bear in mind that the Congress took root and
came to political power not as a political party but as a movement
for independence and reform. What is important is the long
duration and organization of the movement and the forms it took.
Established in 1885, and passing through a long phase of intellectual
agitation during which its goals were articulated, it was trans¬
formed during the 1920s and 1930s into a mass movement that
acquired depth and traditions. This meant two things. Encompass¬
ing as it did all the major sections and interests of society, it
acquired a stamp of legitimacy and came to represent what we have
called a ‘historical consensus’. But this also meant that its structure
was firmly laid out and the conditions of its competence deter¬
mined. It was as a distinctive political elite organized in the form
of a well-knit movement spread in large areas and along a hierar¬
chy of levels—district, Pradesh, and all-India—that the Congress
acquired its identity. It is true that it was not built in the form
of a modern bureaucracy as has been the case with various
socialistic and communist parties, but it remained nonetheless a
powerful movement with a discipline and a strong commitment
to goals. It is this that determined the organizational ideology of
the Congress, which still continues, and of which the ‘Kamaraj
Plan’ is the latest and most characteristic echo.
Second, the Congress was from the beginning committed to
a democratic ideology, a stand from which it never wavered
in spite of a good deal of ‘anti-Western’ feeling and a certain
speculative nostalgia for a utopia in the past. Even the latter
underlined the democratic inclinations of the leadership: it was
not traditional kingship, but panchayati raj (significantly translated
later on as ‘democratic decentralization’) that was the point of
reference. Similarly, freedom of speech and tolerance of opposition
(indeed the necessity of opposition) were cardinal principles of the
movement’s ideology of political modernization. Non-violent
nationalism and intellectual pacifism further underlined the
same democratic orientation. All this ensured the democratic and
competitive character of the intellectual climate in which the
party system developed in India, again setting it apart from the
 The Congress 'System’ in India 47

‘one-party’ models of many other countries. The model of a one

party state was anathema to the Congress from the beginning.
Historical reasons are necessary but not sufficient conditions
for the efficacy of a system. There is no doubt that in its character
and depth, the Congress was .an unparalleled movement for inde¬
pendence, and this has significantly contributed to the present place
of the Congress organization in India. But it was the consolidation
that followed independence that really determined the present
features of the system. Moreover, there were peculiar environmen¬
tal features that not only confirmed the Congress in a position of
unrivalled power but considerably added to its strength and crys¬
tallized it in concrete terms. It is often said that with the coming
of independence, the Congress ceased to be a movement and turned
into a political party. This is a misreading of the reality of the
Indian political situation, for even after independence, the Con¬
gress continued to be a movement. Having acquired independence
from foreign rule, it has now to build a nation. It is this charter
of modernization through nation-building that has determined
many of the present characteristics of the Indian party system. In
this respect, it resembles the various official and movement parties
found in the communist and non-communist developing nations,
without, however, taking on their authoritarian features. It is in
terms of a movement based on a consensus developed through the
operation of free institutions, while at the same time restraining
the excesses of partisan struggle, that the Congress has achieved
its post-independence character. Let us look briefly at the main
features of the system as it operates today.
The Congress, when it came to power, assigned a positive and
overwhelming role to government and politics in the development
of society. Second, it made the power of the central authority
the chief condition of national survival. This power was not only
consolidated but greatly augmented. Third, it made legitimacy the
principal issue of politics and gave to the government and the ruling
party an importance of great symbolic value. ‘Only the Congress
could be trusted.’ This is why only the Congress was the party of
consensus. The political system got legitimized through identifica¬
tion with a particular leadership, and its agents and heirs. This made
the symbolism of the Congress so concrete and manifest. Fourth,
the Congress in power made for a concentration of resources, a
monopoly of patronage, and a control of economic power which
48 The Dominance and Decline of the Congress

crystallized the structure of its power and made competition with

it a difficult proposition. Fifth, by adopting a competitive model
of development, it made mobilization and public cooperation a
function of political participation rather than of bureaucratic con¬
trol and police surveillance. Only the Congress, with its huge
organizational legacy, its leadership, and its control of institutional
patronage, could provide such a framework of participation.
Similarly, the broadening of the social and ideological base of
the Indian polity depended upon the broadening of opportunities
within the Congress as it would be suicidal for new sections and
interests to join an opposition party and invite the hostility of
the ruling party. Indeed, it has been repeatedly observed that even
when the grievances of particular sections have been successfully
ventilated through agitations launched by the opposition parties,
the result has been that these elements have been absorbed into
the ranks of the Congress which only stood to gain from the
bargain: a truly tragic plight for the Opposition.12 The fact that
the consensus represented by the Congress has come not only out
of historical legacy but also a continuing accommodation of
interests is not out of any intellectual alertness or breadth of vision
on part of Congressmen. The Congress has been hard on many
groups, has generally been conservative on the question of admit¬
ting new recruits, has given in only when it must, and has usually
gained in the bargain. But the situation is such that it confirms the
Congress more and more in its position of the pafty of consensus.
In places where it has failed to accommodate entrenched or newly
emergent groups, it has not occupied such a position and has
been defeated by dissident or opposition groups.13

12 Thus as a result of the powerful agitation for linguistic states in

Maharashtra and Gujarat, new cadres of workers were drawn into the political
arena. Soon after the successful culmination of the agitation, however, the
Congress absorbed a large number of the new entrants and succeeded in
capturing full initiative in state politics. Similarly, in Punjab, Congressmen
who had left the party and organized a new opposition group during the
agitation against Chief Minister Kairon have rejoined it following the
formation of a new ministry under Mr Ram Kishen.
13 See, for instance, the articles on Amroha, Farukkhabad, and Rajkot
constituencies in which the Congress was defeated in 1963 by-elections, in
Myron Weiner and Rajni Kothari (eds), Voting Behaviour in India (Calcutta:
Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya).
 The Congress ‘System ’ in India 49

A significant trend in political development in India is the

growth of built-in constraints in the political system which
have led to a containment of conflicts at points where excessive
conflict is likely to disrupt the intricate balance on which the
Congress system is based. An awareness seems to have grown
in the leadership that whereas the mechanism of factions to which
the Congress has given rise serves to make for mobility and leads
to a fresh balance when one is called for, neither factionalism
nor partisan struggle can be allowed to become endemic, and
should be held in restraint. There has developed over the years
a conciliation machinery within the Congress, at various levels
and for different tasks, which is almost constantly in operation,
mediating in factional disputes, influencing political decisions
in the states and districts, and not infrequently backing up one
group againsf another and utilizing the electoral and patronage
systems in confirming the former in a position of power. Apart
from resolution of conflicts and interference in the outcome of
conflicts, there is also a growing tendency towards avoidance of
conflicts from taking an express form at certain levels, such as
the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) or the general meeting
of the PCC. This has been made possible -by the growth of several
buffers in the form of smaller executive committees, informal
consultative committees, and ‘inner groups’ in the leadership.
The trend is also noticeable outside the ruling party. Thus the
significant development in the working of the Indian Parliament
is the growing importance of the Congress Parliamentary Party
(CPP), on the one hand, and various functional committees of
the Parliament, on the other, in legislative and political decision¬
making. Consultation between leaders of various parties on key
business issues and the development of State Committees in the
CPP are further extensions of the pivotal role of the Committee
system in the making of parliamentary consensus. Similarly, in
the Council of Ministers the latest trend is the appointment of
experts and ‘non-controversial’ figures to key ministerial positions.
Even among the politician ministers, conflict and controversy
appear to have been restricted through the emergence of an inner
group in the form of a ‘collective’ and the avoidance of abstract
issues through the elimination of the ‘ideologues’ from important
positions. In other spheres, there has either already taken place
or a demand is being made for autonomy and non-political
50 The Dominance and Decline of the Congress

functioning. Thus in civil-military relationships, the military is

given more and more autonomy on its internal administration, as
well as in the making of policy, thus making for a relationship of
mutual confidence and trust and for a high state of morale and
respect for civilian authority. Similar pleas for autonomy and
‘professionalism’ are being made for the Planning Commission and
the nationalized industries. These are all developments leading to
a limitation of the sensitive zone of factional politics, without any
attempt to limit political participation, or restrict the right to
criticize the government or articulate public opinion to censure it
on particular failures or shortfalls. They constitute no more than
in-built correctives to a highly politicized structure of institutions
through which the Congress system operates.
Such a position of the Congress had been further cemented
by the policy of neutralizing some of the more important sources
of cleavage and disaffection in the country. Thus the removal of
feudalism, the linguistic reorganization of states, the energetic
infiltration by Congressmen of labour unions coupled with pro¬
tective legislation for labour, the removal of gross social inequali¬
ties by grant of special privileges to depressed sections of the
community, and the firm suppression of all acts of violence,
secession, and disaffection—all this has succeeded in neutralizing
potential sources of political disaffection. All of this has been part
of the Congress drive for legitimacy on the one hand and
modernization on the other. Together, these features add up to a
considerable strengthening of the party of consensus and a corre¬
spondingly problematic position for the opposition parties.
On the other hand such an impressive consolidation of power
in the hands of the Congress has not led to authoritarianism
because of the free working of the electoral process, the crystal¬
lization of the factional structure within the party of consensus,
the critical pressures exercised by the opposition, and the general
tendency of the leadership to preserve democratic forms, to respect
the rule of law, to avoid undue strife, and to hold various elements
together in some sort of a balance of interests. The Congress has
also shown great sensitivity on the question of respect for minori¬
ties, including political minorities, accommodating them whenever
possible, and in general pursuing a broad-based consensus on
national politics. We have discussed these points earlier and they
need not be repeated, except to once again emphasize the fact that
 The Congress 'System’ in India 51

in the development and consolidation of the party of consensus,

the role of the opposition has also been preserved, and that India
has categorically rejected any authoritarian model of the party
system in order to avoid dissidence and preserve unity. The one
party dominance as found in India is thus radically different from
the one party dominance as found in, say, Ghana. It is a dominance
based on consensual authority and not simply on civil or military
power.
In giving to the country and its institutions such strength and
character, a critical role was played by Jawaharlal Nehru, the first
Prime Minister of India. Although it is easy to exaggerate his
role and although it is doubtful what he could have accomplished
had he not had the great inheritance of the national movement
and its organization to stand upon, there is no doubt that but for
Nehru and his long tenure in office, it would have been difficult
to consolidate the gains of independence in the manner in which
this has been done. Nehru’s role has been two-fold. By the sheer
force of his personality, he managed to hold the country together,
to arrest disruptive forces, and to take to the road of moderniza¬
tion. By symbolizing a nation’s unity in one man14 for such a long
time, India avoided the painful convulsions through which less
fortunate new nations have had to pass. But far more important
was Nehru’s other and more concrete role of having given roots
and legitimacy to the institutions adopted by the country as well
as to the modern purposes to which they are put. He patiently and
doggedly worked to this end. As we have argued elsewhere, the
contribution of Nehru was not to have started a revolution but
to have given rise to a consensus.15 He provided the country’s
institutions with sufficient time to strike roots, and himself worked
to that end by being their chief operator, and made acceptable to
his countrymen certain critical values—the value of equality, the
value of freedom, the value of the vote. Meanwhile, he concen¬
trated power in himself and in his party and maintained some
sort of balance, pinning his faith on the institutions of democracy
but not allowing political conflict to take too sharp a form, in a

14 Sisir Gupta, ‘Some Aspects of the Problem of National Integration in

India, Pakistan and Ceylon’, Parliamentary Studies, vol. 8, nos 1 and 2, 1964.
15 Rajni Kothari, ‘The Meaning of Jawaharlal Nehru’, The Economic
Weekly, Special Number, July 1964.
52 The Dominance and Decline of the Congress

sense drifting on and hoping for things to sort themselves out

ultimately. Nehru was perhaps not too confident of the way things
were shaping but his sense of power on the one hand and a sincere
conviction about the efficacy of democratic institutions on the
other were enough to allow India time to build a foundation.
In a sense, the Nehru period was an exceptional period in India’s
history, one that was so necessary, but not so normal. This had
its effect on the working of the party system. While the Congress
gained in strength owing to the various factors described above,
Nehru in another way weakened the party by concentrating power
in his own hands and through acting as if only he could hold the
country together. Nehru allowed things to take their own shape
in the states and at lower levels where the party organization often
forced its way, but at the national level he stymied the growth
of the organization. Such a discrepancy in institutional organiza¬
tion, however, could not last forever, especially in such a highly
structured and powerful organization as the Congress. Towards
the end of his tenure, therefore, Nehru agreed to a proposal which,
while it confirmed his own unbridled power, also restored power
and prestige to the Congress organization.
This proposal was the Kamaraj Plan.16 While this scheme has
attracted widespread attention and has been, in turn, made the
subject of praise and ridicule, its real role has not been understood.

16 The Kamaraj Plan was adopted by the AICC on 10 August 1963. The
resolution incorporating it was moved by Mr K. Kamaraj, who was then the
Chief Minister of Madras and seconded by Mr S. K. Patil, the then minister
for Food and Agriculture at the Centre. The chief idea of the plan was to secure
the voluntary relinquishment of their ministerial posts by senior Congressmen
to enable them to devote all their time to the organizational work of the party
so that the ‘unhealthy trend’ noticeable in the formation of groups and factions
in the party and the consequent ‘loosening of the Congress organization’ could
be arrested.
Following the unanimous adoption of the resolution, all ministers at the
Centre and the states submitted their resignations to the Working Committee
which authorized Mr Nehru to decide which of the resignations would be
accepted. On 24th August, Mr Nehru submitted to the Working Committee
a list of names of six central cabinet ministers and six chief, ministers who
should be asked to take up organizational work. The Working Committee
accepted his suggestion and recommended that the resignation of the 12 senior
leaders be accepted. The Central Cabinet Ministers to leave under the Kamaraj
 The Congress ‘System’ in India 53

To consider the Kamaraj Plan in terms of its formally declared

objectives is to misunderstand the purpose, as observers and col¬
umnists were not slow in seeing soon after announcement of the
Plan.17 At the same time, however, to have considered it simply
in terms of a leadership purge, as was done by most of these writers,
is also to have missed the point completely and to have taken an
equally formal position. The importance of the Kamaraj Plan lay
not in the immediate action taken, but in the sequel to it. It was
not the removal ‘for party work’ of central ministers and chief
ministers but the induction of party managers into positions of
power at the national level which proved of greater consequence.
By putting party managers into power, the Kamaraj Plan not only
recognized their importance in national affairs but also restored to
the central organization the prestige and importance it had lost
over the years due to Nehru’s dominating presence. Seen in this
light, the Kamaraj Plan was no coup staged by adventurists; it was
rather a ‘restoration’.
To think that with the return to the government of men and
who had been ‘kamarajed’ the purpose of the plan is defeated
is to misunderstand the nature of the succession after Nehru; it is
also to misunderstand the nature of the change that has come
once again in ministerial-organizational relations at the Centre.
That important leaders should leave the government and look after
the organization was relevant in a situation where the organization
had been weakened by those who were in government. It is no
longer relevant when the organization is restored to its previous
position and is granted its due place in the decision-making
process of politics. It is this that has now come about after the death
of Nehru. The struggle between Lai Bahadur Shastri and Morarji

Plan were Morarji Desai, Lai Bahadur Shastri, Jagjivan Ram, S. K. Patil,
B. Gopala Reddy and Dr K. L. Shrimali. Among the six chief ministers whose
resignations the Working Committee accepted were K. Kamaraj of Madras,
Biju Patnaik of Orissa, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed of Kashmir, UP’s C. B.
Gupta, Bihar’s Binodanand Jha and B. A. Mandloi of Madhya Pradesh.
17 K. Santhanam, ‘Can Kamaraj Plan Provide All the Answers’, The
Hindustan Times, 14 August 1963; Krishna Bhatia, ‘Congress Party Proposes
a Major Toning Up’, The Statesman, 15 August 1963; ‘Go Back to the People’,
Editorial, Eastern Economist, vol. 41, no. 10, September 1963; Romesh Thaper,
‘Congress Re-Birth or Hara Kiri?’, The Economic Weekly, vol. 15, no. 35, 31
August 1963.
54 The Dominance and Decline of the Congress

Desai over the succession issue was at the same time a struggle
between two principles of party organization. In the outcome, the
importance of the organization (alongside the ministry) has been
established as a cardinal principle of the system. It is a principle
that is an essential part of the one party dominance system as it
operates in India, and one that distinguishes it from both the party
system of Western democracies, and the one party systems found
in many of the new nations, in both of which the party organi¬
zation is considered instrumental to the executive. In the Western
democracies, the subsidiary role given to party organization en¬
sures unity in the party and is functional to the two-party system.
In the authoritarian and ‘solidarity’ regimes also it ensures unity
of the regime and keeps factionalism from going too far. In the
Indian system, however, where a strong and potentially monolithic
party must provide its own correctives to its power if it is to
function democratically, the positive role of the party organization
becomes a necessity.
We have now seen in detail the main features of the one party
dominance system and the historical and environmental conditions
under which it developed. It is a system that provides, among other
things, a comprehensive mechanism of change (unlike the Western
party systems, it is within the same party; unlike the ‘one-party
system’ it is not through a coup d'etat), a system of conflict
articulation and resolution (through the operation of the margin
of pressure, both internal and external), and a system of commu¬
nications between society and politics (through the factional
network). It has worked rather well so far. It has its problems too,
some of them serious, for it is still an evolving system and greatly
dependent at the present stage on performance in other spheres.
As for the trends in operation, as mentioned earlier, it is quite
possible that the opposition parties will gain from the Congress
in certain areas, but this is an inherent and necessary part of the
system. Where the Congress has really lost grip, the opposition
may even be able to form a government in one or more states. Only
if this happens on a large scale, and percolates to the Centre,
however, can the system be said to have undergone a major change.
Even in that case, the question remains whether the new party or
coalition provides us with another party, of consensus or is just an
expression of accumulated protest on the part of the public likely
to wither away after a short time in office.
 The Congress System in India
‘ ’ 55

Lastly, there is the important theoretical question: What const-

tutes a stable party system? If still in transition, when does the
real take-off come? Is it necessary that an ‘alternative government’
in the form of another party of consensus should emerge? Or
is stabilization of elite competition, including smooth changes
in government, as found in the Congress system in India, also a
satisfactory condition of political organization?
The one party dominance system in India, with its factions
and its support and communications networks, may yet well be
a transitional system, suited for the special period of national
growth, but one that would transform into a more ‘normal’ party
system later on. This can be left as an open question. Either
through a purposive coalition of dissident and opposition groups
or through some sharp break within the Congress, or perhaps
through the independent strengthening of one of the opposition
parties, such a change may come in the future. Or, for all we know,
the delicate balance on which the legitimacy and power of the
Congress system rests may be rudely disturbed, and a more
authoritarian system might emerge. Political systems do change
in their nature over time, and there is no particular sanctity in one
particular system. Meanwhile, the system of one party dominance
described by us here is an interesting addition to the present
typology of party systems, and one that is also, on Indian
experience, a viable model of political organization.18

18 For an earlier attempt at describing this system, see the author’s ‘Party
System’, The Economic Weekly, 3 June 1961. While sending this article to press,
however, we also notice that W. H. Morris-Jones has developed a similar
concept of ‘one dominant party’. See his ‘Parliament and Dominant Party:
Indian Experience’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 17, no. 3, Summer 1964. The
analysis presented by us, however, differs from that analysis in certain respects,
especially in the characterization of the Congress as the party of consensus.