The defense of self-defense and the defense of necessity differ significantly in both application and acceptance within the Zambian legal system. Self-defense is more readily accepted as it provides protection against unlawful attacks with necessary and proportionate force, as supported by cases like The People v. Mudewa. In contrast, the necessity defense is less frequently recognized, reserved for situations where an unlawful act was unavoidable to avert greater harm, such as in dire circumstances of unavoidable calamity. Courts are cautious with necessity to prevent its abuse and uphold moral integrity, as seen in R v Dudley and Stephens, where killing for survival was not justified .

Under Zambian law, for a self-defense claim to be successful, certain conditions must be satisfied: the force used must be necessary and proportionate to the threat. Necessity implies that less or no violence would not suffice for protection, as seen in the case of The People v. Mudewa, where the accused was justified in using a pistol under pressing threat. Additionally, self-defense can include pre-emptive strikes if circumstances indicate an imminent attack, as noted in Beckford v. R. The action must also be in response to an unlawful attack, highlighting a need for defensive measures .

For a necessity defense to be applied successfully, several strict conditions must be met: firstly, the act must avert an inevitable and irreparable evil; secondly, no more should be done than is necessary for the desired outcome; thirdly, the inflicted evil should not be disproportionate to the evil avoided. These conditions ensure the act was a last resort and preventive in nature, not excessive or unwarranted. Additionally, necessity must typically result from external pressures beyond the defendant's control, and the threat should be directed at the defendant or someone they are responsible for. These criteria are illustrated in cases like Re A and R v Shayler .

The Zambian Penal Code justifies the use of force in self-defense when repelling an unlawful attack against oneself or another, as stated in the definition found in Section 17. Limitations imposed include that the force must be necessary and proportionate to the threat, a principle reinforced in cases like The People v. Mudewa and Elisha Malume Tembo v. The People. The force used should be the minimum required to prevent the attack and cannot exceed the immediate threat, with courts rejecting excessive or avoidable violence even in pressing circumstances .

Pre-emptive strikes in self-defense are justified under criminal law theories when there is a credible and imminent threat that necessitates immediate action to prevent harm. According to the case Beckford v. R, an individual does not need to wait for an attacker to make the first move if circumstances suggest that a strike is forthcoming. This allowance for pre-emptive action acknowledges the reasonableness of a person's belief in the impending danger and supports proactive measures to avert potential harm. This approach seeks to balance the need for individual protection against excessive use of deferral to violent confrontations .

The validity of using the defense of necessity in extreme survival scenarios is contentious, as seen in historical rulings such as R v. Dudley and Stephens. Courts have generally been reluctant to accept necessity in survival contexts due to concerns about eroding legal and moral standards. Although the defendants in Dudley and Stephens argued they acted out of necessity to survive prolonged shipwreck conditions, the court refused this defense, prioritizing the societal need to discourage taking life by personal judgment. This reluctance is consistent with the principle that necessity should not justify acts that fundamentally undermine legal order .

The reluctance of courts to recognize a general defense of necessity is exemplified by the case of R v. Dudley and Stephens. In this case, the defendants, shipwrecked and without sustenance, killed a cabin boy to survive. They argued necessity, claiming it was essential to avoid their own deaths. However, the court rejected this defense, emphasizing that the legal system aims to prevent undermining social order by setting dangerous precedents for justifying unlawful killings. The judgment underscored the importance of upholding moral and legal standards, reinforcing the court's hesitance to broadly apply the necessity defense .

The defense of duress is closely related to necessity in criminal law as a specific form that highlights external pressures compelling an unlawful act to avoid a greater evil. While necessity encompasses a broader justification for a crime committed under unavoidable circumstances, duress focuses on the lack of volition due to coercive threats against the defendant's life or wellbeing. Like necessity, duress requires evidence that the defendant's actions were a last resort response to significant threats, respecting criteria that the harm avoided must outweigh the harm inflicted, reflecting necessity's stringent conditions .

The ruling in Beckford v. R significantly impacts the concept of preemptive action in self-defense by acknowledging that individuals do not have to wait for an assailant's first strike to initiate defensive actions. This decision implies that when circumstances lead to a genuine belief of an imminent attack, a person can lawfully take preemptive measures. The court recognized the necessity of allowing individuals the latitude to act in self-preservation when facing threats that render waiting imprudent or dangerous, thus shaping the legal understanding of reasonable force and preventive action .

In the case of Elisha Malume Tembo v. The People, the principle of proportionality in self-defense was a focal point. The trial judge highlighted that the force used must be reasonable and should not exceed what is necessary in the circumstances. Despite the defendant's belief that the deceased was committing a crime, the court found that alternative actions were available, such as raising an alarm within the army camp where assistance could have been sought. Therefore, the use of a firearm in this context was deemed disproportionate as the threat posed by the deceased did not justify the degree of force employed .