What is the Difference Between

Libel and Slander

The main difference between libel and slander is that libel refers to a
written defamatory statement while slander refers to a spoken
defamatory statement.
Defamation is a false statement presented as a fact that causes injury or
damage to the reputation and livelihood of a person or an entity. Thus, libel
and slander are two types of defamation.

Key Areas Covered

1. What is Defamation
– Definition, Law
2. What is Libel
– Definition, Law, Examples
3. What is Slander
– Definitions, Law, Examples
4. What is the Similarity Between Libel and Slander
– Outline of Common Features
5. What is the Difference Between Libel and Slander
– Comparison of Key Differences
Key Terms
Defamation, Law, Rights, Libel, Slander
What is Defamation
In brief, defamation means ‘the communication of a false statement that,
depending on the law of the country, harms the reputation of an individual,
business, product, group, government, religion, or nation‘.
A defamatory statement can be made in any medium, either in the printed
(including images as well), audio, audio-visual, or virtual media. These
defamatory statements should be either published or communicated to a
third party. Consequently, it is a tort or a civil wrong. Therefore, the
subjected person or the entity (plaintiff) can take legal measures regarding
the damage caused to their reputation, by proving that particular defamation
was a lie.

However, minor factual errors such as getting a person’s age wrong would
not be considered defamation of any sort. Therefore, this defamation
Publication ‘must be a statement expressed as a factual statement and is not
clearly identified as an opinion’.

What is Libel
Libel is an untrue defamatory statement that is made or published in the
written form, either as written or printed words, pictures, etc. Similarly,
defamatory statements on any website would always be libellous rather than
slanderous.

Therefore, the legal dictionary defines libel as ‘involves publishing a

statement about someone in written form or via broadcast (for example, on
radio, television or Internet) that is untrue and would harm the reputation or
livelihood of that person, by tending to bring the target person into ridicule,
hatred, scorn or contempt of others’. As a consequence, the victim or the
plaintiff can open a lawsuit.

Moreover, the law of libel originated in the 17th century in England. With the
growth of publication, the cases of libel also increased.

Some example cases of libel are,

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964).

John Peter Zenger v. William Cosby (1735)
 Figure 2: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was a United States Supreme Court
case based on Libel

Moreover, whether a published statement is libel or not depends on the

person claiming to have been harmed. Therefore, it is on the opinion of the
plaintiff whether to consider a certain publication or the spoken statement as
defamatory.

What is Slander
Slander is an untrue defamatory statement that is done verbally. Slander
applies to defamation made in a transitory form, such as spoken words or
gestures. Statements made in anger or malice that are often untrue, are
commonly viewed as slander. Slander can be made face-to-face, or by
phone, voicemail, or broadcast. Therefore, slander law is concerned with
defamatory speech.
Slander may also consist of the use of private information or facts which are
publicly disclosed without proper authority or permission. Moreover, if the
offending material is published in some fleeting form, as by spoken words or
sounds, sign language, gestures or the like, then also it is slander. There
must be solid evidence, which in the case of slander, means that the
statement is made to a third party.
Some statements, such as an untrue accusation of having committed a
crime, having a loathsome disease or being unable to perform one’s
occupation, are treated as slander since the harm and malice are obvious.

Some example cases of slander are

Joe Francis vs Steve Wynn (2009)

Food Label Law
If the plaintiff is successful in proving the defamatory statements, and that
they caused damage to the plaintiff’s reputation, he may be awarded
monetary damages.

Figure 1: Slander

In order to prove that particular publication as defamation, either as libel or

slander, there are several things a person must prove to establish it in the
lawsuit. For an ordinary person, these steps include; the plaintiff should
prove that

1. the statement was false.

2. it caused harm to the reputation
3. it was made without adequate research into the truthfulness of the fact.
In addition to these basic three steps, a public figure or a celebrity should
also prove that the statement was made with actual malice (with the intent
to harm)

However, since slander is in the verbal form, the plaintiff must be able to
prove that the defendant had, actually, said the statement and that there is
a third party that can attest to that verbal statement.

What is the Similarity Between Libel and

Slander
 Both libel and slander are types of defamation and therefore can be sued
in a civil court.
 Both these acts should have malicious intent to be regarded as
defamation.
What is the Difference Between Libel and
Slander
Definition
Libel refers to written or published defamatory statements while slander
refers to verbally committed defamatory statements.

Medium
Since libel is in the written form, it is found in printed media such as
newspaper, magazines, and on blogs, social media websites, etc. On the
contrary, since slander is a verbal defamation, it is found in television
programmes, on varied public gathering places, face-to-face, by phone,
voicemail, etc.

Punishment
The punishment for general libel is monetary and fine. Punishment for
seditious libel, which is considered a crime (ex: to criticize public officials), is
imprisonment. Also, the punishment may vary with regard to the law in the
particular country. On the other hand, the punishment for slander is civil
lawsuit and financial damages. However, in cases where some countries
regard slander as a crime, the punishment may vary.

Conclusion
Defamation is a tort that is related with the civil law with regard to the
safeguard of civil privacy and reputation, and libel and slander are two types
of defamation. Hence, the major difference between libel and slander is that
libel refers to defamation in written form or defamatory publications while
slander refers to defamation in verbal form or defamatory speech. Even
though the right to criticize people or entities and publicly share information
concerns one’s personal freedom, it is illegal to malign the reputation of
another through slander or libel.

Volenti Non Fit Injuria

Introduction
Normally, when a person suffers an injury at the expense of
someone else’s lack of care or breach of duty, the person who
displays such breach of duty is liable to pay damages to the victim.
Volenti Non Fit Injuria is a defence that could be used by the
defendant to avoid such damages. Volenti Non Fit Injuria is a widely
used as a defence in Tort Law. It is often referred to as the defence
of consent. The burden of proof lies upon the defendant. The
defendant by claiming the defence of Volunti Non Fit Injuria tries to
indicate that the plaintiff voluntarily agreed to suffer harm,
therefore, later he must not complaint about the same as he
consented to it. His consent acts as a strong defence. The consent
given could be implied or express and can even be inferred from the
conduct of the party.
In law of tort, it is said that no person who has voluntarily waived or
abandoned a right can enforce that right later. In Latin, Volenti Non
Fit Injuria literally translates to ‘to a willing person, injury is not
done’. One cannot invite a guest to their home and later sue them
for trespass of their property. Likewise, a sportsperson after signing
the contract for a specific season cannot sue the other party for
getting injured if the contract explicitly indemnifies the other party
of such foreseeable injury or risk. It could be said that the maxim
presupposes a tortious act by the defendant. This maxim has wide
applicability and we passively witness it in our daily life. Often,
people are confused whether this maxim revolves around a legal
contract. The answer to this would be no, the application of ‘volenti
non fit injuria’ is not restricted to a legal contract, rather the
determining factor lies upon the competence of the decision making
capacity of the person at the time the consent was given.

Therefore, a minor, who would otherwise possess no legal capacity

to consent, would be considered to be capable of making a
reasonable assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of a
treatment proposed by a physician or a surgeon, and he could give
a valid consent.

When the defence of Volenti Non Fit Injuria is

available?
For a defendant to plead the defence of ‘volenti non fit injuria’, it is
necessary to show that the person (plaintiff) who consented to doing
the act gave his consent freely. The consent of the plaintiff would
not serve as a good defence if it had been obtained by fraud or
under compulsion or under some mistaken impression. Emphasis
must also be put on the fact that the act done by the defendant
must be the same for which the consent is given.

In order to understand this, we may take the help of a case law.

In Lakshmi Rajan v. Malar Hospital Ltd.[i], the complainant was
a married woman. She noticed development of a painful lump in her
breast. Although, the lump had no effect on her uterus, during the
surgery, her uterus was removed without any reason whatsoever. It
was held that the hospital, was liable for deficiency in service. The
court held that the patient’s consent for the operation did not imply
her consent to the removal of the uterus.

When the defence of Volenti Non Fit Injuria is not

available?
1. Consent obtained by Fraud

If the consent is obtained by fraud, it would not serve as a good

defence. But it is essential to make note of the fact that mere
concealment of facts would not amount to fraud as held in the case
of Hegarty v. Shine[ii]. In law of crime, it is said that fraud vitiates
consent, if it induces mistake as to the real nature of the act done.
Hence, in a case where the accused, a music teacher, induced the
victim to engage in sexual intercourse with him on the pretext that
the said sexual act would improve her vocals, the accused was held
to be guilty of rape.

2. Breach of duty or negligence

The defence of volenti non fit injuria would not stand, if the act is
due to a breach of statutory duty. Hence, an employer may not seek
the defence of ‘volunti non fit injuria’ if he himself caused the injury
suffered by the employee due to a statutory breach of duty.
Nevertheless, where the negligence or breach of statutory duty is on
the part of the employee, who knowingly accepts the risk that
follows from such breach and the employer is not guilty of
negligence or breach of statutory duty, the defendant may seek the
defence of ‘volenti non fit injuria’.

In case of negligence on the part of the defendant, his defence

under this maxim would not hold. In Slater v. Clay Cross Co.
Ltd[iii], the plaintiff was hit by a train due to negligence on part of
the defendant’s servant (driver of the train). The defendant had
instructed their drivers to slowdown and blow a whistle while
entering the tunnel in order to alert the people walking through the
tunnel. Since the driver failed to do so, the plaintiff suffered injuries.
The court held the defendant to be liable.

3. Consent Obtained Under Compulsion

In Bowater v. Rowley Regis Corporation[iv], the court held that

“a man cannot be said to be truly willing unless he is in a position to
choose freely, and freedom of choice predicates, not only full
knowledge of the circumstances on which the exercise of choice is
conditional, so that he may be able to choose wisely, but the
absence of any feeling of constraint so that nothing shall interfere
with the freedom of his will.” A person cannot be said to give
consent when he is compelled by some circumstances to take up
risky work which he would not have done if he had a free choice. For
instance, a labourer may undertake a particular task which he
otherwise would not have undertaken. In such situations, the
labourer takes up such tasks in order to save his job as he fears that
the refusal to comply and take up tasks would deem him unfit for
the job in the eyes of his employer and his job would be at stake.

4. Knowledge alone does not equate Consent

If the defendant wishes to apply this maxim, he must prove that the
plaintiff knew about the risk and that he agreed to suffer the harm
or risk. These two form the pre requisites for claiming this defence.
They are the key elements for claiming this defence. These two
elements go hand in hand and the absence of the second condition
would deem the first condition as an inconclusive defence.
Therefore, simply proving that the plaintiff had knowledge of the
harm would not be sufficient.

Case Laws on Volenti Non Fit Injuria

Smith v. Baker[v]

Facts:
 ADVERTISEMENT

In this case, the plaintiff was employed as a workman by the

defendants for the purpose of cutting a rock. The stones were being
moved from one side to another with the help of a crane. The rocks
would move above the plaintiff’s head. The plaintiff had once
informed the crane driver about the hazards of this activity. One day
while working the drill, one of the stones that were being moved, fell
on the plaintiff’s head and he suffered injuries. The plaintiff was
given no warning whatsoever before transporting the stone.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the plaintiff consented to the risk?

2. Whether or not there was any evidence of negligence?
Held:

ADVERTISEMENT

In this case, the plaintiff pleaded the defence of volenti no fit injuria,
but this was rejected by the court as mere knowledge of risk on the
part of the plaintiff would not suffice in the present case. Lord
Halsbury said that the mere knowledge of the risk would not
mandatorily implicate consent to the risk. Furthermore, while giving
the judgement, Lord Herschell was of the opinion that volenti non fit
injuria would not apply to such a case, and that the employer could
not invoke it to save himself from the liability of his wrongdoing. He
was of the belief that there was certain negligence on the part of the
defendant and mere knowledge of risk by the plaintiff would not
negate such negligence.

Dann v. Hamilton[vi]

Facts:

The plaintiff chose to travel by a car in spite of knowing about the

driver’s drunken state. The driver was driving negligently which
resulted in an accident. The plaintiff then sued the personal
representatives of the driver. They pleaded the defence under this
maxim.

ADVERTISEMENT

Issue:

Whether the defence of volenti non fit injuria be pleaded where the
plaintiff voluntarily accepted the risk of travelling with a drunk
driver?

Held:

ADVERTISEMENT

The court rejected the argument made under the defence of volenti
non fit injuria and held the defendants liable. In the view of the
court, this defence was not applicable because the degree of
intoxication of the driver was not to such an extent where it could
be of grave danger.

Bowater v. Rowley Regis Corporation[vii]

Facts:

The plaintiff was a cart driver and was asked by the defendant’s
foreman to drive a horse. They both knew that the horse could bolt
due to past incidents. Hence, the plaintiff protested but then
followed the order. As expected, the horse bolted and the plaintiff
suffered an injury.

ADVERTISEMENT

Issue:

Could the defendants plead the defence of volenti non fit injuria and
avoid liability?
Held:

ADVERTISEMENT

The court held that volenti non fit injuria could not be applied as the
defendants were negligent. In fact, Goddard L.J made an observation
that in case of master-servant relation, this maxim must be applied
with caution. Subsequently, the plaintiff was entitled to recover.

Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell[viii]

Facts:

The two brothers (employees), working for the defendant, tried to

test detonators without taking prior permission of the employers.
The brothers were also in contravention of statutory provisions and
the employer’s orders in this matter. This caused them to sustain
injuries. They brough an action against the defendants and the
defendants pleaded the defence under volenti non fit injuria.

Issue:

Whether employers could seek the defence of volenti non fit injuria
when the employees expressly disobeyed the instructions and would
they be liable?

Held:

The court held that an employer can plead the defence of volenti
non fit injuria if the employee neglects the instructions and
possesses knowledge about the risk and the same was applied in
this case

Conclusion
Under the law of tort, there are several defences available and the
doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria stands out as an excellent
defence. Notwithstanding that, there are certain limitations to the
applicability of this defence. Rescue cases being one of them.
Therefore, when the plaintiff takes up the risk of saving somebody
else, the defendant cannot plead the defence of Volenti Non Fit
Injuria. This defence can be availed only when the defendant is
actually not guilty of any offence as the consent was communicated
by the plaintiff. While construing this maxim, the courts must make
sure that the two essential elements i.e., knowledge of the risk
along with agreement to suffer such risk are present and have been
proved by the defendants. Unless and until the defendants prove
the presence of both the essential elements, they must not be given
the leeway to escape liability.

References

1. The Law of Torts by R.K. Bangia.

2. The Law of Torts by Ratanlal and Dheerajlal.
3. [Link]
quartermaine/
4. [Link]
5. [Link]
k-b-476/
6. [Link]
[Link]
7. [Link]
8. [Link]
[i] Lakshmi Rajan v. Malar Hospital Ltd. III (1998) CPJ 586 (Tamil
Nadu SCDRC)

[ii] Hegarty v. Shine, (1878) 2 L.R. Ir. 273

[iii] Slater v. Clay Cross Co. Ltd, (1956) 2 All E.R. 625

[iv] Bowater v. Rowley Regis Corporation, (1944) K.B. 476

[v] Smith v. Baker , (1891) A.C. 325.

[vi] Dann v. Hamilton, (1939) 1 K.B 509

[vii] Bowater v. Rowley Regis Corporation, (1944) K.B. 476

[viii] Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell, (1965) AC 656

Rylands vs. Fletcher (1868) L. R. 3 H.L. 330.

Introduction
Introduction Rylands v. Fletcher (1866) LR I Exch 265, (1868) LR 3 HL
330 lays down a rule of strict liability for hann caused by escapes from
land applied to exceptionally hazardous purposes. Although historically
it seems to have been an offshoot of the law of nuisance, it is
sometimes said to differ from nuisance in that its concern is with
escapes from land rather than interference with land. Accordingly,
some authorities hold that there is no requirement - like that in the tort
of nuisance - that the plaintiff be the owner or occupier of the land
affected by the escape, though the point is far from uncontroversial
(see 19.4). If this is so, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher may be thought to
have a role in protecting not just interests in real property but also
interests in the person and in personal property. But its possible
development into a general principle of strict liability for
ultrahazardous activities has been obstructed by a number of
limitations on its scope, notably the requirement of escape. The case
concerned the flooding of the plaintiffs mine with water from the
defendants' recently constructed reservoir. A coal seam had previously
been worked on the site of the reservoir and, although the mine shaft
had been filled up, water from the reservoir was able to escape down
the shaft and from there to the plaintiffs mine. The existence of the
disused shaft had not been discovered before the reservoir was filled
with water and thus no precautions had been taken to guard against
the risk which eventuated. The fault for this lay with the independent
contractors the defendants had engaged to construct the reservoir; the
defendants were not personally to blame. Furthennore, the general
rule is that, while one may be vicariously liable for the acts of an
employee, one is not responsible for the acts of an independent
contractor (see Ch. 21). This difficulty, though, was avoided in the case
by treating the defendants as personally liable irrespective of fault.
In the Court of Exchequer Chamber, Blackburn J set out the rule to be
applied in such cases, together with the defences to it (his fonnulation
was subsequently approved by the House of Lords in the same case):
'[T]he person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie
responsible for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its
escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to
the plaintiffs default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence
of vis major, or the act of God.' This fonnulation makes it clear that
there are two essential ingredients of Rylands v. Fletcher liability: first,
the bringing of a dangerous thing onto one's land (so as to apply it to a
'non-natural use of land'); secondly, the escape of that thing.
Rylands vs. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330 is one of the landmark cases
of tort law. In this case, The House of Lords laid down the rule
recognizing ‘No Fault’ liability. The ‘Rule of Strict Liability’ originated in
this case. By this rule, a person may be liable for some harm even
though he is not negligent in causing the same. Further, this case paved
the way for ‘The Rule Of Absolute liability’ in India.
Judges (sitting)
Lord Cairns and Lord Cranworth
Decided on
17 July 1868
 Major contribution of the case
‘The Rule of Strict Liability’ originated in this case.
Facts of the case
The defendant, Rylands got a reservoir constructed, through
independent contractors, over his land for providing water to his mill.
There were some old disused shafts under the site of the reservoir,
which the contractors failed to observe. So they didn’t block the shafts.
When water was filled within the reservoir, it burst through the shafts. As
a result plaintiff’s coal mines on the adjoining land was flooded. The
defendant didn’t know about the shafts and he had not been negligent
although the independent contractors had been. The negligence was on
the part of independent contractors. Since the plaintiff, Fletcher has to
suffer losses, he sued defendants.
Issues raised
 Whether there was any nuisance or not?
 Was the use of Defendant’s land unreasonable and thus was he to be
held liable for damages incurred by the Plaintiff?
The Court Of Liverpool
This court’s ruling favoured the plaintiff on the basis of both trespass, (as
the flooding was deemed not to be “direct and immediate”) and
nuisance. Later a court order led to an arbitrator from the Exchequer of
Pleas, who was appointed in December 1864. The arbitrator decided
that the independent contractors were liable for negligence since they
had known about the old mine shafts, still showed negligence in dealing
with it. The arbitrator said, Rylands, had no way of knowing about the
mine shafts, so he couldn’t be liable.
Exchequer of Pleas
The case then went to the Exchequer of Pleas, where it was heard
between 3rd and 5th May 1865. It was heard on two points:
 Whether the defendants were liable for the actions of the contractors
and
 Whether the defendants were responsible for the damage regardless
of their lack of negligence.
They decided for the first point that the defendants were not liable, but
they had a diverse opinion on the second point. Channell B
recused. Pollock CB and Martin B held that the defendants were not
liable, as since a negligence claim couldn’t be brought, there was no
valid case. Bramwell B, dissenting, argued that the claimant had the right
to enjoy his land free of interference from water that came from
defendants reservoir, and so as a result the defendant was guilty of both
trespass and the commissioning of a nuisance. He stated that “the
general law, wholly independent of contract” should be that the
defendants were liable, “on the simple ground that the defendants have
caused water to flow into the [claimant]’s mines, which but for their
actions wouldn’t have gone there…”
Court Of Exchequer Chamber
Fletcher was angered by the decision of the three exchequer judges and
appealed to the exchequer chamber composed of six judges. The six
judges “overturned the previous decision”. Fletcher. Blackburn J spoke
on the behalf of all the judges and said that “we, the judges of the
exchequer think that correct rule of law is that, any person, who for his
own intentions brings on his land anything, accumulates and keeps on
the land that thing, which is likely to cause trouble if it escapes, must
keep it at his own risk, and, if he doesn’t do so, is clear (without need for
further information), in charge of all the damage which is that the natural
effect of its escape.” Blackburn J further said that that person can
excuse himself from the liability by taking certain defences like – that
the escape was caused because of the plaintiff’s default; or by proving
that the escape was a consequence of the act of God” (Fordham
Margaret1995)
The judges concluded that “none of these excuses had been proven in
the case”, and it was, therefore “unnecessary to find out what another
excuse would be sufficient”. The judges, in the judgement, relied on the
“basis of the liability for damages of land through the tort of chattel of
trespass, the tort of nuisance”, as well as “the scienter action (common
law rule that deals with the damages directly done by animals to human
beings)” ([Link], 2009).
 The court of Exchequer Chamber provided a rule when the liability of an
owner, who has brought any dangerous in his premises can arise. At the
same time, the court also discussed certain defences which can absolve
the liability.
The court of Exchequer Chamber held Rylands liable for the damage
done to the Fletcher. The court held that the defendants owed a duty of
care towards the risk, as they were aware of the fact that if that quantity
of water would escape, it would be harmful. There was a want of care by
the defendants, as they were doing unnatural use of their land by storing
that huge quantity of water. Though it was not harmful that time, but
would be harmful if escapes.
Rylands felt that this was not just. He appealed to the House of Lords.
House Of Lords
The House of Lords dismissed Ryland’s appeal. They agreed with the
six exchequer judges but went further to feature a limitation on the
liability.
Judgment
The House of Lords dismissed the appeal and agreed with the six
Exchequer judges. Lord Cairns, while speaking for the House of Lords,
stated their agreement of the rule stated above by Justice Blackburn in
the court of Exchequer Chamber but included a further limitation on
liability. The one more requirement is that the land from which the
escape occurs must have been modified in a way which would be
considered non-natural, unusual or inappropriate. The decision of
House of Lords added a requirement that the use be ‘non-natural’. The
judgement of this case was delivered on 17 July. In this the court
consisted of only two judges, Lord Cairns and Lord Cranworth; Lord
Colonsay didn’t attend the case.
Three essentials, for the application of the Rule of Strict Liability
 Some dangerous thing must have been brought by a person on his
land.
 According to this rule, the liability for the escape of thing from one’s land
arises when the thing collected was a dangerous thing. It means a thing
likely to do mischief if it escapes. In Rylands v. Fletcher, the dangerous
thing was a very large body of water
 The thing thus brought or kept by an individual on his land
must escape.
For the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher to apply, it is also essential that the
thing causing the damage must escape to the world outside the
occupation and control of the defendant
 It must be non-natural use of land.
Water collected within the reservoir in such an enormous quantity
in Rylands v. Fletcher was held to be non-natural use of land. In order
to show that, the use is non-natural, it must be shown that use is some
special use bringing with it increased danger to others.
Exceptions to the Rule of Strict Liability
A number of defences to the rule of strict liability too was developed in
this case and some later cases:
 Escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default
 Escape was a consequence of vis major
 Consent of the plaintiff
 Act of third party
 Statutory authority
Impact of the case in India
In M. C. Mehta v. Union Of India, the Supreme court took a bold
decision holding that it was not bound to follow the 19th-century rule of
English law. The honourable Supreme Court said it could evolve a rule
suitable to the social and economic conditions prevailing in India at the
present day. It evolved the rule of ‘Absolute Liability’ as a part of Indian
law in preference to the rule of Strict Liability laid down in Rylands v.
Fletcher. This rule was not subject to any of the exceptions under the
rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. The defences to the Rule of Strict Liability
can be used by the persons who had established ‘hazardous and
inherently dangerous’ industries to escape the liability for the havoc
caused, by pleading some exceptions. So to remove that grey area and
in order to increase accountability on the part of persons engaged in
such kind of activities, the rule of ‘Absolute Liability’ has been evolved in
India.
Conclusion
Ryland vs. Fletcher played a great role in deciding owners’ liability
when he is bringing any dangerous object in his premises. It was
necessary to have a law that could increase the duty of the owner. So
that he can be more careful while bringing any dangerous object in his
premises. The world is progressing very fast and in this era of
industrialization, privatisation and globalization disputes regarding the
duty of care are burgeoning rapidly so there was a need for a law that
could solve these problems. This was done in this case. In the context of
India, this Rule of strict liability paved the way for ‘The Rule of Absolute
Liability’ in India.