An Introduction to Fault Tree

Analysis (FTA)
Dr Jane Marshall
Product Excellence using 6 Sigma
Module

PEUSS 2011/2012 FTA Page 1

Objectives
– Understand purpose of FTA
– Understand & apply rules of FTA
– Analyse a simple system using FTA
– Understand & apply rules of Boolean algebra

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Relationship between FMEA
& FTA

Product Failure

Fault Tree Failure Mode & Effect

Analysis (FTA) Analysis (FMEA)

Part Failure

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Fault Tree Analysis

• Is a systematic method of System Analysis
• Examines System from Top  Down
• Provides graphical symbols for ease of understanding
• Incorporates mathematical tools to focus on critical areas

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 Fault tree analysis (FTA)
• Key elements:
– Gates represent the outcome
– Events represent input to the gates
• FTA is used to:
– investigate potential faults;
– its modes and causes;
– and to quantify their contribution to system unreliability in the
course of product design .

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Symbols

Basic Event

A B A B

‘AND’ Gate ‘OR’ Gate Transfer out

A∩B AUB

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Example Fault Tree
A developed Tree … .. Top event

•A
•A

1 2 2 3 4 5 5 6 7 8
1 3 4 6

1 2
9 10 7 8 9

… .. Ready for analysis 1 2 3 4 5 6

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Example: redundant fire pumps

Source: [Link]

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 Example: redundant fire pumps

Source: [Link]

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Example

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 Example

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Methodology (Preliminary
Analysis)

• Set System Boundaries

• Understand Chosen System
• Define Top Events

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 Methodology (Rules)

1. The “Immediate, Necessary & Sufficient” Rule

2. The “Clear Statement” Rule
3. The “No Miracles” Rule
4. The “Complete-the-Gate” Rule
5. The “No Gate-to-Gate” Rule
6. The “Component or System Fault?” Rule

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Methodology (Rules - 1) –
immediate, necessary and sufficient
cause
Immediate

Closest in space, time and derivation of the event above

Necessary

There is no redundancy in the statement or gate linkage

The event above could not result from a sub set of the causal
events
Sufficient

The events will, in all circumstances and at all times, cause

the event above
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 Methodology (Rules - 2) – The
clear statement rule

Write event box statements clearly, stating

precisely what the event is and when it
occurs

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Methodology (Rules - 3) – The

‘component or systems fault’ rule

If the answer to the question:

“Can this fault consist of a component failure?” is Yes,
– Classify the event as a “State of component fault”
If the answer is No,
– Classify the event as a “state of system fault”

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Methodology (Rules - 4) – no
miracles rule

If the normal functioning of a component

propagates a fault sequence, then it is
assumed that the component functions
normally

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Methodology (Rules - 5) – the

complete gate rule

All inputs to a particular gate should be

completely defined before further
analysis of any one of them is
undertaken

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Methodology (Rules - 6) no gate
to gate rule

Gate inputs should be properly defined fault

events, and gates should not be directly
connected to other gates

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Fault Tree Example

Connector A
Switch

Battery Motor
….. Motor does not
Connector B
run when switch is
pressed

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 Fault Tree Example
Motor does not
run

top event …..

No Power
motor does not run
Motor
failed
Supply
when switch is pressed

Switch No
malfunction connection Battery
is dead

Switch Connector Connector

is Insufficient A B
broken force is detached detached
applied

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Qualitative Analysis
(Combination of Gates)
Q

Algebraic representation is: A C D B

Q=(AC)(DB)

 or gate  and gate

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 Qualitative Analysis
(Cut Sets)

A listing taken directly from the Fault Tree

of the events, ALL of which must occur to
cause the TOP Event to happen

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Qualitative Analysis (Cut Sets)

Algebraic representation is:
Q=(AC)(DB) Q
which can be re-written as:

Q=(AD )  (AB) ( C D )  (C  B)
Q= (A•D ) +(A• B) +( C • D )+( C • B)
… which is a listing of Groupings ...each of
which is a Cut Set A C D B

AD AB CD BC

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 Qualitative Analysis
(Minimal Cut Sets)

A listing, derived from the Fault Tree Cut Sets and

reduced by Boolean Algebra, which is the smallest
list of events that is necessary to cause the Top
Event to happen

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Qualitative Analysis
(Boolean Algebra)
Commutative laws Commutative laws
AB=BA A•B=B•A
AB=BA A + B = B +A
Associative laws Associative laws
A  (B  C) = (A  B)  C A • (B • C) = (A • B) • C
A  (B  C) = (A  B)  C A + (B + C) = (A + B) + C
Distributive laws Distributive laws
A  (B  C) = A  B  A  C A • (B + C) = A • B + A • C
A  (B  C) = (A  B)  (A  C) A + (B • C) = (A + B) • (A + C)

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 Qualitative Analysis
(Boolean Reduction)
Idempotent laws Top event

A•A=A
A +A = A
A

Absorption law
A + (A • B) = A
B A

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Exercise in deriving Cut Sets

…..
(AB)((AC)(DB))(DC)

AB (AC)(DB) DC

A B AC DB D C

A C D B

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 Solution …..
( A  B )  (( A  C )  ( D  B ))  ( D  C )
(A+B)•(A•C+D•B)•D•C
 AACDC + ADBDC + BACDC + BDBDC
 ACD + ABCD + ABCD + BCD
 ACD + BCD
Minimal Cut Sets …… ACD, BCD

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Design Analysis of Minimal Cut Sets

A Cut Set comprising several components is less likely to fail than

one containing a single component

Hint .....
AND Gates at the top of the Fault Tree increase the number of
components in a Cut Set
OR Gates increase the number of Cut Sets, but often lead to single
component Sets

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 Benefits and limitations
• Prepared in early stages of a design and further developed in
detail concurrently with design development.
• Identifies and records systematically the logical fault paths from a
specific effect, to the prime causes
• Allows easy conversion to probability measures
• But may lead to very large trees if the analysis is extended in
depth.
• Depends on skill of analyst
• Difficult to apply to systems with partial success
• Can be costly in time & effort

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Software
• Software packages available for reliability tools
• Relex
• Relia soft
• others

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Exercise 1

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One
Possible
Solution

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 RBD of an engine

LV HV

Ignition system 1
Fuel Fuel Other
pump filter Jet components

Fuel system Carburettor

LV HV

Ignition system 2
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