Improving Implementation

Organisational Change and

Project Management
Improving Implementation

Organisational Change and

Project Management
Edited by John Wanna
Published by ANU E Press
The Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200, Australia
Email: anuepress@[Link]
Web: [Link]

National Library of Australia

Cataloguing-in-Publication entry
Improving implementation : organisational change and project management.

ISBN 9781921313011 (pbk).

ISBN 9781921313028 (web).

1. Organizational change - Australia - Congresses. 2.

Project management - Australia - Congresses. I. Wanna,
John. (Series : ANZSOG series).

351.94

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Cover design by John Butcher

Printed by University Printing Services, ANU
Funding for this monograph series has been provided by the Australia and New
Zealand School of Government Research Program.

This edition © 2007 ANU E Press

 John Wanna, Series Editor
Professor John Wanna is the Sir John Bunting Chair of Public Administration
at the Research School of Social Sciences at The Australian National University.
He is the director of research for the Australian and New Zealand School of
Government (ANZSOG). He is also a joint appointment with the Department
of Politics and Public Policy at Griffith University and a principal researcher
with two research centres: the Governance and Public Policy Research Centre
and the nationally-funded Key Centre in Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance
at Griffith University. Professor Wanna has produced around 17 books
including two national text books on policy and public management. He has
produced a number of research-based studies on budgeting and financial
management including: Budgetary Management and Control (1990); Managing
Public Expenditure (2000), From Accounting to Accountability (2001) and, most
recently, Controlling Public Expenditure (2003). He has just completed a study
of state level leadership covering all the state and territory leaders — entitled
Yes Premier: Labor leadership in Australia’s states and territories — and has
edited a book on Westminster Legacies in Asia and the Pacific — Westminster
Legacies: Democracy and responsible government in Asia and the Pacific. He
was a chief investigator in a major Australian Research Council funded study
of the Future of Governance in Australia (1999-2001) involving Griffith and
the ANU. His research interests include Australian and comparative politics,
public expenditure and budgeting, and government-business relations. He
also writes on Australian politics in newspapers such as The Australian,
Courier-Mail and The Canberra Times and has been a regular state political
commentator on ABC radio and TV.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ix
List of Contributors xi
Foreword — Ian McPhee, Auditor-General for the Commonwealth of
Australia xiii

Section I. Setting the Scene

1. Introduction — Improving Implementation: the Challenge Ahead 3
John Wanna, Sir John Bunting Chair of Public Administration, ANU
2. Driving Change to Bring About Better Implementation and Delivery 11
Peter Shergold, Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Section II. Governance, Ownership and Oversight

3. Managing Major Programs and Projects: A View From the Boardroom 23
Christina Gillies, Non Executive Director and IT Governance Consultant
4. How Boards and Senior Managers Have Governed 35
Raymond C Young, Department of Accounting and Finance, Macquarie
University
5. Overcoming the ‘White Elephant’ Syndrome in Big and Iconic Projects
in the Public and Private Sectors 47
Scott Prasser, Faculty of Business, University of Sunshine Coast

Section III. Organisational Alignment — Organisational Change

6. Organisational Alignment: How Project Management Helps 71
Abul Rizvi, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
7. ‘Crazy Thought or Creative Thinking’: Reform in the Real World 79
Patricia Scott, Department of Human Services
8. The Australian Taxation Office Change Program: Project and Change
Management Directions and Learnings, A Case Study 91
Bob Webb, Deputy Commissioner, Australian Taxation Office
9. Applying Three Frames to the Delivery of Public Value 107
Jim Varghese, Director-General, Department of Primary Industries and
Fisheries, Queensland
10. Building Capacity for Policy Implementation 113
Anne Tiernan, Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University

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 Improving Implementation

Section IV. Better Project and Program Delivery

11. Program Management and Organisational Change: New Directions for
Implementation 123
Lynelle Briggs, Australian Public Service Commissioner
12. What is a Project Management Culture and How do we Develop it and
Keep it Alive 133
Kathleen Kuryl, Manager Better Practice & Project Services, Department of
Premier and Cabinet, Tasmania
13. Project Management and the Australian Bureau of Statistics: Doing
What Works 147
Dennis Trewin, Australian Statistician, Australian Bureau of Statistics
14. Intervention Logic/ Program Logic: Toward Good Practice 157
Karen Baehler, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington
Section V. Implementation Review
15. Implementing Gateway in the Australian Government 179
Department of Finance and Administration, Australian Government
16. Governments Can Deliver: Better Practice in Project and Program
Delivery 189
Ian Glenday, Executive Director, Office of Government Commerce, London
17. The Gateway Review Process in Victoria 199
Wayne Sharpe, Executive Manager, Gateway Unit, Department of Treasury
and Finance, Victoria
18. The Australian Government Cabinet Implementation Unit 219
Peter Hamburger, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
19. Organising for Policy Implementation: The Emergence and Role of
Implementation Units in Policy Design and Oversight 229
Evert Lindquist, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria,
Canada
Appendix A. Annex: A Guide for Drafting Case Study Papers 257

viii
Acknowledgements
The papers included in this collection were presented at the Project Management
and Organisational Change conference held in Canberra in February 2006. This
was the first annual research conference organised by the Australia and New
Zealand School of Government in conjunction with the Department of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet. The conference provided a platform for over 50 speakers
and attracted over 350 attendees across the two days. Speakers included top
public sector executives from the Australian jurisdictions as well as
representatives from the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. The ANZSOG
research committee, chaired initially by Professor Ian Chubb, Vice Chancellor
of ANU and then by Ken Henry from The Treasury was instrumental in framing
the themes of the conference. Audio files of the full proceedings are available
on the ANZSOG website ([Link]
confer_audio.php).
In hosting such an event we incurred a number of debts. In the Department of
the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Isi Unikowski led the reference group and
framed the main contours of the conference. He was indefatigable in his energy,
ideas and commitment. Also important in providing key support were Peter
Shergold, Jim Hargreaves, Peter Hamburger, Gia Metherell and Mark Prebble.
Jenny Keene managed the conference program and undertook the lion’s share
of the conference organisation. The Dean of ANZSOG, Professor Allan Fels,
opened the conference and assisted with invitations. ANZSOG staff and
postgraduates of the Political Science Program at The Australian National
University helped with preparations and in administering the conference event.
Presenters at the conference who are not included in this publication include:
Professor John Alford, Sandi Beatie, Lesley Bentley, Stephen Betros, Ed Blow,
David Butler, David Dombkins, Tim Farland, Iain Fraser, Air Vice Marshall
Norman Gray, Stacie Hall, Robert Higgins, Caroline Hogg, Elaine Ninham, Kersti
Nogeste, David Paul, Kaye Remington, Ann Steward, Sabrina Walsh and Philip
Weickhardt. We thank them for their impressive contributions.
The sponsors of the conference included: the Project Management Institute
(PMI), the Australian Institute of Project Management (AIPM), Tanner James,
PA Consulting, Palm Consulting, Compuware Corporation, Human Systems, the
Australian Public Service Commission and the University of New South Wales
Press.

ix
 Improving Implementation

Finally, John Butcher at the ANU was expert at pulling the publication together,
chasing written papers and undertaking an initial copy edit of the manuscript.
I can’t thank him enough.

Professor John Wanna

Sir John Bunting Chair of Public Administration
ANZSOG/ANU

x
List of Contributors
Lynelle Briggs, Australian Public Service Commissioner
Karen Baehler, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington
Department of Finance and Administration, Australian Government
Christina Gillies, Non Executive Director and IT Governance Consultant
Peter Hamburger, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
Evert Lindquist, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, Canada
Kathleen Kuryl, Manager Better Practice & Project Services, Department of
Premier and Cabinet, Tasmania
Ian McPhee, Auditor-General for the Commonwealth of Australia
Ian Glenday, Executive Director, Office of Government Commerce, London
Scott Prasser, Faculty of Business, University of Sunshine Coast
Abul Rizvi, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
Patricia Scott, Secretary, Department of Human Services
Wayne Sharpe, Executive Manager, Gateway Unit, Department of Treasury and
Finance, Victoria
Peter Shergold, Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
Anne Tiernan, Centre for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith University
Dennis Trewin, Australian Statistician, Australian Bureau of Statistics
Jim Varghese, Director-General, Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries,
Queensland
John Wanna, Sir John Bunting Chair of Public Administration, ANZSOG/ANU
Bob Webb, Deputy Commissioner, Australian Taxation Office
Raymond C Young, Department of Accounting and Finance, Macquarie University

xi
Foreword — Ian McPhee, Auditor-General for the
Commonwealth of Australia
I am pleased to provide the foreword for this collection, representing, as it does,
a comprehensive drawing together of experience and insight from both
practitioners and academic researchers.
The business of government is necessarily diverse, changing and of considerable
scale. Against this background, policy and program implementation,
organisational change and project management are recurring themes in the
ongoing work of the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). The factors for
success are many and varied, and the consequences of failure can carry significant
implications, not least for consumers and the public generally.
From its audit work, the ANAO has drawn important insights into what
contributes to the successful implementation of government programs and
initiatives. The breadth and depth of our work puts us in a unique position to
compare the operations across the public sector. We’ve increasingly been seeking
to pass on these lessons to the Australian Public Service (APS) through a range
of audit products, such as our AuditFocus newsletters 1 and Better Practice
Guides on specific aspects of administration, that draw lessons from relevant
audits as well as international better practice. 2
One positive development in the Australian Public Service (APS) in recent years
has been an enhanced focus on the implementation of government programs
and initiatives. This is important, because the community expects the
Government to deliver on its policies; and so does the Government.
Delays in implementation mean that the community is not receiving the benefits
of the new policy or initiative, and there is likely to be an adverse budgetary
effect as well, neither of which are appreciated by Government. Parliament and
its Committees are also interested in program implementation issues as evidenced
by reports over many years on aspects of program administration and systems
implementation.

Key factors for successful implementation

There are six themes that I feel are important factors for successful
implementation. These are:
• organisational self-awareness;
• effective governance;
• the need for support from the ‘top’;
• an understanding of the interaction between policy development and
implementation;
• engagement with other organisations; and

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 Improving Implementation

• continuous monitoring and evaluation.

Organisational self-awareness
Every organisation has different strengths and weaknesses that bear on successful
implementation. Organisational self-awareness means being able to recognise
the organisation’s strengths and weaknesses. The chances of successful
implementation are increased if senior management is able to recognise their
own (and the organisation’s) strengths and weaknesses; this in turn enables
senior management to consider how to compensate for any weaknesses in a
pragmatic way. This is fundamentally about risk management, taking into
account the three major contributors to organisational risk:
• strategic risk: the concern that major strategic alternatives may be ill-advised
given the organisation’s internal and external circumstances;
• environmental risk: covering macro-environmental risks, including
political, economic and market factors; and
• operational risk: covering compliance and process risks. 3
There is now a recognition by most agencies that an effective risk management
strategy and control environment must be in place, and refined over time to
actively manage their programs in an environment of changing risk profiles –
this is no longer discretionary.
The importance of risk management in today’s public sector was captured by
the UK Government’s Strategy Unit as follows:
Governments have always had a critical role in protecting their citizens
from risks. But handling risk has become more central to the working
of government in recent years. The key factors include: addressing
difficulties in handling risks to the public; recognition of the importance
of early risk identification in policy development; risk management in
programs and projects; and complex issues of risk transfer to and from
the private sector. 4
To be most effective, managing risks should be aligned to strategic objectives,
corporate governance arrangements and integrated with business planning and
reporting cycles.

Effective Governance
Clear objectives and appropriate accountability, authority and reporting regimes
are necessary components of effective governance. Having the right skills and
methodologies is essential. Even so, do not hesitate to apply the ‘blow torch’ to
critical judgments or assessments. Stay focused on what’s important. This is
particularly so with the quickening pace of public administration, including in
respect to policy development and implementation. It is not uncommon for not

xiv
all policy dimensions to be known before a policy is announced, nor all
implementation details to be settled before an implementation commences.
Planned pilot studies can be truncated, or turned into a rolling ‘implementation’.
While these approaches may not always reflect best practice models of
implementation, they can reflect particular priorities and/or timetables. In these
circumstances, an agile approach to governance and risk management is required.
The main message, however, is do not lose sight of the fundamentals of good
governance; they will hold you in good stead. 5

Support from the ‘top’

Appropriate engagement by the ‘top’ reduces the chances of sub-optimal
implementation. A recent manager’s checklist argued that one of the critical
things to get right is to ‘have the visible support of the top of the office.' 6
Conversely, one of the most common causes of project failure is a ‘lack of clear
senior management and Ministerial ownership’.
Without strong and visible top-down support, there is a risk that underlying
infrastructure will be ineffective, especially if cultural change is involved. As
was recently noted in the Palmer report: ‘a strong government policy calls for
strong executive leadership, together with careful management, to ensure that
enforcement and application of the policy are justified and equitable.’ 7
To be effective, an organisation needs to be willing to give and receive ‘bad
news’. Successful implementation depends on having appropriate strategies for
dealing promptly with ‘bad news’. Key considerations include:
• do the governance arrangements within the organisation provide for adequate
progress and review mechanisms. This means including escalation of
significant issues to chief executive and/or ministerial level at the appropriate
time; and
• does the tone and culture of the organisation enable or prevent ‘bad news’
to be reported and listened to?
To be effective, policy and program implementation generally requires there to
be a senior responsible officer who is accountable for the success of a policy’s
implementation. 8 This is the person whom the relevant minister and executive
can turn to for progress reports and details of emerging risks during
implementation.

Policy development and implementation are not separate

Policy implementation should be an integral part of policy design – begin with
the end process in mind. This means engaging those with implementation
experience during the policy development stage. This is important for assessing
the practicability of a policy. 9

xv
 Improving Implementation

For example, it may enable the identification of:

• practical constraints which need to be overcome in order for the policy to
deliver required results on the ground; and
• more reliable cost and uptake estimates.
There has sometimes been a tendency for those with implementation experience
to be consulted fairly late in the design process, which increases the risk of
encountering difficulties during implementation, with subsequent risks to the
delivery of outcomes. The point is that, those with implementation experience
may have far better practical knowledge of what is likely to work and what is
not likely to work. 10
It is also necessary to avoid any tendency to downplay the analysis of
implementation risks. This is especially important where time constraints and
complex negotiation processes create pressure to focus on the outcome to be
achieved, rather than the capacity of administrative processes to deliver. The
danger is of ‘unwanted surprises’ down the track, with mitigation usually much
more difficult at that point.
The other point I would stress in this area is that lessons from ANAO audits
reflect the value of systematic and structured planning for implementation. 11
Planning provides a ‘map’ of how an initiative will be implemented addressing
matters such as:
• timeframe, including the different phases for implementation;
• roles and responsibilities of all those involved in implementation;
• resources (including funding and human resources);
• risk management, including how any potential barriers to implementation
will be dealt with; and
• monitoring and reporting requirements.
Where attention is not given to these matters, problems may arise such as:
overambitious timeframes; 12 resources not being available when required; 13
those implementing the initiative do not have the appropriate skills or capability;
14 and insufficient contingency planning. 15

Engagement with other organisations

It is becoming increasingly the norm for organisations to implement initiatives
with the assistance of others. This may be: other Australian Government agencies;
State and Territory Government agencies; non-government organisations; or the
private sector, among others. Organisational boundaries are no longer as
important as they used to be: there is today a heavy emphasis on
whole-of-government initiatives that bring together the essential policy and
delivery skills from within the APS.

xvi
Whole-of-government implementation is often a particular challenge for agencies.
Such initiatives are greatly assisted by: clear articulation of roles and
responsibilities; assigning responsibility for risk and their treatment; and the
ability to assess progress and outcomes from a whole of government perspective
rather than in ‘silos’.
Identification of a lead agency is also highly desirable for whole of government
initiatives. 16 As well as working from the perspective of their agency, a lead
agency is able to extol the benefits of a whole of government perspective, 17
including whether information is shared and flows between the agencies
involved; performance is monitored; promotion is assessed; and the commitment
by all parties is being met. 18 For the arrangement to be effective, the lead agency
should be recognised and supported as acting in this capacity.

Keep monitoring!
Implementation of government and program initiatives is most commonly a
staged process. Where it is not, there is value in trying to break the tasks into
several manageable steps. Experience here and overseas suggests this increases
the chance of success. So, do not assume that the job is done three quarters of
the way through! Regular and continuous monitoring is essential to determine
the extent to which the desired outcomes have been achieved. This requires
structured reporting.
There is little value in agencies identifying and analysing key implementation
risks, and then failing to act promptly when confronted by performance warning
indicators. This is precisely when it is critical to act promptly. 19
Good systems need to be supported by the right culture. Be willing to hear ‘bad
news’ and react promptly. Another consideration is to keep sight of the
Government’s objective. During roll-out of any initiative one should continually
ask whether the program’s objectives are being met. This can sometimes be a
challenge as the distance between the policy dimension and implementation
increases during roll-out. Keep in mind the key questions: Is the project on track,
on time, and on budget?
Evaluation at an appropriate time assists in determining the extent to which an
initiative has met, or is meeting its objectives and that those intended to benefit
have done so. It is evident from programs such as the reaction to the 2002–03
drought, that evaluation can help agencies learn lessons and share better practice
in policy development and implementation. 20 This can lead to more informed
decision-making; facilitate better use of resources and enhance accountability.

Concluding remarks
We need to recognise that a manager may be expected to deliver something very
quickly with limited notice. However, a consistent message from the ANAO’s

xvii
 Improving Implementation

experience shows that planning for, and carrying through on implementation

does reduce the risk of delay to, and dilution of outcomes. This monograph
offers valuable insights that, if heeded, could make the difference between a
smooth implementation and hitting ‘potholes’ along the way.

ENDNOTES
1 These newsletters seek to capture some of the lessons from our audit work that are likely to be of
general interest and application and are intended to be easy to read for busy public sector executives
The first issue of AuditFocus was published and distributed in November 2005. It covered: compliance
with the APS Financial Framework; Audit Committees; maintaining proper records; and project and
contract management. See [Link] and follow the link to the AuditFocus newsletter.
2 See [Link] and follow the link to Better Practice Guides to see a list of the guides.
3 Atkinson, Anthony A and Webb, Alan, A Directors Guide to Risk and its Management, International
Federation of Accountants Articles of Merit Award Program for Distinguished Contribution to
Management Accounting, August 2005, p. 26.
4 The UK Government Strategy Unit, 2002, Risk: Improving government’s capability to handle risk and
uncertainty, p. 1.
5 If you are looking for a useful reference there is a Better Practice Guide issued by the ANAO in 2003
on Public Sector Governance, and a reference published in 2004 on the same topic by CCH. You may
even wish to read ANAO reports concerned with the governance of programs and projects, available
from [Link].
6 Office of Government Commerce, Achieving Excellence in Construction: a Manager’s Checklist, OGC,
London, 2003.
7 MJ Palmer, Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Immigration Detention of Cornelia Rau Report,
Canberra, 2005, p. ix.
8 A recent ANAO audit highlighted that a senior responsible officer should be allocated to a project,
particularly where there is more than one agency involved in implementation (see ANAO Audit Report
No.40, 2004–05, The Edge Project). ‘Senior Responsible Owner’ (SRO) is a term used by the OGC with
regards to the Gateway Review Process. The Gateway Review Process makes reference to the concept
of a SRO as an individual who is senior and takes responsibility for the successful outcome of a program
or project. See Office of Government Commerce, The OGC Gateway Process: a Manager’s checklist, version
1.0, OGC, London, 2004.
9 National Audit Office, Modern Policy-Making: Ensuring Policies Deliver Value for Money, report by
the Comptroller and Auditor-General HC 289 Session 2001–2002, the Stationary Office, London, 2001,
p. 42.
10 ibid
11 All too often ANAO audits find that agencies have not given sufficient attention to planning for
implementation. Recent ANAO audits that have highlighted poor implementation/project plans include:
ANAO Audit Report No.40 2004–05, The Edge Project; ANAO Audit Report No.36 2003–04, The
Commonwealth’s Administration of the Dairy Industry Adjustment Package; ANAO Audit Report No.15
2002–03, The Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Health Program Follow-up audit; and ANAO Audit
Report No.27 2004–05, Management of the Conversion to Digital Broadcasting.
12 For example see ANAO Report No. 8 2005–06 Management of the Personnel Management Key Solution
(PMKeyS) Implementation Project.
13 For example see ANAO Audit Report No.20 2003–04, Aid to East Timor, para. 6.16.
14 For example see ANAO Audit Report No.36 2003–04 The Commonwealth’s Administration of the
Dairy Industry Adjustment Package, para. 2.44.
15 For example see ANAO Audit Report No.50 2004–05, Drought Assistance, para. 2.3.
16 See ANAO Report No.50 2004–05, Drought Assistance.
17 Management Advisory Committee, Working together: Principles and practices to guide the Australian
Public Service [internet]. Australian Government Australian Public Service Commission, Australia, 2005,
available from [Link] [accessed 11 May 2005].
18 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Managing Departments for Results and Managing Horizontal
Issues for Results, Report of the Auditor General of Canada-December 2000 Chapter 20, 2000, p. 29.

xviii
19 ‘In the dynamic area of immigration detention, the challenge for executive management is to recognise
potential weaknesses and ensure that the arrangements for monitoring, assessment, reporting and review
are sensitive to the changing environment. In particular, the arrangements should provide for adequate
and early feedback to enable corrective action by management, and there should be clear triggers for
involvement and oversight at executive level’. See MJ Palmer, [Link]., p. 167.
20 See ANAO Report No.50 2004–05, Drought Assistance. Also see National Audit Office (NAO) Modern
Policy-Making Ensuring policies deliver value for money report by the Comptroller and Auditor-General
HC 289 Session 2001-2002; November 2001, p. 14.

xix
Section I. Setting the Scene
1. Introduction — Improving
Implementation: the Challenge Ahead
John Wanna, Sir John Bunting Chair of Public
Administration, ANU

Shortly after winning the 2004 election Prime Minister John Howard reflected
that ‘we tend to look at service delivery as an afterthought rather than a policy
priority’. He was referring to difficulties in implementing programs, especially
those involved in more than one level of government or spread over several
agencies. He made the statement in the context of announcing his new cabinet,
including the establishment of the new Ministry of Human Services, which gave
his comment added significance.
Many believe that this marked a new strategic direction for his cabinet and the
policy departments. A key feature of this new direction is the insistence that
project management is about transforming the culture of the public service –
applying project management disciplines not only to major projects but to the
harder areas of social policy and whole-of-government initiatives.
The implementation message conveyed by the Prime Minister signalled a new
direction for the federal government. Entering his fourth term, Howard indicated
he wanted ‘can-do government’ guided by expert practitioners and project
managers to replace the era of ‘hands-off government’ of the late 1990s advocated
by accountants and economists. The new focus was to be on improving
implementation and delivering programs to meet higher expectations. This was
an incidence of a nation-building state changing its collective mind.
But Howard was not alone in expressing such concerns. State premiers have
made similar remarks over the lack of follow-through. Peter Beattie in Queensland
lamented that when cabinet made decisions it often took months for action to
occur. Similarly, in recent years Steve Bracks, Geoff Gallop, Jon Stanhope, Bob
Carr and Morris Iemma have all emphasised service delivery and the need to
focus on performance in the public sector. Implementation problems have beset
all their governments, and blame-shifting has become less and less an option as
a defence and no longer washes with the electorate. In their jurisdictions, when
policy failures occurred critics laid the blame on predictable pitfalls, on ‘learned
incapacities’ and ‘learned helplessness’, and of a malaise in management. Some
have even pointed to an emerging culture of ‘management deficit’ where
executives refused to take responsibility or washed their hands of emergent
problems.

3
 Improving Implementation

The Council of Australian Governments has also moved from a concern with
national policy frameworks and new policy agendas to better co-ordination and
delivery of existing services where both levels of government are invariably
involved (such as in health, the environment, family services and childcare,
training and education).
So, why are government leaders and their cabinets getting interested in service
delivery, project management and implementation? And why now? Normally
the topic would be regarded as the rightful province of line managers, with the
invisible ‘plumbing’ taking place in the depths of departments, too miniscule
and trivial to interest ministers or even their senior executives. Yet, the recent
political concerns are not simply a reflection of partisan interest from one side
of politics, or the preoccupations of a particular leader, or one driven by electoral
cycles. The trend is too topical and widespread.
The ‘take implementation seriously’ movement is part of a much broader concern
with governance and the effectiveness of public policy. Consider, for instance,
the following trajectories and signals.
All governments report far more on their results, performance and progress
towards the achievement of outcomes than ever before (financial and performance
reporting, better annual reports, triple bottom line reporting, quality of services
reports, outcomes reporting, state of the service reporting). How far they are
believed and how far they engage in a little obfuscating is another matter, but
reporting has increased visibility and in its importance to governments.
Governments are calling for greater ‘passion for policy’ and greater commitment
in delivering outputs (see Briggs 2005). They are not satisfied with mere technical
proficiency from their bureaucrats but seeking a cultural renewal in the public
service and a rekindling of a sense of ‘serving the public’ with good policy
innovations. Governments do not want their public officials to absolve themselves
from responsibility but to become passionately committed to policy directions.
To date, three governments have formally established special implementation
units attached to cabinet to both spur and track implementation progress
according to agreed milestones (see Tiernan 2006; Wanna 2006). These units aim
to help agencies ‘think through’ the likely implementation issues at the policy
formation stage when making submissions to cabinet. Cabinet can also flag which
of its decisions it wants monitoring or tracking, and call for broader reviews of
implementation progress. Some of these units (as with the Delivery Unit in
Britain) set targets and measure departmental performance against these
standards, but so far the trend in Australian has been to establish collaborative
bodies increasing the focus on implementation issues.
The Commonwealth and Victorian governments have established ‘gateway
review’ processes to help in the management of large projects and provide project

4
 Introduction — Improving Implementation: the Challenge Ahead

assurance. Special review teams of experienced project managers produce timely

reports to executives (the so-called ‘senior responsible owners’) in the relevant
departments. Victoria commenced in 2002 while the Commonwealth process
began in 2006. Both review processes investigate risk management with projects,
the necessary operational skills and knowledge of project management in
administration. Importantly, while their reports remain largely confidential,
their reviews function to improve the information exchange with the stakeholders
(senior executives and ministers).
In similar vein, the NSW and Queensland governments have established central
assessment units to investigate the cost and quality of services, and whether
governments have been getting value for money in the services they provide or
procure. These bodies have investigated the relative costs of provision, quality
assurance and expectation management.
Most of these central agency initiatives are aimed at enabling governments to
better monitor progress and review performance information. They offer practical
ways of allowing risks to be assessed and managed and, if necessary, for actions
to be taken so that policy initiatives that may have run into difficulty can be
revived or emerging risks managed before the project or policy is seriously
derailed. These initiatives are not intended to embarrass governments or to result
in the release of damaging information into the public realm. They are not done
for public accountability reasons, although it can be argued that they improve
the oversight of executive governance.
Certainly, there were other catalysts prompting these concerns. The importance
of the implementation agenda was underscored by some major policy or
implementation failures where problems multiplied until they could not be
hidden. Such failures were exposed in the areas of income support to families,
job referrals under outsourced provisions, immigration administration and the
detention of supposed illegal over-stayers or residents, child protection and
health administration in public hospitals. Some major information technology
and procurement projects in government agencies such as Defence or Centrelink
have resulted in costly embarrassments. Other significant cost overruns have
been publicly exposed.
A further problem is the issue of cultural alignment between agencies and policy
intent. Is there a close alignment between organisational cultures and the policy
objectives? Are traditional administrative organisations suitable for new delivery
methods? Is there an appropriate synergy between policy departments and
delivery agencies? Are the intentions of government clearly communicated to
delivery agencies and indicated to client groups? These are some of the more
difficult aspects of good implementation.
But, how then do we turn the focus on implementation and build an
‘implementation culture’? What are the challenges ahead?
5
 Improving Implementation

There are concerns among many senior advisors and executives that feedback
loops have been neglected or destroyed as governments have separated policy
responsibilities from delivery responsibilities. Compartmentalisition of ‘policy
advice’ from the delivery coalface has created strains and tensions in the policy
delivery chain. This is a problem that has been noted in the UK especially with
executive agencies (James 2003). 1
Policy designers may lack a detailed knowledge of implementation and delivery.
Today’s senior executives may not know in detail what is going on within their
area of policy responsibilities. They are dependent on the provision of good and
open information exchange, and in practice information asymmetries tend to
occur and obfuscate close scrutiny. Whereas in the past, senior executives, who
had worked their way up the organisation from the bottom up, often had
extensive implementation experience in their agencies, today they are dependent
on information provided by delivery agencies and contracted service suppliers
in the profit and non-profit sector. Some rely on occasional audit reports to
monitor performance. Often there is little implementation knowledge passed
back to the policymakers and little effective monitoring of progress.
Hence, the need for governance frameworks that operate on effective project
management, that provide relevant and timely information to executives with
oversight responsibilities – or to put it another way ‘project management is too
important to be left to the nerds’ (Shergold 2006). ‘Senior responsible owners’
who may not be personally involved in project management but who still have
accountability for the results, are being directed to take a far more active interest
in the governance of projects within their portfolio. They needed better
information and skills to ensure projects were in line with government policy
objectives, were on track with projected timelines and were achieving intended
outputs. They need to employ a matrix of project management disciplines – not
as a formal set of prescribed techniques, but as a range of possible tools and
disciplines to apply when appropriate.
Then, there is the issue of how agencies test the reliability and veracity of
feedback information? How do they ascertain that adequate tests or inspections
have been undertaken and accurately reported? How do they know what issues
to raise with third party deliverers, or what questions to ask if they have limited
background in the area? They often do not. How should those ultimately
accountable for programs and the impact of policy design, collate and interpret
the information they receive from those agents responsible for their delivery?
Policy today is more interconnected and complex. It is increasingly bound up
with delivery issues that cross traditional portfolio responsibilities and
Commonwealth-state demarcations. Many players have legitimate involvement
in policy sectors and their cooperation or involvement is crucial to success.
Welfare services, for instance, now involve anything up to a dozen federal

6
 Introduction — Improving Implementation: the Challenge Ahead

agencies as well as a host of state and third-sector agencies. Delivery issues are
more a kaleidoscope of coordinating influences than a logical set of stages
unilaterally declared by silo departments. Immigration, health and national
security services face similar delivery issues. Effective implementation is as
strong as the weakest link in the chain. When things go wrong, governments
have to accept responsibility and attempt to rectify the problems often under
the glare of publicity. For instance, in Immigration after the release of the Palmer
report into maladministration in her department (July 2005), the Minister, Senator
Vanstone, insisted that her department post its remedial implementation plan
in the department’s website as a discipline to her executives.
Reviews of existing implementation strategies have found agencies do not
adequately identify and address barriers to good delivery. They find policy
proposals conceived and devised without the benefit of implementation
experience. They find that departmental cultures and administrative practices
run counter to declared policy goals of the government. Departments struggle
with changes of management as policy priorities change. In some cases, poor
project management disciplines have been discovered, without adequate
planning, risk assessment, key milestones, or with little heed paid to formal
implementation plans. Government projects and investment decisions are often
uncoordinated and poorly evaluated over time or between different jurisdictions.
Hence, it is clear that much of the current interest in implementation and project
management is an unintended consequence of the trajectory of public sector
reform followed by Australian governments since the 1980s. Governments have
detached implementation 'knowledges' and are now seeking to ‘rebuild the
connections’ in a different organisational context or changed delivery mode.
They are not talking about dismantling the reforms of the past two decades but
of managing the ‘black holes’ created, facilitating better information exchanges,
and building more organic connections not just within agencies but between
them also. They are attempting this within a framework of corporate governance
and integrated delivery.
Those responsible for managing projects are now required to consider not just
the input-output measures, but to show they understand the transaction costs,
the different forms of risk, better evaluations of outcomes, the need for
collaborative partnerships and synergies, and for good relationship management.
They also need to be more aware of how far projects ‘drift’ in implementation
from intentions of government.
Senior officials away from the delivery point need to become responsible owners
and supplement their oversight functions with additional expertise and feedback.
If the policy-delivery loop is broken it needs to be re-knitted by other means,
especially with senior executives taking a closer responsibility and knowing

7
 Improving Implementation

what to ask and when. The trick is to ‘manage implementation’ without getting
swamped in the detail of implementation or descending into micro-management.
Certainly, as this collection demonstrates, governments throughout Australia
are increasingly focused on the politics and processes of implementation, and
on feedback mechanisms to inform ministers and ‘senior owners’ on progress.
Yet, it is the executives and senior managers who are the ones driving this current
agenda, not the politicians. But political interest and occasional prods from the
prime minister or premiers will be essential to sustain the interest of the
bureaucrats. Even if politicians engage in this debate with the motivation of
shifting responsibility for implementation directly to their officials, they will
nevertheless be unleashing a new agenda for those delivering public policy. It
may be somewhat overdue, but the new-found interest is certainly a welcome
development.
The 20 contributions contained in this monograph comprise a cross-section of
the best papers delivered at the ANZSOG annual conference on Project
Management and Organisational Change, held at the Canberra Convention Centre
in February 2006. The monograph is divided into four parts. Part 1, Governance,
Ownership and Oversight, canvasses the range of issues affecting the basic
governance and control of projects. It offers insights into the key factors for
success and failure. Part 2, Organisational Alignment–Organisational Change,
presents a range of perspectives on change management and the cultural
alignment between organisations and government objectives. These papers
illustrate, through real-world examples, how a well-conceived and structured
project management framework can be used to secure stakeholder buy-in and
achieve broad acceptance of organisational aims and means. Part 3, Better Project
and Program Delivery, focuses on the development of appropriate project and
program management cultures in organisations. It provides pertinent advice on
how to improve operational management and sustain effective policy delivery.
Part 4, Implementation Reviews, explores the factors underpinning successful
implementation initiatives and sound implementation cultures. It reports on new
initiatives in various jurisdictions relating to good project and program
management practice.

References
Briggs, Lynelle 2005, ‘A Passion for Policy?’ paper presented Wednesday 29
June 2005 as part of the ANZSOG/ANU Public Lecture Series 2005.
Oliver, James 2003, The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall: Public interest
versus bureau-shaping perspectives, Palgrave Macmillan.
Shergold, Peter. 2006, ‘Driving Change to Bring About Better Implementation
and Delivery’, address to the conference, Project Management and Organisational
Change, Wednesday 22 Februrary.

8
 Introduction — Improving Implementation: the Challenge Ahead

Tiernan, Anne 2006, ‘Working with the Stock We Have: The eveloving role of
Queensland’s Implementation Unit’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis:
Research and Practice, Vol. 8 No. 4, December.
Wanna, J. 2006, ‘From Afterthought to Afterburner: Australia’s Cabinet
Implementation Unit’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, Vol 8, No. 4,
December, p. 34

ENDNOTES
1 Oliver James 2003, The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall: Public interest versus bureau-shaping
perspectives, Palgrave Macmillan.

9
2. Driving Change to Bring About
Better Implementation and Delivery
Peter Shergold, Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet

There are three particular reasons I am glad to have the opportunity to ‘set the
scene’ for this monograph. First, it is been two years since the last time I spoke
out on issues of implementation and delivery,1 and over two years since I
established the Cabinet Implementation Unit. The conference, and this
monograph, provide a good opportunity to maintain the impetus towards the
better execution of government policy. My experience of bureaucratic inertia
is that if one does not keep driving forward one does not stop still: one actually
slides backwards down the mountain of good intentions.
Second, two years of experience of the Cabinet Implementation Unit has produced
valuable lessons about the barriers to successful implementation and how they
might be planned for and overcome. These issues are being explored across all
the Australian jurisdictions, as well as in the UK and New Zealand. This
conference provides us with an opportunity to learn from each other.
Third, I want to continue a campaign to take the issues of project and program
management out of the technical context into which they are all too frequently
consigned. I have a simple message: project management is too important to
leave for nerds!
When I was at school, participation in the Cadet Force was voluntary.
Nevertheless attendance was remarkably high – not least because the alternative
activity for Tuesday afternoons was a double lesson of Latin. For me, and many
others, marching around the quadrangle or crawling through muddy fields
seemed far preferable to conjugating the inflected forms of Latin verbs. And, to
be truthful, if the alternative had been instead a long afternoon of something
called ‘project management’ I might still have preferred to have spent my Monday
nights polishing my boots, creasing my trousers and daubing my puttees. Project
management can sound dull if worthy, a matter of routine process, necessary
but uninspiring.
It is not. It is about getting things done through innovative methods,
organisational change and committed leadership. And its significance to public
administration is even greater. The quality of the implementation of government
policy is central to community support for the institutions of democratic
governance, a theme to which I will return.

11
 Improving Implementation

Although issues of implementation and delivery are attaining a higher profile

in the Australian Government sector, the Cabinet Implementation Unit still gets
told too often that ‘the only reason we’re preparing this implementation plan is
because you’re making us do one’. This is simply not good enough. If we are
fair dinkum about accountability to our respective governments, and through
them to the public, we must embed implementation planning into our routine.
If planning to deliver is perceived as an additional chore, just more bureaucratic
red-tape, then we will have failed.
Better project and program management cannot be left as a technical task for
specialists. It is about ensuring that our organisations are able to change in order
to deliver change effectively. Australian public servants face implementation
challenges somewhat different from their private sector colleagues. They are
marked by agency demarcations, overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities, and
public accountability within an environment of fierce political contest and
intense scrutiny.
And the implications of inadequate management of public policy can be worse.
Poor delivery – such as inadequate service levels, lack of timeliness or
burdensome regulatory processes – risks public dissatisfaction. It can reduce
trust not only in public service but in the government it serves. Poor project
management means that citizens are not receiving their entitlements and, in my
view, that’s even worse than customer dissatisfaction or a decline in shareholder
value.
Implementation is necessarily a learning process. The changing circumstances
and the experience of executing a policy decision have to be taken into account.
Indeed they may require the policy decision to be revisited. Getting things done
well in government requires more than a series of commandments (regulations,
rules and guidelines) handed down to those below or transmitted from the
national office to regional offices. Communication and learning have to work
both ways. Policy prepared without the experience of those who deliver it across
counters or from call-centres is almost certainly policy that will be poorly
designed and difficult to implement.
Let me set out some of what we have learned in the two years since we established
the Cabinet Implementation Unit. The Unit, as you are probably aware, lies at
the centre of government. It taps into the Cabinet decision-making process,
through which almost all the big decisions of the Australian government are
made. It does three things:
• As policy submissions are being prepared for Cabinet consideration, the Unit
works with drafters to ensure that the proposals that Ministers consider
provide a summary of implementation issues, including an assessment of

12
 Driving Change to Bring About Better Implementation and Delivery

expected benefits, governance, milestones and risks: the goal, quite simply,
is to ensure that government can decide on policy with its eyes wide open.
• For important initiatives that pose significant implication challenges, the
Unit then works with agencies to develop more detailed implementation
plans against which progress can be regularly reported to the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet.
• On a quarterly basis, the Unit compiles short reports from agencies, in a
tabular, ‘traffic light’ format to ensure that the government has a snapshot
of how implementation is going on large or sensitive projects. The latest
report covers around 150 specific initiatives of which 26 have been given
‘amber’ or ‘red’ light status.
The first thing I’ve learned over two years is that the successful implementation
of policy is not about the adoption of any particular project management
methodology, although it is essential that an appropriate methodology be
employed. Increasingly it has become apparent that the pathway to better
implementation is that it be consciously driven from the top down with
continuing executive oversight. Chief Executive Instructions create a framework
for due process and accountability but they do not convey the commitment and
interest of leadership in implementation.
There is nothing particularly original about this insight. A recent report on IT
projects around the world found that less than one third succeeded: 53 per cent
did not meet expectations in terms of their timing, cost or capacity to deliver
the required features and functions and 18 per cent failed completely. One of
the most critical factors determining success was executive management support,
in championing and resourcing projects 2 and, equally important, in making
sure that there were systems in place ensuring that the right projects were
selected at the right time for the organisation.
This does not mean that the heads of agencies need to go off and study the Project
Management Book of Knowledge, or PRINCE2. But it does mean that they have
to learn the right kind of questions to ask. In her November 2004 address to the
Australian Graduate School of Management/Harvard Club of Australia, Christina
Gillies 3 emphasised:
In most boardrooms, good financial governance is understood and
operates without question. Even where directors have little or no
experience in financial analysis, they are aware that they must obtain a
level of understanding of the financial operations of the business and
have sufficient basic knowledge to interpret the books of account …
(But) for many directors, IT is a subject to be avoided. How can a director
with little or no experience in IT carry out their fiduciary duties, when
struggling to understand the terminology and ever-changing nature of
technology?

13
 Improving Implementation

Senior public sector managers, who find themselves charged with the oversight
of major programs and projects must know what the right questions are, who
might be able to answer them and how to assess the validity of the answers.
With this in mind, the Cabinet Implementation Unit and the Australian National
Audit Office have been working jointly on a better practice guide to
implementation. The guide is not primarily about how to manage projects and
programs. Rather it provides a checklist of the types of questions that need to
be asked and the assurance that needs to be given to CEOs, the senior officers
responsible for oversight of projects and the project managers themselves. Such
a systematic approach is the key to driving the structural and behavioural
changes needed in organisations if good intentions are to be turned into better
practices.
The Palmer inquiry 4 into the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs’ management of detentions and deportations reveals much
of what can go wrong when government policy is not effectively translated into
organisational systems and processes. Palmer found that DIMIA, and by extension
all public sector agencies, should have in operation ‘systems that ensure integrity
of application and accountability and engender public confidence … and
searching processes of high-level internal review (to ensure) the organisation is
achieving the outcomes expected of it. Such corporate quality assurance would
(need to) be executive driven …’ (p165).
Most importantly Palmer also highlighted the danger of workplace cultures
preoccupied with process and rule-driven operational practice. The risk of
depending upon systems alone is that implementation degenerates either into
blind application of processes or into instructions which, not effectively
monitored, are soon ignored. The tension between the need for systems and the
need for learning can only be resolved by building into our organisations
effective monitoring and communication and the will and capacity to make
change in response. I think that this creative tension needs to be managed
through robust, top-down project management practices mandated and
championed by the agency leadership. People need to know that senior executives
are serious.
I hope that the CIU may contribute to this goal. That is one reason why I have
been keen to avoid the Unit becoming a centralised cudgel-wielding bureaucratic
elite – what Charles F. Sable has recently called ‘a commando centre’ 5 or what
Evert Lindquist, who is also speaking at this conference, calls ‘a temporary
adhocracy’. I see the Unit as a vehicle for communicating more effectively
between those implementing government policy, public service leadership and
government. In that role it has obvious opportunities for contributing to learning,
including – formally and informally – by advising, coaching and mentoring on
the basis of its accumulating experience. But to do so it has to be driven by a

14
 Driving Change to Bring About Better Implementation and Delivery

spirit of collegiality and cooperative partnership, not of imposed authority and

blind obedience. It is about learning by doing and then spreading the learning.
Senior management has to play an increasingly important role in linking
individual projects to wider organisational strategies and goals, and shaping
those goals on the basis of what has been learned from individual projects. 6
They need to understand that policy development and service delivery are not
in a linear chronological relationship. The making and executing of government
policy is an iterative process. We can only avoid policy blunders by ensuring
that policy-making is routinely and constructively informed by service delivery,
in a way that transcends traditional boundaries and structures.
Learning is also prominent in the logic of the system of Gateway Reviews,
developed by the UK’s Office of Government Commerce, adopted by the Victorian
Government and now to be introduced at the Commonwealth level. Gateway is
a response to concerns about the risks of major projects going on for too long
without delivering. You will shortly be hearing from other speakers on the detail
of Gateway, including from Ian Glenday, who will share his experience of the
OGC with us.
A central feature of Gateway which particularly attracted me was that the reports
from peer review teams will be confidential to the project’s senior responsible
owner. This is not only to facilitate full and willing access to project data by the
review teams. Crucially, it is also to facilitate learning between peers and a focus
on overcoming challenges rather than denying problems, designing alibis or
allocating blame.
In thinking about Gateway, for example, one might want to explore what the
introduction of these independent peer reviews will mean for agencies. Are we
ready for Gateway? Have we, for example, adopted consistent project
management practices and methodologies across our agencies so that, if a Gateway
team were to ask for the relevant documentation, or to speak to the relevant
stakeholders, such information would be immediately to hand? Do we have
sufficiently robust project governance practices in place to respond to the
warnings and advice such reviews are designed to provide? What avenues have
been established within and across our agencies to capture lessons from individual
projects and disseminate them more widely?
In posing these questions I do not want to suggest that public servants are
ill-prepared. My sense is that departments have responded well to the increased
emphasis on project management. I now see a lot more preparatory thought on
the best options for delivery, what sort of risks may emerge and how they will
be handled. I discern a better articulation of the program logic and a greater
understanding that effective implementation will improve the quality of the
policy itself.

15
 Improving Implementation

But we need to go further. As the outcomes of the most recent meeting of the
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) powerfully demonstrated policies
of national significance increasingly have to be delivered across jurisdictional
boundaries. The new National Reform Agenda spans increased economic
competition, greater investment in human capital and a less intrusive regulatory
regime. When individual elements of this bold agenda are brought before
governments for decision – as they must be if they are to be designed and costed
– it will be crucial for governments and public servants to understand how all
these pieces fit together. How does this project impact or depend on others?
How can we identify appropriate pathways to deliver expensive, long-term
projects, when we anticipate that the technological environment is likely to
change substantially during the course of their implementation? How can we
identify where the boundaries of relative certainty lie, and how we will gradually
expand them in response to evolving circumstances? Can Commonwealth, State
and Territory public administrations, with their inevitable bureaucratic
demarcations, together develop a clear picture of the decisions that will need to
be taken, when, and by whom, and the associated critical paths, risks, and
interdependencies?
These are the sorts of challenges that already emerge as agencies lodge
implementation plans with the CIU. Departments frequently find that they do
not have the answers to all of the questions when they work up the first cut of
the plan. That’s quite normal. There are nearly always a swag of unknowns
particularly when implementation depends legislative enactment, jurisdictional
cooperation, joint funding or outsourced delivery through contracted
third-parties. This is precisely where the disciplines of project and program
management provide a sound basis for decision making in an environment of
uncertainty. By forcing questions around the scope of a measure we clarify
expectations and align deliverables with expectations; by forcing questions
around timing, we clarify the critical points at which decisions about the next
stage of a project will need to be made; by forcing questions around costs and
benefits, we can disaggregate investment down into phases that help to
understand what is known, and what might have to wait for legal, technological
or political issues to be resolved.
Project management in the public sector is not just a matter of ensuring that
government decisions are delivered to citizens efficiently, ethically and
courteously while paying close attention to the appropriate and effective use of
public funds. It is about more than service, timeliness and value for money. It
is also about recognising that the implementation of government policy can often
intrude on the lives of citizens, and impose costs on businesses, in ways that
undermine self-responsibility and stifle entrepreneurship.

16
 Driving Change to Bring About Better Implementation and Delivery

Bureaucratic red tape can impose regulatory costs, the scale and dimensions of
which are often not sufficiently appreciated by governments who legislate and
public servants who administer. There is a rising sentiment in the Commonwealth,
State and Territory governments (and overseas) that it is better to regulate less
and to regulate better. It is for that reason that the Banks Taskforce into Reducing
Regulatory Burdens on Business was established. It will shortly deliver its
findings to the public.
I am certain the report will require us to ask hard questions about the effect of
regulatory policy on Australia’s society and economy. Good program and project
management should involve consideration of the scope of regulation and how
its costs – including costs arising from uncertainty – can be reduced. Has scope
creep meant businesses not originally intended to be subject to the regulation
are being captured? To what extent are overlapping and inconsistent regulatory
requirements across federal boundaries imposing additional burdens? Are
regulations or reporting requirements justified by the original policy intent, or
have they become redundant or does the policy outcome no longer justify the
compliance cost. Are reporting requirements resulting in same or similar
information being provided to multiple agencies? Do variations in definitional
and operational reporting cause confusion in their application?
Reducing the regulatory burden on business will be a complex exercise. It will
involve systemic reforms to improve regulation-making and enforcement. It will
require project managers to assess the external costs of implementation on those
who are subject to compliance regimes. But change – significant change – is
already afoot. The Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources has developed
a costing tool to better equip public servants to identify and, where possible,
quantify the regulatory impact of new policy measures on businesses. It will
become a requirement for this costing tool to be used in all Cabinet Submissions
that propose regulation on business, to enable Ministers to make more informed
policy decisions. In addition to this, the Productivity Commission will be asked,
on an annual basis, to examine areas of regulatory concern to business to identify
areas that could be improved.

17
 Improving Implementation

Many of you would be aware that John Uhrig was appointed in

November 2002 to conduct a review of the corporate governance of
Commonwealth statutory authorities and office holders. The objective
of the review was to look at the governance arrangements for statutory
authorities and office holders, and come up with options for improving
their performance and getting the best from their accountability
frameworks. Uhrig was asked to develop a broad template of governance
principles and arrangements for statutory authorities and office holders,
and potentially beyond, to a wider range of public sector bodies.
Many of you would be aware that, in response to the Uhrig review more
than 160 Australian Government agencies are currently being assessed
against agreed governance principles. This progressive process is leading
to changes in governance structures. It also involves a system of issuing
Statements of Expectation to, and receiving Statements of Intent from,
various authorities. Such statements will help to communicate and inform
government expectations.
At the same time the Government has brought six key human services
delivery agencies into the new Department of Human Services. The
Department provides direct accountability to a single Minister who is
responsible, in Cabinet, for ensuring that the costs and timing of
administrative change are factored into consideration of health, child
support or welfare policies. I can see that this discipline is already
influencing for the better the policy decisions that are being taken.
– Peter Shergold

The increased interest by governments in reducing regulatory impositions

illustrate the manner in which the environment of public policy changes. It will
influence the character of, but not the need for project management of public
policy. And there are at least three ways in which the requirements for effective
execution of policy are likely to remain constant:
• first, that the disciplines of project and program management are not an end
in themselves. They are the means by which the public service can best
balance the increasing demand for change and adaptation by governments
and the electorate with the need for administrative, technical and financial
efficiency, service quality and structural innovation in program delivery;
• second, project and program management are a way of communicating from
the bottom up and from the top down within and across organisations. For
this to be an effective process, the senior executive must be as engaged in
the development of agency capabilities in this area as the project managers
themselves; and

18
 Driving Change to Bring About Better Implementation and Delivery

• third, they will need support in this role. This support will not primarily be
in the form of workshop training in project management techniques, but
will require innovative ways of supporting senior executives in fulfilling
their responsibilities, including through coaching and mentoring.
As I noted at the beginning, ‘project management’ would not have been a school
subject that attracted me. Perhaps though if it had been called ‘action’ with an
emphasis on ‘getting things done fast and well’ it might have caught my attention.
Certainly that’s why I am such an enthusiast now. To me project management
is transformative – it turns the goals of public policy into acquisitions,
investments, programs and services that are in the public interest. And that
leads me, finally, to why I think project management is more than an important
set of technical skills.
Public servants bear a particular responsibility, directly and indirectly, for the
delivery of government policy. Every government knows that its future depends
not only on how wisely it makes decisions but on how effectively its public
service delivers them. In my interpretation of the Westminster tradition
governments should continue or fall on how the electorate perceives the quality
of their policies not on the competence of public officials to execute them. Indeed
I think that public servants should exhibit bias … but the bias they display
should be for delivering public policy with vigour. I want project managers
who are driven by a bias for action.

ENDNOTES
1 ‘Plan and Deliver: Avoiding Bureaucratic Hold-up’, Speech to the Australian Graduate School of
Management/Harvard Club of Australia, Wednesday, 17 November 2004, National Press Club,
[Link]
2 Sample research from the Standish Group, accessed at [Link]
sample_research/[Link]
3 C. Gillies, 2005, IT Governance: A Practical Guide for Company Directors and Business Executives, CPA
Australia
4 Accessed at [Link]
5 Sabel, C. F. 2004, ‘Beyond Principal-Agent Governance: Experimentalist Organizations, Learning and
Accountability’, address to Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke
Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid - WRR) 30 January. I thank Professor Ian Marsh for drawing this article
to the attention of my Department.
6 Jugdev, K. and Muller, R., 2005, ‘A Retrospective Look At Our Evolving Understanding of Project
Success’ in Project Management Journal, 36: 4.

19
Section II. Governance, Ownership and
Oversight
3. Managing Major Programs and
Projects: A View From the Boardroom
Christina Gillies, Non Executive Director and IT Governance
Consultant

I sit on a number of boards, including public, private, and not-for-profit, and I

can assure you every one is different, however the debate around IT is common
to all, and revolves around the question: 'How do we get a grip on this critical
corporate asset that has become an integral part of most businesses and
government agencies?'
The consequences of project and operational failure can bring a company to its
knees, yet in the boardroom we often feel like powerless onlookers rather than
informed participants.
We are spending an ever-increasing amount of money on IT and the size of the
loss gets bigger every time an IT investment goes wrong. In addition, the
demands of privacy legislation and compliance surrounding IT and information
security are becoming more and more complex.
The incidence of IT failure continues to grow. Some incidents have had high
profile, but many failures in small to medium enterprises cause equal damage
with little publicity. However, as a result, we find the attention of regulatory
bodies and shareholders clearly focused on what goes on behind Boardroom
doors and on the accountabilities of business, audit and finance.
Most board would agree that IT should now be on the agenda, the question is
once it is on the agenda, what do we do with it?
For the most part, boards get to understand that a project has problems or is
completely off the rails when the damage has been done.
Why? Did the board know about the project? Did we understand the risks? Did
we have sufficient information? If we had information, did we understand it?
Today I would like to talk from a boardroom perspective about:
• the relationship between the board and the project;
• IT governance and how it applies to projects; and
• how Boards can realistically get reasonable oversight of IT and know that
the company is getting the planned return on investment and risk is being
managed.
First, I think it is important that we start with a common view of the boardroom.
A board meets formally between six and twelve times a year. Meetings are
23
 Improving Implementation

scheduled to deal with a wide range of corporate governance tasks which range
through setting and monitoring strategic direction, monitoring operational
performance, financial management, regulatory and compliance issues,
shareholder and analyst expectation, compliance with regulatory bodies, internal
and external audit, risk management, international reporting standards, Sarbanes
Oxley 1 … the list goes on.
The board has a lot on its plate, so projects that come to the board tend not to
get a lot of air time once approved

The project scene from a Board perspective

Most big spend projects come to the board for approval and are normally
accompanied by a well thought out presentation outlining strategic fit, costs
and benefits. After long and considered debate the project will most likely be
approved, with the board indicating the need for progress reports against budget
and plan. Reporting at regular intervals commences and here is where the
frustration starts, reports go from ‘on time on budget to ‘slippage with good
reason’.

We have a problem
Boards are required to act in the event of either a huge failure on implementation,
or a big delay in implementation causing significant business losses. The
investigations commence, no doubt you have all watched or participated. The
disturbing fact is the accountable parties are often difficult to identify and the
reasons for failure are many and varied.
In the boardroom, the debate goes on about what to do differently and how to
avoid repeat scenarios.
The key questions that need to be asked are:
• Who was accountable?
• Were post mortems conducted to identify source(s) of failure?
• Do we have consultant reviews and recommendations?
• Could the problem have been avoided?
• Did the board do its job?

What can be done differently?

Starting in the boardroom, if consultants were engaged to identify some of the
problematic issues and behaviours in the boardroom around the treatment of
projects, they might come up with a list that looks something like this:
• the board often make decisions in isolation due to lack of context for informed
debate;
• the board treats project approval as an event – without strategic context;

24
 Managing Major Programs and Projects: A View From the Boardroom

• the board relies on the capability of the CIO rather than ensuring good
governance is in place;
• the board holds the CIO accountable for the failure of business projects;
• the board digs into detail and misses the big picture;
• project risk monitoring can get lost in the overall risk profile of the
organisation; and
• IT is not home ground for most, so the subject can get passed by very
quickly.
So what is the answer? What does the board do? The simple answers include:
• implement better IT governance;
• know what questions to ask; or
• apply better project governance.
These sound good, but what do they really mean? And more importantly, will
these measures address the problem?
In isolation, I suspect not: in the first place the board has to understand what it
is governing! The answer lies in:
• implementing better IT governance in the boardroom;
• knowing what questions to ask; and
• implementing better project governance.
Before we look at the scope of IT governance, let’s go back to first principles,
derived from the ASX principles of Corporate Governance. The key phrases to
note are:
• ‘provide accountability and control systems commensurate with the risks
involved’; and
• ‘accountabilities, processes and auditable and measurable control’.
This raises questions about what we look at in the boardroom: Gantt charts or
decision frameworks and accountabilities?

25
 Improving Implementation

What is the Board’s role?

The Board is ultimately accountable for the company’s purpose and the
means of delivering it ... and the Board is accountable for the Governance
of the organisation:
• ‘Good corporate governance structures encourage companies to create
value and provide accountability and control systems commensurate
with the risks involved’.
• ‘Governance is a set of accountabilities, processes, and auditable and
measurable controls that ensure a company is on track to achieve its
objectives’.
ASX Principles of Corporate Governance 2

Broadbent and Weill developed a further definition which clarifies IT governance

specifically. The key words here being ‘IT governance is different from IT
management’. Think about who makes the project decisions in your organisation
and who is accountable for implementing them.

IT Governance
• IT governance is about who is entitled to make major decisions, who
has input and who is accountable for implementing those decisions.
AND
• IT governance is different from IT management.
(Broadbent and Weill, 2003; Weill and Ross 2004.)

Broadbent and Weill also recommend that we start in the Boardroom by treating
IT as we would treat any other corporate asset and apply the same rigor. For IT
this would mean the Board decides strategic direction, ensures accountability,
makes policy and monitors and supervises. The board appoints the CEO and the
CEO and the board appoints the senior executive team and they are accountable
for the management of the company’s key assets, including IT.
I think this is where the answer lies for boards in coming to grips with IT – it
is not about project detail and Gantt charts – it about decision making,
accountabilities and processes (see Fig 1).

26
 Managing Major Programs and Projects: A View From the Boardroom

Figure 1

The Finance analogy is a good one

Boards spend a lot of time on financial governance, regulation and compliance
and the board along with the auditors; ensure that the accountability structures
and processes are in place throughout the organisation to deliver accurate and
reliable financial information to the shareholders and stakeholders.
The question is, 'why do we treat IT any differently?'. It would be reasonable
to assume that we could have processes and accountabilities in place for the
accurate and reliable delivery of IT projects and ongoing operations that can be
are easily monitored and audited.
As an asset class, IT is new territory for boards – finance is an age old profession
and we can apply many of its disciplines to establish good IT governance
practices.
IT governance often gets confused with IT management and the CIO gets to be
accountable for anything that has the word IT attached to it. As a consequence
the business ends up being interested onlookers and expert critics, rather than
accountable participants in any business process pertaining to IT.

27
 Improving Implementation

IT governance includes the Board, the Business and IT

Analysis of many project failures shows that the business parties either did not
understand or accept their role, and IT tried to fill in the gap. In a vacuum IT
will make the decisions.
Most projects are business projects and over 60 per cent of the work is
non-technical IT work, requiring business skills and knowledge such as process
design, organisational change, benefits identification, product development,
change management and training. As a rule of thumb, well over half of IT project
costs are in the business. IT is the enabler, not the driver,

What does it mean from a governance perspective?

Let’s work our way through ‘who makes decisions’ and ‘who is accountable for
what’ through the lifecycle of a project from concept to outcome. It starts in the
Boardroom where the Board, with the CEO and executive, sets strategic direction.
The interaction between business and IT delivers the Business IT Strategic Plan
which outlines the key initiatives the company will implement over the next
‘strategic’ period. These initiatives will be converted into projects through the
annual business planning process (see Fig 2).
Figure 2

28
 Managing Major Programs and Projects: A View From the Boardroom

In the boardroom, the longer term Business IT Strategic Plan and the Annual
Plans are key. The plans are the roadmap for the Board. The plans set the criteria
for Board decision-making and the framework for board focus, monitoring and
measurement.
The board needs to be confident that governance structures (clear accountabilities
and decision making frameworks) are in place throughout the life cycle and that
the board focuses on the project outcomes and delivered benefits rather than
specific project progress.
The bottom line is that, IT governance is not IT management and IT governance
is not just inside the IT department.
IT accountabilities and processes cross all organisational boundaries and, from
a Board perspective, we need to know that these processes and accountabilities
are in place and are being rigorously monitored.

Nota bene!
• There is a business decision behind every IT Decision;
AND
• Business must be held accountable for these decisions.

Finally, in the context of IT governance, it is appropriate to talk about the

relationship between projects and the board. We tend to put huge emphasis on
getting IT Project Management right and project governance right on the IT side
of the equation. Generally, IT project management reports to the CIO and, if the
project has a large budget, then the CIO reports to the board. However, what
about the management of and accountability for the 60 per cent of the costs and
the delivery of the benefits on the business side of the equation? I agree with
the statement often made that there is no such thing as an IT project – only
business projects (see Fig 3).

29
 Improving Implementation

Figure 3

Post mortems on failures tend to come up with common problems including:

• project alignment with strategic direction;
• poorly expressed business requirements;
• complete underestimation of the business effort and impact;
• untested benefits cases; and
• no plan or project to realise benefits.
All of these problems stem from one root cause: poor governance and organisation
on the business side of the equation.
In too many organisations we see the IT project manager doing the job of the
business project manager and making business decisions he or she is not qualified
to make. As I pointed out before, IT will fill the vacuum to get the job done.
I suspect the rate of project failure would diminish significantly if IT project
management disciplines were implemented on the business side of the equation
and business took on the accountability for the proper business management of
the overall project as described in the diagram above.
So why does not this happen? Why is not the obvious solution often
implemented?

30
 Managing Major Programs and Projects: A View From the Boardroom

I do not have a specific answer but here are three relevant observations:
1. Running projects is foreign to most business people and for the most part
they are not rewarded for implementing a large business project, they are
rewarded for achieving bottom line profits. Business management is put in
a conflicting situation often short term (business profit) versus long term
(sustainability and growth).
2. Taking people out of line roles to populate a project is an issue. Business
managers accountable for the bottom line are loath to put their best staff
into projects because the business suffers.
3. Generally a lack of business transformation skills in the business including
process design and change management, the people who would effectively
scope the strategic business project, and help business management
understand what has to be done to achieve the desired outcomes – these
people tend to be in IT.

A word on the relationship between the board and IT –

and IT projects
Organisations that are heavily depend on IT or which have large organisational
change and IT projects to deliver, do not have the bandwidth in the boardroom
to exercise good governance.
Many organisations establish a board subcommittee for IT, similar to the audit
and risk committee and this committee deals with specific IT governance
including strategic alignment, prioritisation, approval, delivery, benefits,
resourcing and the balancing of supply demand equation. Implementing an IT
committee to the board is one way a board can realistically govern IT. And most
importantly, it is necessary to ensure that business recognition and reward
structures recognise business accountability for project and benefits delivery
(see Fig 4).

31
 Improving Implementation

Figure 4

Concluding remarks
In summary the Board must:
• ensure that IT governance is understood and implemented across the
organisation;
• differentiate between IT governance and IT Management;
• business management and executives own the management and outcomes
of IT projects;
• insist on seeing clear and single point business accountability for strategic
projects;
• monitor project risks, deliverables and outcomes rather than technical Gantt
chart status reports; and
• ensure that business recognition and reward structures recognise business
accountability for project and benefits delivery.

32
 Managing Major Programs and Projects: A View From the Boardroom

References
Weill, Peter and Jeanne Ross (2004), IT Governance: How Top Performers Manage
IT Decision Rights for Superior Results, Harvard Business School Press.
Broadbent, Marianne and Peter Weill, ‘Effective IT Governance. By Design,’
Gartner EXP Premier Report, January 2003.

ENDNOTES
1 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act of 2002 is a United States federal law passed in response to a number of major corporate
and accounting scandals. For a more detailed explanation, see [Link]
wiki/Sarbanes-Oxley_Act.
2 See ASX Corporate Governance Principles at [Link] governance/
principles_good_corporate_governance.htm

33
4. How Boards and Senior Managers
Have Governed
Raymond C Young, Department of Accounting and Finance,
Macquarie University

Abstract
This chapter positions IT project governance in the context of corporate
governance and IT governance. It has highlighted dysfunctional behaviour and
neglect of the governance perspective in project management practice and argued
that the traditional measure of success ‘on-time on-budget’ is inappropriate for
IT project governance. It presents a holistic framework of IT projects in the
context of an organisation and lists six key IT project governance questions that
should be asked by a board (or other approving authority), top managers and
executive project sponsors. The detailed framework and questions are being
published by Standards Australia as HB280 and they incorporate and extend
the best of the IT project governance prescriptions that currently exist.

How Boards and Senior Managers have governed ICT

projects to succeed (or fail)
Many boards are aware of the need for more guidance in the area of IT
governance (Young and Jordan 2002). This is partly as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley
and other international legislative responses to the spate of recent high profile
corporate collapses (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, HIH, One-Tel, etc). It is also a
reflection of a genuine desire of boards to improve their performance (Leblanc
and Gillies 2005).
A number of good guidelines have been developed. These include a recent
publication by CPA Australia (Gillies and Broadbent 2005), COBIT produced by
the Information Systems Audit and Control Association COBIT 2000) and AS8015
produced by Standards Australia (AS8015 2005). However these guidelines are
at focussed on IT governance as a whole and do not elaborate in any detail on
how to govern IT projects. This distinction is important because 74 per cent of
projects are undertaken as business improvement initiatives enabled by ICT
(KPMG 2005) and belong more properly in the domain of corporate governance
rather than being pure ICT projects within the domain of IT governance alone.
The objective of this chapter is to complete the picture by extending the IT
Governance guidelines to describe how projects need to be governed at a board
and senior management level. It summarises the findings of four years of research
undertaken collaboratively with Standards Australia. This research has resulted
35
 Improving Implementation

in the award of a PhD thesis (Young 2005) and the findings are being published
by Standards Australia as HB280, a handbook with the same title as this chapter.

Success from a governance perspective

A case study of an ERP implementation (Young 2005) highlights a paradox. The
project is widely reported as a success because it was one of the world’s fastest
implementations of this particular ERP system. However, the benefits promised
to the board were not realised. The business case stated that a minimum of $6
million of benefits were to be delivered over five years and that the ERP would
be upgraded to underpin the organisation’s long term strategy. The project
ended up delivering only $3 million of benefits and the organisation lost
confidence in its ability to realise benefits and deferred the upgrade indefinitely.
The disappointment was compounded because management considered that
they did everything right: they had formal governance structures (project
sponsors, steering committee), formally documented and signed off individual
responsibilities for each of the targeted benefits, followed a proper project
management methodology, selected appointed a highly motivated high calibre
project team, and they had the benefit of experienced consultants to guide the
project.
The case study was titled ‘how to fail successfully’ because it was both a failure
and a success depending on ones perspective. The problem it highlights is
choosing which perspective to emphasise. Until now the IT vendors, IT
professionals and project managers have had the loudest voices and they
consciously or unconsciously dominate by abusing their so-called expertise
(Thomsett 1989). By claiming to know what was wrong and assuring stakeholders
the next technical solution would be the right one (Currie and Galliers 1999),
for the last 20 years, the discussion of success has been confined largely to the
issue of whether a project has come in on-time on-budget and whether it met
specifications (Grindley 1995).
From a governance perspective this is wholly inappropriate. Governance is about
both performance and risk (Standards Association of Australia 2003, Australian
Stock Exchange 2003) and Hilmer captures the objectives well when he states
that the objective is ‘to ensure management is focussed on above average returns
taking account of risk’ (Hilmer 1993). Organisations do not invest in projects so
that they can come in on-time on-budget or even to meet specifications! Projects
are undertaken to realise benefits e.g. increased revenue, decreased costs, ability
to respond faster to changing customer demands, etc. This governance
perspective of whether a project is successful or not has been largely ignored.
It has been overshadowed by the loud chorus of self interested
vendors/professionals (wanting the next project) who claim projects were
successes because technical objectives were met, users were satisfied or they
came in on-time. A common practice is to choose success criteria only after a
36
 How Boards and Senior Managers Have Governed

project has been implemented and to declare it to be a success based on whatever

criteria of success has been met (Boddie 1987). In one perverse example a project
team claimed a project was a success because they ‘learned not to do that again’.
Where is the governance voice asking ‘where are the benefits you promised
me?’
The pity of this situation is that many reputable people over the years have
correctly pointed out why projects fail (Cooke-Davies 2002, Baccarini 1999, de
Wit 1985, Markus et al 2000, Lucas 1975). They need to be heard because their
perspective is consistent with good governance and they show quite clearly that
achieving on-time on-budget or any of the lesser criteria for success (Delone and
McLean 2003) does not strongly relate to the realisation of benefits. This has
very important implications because the majority of IT prescriptions are focussed
on how to do project management better or how to solve a technical issue. These
prescriptions alone will not lead to success from a governance perspective; at
best they will tend to lead to on-time on-budget. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Almost all the project advice that exists is focussed on the circled aspects of
project management labelled 2–Planning, 3–Development or 4–Implementation
(Yardley 2002). This advice has value but the emphasis at a governance level
needs to be on clarifying what benefits are being targeted and whether they are
being realised (i.e. 1–initiation and 5–benefit). There is very little guidance in
this more important area, and what there is, tends to be directed at the project
manager. This is wholly inappropriate because a project manager tends to leave
at the end of a project, but the benefits of a project (IT projects in particular)
tend to be realised some time after a project has been implemented, and is usually
related to some degree of organisational change (Markus 1996). The implication
is that for a guidance to be effective, it has to be directed at business managers,
the owners of a project’s outputs.
Figure 1: Project Management success vs. Project success

37
 Improving Implementation

The final section will build on this discussion and present the best advice
currently available for boards, top management and executive project sponsors.
This audience has the largest impact on whether a project will succeed or fail
(Young 2005) and is the right audience for any IT project governance guideline.

How boards and top managers should govern projects

The first half of this chapter has presented the evidence that projects can only
be effectively governed when the most fundamental concepts are understood
and accepted: (a) Projects are undertaken to realise some kind of organisational
benefit, (b) benefits are seldom realised at the time of implementation and (c)
benefits tend to be enabled by IT projects but tend only to be realised through
accompanying organisational change. Project governance should therefore focus
on clarifying what benefits are being targeted, what organisational changes need
to be made to realise the benefits, whether the organisation has the capacity (and
will) to make the necessary changes, and whether the benefits are being realised.
Related to this is the issue of appointing a sponsor to be responsible for realising
the benefits and choosing and implementing measure(s) to monitor on an ongoing
basis whether the benefits are being realised.
This synthesis of the key aspects of project governance has been rigorously
justified (Young 2005) and documented for the general public (Young,
forthcoming). Considerations of length prevent a detailed explanation of the
justification but it should be highlighted that it confirmed what has long been
suspected Markus 1983), that top management support is the most important
success factor. Project governance guidelines must therefore focus on top
management responsibilities first. The existing prescriptions (e.g. project
planning, project management, project staff, user involvement, etc.) do not need
to be overly emphasised because they are already in widespread practice (Clegg
et al 1997) and the failure statistics show quite clearly that they alone are not
sufficient for success Young and Jordan 2005).
It should also be highlighted that the guidelines being presented in this chapter
have taken into account all the relevant models of how IT projects deliver benefits
(Yardley 2002, Akkermans and van Helden 2002, McGolpin and Ward 1997,
Reich and Benbasat 1990, Soh and Markus 1995, Grover and Kettinger 2000,
Markus 2000, Sharma and Yetton 2003) and well over 40 different prescriptions
for top management support. What was found was that almost all the existing
prescriptions focus on the ‘hard’ dimensions of governance (e.g. steering
committees, governance processes, etc) and did not capture the essence of how
top managers influenced projects to succeed. It was found that the ‘soft’
dimensions of governance (e.g. passion to drive change, belief in what is
necessary, will to change, listening, communicating and influencing skills) were
much more important and that they completely underpinned the effectiveness
of whatever hard prescriptions were adopted.
38
 How Boards and Senior Managers Have Governed

HB280 & AS8016

The project governance advice to be presented therefore represents an attempt
to summarise the best of what currently exists within a business/organisational
framework (to overcome the deficiencies of the project-centric perspective). It
is based partly on Australian Standard AS8015 on the corporate governance of
ICT and it has informed the development of Australian Standard AS8016 on the
corporate governance of ICT projects. It is more fully described in Standards
Australia’s handbook HB280.
The framework (Figure 2) shows that projects are undertaken to realise benefits
by changing both ICT operations and business processes. It also shows that top
management oversee or govern the change project. The framework identified
six inter-related project governance activities that must be carried out by boards
and top managers. These are:
1. Initiate
2. Evaluate
3. Support – motivation
4. Support – structure
5. Monitor – project
6. Monitor – benefits
Figure 2: IT Project Governance Framework

39
 Improving Implementation

Initiate & Evaluate

The initiate and evaluate stage is traditionally understood as the hard prescription
‘to prepare and approve a business case’. A board or other approving authority
needs to appreciate that the current practice often treats this process as a formal
hurdle to be passed and that 70 per cent of approved business cases are
predisposed to fail because they do not address the right governance issues
(KPMG 2005).
What needs to be asked at the time of approval is 'What are the expected business
benefits?' It must be determined at the outset whether there has been a thorough
consideration of how a project contributes to a strategic objective and whether
it contributes directly to an objective or whether it contributes to a program of
projects which collectively contribute to one or more strategic objectives for an
organisation. The approving authority should be very conscious of the tendency
to write into a business case whatever words it takes to get funding without any
real intention of delivering against the business case. They should be making
the subjective assessment of whether the project sponsor genuinely believes in
the objectives of the business case and has the passion to drive through the
organisational changes needed to realise the promised benefits.
Related to this first question is the evaluation of risk. The greatest risk of any
project is that it will fail to deliver the promised benefits (80-90 per cent
likelihood of failure) so the key question should be 'How much organisational
change is required to realise the benefits?' An approving authority needs to
ensure this issue has been thoroughly considered and make the subjective
assessment of whether their organisation has the will to make the changes needed
to realise the benefits. There are also other risk considerations that should be
part of the evaluation (e.g. economic feasibility, technical/operational feasibility,
resourcing feasibility, etc), but these questions are really details to help answer
the overall issue of how much risk is involved.

Support
The next key governance questions are based on an understanding of how much
organisation change is required. Projects that cross more organisational
boundaries and require more organisational change are much more difficult
because of the larger number of often very powerful stakeholders involved. The
approving authority needs to assess 'Who should sponsor the project' (on their
behalf and be responsible for delivering the promised benefits)? The sponsor
needs not only the passion to drive through the changes, but also the ability,
authority and influencing skills to make it happen. In some cases only the CEO
is the right sponsor, but an alternative arrangement may need to be made because
the CEO may not have enough time to govern all aspects of the project. Quite
often this will relate to the reward mechanism that is adopted.

40
 How Boards and Senior Managers Have Governed

The underlying issue is how to motivate the stakeholders and in particular the
sponsor to deliver the promised benefits. Historically projects have not been
measured or only measured on the basis of on-time on-budget. This is not
sufficient for effective project governance and an approving authority needs to
specifically ask the question 'How will the benefits be measured and sponsor
rewarded?' In some organisational cultures, performance bonuses are appropriate,
in other cultures it may be appropriate to revise the sponsor and other
stakeholder’s budget to reflect the business case promises, in other cases it might
be enough to focus attention by implementing a regularly reviewed board level
progress report. The answer to this question should probably be proposed in
the business case and it is important for the board to consider whether it is likely
to influence stakeholders appropriately given the history of dysfunctional
behaviour in the project space. It is almost never appropriate to monitor solely
on the basis of on-time on-budget and it is incumbent on the board to insist on
a more meaningful measure of success, a measure that is more directly related
to the business case benefits.

Direct & Monitor

Once a project has been approved and funded, monitoring occurs at two levels.
At the project level, the sponsor monitors on behalf of the board to ensure risk
is being managed. At the organisational level the board monitors the sponsor to
ensure (s)he is focussed on realising the promised benefits. The board must
oversee some mechanism to monitor the sponsor because it would be a clear
conflict of interest to have the sponsor monitor themselves. It would expose the
organisation to the risk of having the sponsor change the success criteria if the
project fails to deliver what was originally promised. This is the current practice
and can probably only be overcome with this additional board level discipline.
The advantage of having this mechanism is not that targets will cease to change,
but that boards will have earlier warning and have more opportunities to cancel
projects if circumstances change and make projects unviable. A board must have
the discipline to intercede and cancel unviable projects because it is too much
to expect a fired-up project sponsor to be objective enough to cancel his own
project. The key governance question at an organisational level is 'Are the
benefits on target or being realised?' This cannot be answered without some
kind of monitoring mechanism (ref Q3) and related to this is the question of
whether appropriate interventions are being directed if the benefits are not on
target.
Monitoring at a project level is generally not the direct responsibility of the
board. This activity can be performed on their behalf by the project sponsor
and can be thought of as risk management. The main mechanism for risk
management is the preparation of a project plan to manage all the expected risks.
Project plans are usually well done by following existing project management

41
 Improving Implementation

guidelines. However, project plans do not plan for unanticipated risks and the
majority of projects need to be changed as these unanticipated risks arise (Dvir
and Lechler 2004). There is almost always a warning signal (Nikander and
Eloranta 2001) and the key from a governance perspective is to ensure the project
culture encourages stakeholders at any level to raise issues that may compromise
the targeted benefits. This requires at one level a clear understanding by all the
stakeholders of what the targeted benefits are, and at another level the willingness
to listen and explore the business impact of issues as they are raised. It is
particularly difficult with IT projects because the connection between technical
issues and business outcomes is often not immediately apparent when they are
first raised. The right culture seems to require a sensitivity and humility
(willingness to learn) on the part of all stakeholders and in particular on the part
of the executive project sponsor, because they set the tone for what will be
addressed and what will not. This has many parallels with what is referred to
as establishing a whistle-blowing culture within the corporate governance
literature (Near and Miceli 1995, Smith and Keil 2003). Once a project has been
commenced by following the traditional project management guidelines, the
key governance question is “Is the culture right for unexpected issues to be
raised?”

Conclusion
This chapter has positioned IT project governance in the context of corporate
governance and IT governance. It has highlighted dysfunctional behaviour and
neglect of the governance perspective in project management practice over the
last 40 years. It has shown that a fundamental part of the solution is to recognise
that projects are undertaken to realise some organisational benefit and recognise
that these benefits are usually delivered some time after a project has been
implemented. This insight was extended to show that benefits are delivered
mainly by operational management rather than project management and that
the proper audience for IT project governance includes operational managers,
board members and top managers in particular.
The chapter argues that the traditional measure of success ‘on-time on-budget’
is inappropriate for IT project governance. It presents a holistic framework of
IT projects in the context of an organisation and lists six key IT project
governance questions that should be asked by a board (or other approving
authority), top managers and executive project sponsors. The framework and
questions are being published by Standards Australia as HB280 and they
incorporate and extend the best of the IT project governance prescriptions that
currently exist.
Six key IT project governance questions are presented, corresponding to different
parts of a project lifecycle.

42
 How Boards and Senior Managers Have Governed

1. What are the expected benefits?

2. How much change is required to realise the benefits?
3. How will the benefits be measured and the sponsor rewarded?
4. Who should sponsor the project?
5. Are the benefits being realised?
6. Is the culture right for unexpected issues to be raised?

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Baccarini, D 1999, ‘The Logical Framework for Defining Project Success’, Project
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Boddie, J 1987, ‘The Project Post-Mortem’, Computerworld, 21(49), p. 77-82.
Clegg, C et al 1997, ‘Information Technology: A study of performance and the
role of human and organizational factors’, Ergonomics, 40(9), p. 851-871.
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Cooke-Davies, T 2002, ‘The "Real" Success Factors on Projects’, International
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Currie, W. and B. Galliers eds. 1999, Rethinking Management Information Systems,
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de Wit, A 1985, ‘Measurement of Project Success’, International Journal of Project
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Delone, W.H. and E.R. McLean, 2003, ‘The Delone and McLean Model of
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Dvir, D. and T. Lechler, 2004, ‘Plans are Nothing, Changing Plans is Everything:
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Gillies, C and M Broadbent eds. 2005, IT Governance: A Practical Guide for
Company Directors and Corporate Executives, CPA Australia.
Grindley, K 1995, Managing IT at Board Level: The hidden agenda exposed, 2nd
edition, London, Pitman.
Grover, V and WJ Kettinger 2000, ‘Business Process Change: A reflective view
of theory, practice, and implications’, in Framing the Domains of IT Management:
Projecting the Future Through the Past, RW Zmud (ed.), Pinnaflex Educational
Resources, Cincinnati, Ohio,. pp 147-172, 433-435.

43
 Improving Implementation

Hilmer, FG 1993, Strictly Boardroom: Improving governance to enhance company

performance, The Business Library, Melbourne.
KPMG 2005, Global IT Project Management Survey: How committed are you?,
KPMG.
Leblanc, R and J Gillies 2005, Inside the Boardroom: The coming revolution in
corporate governance, John Wiley and Sons, Toronto.
Lucas, HC 1975, Why Information Systems Fail, Columbia University Press, New
York.
Markus, LM 2000, ‘Toward an integrated theory of IT related risk control in
IFIP TC8 WG8.2’, International Working Conference on the Social and
Organizational Perspective on Research and Practice in Information Technology,
Kluwer Aalborg, Denmark.
Markus, LM 1996, ‘Change Agentry - The next IS frontier’, MIS Quarterly, Dec.,
p. 385-407.
Markus, LM 1983, ‘Power, Politics, and MIS Implementation’, Communications
of the ACM, 28(6), p 430-444.
Markus, ML et al 2000, ‘Learning from Adopters' Experience with ERP: Problems
encountered and success achieved’, Journal of Information Technology, 15, p.
245-265.
McGolpin, P and J Ward 1997, ‘Factors Influencing the Success of Strategic
Information Systems’, in Information Systems: an emerging discipline?, J Mingers
and F Stowell (Eds.), McGraw-Hill: London. p. 287-327.
Near, JP and MP Miceli 1995, ‘Effective Whistle-Blowing’, Academy of
Management Review, 20(3), p. 679-707.
Nikander, IO and E Eloranta 2001, ‘Project Management by Early Warnings’,
International Journal of Project Management, 19, p. 385-399.
Reich, BH and I Benbasat 1990, ‘An Empirical Investigation of Factors Influencing
the Success of Customer-Oriented Strategic Systems’, Information Systems
Research, 1(3), p 325-347.
Sharma, R and P Yetton 2003, ‘The Contingent Effects of Management Support
and Task Interdependence on Successful Information Systems Implementation’,
MIS Quarterly, 27(4), p 533-555.
Smith, HJ and M Keil 2003, ‘The Reluctance to Report Bad News on Troubled
Software Projects: A theoretical model’, Information Systems Journal, 13(1), p.
69-95.
Soh, C and ML Markus1995, ‘How IT Creates Business Value: A Process Theory
Synthesis’, in the Sixteenth International Conference on Information Systems.
Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
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 How Boards and Senior Managers Have Governed

Standards Association of Australia 2005, AS8015, Corporate Governance of

Information and Communication Technology, Sydney.
Standards Association of Australia (forthcoming), HB 280, Case Studies - How
boards and senior management have governed ICT projects to succeed (or fail), R
Young, (ed.), Sydney.
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Governance Principles, Sydney.
Thomsett, R 1989, Third Wave Project Management, Prentice-Hall, Englewood
Cliffs.
Yardley, D 2002, Successful IT Project Delivery: Learning the lessons of project
failure, Addison-Wesley, London.
Young, R and E Jordan 2005, ‘The Implications of Australian ICT Governance
Standards for COBIT’, in 2005 IT Governance International Conference, Auckland,
New Zealand.
Young, R 2005, ‘Case 2005-2: How Projects Fail "Successfully"’, Macquarie
Graduate School of Management, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.
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Governance’, in MGSM, Macquarie University, Sydney.
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Change, Sydney, Pearson Publishing Service.

45
5. Overcoming the ‘White Elephant’
Syndrome in Big and Iconic Projects in
the Public and Private Sectors
Scott Prasser, Faculty of Business, University of Sunshine
Coast

Introduction
This chapter1 analyses ‘big,’ ‘iconic’ or ‘mega’ projects and their impact on
effective project management and also on the effective allocation of funds for
priority infrastructure. It is argued that part of the problem of Australia’s
perceived present infrastructure shortfall is not just the lack of spending on
infrastructure as many suggest. Rather, it is as much about the misallocation of
spending on ‘big’ and so called ‘iconic’ or prestige projects that too often become
expensive ‘white elephants’ requiring considerable post-completion maintenance
and support and further wasting valuable resources that could be used elsewhere.
Such projects, because of their status, size, and complexity too often disrupt
effective project management practices in their original scoping, assessment and
implementation and fail to have clear purposes or functions.
This is not a project management or even an infrastructure problem confined to
Australia. Concerns about misallocation of funding of big, mega or iconic
infrastructure type projects have been observed elsewhere. Flyvbjerg (2003: 3,
9) in his overview of ‘megaprojects’ around the world noted:
At the same time as many more and much larger infrastructure projects
are being proposed and built around the world, it is becoming clear that
many such projects have strikingly poor performance records in terms
of economy, environment and public support. Cost overruns and lower
than predicted revenues frequently place project viability at risk and
redefine projects that were initially promoted as effective vehicles to
economic growth as possible obstacles to such growth ... Megaprojects
are becoming highly public and intensely politicised ventures ...
Indeed, despite all the techniques now available in project management what is
striking, as the Economist (2005) recently lamented, was the large proportion of
major projects across both the public and private sectors that failed to deliver
on time and within budget. The problems that the Australian based firm,
Multiplex is having with the Wembley Stadium project in the United Kingdom

47
 Improving Implementation

is a further recent example of poor project management (Australian Broadcasting

Corporation 2006a).

Australian Infrastructure Spending and Misallocation: So

What’s the Problem?
In Australia, many commentators and interest groups argue that there is an
infrastructure-spending shortfall. Declining infrastructure spending give some
credence to this view. In 1969, 8 per cent of Australian GDP went on
infrastructure. By 1975 this had fallen marginally to 7.2 per cent. In 1989 it was
5.5 per cent and down to only 3.6 per cent of GDP five years later (2004). While
some blame the Whitlam Labor Government’s (1972-75) changed expenditure
priorities from infrastructure to welfare services it has been a pattern that was
not reversed by subsequent federal governments (EPAC 1985; EPAC 1990).
Others contend that the problem has been exacerbated by the drive for
governments to run ‘balanced’ budgets, to accrue surpluses and meet the
demands of external credit rating agencies than the real needs of their respective
communities (Anderson 2006; Allen Consulting 2003).
A similar decline in infrastructure spending is evident across the states. In New
South Wales the public transport crisis has been blamed on low state
infrastructure spending. Queensland has seen infrastructure spending as a
proportion of Gross State Product fall from 5.4 per cent in 2000 to 4.2 pr cent
in 2003 (see also Allen Consulting 2003). Given that Queensland is responsible
for key Australian exports like coal that rely on the provision of extensive
infrastructure then any shortfall in this area has the potential to adversely affect
Australia’s overall economic growth. Reports recently commissioned by the
Queensland Government have also highlighted inadequate spending on
refurbishing energy infrastructure.
Concerns about infrastructure spending have prompted calls from the federal
Opposition (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2005), the business sector and
other interest groups for an infrastructure summit (Taylor 2005), special
infrastructure councils between business and government and increased
spending. Partly in response to these demands the Howard Government in March
2005 appointed the Taskforce on Export Infrastructure, headed by Henry Ergas,
to assess the issue.
While much of the debate has been about the amount being spent on
infrastructure, some have suggested that the problem, especially for the public
sector, is more about the need for better targeting and priority setting. Reluctance
to accept this view is understandable. It is easier to increase spending than to
make choices. It is easier to satisfy everyone by spending more than to disappoint
some and set priorities. It is also easier to take broad strategies than to try to set
long term goals and stick to them. Such strategic activities are inimical to

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 Overcoming the ‘White Elephant’ Syndrome in Big and Iconic Projects in the Public and Private Sectors

government and interest groups. As commentator Alan Wood (2004) summed

up the issue thus:
The lack of cost-benefit analysis means a significant amount of the money
spent on infrastructure has been wasted … But establishing whether
there is in fact a critical shortage of national infrastructure is impossible
to achieve with any degree of accuracy.

Obsession with ‘Big’, ‘Iconic,’ and ‘White Elephant’ Projects

One of the underlying problems of why funds are misallocated is that
governments, and, sometimes even the private sector, have sought to develop,
‘big’, ‘iconic,’ ‘landmark’ or ‘signature’ projects. These projects are characterised
by their large physical size (buildings), extent (e.g. events like Olympic or
Commonwealth games), costs, and alleged ‘iconic,’ prestige and symbolic value.
Such projects are often linked to the use of technology in their construction,
appearance or operations, that too often becomes an end in itself (Scott 1992).
The issue, concluded Flyvbjerg (2003: 6) is that ‘more and more megaprojects
are built despite the poor performance record of many projects’. There is a long
record of these project management failures (see Hall 1968 for some earlier
examples).
The most notable example of an ‘iconic’ project is the $400 million Guggenheim
Art Gallery in Bilbao in northern Spain. Its aim was to help revive a depressed
area by being an ‘attraction’ in its own right because of its size and stunning
building design rather than because of the quality of the art gallery it was built
ostensibly to house. Form dominated function. Although its wider regional
economic benefits have been less than expected (tourists fly in and fly out rather
than stay), many have sought to emulate the ‘Bilbao’ effect with each new
construction more expensive than the one before, but often having only limited
success. In Australia the Geelong City Council tried vainly to attract the
Guggenheim to duplicate the Bilbao project, while in 2000 the Queensland
Government established a taskforce to examine the possibility of developing a
‘Landmark Building’ in Brisbane. One architect described this obsession with
‘big’ projects by governments as ‘monumental madness’ (Hall 2001).
Enthusiasm for ‘big’ iconic projects also pervades the event attraction industry
with nations, states and regions often competing for major events like the
Olympic or Commonwealth games, and Formula One car racing to surf life saving
carnivals. However, the stated economic benefits of events have often been
contested.
At a regional level this is most explicitly seen in tourism based projects that
ostensibly act as destination attractions to boost economic growth (e.g. South
Australian Wine Centre, Queensland’s Stockman’s Hall of Fame), have been
built.

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 Improving Implementation

The problem with many of these ‘big’ or ‘iconic’ projects is that they are
frequently undertaken more for reasons of prestige (personal, governmental,
organisational) than for reasons of function. Broad, ill defined ‘public’ benefits
are usually stressed in relation to these projects rather than any quantifiable
economic positives. Recent comments by the organisers of the 2006 Melbourne
Commonwealth Games in the light of its less than expected economic impacts
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2006b) highlights this sort of justification.
The emphasis was on the ‘profile’ the Commonwealth Games gave to Victoria
and, Australia, than its tangible economic benefits. Similar justifications have
been offered for numerous projects across Australia ranging from Queensland’s
Suncorp Football Stadium (a world class sporting facility), and the Adelaide-Alice
Springs train-link (a symbolic linking across Australia, see Brockman 2005).
Even scientific projects like the synchrotron project that Victoria snatched
(thankfully) from Queensland in 2000 (Baker 2003) have stressed the broader
scientific capacities of such a facility than its direct economic benefits.

‘White Elephant’ Projects

Many of these ‘big,’ ‘iconic’ projects too frequently degenerate into what has
been described as ‘white elephant’ projects (Scott 1992). ‘White elephant’ projects
are not only often large and expensive to build and take longer than originally
estimated, but also form and ‘prestige’ so dominate over function that the project
never performs satisfactorily either in terms of stated role, unclear as it is often
is, or financially. Moreover, what really make these projects ‘white elephants’
is that they become expensive to maintain because of poor design, confused role
and lack of what may be best described as a ‘business case’ for their very
initiation. These problems are most explicitly seen in those projects in the arts
such as art galleries and museums where even in the best of circumstances
purpose is often ill-defined and clear criteria for success, difficult to articulate.
Such buildings are characterised by a failure to meet anticipated attendance
levels and frequently need repeated and expensive refurbishments that often
cost more than their original construction. Scott (1992) reminds us of ‘white
elephant’ projects covering many other areas ranging from technology parks,
very fast train proposals, spaceports, to the famed multifunction polis.
Of course, ‘white elephant’ projects are not limited to the public sector. Examples
in the tourism industry include the construction by various entrepreneurs during
the late 1980s and early 1990s of numerous ‘prestige’ and ‘iconic’ resorts up and
down the Queensland coast. Most ran at a huge losses and were usually on-sold
several times at a fraction of their original development costs. Indeed, many of
these resorts today, although apparently viable, are only profitable in terms of
their operating, rather than full capital costs (Syvret and Syvret 1996) and have
become viable by considerable changes in their scope and range of activities.
Development of strata title units for on-selling has been one strategy used for

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 Overcoming the ‘White Elephant’ Syndrome in Big and Iconic Projects in the Public and Private Sectors

these tourism developments. So numerous are ‘white elephant’ projects that one
commentator suggested they were not limited to one off examples, but had
become a ‘herd’ that pervaded the Australian landscape too frequently (Scott
1992).

Problems of ‘Big,’ ‘White Elephant’ Projects and Project

Management
The important feature of these ‘big’ of ‘iconic’ projects is that many of the key
elements of good project management are downgraded, distorted or ignored.
These problems include:
• Goals both at the beginning, during and after the project remain unclear and
are dominated by post-project justification;
• Overt and covert political goals and political interference in setting the
project goals;
• Limited initial or independent evaluation of the project’s viability so that
expectations are exaggerated, over optimistic, or unspecified;
• Often supply rather than demand driven – the we can build it rather than
we need it, often expressed in the ‘build it and they will come syndrome,’;
• Poor risk analysis;
• Suffer from the ‘sunk costs’ mentality whereby even if project value is
correctly challenged, the project is continued because of previous investments
(financial, personal and political);
• Changing specifications during the project implementation phase;
• Budgets are poorly developed and expansive;
• Timeframes are compressed, uncertain, or established to meet election cycles,
with little accompanying consultation with relevant stakeholders;
• Poor project governance with little separation between project management
and project client resulting in excessive interference in both design, budgets,
and management;
• Long lead times so that their full impacts (and costs) are not appreciated till
project is nearly or fully completed and frequent changing goals;

Examples of Australian ‘White Elephants’

A number of projects undertaken in Australia have highlighted the problems
of ‘big’, ‘white elephant’, and ‘iconic’ projects.

The Port Adelaide (SA) Flower farm

The Port Adelaide Flower Farm (PAFF) project illustrates very clearly deficiencies
in project conception and definition.
On August 1988, the South Australian Minister of Local Government approved
the development by the Port Adelaide Council of a farm on the LeFevre Peninsula

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 Improving Implementation

for the growing of native plants. The project became known as the ‘Port Adelaide
Flower Farm’. Work started in September 1988 but, after continual financial
losses in operation, the farm closed on 3 August 1995.
PAFF would have created much needed employment in the Port Adelaide area
at a time of significant economic recession. The aim was to successfully grow,
harvest and export Kangaroo Paw and Geraldton Wax flowers to Japan and
Europe with prospects of extending to the North American market (South
Australia 1997). The demise of the project after such a short time was a waste of
public money and resources.
PAFF provides important lessons, particularly for local government, including:
• PAFF was not only a new venture, but it was a new venture in a fledgling
industry. At the time, ‘no one had any long experience’ in the growing of
Australian native plants for the international cut flower trade (South Australia
1997). More importantly, this was not made clear in the project Business
Plan. The lesson is that government is not the appropriate vehicle for taking
such economic and technical risks, particularly with totally inadequate
research and planning;
• The Business Plan as presented to the Port Adelaide Council was deficient
in a number of areas. Financial projections were overly optimistic, significant
technical issues relating to the varieties of plants to be grown were not
addressed, the marketing plan was extremely ambitious and based on dubious
information and the risks associated with the flood-prone location for the
farm were not identified;
• The Business Plan set out a number of ‘wider social, economic and
environmental objectives for the project,’ but did not relate these to the
critical success factor – that the flower farm had to be commercially viable
for the project to achieve its objectives;
• Key project sponsors, that is councillors who were in office at the time, were
advised by consultants and council officers that the project would be
profitable and provide benefits to ratepayers and other key stakeholders.
They were not adequately briefed as to the significant risks associated with
the PAFF project. Failure to adequately assess project risks is a common
theme in the audit reports on public projects.
A key lesson from PAFF concerns the identification of a clear business need to
underpin public projects. In the mid to late-1980s councils were being encouraged
to be more entrepreneurial and to become less reliant on revenue from ratepayers
and government funding. While this may explain to some degree the willingness
of the Port Adelaide Council to embark on PAFF it does not justify undertaking
such a high-risk venture with totally inadequate research and planning.

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 Overcoming the ‘White Elephant’ Syndrome in Big and Iconic Projects in the Public and Private Sectors

Magnesium ‘Light Metals’ Project (Queensland)

For some time a light metals industry was mooted based in Rockhampton.2 It
was to produce magnesium for use in the car industry. However, no commercial
backer came forth. Nevertheless, the Queensland Department of State
Development pursued the project, despite advice from a major industry partner
of the project’s lack of long term viability, and even internal departmental
assessment that questioned many of the basis of many of the project’s underlying
assumptions. This critical view was echoed even more strongly by Treasury
assessment. In addition to these economic issues, there were technical concerns.
For instance, the technology for the production processes was not satisfactorily
resolved even as government funds started to be allocated to the project.
Nevertheless, both the Queensland and federal governments provided over
$300m worth of funding, though this was still not enough to attract major
commercial interest. The Queensland Government subsequently developed a
scheme to attract small investor support. Sadly, the project then collapsed with
reputed losses of $450m that has been borne by the two governments and small
investors (Cunningham 2006). Ultimately, it appears the project has cost taxpayers
alone $240m (Fraser 2004).
The magnesium project reflected all the aforementioned problems of poor project
management. It also highlighted what happens when projects are hijacked for
‘political’ purposes to meet electoral timeframes and how the lack of transparency
concerning advice, clothed as it was in the cloak of ‘commercial in confidence’
arrangements (de Maria 2002) in a public service, in this case the industry
department, lacking independence and too eager to please the government rather
than analyse.

National Wine Centre, Adelaide

The National Wine Centre in Adelaide was conceived and built for the purpose
of focusing national and international attention on the Australian wine industry
and South Australia as a principal wine-growing and wine-making state
(DiGirolamo and Plane, 2002). The business need as set out in the National Wine
Centre Act 1997 (SA), stated that the purpose of the centre was to conduct a
range of functions, ‘including the promotion and development of the Australian
wine industry and the management of a wine exhibition (South Australia 2002).
Under the Act a board of directors was established to control and direct the
centre with the board responsible to the appropriate Minister.
Construction of the National Wine Centre in Adelaide was problematical enough
with cost overruns and time delays, but those difficulties were overshadowed
by the crippling losses that the Centre made on operations subsequent to its
opening for business in early October 2001. Reports suggested that the centre
was costing South Australian taxpayers $50,000 per week, despite major cost

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 Improving Implementation

cutting measures (The Australian, 2 October 2002). The South Australian

Treasurer, Kevin Foley described it as the ‘cash-burning’ National Wine Centre.
The original business need for the National Wine Centre could be questioned.
Less than two years after its opening under State government ownership,
operation of the debt-ridden facility was handed over to the Winemakers’
Federation of Australia. Eventually, on 1 July 2003, it was taken over by the
University of Adelaide for $1 million on a 40 year lease.
This project highlights the issue that public ‘icon’ projects are frequently
launched without an adequately identified business need. In fact, unlike
private-sector projects, taxpayer funded projects are frequently conceived and
defined to meet a political need or justification while the business need is cobbled
together to ‘legitimise’ the expenditure of significant public funds. This is not
to say that a political need is not legitimate, but the ‘what?’ and ‘why?’ questions
must be clearly stated and agreed by all stakeholders if large, complex projects
are to have any chance of proceeding successfully.

Hindmarsh Soccer Stadium Redevelopment Project (South

Australia)
The Hindmarsh Soccer Stadium Redevelopment Project (HSSR) provides another
important example of the dangers of inadequately defining the business need
of a large public project. In February 1994, the South Australian Soccer Federation
proposed to the South Australian Government that Hindmarsh Soccer Stadium
be upgraded to a 22,000 seat facility at an estimated cost of $22.5 million. The
redevelopment received bi-partisan support (SA Auditor-General 2001).
From December 1995, under the sponsorship of the new Minister for Recreation,
Sport and Racing, the scope of the project was increased. In the opinion of the
South Australian Auditor-General (SA Auditor-General 2001: 3) ‘that increase
was pursued without proper or adequate due diligence’. In June 2001, the total
cost of the redevelopment of the stadium was $41 million.
The business need identified for the redevelopment of the Hindmarsh Stadium
was to secure the staging of preliminary matches in the 2000 Sydney Olympic
Games. No alternative to the upgrading proposal ‘was given serious
consideration’.
The subsequent controversy over this project damaged the already embattled
Liberal government of South Australia. The difficulty for the government was
in providing sufficient justification for the escalation in the scope of the project.
True, South Australia acquired a soccer stadium of international standard (with
seating capacity for 15,000 spectators) and seven Olympic soccer matches were
played there in September 2000. From then on, however, Hindmarsh Stadium
was used for a limited number of National Soccer League (NSL) and other soccer
matches and trials with an average attendance of less than 3,700 spectators (SA
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 Overcoming the ‘White Elephant’ Syndrome in Big and Iconic Projects in the Public and Private Sectors

Auditor-General 2001: 10). Premier and State League finals attracted over 1,000
spectators with other events not achieving this level. Attendance has not
exceeded 5,500 and income generated by ticket sales has been far less than
required.
The South Australian Auditor-General (2001: 10) concluded that, ‘In economic
and financial terms, there is a very strong basis for concluding that the
Hindmarsh Soccer Stadium Redevelopment Project was not cost-effective’. The
political damage that was caused to the government and the relevant ministers
was severe. The apparent waste of taxpayers' funds was also significant and
increasingly apparent to the general public. So what went wrong?
First, the government committed to the expenditure of substantial sums of public
funds without adequate justification (business need). In fact, the Auditor-General
could not find that either the Sydney Olympics organisers (SOCOG), or South
Australian soccer officials had insisted on the redevelopment of the stadium in
the first place. The business need was never clear and the decision to proceed
was taken entirely by Cabinet on the recommendations of the relevant ministers.
Second, project management controls existed but were repeatedly ignored (SA
Auditor-General 2001: 11). The controls ignored included:
• inadequate feasibility study or cost/benefit analysis was undertaken;
• cabinet submissions recommending major contract and financial commitments
were ‘inaccurate and incomplete in material aspects’;
• an alternative to redeveloping Hindmarsh Stadium was not adequately
considered;
• Treasury instructions on project management were disregarded;
• FIFA and SOCOG requirements were inadequately defined. As a result, the
required minimum pitch size was compromised to provide for corporate
boxes and other non-essentials; and
• ownership and management issues were not resolved before the project
commenced.
The main lesson from this case was that proven project management practices
should have been followed to avoid fundamental mistakes. There was ample
evidence of previous bungled projects, but that experience was ignored. There
appears to have been a strong element of groupthink in the South Australian
government’s management of the Hindmarsh Stadium project. Once work started,
error piled on error, despite the then government being in considerable political
difficulty. Unacceptable risk was built into the project from the start, but the
government apparently failed to identify and analyse the risks and to manage
them effectively.

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 Improving Implementation

The Millennium Train Project (New South Wales)

The Millennium Train project was initiated on 8 October 1998 when the New
South Wales State Rail Authority signed a contract for the design, construction
and in-service management of 81 new suburban double-deck electric passenger
trains. These became known as the Millennium Train.
While the New South Wales Auditor-General (2003) found that the train
represented value for money, the project came in well beyond schedule and
considerably over budget. As at June 2003:
• capital costs had increased by $114 million or 24 per cent to $588 million;
and
• total project costs had increased by $98.4 million or 17per cent to $658
million.
The Millennium Train project highlights issues concerned with technically
complex and innovative public projects. Risk management is an essential element
of such projects, particularly where the number of suitable suppliers or
contractors is limited. This inevitably places the client (government) in a
relatively weaker bargaining position and the supplier in an almost monopolistic
position (New South Wales Auditor-General 2003).
The risks of achieving contract delivery requirements in the Millennium Train
project were significant but the New South Wales State Rail Authority and the
Minister for Transport were not provided with a risk management plan for the
Millennium Train. With an aggressive delivery schedule (prompted by
government election commitments to meet public transport service goals) the
risk was borne disproportionately by the client. As the New South Wales
Auditor-General (2003: 5) rightly pointed out:
… because governments cannot readily walk away from such projects,
even if difficulties arise, they necessarily carry significant risk for such
projects. Contract provisions designed to share risk with private sector
providers thus need to be robust and enforceable should the need arise.
An essential requirement in this type of project is that government contracting
authorities must be both competent and experienced. Private sector suppliers
in this type of project are commonly blessed with long-serving project managers
and contract administrators. Government managers and staff, on the other hand,
frequently occupy their positions for a relatively short period of time and may
lack the longevity and experience of their private-sector counterparts with
whom they must conduct complex project negotiations involving very significant
sums. The New South Wales Auditor-General (2003: 5) stated that:

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 Overcoming the ‘White Elephant’ Syndrome in Big and Iconic Projects in the Public and Private Sectors

… the restructure of the New South Wales rail authorities in 1996 and
a disruptive purchase environment at State Rail had some effect on the
Millennium Train project.
The lesson is that risk management plans must be adequate to protect the public
interest. Considerable information on public project management exists in a
variety of sources and governments should share expertise and experiences to
offset the disadvantage of public-sector employment policies and practices.

Melbourne’s Federation Square Project

Federation Square is situated at the corner of Flinders and Swanston Streets,
Melbourne. A major ‘icon’ project, the objective was to redevelop the site of the
old Gas and Fuel Corporation building to provide a range of recreational,
commercial, cultural and communication facilities. Project performance was
anything but satisfactory. The Square was opened in October 2002, two years
behind schedule but with all construction still not complete (Vic Auditor-General
2003). From an original estimate of $110 million when the Square was conceived
in 1996, the estimated cost rose to approximately $395 million by June 2002 and
by May 2003 had risen to $473 million, with work still required for completion.
The Federation Square project had major ’icon’ implications and was high profile,
located as it is at a major inner-city intersection. Accordingly, any difficulties
with the project were bound to become very public and reflect on the project
sponsors, the Victorian State Government. The project had its fair share of
difficulties including the other original joint venture partner, the City of
Melbourne, withdrawing and a requirement to change the status of a function
centre from privately to publicly-funded.
In his Report on Public Sector Agencies for June 2002, the Victorian
Auditor-General (2002: 4.21) reported that:
Two of the key drivers of cost increases included the adoption of a ‘fast
track’ approach to construction, whereby construction moved ahead of
the detailed design work, and the adoption of a complex and unique
architectural design.
These issues echo the experiences in the Sydney Opera House project almost 40
years before and yet they still bedevil public projects today. Significant risk
was obvious from the start of the Federation Square project, but risk management
still appears to have fallen far short of the standard required.
The Auditor-General reported in May 2003 (Vic 2003: 2.236) that the Federation
Square Management Pty Ltd’s ‘quantity surveyors’ have progressively identified
a number of major risks that could impact adversely on the latest estimated
completion cost of the Square. These risks, which represent ongoing project

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 Improving Implementation

management challenges for the company, involve the potential for higher costs
arising from:
• cost variations associated with incomplete documentation;
• trade contract disruption and delay claims;
• managing contractor cost increases (due to further project delays);
• tenancy fit-out costs borne by the project;
• consultants’ fees and management delivery expenses;
• unplanned prolongation to completion of outstanding works leading to
additional costs for the project;
• latent design defects;
• operator initiated changes (post-completion);
• poor or uncoordinated workmanship; and
• failure to secure full reimbursement for costs of works undertaken on behalf
of major tenants.
The main lesson from Federation Square is that project definition and planning
processes must be improved, particularly for large-scale, complex ‘icon’ projects.
Prestige projects such as Federation Square have the capacity to create lingering
major controversy and to become a sinkhole for taxpayers' funds and maybe the
government of the day.

Parallels with Overseas Experience: The Holyrood Building

Project, Scotland
There are certain similarities between the Federation Square project and the
construction of the new Scottish Parliament House (the Holyrood Project).
Holyrood was an extremely difficult and complex project. The Auditor-General
of Scotland (2004: 8) commented that, ‘in the recent history of Scotland there
has not been a public building project as complex or as difficult to deliver as
the Holyrood project’.
In 1998, the client (the Scottish Parliament Corporate Body) required the new
parliament house to be built by mid-2001. In fact it was not completed until 20
months after that date while cost more than doubled from £195 million in
September 2000 to £431 million in February 2004. There is no doubt that the
resulting building is an outstanding facility and an ‘icon’ for the Scotland’s new
found independence, but the excessive cost could have been reduced by better
project management practices.
The Holyrood project was faced with a very tight and far too ambitious
construction program. The use of the ‘construction management’ method of
procurement and contracting was identified as the main reason for the significant
cost increases. In construction management the design is incomplete and
uncertain when construction starts, whereas in normal construction contracting
most of the costs are determined at the time when the contract is awarded. In
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 Overcoming the ‘White Elephant’ Syndrome in Big and Iconic Projects in the Public and Private Sectors

the Holyrood project, the Auditor-General (2004: 6) identified that, ‘design

development became a process of costing a developing design rather than
developing the design within a cost limit’. Given the high degree of uncertainty
and complexity associated with the various work packages, there was significant
risk. The method of contracting placed most of the burden for risk on the client
and not the contractors, and also left open the opportunity for contractors to
claim additional payment for time-related cost increases.
One of the main criticisms made by the Auditor-General of Scotland was in
regards to project management and control of the Holyrood Project. Leadership
and control of the project was apparently not clearly established (2004: 7). The
Project Manager (or project director) was the Chief Executive of Parliament who
should have been assigned clear responsibility for making decisions about
balancing time, quality (performance) and cost. The Auditor-General stated that
the client (in effect the Parliament) did not give the project director the
responsibility for managing the project. The report states, ‘in the Holyrood
project there was no single point of leadership and control’ (2004: 7). As a result,
the parties to the project could not agree on a cost plan and, when a draft plan
was prepared in late 2000, ‘it was an indicator of the costs rather than a reliable
estimate of the costs’.
The Scottish Auditor-General’s report identified a number of important lessons
for management of public-sector projects.
First, the form of contracting adopted should place the risk on those best able
to manage it. Using construction management methods the risks stay with the
client and not the contractors. In public ‘icon’ projects, the temptation exists to
err on the side of performance (including prestige and appearance) rather than
on cost and time. Consequently, public project sponsors should ensure that
appropriate measures including adequate safeguards are put in place to ensure
that construction costs do not ‘run away’ on technically complex projects.
Second, there is a need to ‘scrutinise the business need for a project at key stages
in its life-cycle, before key contracts are awarded, to provide assurance that it
can progress successfully to the next stage’ (2004: 8). In project management
this can be achieved by establishing key milestones or decision review points
where ‘go/no go’ decisions can be assessed and made.
Third, the Auditor-General of Scotland (2004: 9) recommended that, ‘In all
projects, care should be taken to put in place a payment regime that provides
incentives to contractors to perform against clear targets for quality, time and
cost’. In ‘icon’ projects this is especially relevant, as the practice has often been
to chase quality, prestige and performance, by committing funds well over initial
cost estimates.

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Fourth, there should be a clear distinction between the project sponsor and the
project director. This is particularly important where governments are concerned
as the political need is so inextricably linked with the business need. If big
projects are to be effectively and efficiently managed, there must be a clear
separation between project sponsorship and project direction or management.
There should be a single point of leadership and control for a project.
Fifth, to ensure that time, cost and performance targets are met, there should be
agreed project budgets, timetables and specifications. Key performance indicators
that can be used throughout the project to measure performance should support
these.
Last, the Auditor-General (2004: 9) emphasised the importance of adequate
project planning, particularly in projects where there is significant complexity
or technical risk, or when there is a tight schedule for completion. There may
be some political cost in establishing more realistic time frames for big projects,
but these costs are preferable to the death of a thousand cuts situation
experienced by governments as scandal-ridden projects struggle to completion.

The Project Performance Paradox

These cases highlight the very real problems of effective project management
in relation to particular types of projects. The paradox is that, despite long
experience in public projects, governments (and many private sector firms)
repeatedly make the same mistakes.
Why are the lessons of the past apparently not learned and applied in big
projects? One a New South Wales may be the ‘phenomenon of institutional
amnesia’ (Pollitt 2000: 5). Seeking to explain ‘the declining ability – and
willingness – of public sector institutions in many countries to access and make
use of possibly relevant past experiences,’ Pollitt offers the following causes:
• Constant restructuring of departments and institutions. As governments
and/or chief executives change, each one seeks to put their signature on the
administration (the ‘new broom’), frequently through the vehicle of
organisational change. One of the adverse effects of this is that organisations
and key people lose touch with experience and/or records that contain
important lessons.
• Changes in the form of record keeping, from one media to another, or to a
new and different operating system or software, may mean that important
information on lessons learned is lost or the location of the information is
forgotten;
• The decline of the concept of public service as a permanent career (to which
could be added the increasing politicisation of the public service). Thus
important project decisions may be made by managers with little or no
experience of past debacles and little interest in longer-term perspectives.

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 Overcoming the ‘White Elephant’ Syndrome in Big and Iconic Projects in the Public and Private Sectors

• The embrace of ‘unceasing, radical change’, with its attendant dismissal of

the past and primary focus on the future.

Lessons for Project Management: Let’s Not Do it!

There are some important lessons in the history of big projects in Australia and
overseas.
First, in the conceptual phase of the project it is essential to establish and agree
the business need among all stakeholders. Failure to agree and accept the business
need is at the root of many poorly performed public projects. The business need
should be clearly distinguished from the political need (where appropriate) and
offered to stakeholders to obtain consensus before any planning is commenced.
Where a strong business need cannot be established and agreed, decision-makers
would be well advised to resist the temptation to proceed, but to seek
alternatives. A valid alternative is always to do nothing. If only the Queensland
Government had not persisted with the magnesium project despite the lack of
commercial partnerships, then the taxpayer would not have seen several hundred
million dollars wasted and small investors would not have lost considerable
funds they had so hopefully invested in a project seemingly guaranteed by
government.
Second, in setting up a project management structure, there should be a clear
separation between the project sponsor (often individual politicians or the
government of the day) and the project director/manager. The project sponsor’s
role is to provide political and other support to the project management
organisation, not to manage the project. The project sponsor should prepare a
project charter or directive and, in it, assign specific responsibility to the project
director for decisions on cost, time and performance. The Hindmarsh Soccer
Stadium Redevelopment Project provides clear evidence of the problems when
this distinction between project sponsorship and management is blurred.
Third, there should be increased emphasis on project definition and planning
to ensure that adequate consideration is given to how the project objectives can
best be achieved. The temptation to plan on the basis of ‘ready, fire, aim’ should
be avoided. Additional time spent in planning may not satisfy the need to appear
to be doing something, but it can provide an opportunity to consider how best
to award contracts, how to deal with complex, technically demanding projects
and how to identify, assess and manage risk. The Federation Square project
could have benefited from these basic guidelines.
Last, there should be an improvement in the procedures for identifying, assessing
and managing risk in big projects. A common thread of numerous adverse reports
by the respective auditors-general is inadequate risk management. Measures for
avoiding political embarrassment, an area where the public sector frequently
outperforms the private sector, are an inadequate replacement for disciplined

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project risk management techniques. There needs to be more realistic assessment

of the risks involved in big projects, not least because the costs of doing otherwise
are so great. The Adelaide Port Flower Farm highlights the need for this risk
analysis.

Some Reforms
All these issues highlights the need for some fresh thinking about the way new
major project proposals are assessed so that they do not turn into ‘white
elephants’. Flyvbjerg et al (2003: 7) concluded in their international survey of
poor megaproject management that:
… good decisions making is a question not only of better and more
rational information and communication, but also of institutional
arrangements that promote accountability … We see accountability as
being a question not just about periodic elections, but also about a
continuing dialogue between civil society and policy makers and about
institutions holding each other accountable through appropriate checks
and balances.
It seems that existing processes and institutions and now accepted norms in
public sector management are no longer adequate in ensuring effective project
management of major public infrastructure. Auditor general reports, as
highlighted in this chapter, do provide useful insights into what went wrong.
However, these evaluations are necessarily after the event. Nor can exhorting
elected officials to act in the public interest be effective. Such exhortations are
like asking children put in charge of a sweet shop not to eat the merchandise!
Treasuries certainly have the capacity to do the analysis, but treasuries are part
of the bureaucracy and face all the limitations that this imposes as has been
discussed above. As Ian Lowe (1992:142) suggested:
The crucial lesson to be learned (from white elephant projects) … is that
we ought to be able to do a better job of foreseeing problems. The need
is for improved foresight: an enhanced ability to analyse the future
impacts of our decisions and actions.
Others too, have stressed the need for improved long term policy development
processes in Australia, but these suggestions have focussed on the broader policy
framework (Marsh and Yencken 2004). The need, it seems, is to provide some
brake of the ‘Let’s do it’ approach in project initiation which while possibly
acceptable for entrepreneurs like Richard Branson of Virgin Airlines fame, are
so patently unsuitable for major long term public sector projects, and one suspects
most private sector ones.
While Lowe stresses the need to challenge some of the underlying rationale of
many projects such as the obsession with growth and faith in technology, what

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 Overcoming the ‘White Elephant’ Syndrome in Big and Iconic Projects in the Public and Private Sectors

is also needed is some institutional renovation to better manage infrastructure

issues in general. This is especially needed at the state level where many
infrastructure decisions are made. Also, at the state level there are fewer and
less transparent processes of decision making, accountability and advice giving
than nationally.
Indeed, in many ways the problems in effective project management now so
evident in the public sector are similar to those that surrounded industry
assistance at the beginning of the 1970s. In those times there was a lack of any
real independent and public evaluation process of what industry assistance was
really costing the Australian public both directly in the form of subsidies and
indirectly in terms of extra costs to consume certain products. The solution was
the establishment in 1973 by the Whitlam Labor Government of the expert
based, independent Industries Assistance Commission (IAC), which has now
become the Productivity Commission Notwithstanding the potential narrowness
of IAC’s economic analysis, it gave the Australian public some insight into the
real costs of assistance across both the manufacturing and agricultural sectors
through a very public and consultative process (Rattigan 1986; Warhurst 1982).
John Howard (1976:12), when Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs in
the Fraser Government summed up the rationale for the IAC:
Most economic issues involve some kind of dilemma, some kind of
striking a balance and that is one of the reasons why it is important as
part of the process of arriving at decisions on industries, that you have
an independent advisory body such as the IAC to give government
advice.
While different state business groups have proposed an infrastructure council
composed of representatives of government and business, this smacks of decisions
behind closed doors between consenting interest groups. Such an infrastructure
council would lack any sense of independence or have any real research and
analytical capacities.
Another suggestion to tackle both the infrastructure selection issue, to improve
choice, ensure public involvement, enhance accountability and potentially
improve subsequent project management is for an expert, statutory base state
priorities commission.
Such a body would audit a state’s present infrastructure needs, identify gaps,
and make public recommendations for improvement. Done annually, this would
provide a report card on a state’s infrastructure needs and their overall
performance. In addition, such a commission could evaluate openly any new
proposals for new infrastructure or events and to provide a means for effective
consultation with both the business and wider community. It could provide
government with a convenient post box to which complex proposals could be

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despatched and so give everyone time to think, before acting. The government
could lay down priority areas and criteria that the commission would use to
determine priorities and make assessments.
Of course, a priorities commission could only provide advice to governments –
elected officials would have to make the final decisions. Nevertheless, such a
process would give governments a better means of making choices from a range
of projects that maximise benefits. It would also provide greater public
participation in decision-making, improve accountability and assist in more
efficient allocation of taxpayers’ funds on big projects.

Conclusion
‘Iconic’, or ‘big’ projects are an important component in infrastructure. They
can provide significant benefits and focus, but not if they are mismanaged and
do not meet clear performance criteria. Public cynicism towards politicians and
public organisations is reinforced when taxpayers see examples of where more
and more of their funds are seemingly squandered on projects that run seriously
over cost estimates and well exceed scheduled completion dates.
More importantly, the failure of ‘big’ projects to meet performance criteria
through poor project management can mean that an otherwise important ‘icon’
can present an ongoing reminder of the failure and inefficiency of public
administration. Successful projects on the other hand, while often not attracting
the same degree of spectacular media reporting as problematic projects, can
deliver the lasting economic and social benefits that were intended and build a
positive image for a government.
‘Good’ government is not just about having grand visions and building ‘big’
projects. These have their place, but ultimately, ‘good’ government is about
allocating funds in a timely manner to maximise benefits and meet real needs.
Project management is tools to assist governments achieve these goals, nothing
more and nothing less. Project management cannot make up for poor policy
choices and craven political behaviour. However, adherence to project
management principles and processes can help improve public policy outcomes
if it accompanied by the same features that improve all aspects of accountability
– transparency and integrity of process. Too often in the past the ‘Let’s do it’
approach, the obsession with project prestige and the electoral cycle driven
timeframe has so overwhelmed project management as to render it useless. The
result has been poor project conception, design and execution, resulting all too
often in ‘white elephant projects. This is bad policy and ultimately bad politics
when the money runs out, the roads become clogged and taxes have to be
increased to pay for urgent and overdue infrastructure repair.

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References
Auditor-General of Victoria 2002, Report on Public Sector Agencies, June 2002,
Part 4 - Infrastructure, including Local Government, [Link]
/reports_mp_psa/[Link]#P22_480
Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2005, ‘Beazley Says Govt has Missed
Building Up Nation’s Infrastructure,’ AM, Wednesday 2 March,
[Link]
Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2006a, ‘Wembley Stadium Delays Fuel
Controversy’, AM, Saturday 1 April, [Link] /content/
2006/[Link]
Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2006b, ‘Games Business Upturn Disappoints
Some’, AM, Saturday 25 March, [Link]
2006/[Link]
Allen Consulting Group 2003, Financing Public Infrastructure in Queensland,
December, Melbourne.
Anderson, G. 2006, ‘The Loan Council, International Credit Rating and the
Australian States – The Implications of State Borrowing for Fiscal Federalism’,
paper presented to the Public Policy Network Conference, Curtin University of
Technology, February, Perth, [Link] research/
2006papers/[Link]
Armitage, C. 2005, ‘Beware White Elephants’, The Australian, 23 March.
Audit Scotland 2004, ‘Management of the Holyrood building project’,
[Link]
Bachelard, M. 2004, ‘Capital Projects Hit a Brick Wall’, The Australian, 10 July.
Baker, R. 2003, ‘Labor “lying” over Synchrotron Plan’, The Age, 26 August.
Brockman, M., 2005, ‘Train Link Fails Trade Test’, The Australian, 26 February.
Cunningham, M 2006, ‘Achieving Sustained Economic Growth’, in D. Moore,
The Role of Government in Queensland, Report to Commerce Queensland, May 2006,
Brisbane, pp. 42-56.
DiGirolamo, Rebecca and Plane, Terry 2002, ‘Wine centre ‘burns cash’’, The
Australian, 15 March 2002, p. 4.
Economic Planning Advisory Committee (EPAC) 1985, Public Sector Expenditure
in Australia, AGPS, Canberra.
EPAC 1990, The Size and Efficiency of the Public Sector, AGPS, Canberra.
Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N., & Rothengatter, W. 2003, Megaprojects and Risk:
An Anatomy of Ambition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

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Fraser, A. 2004, ‘Mag Deal Costs the Taxpayers $240m’, The Australian, 26
March.
Hall, P. 1968, Great Planning Disasters, Methuen, London.
Hall, R. 2001, ‘Monumental Mess’, Courier-Mail, 1 June.
Harris, T. 1999, ‘The Auditor-General’s Last Stand’, Canberra Bulletin of Public
Administration, No 93, October, pp. 1-3.
Johnston, J. 1999, ‘Serving the Public Interest: The Future of Independent
Advice’, Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, No 91, March, pp. 9-18.
Lowe, I. 1992, ‘Learning from the Elephants: Toward a Rational Future,’ in P.
Scott (ed.), A Herd of White Elephants: Some Big Technology Projects in Australia,
Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, pp.142-153.
de Maria, W. 2002, ‘Commercial-in-Confidence: An Obituary to Transparency,’
Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol 60, No 4, pp. 92-109
Marsh, I., and Yencken, D. 2004, Into the Future: The Neglect of the Long Term
in Australian Politics, Australian Collaboration and Black Ink, Melbourne.
Moore, D. 2006, The Role of Government in Queensland: Report to Commerce
Queensland, May 2006, Brisbane, <[Link]
New South Wales 2003, Auditor-General Audit Report, Performance Audit, 2003,
State Rail Authority, Millennium Train Project.
Pollitt, C. 2000, Institutional Amnesia: A Paradox of the Information Age?, in
Prometheus, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2000, pp. 5-16.
Rattigan, A. 1986, Industry Assistance: The Inside Story, Melbourne University
Press, Melbourne.
Scott, P. (ed.), 1992, A Herd of White Elephants: Some Big Technology Projects in
Australia, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney.
South Australia 1997, Report of the Auditor General, Special Audit Report - Port
Adelaide Flower Farm.
South Australia 2002, Report of the Auditor-General for the Year ended 30 June
2002, Part B, Vol III.
South Australia 2001, Final Report of the Auditor-General on the Hindmarsh Soccer
Stadium Redevelopment Project, Part 1, Adelaide, Government Printer.
Syvret, P., and S. 1996, ‘Williams Dives into Troubled Waters,’ Australian
Financial Review, 22 July.
Taylor, L. 2005, ‘Push for Infrastructure Summit,’ Australian Financial Review,
7 March.
The Economist 2005, ‘Overdue and Over Budget, Over and Over Again’, 9 June.

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Warhurst, J.,1982, Jobs or Dogma? The Industries Assistance Commission and

Australian Politics, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia.
Wood, A. 2004, ‘It is Worth Spending Time to Find Facts,’ The Australian, 13
November.

ENDNOTES
1 This chapter originally began with a focus on regional issues. Special thanks is given to John Wilson
who co-authored the original draft.
2 This case study is based on a report Mike Cunningham, a former Queensland State Treasury official,
in D. Moore, The Role of Government in Queensland: Report to Commerce Queensland, May 2006, Brisbane.

67
Section III. Organisational Alignment
— Organisational Change
6. Organisational Alignment: How
Project Management Helps
Abul Rizvi, Department of Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs

As many of you will know, in February 2005 the Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, Senator Amanda Vanstone commissioned Mr Mick Palmer
to investigate the circumstances of the immigration detention of Ms Cornelia
Rau.
During the process of this investigation, another report, by Mr Neil Comrie, into
the Circumstances of the Vivian Alvarez Matter, was also commissioned.
Mr Palmer delivered his report in July 2005 and Mr Comrie in October. These
reports were highly critical of the Department and made a number of
recommendations – most of which addressed shortcomings they saw in DIMA’s
culture and organisational practices.
Both reports found DIMA wanting on a number of fronts and have lessons
perhaps for many government agencies about:
• communication;
• structure & governance;
• accountability;
• contract management;
• case management;
• IT Systems;
• identity issues;
• quality decision making;
• leadership; and
• training.
Late last year the Government accepted the broad thrust of the findings and
recommendations in the Palmer Report and the Comrie Report. This kick-started
a major organisational change process.
The change agenda we are undertaking is substantial. It is across the whole
department, and has to be carried out against a background of keeping the
business going – and what a business it is.
In last 12 months DIMIA has
• responded to more than 1.6 million telephone inquires;
• facilitated the arrival of more than 5.7 million temporary entrants;

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• granted visas to over 12,000 migrants. Granted humanitarian visas and then
settled more than 11,500 refugees and people in humanitarian need;
• heard around 4,800 applications for AAT or judicial review of Departmental
or tribunal decisions; and
• been mentioned at least 31,750 times on the TV or radio and over 37,800 in
newspapers.
Everyday, DIMA staff have to make decisions which can dramatically affect
peoples’ lives. We recognise that this is a big workload on which to place such
a substantial change agenda. We are doing this in the glare of public scrutiny
and in the face of competing (and often conflicting) expectations about what it
is that DIMA should do.
DIMA business is complex and diverse. We range from working across
government on counter-terrorism and border security, playing our part in the
international response to humanitarian crises (in the short and medium term),
promoting the benefits of cultural diversity in the Australian community, helping
new migrants become active and productive members of that community and
contributing to economic growth by facilitating the entry of people to fill skilled
positions or who come as tourists or as students.
We deliver services on behalf of a number of other agencies – health, education,
industry, security and community services. These other agencies require different
approaches and have different objectives and we have to balance each one against
the other.
The Australian community also has different expectations of our work. Business
wants easy and seamless access to skills and a competitive environment for
attracting tourists and students. Families want to be able to bring their loved
ones to Australia. Some sectors of the community think we should do more on
the humanitarian front, while other sectors want to feel assured that we
administer a strong immigration policy with inbuilt safeguards against introduced
disease, abuse and possible criminal activity.
Measuring the success of the changes in the light of these competing objectives
will not be easy.

So, how do we go about doing this?

To respond properly to the Palmer and Comrie reports, and to meet the
expectations of the Government, the Parliament and the wider community, we
have identified that we must do three things:
• become a more open and accountable organisation;
• deal more fairly and reasonably (and lawfully) with clients; and
• have staff that are well trained and supported.

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 Organisational Alignment: How Project Management Helps

Being more open and accountable

Since the Palmer and Comrie reports, the Minister has twice directly and
personally addressed all DIMA staff on the Government’s expectations of the
reform agenda. She continues to encourage staff to share ideas for change and
improvement. The Secretary has continued his practice of communicating twice
weekly with all staff in the Department and delivering keynote addresses,
updating staff on current issues and achievements and seeking their input and
ideas.
The Senior Executive has travelled to all of our capital city offices in Australia
and a number of our overseas posts to discuss the reform agenda and hear first
hand the impact it is having on our state and territory and overseas operations.
We have continued to engage with our clients, critics and other organisations,
particularly those who have a role in scrutinising the activities of the Department.
We have very constructive relationships with the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s
Office and the Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner and their feedback is
highly valued. A privacy training strategy has been developed and training has
commenced. The restructure of our National Office is complete and new and
stronger governance arrangements are in place.
A whole range of appointments have been made to Senior Executive Service and
State Director positions. The new Values and Standards Committee is up and
running. With its three external members (from the Ombudsman’s Office. The
Australian Public Service Commission and the community), it is well placed to
ensure that the Department is meeting community expectations. An expanded
Audit and Evaluation Committee, with an external chair, is providing rigorous
oversight of the enhanced internal audit program.
For the first time in many years, there has been a comprehensive staff survey
to assess the views of staff and to provide a benchmark for monitoring change.
The report will be available shortly and the Department’s executive will be
taking a strong personal interest in developing the responses to staff ideas and
concerns.

Being more fair and reasonable with clients

Improving client service must be a key focus of our efforts. Client Satisfaction
surveys and Values Creation Workshops, where DIMA staff must actively listen
to the views and concerns of clients, will be conducted in the early part of this
year. This will allow us to better understand the differences between client
groups and their needs and will allow us to respond to systemic concerns that
clients raise.
DIMA’s National Office in Canberra is a long way from the service counters
where we interact with our clients. We have therefore also asked all of the senior

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executives in DIMA to spend some time in operational or service delivery parts

of the Department in the first half of this year to get first-hand experience in
client service.
The draft Client Service Charter released last year for public comment is being
finalised at the moment to take account of the largely positive feedback. It will
set out clearly the expectations for both clients and DIMA staff. Better
arrangements are being put in place for handling client feedback and providing
clients with choice about how they connect with the Department.
Every month the Secretary recognises a member of staff or team through the
Secretary’s Award for Service Excellence (ASCE) on the basis of positive client
feedback.
We have further built on improvements made last year to health service delivery
for immigration detainees, in particular at Baxter with other centres to
progressively follow over coming months.
All detainees are screened for mental health problems using two internationally
recognised screening tools on admission and they are routinely and regularly
screened after that. Mental health plans are developed for any detainee who
screens positive. We are currently finalising the membership of the Detention
Health Advisory Group, which will provide expert professional health advice
on health service standards and research projects to improve health outcomes
for people detained.
Physical improvements at Baxter and other immigration detention centres have
been made, well beyond the recommendations made in the Palmer Report. The
Baxter Plan, launched by the Minister in September 2005, included development
of the Interim Visitor Processing Centre, which opened in December, and sporting
facilities. Self-catering options have improved and further design options to
open up the closed compounds, develop a new primary health care facility and
a new central cafeteria have been developed.
Considerable progress has been made in developing a new, holistic, case
management framework for the case management of clients with exceptional
circumstances. In conjunction with case management, DIMA is developing a
‘community care’ pilot in Sydney and Melbourne to trial and evaluate a model
where case management is supported by access to additional community services
to vulnerable clients.
Appropriately skilled and qualified case management staff have been recruited,
trained and are now working in our Sydney and Melbourne Offices. Our
compliance activities have been properly criticised and will continue to be
criticised in those cases which come to light where people have been improperly
determined to be unlawful and detained.

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 Organisational Alignment: How Project Management Helps

Clearly, DIMA officers exercise extraordinary powers and we have to be

extraordinarily careful in our decision-making where the outcome can be the
deprivation of liberty. We are making committed efforts to ensure decisions to
detain are only made where there is no realistic alternative, and that they are
subject to ongoing review. We will continue to place a strong focus on training
for staff in these operational roles, and in ensuring there are strong accountability
mechanisms in place.
This is especially the case where we are faced with people who are not easily
identified, either because they do not wish to cooperate, have mental health
issues or for other reasons. These difficulties do not release us from our obligation
to make each decision on the basis of law and the facts and to review those
decisions regularly.

Having well trained and supported staff

Enhanced training for staff is the centrepiece of the reform agenda for DIMA.
Plans for the new College of Immigration, Border Security and Compliance are
on track to commence training in mid-2006.
In the meantime, specialist technical training is being provided, addressing areas
such as making decisions on the basis of ‘reasonable suspicion’, using all available
methods to identify people, issuing search warrants and case management. These
courses will ultimately become part of the College curriculum.
Enhanced training in ICSE, DIMA’s main processing system, was rolled-out in
November and December last year and further modules in this e-learning program
are being delivered in 2006.
Leadership, values, standards and management skills were also areas of concern
identified by both Palmer and Comrie and a new National Training Manager
was appointed in early December to develop and lead the new department-wide
training programs in these areas.
The Executive Leadership program commenced delivery in September last year.
All DIMA executive level staff will undertake this course. A development
program for lower-level managers, a Fundamentals of Leaderships Program and
enhanced induction training are all being delivered to staff.
The significant systems issues identified by Palmer and Comrie are being
addressed. Independent reviews of DIMA’s business information needs, systems
governance, the IT platform and records management arrangements have been
finalised and their recommendations are currently being considered. Pilot projects
to better support DIMA staff in the field have also been completed, including
using Blackberry technology to connect remotely to the ICSE system and trialling
a field office. These pilots have shown acceptable results and will be considered
for further development.

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 Improving Implementation

If implementation is to be driven hard it, is important that there be clarity of

purpose, powers and relationships and transparency of authority, accountability
and disclosure. Project and program management techniques help do this. At
one level project management is a discipline, but at another level it is just common
sense. It is about setting objectives and planning how to meet them
We have recognised this and have incorporated in our new structure a Program
Services Office (in the Strategic Policy Group) to help business owners develop
plans and to monitor progress on the implementation of the Palmer Projects and
other key initiatives.
To ensure that DIMA staff, including those in the Senior Executive Service
understand the principles of project management, a series of information sessions
and one and two day workshops are underway. Response to project training
has exceeded our expectations and regular project management training will be
part of the long term training strategy.
Regular reports are fed up to the Executive Management Committee and to the
Cabinet Implementation Unit (CIU) of the Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet.
We are also required to report to the Minister on progress on a regular basis and
we are required to report progress to Parliament in September 2006.
We could not do this successfully and honestly without a program management
approach.
Our success in achieving change will be measured by improvements in the
confidence the Department is able to inspire in the broader community, including
recognition of the benefits delivered by a well managed and administered
immigration program.
Success will be reflected in the fact that our decisions are fair and reasonable,
that implementation of policy is open and there are clear lines of accountability
through the DIMA executive, to the Minister and Government and to the
Parliament and the broader community.
Measuring our success must take place on a couple of different planes. Our
overall success will be measured through things such as:
• the community’s acceptance of the level and nature of our immigration
program;
• the recognition of the net economic benefits delivered by a well managed
immigration program, including how it assists in Australia’s economic growth
through improved productivity and export performance;
• the settlement success of migrants; and
• our contribution to border security by preventing people with major health
or criminal issues from entering Australia.

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 Organisational Alignment: How Project Management Helps

The success of the Palmer Plus program of work can be measured by:
• positive feedback from our clients (even if they do not like the decision, do
they feel that they have been treated fairly and reasonably throughout the
process?);
• easier and faster access to information by the staff and the public;
• faster resolution of identity issues;
• reduction in visa overstayers through improved education of both visa holders
and employers;
• improved processing times for complex cases;
• positive audit and Ombudsman reports; and
• feedback from staff on whether the changes are making it easier for them to
do their jobs in a fair and reasonable way.
Change does not come easily to large organisations – it takes time and
commitment. And while under no illusions about the scale of the task, we are
confident that we have the capacity to deliver on the change agenda. We shall
be judged on what we have achieved.

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7. ‘Crazy Thought or Creative
Thinking’: Reform in the Real World
Patricia Scott, Department of Human Services

Introduction
In this chapter, I intend to focus on the following;
• practical ways to drive reform;
• ensuring alignment to government objectives;
• exerting influence when you cannot simply use control; and
• how to use cultural differences between agencies to speed reforms.

Backgrounder to the Department of Human Services

The Department of Human Services (DHS) occupies a unique space. It is chiefly
concerned with issues affecting service delivery and improving the connection
between policy and service delivery so that we get better outcomes. The core
department is tiny – around 75 permanent staff. But small does not mean
insignificant, as we are working with six agencies that employ 37,400 staff in
850 locations around Australia delivering over $90billion of government services
and transfer payments. We are also working on some significant proposals
including a Health and Social Services Smartcard, and on the implementation of
key elements of the government’s agenda, including Welfare to Work.
Human Service agencies have to deliver on two key programs:
• Welfare to Work; and
• changes to the Child Support formula currently under consideration by the
Government
The six agencies are:
• Centrelink with 6.5m customers;
• Medicare Australia has all Australians as customers with 20.5 million
customers;
• Child Support Agency with 1.3 million separated parents;
• Health Services Australia;
• CRS Australia, with 43,000 customers; and
• Australian Hearing with 200,000 customers.
It would be a mistake to imagine that Human Services is a monolith – a mega
department. Decisions are not taken by one individual or one board or one
executive. DHS seeks to influence the agencies and the policy departments. A

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unique feature of DHS is that it does not have financial responsibility for the
great bulk of the operating or program expenditure of the agencies under its
umbrella.
The Minister sets the directions for each organisation and, in my case he has set
out a series of objectives for 2006 against which he will assess both my and the
department’s performance.
In relation to Centrelink and Medicare Australia, which are separate entities
under the Financial Management Act, the Minister has exchanged letters with
the CEO of Medicare Australia and the CEO of Centrelink that set out the
Minister’s expectations and, in return, how the CEOs propose to meet those
expectations. This exchange of letters is in accordance with the Uhrig reforms
which are now moving through the Australian Government.
Health Services Australia and Australian Hearing are bodies under the
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act where the two separate Boards
have financial responsibility.
DHS as a legal entity does include two divisions which are separately and publicly
identified given their strong and separate stakeholder interests: CRS Australia
and the Child Support Agency. Those two agencies do not have a great deal in
common and it would be a mistake to treat them as homogenous parts of a
department like any other.
Figure 1

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 ‘Crazy Thought or Creative Thinking’: Reform in the Real World

The lines of reporting from the CEOs to the Minister are through the CEO of
DHS, consistent with the Prime Minister's statement that:
The new department will ensure that the development and delivery of
government services is placed under strong ministerial control with clear
lines of responsibility through the Secretary.
This gives me considerable responsibility, although not control, in that four
CEOs and two Boards have financial responsibility in their own right.
Our citizens and customers have distinct and diverse needs across the 6 agencies.
It would be a mistake to imagine that the service offer has to be the same or
should be the same. The legislation and policies, set by the policy departments,
that drives our agencies and the programs they deliver, are not the same.
The idea of a mega department has been rejected. As an economist I know that
mega organisations with diverse client bases can be plagued with poor service
and poor management because size doesn’t mean quality. There is nothing in
the Prime Minister’s announcement which is about watering down the purpose
for which each of the agencies were created.
Knowing that project managers, team leaders and even executives do not control
all elements necessary to successfully achieve their agendas, I will use examples
to illustrate how DHS has driven reforms in ways that are more about influence
and outcomes and less about dictates and control.

Practical Ways to Drive Reform

One of our most successful and very low cost initiatives is the Local Liaison
Officer (LLO) Program.

LLO Program
Establishing the Local Liaison Officer network was one of the Minister's first
priorities for the new Department. This program was established to improve the
level of support and advice provided to customers who take their service delivery
query or complaint to their local MP.
Every Member of the House of Representatives and Senator has been allocated
an LLO from one of the six agencies in their local area. This provides an additional
mechanism to Members and Senators for the resolution of any bottlenecks with
regard to constituent inquiries.
With just one person initially working on this full time and, later, one person
working on it part time, we have been able to draw on the network of the
agencies to provide a fast and very personalised service to every Member of
Parliament.

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The LLO Program has been highly successful. In its first 12 months around 4,600
queries have been referred to the LLO network by Members of Parliament. With
the exception of only 14, all queries have been responded to within two working
days.
As at the end of January 2006, 97 per cent (145) of the Members of the House
of Representatives and 62 per cent (47) of current Senators have utilised the LLO
program.
The first task for DHS was to build a network of contacts in the agencies. These
agency contacts were required to undertake any internal consultation required
within their own agencies and present a coherent and agreed agency perspective
to DHS (Centrelink had a good foundation already in place).
Development of the LLO program involved both one-on-one discussions between
DHS and individual agencies, as well as combined forums when all agency
representatives met to discuss the project. At all times DHS' leadership role and
responsibility for delivering the LLO program was clear with the LLO Project
Manager as a virtual team leader.
The Project Manager in DHS sought to give agency contacts as much autonomy
as possible in tailoring the requirements of the program to their own agency's
operations. In practical terms this meant that while there were certain
non-negotiable elements of the program, agencies were given leeway to develop
agency specific responses to some aspects of the program where this flexibility
did not threaten to compromise the consistency and quality of the LLO network.
Not only has the LLO program been a way to improve services to MPs and their
constituents, it has provided a network for DHS to use in obtaining information
and feedback from staff at the front line.

Better Alignment to Government Objectives

UHRIG
The Uhrig Review identified options for Government to improve the performance
and get the best from statutory authorities.
The Review found that generally Boards do not work unless the Board can
appoint and sack the Chief Executive Officer and determine strategy. This usually
applies in a commercial enterprise, or where there are multiple owners, but it
does not apply in regulatory agencies or where an agency is expected to
efficiently deliver a service specified by the Government.
Uhrig also found that good governance requires owners or their representatives
to be clear about they want to be achieved, establishing an unambiguous purpose
for the entity and developing clear expectations of the meaning of success. Uhrig

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 ‘Crazy Thought or Creative Thinking’: Reform in the Real World

was not supportive of Boards where Ministers exercised control. It was the case
of too many cooks spoil the broth.
The Centrelink Board and the Health Insurance Commission were replaced on 1
October 2005 by two agencies, each headed by a Chief Executive Officer
appointed by the Minister, accountable to the Minister and reporting through
me. This is consistent with the Uhrig report.
The Health Insurance Commission was renamed Medicare Australia and brought
under the Financial Management and Accountability Act, rather than the
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act, and the staff, who were employed
under conditions determined by the Commission, were brought under the Public
Service Act. To provide clarity of purpose for the agencies, the Minister issued
Statements of Expectations on 27 October 2005, setting out his requirements for
the agencies for the next twelve months. These are publicly available.

Exerting Influence When You Cannot Simply Use Control

From the outset the Prime Minister wanted us to increase participation for those
people who are on benefits, are able to work and are currently not working.
Our role was to increase referrals to the Job Network for those who do not have
a mandatory requirement to look for work, such as parents. Our objective was
clear. We gave clear and unambiguous guidance to Centrelink on what was
required and, in consultation with the Department of Education and Workplace
relations (DEWR) and DHS, Centrelink set about delivering.
This is an example of influencing behaviour rather than controlling it as
legislation up to 1 July 2006 does not compel these people to work. Centrelink
embarked on an active strategy of contacting voluntary customers, when they
visited Centrelink to see if they were interested in working, and later extend
the contacts to calls from call centres. As a result of this strategy over 141,000
voluntary job seekers have been referred to the Job Network for the period
November 2004 – January 2006.
The average number of referrals to the Job Network increased from 4,100 per
month (July 2004 – November 2004) to over 9,400 per month (November 2004
– January 2006).
As you can see in Figure 2, referrals directly and dramatically change with the
effort Centrelink puts into this strategy. Referrals dropped over the period of
January, as a result of cessation of strategy over the Christmas/New Year period.
Not only have referrals gone up, there has been a marked increase in job
placements for voluntary customers: job placements increased from around 2,400
per month (July 2004 – November 2004) to over 4,000 per month (December
2004 – January 2006).

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‘Crazy Thought or Creative Thinking’: Reform in the Real World

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Communications
Partnership and influence has been a feature of our communications activity.
Last year, we secured funding of $4 million to pilot a new way of informing
people about the benefits and payments available from the Australian
Government. And as we were developing the pilot, we were invited by the
Ministerial Committee on Government Communication to play an active role in
other major Government campaigns.
Why is it that DHS with a short term budget allocation of only $4 million has
been asked to be involved in some very significant campaigns worth many tens
of millions? It is because government campaigns usually direct people to a service,
and the service is usually provided by a Human Services agency.
What we bring to the communication is a customer perspective, through the
everyday experience of our agencies. And because our agencies, in particular
Centrelink, have strong media teams, they can also play a valuable role in
securing unpaid media coverage that informs the customer and supports the
larger campaign.
The DHS pilot I mentioned earlier is now concluding, with excellent results. We
invested the $4million across a Drought Assistance Campaign, a component of
DEWR's Support the System that Supports You campaign and a Student On-line
campaign.
The common thread for all three was the use of spokespeople who could engage
and inform the target audience. In the case of drought assistance, our two-week
campaign lifted awareness and understanding by over 30 per cent and generated
triple the number of calls from farmers to the Drought Assistance Hotline. For
Support the System, insertion of an infomercial featuring Centrelink spokespeople
into the campaign caused a noticeable spike in calls registered via the call centre.
The latest campaign, encouraging students to apply for Student Youth Allowance
and Austudy on-line is generating an excellent response.
In our communication activity, DHS never acts alone. In the Drought Assistance
Campaign we worked closely with the policy owners, Department of Agriculture
Fisheries and Forestry, and with Centrelink, our Human Services agency charged
with delivering the services.
In the Support the System that Supports You campaign we were partners with
DEWR. Because the call to action – that is, updating your details at Centrelink,
is entirely handled by that agency, we produced an infomercial that had
Centrelink staff talking to people about their responsibilities.
Currently we are working with DEWR and our delivery agencies in developing
the communication support and call to action for Welfare to Work. DHS, policy
and delivery colleagues together present a whole of government communication
approach to MCGC (Ministerial Committee on Government Communication). We
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 ‘Crazy Thought or Creative Thinking’: Reform in the Real World

are influencing both the Policy Departments and our Agencies to ensure that
the customer is at the centre of all our strategies and approaches. Through our
‘spokesperson’ strategy we provide a human face for what has traditionally
viewed as a faceless bureaucracy.

How to Use Cultural Differences Between Agencies to

Speed Reforms
Absenteeism is a problem in three of our agencies but thankfully not all. Some
are already making progress on reducing absenteeism and some of our agencies
are specialists in getting people back to work so we are collectively working on
ways to reduce absenteeism. The problem is significant and a blight on our
service delivery.
On an annualised basis the Child Support Agency (CSA) experiences unplanned
leave at the rate of almost 18 days on average. This is an extraordinarily high
figure and makes CSA a leader in the pack across the Australian Government in
terms of unplanned leave. One way of looking at this is to say that the average
person in CSA would be entitled to 4 weeks annual leave, 12 public holidays
and on average takes a further 18 working days which in accumulative sense
would mean that they would start work mid March. As a Secretary charged with
improving service delivery to customers and as a taxpayer, this is entirely
unacceptable.
Here are six months figures for organisations to the moment.
Figure 4

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Medicare Australia and Centrelink figures are nothing to write home about and
clearly all three organisations need to improve their outcomes. On the other
hand, Health Services Australia is well below the median for the APS at 8.94
days per FTE employee (in 2001-02) and in the 6 months to December has had
an unplanned leave of less than 3 days – the same as the core Department. So
for this graph anything above 41/2 puts the agency on the wrong side of the
APS median.
I appreciate why CSA may have a higher level of unplanned leave than other
places: CSA staff face a particularly challenging role in dealing with parents that
have complex issues often in an environment where there is ongoing conflict in
their relationships. The average CSA officer dealing with clients spends 4.6 hours
on the phone every day. Those calls go from simple transactions (such as changing
addresses) to high level interpretation of legislation. Officers at the APS 3 and
4 levels are dealing with people who are in difficult emotional states or in
financial crisis and they are the go-between for separated parents.
That said, having a level of absenteeism that is 99 per cent over the APS median
of 8.9 means that those staff that are at work on any given day face greater
pressure, customers have to wait longer for service, productivity is diminished,
management is more difficult and costs to taxpayers are increased. CSA managers
should not feel overwhelmed. Clearly managers and team leaders can make a
substantial difference.
Let me illustrate using an example from Centrelink. A new Centrelink manager
in Parramatta achieved a remarkable breakthrough working with his staff to
address the ongoing issue of the increasing size of office queues. After having
observed the office for a few days he summarised the following:
• some staff had a preference to start work at 7am and leave at 3pm;
• queues were generally longer in the afternoons;
• staff were often dealing with aggressive clients and reacted accordingly; and
• prisoners (from a nearby prison) were generally released in the afternoon
(when there were longer queues and fewer staff).
The manager held a staff meeting and offered them an extra two experienced
officers to carry the workload. The workers were excited by this prospect. He
then went on to explain that the two extra staff would come from them working
hours that were the same as office opening hours. He also spoke to the prison
authorities and formed a new arrangement whereby Centrelink officers would
see prisoners before they were released (in the prison) and he asked the line
managers sit near the front of the office to watch and actively manage the queues.
The results were outstanding – shorter queues and happy staff, lower
absenteeism. As it turned out, queues were a manifestation of other problems.

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That is just one story in an organisation with over 25,000 staff working across
Australia. Can drawing attention to this problem make a difference? Absence
rates at December 2005 have dropped by an average of one full day per employee
when compared to a similar period in 2004. This improved attendance has allowed
Centrelink to provide additional service to the Australian community. Over the
six-month period to December 2005 the improved attendance is estimated to
have allowed an additional 142,000 face-to-face contacts and an additional 168,000
phone contacts with Centrelink customers.
Centrelink commenced in January 2005 with a three prong attack on unplanned
leave:
• Communication and Awareness Raising;
• Leadership Accountability and Support; and,
• Performance Monitoring and Reporting.

Communication and Awareness Raising

Unplanned leave was raised as a key area of focus for all levels within Centrelink
with managers being asked to review their existing attendance plans. Messages
from the CEO and Executive emphasised the impact of absenteeism on
productivity and Centrelink’s reputation, and encouraged team leaders to improve
attendance rates.

Leadership Accountability and Support

A project manager was assigned to develop and support the strategies for
reducing absenteeism and provide advice to Centrelink managers. Training
programs were developed to assist managers in the task of dealing with staff
absences earlier and more consistently. A resource kit was developed and
distributed regarding better practice in attendance management.

Performance Monitoring and Reporting

A visual tool was developed to provide a quick snapshot of absence rates within
Centrelink. A simple traffic light approach was used to quickly identify sites
that were performing well and those sites that required additional assistance.
The culture in Centrelink is changing in response to managers adopting a more
consistent approach towards absence cases while at the same time dealing with
individuals more flexibly. Employees are being encouraged to be more honest
about their needs and commitments, and told they have an opportunity to
negotiate with their manager rather than calling in for a day off as they may
have done in the past.

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Figure 5

In Conclusion
There is still much work to be done to entrench a positive attendance culture;
experience has shown that the relationship between employees and their
immediate managers is a critical factor in assisting this change. In summary,
influence is not as good as control but it is good enough when you can harness
the talents of others. That is the role of the project manager – that is the role of
all managers.

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8. The Australian Taxation Office
Change Program: Project and Change
Management Directions and Learnings,
A Case Study
Bob Webb, Deputy Commissioner, Australian Taxation Office

Introduction
Corporate policies, the literature and any number of very capable consultants
provide frameworks to successfully tackle project and change management.
Nobody doubts the increasing significance of project management in a world
where change and flexibility at speed have become a part of life, and an
expectation on all organisations. So if the literature and experience are to be
believed, why is it so hard to succeed?
This chapter uses the sometimes successful, sometimes painful, but never dull
experience of the Tax Office as a case study.
In particular, it tells the story of lessons from the introduction of major tax
reform, and how we have drawn on that experience in the current fairly
ambitious enterprise-wide Change Program.
Figure 1

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It also briefly covers how our organisational learning is continuing, as we attempt

to build a practical and flexible approach to project and change management as
an ongoing capability for the Tax Office. This is increasingly important to manage
a growing portfolio of program and project activities.

Context and Drivers for Change

The Tax Office administers a range of revenue legislation including income tax,
GST, excise and superannuation, which generates 89 per cent of Commonwealth
Government revenue and about $35 billion for the States and Territories. Less
publicised is that we also provide benefits of about $4 billion to the community.
The Office has about 22,000 staff at around 60 locations around Australia. We
interact with just about every segment of the community. There are fairly high
annual volumes of phone enquires (11 million), returns for processing (14 million
income tax returns and a similar number of activity statements), and debt
collections (1.4 million for $52 billion).
Major tax reform was announced by the Government in 1997. It was introduced
primarily in 2000/2001 with the GST, the Australian Business Number (ABN)
and a series of business and personal tax reforms. Three years might sound like
a reasonable period to plan and deliver, but for more than half that period the
Government was defining and negotiating what the actual reform was going to
look like, so the period for implementation telescoped down fairly dramatically.
In hindsight we can see that, partly because of the ‘telescoping’, but also because
of some things we just did not anticipate, our consultation processes were not
fully up to the job. Our systems were outdated and fragmented, and we
implemented the program internally in a quite devolved style. We had, perhaps,
not appreciated how difficult it was going to be to bring about a major reform
or change with that sort of fragmentation.
At one level we succeeded – all policies were delivered on time and the revenue
came in – but some of adverse consequences started to manifest themselves in
2001 and 2002, particularly amongst the tax agents and business community.
This is evident from some media reports of the time.
Basically tax agents said ‘if things do not improve in terms of our experience of
the administration, we will stop dealing electronically with the Tax Office’. They
knew this would cripple our activities. Suffice to say we were building up a
pretty significant set of issues around 2002 which we had to respond to.
So we took a step back and commenced the ‘Listening to the Community’
initiative. This took about nine months during 2002. We listened not only to
our client segments – individuals, business, large business, small business – all
of whom had some very different perspectives and priorities – but also to our

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 The Australian Taxation Office Change Program

staff. This involved surveys, user clinics and focus groups, and testing prototype
products at creative retreats with Tax Officers and the community.
Figure 2

A question often asked is whether the sort of change we subsequently embarked

on is best managed from the top down or the bottom up. There is no doubt that
establishing the strategy and implementation I will describe later has been driven
from the top down, otherwise it would not have worked at all. However if we
had not had the bottom up ‘listening’ step first, so that we could distil an agenda
to address both client and staff concerns, we could easily have missed the mark.
We distilled many messages and priorities from the listening initiative. I will
use an example from the tax agents’ feedback. One of the things they wanted
was more detailed and on-line access to the information we hold on their clients.
It became obvious that we had to do something about that issue. I will mention
later how the tax agent portal, which allows tax agents to access their clients’
information directly from our systems, has been the single biggest benefit to
that segment of the community.
Suffice to say we got real benefit out of the listening exercise, and the findings
are still a major driver of the current program.
There have been other drivers for change as follows:
• Government expectations for policy change – At any one time we have about
100 policy projects on the go, not quite as big as the tax reform period, but
nevertheless quite significant;

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• Technology – The fact that technology is moving so fast which in turn is

changing community expectations quite significantly; and
• Community confidence – If we do not maintain community confidence in the
taxation system then we really have a problem, as the revenue base to a
significant extent depends on voluntary compliance.

The Easier Cheaper and More Personalised Change Program

The Easier, Cheaper and more Personalised Change Program is the program
developed to address these issues, including the priorities from listening to the
community and the staff.
What is this program? It is primarily about improving the client and staff
experience. However it is also about improving productivity and flexibility, to
respond to both government and community needs in an ongoing way. It is a
five-year program, started in 2003 after listening to the community. It covers
new products and services for all segments and channels of interaction with the
community.
It has had quick wins such as the tax agent portal. We realised that while some
things will take until 2008 to achieve, if we were waiting until then to start the
real improvements for the community, we would have long ago lost the
confidence that we needed to gain and regain.
The program replaces essentially all existing Tax Office business processes and
systems, front and back end. One way of typifying the change is that a call
centre representative currently responding to a tax payer or tax agent enquiry
may have to access anything up to 16 systems. Following the introduction of
the Change Program it will be just two systems, a quite radical improvement for
staff.
The program is based on enterprise-wide approaches. Often in the past we have
had different approaches and systems according to which revenue product or
which client segment was being served. In the new approach we only customise
where necessary.
The program will affect most of our staff over the period. We have just
introduced the new Client Relationship Management system to our call centres
(about 3,000 staff). In further releases during this year we will add case and
correspondence management, content management, reporting and record keeping
to about 12,000 staff. In our final releases during 2007/08 we will replace all our
processing systems, and nearly all staff will be involved. The total cost is about
$450 million.
A key learning from previous attempts at large scale change was that we needed
to address the program and manage risks at three levels – Strategic Positioning
and Intent, Program Design and Development, and Program Implementation.

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 The Australian Taxation Office Change Program

Figure 3

We also decided to separate our approach into very deliberate phases.

Figure 4

Strategic Positioning and Intent

A key part of strategic positioning is that the Change Program is explicitly linked
to, and supports delivery of, the ATO Business Model.

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Figure 5

While we were developing the Change Program, we realised that something we

were in want of was a clearly articulated business model – what is our business
philosophy, what is the way we thing about the business, starting from the
self-assessment system which itself conditions a lot of our approaches? There
are two main strategic planks in the model. One is the compliance strategy and
program. Under a self assessment system you need risk based compliance
approaches. The second is the Making it Easy to Comply strategy, of which the
main component is the Change Program.
Some additional aspects of the strategic positioning were as follows.
• A contract with the community. Having listened to the community we fed
back to the community what we had heard through a booklet (also provided
electronically on our web site) entitled ‘Making it Easier to Comply’. We first
published this in 2003. We put it out every year to say ‘these are the
commitments we are making in terms of some really specific future products
and services we are going to introduce; and this is how we delivered against
the commitments made in the previous year’. Making such an external
commitment is also useful internally in keeping us focussed on the main
strategic intent.
• Both external and internal transformation. Whilst the program started from
the external stakeholders’ needs we realised early on that we would not be
able to sustain and deliver many improvements unless we also transformed
our internal capabilities (people, process and technology).
• Emerging community based systems and whole of government. The changes we
make are also intended to provide the foundation for a whole range of
community based approaches (for example the ability for small businesses
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 The Australian Taxation Office Change Program

to lodge and finalise their returns directly from their accounting software),
and improved whole of government approaches, for both businesses and
individuals.
• Leverage off capabilities and experience of other organisations. When we think
hard about our business, most of what the Tax Office does, broken into its
component parts, is actually very similar to what a lot of other organisations
do. We have taken a strategic position to learn and take product from others,
rather than (our traditional approach) do everything ourselves and build
our own unique systems and processes.
• Phase the program over the minimum reasonable timeframe. We talked to a
number of our colleague revenue agencies and other big organisations around
Australia and the world about their experience. A common finding was that
many tried to transform too quickly and found there was too much happening
in parallel. But an even greater number saw failure as a result of the change
taking too long. They were living in two worlds, the new world and the old
world for too long. Investment in both worlds was costly and complicated,
and people also lost focus. So we chose an ambitious, but feasible,
implementation timing as a deliberate trade-off between these two tensions.
• Quick wins. As I mentioned earlier we committed to a significant number of
improved products and services across all segments and channels. This
bought some critical time to allow us to deliver the underlying changes, and
also provided external and internal credibility to the program.
• Top level leadership. The Commissioner led the effort right from the outset,
and frankly, in an organisation as complex as the Tax Office, you would not
want to try such a large scale change unless this was the case. This was
complemented by a number of joint strategy and design activities including
the senior management from across the organisation, as well as external
expertise at key stages.

Program Design and Development

Once we had the strategic positioning settled we moved to the second phase of
program design and development.
The following were key features of this phase:
• Ongoing engagement with stakeholders. We had completed the initial listening
to the community, but the fact is you have to keep at it: reviewing directions
and co-design of products, as well as monitoring perceptions and feedback.
We found that even as we designed the various products, some of the things
we thought we understood out of the listening to the community phase, had
to be modified.
• Formal blueprint and transition plan developed throughout 2004. The Solution
Blueprint covered the people, process and technology aspects of the future

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design. An integrated Transition Plan set out the sequence and timing of
packages of change (or releases) through to 2008.
• A whole-of-program business case. In previous change initiatives we had
attempted a separate business case for each component of the change and it
never quite stacked up, it never quite justified the investment. It wasn’t
until we lifted the business case up to the level of the integrated outcomes
and benefits that it became viable.
• Selecting off the shelf and transfer technology. Although this particular change
initiative is not a technology program, the technology component is critical.
Through a number of market tenders we selected a small number of suppliers
– one for Client Relationship Management; one for Case and Correspondence
Management; one for Content, Document and Records Management; and one
for our core processing systems.
• Obtaining the required program management and integration expertise. We are
a revenue agency not a program management agency. For a program like
this we decided to buy in the expertise of people who do this as their daily
living. We also decided we wanted a single program partner with clear
overall accountability for delivery across the program. Through an open
market exercise we selected Accenture as the Program Implementation
Partner. They can and do sub-contract others in, but we deal only with them.
• An outcomes-based fixed-price contract.
Outcomes-based means that the contract deliverables are specified as higher
level business outcomes within eight categories.
Figure 6

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 The Australian Taxation Office Change Program

Something we had found out through experience was that if you try to contract
to detailed specifications of what you think you need for the next three or four
years, your imagination fails you, and sure enough down the track you have
countless scope variations and increases. However if you pitch expectations at
the outcomes level, they are much more likely to remain valid over the period.
Fixed-price in this case means not only for the partner’s consulting fees, but also
for our own costs which are about half of the total program costs. If there is a
greater use of Tax Office staff than anticipated in the fixed price, the extra cost
is underwritten by the program partner. This is possible because they manage
the project, and they manage the Tax Office staff who work with them on the
project. For us this was fairly innovative.
• Expert independent advice. We selected Capgemini as Independent Assurer
to look over both our and Accenture’s shoulders. Whilst we may get enmeshed
in the daily run of things they are able to step back and point out if we are
overlooking key issues. They have been involved in design, planning and
implementation phases.
• Procurement practices. We followed Australian National Audit Office best
practices, particularly around probity and risk management aspects of the
procurement.
• Leadership. There has been a Change Program Steering Committee throughout,
comprised of the four Commissioners. We report twice a month as to how
we are going and to seek guidance or direction on any major strategic or
design issues. This has been going for two and a half years and will continue
through the life of the program.

Program Implementation
Having established the strategic positioning, program design and development,
and with key procurement complete, we moved to the major phase of
implementation.
It has been mentioned elsewhere that 66 per cent of programs and projects fail
and 33 per cent succeed. Of those that fail most are classified as failures of
implementation. I have to say, though, unless we had done the work in the prior
phases as described above, the task and risks of implementing would be much
greater.
Having said that, there are still ‘bucket loads’ of implementation risks, so we
need overt strategies to address these:
• Continuing strong governance and accountability arrangements. I already
mentioned the Change Program Steering Committee. Below this, the program
design and delivery has been the responsibility of a single integrated Change
Program team. When we delivered tax reform we did it in a very devolved

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way. The different revenue product areas had the major responsibilities for
introducing the change, including business processes and systems, and,
whilst we had an overall Reform Program Office for planning and monitoring,
the approach was very decentralised. We have taken a very different
approach this time. We have brought the Accenture, business area and IT
people into the one team, quite a large team of around 500 people, to form
a new Tax Office division for the duration of the program.
• Formal program and project management methodology. Obvious in a sense,
but not always easy to make work in an organisation where very large scale
program management is not a way of life. We decided to essentially use the
methodologies of our program partner and our independent assurer.
• Formal stage gates. The Government has recently introduced the requirement
for formal stage gate type approaches in significant projects. This project is
not subject to these Government arrangements because it was committed
before they came into effect. However we have in any event incorporated a
total of ten key stage gates throughout the program. We effectively have a
go/no go decision at each of these, and get an independent assessment of
how we are going, as well as a self assessment.
• Staying outcomes-focussed and realising benefits. The Tax Office has found
this a difficult area in the past. With continuing intensive policy and
community agendas, the tendency is to get one project almost finished when
another comes rolling over the top. So we have been very intentional this
time with a ‘formal benefits realisation measurement process’ built in, and
an ongoing assessment of how we are going against the initial intent and
outcomes.
• Supporting existing business operations. Implementation of major change causes
a lot of transition issues, so the engagement with the other Tax Office
divisions or sub-plans, particularly the compliance and the operations areas
of the office, is very intense indeed, to help manage the impact of the changes.
• Growing emphasis on people and change management. Some people have said
‘you will need a culture change program to complement the other activities’.
We thought about that pretty hard, and concluded people are not going to
change their attitudes or approaches until there is something tangibly
different in their work life. So we have tailored the approach to people and
change management to be much more closely aligned to the period just before
they are about to experience something that is significantly different. In a
4-5 year program this is not immediate.
However I mentioned that we directly impacted 3000 staff last year, and will
impact 12,000 staff this year. So people and change management is about half
of our focus and concentration at this time.

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 The Australian Taxation Office Change Program

We have adopted a model to frame our approach. At one end of the spectrum
there are some very hard or concrete process and systems elements – for example,
of course you have to train people on the new systems and help them with
ongoing performance support. There are organisational job design issues to be
addressed. That’s all very concrete. At the other end there are many softer but
equally critical elements such as sponsorship and communications, and
behavioural change and expectations.
Figure 7

Results and learnings to date.

With implementation of the major changes well under way we are about half
way through the Program. How are we tracking against the original intent?
Most client product and service commitments have been delivered on schedule
with some, however, being several months late. Surveys and product uptake
indicate we have been particularly successful with tax agents. Individual
taxpayers’ uptake of enhanced products like e-tax has been very strong. Our
biggest challenge remains with business and especially small business where
satisfaction levels and uptake are increasing slowly, and from a low base.
As for internal systems and business process releases, we are still on track for
the original plan to be completed by 2008. We have had some delays of around
six months overall on the first and second of the three main releases, but the
first was completed last year and the second is well progressed for completion
during 2006. The fixed price means that there has been no material cost increase
as a result of these delays. The evidence to date is that we can still achieve all

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of the expected outcomes by 2008, although we have often had to revisit the
exact way we do this. Basing the contract on what we want to achieve rather
than the detail of how we achieve it, is already paying dividends.
We have some additional learnings from the implementation phase so far:
• Technology. Introducing a new platform entails risk. So far, in the Change
Program, where we are introducing several new platforms and systems, most
have now settled in, but only after a range of problems – unexpected issues,
integration issues – which have been the prime cause of the temporary delays
noted above;
• Rapid decision making versus wide engagement. One of the continuing struggles
is to find the right balance between the need for well informed but quick
decision making, and wide consultation with the rest of the business.
Engagement has been intensive but we have also had to recognise when we
need to go forward on an 80-90 per cent confidence level rather than 100
per cent;
• The call on other Tax Office business areas. We attempted to factor the costs
of this fully into the Business Case but clearly underestimated the level of
resource demand on the rest of the Office, to play their critical part in both
design and deployment;
• Value of the stage gate reviews. These have been invaluable in forcing us to
step back and assess how we are going and making any necessary
adjustments; and
• Staying focused. There is a lot of pressure from both inside and outside the
organisation to add scope. In a program of this size one of the main tasks is
to stay focused. One of the key roles for the leadership team has been to keep
the program in line with the original outcomes, and recognise that we cannot
deliver everything in the first wave.

Project Management in the broader ATO

Finally let me reflect on some of the approaches we are taking to program and
project management across the Tax Office.
We categorise our projects into policy, compliance and administrative projects –
and we have literally hundreds of them.
A part of the challenge is the sheer number and variety of projects that exist at
any one time. At any one time, we have 100 or so policy projects at various stage
of maturity. We also have a large number of compliance projects, not all of which
are managed formally as projects at the moment, and we have a number of
administrative projects. The Change Program is easily the biggest of these and,
in fact, through the Change Program we have closed down a number of other
projects to keep the focus on the main game.

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 The Australian Taxation Office Change Program

Apart from the Change Program, the main corporate project management focus
to date has been on policy and on IT projects. There has been hesitancy in some
other areas to apply project management approaches. This might be because of
behaviour, attitude or cultural issues or just unfamiliarity. But there are also
some more direct barriers. These include:
• poor understanding of how to differentiate between project and business as
usual work;
• a perception, often justified, that full project management methods are too
complicated for many situations, so that ‘one size fits all’ is not appropriate;
and/or
• limited integration with other governance and management processes e.g.
business planning in the annual planning cycle and regular governance
reporting.
To address these and other issues, and with the Commissioners’ endorsement,
we commenced a Project Management Improvement project about 18 months ago.
Some initiatives at the governance level include:
• integration of project management into existing business processes such as
business planning, to achieve an equivalent standard of governance and
reduce duplication;
• clearer project sponsor and manager accountabilities;
• introduction of formal review points (stage gates) for major programs and
projects; and
• review of the relevant corporate policies, including a new Practice Statement
for project management and a formal assurance process – particularly
important in the complex and decentralised environment in which most of
our projects necessarily live.
At the methodology level we are developing:
• clearer ‘program’ as opposed to individual ‘project’ approaches, recognising
that it is very common for projects to be part of a larger program;
• uniform approaches to project identification and profiling;
• methodologies that can be more readily tailored to suit project characteristics,
including a 3 Tiered Approach, with more rigour required for larger high
impact projects (Tier 1) and less for smaller low impact projects (Tier 3);
• alignment of related methodologies and disciplines (e.g. change management,
design, systems development) within the overarching project management
approaches; and
• appropriate technology support to assist managers and staff in project
governance and management.

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Figure 8

These initiatives are, in some cases, building on the learnings from the Change
Program. However, they also recognise that such approaches would be ‘overkill’
for many of our projects. The work is showing promising signs of bringing a
practical approach to achieving the undoubted benefits of project management
approaches, without burdening managers out of all proportion to the value.

Conclusion
This chapter has focussed primarily on the Tax Office Change Program as a case
study. When you hear that sobering statistic that 66 per cent of projects fail you
could be forgiven for believing that embarking on such a program is either
foolhardy or courageous.
In our case we concluded there was no option but to change, and to do so in an
ambitious way, in order to fundamentally address the growing range of issues
and expectations. What we have tried to do, is to mitigate the undoubted risks,
by learning from our own and others’ experience, and so improve the odds in
our favour. So far we have negotiated a range of issues and obstacles, and remain
essentially on track.
We can expect that many more issues will need to be navigated throughout the
remainder of the program. The decisions that have positioned the program at
each of the strategy, design, and implementation phases have undoubtedly
helped. But from here it will be continuing attention to rigorous program and
change management approaches, anticipation of those issues that might be

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predicted, and responsiveness to the unexpected, that will be the prerequisites

of success.

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9. Applying Three Frames to the
Delivery of Public Value
Jim Varghese, Director-General, Department of Primary
Industries and Fisheries, Queensland

I recently attended an ANZSOG CEO workshop where I was particularly

encouraged and interested in the work of Harvard University academic Mark
Moore on public value. Moore (1995) offers the notion of public managers
creating public value for society (for the short and long term) for strategic
management in Government. Drawing on Moore’s definition, public value is
understood to be the achievement of favoured outcomes by the use of public
resources in the most effective manner available (Moore 1995).
In this presentation, I would like explore the idea of using a management process
called the ‘Three Frames’ to deliver innovative public value. During my public
service career, I have had the opportunity to work in a number of different
agencies. I have served as Director-General of four Queensland Government
Departments – Main Roads, Education, Employment and Training, and Primary
Industries and Fisheries. I am also the Government champion for Lockhart River
– a remote community in Cape York.
Each department and the community presents its own set of challenges, diversity
and opportunities for creating public value. Some significant results for public
value ranged from completing roads projects such as the Pacific Motorway in
Main Roads to shaping the Learning, Skilling and Work agenda for Employment
and Training and the creation of the Lockhart River fishing company.
In a case study by Dr Kerry Brown and Christine Flynn on the Queensland
Department of Main Roads, they concluded that:
The integration of relationship-building with high quality technical
service delivery (at Main Roads) gives new insight into public sector
management strategies, as traditional internal strengths were built on at
the same time as efforts to broaden and enhance organisational capabilities
in different ways.
In all of these cases, my focus has been on creating the purpose and mission of
these organisations to shape their identity.
I developed the Three Frames management process and successfully implemented
this in the Government agencies where I have served as Director-General—most
recently, the Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries (DPI&F).

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While it can be described as a management tool, the Three Frames process is not
limited to management in a purely business sense. It is a methodology, or a
philosophy, that can be equally well applied to personnel management or to the
way in which agencies such as my own can deliver on government priorities
and meet the many challenges we face daily.
One such challenge was the response to the recent oil spill in Gladstone Harbour
where a fuel tanker on a bulk carrier from Korea was ruptured when it was hit
by a tugboat in Gladstone Harbour on 24 January 2006. For around 40 minutes,
the ship’s fuel spilled 25,000 litres of heavy fuel into Gladstone Harbour, creating
a slick.
Apart from the immediate environmental impact, this oil spill had the potential
to have a long-term economic impact on the local fishing industry –
contaminating prawns, crabs and fin fish, making them unsuitable for sale, and
destroying local breeding grounds. The immediate environmental and economic
impact would also have significant social implications for the local community.
The Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries was charged with ensuring
that the impact on the fishing industry was minimal and that the local community
supported the actions the department would take to remedy this situation. Our
response was based on the Three Frames approach with the aim of creating public
value. This involved having a clear understanding of the desired outcome,
connecting the people and organisations involved and identifying problems and
responses together.
This approach can be applied on our general business operations. Each day, the
operations of public sector operations consume public resources and produce
real consequences for society. Moore provides the idea of a strategic triangle
with the intersection of legitimacy and support, public value and organisational
capabilities as essential elements in this outcome. He challenges public managers
to imagine and articulate a vision of public value that can command legitimacy
and support and is operationally ‘doable’ in the domain for which they have
responsibility.
This framework helps us, as public managers, to connect what we believe is
valuable, and requires public resources, with improved ways of understanding
our public value. I believe that there is a strong congruence between Moore’s
premise and the Three Frames methodology – of performance, relationships and
alignment to create innovative public value and leadership of strategic
management in Government.

The Three Frames

The Three Frames approach consists of three interacting, learning frames, being:
• the Relationship Frame;

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 Applying Three Frames to the Delivery of Public Value

• the Performance Frame; and

• the Alignment Frame.

The Relationship Frame

The aim of the relationship frame is to build and sustain a safe, non-threatening
environment in which people feel able to share information including their
thoughts, feelings and values honestly with others.
This frame of reference acknowledges the individuals and relationships within
the system and also recognises these within social capital theories. Robert Putman
put it this way:
Stocks of social capital, such as trust, group norms, and self help
networks, tend to be self reinforcing and cumulative. Successful
collaboration in one endeavour builds connections which makes further
collaboration possible.
The Relationship Frame helps individuals and groups develop a rapport with
others, providing the best environment to solve problems, support each other
and to achieve desired outcomes.

The Performance Frame

The Performance Frame looks at what we want to achieve and provides a clear
and measurable picture of what we want, and need, to achieve to meet our goals.
In a business management context a balanced scorecard approach can be used
to set goals and accurately monitor performance. In the macro sense ‘government’
expectations are the benchmark. In this frame we need to determine what we
as a department want to achieve and the way we want to achieve it.

The Alignment Frame

The Alignment Frame looks at the relationship between or within organisations
and their members, and identifies any blockages that are stopping them from
achieving their goals as set in the performance frame. The alignment frame
accepts as its basic premise that poor alignment of relationships creates barriers
to the achievement of an organisation’s goals.
The Alignment Frame acknowledges the importance of both the organisation
and the individual, and in so doing, highlights the importance of each to attaining
of the goals of the other.
The Three Frames approach has been, in my view, the critical success factor in
delivering what the Government requires from my agency. Effective relationships
breed productive connections, both for the individual and for the organisation.
Through relationships, information is created, transformed and passed on, and
confidence and empowerment are built. This spirit of connectedness

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(relationships), coupled with a supportive environment that brings commonality

of purpose (alignment) for all parties, will ensure that departmental delivery is
aligned to government expectations (performance).
The Three Frames supports Moore’s idea that public managers are seen as
explorers (through the alignment frame) who with others (in the relationship
frame) seek to discover, define and produce public value (the performance frame).
I see the strategic triangle as an ‘organic’ system. Our reliance on mechanistic
and controlling approaches to leadership and management stand in the way of
innovation and effective leadership over participatory and self-organising
processes. There is an intrinsic value in participation.
Moore’s strategic triangle neatly overlays with this and the Three Frames. As
Moore suggests: ‘Managers should interact with the political system not simply
through the medium of their mandated purposes but instead through more
continuous and interactive dialogue’.
The Three Frames supports participation and engagement through dialogue, in
a committed and consistent manner, to respond effectively to issues.
The features of dialogue are:
• welcoming multiple viewpoints and maximum interaction;
• behaviours that encourage co-operation with and acceptance of others;
• talking and learning about shared issues which effect public value; and
• inquiry, exploration and participation with the authorising and
un-authorising environment.
Dialogue creates and recognises the humanised social systems of internal and
external relationships which exist in all authorising environments. I believe the
government’s response to the Gladstone oil spill is one example where Three
Frames has been successfully applied to support a dialogue-based process to
enhance public value.

Legitimacy and Support

As mentioned previously, the Gladstone oil spill had economic, social and
environmental consequences for public value. It had the potential to generate
public and political controversy. A wide range of interests were affected,
including local and State government, industry, environmental groups and the
local community, among others.
Commercial fishermen, seafood processors and local seafood retailers were worried
that their industry would be devastated, with potential long-term impacts on
fishing stocks. Environmentalists worried about the impact on sensitive seagrasses
and mangroves, as well as local dolphin and dugong populations. The wider
Queensland community was concerned about health and safety issues in
consuming seafood from the Gladstone area.
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 Applying Three Frames to the Delivery of Public Value

The Gladstone community was concerned about the impact on its seafood
industry. The Queensland Seafood Industry Association was worried about the
impact on consumer’s perceptions of wild caught product.
The public value lay outside the scope of one public organisation. It involved
Queensland Transport who were responsible for cleaning up the oil spill; the
Environmental Protection Agency who were responsible for managing the impact
on wildlife and water quality; Queensland Health who administer ‘The Food
Act’ and is responsible for ensuring the seafood is safe to eat; Primary Industries
and Fisheries who is responsible for the local fishing industry; The Premier and
Cabinet who is responsible for the government’s response to this incident and
the local council.
DPI&F facilitated the co-ordination of these diverse interests and perspectives.

Organisational Capabilities
I facilitated a learning circle dialogue in Gladstone with key players in the
authorising environment to respond to the issue. The objective of the dialogue
was to commit to a course of action with specified outcomes, responsibilities and
timeframes. The result of the dialogue-based learning circle was a commitment
to a course of action by a range of groups with multiple public value dimensions.
We convened the learning circle in the place where the event occurred in order
to empower local groups with a perceived stake in the decision-making affecting
their community. While we used the learning circle in this particular instance,
I have developed a range of techniques to support the Three Frames in delivering
innovative public value.
These include:
• Achievement Planning—a system for creating individual staff achievement
plans to link staff outcomes, results and behaviours to priorities and directions
that maximise public value (DPI&F is also introducing the Leadership Impact
tool by Human Synergistics to measure leadership impact of our Executive
and senior leaders);
• Dialogues for Action Forums—engagement and dialogue with external
stakeholders;
• Three Frame Audits—engagement and dialogue with internal stakeholders;
• Strategic Conversations—face-to-face dialogues between the Director-General
and groups of staff to discuss a current business issue;
• Management Learnings—a dialogue to reflect, learn and improve from an
activity or event; and
• Director-General Chat-line—an on-line communication system for staff to
engage with the DG by posting direct messages/questions and answers to
business issues and issues of public value.

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There have been over 60 Three Frame-based engagement sessions used in DPI&F
to interact in a meaningful way with our internal and external stakeholders.
This is also being recognised internationally with DPI&F currently being short
listed as a semi-finalist in the Commonwealth Awards for Public Administration
and Management for its citizen engagement work.

Conclusion
In the case of the Gladstone oil spill, in February 2005 we were able to inform
the commercial seafood operators that their catches were cleared for market. As
promised during the Learning Circle, the department collected more than 100
seafood samples from commercial operators. All of the samples were tested by
Queensland Health and showed that the seafood was suitable for sale. Also as
promised, the affected area will continue to be monitored over the next five
years to ensure there are no long-term effects.
DPI&F is working in concert with stakeholders, the Gladstone City Council, the
Central Queensland Ports Authority and others to rebuild the reputation of the
city’s seafood. This is just one example of where the Three Frames gives a simple
heuristic tool for public managers to address performance, relationships and
alignment to enable and deliver corporate strategy and create public value.

References
Moore, M H (1995), Creating public value: Strategic Management in Government,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Wheatley, M (2005), Finding our way: Leadership for an uncertain time,
Berrett-Koehler Publishers, San Francisco.

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10. Building Capacity for Policy
Implementation
Anne Tiernan, Centre for Governance and Public Policy,
Griffith University

Introduction
In Australia and internationally, the discourse of ‘declining policy capacity’ is
pervasive. Politicians, practitioners and scholars have expressed concern about
the ability of the public service to support policy processes through its analysis,
advisory and service delivery functions. There is particular concern about policy
implementation – about the ability and willingness of the public service to
promptly deliver on government commitments and priorities, and about the
extent to which policy and program design is informed by operational realities.
Anxieties about the potential for ‘disconnect’ between policy and service delivery
have been heightened by recent high-profile failures in sensitive areas of
government policy. This chapter examines recent efforts by the Commonwealth
and Queensland governments to build capacity for policy implementation,
notably through the establishment of implementation units. It offers an
assessment of their potential to address the dilemmas of implementation exposed
by recent policy failures.

Declining policy capacity

Both in Australia and internationally, there is concern that governments have
lost policy capacity (Parsons 2004; Peters 1996; Savoie 2003). The concept of
policy capacity is complex and ambiguous, but is typically concerned with
policy advising – specifically the availability of high quality information, analysis
and advice to support decision-making.
Perceptions that policy capacity has declined are widespread, including in
Australia (Edwards, Ayers and Howard 2003). Under a variety of labels including
‘capacity’, ‘competency’ and ‘capability’, concerns have been expressed about
the ability of governments to make intelligent choices (Painter and Pierre 2005),
to scan the environment and set strategic directions (Howlett and Lindquist
2004; Savoie 2003), to weigh and assess the implications of policy alternatives
(Bakvis 2000), and to make appropriate use of knowledge in policy-making
(Parsons 2004; Peters 1996). Others question the ability of existing processes
and structures to ensure an appropriate flow of information, analysis and advice
to decision-makers (Painter and Pierre 2005; Walter 2006), particularly around
issues of policy implementation and delivery, and whether after two decades of

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almost continuous public sector reform, the public service has the requisite
expertise, knowledge, skills and resources to support decision-making through
its policy advising functions (Bakvis and Aucoin 2005).
Concerns about declining policy capacity have been expressed by ministers,
senior public servants and scholars. Prime ministers from Australia’s John
Howard, to New Zealand’s Helen Clark to Britain’s Tony Blair have stated publicly
that they have been underwhelmed, and at times let down, by advice from their
bureaucratic advisers. The Australian Wheat Board (AWB), Iraq weapons
intelligence and ‘children overboard’ controversies are recent cases in point. In
Queensland, Premier Peter Beattie, has complained bitterly about the quality of
advice provided to him by public service departments and agencies. Public
service leaders have also expressed concern about declining policy advising
skills and competencies (Briggs 2005; Podger 2002; Wintringham 2003),
particularly in moments of crisis (Shergold 2004b).
Though expressed in similar terms, the discourse of declining policy capacity
means different things to different people. It has become an umbrella term
encompassing a variety of concerns about:
• the research, analytical and advisory skills and abilities of the public service;
• the ability of the public service to recruit and retain people with requisite
knowledge, skills and experience;
• the nature of relationships between officials and political executives; and
• the policy advising role of the public service in an increasingly dynamic,
pluralised and contestable environment.
Within the discourse of declining policy capacity, concerns have also been
expressed about implementation and delivery, specifically:
• the ability and willingness of the public service to promptly deliver
government commitments and priorities;
• the potential for policy intent to become distorted or diffused during
implementation. That is, for the ‘line of sight’ between policy formulation
and implementation to be obscured;
• the public service’s ability to mobilise and coordinate around
whole-of-government issues and priorities; and
• the potential for unanticipated or unintended consequences to flow from
government policy interventions.
Such concerns have sparked a more general renewal of interest in policy
implementation – a much neglected topic in policy studies (Barrett 2004). The
Blair government in Britain is frequently credited with spearheading this agenda,
mostly tangibly through its creation of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU)
in 2001. The PMDU is dedicated to ensuring that the government delivers on
its priorities in key areas of public service provision (Smith and Richards 2006).
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A major reform effort is currently focused on enhancing the British government’s

capacity for policy delivery, including the requirement for regular departmental
‘capability reviews’ to be conducted by the PMDU. 1 Implementation Units
have emerged within the core executives of other jurisdictions including the
Australian Commonwealth (Wanna 2006) and Queensland (Tiernan 2006). The
Victorian and South Australian governments have also established implementation
units recently. This suggests that there is broad interest in strengthening capacity
for implementation and that significant policy transfer and learning is occurring
between jurisdictions – a finding endorsed by comparative research. Lindquist
(2006) notes that first ministers in each of these locations have instigated the
development of new central capacities to ‘advise, monitor and ensure better
implementation of policy initiatives’.
The renewed focus on policy implementation has been primarily driven from
the political centre. In the Commonwealth and elsewhere, implementation units
are co-located with Cabinet support functions in Prime Minister’s and Premiers’
departments. As with much of the infrastructure supporting first ministers, they
are instruments of central control, principally concerned with advancing the
political interests of the incumbent leader (Peters, Rhodes and Wright 2000, p.
266).
Since their establishment in late 2003 and early 2004 respectively, the
Commonwealth and Queensland implementation units have established strong
central monitoring and reporting of commitments and priorities. Procedural
changes to focus agency attention on implementation planning during policy
development have been introduced and the units are engaged in a variety of
awareness and consciousness raising initiatives – the Commonwealth much more
so than its Queensland counterpart. 2 Secretary of the Department of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet, Dr Peter Shergold, has been an energetic champion of the
Cabinet Implementation Unit, and of the utility of project management techniques
in implementation planning and monitoring (see, for example, Shergold 2004;
2006b).

Concerns justified: delivery failures

Concerns about implementation capacity have been reinforced by high profile
implementation and delivery failures. In Canberra, the treatment of two mentally
ill Australian citizens wrongly deported by the Immigration Department became
a major scandal, precipitating wide-ranging reforms to the structure and culture
of the agency (Palmer 2005). The botched repatriation of the body of Australian
soldier, Jake Kovco, accidentally killed in Iraq, exposed coordination difficulties
in the interface between the Department of Defence and private contractors, at
the cost of great hurt to the bereaved family, and major embarrassment to the
Defence Minister and the government. In Queensland, a litany of delivery

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problems has plagued the Beattie Labor government during its third term, most
seriously the ‘crisis’ in the State’s public hospital system (Tiernan 2006). These
cases have served as ominous reminders to politicians and public administrators
alike of the serious political costs and consequences of implementation failure.
As Peter Shergold noted recently:
Poor delivery – such as inadequate service levels, lack of timeliness or
burdensome regulatory processes – risks public dissatisfaction. It can
reduce trust not only in public service but in the government it serves.
The quality of the implementation of government policy is central to
community support for the institutions of democratic governance
(Shergold 2006b, p. 1).
Much of the focus of the Australian implementation units has been on ensuring
delivery issues are planned and addressed in new policy areas. The problems
and failures afflicting the two governments have occurred in established service
delivery systems. In the Immigration and Queensland hospitals cases,
governments responded by establishing independent inquiries, including in the
Queensland case, a royal commission. As well as providing forums for
investigating the factors that led to the events in question, the reports of these
inquiries have generated useful blueprints for reform and change. They have
highlighted a serious disconnect between policy and service delivery – the classic
implementation deficit identified by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) in their
seminal study of implementation failure.
In Queensland, consultant Peter Forster (2005) who led the independent review
of public hospitals, was particularly critical of central agency and head office
officials for failing to appreciate and address systemic problems of under-funding,
workload issues, and the difficulties of recruiting and retaining appropriately
qualified staff to work in the state’s public hospital system. Forster (2005)
describes a major ‘expectation gap’ between what politicians and the public
expect can be delivered and what service systems are actually capable of.
Managing public expectations is an invidious and likely insoluble implementation
dilemma for politicians, as recent criticism of the Commonwealth and Queensland
government responses to the Cyclone Larry disaster have again demonstrated.
Despite a swift and focused emergency response to widespread damage wreaked
by the cyclone, and the difficulties of establishing services in the absence of
electricity and transport access, governments were criticised by some locals,
frustrated by delays in gaining access to relief supplies and funds. Their
complaints were amplified through the broadcast media – a young woman’s
anger at perceived inaction of ‘bureaucrats’, broadcast to an attentive national
audience.
The Immigration and Queensland hospitals cases also highlight the difficulties
of ensuring that operational realities are reflected in policy advice and

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decision-making, though it is interesting to note that both have been identified

primarily as public service failures – as failures of analysis and persuasion (see
Briggs 2005; Shergold 2006b), rather than failures on the part of policy-makers
to understand systemic problems and direct energy, attention and resources
towards addressing them before they escalated.
In the wake of these controversies, the Australian and Queensland governments
have initiated wholesale changes to affected departments. In Immigration and
in Queensland Health, the entire senior leadership teams were replaced, and the
organisations were radically restructured. There have been major funding
injections, and agency-based implementation units are bolstering the commitment
to ‘fix’ the identified problems. Strong central monitoring and reporting
arrangements have been established, including requirements to provide regular
reports to Parliament. 3
But rather than building local capacity, the appointment of significant numbers
of central agency staff to leadership positions in agencies like Immigration and
Queensland Health raises questions about the value placed on content knowledge
and service delivery expertise. Though perhaps understandable in an increasingly
personalised governance context, there are tensions between building capacity
for implementation and parachuting it in. It may further undermine confidence
in agencies already regarded as having failed in their duties to government and
the community. In both cases, delivery problems have persisted after some initial
blood-letting; agencies and their responsible ministers remain in the media
spotlight, as new leaders try to bed down hastily devised political ‘fixes’ and
confront the very genuine complexities of large-scale system reform.
These developments reflect the inherent tensions between ‘the normative
expectations of managerial control of policy implementation processes’ (Barrett
2004, p. 260) and the realities of implementation in a networked and highly
politicised service delivery context. Tiernan (2006) notes the predominance of
a ‘top-down’ view of implementation in the development of implementation
units and their monitoring strategies, especially in areas that have caused political
embarrassment. Barrett (2004) and Hudson (2006) observe a similarly top-down
orientation to implementation in the British context, noting ‘there is a lack of
recognition of the time and resources involved in achieving the organisational
capacity to achieve effective change’ (Barrett 2004, p. 260).
Political pressure to quickly address problems and failures in sensitive areas of
public policy may have perverse unintended consequences, potentially
embedding new and different implementation challenges down the track. For
example, Barrett (2004, p. 260) describes how ‘top down coercive pressure to
meet prescribed targets’ has ‘led to the skewing of service priorities’ (in this case
hospital waiting lists), and ‘even the manipulation of figures for the fear of the
consequences of failure’. Shergold, however, is unapologetic about the need for

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the focus on implementation and delivery to be driven centrally. He argues that

‘better implementation must consciously be driven from the top down’, while
simultaneously acknowledging that policy prepared without the experience of
those who deliver it ‘is almost certainly policy that will be poorly designed and
difficult to implement’ (Shergold 2006b, p. 3). Reconciling these competing
imperatives would seem to be the key challenge facing governments in building
capacity for policy implementation.
What role will implementation units play in this agenda, and how and in what
ways will their establishment help to address the problem of implementation
capacity in contemporary government? What are the prospects of addressing
the capacity problem through the establishment of implementation units? The
papers contributed to the special issue of the Journal of Comparative Policy
Analysis (JCPA) on the emergence of implementation units demonstrate clearly
that some progress has been made. Central units are playing leadership roles in
promoting and raising awareness of implementation at the ‘front end’ – during
policy development and design, though there are issues about their capacity to
do so. As fairly small units, whose work is closely linked to the strictures of the
Cabinet timetable, and driven by the priorities of the first minister, central
implementation units have limited capacity to undertake the kind of outreach
activities that would help to build capacity for implementation across
government. Peter Shergold (2006b, p. 3) describes these functions as being
about ‘learning by doing and then spreading the learning’.
The Immigration and Queensland hospitals controversies suggest that if the goal
of the new focus on implementation is capacity building, a more constructive
role for central units may be in helping promote better understandings of
implementation issues and challenges, particularly among decision-makers.
There is also an important role to be played in assisting agencies to more
effectively communicate the complex realities of translating decisions into
actionable programs to policy-makers. Greater engagement with the literature
on policy implementation and the policy-action relationship (Barrett 2004) could
be a useful first step, yet Lindquist (2006) reports there has been limited
engagement with the implementation literature in the design and development
of implementation units. In addition to their enthusiasm for project management
techniques, those interested in building capacity for policy implementation
would do well to revisit the scholarship and adapt some of its learnings to
contemporary practice.

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References
Bakvis, H. 2000, ‘Rebuilding policy capacity in the era of the fiscal dividend: A
report from Canada’, Governance, Vol. 13, No. 1, January, pp. 71-103.
Bakvis H. and Aucoin P. 2005, ‘Public Service Reform and Policy Capacity:
Recruiting and Retaining the Best and the Brightest? in M. Painter and J. Pierre
(eds.) Challenges to State Policy Capacity, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills,
Basingstoke, pp 185-204.
Barrett, S. 2004, ‘Implementation studies: time for a revival?’ Public
Administration, Vol. 82, No. 2, pp. 249-262.
Briggs, Lynelle 2005, ‘A Passion for Policy?’ paper presented Wednesday 29
June 2005 as part of the ANZSOG/ANU Public Lecture Series 2005.
Edwards, M., Ayers, R. and Howard, C. 2003, Public Service Leadership: Emerging
Issues, APSC.
Howlett, Michael and Lindquist, Evert 2004, ‘Policy Analysis and Governance:
Analytical and Policy Styles in Canada’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis,
Vol. 6, No. 3, 225 – 249, December.
Forster, P. 2005, Queensland Health Systems Review Final Report, Queensland
Government, September 2005.
Lindquist, E.A. 2006, ‘Organising for policy implementation: the emergence and
role of Implementation Units in policy design and oversight’, Journal of
Comparative Policy Analysis, Vol 8, No. 4, December, p 421.
Painter, M. and Pierre, J. 2005, ‘Unpacking policy capacity: issues and themes’.
In Painter, M. and Pierre, J. (eds.) Challenges to State Policy Capacity: Global
Trends and Comparative Perspectives, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Palmer, Mick 2005, Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Immigration Detention
of Cornelia Rau, Commonwealth of Australia, July 2005.
Parsons, W. 2004, ‘Not just steering but weaving: relevant knowledge and the
craft of building policy capacity and coherence’, Australian Journal of Public
Administration. Vol. 63 (1), March, pp. 43-57.
Peters, B.G. 1996, The Policy Capacity of Government. Canadian Centre for
Management Development.
Peters, B.G., Rhodes, R.A.W. and Wright, V. 2000, ‘The struggle for control’ in
Peters, B.G., Rhodes, R.A.W. and Wright, V (eds.) Administering the Summit:
Administration of the Core Executive in Developed Countries, Macmillan,
Houndmills.
Podger, Andrew 2002, ‘Defining an Australian approach to the roles and values
of the public service in the twenty-first century’, Canberra Bulletin of Public
Administration, no.104, June 2002, pp 1-5.
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Pressman, J. and Wildavsky, A. 1973, Implementation, University of California,

Berkley.
Savoie, D. 2003, Strengthening the Policy Capacity of Government, Report to the
Panel on the Role of Government, Research Paper Series, Vol 1, pp 239-290.
Shergold, Peter. 2006a, Pride in Public Service, Address to the National Press
Club, Canberra, 15 February.
Shergold, Peter 2006b, Project Management in Public Administration, Speech
delivered to ANZSOG Conference on Project Management and Organisational
Change, Canberra, 22 February.
Smith, M. and Richards, D. 2006, ‘Central control and policy implementation in
the UK: a case study of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit’, Journal of
Comparative Policy Analysis, Vol 8, No. 4, December, p. 325.
Tiernan, A. 2006, ‘Working with the stock we have: the evolving role of
Queensland’s implementation unit’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, Vol
8, No. 4, December. p. 371.
Walter, James 2006, ‘Ministers, Minders and Public Servants: Changing
Parameters of responsibility in Australia’, Australian Journal of Public
Administration, Vol 65, No 3, pp 22-27.
Wanna, J. 2006, ‘From Afterthought to Afterburner: Australia’s Cabinet
Implementation Unit’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, Vol 8, No. 4,
December, p. 347.

ENDNOTES
1 The capability review process was announced by Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil
Service, Sir Gus O’Donnell, at an appearance before the House of Commons Public Administration Select
Committee in October 2005. Though details are still be worked through, the departmental capability
reviews will focus explicitly on ‘the underlying capability issues that impact on effective delivery’. For
more information see O’Donnell’s statement at: [Link]
/pasc_speaking_note.asp
2 For detailed descriptions of the structure and activities of the Commonwealth and Queensland
Implementation Units see Wanna (2006) and Tiernan (2006) respectively, while for a comparative
assessment of these developments see Lindquist (2006).
3 Immigration is due to report to Parliament in September 2006. Queensland Health must report formally
on the implementation of the Health Action Plan by December 2006, but is posting regular reports on
progress towards key promises on its website [Link]

120
Section IV. Better Project and Program
Delivery
11. Program Management and
Organisational Change: New Directions
for Implementation
Lynelle Briggs, Australian Public Service Commissioner

The Issues
Effective and responsive program management is not simply about technique.
Rather, we are here concerned with the much harder job of changing our
organisations. This leads neatly to the question of why do we need to change?
What problems, what issues, what challenges are we responding to?
The answer to these questions will, of course, vary depending on the very
specific contexts of our agencies, and the public sector jurisdiction in which we
work. There are, however, a number of ‘generic’ factors common to Australia
and other advanced countries that are driving change across Australia’s public
sector.
I want to look briefly at those that I regard as especially important for
organisational change. They are:
• community or citizen expectations,
• challenges to implementation,
• organisational performance,
• complex, difficult and seemingly intractable, or ‘wicked’, problems, and
• political interest and will to improve the realisation of policy goals.

Community Expectations
Australians are much more sophisticated consumers of government services than
they were only a few decades ago. They are much better educated, much
wealthier and benefit not only from a supportive social safety net, but also from
the convergence of new administrative law in the 1980s and widespread access
to media and information and communication technologies. With this
improvement in Australian’s standard of living, our focus has switched from
the Government providing the basic fundamentals of health care, shelter and
welfare towards the overall quality and standard of government services.
Yet, as we have become wealthier and more sophisticated, we are no happier
and we demand more from governments than ever before. The Australian
community now expects high quality, seamless, accessible and responsive service
delivery … and that’s how it should be!

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Implementation Problems
At the same time, the Australian public sector has become more efficient, effective
and innovative at delivering government services. It is, then, somewhat
paradoxical that successive governments at all levels in Australia have been
bedevilled by implementation problems, or by programs going off the rails.
There is no one particular cause, more a reflection of a multitude of sins—for
example, where policy design has failed to properly take account of the challenges
to implementation, resulting in cost overruns, unexpected delays and poor
outcomes; or where officials have failed to get across to governments the problems
of underinvestment in essential aspects of programs; or where we have not
appreciated the time that it might take to get key stakeholders on side; or where
officials have not kept their eyes on the target or have let the ball drop; or where
we have simply failed to appreciate the higher standards demanded of us today.

Organisational Performance
Everyone knows that the world is changing constantly. Many of us have trouble
just keeping up and, yet, the spot light is on all of our organisations’
performances and how they might be improved, in the wake of productivity
requirements, tighter budgets, higher community expectations and so on. Our
goal really should be to move from a leading edge public sector, where we are
now, to an outstanding one. That’s why organisational change is so closely linked
with effective program management.

‘Wicked’ Problems
Complicating the picture even further are what Peter Shergold describes as
‘wicked problems’—complex and intractable issues, such as the health and
economic well-being of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, balancing
environmental protection and economic growth, social under classes and welfare
dependency and national security; problems that are seemingly resistant to
government intervention. 1
These are the sorts of problems that urgently need to be both the focus of new
thinking (informed by past experience) and subject to leadership that employs
dynamic and citizen focussed techniques—that are integrated and coordinated
across agencies and jurisdictions. On top of that, there needs to be a commitment
to directing the right level of resources to the task.
It is in this context that we have seen, in Australia and around the world, a focus
on connecting government; on whole of government solutions to hard problems;
on working across agencies and across jurisdictions; and on horizontal governance
that involves stakeholders in the design, planning and implementation of
government programs.

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We are, of course, also seeing new and innovative approaches in many areas,
but the point is that there is more to do, and there are no one-size-fits-all
solutions. Many of these ‘wicked’ problems—addiction, obesity, welfare
dependence—require behavioural change. Much of the recent policy design in
these areas is underpinned by notions of shared responsibility and self reliance,
and an acknowledgement that governments cannot achieve their objectives
without the support and involvement of the community, or without increased
cooperation and collaboration between sectors and agencies—more
‘co-productions’ (as ANZSOG is known to describe them).
This approach is evident, for example, in remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander communities where communities make commitments (to improve school
attendance, reduce drug and alcohol use, for example) and governments
undertake to provide services or funding to assist the community to achieve
their objectives (through Regional Partnership Agreements and Shared
Responsibility Agreements).

Political Will and Interest

Responsiveness to the elected government was a key theme of the watershed
report of the Coombs Commission into Australian Government administration
in the mid-70s, and was generally understood in terms of how the Government’s
intentions were translated into policy.
What we are seeing today is a determination by the Government to have greater
influence on the timely and effective delivery of their policy interventions.
Governments want to see some ‘bang for their bucks’—clear improvements as
a result of their interventions. They do not want to see their money fritted away
or unspent through poor planning or bureaucratic time wasting or incompetence.
Indeed, Peter Shergold said last week that ‘[e]very government knows that its
future depends not only on how wisely it makes decisions but on how effectively
its public service delivers them’.
It is, therefore, not surprising that the Australian Government has moved to
push for a greater focus on Government outcomes and to make some important
structural changes at the delivery end.
It has established the Cabinet Implementation Unit, within the Department of
the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to encourage earlier and more effective planning
for implementation of public policy decisions delivered through government
programs and services.
It is implementing the findings of the Uhrig Review of Corporate Governance of
Statutory Authorities and Office Holders to clarify lines of accountability between
agencies and Ministers and relationships between agencies and their portfolio
departments.

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What we are seeing here is a determination to get the right governance

arrangements in place, as a foundation for improved delivery and implementation
of the Government’s policy initiatives. This is not a shift away from devolution,
but an enhancement, with a focus on achieving better results for the Australian
community within a devolved environment.
To this end, in 2004 the Government created the Department of Human Services,
which brings together six agencies, as a means to improve co-ordination between
them, improve their responsiveness to Government direction, and to raise the
quality of the services they deliver. The Prime Minister said at that time:
[O]ne of the things we lack in the public service both at a Commonwealth
and a State level is a consolidated focus on the efficient and timely and
sympathetic delivery of services. We tend to look at service delivery as
an afterthought rather than as a policy priority.
Of course, the political interest in the nuts and bolts of public administration is
not limited to Australia. In the UK recently the House of Commons Public
Administration Select Committee launched an inquiry into the place of strategy
and planning in government. It will explore, among other things, whether
strategic planning is too centralised, or not centralised enough; how people are
best trained to carry out strategic planning; and whether Parliament should have
a greater role in the strategic planning process.
It raises in my mind that classic question of when is it appropriate to bring
project management skills into the policy process? I guess, the answer must
surely be, as soon as possible—the two are, after all, part of a wider program
management continuum.

The Focus of this Conference

These, then, are some of the complex problems, issues and developments that
have inspired this conference. The focus of the conference is project management
and organisational change. Its fundamental message is that implementation must
be taken seriously, and that we can, and we must, do it better.
In the time that remains I would like to outline my views about what I think of
as an evolved concept of program management.

A More Evolved Sense of Program Management

In the early 80s, when I was working in the then Department of Social Security,
‘program management’ was used in a limited sense of ‘to run’ a program. With
the advent of the ‘new public management’ it evolved to reflect new styles of
operating in the public sector. The use of the term very likely records the shifts
and nuanced adjustments that have occurred in public administration in the last
two to three decades.

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Today, the sense in which I am using ‘program’ describes the overall intervention
by the Government which is intended to bring about change that is consistent
with a policy position. Welfare to Work, the Regional Partnerships program, or
Australia’s skilled migration program are classic examples.
In this contemporary sense, program management is the discipline of delivering,
directly or indirectly, the outcomes and outputs that contribute to achieving a
policy objective of the Government—for example, to support elderly people
with low income in their retirements; or to assist business and community
development in regional areas; or to provide more effective government services
to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities.
The type of integrated and coherent program management framework that I see
evolving in the Australian Public Service operates on two levels: the systemic
or public service-wide level, and at the agency level.
At the agency level, officials manage particular programs and work with others
to facilitate the delivery of Government policy objectives.
At the systemic level we are seeing a whole of government approach to the
monitoring of implementation of Government policy decisions. This is happening
through the Cabinet Implementation Unit is ‘traffic light’ report, and the
‘gateway’ review system being developed by the Department of Finance; a focus
across the APS on learning from experience; capability building through
development programs, and, importantly, by ensuring greater exposure of people
to service delivery and implementation issues.
The discipline imposed by program management not only helps to articulate the
relationship between aspects of the program’s outputs, but seeks also to ensure
that they are integrated so that ‘the whole is worth more than the sum of its
parts’.
A commitment to program management recognises that responsibility for
developing and implementing the Government’s major programs often crosses
organisational and jurisdictional boundaries, and requires joint agreement about
what is to be achieved and how that will happen.
As it has evolved, program management has taken on a ‘change’ focus. The term
itself implies, in my view, a responsiveness to the environment (political, social,
cultural, strategic) that drives change; but also changes to structures and
processes, to a more strategic focus on expected outcomes and, if necessary, to
culture—with a clear view to achieving the Government’s policy objective. 2
For program management to be effective in this new environment, organisations
must change to move with it and to deliver on the Government’s objectives.

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Active Program Management

What I think this conference reflects is a determination to follow through on a
cultural shift that has been taking place in the public sector—where we are
finally shaken loose from our silos, where we move past the rhetoric of whole
of government working, to what I think of as an active or dynamic form of
program management.
What do I mean by active program management? I mean that it is not sufficient
to simply have the elements of good corporate governance in place—to have
ticked the boxes—corporate plan—tick; strategic plan—tick; service
charter—tick. Rather, what is required is a framework that actively supports
program managers (and project managers below that) to manage their piece of
the puzzle and to understand and manage the intersections with other areas of
their business. 3 Some of the important elements of such a framework include:4
• sophisticated scoping, planning and timing (including business case, setting
of milestones etc);
• putting in place appropriate milestones, success criteria, and measures for
quality assurance;
• proper and early assessment of risks and strategies for their handling;
• stakeholder management and communications strategy;
• ensuring all the resources are in place (human as well as financial);
• ongoing monitoring to ensure that the program continues to meet its
objectives;
• we should also build into the management of our programs:
• consideration of whether the program is having its intended effect and,
if not, take corrective action (for example, suggest policy changes or
changes to guidelines);
• processes for advising the Minister of progress, developments and
outcomes;
• measures to achieve efficiencies or improvements in administration of
our programs;
• audit and evaluation processes, including sound management information
systems, to assess how program and project outcomes are shaping up in
relation to the objectives of the program;
• given the trend to increasingly work through others for the delivery of
Government services, we also need to employ partnership approaches,
effective contract design and management and procurement processes; and
• we need to come to grips with the new governance and accountability issues
these approaches bring—to find effective ways of marrying vertical and
horizontal lines of accountability, and to understand that ultimately (whether
we like it or not) accountability for program performance and outcomes still
remains with us.

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Active program management promotes efficient and effective use of

Commonwealth resources, particularly by ensuring that expensive rectification
measures—for programs gone wrong—are not required.
We’ve been on a fairly steep learning curve in the APS as the financial
management and related skills (including contract management and procurement)
expected of us have expanded. I think there’s been a tendency for
over-confidence, followed by some predictable fall-out. Financial management
is a core competency and has to be managed year in and year out to ensure not
only that existing projects are supported, but that new projects—responding
to new challenges and new policy directions—can be implemented well.
Program failures, through botched program management, result in damage to
the reputation of the APS, and undermine the level of trust in government
amongst those that are the focus of the program and amongst the community
more generally. The snowball effect of unhappy customers equally applies to
the public sector as in the private sector—word spreads quickly; therefore active
and effective program management is essential.
Programs, in whatever form, are never static. They need to be actively managed
with a critical eye for their nuancing and further development or even their
replacement by something better—bringing us back to organisational change
and project management. 5

Program Management Capabilities

Peter Shergold describes implementation as the ‘heavy lifting’—as opposed to
policy advising which he says is often seen as the ‘zenith of apolitical courage’.
Implementation, he argues, is the point at which ‘courage’ is most needed,
undertaken as it is in the public gaze and subject to intense scrutiny. 6 It is the
point at which the policy is judged to have succeeded or failed.
It would, therefore, be remiss of me not to refer explicitly to the capabilities that
we need in the public sector to achieve the integrated program management and
high standard of outcomes we aspire to, and which the Government and the
community demands.
Program management requires a diverse set of capabilities, including, but not
limited to:
• financial management;
• risk management;
• contract management;
• change management;
• relationship management;
• strategic management;
• project management; and

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• influencing skills.
Even a cursory glance at the Senior Executive Leadership Capability (SELC)
Framework—the criteria against which senior executives in the Australian Public
Service are selected and developed—gives a sense of the wide ranging skill sets
required to perform the business of government.
Dynamic and integrated program management does not require a new super-breed
of public servant—but we are clearly looking to recruit people with a different
and more diverse mix of skills than we have in the past. It is not surprising,
then, that the APS has become a ‘graduate’ workforce. Overall, about half of us
have graduate qualifications, and 64 per cent of new recruits (who mostly do
not enter through graduate programs) are graduates. 7
Changing capability requirements are also reflected in the learning and
development programs that the Australian Public Service Commission offers. I
am committed to the development of programs by the Commission that are
responsive to what agencies need, and to supporting agencies align their business
objectives with their organisational cultures.
A common thread is the importance of a strong, strategically orientated APS
leadership team. The Commission plays a central role in the development of APS
leaders and over the next few months I will be unveiling a new suite of leadership
programs for the SES. We have already begun reinvigorating our EL programs
to focus more on regulatory activity, service delivery, policy development and
program management. I am hoping to launch our new program management
training programs by the middle of the year.
Attracting people with the right mix of capabilities is critical to the success of
program management in the APS—we need the right people in the right jobs at
the right time. A feature of the project management approach you will hear
about today and tomorrow is the explicit focus on looking at what you’re trying
to achieve and actively matching the skills that are required to bring it about.
I am very firmly of the view that we need to be much better at this in the public
service.
The latest Management Advisory Committee report on managing and sustaining
the APS workforce highlights some of the significant challenges we are going
to confront in the coming decades, as we respond to population ageing and
workforce constraint and as we compete to maintain our specialist and technical
skills.
Added to this, though, is the need for public servants to reflect personally on
what they can do to align their behaviours and attitudes with the changes evident
in modern government program directions, and what they might do to work
towards moving the cultures of entire public sector organisations towards greater

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alignment. It is this sort of thoughtfulness and action that is necessary, amongst

other things, if we are to reach the gaol of an outstanding public service.

Program Management ‘take-aways’

To sum up, the messages that I would like to leave you with about the evolving
concept of program management are that:
• program management seeks to provide coherence in the context of (ever
increasing) complexity;
• program management is a dynamic and integrated process that drives change
in order to achieve the Government’s policy objectives;
• program management provides clarity about the roles of people and agencies,
so that responsibilities and accountabilities are also clear;
• program management often requires responsibility and accountability across
boundaries;
• program management helps to identify and resolve tensions between different
aspects of a program—including through the alignment of business objectives
with organisational culture; and
• program management requires a diverse set of capabilities and active
engagement to use them and to change cultures and practices;
Ultimately, good program management will impact positively on trust in
government, citizen engagement and good outcomes for the Australian community.

Conclusion
We are all heading in much the same direction—looking to achieve better
alignment of our organisational cultures and business objectives so as to achieve
better outcomes for the communities we serve. The language we use to describe
what we’re doing will, undoubtedly, vary between agencies to some extent,
and more so across jurisdictions and sectors. The fundamental message remains,
however, that we must do implementation better and that we can do it better.

References
Bridgman, P. and Davis, G. 2000, The Australian Policy Handbook, 2nd edition,
Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW.
Marsh, I. 1999 'Program strategy and coalition building as facets of new public
management', Australian Journal of Public Administration, Blackwell Publishers,
December, 58 (4).
National Audit Office, 2001, Modern policy-making: ensuring policies deliver
value for money. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, HC 289 Session
2001–2002: 1 November.

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Normington, D. David Normington's 5 non-negotiable elements of program

management, Department for Education and Skills, United Kingdom,
[Link] [Link]
&CategoryID= 30 &ContentID= 199 &SiteID=1.
Shergold, P, Regeneration: New Structures, New Leaders, New Traditions, speech
delivered at the Institute of Public Administration Australia National Conference,
Canberra 11 November 2004. [Link]
shergold/regeneration_2004-[Link]
Australian Public Service Commission, 2005. State of the Service Report 2004-05,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, [Link]
stateoftheservice/ [Link]

ENDNOTES
1 Bridgman and Davis (2000: 43-44) describe wicked problems as 'issues that cannot be settled and will
not go away'; they typically involve '[h]istorical factors, competing interests or sunk costs … mak[ing]
all sides to a dispute unwilling to compromise'.
2 Marsh (1999:54) has identified a range of elements required for strategic thinking in program
management: continual monitoring of outcome effectiveness, identifying alternative ways in which to
configure a program, and monitoring emerging issues and trends and the identifying the implications
of those for the existing program.
3 Marsh (1999:54) characterises program managers as 'legitimate change agents', and suggests that active
engagement is critical to their role.
4 Normington refers to ‘5 non-negotiables for program management’: clarity on objectives, leadership
and roles, boundary working, risks, timelines and milestones.
5 The UK Auditor-General's 2001 report, Modern policy-making: ensuring policies deliver value for money,
suggests some essential considerations for active management of policy delivery:
1. A program is not always relevant or effective in a static form, and as a result there must
be continual monitoring of effectiveness
2. The needs of the group(s) targeted by a program may change or evolve
3. As time progresses, there may be opportunities for savings and efficiencies to be realised
in the delivery of the program
4. Program managers working in a whole of government context must be aware of, and,
where appropriate respond to, changes that partner agencies make to their parts of the
program delivery.
6 Shergold, P, Regeneration: New Structures, New Leaders, New Traditions, speech delivered at the
Institute of Public Administration Australia National Conference, Canberra 11 November 2004.
7 State of the Service Report 2004-05, p.150

132
12. What is a Project Management
Culture and How do we Develop it and
Keep it Alive
Kathleen Kuryl, Manager Better Practice & Project Services,
Department of Premier and Cabinet, Tasmania

Abstract
In developing the Tasmanian Government Project Management Framework, the
Project team relied heavily on the involvement and support of all Tasmanian
Government Agency representatives. The stakeholders developed into a very
cohesive group who believed in celebrating success! One result has been the
development and adoption of a whole of government approach to Project
Management methodology, as detailed in the Tasmanian Government Project
Management Framework (TGPMF), supported by the Project Services area in
the Tasmanian Department of Premier and Cabinet. Another result has been less
tangible but manifests itself in a sense of shared ownership across government,
leading to wider adoption. This sense of shared ownership and wide adoption
of the TGPMF could be said to be a good indicator of a healthy project
management culture across the organisation, but is it really? And if it is, how
do we continue to ‘grow’ the culture and also how do we link it to supporting
organisational change?

Background
In 1999 the Tasmanian Department of Premier and Cabinet, (DPAC) initiated a
Project with the rather long title of Project Management Information and
Resources Project (PMIRP). The Objective for the PMIRP was to improve
accessibility to, and improve the quality of, information on project management
tools and techniques and on available training for Tasmanian Government project
participants.
Longer-term benefits from the Project were identified as:
• improved standards for project management across the Tasmanian State
Service; and
• increased knowledge and skills in project management methodology, through
training and development covering all project participants.
Outputs included a new website featuring electronic copies of all resources,
including:

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• Tasmanian Government Project Management Guidelines;

• glossary;
• templates;
• knowledge base;
• fact sheets;
• resource kits;
• interactive tools, such as a Project Sizing Calculator and an ‘Ups and Downs’
game;
• an opt in mailing list; and
• help desk function.
Other outputs included:
• a Communication and Marketing Strategy Plan;
• Project Management Forums;
• newsletters;
• agency information sessions;
• facilitation of planning sessions for project teams in agencies; and
• individual advice and support.
The Project was termed a ‘Project about doing projects’ as it modelled, tested
and reviewed the Tasmanian Government’s preferred project management
methodology in its project management processes, as well as in the development
of the outputs. It was to exemplify the application of better practice in the
management of a project. This imposed extra constraints on the Project Manager
and team as, not only did quality outputs have to be delivered, the Project itself,
together with its outputs, had to stand alone as a model for projects within the
Tasmanian State Government.
In developing the outputs, the Project relied heavily on the involvement and
support of all Tasmanian Government Agency representatives. The project was
typified throughout as people working collaboratively across Government to
produce quality, useable and accessible resources. The goodwill and support
experienced by the project team, in undertaking their project activities, was
overwhelming. There was extensive whole-of-government consultation before
the Project commenced and during its execution. The result has been the
development and adoption of a whole-of-government approach to Project
Management, as detailed in the Tasmanian Government Project Management
Framework supported, by the Project Services area within the Tasmanian
Department of Premier and Cabinet.
An external consultant, John Smyrk of Sigma Management Science, conducted
a post project review in 2001 and again in 2003. In compiling the report, the
Inter Agency Steering Committee, joint Business Owners of the Project, were
surveyed. The report concluded, ‘Information about project management is

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 What is a Project Management Culture and How do we Develop it and Keep it Alive

much easier to obtain than it used to be. The practical value of the toolset is seen
as good. The impact on projects using the toolset is seen as very good’ (July
2001).
Phase One of the PMIRP, which was the planning stage, involved the management
of a large number of stakeholders in the form of project managers from all
Tasmanian Government Agencies as members of the Output Working Groups.
This exercise increased stakeholder expectations across Agencies and these
expectations had to be managed during Phase Two of the Project, which was
the production phase. This phase resulted in the early release of some outputs,
such as project management forums and resources on the web site. It also resulted
in a growing sense of shared ownership of the resources as opposed to being
seen as DPAC imposed.
In the redevelopment of the existing resources, and identification of new ones
to be developed, considerable changes were identified from consultation activities
conducted in Phase One. The existing Guidelines, although fit for the purpose
for which they were intended, were incomplete and focused mainly on IT
projects. They had also only been available to a limited audience, mainly those
projects that contracted the formal Quality Advisory and Review Service. The
PMIRP worked collaboratively with project managers from all agencies to
redevelop the Guidelines to become the Tasmanian Government Project
Management Guidelines, which were then made publicly accessible through the
Project Management website ([Link]).
The methodology as described in the Guidelines identifies 11 key elements,
which must be considered in the management of projects no matter what the
project size. The Guidelines are structured around these. The key elements
include some relationship to PMBok , but also others identified by Tasmanian
Government project participants. The core of the methodology focuses on the
application of a scoping and planning model adopted from John Smyrk, Sigma
Management Science. The model is termed the Input-Transform-Outcome model
(ITO). It directs project planning processes that are focused on the
outcomes/benefits, which the Project is aiming to achieve, and planning from
this identification. The PMIRP modelled this approach. One of the results was
the development of an Outcome/Benefits Realisation Plan, which was signed off
by the Project Business Owners and committed, in principal, all Agencies to the
utilisation of the outputs in order the achieve the stated outcomes/benefits. I
will focus on this further in the chapter, as it is one way we link project
management activities to organisational change management.
Existing templates were redeveloped mirroring the Guidelines redevelopment.
New templates, identified from the consultation processes, were also developed.
It was determined that if the Tasmanian Government Project Management
Guidelines were the ‘what’ of the methodology, then they needed to be supported

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 Improving Implementation

by products which detailed the ‘how’ of their application. This included

templates that could be downloaded from the website and content added; Fact
Sheets; Knowledge Base, including example documentation from Agencies; A
Quick Guide to the methodology; interactive tools and games, help desk, and
an opt in email list. A number of Forums were held where the draft resources
were tested and project managers shared their learnings with practitioners from
all agencies and also practitioners external to government.
It was deliberate policy to make all project management resources, tools and
information available electronically, without restriction. It was recommended
by the Project Manager, and agreed to by the Business Owners, that while the
primary clients were Tasmanian Government Agencies, in the interests of
fostering the Project Management Community of Practice, resources would be
freely available on a public site.
A strong partnership was formed with the existing Quality Advisory and Review
Service, later incorporated into the Project Services area, operating from the
Unit and also the Training Consortium, which has responsibility for brokering
training for Tasmanian Government Agencies.

Project Management Culture

The development of the Tasmanian Government Project Management Framework
and subsequent publishing of all resources on a publicly accessible website has
led to a greater focus on the practice of project management techniques within
the Tasmanian State Government. This is evidenced, not only from the final
review of the Project, but also from continuing feedback from Agency personnel,
information from website usage, attendance at forums and the number of requests
for information, support and advice. A requirement for project management
knowledge and skills, specifically knowledge of the TGPMF, has also been
included on a much more regular basis for project positions advertised within
Agencies.
Not only has the profile of the project management profession been raised within
the Tasmanian Government, but also emails received from around the world
indicate increased professional interest and the use of project management tools
and techniques. This area has received formal requests from organisations wishing
to adopt the methodology and tools available on our website. The free online
registration system for the download of the Project Management Templates
provides an ongoing record of where these templates are being used, and
therefore where there is the application of project management techniques.
Another result of the development of the TGPMF has been less tangible, but
manifests itself in a sense of shared ownership across government, leading to
wider adoption. This sense of shared ownership and wide adoption of the TGPMF
could be said to be a good indicator of a healthy project management culture

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 What is a Project Management Culture and How do we Develop it and Keep it Alive

across the organisation, but is it really? And if it is, how do we continue to

‘grow’ the culture and how do we link it to supporting organisational change?
We are quite happy to admit that Tasmania is a small State and we are either all
related to each other or know each other, or know friends of friends. This can
be a disadvantage, but throughout my rather long career in the Public Service
whenever we are working on a major change initiative it has proved to be a
huge advantage. Certainly in gaining commitment to developing the TGPMF, it
was of great advantage in helping develop and use our networks.
Key messages identified as part of our communication planning included stressing
that the sharing of understandings and experiences of project participants was
a vital element of any project management support activities. Another key
message was that the project outputs had been produced as a joint effort between
all Government Agencies and were therefore relevant across government. Both
of these key messages still form part of our communication and marketing
initiatives. We continue to ‘sell’ the message that the Guidelines and materials
are not DPAC’s, but belong to all agencies, as they were involved in the
development of them. While most of the material is written within the Unit, the
resources do capture the experiences of project participants together with
research into better practice. Resource development involves a great deal of
consultation with our practitioners and focuses very much on capturing their
learnings.
While the PMIRP employed all of the formal project management approach
including stakeholder management and communication strategies, a great deal
of informal networking was also taking place. This has continued with team
members currently spending many hours on the phone providing advice to
project participants, meeting for informal chats over coffee and inviting agency
project participants to drop in. We also put project managers in touch with other
project managers. We organise formal forums and informal get togethers. No
resources are published without going through our Project Management Advisory
Committee (PMAC) who also circulates them to agency project participants for
feedback. We are always conscious that Premier and Cabinet can be seen as an
ivory tower and that we could lose touch with the realities of the everyday issues
that project managers and teams face.
In recent times we have focussed on more organised ‘community of practice’
activities and on supporting other areas of government business to take a
‘community of practice’ approach under the Better Practice program. We now
have other frameworks developed, such as Web Publishing and Information
Security, which are supported by active communities of practice.
It is said that culture manifests itself in both formal ways, such as through the
use of symbols, and informal ways. The TGPMF and related activities can be
said to be the more formal manifestations of our Project Management Culture
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 Improving Implementation

and are to a certain extent measurable. The community of practice and associated
network activities are the less formalised manifestations of a healthy culture,
but vital to its development and sustainability.

So, what is a PM culture?

[Link], Wikipedia 1 defines organisational culture as ‘comprising the
attitudes, values, beliefs, norms and customs of an organisation. Whereas
organisational structure is relatively easy to draw and describe, organisational
culture is considered to be less tangible and more difficult to measure’. The same
applies to defining what makes a project management culture. [Link]
describes a strong culture as one where staff respond to stimulus because of
their alignment with organisational (substitute project management) values.
Where culture is strong people do things because they believe it is the right
thing to do. If we were to take this as an indicator of a strong project management
culture, within the Tasmanian Government, the TGPMF has not been mandated
in any policy documents but accepted as the Tasmanian Government
methodology through its application in practice.
If we were to try listing the criteria for defining a project management culture
I would suggest that it would vary from organisation to organisation. The
‘evidence’ I use to make me believe we are a long way there in the Tasmanian
Government is the following.
• the TGPMF is not mandated but accepted across agencies;
• we have high level sponsors including the Inter Agency Steering Committee
(IASC), which has membership of Deputy Secretaries from all agencies;
• we have an active Community of Practice that extends outside government;
• senior executive within agencies expect to see projects planned and
documented using the Framework;
• we have a whole-of-government training pathway for project managers;
• our workshops and forums are well attended (usually over 100);
• agency personnel know whom to contact if they have a project management
issue, not just us but project managers in other agencies, networks are alive
and well;
• we have two representatives from each agency on our Project Management
Advisory Committee, (PMAC) and the majority consistently turn up for
meetings, circulate information within their agencies and regularly provide
timely feedback to us on resource development and service delivery issues;
• we continue to monitor and report activities and current issues, and there
is still interest in us doing so;
• 90 percent of large Tasmanian Government projects use our fee-for-service
QA;

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 What is a Project Management Culture and How do we Develop it and Keep it Alive

• 100 percent of large Tasmanian Government projects use our guidelines and
templates;
• several agencies have recently begun to look at the establishment of various
forms of Project Support Office (PSO) using the TGPMF resources as the
tools;
• several agency Corporate Plans specifically mention having applied the
TGPMF;
• our team is well known across agencies and we are told we have a good
reputation as being accessible and responsive;
• we currently have 650 subscribers to our email list (self-subscription process);
• we receive many requests to present at agency information sessions;
• agency personnel return from conferences and contact us to proudly mention
that ‘our’ TGPMF has been referred to;
• current major projects across government – all of which include significant
organisational change management challenges (OCM) – have elected to take
a project approach, either by individual sets of projects or programs of
projects; and most importantly
• there is a sense of shared ownership of the methodology on the part of
practising project managers, who feel comfortable to comment and provide
feedback on what works and what does not.
With regard to helping ascertain how healthy your Project Management Culture
is, Project Management Maturity models exist, and organisations can be
contracted to assist in assessing the maturity level of your organisation. The
Australian Institute of Project Management (AIPM) proposes one such model.
It proves a little more difficult to gauge whole-of-government maturity as opposed
to individual agencies. While I have focussed on whole-of-government activity
in this chapter, individual Tasmanian Government agencies are obviously at
differing stages with their own application of a project management discipline.
One can also join Project Management Benchmarking Networks that provide
valuable insights when you are benchmarked with like organisations. Many of
these opportunities we are unable to take advantage of due to budgetary
constraints. We therefore try to use our networks, both interstate and overseas,
to as much advantage as possible. We continually seek to share our learnings
with others and to learn from them. Our standard response to a copyright request
is:
Yes, with due acknowledgement, but it is ‘warts and all stuff’ and we
would love to hear back from you about what you are learning about
the usefulness of the resources and how they might be improved. More
importantly lessons learnt from the projects you are undertaking and
how these lessons might be captured and shared.

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 Improving Implementation

In summary, I believe we do have a healthy project management culture in the

Tasmanian Government but the form it takes is probably different to how it
would be seen in other State or Federal Government jurisdictions. For example,
in some Commonwealth Departments it is a mammoth job to get agreement to
common project management processes across individual units let alone across
the whole of department or indeed government. In many cases Project
Management frameworks or methodologies have to be mandated with other
support activities aimed at creating the collaborative culture that will enable
more than lip service to be applied. Gateway processes are gradually being
implemented where projects have received large amounts of funding. I would
contend that gateway processes need to be founded on particular project
management methodologies. The UK uses PRINCE2 for example. It is much easier,
and possibly more efficient and effective, to introduce a Gateways approach if
the project management practices are sound and in place. In fact, why would
we fund major change initiatives where there is no evidence of a quality project
management framework within which the projects will be undertaken?

How do we continue to grow the PM Culture?

Our biggest challenge now within the Tasmanian Government is to fight the
perception that (okay) we have done the project management ‘stuff’ we can go
into maintenance mode with the Project Services’ activities and focus on other
things. I have responded by using a very female type metaphor of, 'if you give
birth to a baby and nurture it to early adolescence, you do not suddenly leave
the child to fend for itself, as it probably will not survive!' In our case the
Community of Practice would certainly keep things going, but without strong
support and continual revision and improvement of the TGPMF, the rot would
soon start to set in.
Referring to Wikipedia once again, there is a stated risk that where a strong
culture exists another phenomenon can emerge, Groupthink. This is a state where
people think so alike that they do not challenge organisational thinking and
there is reduced capacity for innovative thought. Having an established Project
Management methodology could lead to missed opportunities for innovation
through reliance on established procedures. We are very conscious of this and
constantly seek feedback from our practitioners, based upon their knowledge
and experience. We also do our very best to keep up to date with the latest
research and to keep our own professional development current. We have tried
to create a ‘living’ framework where we are constantly reviewing and
endeavouring to make sure that our resources, advice and support meet the
needs of our practitioners. We have been told that our resources are very practical
and useful, and this is what we strive to achieve. We also strive to keep a high
profile amongst the practitioners, keep them in touch with each other, and
continue to generate the sense of shared ownership of the resources.

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 What is a Project Management Culture and How do we Develop it and Keep it Alive

Our standard response whenever someone mentions the DPAC Project

Management Guidelines is to say, (nicely) 'No, they are the Tasmanian
Government Project Management Guidelines and were put together by
practitioners from all agencies, not just DPAC'. This continues to be one of our
key marketing messages. We now have an extensive network of practitioners
across all agencies and we use constant communication, formal and informal to
keep this network alive. We work in partnership with our Government Training
Consortium to ensure Project Management training pathways are provided and
information sessions are held for new recruits. Agencies can also request in-house
training tailored specifically to their needs, and we assist with organising this,
sometimes delivering it ourselves, depending upon the need.
Our local TAFE has introduced Project Management training as part of the
Business Services and Public Sector Training Packages. We are collaborating
with them and they are using some of our resources so that government
employees receive similar messages. One of our team is delivering part of the
course.
We have begun to work with our Department of Treasury and Finance to
incorporate the requirements of the budget submission process into the Project
Business Case templates. This includes assisting with designing of training
modules for budget submissions and aligning that with project management
processes.
A number of Inter-Departmental Steering Committees have been formed to
oversight major Tasmanian Government projects, and these committees apply
the governance structures and methodology as outlined in the TGPMF. This
includes
• the Tasmania Together Program which is a long-term social, environmental
and economic plan for the State’s development for a period of 20 years; and
an overarching framework for planning, budgeting and policy priorities for
the government and non government sectors;
• eGovernment projects, including major changes to the Monetary Penalties
and Motor Registry systems; and
• Social Policy Projects.
Our area has contact with each of these Inter-Departmental committees including
the Inter Agency Steering Committee that also acts as the governing body for
our Unit is activities.
We are beginning to explore, as a Government, the relationship between policy
development and project management. As previously mentioned we already
have good examples in government of major policy initiatives, which have taken
a structured, project management approach in development and implementation.
Tasmania Together has been mentioned as one such example. Our Social Policy

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 Improving Implementation

Projects Unit, within DPAC, takes a project management approach to

implementation of social policy. It is arguable that good policy development and
implementation is achievable by taking a structured project management
approach within the context of the strategic direction of the organisation. If
project management is all about the management of change, so is policy
development.
Team members continue to make themselves personally accessible and
practitioners come to us for support and advice. We can also assist by putting
project participants in touch with each other across government. As I mentioned
previously, being small has its advantages. We often refer to silos within
government but I argue that through our project management community of
practice (CoP) and other CoP activities we are drilling so many holes in the silos
that they should eventually crumble.
The Project Services team has also gained credibility with Senior Executives and
through the provision of the Project Management Quality Advisory and Review
Services, Steering Committees take quality recommendations very seriously and
in at least two recent cases recommendations to halt and review large projects
have been accepted.
There is no easy answer to keeping the culture alive. I think it boils down to
sheer perseverance and the need for a central group to continually support the
practitioners out there in whatever ways they deem useful. Passionate
commitment to ‘the cause’ is a must as is a belief in celebrating every whiff of
success. A sense of fun is also important and that is why we include a ’fun’ bit
on our web site.
Project managers need champions as they ply their craft, often in the face of
middle managers who put the pressure on to ‘just get on with doing the project’,
none of this rubbish about taking time to plan and document before commencing
the work. The Tasmanian Government Project Management Guidelines Version
6.0 (March 2005) state specifically that ‘considerable time should be allowed in
the initiation phase of the project life for initial planning and scoping activities,
as this is often the most neglected key element, due to pressure just to get on
with doing the project. This pressure should be vigorously resisted’. 2
We still have a big job to do in winning over that group labelled ‘middle
managers’. We do have strong commitment from the practitioners, and strong
support from the senior executive. But it is at the business unit level and with
the business unit managers that we still have a challenge to convince of the
usefulness of taking a structured approach to managing projects. There is still
the perception that project management is all about documenting and far too
much of it. We have to constantly fight that perception and stress that the
purpose of the documentation is all about recording the decisions made for future
reference.
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 What is a Project Management Culture and How do we Develop it and Keep it Alive

How do we link Project Management to Organisational

Change Management?
Having determined that we believe we have a reasonably healthy project
management culture within the Tasmanian Government, how can we use this
to support organisational change? We do this by building it into our project
management methodology and supporting project managers and steering
committees to clearly define the nature and extent of the changes the projects
are aiming to bring about. We try to give them the tools and networks to support
their efforts to do so.
We define project management in the Guidelines as ‘a formalised and structured
method of managing changes in a rigorous manner. The application of any project
management methodology requires an appropriate consideration of the corporate
and business culture that forms a particular project’s environment’. 3
One of the key fundamentals of our approach is that all projects bring about
change. Our approach in planning and scoping projects is to begin with the
fundamental question of ‘why is the initiative being undertaken?’ and ‘what
are the planned outcomes/benefits the project aims to achieve?’. Some of these
are then defined as ‘measurable’ and we term these ‘Target Outcomes’. We argue
that every project, no matter what the size, should be able to prove at the end
that they have achieved the planned business benefits/outcomes.
Our response to a recent Cross Jurisdictional CIO committee survey requesting
information in relation to current/best practice associated with ICT project
management and benefits realisation, stated that:
It should be noted that the Tasmanian Government Project Management
Framework stipulates that Departments frame Business Case funding
requests and Project Business Plans in terms of the business drivers rather
than solely technology or infrastructure requirements. In this sense,
there are no ‘ICT’ projects as such, but rather projects with business
drivers that may include an ICT component as part of the solution.
In recent times, the Tasmanian Government has chosen to manage change
increasingly through the use of project management principles and practices.
There are currently no cross-agency projects being undertaken in Government
that do not employ the TGPMF to some degree.
Organisational Change Management (OCM) can be defined as the management
of realigning an Agency/organisation to meet the changing demands of its
business environment, including improving service delivery and capitalising
on business opportunities, underpinned by business process improvement and
technologies. It includes the management of changes to the organisational culture,
business processes, physical environment, job design/ responsibilities, staff
skills/knowledge and policies/procedures. Projects are used as the vehicle for

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implementing changes to an Agency/organisation. Projects are all about

transformation and are intended to create change of one kind or another, no
matter how small or large. 4
While organisational changes are often monitored during project implementation,
in the past not enough attention was paid to defining the organisational changes
required to ensure project outputs are effectively managed after project closure
and defining who is responsible for making this happen. For the changes to be
effective and the full benefits achieved on an ongoing basis, planning for
business/organisational change, at the beginning, during and after the project,
is essential.
Very few projects are carried out in isolation in an agency, organisation or
business unit. Overall strategic direction for the management of change within
the agency/organisation may have been established already, and articulated in
relevant corporate/strategic plans or similar documents. This should be
considered in the light of the overall organisational approach and the extent to
which the project is involved in bringing about change. We contend that project
outcomes/benefits cannot be fully realised without the necessary organisational
changes being made.
Owens and Owens state that organisational change management should focus
on both tangible and intangible changes. The tangible being the physical
organisational changes required and the intangible being the people risks to the
project, i.e. cultural changes, buy-in and acceptance from stakeholders etc. While
Owens and Owens suggest that it is the Project Manager who takes responsibility
for this, we argue that it is the collective responsibility of the Project Manager,
Project Sponsor, Steering Committee and Project Business Owners. 5
James Carlopio (2003) states that, for a project to be successful, organisational
change management needs to be integrated into project management, not just a
bolt on. 6 In the TGPMF we have named Organisational Change
Management/Outcome Realisation as one of the eleven Key Elements of project
management.
There is a growing focus on being able to measure and secure benefits. We
support the Outcome/Benefits Realisation planning approach where we argue
that no project should be closed until it is very clearly documented as to whom
the project outputs will be delivered, what business process changes will be
needed to manage the outputs and who will be held accountable for
Outcome/Benefits Realisation on an ongoing basis. We suggest that this planning
commence with project initiation so that before the project commences there is
at least an understanding of who the Business Owners for the project outputs
will be on project closure.

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 What is a Project Management Culture and How do we Develop it and Keep it Alive

The purpose of Outcome/Benefits Realisation planning, and its documentation,

is to ensure that:
• the final stages of the project are managed in a satisfactory manner;
• the utilisation of the projects outputs are linked to the planned project Target
Outcomes;
• the success of the project’s outputs are assessed and corrective action
performed if required; and
• the planned project outcomes/benefits are realised to a significant extent,
prior to formal project closure.
Outcome/Benefits Realisation planning, we suggest, is all about gaining
commitment from the Business Owner(s) to manage and maintain the outputs in
a quality manner, and to ensure that reporting of progress against the realisation
of the Target Outcomes occurs at agreed intervals after the project closes. In
order to manage the project outputs in a quality manner, Business Owners must
take responsibility for implementing the necessary organisational changes.
We advise that as part of the initiation phase of a project, the Business Owner(s)
for each of the high-level outputs from the project should be identified and
included within the governance structures. It is the Business Owner(s) who will
accept responsibility for the ongoing management of the project outputs once
delivered, the realisation of the Target Outcomes from the use of those outputs
and subsequent flow of benefits to the agency/organisation and its customers.
Organisational change management programs are increasingly delivered by using
a project management methodology with the aim of fully achieving the benefits
of the project. Benefits cannot be fully achieved if the required organisational
changes have not taken place. These include process change, technology change
and most importantly, people change.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the development of a project management culture within the
Tasmanian Government has meant a long-term commitment, mainly on the part
of the project management practitioners, but also for senior executives and the
Project Services team based in DPAC. One cannot really pinpoint in time when
it began, but like most other organisations, the Tasmanian Government has
progressed along a path of project management maturity. As a result of a major
project failure in the early 1990’s, there was recognition of the need for a
structured approach to managing projects to increase their likelihood of success.
The Tasmanian Government’s project management methodology was developed
and has evolved over the past ten years. It has been an iterative process with
input from external consultants, international research including an analysis of
the nine knowledge areas within the PMBOK® and pragmatic input from
practising project managers within the Tasmanian State Service.
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The Project Management Resources and Information Project (PMIRP) was an

exercise in organisational change management. It resulted in the establishment
of the Tasmanian Government Project Management Framework and a small
Project Services team. This team continues to work collaboratively with our
practitioners to keep our project management culture alive and healthy. This
work does require passion, commitment and continual championship for ‘the
cause’.

ENDNOTES
1 [Link]
(accessed on 7 February, 2005)
2 Tasmanian Government Project Management Guidelines Version 6.0 March 2005, page 11.
3 Tasmanian Government Project Management Guidelines Version 6.0 March 2005, page 3
4 Tasmanian Government Project Management Guidelines Version 6.0 March 2005, page 30
5 Using Change Management to Achieve Business Benefits, Steve Owens & Susan Owens, AIPM IRC,
[Link] (accessed 10 February 2006).
6 Carlopio. J, Changing Gears The Strategic Implementation Technology, Palgrave Macmillan, New
York as quoted in Using Change Management to Achieve Business Benefits, Steve Owens & Susan Owens,
AIPM IRC, [Link] (accessed 10 February 2006)

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13. Project Management and the
Australian Bureau of Statistics: Doing
What Works
Dennis Trewin, Australian Statistician, Australian Bureau
of Statistics

Introduction
Project management has to be a core competency for an organisation like the
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and, indeed, for all our organisations. And
I am not just talking about IT projects, I am talking about operational projects,
particularly large projects like the population census which we are doing later
this year. Now I said IT projects, but that is probably a bad term to use. What
we really should be talking about is business projects with IT as an enabler.
I will first go through some of the reasons for needing a project management
framework, that is, why the ABS decided to introduce one. I will then walk
through the ABS project management framework before talking about some of
our key learnings, both successes and failures. Finally I will describe a case study
of the application of the project management framework, our Business Statistics
Innovation Program.
My key message is the need for an agreed project management framework. This
is not only to ensure that you have effective project management, but that it is
done in a consistent and effective way. You can then support your project
management framework with training programs, guidelines and so forth. If
everyone is doing it their own way it becomes much more difficult. I will be
talking about the ABS project framework, but I am not trying to sell that to you,
what I am trying to sell to you is that it is important to have some form of project
framework. And there is off-the-shelf software available. Microsoft Project is
one example but there are many others that you might be able to fairly easily
adapt for your own particular circumstances.

The ABS Project Management Framework

Why did the ABS implement a project management framework? There was a
situation about eight years ago where we had too many projects running over
time and over budget. And there also was a lot of creep in project scope and
that’s one of the reasons that they were running over time and over budget.
Project responsibility was not always clear. There was insufficient ownership
by the business areas of projects. There was also insufficient emphasis on

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identifying risks and how they should be managed. And, interestingly, we found
there was too much emphasis on output rather than outcomes. This is quite
common for projects that are based on new IT applications. There is a tendency
to think the job was finished when the IT application had been developed.
Just to give you one example of the emphasis on outputs rather than outcomes,
we had a major data warehouse project where the people that developed it said,
'it is built, it meets all the specifications and is fully tested”. But the end users
were not using it effectively. So the project was not really complete. There was
a missing gap between the output of delivering a particular warehouse system
and the outcome it being used successfully by the people who should be using
it. And I think this is true of a lot of projects. People forget about the last step
of assisting users to apply the new system effectively.
And also we did not have a universal approach to project management. A lot of
people did take project management seriously but they did it in their own way.
We were influenced by a representative of Lend Lease, a company that has a
great reputation for project management. In fact they argue that good project
management is one of the most significant contributors to their profit margins.
At the time they were constructing a new building for us so we had an
opportunity to talk to some of their senior people and project management was
one of the issues that we talked about.
Our project management framework has seven key elements. These are set out
in Table 1. It is not rocket science, but a lot of common sense. But actually having
the elements documented and used to manage projects is very sensible.

TABLE 1: Key Elements of the Project Management Framework

• Project Planning
• Management of Risk
• Management of Issues
• Management of Change
• Project Quality
• Project Governance
• Project Financial Management

The first phase I will talk about is project planning. This phase sets out the
business case including the specification of outcomes that you actually want to
achieve. But also, importantly, it defines measures that determine whether you
actually met these outcomes or not. It also sets out the project outputs and how
they are linked to the project outcomes.
Management of risk is extremely important. The first step is to identify what
the significant risks are and this really should be done in a brainstorming type

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of session. And sometimes it is very useful to bring in people who are not too
closely associated with the project. You might bring in people who may not
know much about the particular project but they have experience in project
management and through this set of eyes they can see things that often those
that are closer to the project cannot see. After you have identified the risk it is
important to develop risk mitigation strategies, i.e. how might you reduce or
even eliminate a risk. And then you have to make a decision on whether you
will adopt the risk mitigation strategy or take the risk. In some cases its impact
may be so low or the chance so low you decide, well let us take the risk and not
expend the resources involved in reducing the risk. It is also an important part
of project management to think about what the contingency plans will be where
you are not fully taking account of a risk. And of course it is important to monitor
risks all the way through the project. They can change.
We all know from our experience that issues crop up all the time. They need to
be managed but it does not make sense to deal with them one by one as they
occur. It would simply lead to chaos. I guess some are so important you have to
and that is where judgement comes to play. But all issues should be recorded
and it is important to examine if there are some patterns emerging so that you
can address issues in a systemic way rather than just on a one by one ad-hoc
way. And as issues are processed they become either tasks or risks or dropped
as no longer an issue because they are not sufficiently important.
Management of change is another key part of project management. And this
should be planned for early in the project rather than waiting until the
commissioning stage, because it really can be the key to success. We all know
that change is not always welcome by those who are most affected. A lot of
people prefer to live in their comfort zone. So it is important to identify the
people who might be affected by change, understand what their concerns are
and develop plans to address these concerns. It is also important to win their
hearts and minds and that they know and understand why you are making
change. You need to convince people that it is not only in the long term interest
of the organisation that it is also in their long term interest if that is the case. If
it is not their long-term interest it is better that they know that sooner rather
than later as well. It helps them plan their future. Job design is a very important
part of this process. And if you can, you should allow the people who are most
affected to influence the way jobs are designed. And training or reskilling of
course is a vitally important part of the management of change, particularly if
staff are changing responsibilities.
Project quality is largely common sense. For your outputs, determine how you
are going to decide whether they are actually fit for purpose. What are the
measures of success?

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Project governance is important. Many projects fail because the governance

arrangements are inappropriate or unclear. First of all, establish milestones and
manageable project phases. A lot of projects are very big so it is important to
break them down into chunks, manageable chunks. We have a rule that we do
not allow any project phase to last more than 12 months or take up more than
four staff years. Once you get beyond that, it is starting to get difficult to manage.
Of course lots of large projects are much bigger than that. So you should try and
break it down into manageable chunks that you can control much more easily,
as well as being able to gain a full understanding of the links between the
different chunks. These have to be managed as well.
As to setting up the actual governance arrangements, this is ‘horses for courses’.
Our project management framework suggests that a project board be set up.
And generally you should make the business area provide the chair of the project
board just to make sure the project ownership is appropriate and senior people
from the business area are involved throughout the project. For smaller projects
this might be overkill and the usual line manager, if you like, can take on the
responsibility of the project board, i.e. the decision making responsibility:
determining key strategies, monitoring project progress and so forth. But they
may decide to set up a consultative or steering group to assist them even though
they are taking the main responsibility. But no matter what the project
governance arrangements are it is important to define and document the roles
and responsibilities of all who are involved or confusion can reign. People can
start getting involved in activities that are not really their business. Or the
reverse can occur, that is they do not take responsibility for things that they
really should be responsible for. The key role is the project manager. That is the
person who has most responsibility for the things that happen from day to day.
And the project owner is important. They often are the Chair of the Project Board
or they may delegate their authority to someone else. But they must retain
ownership.
It is necessary to make hard decisions that may change original project plans if
things do not proceed according to plan. It may be that as things develop the
original plan does not make sense anymore, that you should do something
somewhat different. You may have budget blowouts or time table blowouts
perhaps even in the early phases of the project. And making necessary
adjustments to the project plan is a very important plan of the responsibility of
the project board or whatever governance arrangements you establish. We try
very hard to maintain budgets and timetables no matter what. So, if things are
not going according to plan the preferred option is to modify our ambitions
rather than just let things slip.
I will not say much about the project financial management except that it is
largely common sense. We have found it useful to analyse variations to

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expenditure plans, particularly significant variations, because it can give you

insights into potential problems.
Within our project management framework, there is a set of facilities that are
part of the framework. First of all there is a software package. We have developed
our own package within the Lotus Notes system. To support the package there
are a range of templates (e.g. Issues Management, Risk Management) and
Guidelines. And there are also support arrangements inside the ABS, experts on
project management that people can talk to particularly in the early stages of a
project but also in the intermediate and later stages if problems emerge. We have
also contracted an external expert, a chap by the name of John Smyrk who helps
us from time to time, particularly in the early stages of large projects. And the
suite of tools is supported by classroom training and an online training package.
Just repeating something I said at the start of the talk, I am not arguing that you
should use the ABS project management framework, I am just using it as an
illustration of a framework and suggesting that something along these lines is
important for all organisations. It is also important for all projects whether IT
enabled or not.

What have we learnt from the use of the Project

Management Framework?
I will first turn to a summary of the successes we have had since the introduction
of the Project Management Framework. Since we introduced the project
management framework we have experienced better control of projects. We
have managed risks much better. For each project we go through a process of
identifying risks and working out how they should be controlled. Problems
have been identified earlier and therefore much easier to resolve. Also our
financial performance on projects has been much better. There have been less
budget blow outs. Quality has been built into project outputs – there has been
greater collaboration between the project team and the project owners on what
fit for purpose actually means. And that is partly because of the improved
information flow between the different stakeholders and a better understanding
of their respective roles. So we have reduced project creep. Project creep now
is seen in a negative light and avoided. If there really is a need to add
functionality to a particular project it is seen as a separate exercise, requiring
separate justification.
There are some lessons we have learnt, particularly from our early experiences.
The first one is getting the scale of project management in proportion to the size
and impact of a project. The mistake we made was using the project management
framework to its full extent on every project and for some projects that was a
sledgehammer cracking a nut. So adapting the project management framework
to fit the particular characteristics of a project is quite important. We’ve also

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learnt to monitor milestones better. And to take deliberate action once we realised
that a milestone will not be met rather than just hoping that you’ll catch up at
some later stage in the project.
Some of the projects board got into micro-managing the project. The
micro-management tasks are for the project manager and his/her team, not the
board. So having a clear understanding of the respective roles of the project
board and the project manager is something that has been refined with
experience. And the other lesson is to kill-off projects or significantly modify
projects if it is clear that they will not deliver. This is a very important role for
the project board. Project managers can often fall in love with what they are
doing and it is very hard for them to let go. But project boards are a step removed
and should be in a position to stop projects if that is what is really necessary. It
is not easy to admit failure.

A Case Study – The Business Statistics Innovation Program

Now I am now moving onto the case study. It is our Business Statistics Innovation
Program (BSIP). It finished in June 2005. It was aimed at achieving multiple
outcomes as described in Table 2.

TABLE 2: Outcomes Sought from the Business Statistics Innovation

Program
• Improved efficiency/productivity
• Methodological and technological improvement (exploiting new data
sources (e.g. taxation) and new technologies e.g. input data
warehouses)
• Improved data quality
• Improved management of business respondents
• Increased capacity to respond to emerging needs
• Stronger statistical leadership
• Enhanced opportunities for staff

I will soon tell you a little bit about what we actually achieved through this
project. What we were trying to do was adapt new technology and new
methodologies to achieve desirable business outcomes. But to be successful we
also had to move away from an organisational structure that was based largely
on silos. ABS collection activities were largely vertically organised around
particular statistical collections or groups of collections and that stopped us
getting full advantage of new technologies, new methodologies where economies
of scales matter as well as reducing the coherence of statistics across the silos.
The following diagram illustrates what we did (Figure 1):

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 Project Management and the Australian Bureau of Statistics: Doing What Works

Figure 1

We changed from a vertically structured organisation that I just talked about

to a more horizontal structure to provide greater functional specialisation and
economies of scale. Starting on the left hand side of the diagram, we have the
Economic Statistics Data Centre which undertakes all the data collection activities,
all the front end processing activities and so forth. There is only a single data
centre whereas there are multiple Business Statistic Centres (BSCs), shown in the
middle part of the diagram. They are based around groups of similar business
collections. For example we have one Business Statistic Centre (BSC) for all our
sub-annual business collections, we have another BSC for all our agriculture
collections. The third type of organisational unit is the National Statistic Centres
(NSCs). There are multiple National Statistic Centres and they are based on
particular statistics themes. So we have a labour NSC, for example, and its role
is to get away from being solely based on internally focused labour collection
based activity that it was responsible for to having a much greater alignment
with the users and producers of labour statistics and to take an interest in all
data sources that could be used for labour statistics.
BSIP was a significant program, taking a bit over three years to establish. But
we went about it in a structured way. Firstly we consulted very broadly with
staff, very early when we were first thinking of making changes. And we actually
changed plans as a result of those consultations. I personally got involved in
some of the consultations because I wanted to demonstrate my own interest in
this major change program as well as hearing first hand the reactions of staff.

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As I mentioned above, we exploited the available technology. It was new

technology, but not leading edge.
A key objective of this whole program was to exploit new administrative data
sources. The key source we had was taxation data and with the introduction of
the GST all of a sudden we had available to us all the information on the business
activity statements. So in effect we were getting a business Census every quarter.
People may not have liked GST but statisticians did because they had this
wonderful new data source that they could now use to produce new statistics
or reduce the collection load we place on businesses. And BSIP was also an
opportunity to introduce greater consistency across our statistical collections.
They each had their own life and developed the way they did things
independently. This may have been justified when looked at in isolation but
they were different so we didn’t have the degree of coherence that we would
have liked across our statistical sources. Re-skilling staff was an important part
of the ‘how’ and very early in the change program we identified the training
needs. And consistent with the theme of this chapter, good project management
was also very important.
I would now like to make a few more detailed comments on the involvement of
staff. Before we actually started the program we developed a set of what we call
strategic scenarios and they were the basis of the discussions we had with staff
and unions. The key thing was not only that we did talk to staff about the
scenarios but we weren’t just lecturing, we were also listening. We actually
made changes as a result of the feedback and that helped get greater ownership
of what we were doing. Once BSIP was broken down into specific projects we
also provided scope for staff to have an influence on exactly what was going to
happen within each project, particularly on job design aspects. And there was
continuous commitment from senior staff for the whole program. The end result
was that, in terms of staff reaction, we moved from staff being very sceptical at
first (understandably because there was concern about things like job tenure,
what sort of work they were going to be doing, whether they were going to be
made redundant, would they have the skills to do it) to reluctant commitment.
By the end of the three years we really had most staff very committed and
enthusiastic about the whole program and looking for ways to actually do new
things that we hadn’t actually thought of.
With respect to governance, we set up a BSIP management board. I will mention
one thing that I think is quite important: we included an outside expert on the
program management board. We thought it was important to have someone who
was going to have a different perspective and that actually proved to be very
useful. We also as I mentioned before used a chap named John Smyrk who did
a review at the very beginning of the proposed arrangements and also mid way
through the program just to give us some insights on some things that we might

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do a little bit better. The BSIP program was broken up into a series of projects
and line managers took responsibilities for particular projects. Because of the
size of BSIP we set up an implementation coordination team that provided
secretariat and monitoring services and a range of other support activities.
In terms of achievements, I guess the one that we are most pleased about was
that we more than achieved our productivity goals. We were planning to reduce
from 1,029 staff employed on business statistics to 895 in fact we ended up with
856. And other good things happened whilst BSIP costs stayed within budget.
The organisational change was completed but business continuity was important.
In the early phases of the project we managers asked about measures of success
and business continuity was at the top of the list. We did not want to implement
the changes in a way that meant that particular statistics were going to be delayed
or not produced for a particular period of time, or that there were serious
discontinuities in time series. We managed to do this and being able to achieve
this goal was very important to the success of the project.
There were a number of lessons learnt. First of all, the need to be clear and
focused at the start about the outcomes being sought. A lot of the projects fail
because the outcomes or goals that were being sought were not clear. This was
a big program, involving a massive change. We had a number of projects that
contributed to the program but they all needed to be inter-related. So having
all that set out clearly and setting up the governance arrangements to allow it
to happen and manage issues is important.
Keeping the amount of change manageable is another lesson. We actually cut
back on some of our plans when we thought that it was going to be too much
to achieve at one time. Communication is very important. We used our intranet
to get messages, particularly from me, out to staff about what was happening
and how progress was made. But there is nothing like face-to-face communication
and we encourage the senior people who were involved in BSIP to get out and
about as much as they could and let people know what was happening. This is
a three-year program, and staff do not want to hear ‘nothing’ about it for those
three years. People want to actually know what is happening as the project
progresses. And just repeating what I said a few moments ago, address the skills
development process early in the program. It is very important to involve staff
in working out exactly what the skill gaps are and what you might do to address
them. It also helps develop ownership.

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14. Intervention Logic/ Program Logic:
Toward Good Practice
Karen Baehler, School of Government, Victoria University
of Wellington

Abstract
Although it is often possible to assess policy separately from service delivery,
good final outcomes for citizens invariably depend on smart policies being
effectively implemented. It makes sense, therefore, to look for ways of improving
performance in both realms – policy and service delivery – simultaneously and
collaboratively. A contrivance known as intervention logic or program logic is
being recognised in Australasia as one such tool for bridging the
policy-implementation divide and thereby contributing to organisational change
and renewal. Logic models work by introducing a single framework for
designing, managing, and evaluating programs and projects. This chapter will
briefly describe that single framework and discuss recent applications of logic
modelling in New Zealand’s public sector, including lessons learned about good
and bad practice in logic modelling.

Introduction
The pursuit of better government is unquestionably a noble pursuit, and one
which springs, at least most of the time, from the better angels of our nature to
which Abraham Lincoln once referred. Noble intentions do not necessarily
guarantee good results, however, and so we find that many bright ideas for
improving government processes and operations only barely see the light of day
before fading into obscurity. My colleague Bob Gregory (2004) has called the
roll of these now-forgotten innovations – zero-based budgeting, management
by objectives (MBO), total quality management (TQM), and planning
programming and budgeting systems (PPBS), for starters – and reminded us that
current and future innovations of the same ilk are likely to suffer the same fate,
despite their creators’ good intentions.
The analysis presented here begins by acknowledging this important lesson of
history, but then looks beyond it to see whether a more stable core of knowledge,
insight, and common sense might lie below the surface of fluctuating public
management fashions and political tastes for public sector reform. If such a core
exists, and if it has the potential to contribute to long-term progress in
government performance, then it is worthwhile trying to unearth it. One place
to start doing this is with a disparate set of good-practice methods drawn from

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the fields of public policy, program evaluation, and public management, all of
which reflect a common set of basic propositions about the nature of policy and
policymaking.
This chapter has two main purposes: (1) to identify and describe a common core
of common sense wisdom that unites recent developments in the areas of policy
design, public management, and program evaluation, and (2) to plead the case
for focusing our limited attention on developing, nurturing, and applying this
core of ideas across the public sector, rather than perpetuating competition
among new policy and management ‘innovations’ and their acronyms.

The Common Core

In today’s fragmented and narrowly specialised public sector, different functional
areas quickly develop their own distinctive language and practice. Thus, as
public management theory and practice has settled into the current era of
‘managing-for-outcomes’ (MfO) and ‘results-based management’, the field of
policy analysis and advice has been striving to become better informed by
evidence, sensitive to community concerns and interests, forward-thinking, and
outward-looking. Over the same period, program evaluators have been
developing a wide array of methodologies suited to different kinds of evaluation
tasks, as well as experimenting with and adapting techniques drawn from the
fields of systems thinking and dynamics and dabbling in complexity theory,
while those in charge of public sector service delivery have been seeking to lift
their game by way of project management applications and other methods.
Optimistic outsiders gazing down upon this scene may see a rich abundance of
public sector energy and creativity which is bound to generate improvement,
but their pessimistic counterparts will be quick to note that continual
proliferation of new techniques and methods within narrowly defined areas of
public sector activity is more likely to build a bigger and better Tower of Babel
than it is to improve actual government performance. With policy, management,
evaluation, and service delivery experts all pursuing their own discipline-specific,
smart-practice innovations, it is no wonder that practitioners in these fields are
finding it hard to talk to each other and work together effectively. Intra- and
inter-agency cooperative networks may be all the rage in public sector studies,
but scant attention has been paid to the ways in which core, discipline-based
practices actually impede such collaboration. Exhorting policy advisers, public
managers, evaluators, and service deliverers to spend more time building
networks, sharing information, and looking for collaborative opportunities will
not yield fruit so long as the professionals in these fields are speaking different
languages with respect to good practice.
Fortunately, beneath the buzzword-babble of outcomes, systems, complexity,
and evidence, one can detect a common core of plain-language meanings from

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which shared understanding and action may emerge. What unites these various
devices and techniques are two simple and familiar, but also revolutionary, ideas
about means and ends:
1. policy means and ends, and the theories of cause and effect that connect
them, should nearly always be considered together; and
2. where public purposes are concerned, only citizens can complete the process
of converting public resources into real outcomes. Government cannot do
everything; it constantly relies on the active cooperation of citizens.
New Zealand’s embrace of managing-for-outcomes (MfO) was justified partly on
the grounds of the first idea. Although the big state sector reforms of the 1980s
clearly had accomplished much in the way of efficient delivery of programs and
services and transparent governance, some critics concluded that the New Zealand
model’s strong focus on monitoring and reporting outputs was causing the public
service to lose sight of policy objectives (Schick 2001, Steering Group 2002).
With ministers officially accountable for outcomes and agency chief executives
primarily accountable for outputs (and for reporting on the links between the
two), there were concerns that these two essential actors, and their respective
institutions, were slowly drifting apart into their own preoccupations.
The common language and shared mission of MfO was therefore needed to
reconnect outputs with outcomes and to reconnect government departments
with both ministers and the people whom they serve. Central agencies put
considerable effort into helping agencies articulate their ‘vital few’ high-level
outcomes in ways that would clarify links as well as gaps between the agency’s
outputs and intended outcomes, with the ultimate goal of helping agencies
rethink and then reconfigure their output mix for greater effectiveness. It is too
early to say whether or not MfO has had the desired effect yet. There is always
the danger that a focus on outcomes will perpetuate or aggravate the artificial
distinction between outputs (means) and outcomes (ends), rather than
reconnecting them. Whatever the result, it is worth remembering that restoring
the integrity of the output-outcome chain was at least part of the original
intention. It is also worth noting that many of MfO’s effects on actual
departmental practice may be both powerful and unobservable; the fact that
evaluations cannot pick up these effects does not mean they are not present.
The idea that means and ends always travel together also has roots in certain
perspectives on policy analysis. Whereas the conventional view of public policy
assumes that decision makers set policy objectives and analysts/advisers design
various configurations of resources (in the form of programs and policies) for
reaching those objectives, Aaron Wildavsky (1987) defined a public policy as a
yoked phenomenon – a program together with its goals or a particular set of
resources tied to particular objectives. We might call it a sort of means-and-ends
package deal. In order to ensure the coherence of this package, it is also necessary
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to include some kind of theory, rationale, or causal logic that explains why those
particular means are expected to generate those particular ends. For example,
the policy of providing welfare benefits is linked to the outcome of improved
family well being and social solidarity according to a typical social democratic
view of causation, whereas a more conservative worldview links the very same
policy to an entirely different set of outcomes that includes inter-generational
dependency, declining well being, and resentment between the working poor
and the beneficiary poor. Thus, means and ends are not enough to specify a
policy; some sort of linking theory or logic is also needed.
Viewed in this way, policy choice becomes not only a choice among alternative
programs, services, regulatory schemes, or activities, but also a choice among
alternative objectives, the achievement of which would constitute each related
program’s aim, as well as a choice among causal theories. This redefinition of
the policy choice process as a simultaneous and interlocking (rather than
sequential or hierarchical) choice of ends, means, and causal theories has
significant implications for those who give advice about improving government
performance, because if Wildavsky was right, then determining which programs
and services are ‘best’ cannot be done by reference to externally derived policy
objectives. Instead, advisers need to present policy options in the form of
alternative program packages, each designed to achieve a slightly different
configuration of objectives via its own combination of multiple instruments and
resources, and each supported by its own causal theory. Advisers also need to
present decision makers with information that will help them compare the
alternative packages in terms of feasibility, costs, risks, uncertainties,
distributional impacts, and, where possible, likely overall effectiveness. Decision
makers need to know not only what the program is meant to produce and how
it is meant to do so, but also whose cooperation and/or compliance is required
to make it work and the kinds of circumstances that are most likely to support
or undermine it. This approach to policy advice recognises that policy choices
are nearly always driven by a combination of technical, broadly political, and
more narrowly partisan considerations. It does so by presenting program options
as multi-dimensional packages and recognising that different actors and
stakeholder groups inside and outside government will focus on different
dimensions of the selected package.
Wildavsky’s yoked definition of public policy also has implications for program
evaluation. In addition to the familiar problem of attributing specific outcomes
to specific actions by government, the desired outcomes themselves are seen as
a matter of policy choice and, therefore, subject to interpretation and change
over time. Among the various professional groups associated with the public
policymaking process, evaluators have been leaders in thinking about how
means-ends connections and causal theories should be studied amidst uncertainty
and complexity.
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Examples of yoked policy choices are not hard to find. In the area of drug policy,
choosing between a policy of stricter sentences for drug convictions or a policy
of decriminalisation also constitutes a choice between the objective of clearly
communicating society’s disapproval of drug-taking behaviour, on one hand,
or on the other hand, loosening that message in order to pursue a different
objective, that is, reducing the social and financial costs associated with drug
law enforcement. In an area such as transport, choices among competing
objectives are often much more explicit, as when government must divvy up
its limited budget for road works among competing projects with different
objectives, such as alleviating big city traffic congestion versus improving market
access for rural farmers versus reducing road accidents and fatalities. Virtually
all allocative policy choices have this simultaneous ends-means quality about
them. This is why very few experts have even attempted to devise technical
schemes for solving government’s grand budget allocation decisions – guns vs
butter or health vs education vs housing. Examples of competing causal theories
are also plentiful. The invasion of Iraq was expected by some to liberate the
Iraqi people from oppression and ultimately contribute to Middle East stability
and development, while others expected it to fuel civil war in Iraq and destabilise
the region.
A particular program or policy’s intended links between means and ends can,
of course, be strong or weak, direct or indirect, proximate or distant; the causal
theory may be based on evidence, educated guesses, or flights of fancy. Whatever
their features, it is these hypothesised links in the cause-and-effect chain that
communicate government’s intentions and thereby provide the platform from
which policy designers, implementation planners, and operational units can go
about their core business of marshalling resources and enabling people inside
and outside of government to work together converting resources into desired
outcomes.
This brings us to the second core idea signalled earlier. The second unifying
theme from recent developments in good practice is that turning outputs into
outcomes, or public means into public ends, is fundamentally a process of
co-production that requires action by both government and citizens. This
principle may seem obvious in cases such as social services, where the
effectiveness of social work interventions clearly depends upon the receptiveness
and responsiveness of the client. 1 But even the least touchy-feely of all public
functions – national defence – depends upon people paying their taxes, refraining
from gratuitous actions that would undermine the military (such as interfering
with military exercises or bombing military bases), and keeping a watchful eye
on government’s use of military power. These sorts of activities, in turn, depend
upon public support for the norms of parliamentary representation and oversight,
a free press, and free speech, to name just a few of the essential prerequisites to
healthy democratic governance. Although some of these citizen obligations are
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backed by laws and the threat of penalties for non-compliance (including voting
in Australia and census participation in New Zealand), we assume that the vast
majority of people will fulfil their obligations voluntarily. Production of the
resulting goods can therefore be attributed in large measure to high levels of
cooperation.
Examples of co-production are everywhere. Government determines eligibility
for benefits and writes benefit checks, but it is up to individual beneficiaries
how they will spend the money to sustain their families. Government builds
roads, but citizens decide when and where to drive on them for purposes of
work, recreation, socialising, etc. Citizens also choose how fast to drive (with or
without regard to posted speed limits) and with what level of care and attention
(with or without regard to legal definitions of reckless driving). Government
funds universities, but citizens decide whether and what to study, how much
effort to expend, and whether to join or resist the brain drain once they graduate.
Understanding these co-production processes is central to designing smart policies
that will encourage, enable, educate, persuade, bribe, or coerce citizens into
making the kinds of choices that contribute most to aggregate public goals.
Although the principle of co-production is not often acknowledged explicitly,
it is implicit in current conversations about accountability for outcomes,
participatory policy design, and public trust in government. New Zealand central
agencies have worked hard over the past several years to reassure chief executives
that they are being held accountable for outputs and ‘managing for outcomes’
only (always in inverted commas), and not for actual outcomes themselves. This
sort of approach acknowledges the complex web of factors that combine to
determine any social or economic outcome, and recognises that government
policy contributes only a few sticky threads to that web. It is a small step from
this acknowledgment to embracing a co-production model of the output-outcome
chain. Those who agitate for more participatory approaches to policy design,
through more and better consultation for example, also seem to tacitly understand
the role that citizens play (whether they are consulted or not) in the achievement
or undermining of policy goals, although the pro-participation advocates often
couch their arguments more in terms of democratic principles than co-production
realities. Likewise, those who warn about citizens’ declining trust in government
clearly understand the central role that citizens play in the work of government
even if they do not always acknowledge policy-specific cases of co-production.
Scratching below the surface of current public sector fashions reveals at least
two core ideas – the principle of means-ends dependency and inseparability in
public policy, and the principle of government-citizen co-production – which
may be worthy of further development. A currently popular set of concepts
known as program or intervention logic in Australasia (or the results chain in
Canada) provides one possible avenue for this development.

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Intervention or Program Logic

As noted above, the linchpin of a yoked approach to means and ends is the
theory of causation. Such a theory consists of assumptions and propositions that
lead from a policy, program or service idea – such as an immigration point scheme
that favours applicants with certain job skills or a program of tax credits for
research and development investments – to a policy goal, such as economic
growth. It is very much like an argument, and the causal logic for any particular
policy or program should, in fact, reflect the substantive arguments being made
in favour of that policy or program in the political arena, while also addressing
the substantive arguments being made against it. Causal theories or logics can
be presented in many different forms ranging from a simple narrative that
describes an expected scenario (textual) to a causal loop diagram (visual) to a
decision tree model populated with probabilities of selected events (visual and
mathematical).
In Australia and New Zealand, a linear form of presentation known as
intervention or program logic has enjoyed some popularity over the last few
years. This version of logic modelling is based largely on the work of Sue Funnell
(1997), who focused on evaluation applications but also noted the potential for
logic modelling to function as an ex ante policy design device, a point also made
in the international development literature (Saldanha and Whittle 1998). In their
2002-2004 guidance to departments preparing Statements of Intent, New Zealand
central agencies promoted the use of intervention logic as a tool for presenting
each department’s full array of output-outcome chains, thereby propelling logic
modelling into yet another realm of practice, that of organisational strategic
planning and public management.
Following Michael Quinn Patton (1997: p. 221), we can describe the logic of a
government intervention in terms of a ‘theory-of-action,’ i.e., a set of assumptions
and inferences about cause-and-effect that add up to a theory of ‘how to produce
a desired result’. Such theories may spring from academic work or they may be
found among what Robert Gregory (1989: p. 141) calls the ‘inchoate hypotheses’
held by virtually all decision makers, or the rough-and-ready assertions by
politicians that the future will be brighter if my preferred policies are pursued
rather than yours. Douglas Arnold (1990: p. 18) views ‘causal chains’ as the
common currency of citizens, legislators, and coalition leaders within legislatures,
and therefore as the heart of policy debate:
A large part of any policy discussion is a debate about cause and effect,
and it is so whether the debate occurs on the evening news, in living
rooms across America, in the halls of academe, or in the halls of Congress.
Unlike theories in science, policy theories are always normative; they describe
the intended sequence of causes and effects associated with an actual or proposed

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policy, rather than the actual sequence. Thus, in order to understand such
theories, logic modelling must start optimistically: It consults common sense and
asks the policy’s supporters how the policy is meant to work, ideally; in other
words, it models the intentions rather than actual effects. The optimistic model
is then subjected to relentless critical scrutiny.
A policy’s intended theory-of-action may be illustrated by a sequence or chain
of outcomes, each stage of which represents both an end (i.e., the outcome of
the previous link’s success) and a means (i.e., a prerequisite for reaching the
next link). The particular policy, intervention, or output to be examined fixes
the bottom of the chain; the policy’s end outcome or chief goal provides the top
fixture; and the mechanisms by which the intervention is expected to work form
the middle links of the chain. In many cases, a single intervention or output will
have more than one ultimate outcome, in which case the chains of outcomes
leading to each form a sort of bouquet of logics. In other cases, a single
intervention will link to a single end outcome via more than one rationale, in
which case the chain of outcomes will sprout branches that rejoin at the top. A
variety of configurations is possible.
The chain of outcomes and hypotheses provides a platform for the most important
step in the intervention logic exercise: exposing what the policy seems to be
taking for granted, that is, its assumptions (Cato et al, 1998). Every policy rests
upon assumptions concerning the suitability of its ‘technology’ to the situation.
For example, welfare-to-work programs assume that jobs are available for former
beneficiaries; anti-smoking media campaigns assume that people respond in
predictable ways to public-service advertisements; tax breaks for targeted
industries assume that businesses take taxation into consideration when making
location choices; devolution assumes that lower levels of government can absorb
new functions effectively. In an intervention logic model, key assumptions will
slot in at particular links in the chain.
Revealing assumptions about relevant social, environmental, economic, legal,
or behavioural prerequisites to success is the shortest route to unearthing the
risks embedded in any given policy proposal. Indeed, risks can be defined as
what happens when assumptions go wrong. They are a combination of (1) factors
that might derail progress along a chain of outcomes, plus (2) factors that might
cause even a successful policy chain to generate unwanted side effects or
unintended consequences. A chain of risks associated with a chain of outcomes
and assumptions often adds up to an argument against the intervention in
question – what might be called the pessimistic or opposition logic. As described
later, studying the opposition’s arguments against a policy is a highly efficient
way to identify some of that policy’s risks.
Other horizontal dimensions may be added to the logic model as well, and are
described below.

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Factors inside and outside control

As one moves up a chain of outcomes, the number of variables within
government’s control tends to diminish while those outside government’s control
expand (Funnell, 1997). Identifying factors within government’s control helps
analysts and managers pinpoint where an agency has some leverage over events,
while identifying factors outside control exposes complicating factors. Together,
these factors begin to define the boundaries for a systems view of the policy in
question (Stewart and Ayres, 2001).

Opportunities for collaborating with other agencies either inside

or outside of Government
Factors outside the agency’s control may fall within the control of someone else
who qualifies as a natural collaborator in the project. If that someone else is
another government department or a community organisation, then the author
of the logic has good reason to reach out to the specified organisation(s) to discuss
possible partnerships or cooperation arrangements. Policy logics provide clear
grounds for joined-up initiatives.
If the outside actors with control are the program’s clients or just citizens in
general, then the co-production element of the program can be seen as emerging,
and program designers will want to think carefully about how the program is
expected to interface with and potentially influence the behaviour of these key
actors.

Enabling outputs
Managing the risks to a given intervention and keeping the outcomes chain on
track may require additional interventions over and above the program being
modelled. This step prompts the policy designer/adviser to think about the
whole package of instruments and resources that may be needed to help a policy
idea achieve its associated objectives.

Target outcomes (intermediate and final) versus ‘actuals’

Funnell’s (1997) approach expands from an output-outcome backbone to a
management and evaluation matrix where resources can be allocated to various
stages of the logic, the program’s progress can be monitored at each stage of the
intermediate and final outcomes, and operational risks can be identified and
managed. This is the key point of overlap with project management techniques,
which could usefully be applied to the program logic matrix.
Every policy idea will contain multiple competing logic models – one that
expresses the intended logic, that is, the course of events or chain of results
anticipated and promised by the policy’s supporters (some version of this becomes
the official logic once a policy has been adopted), and another that describes the

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chain of results most likely to unfold if the policy were adopted and implemented,
that is, the realistic logic. The realistic logic is, of course, the policy analyst’s
holy grail – a glimpse of the policy’s actual future. If policy analysts could
accurately describe the realistic logic before a policy is implemented, they could
advise more confidently about both the preferred course of action for government
to take and the best way to manage risks in chosen policies. 2
Unfortunately, analysts cannot generate accurate, realistic logics with any
confidence, at least not in complex policy areas, but they can test official logic
against its opposition logic. Opposition logic refers to the chain of failures or
disasters that would result if a policy fulfilled the expectations of its critics rather
than its supporters. Comparing official and opposition logics yields considerable
insights about a policy’s risks – both political and operational. This technique
allows policy analysts to make use of political rhetoric – the language of both
clients and clients’ opponents – to structure and guide (but not pre-empt)
analysis. It also helps clarify the principle of the inseparability of policy ends
and policy means by emphasising the importance of clarifying causal theory.
Starting from identical programs, different causal theories can lead to entirely
different outcomes, and for this reason, logic models need to explain why and
how they expect one particular set of outputs to generate a particular set of
outcomes.
Some policies will arrive on the analyst’s desk already sporting multiple rationales
thanks to coalition logic. Because officials can bargain around means more easily
than around ends, they often find it easier to agree on a particular activity than
to agree on a goal for the activity (Kingdon, 1984). For example, supporters of
wetlands conservation might assemble a coalition consisting of environmentalist
groups, who wish to protect fragile species, and traditional hunting clubs, who
wish to preserve duck-breeding habitats so that they can hunt the ducks.
Although the groups’ values and purposes diverge rather sharply at the top of
the policy’s outcomes chain, they coincide lower down the chain, and this
coincidence of intermediate outcomes may be sufficient to sustain the political
coalition. In this example, the politically astute user of intervention logic may
decide to obscure the divergence in ultimate ends by truncating the outcomes
chain somewhere in the middle, below the point of disagreement.
One of the most forceful of all logic models is the analogy. Analogies may take
normative forms, for example, work is to welfare receipt what voting is to
citizenship. Or they may take hypothesis-like forms, for example, the
decriminalisation of marijuana is to expected marijuana consumption what repeal
of prohibition was to alcohol consumption in the U.S. in the 1930s (MacCoun
and Reuter, 2001). The analogical device informs policy by revealing and
providing evidence about the mechanisms that cause outcomes – evidence taken
from analogous, but not identical, times, places or policy sectors.

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Intervention logic offers policy advisers a structured approach to critical thinking

rather than a formula-driven decision tool. Whereas decision-based methods tell
the advisor to recommend the option with the highest score on the top-weighted
criterion or the highest benefit/cost ratio, intervention logic does not produce
any recommendation at all. Instead, to borrow Sir Geoffrey Vickers’ (1965: p.
40) term, intervention logic helps the analyst build and communicate an
‘appreciation’ of the policy’s key features – facts, values, assumptions,
mechanisms of intended cause and effect, and likely feedback effects. The practice
of logic modelling seeks to promote a critical stance toward conventional wisdom
but from an internal vantage point rather than a bird’s eye view. Intervention
logic assumes that, at least in some cases, a policy’s key features, including both
strengths and weaknesses, are easier to see at close range. It assumes that we
often cannot judge the degree of divergence between intentions and reality until
we truly grasp the intentions. Therefore, the skilled intervention logic user starts
by taking conventional wisdom seriously (even when one thinks it is wrong),
modelling the rationale behind a current or proposed policy, and then identifying
its strong and weak links.

Toward Better Practice

Experience with applying intervention logic in the New Zealand public service
has generated a few lessons about good and bad practice.

Learning v accountability
A common complaint about logic modelling is its vulnerability to being captured
by conventional thinking. Once a policy or program backbone has been created,
it tends to look authoritative and people may think twice about questioning it.
Over the last several years, as New Zealand departments prepared their
department-wide ‘outcomes hierarchies’ or logic models to be included in
Statements of Intent, some concerns have been expressed about the tendency for
departments to simply use the logic model format to rationalise and justify their
status quo policies and outputs, rather than using it to examine critically their
mix of outputs. The litmus test of outcomes-based management, and logic
modelling, when used as one of its tools, is whether or not it gives departments
a platform from which to make changes in their output mixes to boost
effectiveness. It is not yet clear that such changes are occurring as hoped.
Does this absence of discernible impacts mean that logic modelling is either a
bad idea or hopelessly unrealistic or both? On one hand, a methodological purist
would have to condemn the kind of retrofitting application of logic models that
departments are suspected of using in New Zealand. Good practice in intervention
logic clearly emphasises the absolute necessity of revealing assumptions and
risks associated with each backbone and critiquing each step in the causal logic.
It is not meant to be used for rationalising or shoring up either current policy

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or someone’s favoured proposals for change. On the other hand, no one should
be surprised when departments respond to an official request for
performance-related information by defending their existing programs. When
faced with official reporting requirements, no matter how non-threatening the
language of the requirement, rational departmental officials will always use
whatever tools are available to weave the most positive picture possible of their
department’s development. Officials know that all reporting can and will be
used to construct a ‘performance story’ tied to their departments (Mayne 2004),
and it is natural for them to want to control that story to the greatest extent
possible. 3 For this reason, central agencies probably ought to acknowledge
quietly that some sugar-coating of departmental performance stories is tolerable,
but only if robust procedures are in place for scrutinising these performance
stories and asking the kinds of hard questions that will reveal areas of weakness.
Parliamentary committees, auditor agencies, and other institutional actors will
probably play big roles in this. It may be time for government to direct some of
its attention away from making marginal improvements in departmental reporting
and direct it toward building more effective scrutiny and feedback arrangements.
Gregory (2004) has argued that political imperatives will always swamp serious
efforts by policy advisers to question the government’s policy thinking.
Therefore, according to his argument, expecting policy advisers to use logic
modelling techniques even for internal policy advice may be unrealistic. Even
if Gregory is overstating somewhat the obstacles to free and frank policy advice,
it is probably hopelessly idealistic for us to expect departments to publish reports
on their websites that contain logic models revealing their current program’s
deepest vulnerabilities, particularly if the department is still early in the process
of addressing those vulnerabilities. Good practice in logic modelling, if it happens
anywhere, is most likely to be found in policy and management teams that are
working behind the scenes to improve program effectiveness.
Transparency and accountability are fundamental values in a democratic system,
and therefore, central agencies must specify particular forms of reporting that
will be uniform across agencies. But at the same time, the art of crafting an
effective public sector reporting system requires a delicate balance between
Parliament’s and the public’s need for detailed information for assessment, on
one hand, and departments’ needs for time and space to carefully analyse and
sensibly address problems behind the scenes, on the other hand. Rather than
requiring departments to report on current weak points and future risks, I
wonder if it might not be better for central agencies to require retrospective
reporting from each department about how it has identified and addressed
weaknesses in the recent past and learned from them. Knowing that they will
be held accountable for evidence of recent learning may encourage officials to
look for genuine learning opportunities now and in the future. This sort of
retrospective reporting of learning is surely not game-proof, but it may provide
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a stronger incentive for genuine risk assessment and change management than
the more direct reporting requirements provide.
Central agencies in New Zealand (and those advising them, including the author)
are learning from their own recent experiences with intervention logic. The
guidance documents for agencies around Managing for Outcomes and preparation
of Statements of Intent made sustained and explicit reference to intervention
logic techniques in 2002, while the 2003 and later versions of these documents
did not endorse any particular methods for articulating the rationales linking
outputs to outcomes. The more vigorous promotion of intervention logic in
previous guidance documents generated backlash among some officials who felt
that they were being forced not only to learn a new technique at relatively short
notice, but also having to apply it to the broadest possible canvas – a whole
department. Although central agencies provided considerable support, the task
was probably too much too soon, and there were probably too few positive,
internal incentives for departments to really get stuck into the task rather than
simply ticking the box.
In hindsight, it may have been better to allow the interest in and enthusiasm
for logic modelling to spread at a more natural pace across public service agencies
and departments in New Zealand, fuelled by word of mouth and evidence of
effectiveness. In addition to being slow, this kind of dissemination is hard to
control, of course, and difficult to harness for purposes of reporting and
assessment. It surely would have generated a potpourri of practices, very little
uniformity, and huge difficulties for anyone trying to compare the effects of
logic modelling practices on different agencies. In this case, however, a natural
proliferation of practices may have been just what was needed to generate
innovation and change, particularly with respect to practical areas where logic
models are only recently being applied – including policy design, public
management, strategic planning, and project management.

Outcomes always happen to someone outside government

A mysterious and powerful force has often been observed in logic modelling
exercises, drawing participants away from thinking about intermediate and final
outcomes towards thinking about internal government processes, such as: have
we followed procedures? are we setting up the right networks? are we on time
and within budget? are the operations people doing what they are meant to be
doing, according to the policy? is the minister happy? These are urgent internal
matters, and the public management/project management matrix associated with
a logic model is suited to addressing these, but they should not to be confused
with intended outcomes themselves. Outcomes (intermediate or final) are the
consequences of government activity, as experienced by something or someone
outside government – such as health status, educational achievement, border
security, sustainable fish stocks, and the like. They are not processes of
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government activity. Logic models should start by thinking about the chains of
outcomes that a particular program or policy is meant to produce, before turning
to questions of resource allocation, staffing, procedures, networks, and other
essential ingredients for making the chain work.

Where logic models leave off and systems models begin

Department-wide logic models may quickly become unreadable if all logical
steps are included for all core programs (not to mention assumptions and risks
as well). These ‘copulating spider’ diagrams, as current State Services
Commissioner, Mark Prebble, once described them, are a common pitfall of logic
modelling practice. Not only are they hard to read, but they also tend to miss
out on opportunities to cut to the chase. Some programs’ and departments’ causal
theories can be summarised simply and elegantly in just a few basic propositions;
using a logic model to make these more complicated than necessary is a poor use
of time and resources. Logic models are most useful when a department or
program group can use them to stay focused on a few vital outcomes and on key
stages in the output-outcome conversion process. A good logic model should
reveal these logical ‘hinges’ rather than obscuring them (Baehler 2003).
However, those who use logic models to portray policy intentions will often
find themselves under pressure to include in their diagrams every possible
feedback loop and causal variable that might influence the policy’s effectiveness.
This is where policy logic models begin to shade into systems models of the
policy environment. The tendency to drift from one technique to the other is
natural and not necessarily to be avoided, but at the same time, modellers should
try to keep certain important distinctions between the two practices clear in
their own minds. The two most important distinctions, in my opinion, are
between intention and reality, and between a policy idea and the setting in
which it is meant to function.
The world is obviously a very complex place. Much social and even economic
behaviour is notoriously difficult to explain and predict. No one can be certain
how events and developments will be influenced (if at all) by any single
government intervention, much less a complex array of policies and programs.
Public policy experts like to repeat the mantra that we are constantly besieged
by ‘wicked problems’ that morph before our very eyes and cannot readily be
defined let alone solved using standard analytical tools. Brave souls in the social
science world are now exploring how insights from complexity theory can be
applied to wicked problems to help us understand them. These truly are
important developments and worthy of more attention.
At the same time, however, it is important to remember that the basic logic of
most government interventions is relatively simple. Policy logic has to be simple
and forceful because (1) politicians have to be able to explain policies to

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stakeholders and citizens in order to win their support, (2) government policy
itself is a fairly blunt instrument and delicate operations involving complex
interactions of multiple variables are generally the responsibility of frontline
staff and implementers (the algorithms of judgment used by frontline staff are
virtually impossible to incorporate into policy or to express in a policy logic),
and (3) as implementation scholars discovered decades ago, the more moving
parts a policy or program has, the more opportunities there are for things to go
wrong. For all of these reasons, intervention logic seeks to keep the policy
backbone model relatively simple and straightforward. Logic backbones are
usually linear to reflect the linear nature of most policy arguments – for example,
if we subsidise or otherwise facilitate X, people will consume more of it; if we
regulate Y, the harms associated with it will decrease; if we provide a new service
Z, the target population will be enabled to function more effectively. As described
above, laying out the intended logic of these interventions allows us to test it
against what we know about how the real world works. Intended policy logic
and social/economic reality need to be closely related to each other, but they
are not the same thing.
This is where systems models come in. 4 They allow us to map what we know
about how a relevant piece of the world works, such as economic development
processes, or family formation processes, or cycles of environmental degradation
and repair. When policy analysts and evaluators are testing the logical chain of
impacts associated with a particular policy or program, they must draw upon
knowledge of the many complex and often chaotic influences and drivers that
characterise the actual world into which policies and programs interject their
resources and rules. Systems models are simply tools for describing what we
know about this complex reality. The relationship between logic models and
systems models is therefore a reflection of the relationship between intention
and actual effect. Logic models plug into a systems model at one or more points
with the intention of showing how a policy is expected to break a problem circuit
or create opportunities for new patterns of interaction to emerge. Logic models
plug into a systems model by way of influencing the system’s incentives,
changing the resource mix, reshaping the rules and norms governing the system,
or otherwise influencing actors’ tastes, preferences, and choices. This is where
the co-production relationship described earlier becomes essential. Policy
designers need to understand the ways in which each particular area of policy
depends upon group or individual cooperation and action in order to generate
outcomes.
Excellent practice in logic modelling, therefore, requires at least some use of
systems modelling to map the context for policy intervention. At a minimum,
good practice in logic modelling requires that practitioners keep the distinctions
between intention and reality, and between the policy idea and its setting, as
clear as possible. Confusing or ignoring these distinctions may produce a model
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that neither communicates the policy’s basic theory nor describes the policy
setting adequately.
Where systems are concerned, model builders also should be in regular contact
with the department’s operational staff, most of whom interact daily with
programs, clients, and their real-life settings. Based on these interactions,
operational staff are continually forming and revising their own, often
unconscious, models of how various components of a program, service, or policy
influence client behaviour, nudge economic trends, shape international relations,
or alter patterns of environmental change. Head-office staff cannot begin to
understand policy logic, policy systems, or policy complexity without regularly
consulting the front lines and comparing what they find there with what the
original policymakers promised to deliver.

Top down or bottom up?

Logic models are most useful when one has a particular program or policy in
mind, but they can be used to generate policy ideas if one has a set of high-level
desired outcomes and a working knowledge of the systems model. This approach
is sometimes called top-down logic modelling because it begins by mapping the
chain of outcomes that are known to contribute to a chosen outcome, rather than
starting with a selected policy or program. The process of mapping these outcome
chains closely resembles the systems modelling process (I sometimes call it
‘systems lite’) because the intermediate outcomes are simply variables that
contribute to the final result. The process of producing the map helps participants
organise what they know about the outcome and the conditions that contribute
to or detract from it, and sometimes leads to creative ideas for interventions as
the chains move down the page.
I have not seen very many departments using top-down logic modelling, and it
may be that systems thinking is more appropriate in the kinds of blue-skies
policy advice and strategic planning settings where this technique is most likely
to be needed.

Too soon to tell …

The frontier for logic practices – their potential contribution to both vertical
and horizontal integration of public sector work – has yet to be explored. Can
policy models be devised that allow policy designers, implementation planners,
project managers, strategists, evaluators, and even ministers all to see at a glance
how their separate activities fit together into a coherent whole? If so, what would
these models look like? How much detail would they contain? Would they be
expandable and contractible, depending upon the desired application? Can
website-writing software help us think about the shapes and functions of these
sorts of models? One can imagine an entire department’s website organised
around the intervention logic for its core outputs. It would say: Click here for
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the strategic view and high-level outcomes, click here for the intermediate
outcomes associated with output X, click here for the research projects designed
to test assumptions of this causal link, click here for the plan to manage the risks
associated with these intermediate outcomes, click here for a list of partners need
to co-produce this outcome, and so on.

Conclusion
It is still probably too early to reach any definitive conclusions about the effects
of logic modelling practices on policy advice, public management, and good
government in New Zealand, Australia, or anywhere else, partly because their
recent association with performance-related reporting documents has triggered
a bit of backlash against these methods. Despite these setbacks, various forms
of logic modelling are likely to continue evolving (though probably with different
names) so long as individual analysts and managers continue to find them useful.
The same is likely to be true of recent good-practice developments in the same
‘cohort,’ such as managing for outcomes, systems-based evaluation, and project
management. As public policy and management fashions move on to the next
set of enthusiasms, now is a good time to pause and look at the core messages
that underpin logic modelling and related practices: the principle that means
and ends and their linking theories cannot easily be separated, and the principle
of citizen-government co-production of outcomes.
This chapter has argued that logic modelling practices, combined with systems
modelling, can help policy, implementation, and evaluation professionals harness
these core insights and put them to use both within their own professional realms
and also as a bridging device across functional realms in the public sector. Even
if logic models are not the best solution to any single challenge posed by the
outcomes-based approach to public policy and management, logic modelling
may be worth further attention due to its distinctive capacity for crossing
functional boundaries and speaking a language that unites the notoriously
fragmented areas of policy, management, implementation, evaluation, and even
politics. As the practice develops, it is not inconceivable that logic models may
provide a common platform from which policy designers, public managers,
project managers, and evaluators, as well as politicians and citizens, may begin
to develop a shared understanding of government policy – what it is trying to
accomplish and how – and a vision of where they fit in the overall chain of
effective co-production. By this train of logic, the multi-dimensional package of
principles and methods known as intervention logic or program logic deserves
continued attention and development wherever governments are seeking to
work across functional areas, across departments, and with citizens to convert
public resources into public goods.

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References
Arnold, R. Douglas 1990, The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Baehler, Karen 2003, ‘Managing for Outcomes: Accountability and Thrust,’
Australian Journal of Public Administration 62(4): 23-34.
Cato, Bertha, William Chen, & Shannon Corbett-Perez 1998, ‘Logic model: A
tool for planning and evaluating health and recreation prevention projects,’
Journal of Physical Education, Recreation & Dance 69(8): 57-61.
Eoyang, Glenda 2004, ‘Soft Systems Methodology’. W.K. Kellogg Foundation.
Available on [Link]
Funnell, Sue 1997, ‘Program logic: An adaptable tool for designing and evaluating
programs,’ Evaluation News and Comment, July, pp 5-17.
Gregory, Robert 2004, ‘Political Life and Intervention Logic: Relearning Old
Lessons?’ International Public Management Journal 7(3): 299-315.
Gregory, Robert 1989, ‘Political rationality or “incrementalism”? Charles E.
Lindblom’s enduring contribution to public policy making theory,’ Policy and
Politics 17(2): 139-153.
Harris, Bill and Bob Williams 2005, ‘Systems Dynamics Methodologies’. W.K.
Kellogg Foundation. Available on [Link]
Kingdon, John W. 1984, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little
Brown.
Maani, Kambiz E. and Robert Y. Cavana 2000, Systems Thinking and Modelling.
Auckland: Prentice Hall.
MacCoun, Robert J. and Peter Reuter 2001, Drug War Heresies: Learning from
Other Vices, Times, & Places. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mayne, John 2004, Reporting on Outcomes: Setting Performance Expectations
and Telling Performance Stories, Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation 19(1):
31-60.
Patton, Michael Quinn 1997, Utilization-Focused Evaluation: The New Century
Text, 3rd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Saldanha, Cedric D. and John F. Whittle 1998, Using the Logical Framework for
Sector Analysis and Project Design: A User's Guide. Asian Development Bank.
Manila, Philippines.
Schick, Allen 2001, ‘Reflections on the New Zealand Model,’ based on a lecture
to The Treasury, Wellington, August.
Steering Group 2002, ‘Managing for outcomes: Guidance for departments,’
Managing for Outcomes Roll-out 2003-04. The Treasury, State Services

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 Intervention Logic/ Program Logic: Toward Good Practice

Commission, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and Te Puni Kokiri.

Wellington, New Zealand.
Vickers, Sir Geoffrey 1965, The Art of Judgment: A Study of Policy Making.
London: Chapman and Hall.
Wildavsky, Aaron 1987, Speaking truth to power. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Books.
Williams, Bob 2005, ‘Complex Adaptive Systems’. W.K. Kellogg Foundation.
Available on [Link]

ENDNOTES
1 I am reminded of the old joke: How many social workers does it take to change a light bulb? Only
one, but the light bulb really has to WANT to change.
2 Intervention logic shares features with many other approaches, such as scenario planning and decision
trees, but should not be confused with either. Scenario planning (Schwartz, 1996) takes a very broad
scope and seeks to anticipate major shifts in social, economic, environmental, etc. patterns. (Intervention
logic is closer to providing a structured approach to Bardach’s (2000: pp. 32-33) more modest ‘scenario
writing’ process, which he offers as an informal antidote to ‘excessive optimism’ on the part of analysts.)
Decision tree analysis (Kidd, 1991) resembles intervention logic insofar as it includes the probabilities
of both chance events and particular types of outcomes along various trajectories in its model. It differs
from intervention logic, however, in treating the nodes in the sequence as intermediate choices to be
made rather than intermediate outcomes to be produced.
3 It is important to note that when departments emphasise strong points over the weak points in their
performance stories, this does not necessarily mean that department officials aren’t interested in, or
aren’t aware of, the weak links in their output-outcome theories (although that is possible, of course).
It may mean simply that department officials prefer to address these weak links internally, before
exposing them to intense public and parliamentary scrutiny.
4 Those interested in exploring policy applications of systems thinking should have a look at Maani
and Cavana (2000), Eoyang (2004), Harris and Williams (2005), and Williams (2005).

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Section V. Implementation Review
15. Implementing Gateway in the
Australian Government
Department of Finance and Administration, Australian
Government 1

Introduction
This chapter examines the Australian Government’s approach and experience
to date in implementing the Gateway Review Process (Gateway).
The Australian Government undertook research in 2005 to identify ways to
improve the delivery of major projects (as measured by successful project delivery
on time and within budget) by Financial Management and Accountability Act
1997 agencies (FMA agencies). From the options available to the Government
for meeting this objective, the decision was made by Cabinet to implement
Gateway, which had been developed in the United Kingdom by the Office of
Government Commerce in 2000 and subsequently applied by the Victorian
Government in 2003.
Gateway is a project assurance methodology designed to improve project delivery.
The methodology involves a small team of independent experts conducting
short, intensive and timely reviews at key decision points (referred to as Gates)
during the life of the project. The reviews focus on the issues that are most
important to the project at that stage of the project’s life, with reference to an
established set of areas to be considered for each Gate that address the proven
and comprehensive Gateway methodology. One of the key benefits of Gateway
is that the reviews are focussed and short in duration, allowing reports to be
high level and action oriented, highlighting where corrective action may be
required at that particular point in time.
Implementation of Gateway provides an opportunity for the Australian
Government to apply an approach that is acknowledged to have delivered on
its objectives. 2 Demonstrable benefits in respect to project delivery have been
achieved in other jurisdictions through:
• identifying the skills and experience required to deliver successful projects;
• increasing stakeholder understanding of their role in successful project
management and the factors which contribute to the achievement of project
objectives;
• identifying early in projects where corrective action may be required; and
• improving project management and delivery skills.

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Gateway also sits well with the Government’s budgeting and accountability
framework. 3

The Phasing-in of Gateway

Drawing on the experience of other jurisdictions, the Australian Government
decided to phase in the implementation of Gateway over three budget cycles to
allow time to consider the nuances of Gateway and adapt it where appropriate.
In taking this approach, FMA agencies have the time, support, and opportunity
to be fully engaged in the establishment of Gateway in the Australian
Government, thereby helping to realise the benefits of Gateway.
A particular benefit of this phased approach has been having the time to develop
an Australian Government focused Gateway training program and to train
suitable Australian Public Service (APS) staff and private sector personnel as
Gateway reviewers. One of the main outcomes sought in introducing Gateway
into the Australian Government was to share and improve upon the project
management skills of the APS. The involvement of public servants as reviewers
capitalises on this existing expertise and facilitates the development and
dissemination of project management and other skills across the APS.

The Implementers
At the direction of the Government, the Gateway Unit was established within
the Department of Finance and Administration (Finance) to manage the
introduction and continued operation of Gateway. The Gateway Unit:
• provides guidance and advice to agencies and reviewers;
• coordinates gateway reviews, including the selection and assembly of gateway
review teams and assisting with logistical and administrative arrangements;
• disseminates generic lessons learnt on the management of major projects
throughout the APS; and
• verifies gateway assessment tool (GAT) indicative risk ratings for projects
prior to cabinet consideration of the proposal.
Although the Gateway Unit coordinates reviews, they do not participate as
reviewers, nor are they responsible for actions taken by agencies on Gateway
Review Report recommendations. The Unit takes the confidentiality of Gateway
very seriously and as such does not disclose project information provided to the
Unit, even to other areas of Finance.
To assist participants in the efficient and effective conduct of Gateway reviews,
the Gateway Unit has developed publications as part of Finance’s Financial
Management Guidance (FMG) and Reference (FMR) series. The publications are:
• FMG No. 20, Guidance on the Gateway Review Process - A Project Assurance
Methodology for the Australian Government (the Guidance); and

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• FMR No. 7, Gateway Review Process – A Handbook for Conducting Gateway

Reviews (the Handbook).
A high level Brochure on Gateway is also available. It provides a high level
overview of gateway for those wanting to gain a general understanding of the
Gateway Review Process.
The purpose of the Guidance is to provide an introduction and practical
information to Gateway reviewers, project teams and other potential participants
on the process and requirements of Gateway.
The Handbook complements the Guidance and is intended to be a resource
document to assist with the successful preparation for, conduct of, and
participation in, Gateway reviews. It includes material on:
• the purpose of the review for each specific Gate;
• a list of the likely project documents to be reviewed at each Gate;
• areas to probe and the evidence required at each Gate, including possible
questions; and
• a Gateway Review Report template.
As each project is different, the Handbook is not an exhaustive reference. It
provides information that will assist with promoting a consistency of approach
for conducting reviews of different projects across government and should be
used to complement the expertise of the Gateway review team.
The Gateway Guidance, Handbook and Brochure are all available at the Gateway
website, at [Link]/gateway. The website also contains advice on
the Gateway reviewer training, the application process to become a Gateway
reviewer, the GAT (discussed later in this chapter) and a Frequently Asked
Questions section for potential reviewers.

The Review Points

The Gateway Review Process is tied to the key decision points (referred to as
Gates) of a project’s lifecycle. The Australian Government’s implementation of
Gateway closely models the United Kingdom’s (UK) application of the process;
however, there has been some alteration of the content focus of each Gate to
accommodate the Australian Government working environment, policy and
processes. The Gates are illustrated in the diagram on the following page:

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Figure 1

The Thresholds
Not all Australian Government projects will undertake Gateway. Gateway only
applies to new projects conducted by FMA agencies, which satisfy certain
financial and risk thresholds and which are being submitted to Cabinet for
approval.
The current financial thresholds are:
• $10M and above for Information Technology (IT) projects; and
• $20M and above for other procurement and infrastructure projects
These costs are calculated over the life of the project (not just in one financial
year) and include capital and operating expenses. These different financial
thresholds were set based on the research and experience of FMA agencies,
which established that there is generally a higher risk for IT projects than for
other projects. The financial thresholds will be reviewed from time to time to
ensure their appropriateness.
The second criterion, risk, is determined using the GAT. FMA agencies seeking
Cabinet approval for projects costed in excess of the financial thresholds are

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required to submit a completed GAT to the Gateway Unit before the consideration
of the project by Cabinet.
The GAT is a high level assessment tool that is designed to identify the indicative
level of risk for a project. It provides a set of criteria against which an agency
can assess the characteristics and degree of complexity of a proposed project, in
order to develop an overall indicative risk rating. The risk rating is then
confirmed in discussions with the Gateway Unit. The questions in the GAT allow
for the provision of a written explanation for each of the responses to help inform
the Gateway Unit in assessing the overall project risk.
As part of the phased implementation of Gateway, during the 2006-07 Budget
process projects meeting the financial thresholds were required to complete the
GAT. The Prime Minister and the Minister for Finance and Administration
subsequently agreed to five projects undertaking Gateway. These five projects
represent a cross section of projects of differing financial values and from both
the ICT and infrastructure classifications.
Since May 2006, all projects meeting the financial thresholds and assessed as
high risk are required to undertake the Gateway Review Process, if the project
is approved by Cabinet. All projects assessed as high risk must have their Gate
1 Business Case Review scheduled prior to Cabinet considering the proposal.
Commencing with the 2008-09 Budget process the risk threshold will be extended
to include medium risk as well as high risk projects.
A subset of high risk projects have been defined by the Government as ‘Mission
Critical’, and as such, the Government has decided that additional governance
requirements be applied to these projects, on the basis that:
• such projects are essential to the successful delivery of a major legislative
requirement or a major policy initiative committed to by the Government;
or
• project failure would have catastrophic implications for delivery of a key
public service, national security or the internal operation of an agency.
The classification of projects as ‘Mission Critical’ is expected to be rare.

The Reviews
A Gateway review is a highly interactive, cooperative and confidential process
involving the Gateway review team, the Senior Responsible Official (SRO) 4 and
the Sponsoring Agency’s Project Team. It is neither an audit nor intended to be
onerous for the Sponsoring Agency. The project can continue while the review
is being conducted and the review should not require new documentation to be
produced; it focuses on information already developed.
Gateway reviews are conducted by independent reviewers – people not associated
with the project itself. Gateway reviewers are sourced from the public and
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private sectors and are selected for their skills and experience, not to represent
their agency or firm. For high risk projects, the selection, engagement and
funding of the review team is by Finance. For medium risk projects, the Review
Team Leader will be selected, engaged and funded by Finance, but the remaining
Team members (usually three) will be staff nominated from within the Sponsoring
Agency who are not associated with the project.
As part of a Gateway review, the review team is provided access to relevant
project documentation and to the stakeholders involved with and / or affected
by the project. Stakeholders are encouraged to be as frank as possible in their
discussions with the review team during the review in order to help the team
gain an understanding of key issues or concerns.
There are three key stages in a Gateway review:
1. An Assessment Meeting between the Gateway Unit and the SRO and Project
Manager for the project, to clarify the characteristics of the project, discuss
the timing and logistics of the review and determine the skills requirements
for potential reviewers. This meeting will generally take one hour.
2. A Planning Meeting between the assigned Gateway review team and the
significant project personnel (including the SRO and the Project Manager)
to clarify the project’s characteristics and the requirements for the review.
Requirements include the documentation to be provided, people to be
interviewed and logistics associated with the review. This meeting will
generally take no more than half a day.
3. The Onsite Review Activity, which involves examination of critical
documentation and interviews with key Project Team members and other
project stakeholders on the Sponsoring Agency’s premises. Interviews will
be carefully planned and scheduled to minimise the disruption to
interviewees. The Onsite Review Activity typically takes four to five
working days to complete. The Review Team Leader will brief the SRO on
a daily basis regarding any findings to date. This briefing typically takes
less than half an hour.
Gateway reviews should take approximately six weeks to complete from the
Assessment Meeting to the conclusion of the Onsite Review Activity. To maximise
the benefit attained from a Gateway review, the review activity should ideally
take place four to six weeks prior to a major decision point to allow time to
consider and implement recommendations emanating from the review.
Each Gateway review produces a short confidential report, which is provided
to the Sponsoring Agency’s SRO. To enable the review team to produce a report
which is of most use to the Sponsoring Agency, there needs to be a willingness
by all parties to share information openly and honestly. The Gateway Unit works
to ensure this through:

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• careful selection of review teams;

• ongoing liaison with review teams and FMA agencies;
• communication and dissemination of guidance material;
• ongoing training for the Gateway Review Process; and
• supporting the confidentiality of the process.
Communication with Sponsoring Agencies in the implementation of Gateway is
a key focus for the Gateway Unit. That is why communication commences as
early as possible in preparation for a review and continues through to the
conclusion of the review. There will be a great deal of interaction between the
Gateway Unit, the review teams and the FMA agencies participating in reviews.
Proactive involvement of the SRO is an essential element in a Gateway review.
The SRO is important because they:
• oversee preparations for a review and take responsibility for meeting the
agency’s obligations;
• are the focal point for the work undertaken by a review team;
• own the review report and control its distribution;
• decide what, if any, action should be taken in response to the review team’s
recommendations; and
• are in a position to influence the people associated with the project, to help
lay the foundation for a productive interaction with the gateway review
team.
The focus of the review team’s work is to provide a useful report to the SRO
through the findings and recommendations they develop. Although they are
providing a report to the SRO, the independence of the review is crucial to the
success of Gateway. The review team is not working for the SRO, and the SRO
can not dictate the way the review is conducted or what goes in to the report.

Gateway Reports
The product of a Gateway review is a Gateway Review Report which is handed
over to the SRO on the last day of the Onsite Review Activity. Review reports
are confidential, high level and action-oriented and around eight to ten pages
in length. They are prepared for the Sponsoring Agency, not for the Gateway
Unit. Because the review team meet daily with the SRO and a draft of the report
is usually provided on the second last day of the review. The content and findings
of the report should not be a surprise to the SRO but rather a summation of the
advice and discussions that have been held during the review activity. Regardless
of how critical its recommendations are, the Gateway report itself does not stop
a project. It is the SRO’s responsibility to decide the appropriate action to address
the Gateway review findings.

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The overall status for a Gateway reviewed project is indicated by a ‘colour code’
system of red, amber and green which allows the SRO to quickly determine how
critical the recommendations are. It is emphasised to Sponsoring Agencies that
a red rating does not indicate a project should stop; rather, it is critical to the
success of the project that the issues raised in the report are addressed. An amber
rating indicates that the issues raised in the report should be addressed before
the next Gateway review. A green rating indicates that the project is on target,
but may benefit from implementing the recommendations in respect to the issues
raised in the review.
As part of the Gateway Unit is broader policy work in ensuring lessons learnt
in projects are shared across the APS, a summary of the review recommendations
are provided to the Unit at the end of the review for collation on a
non-attributable basis. As part of this lessons learnt activity the Unit also receives
a full copy of the Gateway Review Report but only once the next Gate is
completed and in the case of the final gate review (Gate 5 – Benefits Realisation),
the report is received three months following the review. The Unit does not
receive a copy of the report to follow up what action was taken with respect to
the recommendations, it is only for the purposes of developing the lessons learnt
policy advice and to ensure the quality of reports is of an acceptable and
consistent standard across reviews.

The Opportunities
In introducing Gateway to Australian Government projects, the Gateway Unit
has been able to leverage off the experience of previous implementations of the
Gateway Review Process in the UK and in Victoria, Australia. The Gateway Unit
would like to acknowledge the considerable assistance both the Office of
Government Commerce in the UK and the Gateway Unit of the Department of
Treasury and Finance in Victoria have given Finance in establishing Gateway
in the Australian Government.
The objective of Gateway for the Australian Government is to improve the
delivery of major projects; however, Gateway does present other opportunities
for the Government. The benefits of Gateway, effectively implemented, are
expected to extend beyond the projects passing through Gateway so that learning
and the dissemination of experience from the reviews can assist the development
of improved project management across the APS.

References
Australian Public Service Commission 2004, Connecting Government: Whole of
Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges, APSC, Canberra, available
at [Link]/mac/[Link]

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 Implementing Gateway in the Australian Government

National Audit Office Report (HC 877, 2003-2004): Improving IT procurement:

The impact of the Office of Government Commerce’s initiatives on departments and
suppliers in the delivery of major IT-enabled projects, UK NAO, London, available
at [Link]

ENDNOTES
1 This chapter is an updated and expanded version of a presentation delivered at the conference by
Robert Higgins, (then) Branch Manager of the Gateway Unit in the Department of Finance and
Administration.
2 National Audit Office Report (HC 877, 2003-2004): Improving IT procurement: The impact of the Office
of Government Commerce’s initiatives on departments and suppliers in the delivery of major IT-enabled
projects.
3 Australian Public Service Commission 2004, Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses
to Australia’s Priority Challenges - Chapter 5.
4 The Senior Responsible Official (SRO) is the official within the Sponsoring Agency that has overall
accountability for the realisation of the project outcomes and objectives for the project under review.

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16. Governments Can Deliver: Better
Practice in Project and Program
Delivery
Ian Glenday, Executive Director, Office of Government
Commerce, London

Synopsis
The concept of independent peer reviews leading to improved benefits from
major projects and programs is established by some leading enterprises. The
British Government’s Office of Government Commerce (OGC) have taken this
concept and delivered it for nearly 2000 major reviews in British Government.
Significant performance improvement has been delivered together with £3 billion
savings.
This chapter examines the strategy for OGC Gateway Brand management, the
lessons learnt from the large-scale roll out and the plans for the next phase.
The conclusion is that Governments can improve delivery of policy using this
strategy provided robust political and senior official support is established.

Genesis of the OGC Best Practice

The Office of Government Commerce is the British Government Agency
responsible for UK best practice in procurement and project and program
management. When it was set up in 2000 it had to decide upon its priorities in
the project management area. OGC made a fundamental decision early on to stop
work on an already extensive library of project management best practices.
Rather OGC wanted to work on how to move these existing best practices to the
level it wanted to influence, that of the senior leaders of projects, the senior civil
servants and Ministers, to help them understand their role in their projects and
policies. OGC chose one service initially, with which it felt it could succeed at
that level. That was the service of Independent Peer Reviews of projects by
practitioners. This has been very successfully applied by the best of private
sector and OGC wanted to translate it into a Brand which became a product and
service, free at the point of delivery for Ministers and senior civil servants who
were trying to run projects. A big challenge of course was communicating with
these clients without any trace of techno gabble that was frightening to them
and would have meant the material would have been blindsided immediately.
Not because OGC didn’t want a professional body of knowledge, but because it
wasn’t going to help with the selected audience. OGC has been highly successful,

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learnt a lot on the way, and had a lot of fun and excitement in making it work.
It is exciting to note that, in Australia, both the Federal and the Victorian state
governments decided to proceed on a similar basis. We have applied the service
to IT Projects, construction and defence projects all over the UK. The early
projects generated success stories which were remembered and used in OGC
marketing of the Brand.

Establishing the Brand

OGC helped turn things around: ‘it wasn’t rocket science’. For example OGC
Gateway helped turn around the Commonwealth Games in Manchester. The
Stadiums were relatively straightforward at Manchester, but the project was
not doing a terribly good job on getting the roads, rails and security links built
on time. These tended to be in silos. It was easy for an independent team to
suggest the need to think about these other things in an integrated manner. It
was not about what concrete the stadium was made of, it was about whether or
not anybody could even get out of the stadium. It is easy to fix when somebody
comes in who has done it before, has been there before. Similarly, the UK has
had helicopter projects without pilots when somebody forgot to train the pilots.
These sorts of things do happen. But things like the Commonwealth Games
became a medal on OGC’s chest to say ‘we’ve done something that really helped’.
It is important when running out this sort of campaign not to be ashamed of the
publicity involved in saying, ‘hey, we do help’. So OGC were successful and
said so.

How to Measure Success

So how would we measure success? Firstly by the large number of volunteer
projects that came forward, totalling nearly 2,000. This is a phenomenal number.
This suggests that OGC’s reputation is high and the reputation is high because
of who turns up, to do the Reviews. Teams include very senior civil servants
that turn up to review other department’s projects. They are not Review Team
Leaders, they have a different contribution to make, mainly in the policy
deliverability area. However, as part of a balanced team, they are valuable. This
is very different to a less experienced person turning up. Ministers are now
always interviewed on their projects by the review team and they have been
very supportive and very helpful. We are now achieving a 6.5 per cent a year
delivery improvement. Whilst we wish it was 100 per cent, there is nothing else
that we are doing in Britain which is remotely providing 6.5 per cent across our
big portfolio. In value terms the British Government gains 150 times more value
out of this than it costs to run the Brand. It costs us five million pounds a year
to run it and we make £1 Billion VFM savings every year. We make a lot of
savings out of it but it is not why we do it. We do it because it is a better deal

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 Governments Can Deliver: Better Practice in Project and Program Delivery

for the taxpayer in getting the benefits of projects. Nobody really questions the
cash anymore, it is more about the benefits.

The Other Benefits of OGC Gateway

These sorts of initiatives have very surprising outcomes. One was that OGC
learnt so many lessons from the reviews, that The British Government had to
put into place a major initiative to set up project management Centres of
Excellence (COE’s) to embed those lessons in their own departments. The COE’s
take the lessons, and embed them up front in the next generation of projects,
so that if a mistake happens it happens once but it will not happen too many
times. So excellence became fallout. Rather fascinating fallout was that all senior
civil servants are now required to do Gateway Review training and it is a career
expectation to turn up to do Gateway Reviews. These reviews are now the project
management training of choice for senior civil servants. So England has nearly
4,000 people now who, because they have been trained as review team members
and have turned up on reviews, do their day job quite differently. That is a
tremendous outcome, so we managed to get some short term outcomes, some
medium term outcomes with the service of excellence and these terrific long
term reskilling outcomes. And we have now built that in to the civil service
standard career progression criteria. But it has taken five years to get to that
happy state. So why did we succeed and how does it help other people?

Why did The British Government Succeed?

The UK had a clear business case for action. Politicians and the top of the civil
service had had enough of failure to deliver. Therefore we did not have to
generate enthusiasm. On the other hand OGC didn’t have carte blanche. OGC
said it could help, but we had to deliver something quickly otherwise support
would have evaporated. We were very conscious when we put the program into
action that we had to deliver the first set of results within six months. And we
did so. So OGC didn’t get a blank cheque, it got a blank cheque for a few months
to prove a concept which helped make alliances successful. We had the right
people involved, we had the head of the civil service literally on the phone every
week asking, ‘what’s going on next?’. Politically, we had our Cabinet minister,
the Chief Secretary of the Treasury, Chancellor Brown’s deputy, involved in
pushing the concept. So we had political support, we had the top official support.
Next, we did not delegate this activity of getting the Gateway program underway
to a low level. We ran it at a senior level, senior practitioners wrote the
procedures as well as getting the reviews done. That was important. The
productivity gain was enormous and we spoke the management language of the
people we had to communicate with. Not to delegate too far would be a lesson.
Of course we did have an important thing, the right structures, to stick with us
long term. This was not a short-term program. We made mistakes, learnt, and

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adjusted direction. The board that runs this program, the Office of Government
Commerce Supervisory Board is chaired by a Cabinet Minister, and has eight
Permanent Secretaries. They lived with OGC and this process for all the meetings
and took commitments as to what they were going to do next. It is a very good
structure. So we had all the building blocks but we still had to produce a product
that mattered. So what about the products?

The Products
The OGC Gateway product was the first trademarked product, and that’s led to
other services. The purpose of a product or service is that it is absolutely
repeatable, if you have to do it one thousand times the quality will be consistent
a thousand times. We could not invent it each time we did it because the UK is
a very large-scale business, We had to have something good, repeatable and
high quality. We were pursuing a very simple concept. We said there is a life
cycle of a project or a procurement which starts with a strategic assessment,
moves through a business case, then you choose a contractor from a long list,
you check it is ready for service and you get some benefits, pretty easily. We
chose six stages as the stages at which an independent review team would look
at the project, during its life cycle (Fig. 1). The process emphasises early
intervention. The opportunity to improve a project starts when the project
begins, it is almost hopeless half way through to try to rescue it.
Figure 1

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 Governments Can Deliver: Better Practice in Project and Program Delivery

The issue was ‘how does one use this as a discipline that is encouraging for the
top of the office and for a Minister or anybody else?’. One of the most interesting
outcomes of this process when we first used it was the project team sitting down
and saying, ‘well, actually I thought we were just about to start this project up’.
And somebody else would say, ‘no actually I have not seen a business case yet’.
And somebody else would say, ‘I think we’ll let the contract tomorrow’ and
somebody else would say, ‘well, actually we have not even agreed a business
case or a short list of contractors’. The ability of this sort of diagram and the
checklist that goes with it to tell a wide spread number of stakeholders where
they actually are was a big win early on. So, using it as a route map just by itself
proved very interesting. And then each of these stages had about ten criteria
that helped people decide where they should be and what gaps they might have
to fill in order to move on.
We thought about how to promote that message to a population who is not used
to project management. We decided we wanted this to be a Mars Bar. You know
it looked good, it tasted good and my goodness it did you good. It had to deliver
every time. So we had no shame in saying, this is a Brand, it is going to be
established as a Brand leader and we had a clear strategy to promote it as a Brand
from day one. The Brand documentation was purposely world class and is written
in plain English which includes no unique project management speak. OGC
know it is world class because people have stolen it all over the world. We had
high-class multi media promotion to promote the brand because it was not going
to promote itself fast enough. And like a Mars Bar, we controlled the quality.
We determined the team members, what they did and how they acted. People
do not turn up because they are good people. They turn up because they have
passed the accreditation test for being allowed to turn up. And that was very
important. Now did we win the brand battle? Yes we did. If you flick on the
BBC website and listen to the transcripts for the BBC news, you will hear every
month a Minister on the radio being asked something like, ‘okay Minister, how
do you know this particular defence project is going to work?’. And he will say,
‘because I’ve been working it with OGC Gateway team and they tell me we’re
on the right track’. Now that is Brand success. Each Minister has been given
one of the Gateway brand management check lists and there’s about 40,000
copies of these have been used. That is what comes of five years of branding.
And people now know the term. The Prime Minister will use the term on radio.
Ministers will use it. And they actually will understand what they are talking
about too, which is even better.

Establishing Brand Criteria

In order to control the quality of this Mars bar, we had to decide on the quality
elements. For us it was free at the point of delivery and then meeting the criteria
shown in the slide. Because if you have a brand it is important to say how would

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you recognise it if you fell over it in the street. There are two issues to
particularly emphasise (Fig 2). One is independence and the next is an accredited
practitioner team. Who turns up is vital, and they are very distinguished people
for the big projects. It will be somebody from the Sydney Olympics who does
the Gate Zero review of the London Olympics. They have been there before,
they are not scared of big decisions and have learnt from their mistakes. These
are very impressive people and they are tuned to the projects size and complexity.
The teams who turn up will have been there before and will recognise what is
going on in minutes. And that is what is impressive. Next, fast delivery–five
days maximum for a review, including writing the report. Even for an aircraft
carrier project this is doable. It assumes it is an 80/20 process. It is very important
to note that an OGC Gateway Review is not an audit and it is not quality assurance
– it is an 80/20 top down management process, massively well received as a
result of it being a short and focused review. The last thing to mention on criteria
is access to stakeholders. That means all stakeholders. If it is a ministerial priority
the Minister will be interviewed, they usually want to be interviewed but, if
for some reason they are not available, we just simply will not do the review
rather than fail to understand the issues. Good advice would be to stick to the
elements that matter in the Branding.
Figure 2

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 Governments Can Deliver: Better Practice in Project and Program Delivery

You can only get away with all of these process of course if it is based on reality.
So it is a fact that the real successes have helped us preserve our position today.
The sort of repeat issues that come up at each of these six gate reviews are shown
in Figure 3. We know eight or nine things that, if we could stop them going
wrong on every project, life would be more successful. At each Gateway review
we are limited to ten or twelve points only that the team will be examining.
What they will do is rapidly home down on three or four. Typically some of
these repeat points, such as leadership, business case, adequate skills and
resources will be amongst them. That’s fairly normal and enables OGC to focus
project help.
Figure 3

Mission Critical Projects

The UK had a problem to solve. We were producing 6.5 per cent improvement
rates on our project portfolio. That actually hid the fact that for the small projects
(50 to 100 million-dollar projects) we were achieving 20 per cent improvement.
For the very largest ones, the ones that were nearest the heart of political change,
we were only achieving 3-4 per cent. So we did a study to find out why and
then more importantly try to decide what to do about it. Figure 4 shows the
results of our study and of Gartners worldwide study of what goes wrong with
the very largest government projects. Not everyone may agree with it.

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Figure 4

What it suggests is that technology is not the problem on the very largest
projects. Project management processes are not the problem on the very largest
projects, but the clarity of policy interpretation, the scope of it and understanding
the political intention is the crunch that causes the very largest to either succeed
or fail. OGC realised that we were not putting enough effort into the early stages
of policy development and policy deliverability. And so we are moving on to
getting involved with the policy developers before it even becomes a policy.
What we did on the London Olympics, was to be involved with our project
management teams as the bid was produced. So there were no excuses for the
bid not to be right. We worked out a program where all the Ministers and
Permanent Secretaries got involved and identified their key success indicators,
which varied widely. Then we pulled them together and fed that back to the
ministers as a group. The better news is we have also set up for the first time
ever, a cross-functional ministerial group with a role in running the Olympic
program. There are six Cabinet Ministers chaired by an independent Cabinet
Minister who run the Olympic program. Please note the word ‘run’, they are
not there as a safety valve, they have a job to do in setting priorities, and
resolving escalated problems. So that is a real success. And we’re now going to
bring that success into all of our cross-functional projects. So what we now do
is before the Gateway review program even starts we run an activity with the
project at the stage of policy development. It can be done but only because of
who turns up to help and their credibility in crossing the divide between project

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management and policy. The sort of people who do that, some retired Chief
Executives of FTSE 100 companies, some ex-Permanent Secretaries in the UK,
are all distinguished people who have been around and carry the credibility to
talk to policy makers and are independently minded.

Conclusions
The Gateway program itself is now internationally trademarked to protect its
integrity. So if it is not a Mars Bar it is a Coca Cola. You know it arrives tasting
good, at the right temperature and it arrives in the same shape all of the time.
And like Coca Cola, OGC do not distribute the products unless we are quite sure
they are in good hands. There is more to do, since there is an ever-growing need
to keep building capability at very senior levels. The policy makers and the
politicians have shown great enthusiasm and patience in being involved with
this Gateway process and they want to continue to be involved.
The UK Cabinet Secretary, Sir Andrew Turnbull gave the nicest accolade the
Gateway program has had. He said, ‘The OGC Gateway program is one of those
more rare initiatives that has permanently changed Government’.

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17. The Gateway Review Process in
Victoria
Wayne Sharpe, Executive Manager, Gateway Unit,
Department of Treasury and Finance, Victoria

Government policy rationale

The Victorian Government spends billions annually on procuring infrastructure,
information systems, real property, goods and services. Contemporary
government procurement is now well accepted as a strategic management function
requiring a commitment by departments, large and small, to effective
procurement planning, innovative contracting strategies, active contract
management and continuous improvement of procurement processes.
Implementing the Gateway Review Process is a key strategy for improving
infrastructure and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) project
development and delivery across government. The initial focus of the Gateway
Review Process is on high-risk and medium-risk infrastructure, procurement
and information technology/change management projects. The aim is to help
departments ensure their investment is well spent, meets business objectives
and achieves value for money outcomes.
Successful procurement projects depend on aligning service outcomes with
project objectives in all phases of the procurement process. A project based on
a sound and tested business case is more likely to achieve the planned benefits.
The Gateway approach is a structured process that examines and confirms critical
decision points from concept development through to project benefit evaluation.
It probes the adequacy of the risk management framework to ensure that
government procurement of construction, information technology and other
services or projects is successfully delivered and that learnings are fed back, so
that future projects can be managed better. It does this by enhancing the
discipline of project delivery, for example, ensuring ongoing alignment of project
objectives throughout the various stages of project development.

Why a Gateway Review Process?

The Gateway Review Process (GRP) is part of a broader Gateway initiative
endorsed by the Victorian Government in March 2003. The initiative is a project
management/development framework with three underlying objectives:
1. reduce budget/time overruns and scope changes in the delivery of initiatives
by departments;

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2. improve alignment of initiatives with government strategic objectives and

departmental corporate plans; and
3. better assessment of portfolio initiatives across government (‘joined-up
government’).
Applying to major capital investments across the General Government sector,
the Gateway Initiative consists of:
1. a multi-year strategy with a long-term view (5-10 years) of general
Government sector asset investment projects or initiatives – aligned with
the Victorian Government’s strategic objectives;
2. development of consistent general Government sector project lifecycle
guidance, with an initial focus on preparing better business cases to
support asset investment proposals;
3. independent Gateway Reviews built around six key decision points in a
project’s lifecycle, with the aim of assuring successful project delivery; and
4. reporting focused on exceptions – identifying issues early enough to keep
projects on track or get them back on track.
Evidence suggests that a primary cause of cost and time overruns in asset
investment projects is a failure to identify and manage project risks at all stages
of the project’s lifecycle, including the particularly critical initial project planning
stages. Gateway Reviews focus on addressing this issue.
The process has been developed and adopted by a number of major corporations
and progressive governments.

Characteristics of the Gateway Review Process

The Gateway Review Process has been developed from tried and tested practices
in industry and in the public sector in the United Kingdom 1 and has the
following key characteristics:
• it uses short, focused independent reviews;
• it uses a team of experienced and independent practitioners;
• it includes all key stakeholders;
• it is not an audit;
• it is undertaken in consultation with the project team; and
• it is confidential, and independent from the project approval process.

Reactions to Gateway Review Processes in other

jurisdictions
The characteristics and benefits of the Gateway Review Process have ensured
that it is well received throughout central civil government in the United
Kingdom. The process has been successfully applied to projects undertaken by
all its central civil departments including the Ministry of Defence. Departmental

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and industry reaction to the introduction has been extremely positive, with
improvements to project delivery already demonstrated. Consultation with
Gateway practitioners and other contacts in other jurisdictions has highlighted
reactions and experiences.

United Kingdom
A number of benefits have emerged from the UK experience of implementing
the Gateway Review Process, including increased assurance that the expected
service delivery outcomes will result, delivery of projects within budget and
time constraints, better management of risks inherent in projects, increased
stakeholder satisfaction, and a snapshot of the procurement health of key projects
for Senior Responsible Owners. 2 Specific comments include:
• project owners who have received Gateway Review reports on their projects
are supportive of the process and have benefited from recommendations
contained in the Review report;
• it is of paramount importance to keep the Gateway Review Process separate
from capital approval sections of government. Gateway Reviews are about
‘helping projects succeed’. They are not part of the approval process;
• the Gateway Review Process must add value and support to projects, with
the initial focus on high-risk projects; and
• the need to improve project delivery for projects which cut across
departmental or jurisdictional boundaries is not well recognised or accepted
(a common misperception is that ‘all physical-build projects are low risk’).
The cost of the Gateway Review Process to the central civil government in the
UK is reported as approximately 0.01 per cent of the overall cost of projects.
Office of Government and Commerce Value for money reviews have confirmed
that average cost avoidance of 3-5 per cent are being achieved when best practice
recommendations from review reports are implemented. The cost avoidance
result from early implementation of actions needed for successful project delivery.
For example a project with a total estimated investment of $100 million would
generate an average cost of $10,000 to undertake a Gateway Review that could
result in average cost avoidance of between $3 and $5 million.

Practical benefits of Gateway Reviews

Some Victorian Government departments and agencies have implemented
excellent internal processes for obtaining better value for money spent on
procurement. As a major procurer of projects, government recognises that
processes can be further enhanced to improve project outcomes and services to
the community.

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In other jurisdictions and in the private sector, experience has demonstrated

that reviews at critical decision points in the procurement cycle add value and
improve the outcomes of procurement and minimise the risk of project failure.
The Gateway Review Process involves targeted application of structured reviews,
with the appropriate level of independence at critical decision points in project
delivery. Implementation of Gateway Reviews can be expected to support a
disciplined approach to the application of proven procurement processes leading
to better outcomes.
Gateway Reviews will consolidate learning and procurement across the sector
and give government and departmental Secretaries/CEOs confidence that high
to medium-risk projects have had a level of expert independent review. The
GRP provides three key benefits for government:
• a consistent, whole-of-government, disciplined process to help ensure that
projects are delivered on time and within budget;
• increased confidence by departments, agencies and the Expenditure Review
Committee of Cabinet in the health of a project; and
• an increased skill base across government through the development of review
skills.
Implementing and operating the Gateway Review Process in Victoria will also
help provide:
• successful projects delivered in a timely, efficient and appropriate way;
• best practice techniques in project delivery;
• lessons learned that are disseminated and incorporated into new projects;
• increased competence and valuable development opportunities for individuals
involved in review teams; and
• enhanced project management capability within the Victorian public sector.

Scope
The Gateway Review guidelines apply to all new or existing high to medium-risk
government projects that procure services, construction/property and information
technology/change management projects.
At the earliest stages, if procurement is likely to be the chosen means of satisfying
an identified need, departments and agencies should:
• assess the complexity and risk profile of the project;
• if high or medium risk, decide on the type of Gateway Review required and
the timing; and
• schedule reviews to ensure discipline in the procurement process and an
optimum value for money solution.

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 The Gateway Review Process in Victoria

The Gateway Review Process is not designed to duplicate existing approval

processes, but should assist and enhance outcomes from these processes. The
GRP generally serves a different purpose than internal approval or reviews
processes.

Establishing the Gateway Review Process

As noted, the Gateway Review Process is based on established industry practice
comprising short, structured, independent reviews at six key stages in the life
of the project.
Figure 1

The reviews are conducted for and reported to the Senior Responsible Owner.
The reviews seek to identify issues to ensure the successful delivery of the
project.

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The key to delivering objective high-quality reports is the independence of the

review team from the project, and, in the case of high-risk projects, the
independence of the review team from the project’s department.
The review teams consist of senior government staff supplemented where
necessary by external consultants. The interchange of senior staff between
departments and agencies undertaking Gateway Reviews should improve project
delivery across government.

Setting up – the steps

Several steps were involved in setting up support systems for the Gateway
Review Process in Victoria. The plan involved establishing:
• an independent Gateway Unit with the role of developing, implementing
and overseeing continuous improvement of the Gateway Review Process.
The Gateway Unit has been initially incorporated into the Commercial
Division of the Department of Treasury and Finance’s organisational tree,
with the operational and resourcing costs funded by Treasury, not on a cost
recovery basis;
• a multi-department Gateway Supervisory Committee to oversee the
implementation of the Gateway Review Process (including lessons learned
and continuous improvement);
• Gateway Reviews for all projects classified as high risk for the 2003-04
Budget, with voluntary review of medium risk projects, and prioritised high
risk projects to be considered at part of the 2004-05 budget process;
• feedback to the Gateway Supervisory Committee six times a year and
quarterly to the Premier and the Treasurer on generic lessons learned from
the findings of Gateway Reviews;
• encouragement of participation by senior experienced staff within the
Victorian Public Sector as Gateway reviewers, particularly for high-risk
projects;
• an accreditation and training regime to develop skills of Gateway reviewers
in portfolio departments; and
• a database of accredited staff to participate in Gateway Reviews.

What is required by departments?

Government departments and agencies, managers, reviewers and particularly
Senior Responsible Owners have a number of responsibilities in relation to the
GRP.

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Understanding the Gateway Process

Government departmental and agency staff involved in procurement or project
delivery should familiarise themselves with Gateway Review responsibilities
and processes including:
• ensuring that the Project Profile Model (PPM) is completed and sent to the
Gateway Unit when the project is first considered during the strategic phase
or the business case generation phase;
• ensuring the conduct of reviews necessary under the Gateway Review
requirements;
• considering review outcomes and recommendations in decision-making on
the project; and
• understanding the independence of reports issued by the Gateway Review
Teams.
Departments and agencies are expected to establish a mechanism for coordination
with the Gateway Unit and to make all arrangements for the venue and equipment
required for Gateway Reviews. In addition, departmental and agency staff
involved in the Gateway Review Process should be familiar with government
policies and guidelines relating to asset management, procurement, construction
and information technology.

Role of Senior Responsible Owner

A Senior Responsible Owner, who is either a Senior Executive or Senior Manager,
is to be nominated by the departmental Secretary or Chief Executive Officer for
each procurement project subject to a Gateway Review. Senior Responsible
Owners ensure that Gateway Review requirements are implemented for the
project for which they are responsible. This includes:
• managing the implementation of the Gateway Review requirements;
• arranging for completion of projects’ complexity rating using the PPM and
classifying them;
• liaising with the departmental Secretary or the Senior Executive nominated
as responsible for procurement on the risk rating for the project;
• providing a copy of the completed PPM risk assessment to the Gateway Unit;
and
• coordinating Gateway Reviews of the project with the Gateway Unit.

Selecting Gates for Review and nominating reviewers

Gateway Reviews are conducted before key decisions are taken in the
procurement cycle (see Figure 1 a more detailed version).
As noted, Senior Responsible Owners from departments and agencies are expected
to communicate with the Gateway Unit at least six to eight weeks before a

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Gateway Review for all medium to high risk projects to ensure that the correct
resources can be assembled and that the pre-Review work is completed.
The Gateway Unit assembles the review teams for all high-risk projects. The
Unit will seek departmental nominations of potential review team members to
be trained for medium and high risk projects. When trained, these people are
considered accredited for Gateway Reviews of medium and high risk projects
across other departments and agencies.

Application of Gateway Reviews

The primary purpose of the Gateway Review Process is to realise better value
for government asset investment decisions. The process provides government
and departmental Secretaries with assurance that:
• the best option to achieve a service objective is being pursued;
• independent review at key stages will help avoid potentially costly mistakes;
• the best available skills and experience are being deployed on the project;
• all stakeholders involved in the project fully understand the project status
and the issues involved;
• the project can progress safely to the next stage of development or
implementation;
• predictability of time and cost targets for the project is increased; and
• knowledge and skills are improved through participation in review teams.

Project profile model

The decision about conducting a Gateway Review is based on the complexity/risk
assessment using a Project Profile Model (PPM). This assessment is done by
departments.
The PPM is intended to provide a standard set of high-level criteria against
which Senior Responsible Owners can assess the intrinsic characteristics and
degree of complexity of a proposed procurement project, in order to establish
the appropriate:
• control structures (including Gateway Reviews);
• risk profile and corresponding risk strategy; and
• design approach (for example, delivering the project in several increments
or modules to help reduce complexity).

Using the project profile model

Three spreadsheets are provided by the Gateway Unit that are appropriate for:
1. Information technology/change management projects: all business change
projects involving an IT element which, if not delivered, would significantly
impact upon the project's ability to deliver its intended benefits.

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2. Property and construction projects: projects procuring property (existing

or to be constructed) as a supply of works or service.
3. Other services: (e.g. environmental management, facilities management,
property and estates advice etc).
Senior Responsible Owners should use the spreadsheet most appropriate for
their project. 3 The PPM should be used as a starting point in assessing the
likely levels of risk associated with the project. It is a high level indicator, not
an exhaustive project risk analysis model, although it can form the basis of a
fuller project risk analysis. The model requires the Senior Responsible Owner
to assess the project against a number of criteria to provide an overall score for
the project. These initial scores will be validated by the Gateway Unit. The
current approach is that:
• a total score of 20 or less indicates that the project is relatively low risk and
Gateway Reviews will be managed from within the department or agency;
• a total score in the range of 21–40 indicates that the project is medium risk.
Gateway Reviews for this category will require a review team leader,
nominated by the Gateway Unit, who is independent of the department or
agency. Review team members are sourced by the department or agency,
outside of the project team for medium risk reviews; and
• a total score 41 or more indicates that the project is high risk and will require
the review team leader and the review team members to be nominated by
the Gateway Unit and to be independent of the department or agency.
It is important to stress that the PPM is designed as a guide to help the Senior
Responsible Owner make their assessment. There may be issues that are not
explicitly covered by the model but which affect the assessment. In particular,
there may be other factors that increase the risk to the project and therefore
warrant a higher rating. If in any doubt, Senior Responsible Owners should
discuss these issues with the Gateway Unit.
Senior Responsible Owners are asked to notify the Gateway Unit (after confirming
the PPM details with the departmental Gateway Coordinator) if the proposed
project is medium or high risk. (The Gateway Unit does not record information
for low-risk projects.)
The Gateway Unit needs a minimum of six to eight weeks from the receipt of
the PPM to undertake the necessary planning and team selection. However,
PPMs may be sent to the Unit in advance of this minimum period.

Procurement types
Gateway Reviews may be conducted at the six key decision points in the
procurement cycle for all types of procurement, but the Gateway Process does
not apply to all government projects, and not all Gateway Reviews are necessarily

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applied at all stages of projects. The need for and level of review required will
be assessed on a complexity/risk basis. Core Gateway Reviews apply to specific
procurement types, depending on the level of risk assessed via the PPM. Specific
Gateway Reviews are required for different types of procurement. For instance,
a post-completion Gateway Review would be appropriate for an information
system project assessed as high risk with wide impacts across government, but
may not be considered appropriate for a project procuring capital equipment
assessed as low risk.

Gateway Reviews – The Six Gates

As noted earlier, there are six Gates, or key decision points, for reviewing
projects. Gateway Reviews may be conducted for all types of procurement at
any of the six key decision points (Gates) in the project (procurement) lifecycle:
strategic assessment, business case, procurement strategy, investment decision,
readiness for service and benefits evaluation. The detail in each Gateway Review
is based on the results of workshops and tests on pilot projects.

Strategic assessment (Gate 1)

Gateway Review 1, strategic assessment, assesses whether the proposed
procurement project is the best value means of servicing the identified need and
whether it aligns with government and relevant departmental or agency strategic
plans. To achieve this, the strategic assessment:
• confirms the need for the delivery of the service outcomes proposed;
• confirms that there is government and departmental/agency commitment to
meeting the service need;
• ensures that the service and project objectives are fully enunciated;
• ensures investigation of all alternatives to procurement projects for meeting
the perceived need;
• confirms whether a procurement project or program is the appropriate means
of providing service outcomes;
• confirms that there has been a comprehensive investigation of alternative
procurement methods including integration with service outcomes required
of other departments or agencies (‘joined-up’ government);
• reviews plans for developing a business case, including financial and
economic analysis, value management, risk management, stakeholder
consultation, project management and change management; and
• confirms resources (including funding) are available to develop a sound case
for government consideration for approval.

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 The Gateway Review Process in Victoria

Business case (Gate 2)

The business case review assesses whether the project options have been fully
canvassed and evaluated, whether the recommended option is the best value
solution, and whether government should proceed with it.
To achieve this, the business case review aims to:
• confirm that the business case is robust – that is, in principle it meets service
needs, is affordable, achievable, that appropriate options have been explored,
and that the project is likely to achieve value for money;
• establish that a feasibility/options study has been completed satisfactorily
– including financial analysis meeting Treasury requirements, and that a
preferred way forward has been identified;
• confirm that the implementation of the project is based on open and active
communication with all major stakeholders represented;
• ensure that the major risks have been identified, that outline risk management
plans have been developed and estimated costs of risks are included in the
project budget;
• confirm that, for major asset initiatives, alternative delivery methods have
been evaluated, for example. Partnerships Victoria private/public operation
versus a government-funded project;
• confirm that the scope and project objectives are realistic, clear and
unambiguous;
• establish that, in formulating the proposed project, impacts on suppliers and
their ability to deliver has been fully considered;
• establish that robust plans for managing the next stage of the project are in
place;
• establish that stakeholders were considered in formulating the project;
• review stakeholder opinions and establish that plans are in place for ongoing
stakeholder consultation;
• review and validate assessment of assumptions made about the project; and
• review the analysis of economic, social and environmental impacts and
confirm that the project meets government’s current objectives.

Procurement strategy (Gate 3)

The procurement strategy review aims to propose the optimum methods for
delivering the project within budget and time constraints and to allocate risks
to the parties best able to manage them. This review is undertaken before
committing to a procurement methodology and contracting system. To achieve
this, the procurement strategy review aims to:
• confirm that the proposed project aligns with the business case and will
deliver the service outcomes within the budget allocated;

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• ensure that the procurement strategy is robust and appropriate and has been
established through authorised departmental/agency processes;
• establish that comprehensive plans for managing the project during the
delivery process have been developed and are implemented;
• review risk management plans and establish that all major risks have been
considered and plans for risk management are established, including
budgetary provisions;
• ensure that supplier capacity and past performance have been realistically
evaluated in developing the proposed procurement strategy;
• review benchmarks established to evaluate the project’s success in delivering
service outcomes;
• assess the appropriateness of the proposed contracting methodology and
likelihood of its success in delivering the project and satisfying broader
government policies;
• ensure the procurement method is in place; and
• ensure the site has been secured and all other pre-procurement actions are
in hand.

Tender decision (Gate 4)

The tender decision review assesses whether the business case is valid once costs
are established. The review also assesses whether the investment decision process
was conducted with due probity and fairness to tendering parties.
To achieve this, the tender decision review aims to:
• confirm the business case and benefits plan when the bid information is
confirmed;
• check that all necessary statutory and procedural requirements were followed
throughout the procurement process;
• confirm that the recommended contract decision – if properly executed
within a standard lawful agreement – is likely to deliver the specified
outputs/outcomes on time, and within budget and will provide value for
money;
• ensure that management controls are in place to manage the project through
to completion;
• ensure there is continuing support for the project;
• confirm that the approved procurement strategy has been followed;
• confirm that the development and implementation plans of the client and
the supplier or partner are sound and achievable;
• check that the business is prepared for developing any new processes where
required, and has prepared for implementation, transition and operation of
new services/facilities;

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• confirm that there are plans for risk management, issue management and
change management (technical and business) and that these plans are shared
with suppliers; and
• confirm that the technical implications, such as ‘buildability’ for construction
projects and, for IT-related projects, the impact of e-government frameworks,
have been addressed.

Readiness for service (Gate 5)

The readiness for service review assesses the state of readiness to commission
the project and implement the change management required.
To achieve this, this pre-commissioning review is designed to:
• check that the current phase of the contract and all documentation is properly
completed;
• ensure that the contractual arrangements are up-to-date;
• check that the business case is still valid and unaffected by internal and
external events or changes;
• check that the originally projected business benefit is likely to be achieved;
• confirm that there are processes and procedures to ensure long-term project
success;
• confirm that all necessary testing is done to the client’s satisfaction
(e.g. commissioning of buildings, business integration and user acceptance
testing) and that the client is ready to approve implementation;
• check that there are feasible and tested contingency and reversion
arrangements;
• ensure that all ongoing risks and issues are managed effectively and do not
threaten implementation;
• evaluate the risk of proceeding with the implementation if there are any
unresolved issues;
• confirm the business has the necessary resources and that it is ready to
implement the services and the business change;
• confirm that the client and supplier implementation plans are still achievable;
• confirm that there are management and departmental controls to manage the
project from implementation to operation;
• confirm that all parties have agreed plans for training, communication,
roll-out, production release and support as required;
• confirm that all parties have agreed plans for managing risk;
• confirm that there are reciprocal plans for managing the working relationship,
with reporting arrangements at appropriate levels on both the
department/agency and the supplier side; and
• check that lessons for future projects are identified and recorded.

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Benefits evaluation (Gate 6)

The benefits evaluation review assesses whether the benefits expected in the
business case have been achieved. The review will ensure that post-completion
and post-occupancy reviews are conducted and the findings communicated, to
improve future projects.
To achieve this, the benefits evaluation review aims to:
• confirm that post-completion review and post-occupancy evaluation have
been carried out and the findings disseminated to participants in the
procurement chain;
• assess whether the project has met business case goals and whether claimed
operational benefits have been realised;
• review the adequacy of funding arrangements for ongoing operation and
management of the project;
• establish the benefits of applying Gateway Reviews and government
procurement processes to the project;
• identify improvements that might be made to existing procurement processes,
as a result of experience from this project;
• if ongoing contract management is required, review the adequacy of client
and supplier resources for the task;
• identify any deviations from the business case for the project;
• confirm that plans are in place for future renewal of the procurement project;
• review the adequacy of risk management plans for the project;
• review the adequacy of project change management plans;
• review the extent to which the project met stakeholder requirements; and
• review the project one year after it has been completed, and on a three-year
cycle for the life of the project thereafter, to ensure the ongoing benefits of
the project.

Gateway Review Reporting and Support

Review Guidelines
Guidelines to assist the review team conduct a review are available for each
Gateway Review. The Gateway Unit can provide documentation and presentations
to assist at any particular Gateway or for the general review process.

Reports
As project personnel, clients and other stakeholders may be interviewed about
issues arising in the Review, review teams produce a short report summarising
the review activities undertaken and the conclusions of the team about the health
of the project. Review reports are provided to the Senior Responsible Owner
only. If a copy of the report is sought it is at the discretion of the Senior

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Responsible Owner if he or she releases the report. The report will not be released
or circulated by the Gateway Review Team of the Gateway Unit.
Gateway Review reports provided to the Senior Responsible Owner, like all
other government documents, are subject to the Freedom of Information Act
1988. Freedom of Information (FOI) requests for Gateway Review reports will
be handled through the Senior Responsible Owner’s department and not through
the Gateway Review Unit. Certain information contained within the Gateway
Review reports may be excluded from release as part of the various exemptions
in the FOI Act.
The Gateway Unit retains a copy of the each Review report, to compile lessons
learned for reporting generically to the Gateway Supervisory Committee and
back to relevant departments or agencies. The Gateway Review Process uses
Red, Amber and Green (RAG Status) classifications for assessing projects at each
Gate:
Red – To achieve success the project should take action immediately.
Amber – The project should go forward with actions on recommendations to be
carried out before the next Gateway Review of the project.
Green – The project is on target to succeed but may benefit from the uptake of
recommendations.

Review Team Status

Review teams have no decision-making powers. All decisions arising from review
recommendations are made by the Senior Responsible Owner.

Supporting Gateway Reviews

Importance of the review team
Any Gateway Review relies substantially on the independent expertise of the
review team. Reviewers are required to have high-level skills, through training
and extensive or relevant experience of aspects of the projects under review.
Review team members will be chosen from the private sector or other government
jurisdictions when necessary to supplement skills and experience within the
Victorian public sector and the Gateway Unit. Registration of Interest
advertisements and other methods are used to compile a database of experienced
private sector people to supplement review teams.

Training reviewers
Training is provided on ‘Preparing to carry out Gateway Reviews’ and ‘Leading
Gateway Reviews’. The training is designed to equip participants with the
knowledge and skills to plan, prepare and undertake Gateway Reviews as team
members and team leaders of high, medium and low risk reviews. Training is
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delivered by a external organisation, utilising modified OGC Gateway Training

material from the UK. For details on how to undertake training please see the
Gateway Review website.

Accreditation and skills – reviewers and team leaders

There are different levels of training for review team members and team leaders.
The database of accredited departmental and agency reviewers as well as the
private sector reviewers (established by the Gateway Unit) will include details
of their skill base and experience. New nominees will be assessed and considered
for inclusion on the database of reviewers. The reviewers details in the database
are subject to the Privacy Act and are only utilised by the Gateway Review Unit.
Nominees for Gateway Review team membership are expected to meet certain
minimum requirements.
This outline recognises three levels of skills or expertise:
Level 1: Awareness. The participant is able to understand the key issues and
their implications for the client, and ask relevant and constructive questions on
the subject.
Level 2: Knowledge. The participant has a detailed knowledge of the subject
and is capable of providing guidance and advice to others.
Level 3: Expert. The participant has extensive and substantial practical
experience and applied knowledge of the subject.
The Gateway Unit will advise nominees and their departments or agencies of
their inclusion on the database.
(i) Team leaders – There are particular requirements for team leaders of reviews
of medium and high-risk projects.
(a) For high-risk projects, team leaders are:
• typically executive level in the public sector and the equivalent in the private
sector; 4
• substantially experienced (minimum of 15 years), with a background in
managing business aspects of major procurement projects and/or programs
with a typical value of $50 million or more;
• familiar with handling major strategic initiatives and managing business
change;
• excellent communicators; and
• experienced in connection with sensitive and complex or unusual projects.
(b) For medium-risk projects, team leaders are:
• minimum level – Victorian Public Sector level 5;

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• substantially experienced (minimum of 10 years), with a varied background,

particularly in procurement or project/program management typically valued
at $20 million; and
• excellent communicators.
(ii) Team members – Team members need a certain level of project management
experience and/or experience in business change, business analysis or other
operational or procurement areas. They include:
(a) Project managers with the following experience:
• professional project managers, who are accredited in Prince 2 (UK Office of
Government Commerce project management methodology) or PMBOK (the
Project Management Body of Knowledge Guide);
• successful managers of significant projects/programs or procurements;
• good team players and communicators; and
• 5+ years relevant experience.
(b) Business analysts with:
• in-depth financial assessment evaluation experience; and
• experience in preparing business cases, strategic assessments and business
requirements.
(c) Specialists in management in the following areas (minimum five years
experience):
• business change;
• electronic documents and records;
• facilities; and
• construction and property.
(d) procurement professionals (minimum 5 years experience):
• professional procurement practitioners;
• with experience in managing contractual relationships; and
• with responsibilities for best procurement practice.
(e) operations experience (minimum five years) in:
• operations support;
• property portfolio management; and
• service management.
No fees are paid to departmental/agency personnel for participation in review
teams.

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Conclusion
Since the introduction of the GRP in 2003, over 90 projects with a total estimated
investment of over $14 billion have had more than 120 reviews completed.
Of the SRO’s that have provided feedback (greater than 80 per cent), all agreed
that the Gateway Review undertaken on their project was beneficial and will
impact positively on the outcome of their project.
A recently completed independent review of the Gateway Initiative, has also
determined that:
• the Initiative’s first component, the Gateway Review Process, helps identify
problems early to allow time for their remedy;
• the Initiative’s second component, the Multi-Year Strategy, has improved
the alignment of asset projects with Government strategic objectives and
department plans but, importantly, the lack of sharing of the Multi-Year
Strategies among Departments is weakening Gateway’s objective of better
whole-of-government planning;
• the Initiative’s third components, Business Cases, are useful decision-making
tools for Departmental Secretaries and Government to determine how asset
procurement should best occur; and
• based on the lessons learned from over 100 Gateway Reviews a publication
entitled ‘Commonly Identified practices that limit project success*’, has been
produced to share generic lessons learned.

Annex: Commonly Identified practices that limit project

success can be downloaded from:
[Link]
LessonsLearned/$File/Gateway%20Lessons%[Link]

Glossary
Gateway Review: Review by a small team of people, independent of the
procurement project, undertaken at key decision points (Gates) in the project
(procurement) lifecycle
Government department: The terms government ‘department’, ‘department’
or ‘funding department’ are used interchangeably. Agencies are included in the
Gateway Process.
Infrastructure: Fixed assets that support economic and social development in
a fundamental way.
Milestone: Significant events or outcomes that mark the progress of a project.
Monitoring: Process of regularly collecting information to review performance
against specified criteria.

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Outcome: Measurement against specified criteria of the extent to which

objectives are achieved.
Project profile model: The project profile model (PPM) is a high-level
assessment of the risk of a procurement activity. It provides an indication of the
project’s complexity/risk rating: high (category 3), medium (category 2) or low
(category 1).
Procurement: Process involving all activities following the decision that goods,
assets, facilities or services are required. It involves defining the scope, the
acquisition and the disposal of goods, assets, facilities and services.
Project: An undertaking with a defined beginning and objectives by which
completion is identified. A project may be completed using one or a number of
contracts.
Risk management: A structured methodology for identifying and analysing
potential risks and implementing an appropriate plan to manage them.
Senior Responsible Owner: The Senior Responsible Owner is a generic title
for the senior individual who takes personal responsibility for the successful
outcome of a program or project.
Service provider: Includes contractors, sub-contractors, consultants,
professional service contractors, suppliers, agents and employers who provide
goods, assets, facilities or services to a client.
Skill development: Any work-related learning or training activity that results
in enhanced skills, knowledge and aptitude to perform a job.
Training: The development of skills, knowledge and aptitude to perform a job.
Value for money: Value for money is determined by considering all factors
relevant to a particular purpose. It includes experience, quality, reliability,
timeliness, service, capital costs, whole-of-life costs, innovation and value-adding
components such as meeting government’s economic, social and environmental
policies.

ENDNOTES
1 Office of Government Commerce. For more information, see [Link].
2 The Senior Responsible Owner is a generic title for the senior individual who takes personal
responsibility for the successful outcome of a program or project.
3 Please note that the first two spreadsheets are applicable to IT and construction/property management
projects procuring services. While such projects may be seeking to pass responsibility to service
providers for some of the criteria addressed within the PPM (e.g. the degree of innovation used) these
factors will still be fundamental to the ultimate success or otherwise of the project and will need to be
monitored throughout the project lifecycle by the Senior Responsible Owner.
4 This will vary depending on the requirements of the Gateway Review under consideration.

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18. The Australian Government
Cabinet Implementation Unit
Peter Hamburger, Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet

My purpose is to address a particular managerial initiative in the Australian

Public Service – the Cabinet implementation Unit – an initiative that is now
about two-and-a-half years old and that reports to me.
One might, therefore, expect me to talk about the management role of the Unit
but, in fact, I am going to start with the politics.
I will do that because, contrary to the expectations and hopes of many public
servants, the Cabinet is primarily a political, not a managerial, institution and a
body called the Cabinet Implementation Unit will therefore be located at the
boundaries of politics and management. The political dimension will always
affect what the Unit can do and how it can do it.
I gave a talk on Cabinet processes to senior officials of the Department of Finance
some months ago and emphasised – to the point of tedium, I thought – that
Cabinet is a group of politicians, performing the hugely valuable role of politics
in a democratic society and that as a result they might not always appear rational
to public servants. Their first question was ‘why do they so often ignore our
good advice?’
I had clearly failed to convey the message that politicians, when they collectively
consider the political aspects of government decisions, are likely to take into
account factors beyond costs and benefits, probabilities, and the nitty gritty of
how to implement the decision. They are quite properly interested in the politics
as well.
In our system Cabinet is about decision-making, coordinating government
activity building and maintaining cohesiveness all at the political level. Cabinet
decisions will naturally be based on the political judgments of the leading
members of the political party that has been given a parliamentary majority by
the people of Australia – and this is perfectly proper.
They will also be made under a constitution in which the responsibility for
managing rests with the Queen’s Ministers of State and the Departments of State
they administer not the collective Cabinet which, like the Prime Minister, is not
mentioned in the constitution. In practice, as well as in law, the responsibility
for making a change in policy happen after the collective Cabinet has decided
on it rests with individual ministers and their portfolio agencies.

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So the two big impacts of the political dimension are:

• Government will always have an eye on the politics; and
• the politics within the Government involve tensions between individual
responsibility of ministers and collective responsibility of Cabinet.
The size and complexity of modern government has greatly increased the amount
of managerial work that has to be done at the ministerial level. I like to draw
the contrast with the Australian Public Service of 1901: seven departments,
eleven-and-a-half thousand public servants, 89 per cent of them in the Post
Office.
The figures show that on size grounds alone Cabinet needs to be interested in
implementation, however, size is not the only issue. Delivery is now a lot more
complex:
• in many cases it has been moved outside government altogether, with
government becoming a purchaser rather than a direct provider of services;
• very often, and increasingly, there are partnership, joint provision, or
complementary provision arrangements, often across jurisdictional
boundaries;
• even where government is the sole provider, that is often contestable or open
to challenge;
• technology has very greatly widened the capacity for policy makers and
implementers to interact, both in terms of the data processing that can happen
and the extent to which higher level policy makers can by pass hierarchies
(I have elsewhere used the ‘strategic corporal’ analogy); and
• customers for all sorts of services, including those provided by government,
have become more demanding as they experience what can be provided in
other areas.
Expectations have moved from the Model T Ford, with no options, even for
colour, to the latest Fairlane which, if you buy it new, you can almost have built
to your own specifications. Government service delivery has moved from the
old clerical factories to complex networks like Centrelink and Job Network.
Cabinet and ministers are all held accountable in this very complex managerial
environment and implementation failures often do lead to large difficulties for
governments, for example:
• the Customs cargo management system threatened to leave everyone’s
Christmas presents on the wharves last year and bankrupt retailers;
• the Pay TV licensing in the later years of the previous Labor government
caused enormous problems for that Government;
These are just two examples where ministers found that ignorance was no excuse,
or at least did not ease the political pain very much.
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It is self-evident from all this that we need much stronger support structures
for Cabinet decision-making and much stronger linkages between the political
and the managerial levels of government now than our forebears did in 1901,
or even in 1970.
That is where the CIU fits in. It gives Cabinet a capacity to oversee
implementation and an opportunity to be involved in, or at least in control of,
the learning and adaptation that occurs in the implementation process.
In principle also, Cabinet is well suited to this:
• coordination is one of the central functions of Cabinet and many of the most
difficult implementation problems arise at boundaries between agencies,
portfolios or jurisdictions where Cabinet coordination occurs anyway;
• implementation is in part a learning process in which the policy and delivery
elements interact to produce improvements in policy as well as delivery, and
cabinet is high-level forum for collective policy making in government; and
• if an issue is important enough for Cabinet to have decided it, the issue
should be important enough for Cabinet to keep track of how it is going.
But, whatever the in-principle arguments might be, in practice it is very much
up to the Prime Minister of the day, having regard to the dynamics of the Cabinet
they chair and the party they lead to decide whether and how something that
is desirable in principle should actually happen: it is certainly up to the Prime
Minister to lead on whether the practical system that is located with Cabinet
and not somewhere else in the governmental structure.
The fact that this topic is on your program today and that it is me talking to it
is proof that the present Prime Minister has decided that:
• the Government should pay more systematic attention to implementation;
and
• that it should be done through Cabinet.
The Prime Minister has clearly set out his preferences and there is no doubt that
the recent interest in implementation planning and monitoring very much follows
a prime ministerial lead. Consequently, the arrangements that I will be talking
about are, in the end, contingent not only on how well they work but also on
personalities in the top political positions and the way particular personalities
choose to operate.
That said, it is often useful to see Cabinet as a broader entity than the seventeen
ministers who meet every week or two and an entity that consequently has
elements that last beyond the tenure of particular prime ministers. The broader
concept of Cabinet is that it includes the set of processes and procedures and
the direct bureaucratic support that centres on the meetings of ministers:

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• the history in Australia has been that the elements of the broader Cabinet
system beyond ministerial membership tend to be sticky;
• procedural innovations that work have tended to survive and the greater
part of our current Cabinet system is an accretion of past procedural
innovations that have long survived their political parents.
There is good reason to think that if we build within the broad concept of Cabinet
a workable and useful set of processes that focus on implementation, they will
survive the inevitable future changes of personnel in the Cabinet narrowly
conceived. That is our driving ambition anyway. We hope that the system we
have set up has a degree of sustainability beyond the term of the present Prime
Minister. One of the arguments for having a permanent public service is the
capacity for thinking about the longer term.
So what are we actually doing?
One of our key initiatives has been to set up a Cabinet Implementation Unit,
which has had a staffing level in the range of six to 12 for the past two-and-a-half
years.
Our work so far has been of three broad types:
• ensuring that better information is put before decision-makers at the
decision-making stage – a modest extension of the traditional cabinet support
role;
• organising selective and targeted follow-up of decisions;
• and, partly as a spin-off from the other two, helping to change the way
people think about implementation relative to policy and how they plan for
implementation.
How are we doing it?
First, we have tweaked the cabinet drafters guide to require that proposals
coming forward that have any significant implementation implications cover off
on standard implementation issues:
• policy objectives;
• deliverables;
• milestones;
• the range of stakeholders (an important indicator of implementation
complexity);
• risks; and
• governance arrangements.
The CIU, as matter of routine, checks draft proposals on their way to Cabinet
and improves the quality of the information and argument going forward on

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implementation. Generally we end up with reasonable summary information on

the important things that bear on implementation.
I should note at this point that Ministers do not have to read the implementation
summary for the system to work, although it is clear that many do read them in
important cases. But, most importantly, they can draw some comfort that these
issues are being addressed and that, crucially:
• that the proponents of proposals, including ministerial proponents, have
had to think through the issues and the defensive arguments as they prepare
the document; and
• that the staff and public service briefers of ministers having studied the
implementation attachments;
We are satisfied that the discipline is producing better outcomes.
If a key proposal is accepted, the implementation assessment must be expanded
into a full implementation plan, lodged with the CIU. We work collaboratively
with agencies in finalising the plan to ensure that it treats the relevant issues
appropriately. We then use the plan to support structured follow-up of decisions.
This gives us a basis for:
• assessing whether the project and its risks are such as to warrant keeping
the Government informed of progress; and
• an agreed statement of the key milestones at which information will be
potentially useful.
Essentially we pick up the higher-risk/higher-interest initiatives and provide a
summary report every three months to the Prime Minister and then to Cabinet:
• the core of the report is a table presenting Green, Amber or Red traffic lights
against the selected initiatives and measures within them;
• on top of that is a short summary of the Ambers and Reds and any notable
points from the Greens;
• the number of initiatives being covered has risen as decisions are made that
come into our net (there are currently about 70 initiatives comprising about
180 individual measures) but we expect to plateau about 10 to 15 per cent
above this;
• to put some scale on this, the Cabinet makes something over 300
substantive policy decisions in a typical year;
• not all of them pose significant implementation issues and implementation
does not last a full year in all cases (although sometimes it takes longer);
and
• the 70 that do is a significant number but one that is both a manageable
preparation task for us and a comprehensible product for ministers.

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The early experience has been that this is a very effective communications
system:
• from the point of view of our Cabinet-level leaders:
• it presents information in a manageable format; and
• it quite rigorously filters a lot of information so that the bits that interest
them are at the top and helpfully colour coded.
• from the public service point of view:
• it is not frightening since it provides an early and hence usually fairly
low-key opportunity to point to problems;
• confessing at that stage means one’s misery has company since there are
always a number of Amber and Red lights across a good spread of
portfolios;
• there is a strong incentive not to hide looming failure since it is not
generally career enhancing to assure the top of government that things
are going well shortly before the train falls off the bridge; and
• you are able to look good if things are travelling well.
Beyond the follow-up activity on initiatives being monitored, the Unit also has
authority to conduct larger scale reviews in areas where we think there might
be implementation issues worth pursuing. The Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit
in the UK has this function and has pursued it vigorously and, as far as I can
see, with some success.
As far the CIU’s review role is concerned, I think it is fair to say that so far it
has been pretty much a flop:
• there are obvious sensitivities about the Prime Minister sending his
Department officers in to review work in other portfolios;
• the Unit is not sufficiently staffed to do serious reviews and the Unit itself
does not have the clout to do the sort of work the UK Delivery Unit does;
• we have not yet developed an approach to or methodologies for review
activity that show any promise.
While I have not yet given up on finding a proactive role for the Unit in review
work, I have yet to find a way to do it.
What I know, however, is that if we are to successfully undertake this function,
we will need to be very selective, to focus on successes as well as failures, and
work with the relevant line departments and agencies to get the best possible
advice to the top of government.
The Unit has, however, been active in looking at systemic issues and played a
significant role in the development work that led to the Australian Government
adopting the system of Gateway Reviews discussed elsewhere in the program.

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Also discussed elsewhere in the program is a better practice guide to

implementation of program and policy initiatives. We have been working with
the Australian national Audit Office on this and expect it to be released in a few
months.
I mentioned that changing the way people think about implementation is also
an explicit part of the Unit is charter. We get out a fair bit in a variety of forums
to spread the message about the need to keep implementation issues in mind at
all stages of the policy cycle.
Some of that effect comes anyway from the work people have to do to meet the
new planning and monitoring requirements:
• there is a useful discipline of having to deal explicitly with implementation
in the initial proposal to Cabinet:
• then and in the later monitoring phase, the system forces the policy
proposers to talk to the intended implementers, if they are not the same
people as they often are not (i.e. it is good to see the left hand working
with the right);
• we have had some suggestions that our processes have helped people drafting
proposals to think beyond the details of delivery and place their proposals
into the context of broader government policy;
• we think that the process changes have also nudged the policy people in
PM&C to pay a bit more attention also to implementation issues.
In a few cases departments have set up project management or similar units to
improve and monitor their own implementation activities and we do quite a lot
of work with those counterpart units to improve the implementation of new and
existing measures.
I started by noting that Cabinet’s interest in implementation has been pretty
much led from the top and the durability of anything flowing from it is
consequently vulnerable in the medium to long term.
It is pretty much axiomatic that getting government policy properly implemented
is going to be important to whomever is in government and that the sorts of
things we are doing should be done:
• however, no-one can rely on things happening in government just because
they make sense;
• and we cannot expect them to result simply from declaration of their
importance; and
• the test will be whether the structures we have set up deliver something of
value and survive well into the future.
So what are some of the key things we have found so far?

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• most of the initiatives that are selected for this sort of high-level visibility
start off as Green lights and stay that way;
• most of the others do not get beyond a watching brief;
• we are able to tell ministers that something will be a bit late or fall a bit
short of target in some other way but ensure that expectations are
managed and no real damage occurs ;
• a small proportion clearly need follow-up and our monitoring system is being
successful in starting action on these a bit earlier and a bit more vigorously
than would otherwise be the case;
• we have produced some empirical evidence for various points that probably
could have been taken as bleeding obvious:
• within an agency, top level commitment to, and attention to, delivery is
crucial;
• many projects that depend on alliances within or beyond the APS get
into difficulty because there has been insufficient attention paid to
whether such alliances will work;
• cross-jurisdictional or cross-sectoral, urgent, and politically sensitive
initiatives are usually harder to do than initiatives completely within the
control of a single minister and agency;
• some things get in the way of other things, for example when you add
up the huge amount of ICT procurement that underpins every Budget,
it is hardly surprising that a lot of these projects have to re-phase their
expenditure, because they just cannot get their procurement process for
the contractors or specialists to line up with their Gantt charts. This is
an area the Unit now pays considerable attention to, in reviewing new
policy proposals;
• the greater the uncertainty, the harder it is to do things; and
• shit happens.
But even if these seem to be platitudes, a system that keeps a
whole-of-government perspective on the progress in implementing key decisions
offers a lot of advantages in terms of both an early adjustment of expectations
and early corrective action.
For this reason, I have high hopes that the changes the Unit has introduced will
stick, largely because the changes we have made are not only simple and robust
but they are also small, bureaucratic, low-cost, non-threatening and add value
to both government and taxpayers alike.
That may not sound glamorous – members of the Unit sometimes chide me for
not taking a higher tone in describing their work:
• but minor bureaucratic changes that have slipped into the cabinet process
over the years tend to be the changes that have stuck once they got there;

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• also, of course, our changes self-evidently do good things and we should

not be so cynical as to assume that that will be discounted; and
• usually, in fact, political decision-makers set out to do good rather than harm.
The changes are quite well-pitched strategically: although small and bureaucratic,
they are located at points in the cabinet process where they cannot very easily
be avoided and they set up incentives that are wholly positive.
Perhaps most importantly, after a relatively short time in operation we are
beginning to see the Unit add some value to the policy process.
In particular, it is no longer enough for those advocating major policy to have
a good idea. We know that there are many good ideas that originate in Canberra!
We are now constantly reminded that the Government demands that that we
think through our ideas and how they are going to be implemented. Overall,
we are pretty optimistic that we are doing good things and that what we are
doing is being well received. But you can bet your bottom dollar that we will
not be resting on our laurels.

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19. Organising for Policy
Implementation: The Emergence and
Role of Implementation Units in Policy
Design and Oversight
Evert Lindquist, School of Public Administration, University
of Victoria, Canada

Introduction
Over 40 years ago the spotlight was put on gathering scholarly interest on policy
implementation with the publication of Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973) seminal
book on Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in
Oakland. 1 In its slipstream came Bardach’s (1977) Implementation Game outlining
the myriad ways in which policy initiatives could be diverted, deflected,
dissipated, and delayed. Despite his pessimism about the promise of big policy
solutions more generally, and the prospects for improving implementation in
particular, Bardach nevertheless suggested creating capabilities related to
implementation in two institutional locations for the purpose of ‘game-fixing’:
in staff policy analysis and evaluation units in pertinent department budget
offices and, in an environment of policy-capable US legislatures, in policy or
appropriation committees with low turnover in staff and representatives. There,
he speculated, officials might have the incentive, perspective, expertise, and
resources to mitigate dysfunctional implementation dynamics.
40 years later, in very different institutional contexts, the leaders of governments
in several jurisdictions – the United Kingdom, Australia, and Queensland – have
created ‘implementation’ or ‘delivery’ units at the centre, ostensibly to advise,
monitor and ensure better implementation of policy initiatives. In the UK, the
Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit was established by Prime Minister Tony Blair
government in the Cabinet Office in 2001. In Australia, a Cabinet Implementation
Unit was installed by Prime Minister John Howard in the Commonwealth’s
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in 2003, and an Implementation
Unit was established in March 2004 in the Queensland Department of Premier
and Cabinet under Premier Peter Beattie.
The emergence of policy implementation units is intriguing, if only because they
seem to have been at the instigation of prime ministers and premiers, and not
the result of a recent call by policy scholars to build new capacities. Indeed,
although implementation analysis has long been a staple in the tool-kit taught

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in graduate policy programs and textbooks, and should be an essential feature

of decision briefs prepared for ministers, arguably the implementation literature
has lost considerable profile and steam, with a small band of insightful
contributors refining and elaborating theoretical propositions (Hill and Hupe
2002). Relatively little attention has been paid to question of capacity and doing
better at making initiatives work in ever more complex policy environments.
This, of course, has been a top concern of political leaders, who have adopted
new performance regimes, the language of the New Public Management, and
project management techniques to ensure priority initiatives are realized. Against
this backdrop, the emergence and nomenclature of policy implementation units,
however intriguing, seems like a throwback – one would have thought that the
wave of such units would have hit in the 1980s in response to the original insights
of Bardach, Pressman, Wildavsky, and many others writing at that time.
This chapter explores the emergence, roles, functions and accomplishments of
policy implementation and delivery units, as well as their prospects. It does not
argue that such units should be established as a feature of modern central
government, but rather, that their emergence is worthy of note and
understanding. Proceeding under the auspices of first ministers, these capabilities
can be seen as a critique of existing management, implementation, and monitoring
capabilities of the larger governance and public service systems where policy
priorities are concerned, and the latest instrument unsheathed by some first
ministers to design, assist and embed critical policy initiatives. But policy
implementation units join the panoply of different capabilities leaders have
experimented with to drive policy agendas and coordinate government activities,
and, in the modern era, where policy is often recognised as inherently complex,
share some similarities with capabilities intended to manage horizontal and
whole-of-government initiatives. Indeed, a key goal of this collection is to
ascertain what policy implementation units actually do, and whether they will
endure, recognising that capabilities with the same names may play completely
different roles in different systems, presumably reflecting the ecology of their
respective institutional environments and the strategic needs of their progenitors.
The cases considered in this chapter (Richards and Smith, 2005; Wanna, 2005;
Tiernan, 2005) reflected the universe of known ‘named’ policy implementation
units in late 2005. 2 Despite the preponderance of Westminster systems serving
as backdrop for these cases (with the exception of the European Union case),
they have considerable diversity with respect to the motivations of political
leaders who established them, the bureaucratic capabilities and roles that were
installed, and the governance environments in which they have operated (unitary,
federal, and multi-level governance). This chapter seeks to provide a framework
for analysing and assessing the work of these units to date. It begins by with a
brief synopsis of the evolution of thinking on implementation, and then considers
the new environment for governance, policy development, and implementation.
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Against this backdrop, the chapter casts policy implementation and delivery
units as one of several ‘adhocracies’ that populate the centre of government
(Desveaux, Lindquist, and Toner, 1994; Lindquist, 2004), and distinguishes
among different functions because, despite their labels, implementation units
may take on quite different roles and could be seen as rival capabilities and
processes to other central capabilities. The chapter then provides an overview
of the case studies and key findings. It provides a preliminary analysis of the
patterns of these units, seeks to explain their arrival and mandate, and considers
whether functional equivalents might exist in other jurisdictions. The chapter
identifies lessons for establishing central implementation units and concludes
by considering the prospects for these units and calling for more engagement
with scholars on these developments.

Evolving perspectives on implementation

There has been no shortage of reviews of the implementation literature. Generally,
it is suggested that the modern literature has moved through three phases (for
example, Goggin et al, 1990; Hill and Hupe, 2002; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003;
Schofield and Sausman, 2004). The first phase was triggered by the contributions
of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Bardach (1977), and others. A flurry of
writing emerged on the gap between policy intentions and the reality of program
delivery in the US and other jurisdictions, considerable introspection about the
limitations of social science research and ambitious ideas and solutions informing
policy-making and the design of programs, and strong interest in discerning
what interventions worked. Recognition of and debate over the implementation
challenge was a defining moment for the modern policy literature, producing
important strands of inquiry on implementation, evaluation, and knowledge
utilisation that further defined the field and became insinuated into the ‘policy
cycle’ heuristic (see Howlett and Ramesh, 2003; Pal, 2001; Bridgman and Davis,
2000; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984) but distinguished it from the early policy
sciences approach (Lerner and Lasswell, 1951).
A second stream of writing focused on searching for useful theoretical
perspectives and frameworks on implementation. This included work seeking
to determine the most productive vantage points for thinking about how to
anticipate and work through implementation challenges, which included the
interesting debate over ‘top-down’ (forward-mapping) and ‘bottom-up’
(backward-mapping) approaches (Elmore, 1979; Berman, 1978), increasingly
sophisticated efforts to develop frameworks and more sophisticated analytic
tools that addressed the complexity of implementation (Mazmanian and Sabatier,
1983), and the sustained efforts to find better efforts to monitor and measure
the impact of policy interventions (e.g. Williams et al, 1982). Arguably, this
latter stream of research has built the most momentum over the years, particularly
in the US, leading to a huge consulting industry dedicated to evaluation and

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 Improving Implementation

quasi-experiments of program implementation, and effectively has defined the

work supported by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management
for the last two decades.
Like all fields, many of its early strands of writing endure as important lines of
thinking in their own right. Howlett and Ramesh (2003) have suggested that
more recent inquiry in implementation has tapped into game theory, public
choice and principal-agent models to frame implementation challenges and guide
empirical research. Considerable attention has focused on how instruments can
be wielded and used in combination to achieve policy goals as well as different
sectoral and national styles for approaching design and implementation (Linder
and Peters, 1990; Howlett, 1991; Howlett, 1993). Recently, there has been
renewed interest in implementation in the context of whole-of-government and
multi-level governance perspective (Schofield and Sausman, 2004) and the
challenge of managing complexity and networks more generally (O’Toole, 2004).
However, like the knowledge utilisation literature (though not as thoroughly),
one senses that the literature on implementation has dissipated as a coherent
field into specific lines of inquiry, effectively a victim of its success. Despite its
status as a foundational stone in the policy tool-kit, many of the themes associated
with implementation are taken up under different rubrics, such as horizontal
management, whole-of-government, evaluation research, governing instruments,
network analysis, etc. (Hill and Hupe 2002). Relatively few scholars march
forward waving the implementation flag. And, despite the interesting theorising
still occurring, and recent resurgence in interest in implementation (Schofield
and Sausman, 2004), there is little evidence of applying implementation theory
to practice and engaging practitioners in the emerging challenges of
implementation, a style that was the hallmark when the literature first burst out
(O’Toole, 2004).
This sketch of the implementation literature should suggest that contributors
have done a good job of recognising complexity over the years, and thinking
carefully about the analytic challenges of anticipating implementation issues;
the mix, qualities and merits of different policy instruments for an
implementation perspective; and the evolutionary and emergent quality of
handling implementing policies and programs, a process of negotiation,
adjustment and learning as managerial strategies. All of these themes and lessons
should resonate even more in today’s arguably more complex policy-making
landscape. However, Bardach’s early musings about building the right
organisational and institutional capacities to mitigate implementation challenges
has not received much attention over the years, and at best is only implicitly
addressed in the field. This, combined with the lack of dialogue with practitioners
on implementation challenges in recent years and the fact that several
governments have recently considered or created units in their core executive

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to inform the upstream of policy development and to provide central oversight

of implementation, suggests that the study of implementation units at the apex
of governments is a timely and potentially fruitful line of inquiry.

Evolving contexts, new rationales for Implementation Units

Innovations like policy implementation and delivery units do not spring out of
thin air: they are responses of first ministers to perceived challenges, signals
about how they expect policies should be designed and implemented. Whether
such innovations are well-conceived and live up to their promise is one matter,
one that will be addressed by the case studies. Here we consider how the policy
environment might have changed to stimulate such action in several different
jurisdictions.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, a common challenge for many OECD countries
concerned stemming the growth in the size of government budgets and either
cutting or rationalising programs. Public bureaucracies were depicted as having
their own incentives, resistant to efforts by governments to control growth in
programs, and political leaders unwilling or unable to take decisive steps. This
led to the argument that governments should assert political priorities and control
over public service institutions, buttressed by theoretical perspectives such as
public choice and agency theory. As tough fiscal decisions were made by many
governments, their focus was less about implementing new policies and more
about scrutinising and changing existing policy regimes, and meeting aggressive
expenditure targets and reorganisation timelines. In this context policy
implementation naturally received less attention, executive careers were
increasingly based on managerial performance as opposed to policy shrewdness,
and policy capabilities (not to mention labour negotiation capabilities) in public
service institutions waned in many jurisdictions. For similar reasons focused
less on the challenges of policy design and implementation (Barrett, 2004) and
more on scrutinising alternative ways to deliver government services, ensuring
that big service transformation projects were on time and budget, and adopting
performance regimes.
As some governments turned the corner in their efforts to stabilise deficits and
climb back to surplus positions, this raised the possibility of investing in new
policy initiatives. With the pain of cuts fresh in the minds of decision-makers,
there were likely higher tests for what constituted prudent and worthwhile
spending, and for ensuring that the funds led to intended results. Arguably,
too, by the end of the 20th century policy-makers had a much better sense of
the interconnectedness of issues, the need for alignment in the use of different
governing instruments, and the reality that many policy solutions required
working across the boundaries of departments and agencies within and across
levels of government. Whether such appreciation for complexity and the need
for horizontal and whole-of-government thinking emerged from lessons from
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downsizing and restructuring, the frames emanating from hypertext and

we-based models, or systems thinking from the likes of Peter Senge and others
does not matter. The important observation is that more citizens and
policy-makers sought to be more careful about how new policy initiatives were
designed, how well-aligned new instruments were with existing ones, and how
quickly such initiatives could be put in place.
With this sketch of the recent evolution and swings in the governance
environment for many OECD jurisdictions, we can venture several different
hypotheses for establishing policy implementation and delivery units. They
include:
• Meeting government commitments. During the 1990s many political leaders
as they campaigned for office committed to policy platforms with specific
program commitments (i.e., the Liberal ‘Red Book’ in Canada; Gingrich’s
‘Contract with America’, British Columbia’s ‘New Era Commitments’, etc).
Here delivery and implementation units can be seen as an additional tool for
first ministers and their government to ensure that top political and
government commitments get met – a means for ensuring that governments
kept focused on its agenda and message.
• Asserting political control. This hypothesis would be rooted in the
presumption that departments and agencies would resist adopting new
policies because they might compete with existing programs or not reflect
the preferences of public service leaders. The goal of an implementation unit
would be to bring pressure to bear and a spotlight on the public service.
• Anticipating design challenges. This hypothesis would argue that there is a
need to vet policy proposals from departments and agencies for whether
they fully account for the complexity of problems and the interaction of
pertinent policy instruments, perhaps wielded by other governments or with
other sectors.
• Navigating implementation challenges. The more complex a policy initiative,
the more likely it will require capacity to manage and coordinate
implementation in a multi-level governance context.
• Addressing political optics. Given the loss of credibility of government with
citizens, and the perceived need for governments to become more
‘business-like’, implementation units might be established to project a new
image and focus on getting programs in place on time and within budget.
Interestingly, each hypothesis implies that a government might staff an
implementation or delivery unit with different kinds of talent and expertise,
where they are located at the centre, and what processes they engage with. That
said, the case studies may reveal that governments had overlapping and
reinforcing reasons for creating the units, and that, no matter the initial goals
driving inception, they evolved over time.

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Implementation Units and the ecology of central capabilities

The ‘centre’ in most governance systems is comprised of a constellation of central
agencies and secretariats dedicated to serving first ministers, and supporting
and coordinating the government and the public service as corporate entities.
Implementation units cannot be understood and evaluated on their terms because
they are insinuated into an ecology of capabilities at the centre of government.
This observation is important for three reasons. First, implementation units may
have emerged as a critique of other central units in the systems. Second, in a
complex and ‘congested’ central state apparatus, such units have to compete for
resources and the attention of ministers and departments alike. Third, any unit
may be called on to take up different tasks and roles in the upstream or
downstream of the policy-making process. In what follows we consider the
ecology of capabilities that such units have to navigate and consider the different
roles that implementations units might play.

Traditional cabinet secretariats

Perhaps the most important, if the least exciting, central capabilities are the
secretariats that handle the upstream and downstream logistics for the meetings
of cabinet and its committees. Typically, these units are dedicated to ensuring
that proper notice, sign-off, consultation, and proper documentation and analysis
occur before initiatives are tabled for ministers to consider. Depending on the
size of the cabinet and its jurisdiction, there can be many secretariats, some
serving cabinet as a whole and others serving particular standing and ad hoc
committees. Usually, these units function as gate-keepers and process managers,
and do not have the capacity to undertake policy and implementation analysis,
nor to monitor or hold to account the performance of ministers and departments
assigned responsibility for implementation.

Other standing cabinet secretariats

Cabinet offices typically have responsibility for advising the first minister and
cabinet secretary on the overall direction of public service institutions. In this
connection there usually are secretariats that provide advice and support on the
appointment of top executives across the public service, the overall structure
of ministerial portfolios and the machinery of government, and broader reform
initiatives such as renewal and public service reform. Finally, there will be
secretariats dedicated to coordinating the assessment and evaluation of ministers
and top officials.

Coordinating secretariats
First ministers often establish several policy units at the centre of government,
such as national advisors or secretariats on security, science, Aboriginal affairs,
and the environment. These are different from the traditional standing secretariats
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responsible for supporting cabinet and its committees (although coordinating

secretariats may support ad hoc committees of cabinet). These secretariats can
function as focal points to move issues higher on the government agenda and
clear the path for policy development; what Bakvis and Juillet (2004) have
depicted as a ‘catalytic’ or champion role. However, Lindquist (2004) suggests
that without strong political will, such capabilities will quickly become seen as
‘symbolic’ (Myer and Rowan, 1977).

Policy adhocracies in departments

The lead responsibility for developing, framing, and advocating a major policy
initiative – even one that is clearly horizontal – will typically be assigned to a
lead department or ministry, unless it is determined by the first minister that is
prudent or necessary for a central coordinating units to be established. Such
units are responsible for assembling expertise and undertaking analysis,
developing a coherent and politically sensitive policy plan, and deal with and
manage the central agencies and cabinet. It is in this latter role that such policy
units will encounter and perhaps clash with policy implementation units.

Scrutiny and challenge

Central agencies may tend to defer to departments for their policy and operational
expertise, but one time-honoured role of the centre is scrutinise and challenge
new proposals and often their implementation plans, even if approved by the
cabinet. Such scrutiny emerges from the responsibilities of departments of finance
and treasuries – particularly in the expenditure management and budget office
functions – to ensure that funds are well-spent and provide good
value-for-money. This challenge role can be exercised as part of informing cabinet
deliberations when considering proposals, but it can also take place once policy
decisions have been made, and finer-grained budget and human resource
allocation decisions have to be made in the downstream to decisions. The extent
to which this takes place will also depend on how potent the budget office and
finance ministries are in the implementation process; in some jurisdictions,
managerial flexibilities and traditions of autonomy may circumscribe this role.

Facilitation advice
In some systems, central capabilities are established to support horizontal
initiatives, either by providing advice, training or lesson-drawing. They could
facilitate learning, the dissemination of best practices, and function as a ‘centre
of excellence’. This could be relevant to implementation initiatives since there
could be learning and support informed by previous experience. Such capacity
could assist officials leading a horizontal initiative at the formative stage, but
such a role should be seen as distinct from the catalytic, champion, and
implementation roles identified above.

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Downstream coordination
The implementation of policy initiatives are usually assigned to lead departments,
but sometimes their complexity and horizontality may require that the centre
establish a coordination secretariat, either located with a lead department and
sometimes in the cabinet office. In a parallel way, central agencies may often
agree to coordinate across ‘service’ lines, particularly if key oversight functions
and policies are distributed across different central agencies, to streamline the
approvals and reporting associated with a particular initiative.

Monitoring and evaluating performance

The line between monitoring progress on specific implementation initiatives
and evaluating the performance of ministers and their executive teams can be
blurry, but the latter activity focuses on more global assessment and reporting,
whereas the former may involve remedial steps by the centre to ensure that
implementation occurs. This might involve working with ministers and their
departments to identify milestones and performance indicators for specific
initiatives, and more generally, developing accountability frameworks for
departments and executive teams, and reviewing indicators to inform the annual
assessments of executive performance. It may also involve identifying broad
outcome indicators for gauging the impact of government policies and programs
in different domains over a longer period of time.
The forgoing leads us to see that there is a significant difference between creating
capacity to promote priorities, assign responsibilities for horizontal initiatives,
design significant policy interventions, coordinate approvals, facilitate progress,
provide information, monitor implementation, and assess outcomes. These are
distinct roles for coordinating units to play in government, and itemising them
in sequence lays bare the inherent complexity for properly managing policy
initiatives from the centre. It is in this context that we need to consider the role
of policy implementation units at the centre for government. But even here we
can have functional differentiation, and in this connection it is useful to identify
two different potential roles that such units could play:
• Upstream implementation. First ministers in Australia and Queensland have
created implementation units in cabinet offices seemingly intended to ensure
that when new initiatives are proposed, the administering organisations are
properly identified, constructed and located, and that the right questions
have been asked about a variety of implementation issues (Shergold, 2003).
These implementation units provide ex ante quality control, to ensure the
priority issues of government are properly addressed.
• Downstream implementation. A related, but distinct, function is to monitor
progress on implementation and, when necessary, invoke central authority
to clear the path for horizontal initiatives as they evolve. The best example

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of dedicated capabilities for this purpose is the Delivery Unit in the British
government, initially attached to the British Cabinet Office along with other
policy and reform capabilities, and later moved over to the Treasury (Burch
and Holliday, 2004).
It should be understood that implementation units could play one or both of
these roles, or their focus could evolve over time depending on the interests of
first ministers, and, of course, the competition and comparative advantage of
other central capabilities.
More generally, we can see that there is great potential for implementation units,
however defined and mandated, to overlap with and perhaps assume the
responsibilities of other central actors in governance systems. Indeed,
implementation units may have been established precisely to compensate for
and as a critique of existing central capabilities. This implies considerable
potential for overlap and rivalry for implementation units, and suggests that
other central capabilities may exert pressure or attempt re-build capabilities to
compete with or absorb implementation units. Moreover, there is no end to
ongoing demand to create adhocracies and secretariats at the centre, and
considerable pressure and incentive – particularly symbolic in nature – to retain
them (Lindquist, 2004). However, prime ministers and top advisers also have to
ask, ‘How do you cull and re-align the centre?’, so that governments can maintain
their focus, and the time of central actors, departments and agencies can be
utilised more effectively. In short, this canvassing of central capabilities suggests
a degree of precariousness for these new units and suggest important empirical
questions to explore in the case study contributions.

The Cases: Summary of findings and key themes

The three case study papers were presented recently at the Second Annual
International Comparative Policy Analysis (ICPA) Workshop on October 3, 2005
in Vancouver. They included the following papers:
• David Richards and Martin Smith, ‘Central Control and Policy Implementation
in the UK: A Case Study of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit’ (2005)
chronicles the emergence of the Delivery Unit (PMDU), but first considers
larger trends in the governance of the core executive in the UK. The authors
show how the design of the PMDU and its direct reporting to the Prime
Minister (even though it has been located in the Cabinet Office and the
Treasury) can be seen as a response not only to the arrival and challenge of
New Public Management themes to the Westminster style of governance but
also to significant fragmentation of delivery of service. They see the PMDU
as a concerted effort of the Prime Minister to work directly and negotiate
with delivery agencies on implementation of priority initiatives because the
departments of the core executive had failed to bring about a necessary

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culture shift to improve delivery performance. Richards and Smith see the
PMDU and its monitoring activities as reflecting Tony Blair’s ‘personalism’
in carrying out the duties of the Prime Minister.
• John Wanna, ‘From Afterthought to Afterburner: Australia’s Cabinet
Implementation Unit’ (2005) examines the decision of Prime Minister John
Howard and his top political and public service advisors to create a capability
to encourage ministers and public servants to focus attention on the delivery
or implementation aspects policy decisions. This interest arose close to the
second term of the Howard government, and was addressed as part of the
transition planning for his third government. Wanna describes how Prime
Minister Howard and top officials learned from the UK experience with the
PMDU and located a small Cabinet Implementation Unit (CUI) in the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The CUI can be seen as one
of many strategies that Howard employs for running a ‘disciplined’ cabinet
system. While the officials do not seem to be the high-flyers found in the
PMDU with direct access to the Prime Minister, the unit does review all
proposals going to cabinet for implementation analysis and risk assessment,
and the unit maintains a ‘traffic light’ system to the Prime Minster and cabinet
for about 30 per cent of all proposals that the cabinet has approved.
• Anne Tiernan, ‘Working With the Stock We Have: The Evolving Role of
Queensland’s Implementation Unit’ (2005) provides some background on
Queensland’s history and governance challenges, including efforts of the
last couple of decades to modernise public sector governance and
administration. The interest of Premier Peter Beattie in implementation arose
as a result of several embarrassments during the second term of his
government that revealed a disconnect between cabinet decisions and
on-the-ground service delivery. This interest emerged as he shifted from a
collaborative style of governing with colleagues to a far more directive and
populist approach, running against the performance of the public service
and working hard to keep his ministers in line. Beattie and his top officials
were very well aware of Blair’s PMDU and Howard’s Cabinet Implementation
Unit. However, they chose to re-organise standing policy and reporting
capabilities to establish an Implementation Unit in the Department of Premier
and Cabinet’ Policy Division. An interesting feature of the Queensland
experience is the extent to which the Premier sought to have this capability
work through the ‘desk officers’ in DPC responsible for liaising with
departments and agencies.
The annex to this chapter contains the list of the questions sent to
contributors to guide the drafting of the cases. Table 1, inserted below,
summarises many of the details from the cases studies along several
dimensions. The rest of this section considers the similarities and differences
in the experience to date with the three implementation units.

239
240
Dimension United Kingdom – Prime Australia – Cabinet Queensland
Minister’s Delivery Unit Implementation Unit –Implementation Unit
Genesis and Context Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Part of third term approach of Emerged after June 2004
arises in 2001 from the PM’s the Howard government. Put election as result of second
disappointment in lack of in place in February 2004 at term difficulties of Beattie
follow-though of policy behest of Cabinet Secretary government concerning
Improving Implementation

initiatives on the ground, such with a business background Cabinet decisions that had not
as Joined-Up Government. determined to assist in effort been implemented and led to
Challenge was to create to consolidate and ensure a campaign promise to ‘fix’ the
coherence and coordination in implementation, incl. project problem. Queensland public
highly de-concentrated and management. Part of a larger service yet to modernise.
fragmented delivery system. reorganisation of the DPMC. Created room for bureaucratic
Cabinet Secretary designed the entrepreneur to create unit.
unit as part of transition
planning before 2001 election.
Exemplars and Precursors UK Prime Ministers have a The Australian government Strong premier tradition with
tradition of creating central established strong policy and traditional structures, and a
units in the Cabinet Office for coordination units in the brief dalliance with a higher
Table 1 – Highlights from Case Studies

driving major public service 1920s, 1940s, and mid-1970s. capacity Cabinet office during
reform strategic initiatives. Informed by UK’s PMDU as the 1980s. Beattie established
Typically staffed with a mix result of Australian DPMC central units in Department of
of central, departmental and staff on interchange in the UK Premier and Cabinet (DPC) on
private sector officials. Blair Cabinet Office. Secretary of Strategic Policy, Reporting for
ran a highly personalised DPMC went to UK to learn Government, and Policy
government and created many more about PMDU. Sought a Research. Beattie moved from
central units relating to policy bureaucratic as opposed to collaborative to directive role
and implementation issues. political-based capability that by end of second term. Design
would be more collaborative. of IU informed by Queensland
officials on exchange with UK
Strategy Unit, and by
Australia’s CIU and UK’s
PMDU.
 Stated Goals To ‘ensure the delivery of the The Primer Minister sought a To monitor key election and
Prime Minister’s top public more strategic approach to cabinet policy commitments of
service priority outcomes’. To managing the government’s the government, and to ensure
work directly with delivery mandate. Key facet of this was that implementation takes
units, rather than departments, to ensure timely and effective place. To encourage
to identify reasonable delivery implementation of decisions, considering implementation
schedule and outcomes. To early warning if initiatives off when policy is determined, to
monitor whether goals in the track, awareness of best identify and remove obstacles.
Public Service Agreements, practices, and better design of Underlying goal was to avoid
first introduced in 1998, are significant policy and previous failures.
getting achieved. horizontal initiatives.
Capacity, Skills, and Leadership PMDU consists of 40 staff CUI started in 2003 with 5 staff; Queensland unit has 15 staff
reporting directly to the PM. by mid-2005 had 10 staff. The with strong central expertise in
Comprised of a mix of central, unit does not include high-level policy and reporting, but no
department, agency, officials executives. Came from several expertise in implementation per
and private sector consultants. policy and reporting units in se. Initial leader came from
It is led by a Chief Advisor on DPC; no special expertise in experienced pod of central
Delivery, and has had two policy or project officials who knew the Premier.
leaders to date. implementation. Succeeded by a Treasury
official with strong interest in
risk management.
Location First physically located in the Inside the Department of the Inside Policy Division of the
Cabinet Office; PMDU moved Prime Minister and Cabinet. Department of Premier and
in 2002 to the Treasury to Cabinet.
ensure a good relationship with
the Treasury’s Civil Service
Division. However, PMDU
continued reporting directly to
the Prime Minister. In 2005,
PMDU became part of Building
Organising for Policy Implementation

Capacity Section of Cabinet

Office including EGU, OPSR,

241
and the Better Regulation Unit.
242
Dimension United Kingdom – Prime Australia – Cabinet Queensland
Minister’s Delivery Unit Implementation Unit –Implementation Unit
Ex Ante Modus Operandi Worked with Treasury and Review cabinet proposals at the Involved in announcing key
agencies to develop targets design and development stages. government priorities;
associated with the bilateral Goal is to ensure that proper developing and circulating
Public Service Agreements. risk assessment and Ministerial charter letters;
Improving Implementation

PMDU works with the PM on implementation analysis has reports on ‘Top Fifty’ to
his priority areas – health, been undertaken by sponsor Cabinet; developed the
education, crime and transport departments. Identifies the Implementation Assessment
– which involves 20-25 of the milestones to guide reporting. Template and revised the
approximately 130 negotiated The CUI can also negotiate the handbook for submissions to
PSAs, and five departments. implementation plans of Cabinet. Goal is to educate DPC
departments. and department staff.
Ex Post Modus Operandi Once targets are agreed on, Progress reports and early Monitor and pursue the
PMDU reports on progress. warning should initiatives get implementation of all Cabinet
This includes the Delivery off track. Includes a and Cabinet Budget Review
Planning Process (links targets traffic-light warning system of Committee decisions, election
to deliverables), the Delivery about 30 per cent of initiatives commitments, and key policy
Report (assesses whether to the Prime Minister; he sees initiatives. Produces reports on
targets are realistic), and the all of them, departments see milestones, Top Fifty, and Key
Prime Ministerial Stock-take reports that involve them. Initiatives. Reports to Premier
(agency representatives meet Quarterly roll-ups are sent to and twice yearly to Cabinet on
directly with the PM). If there Cabinet. The reports do not Charter Letters.
are problems, a Joint Action have qualitative assessment,
program is negotiated. but there have been a few
reviews of
whole-of-government
initiatives.
 Interactions with Central & PMDU intrudes in an area DPMC Secretary consulted Premier concerned about not
Other Actors previously the domain of the portfolio secretaries about the overburdening departments
departments. PMDU must also CUI concept. Few tensions have with more central interactions;
navigate complex central emerged because CUI is therefore IU required to work
terrain. Blair had also created a essentially a reporting unit and though DPC desk officers
Forward Strategy Unit in the does not connect to the budget (PCOs) for each department. No
PM’s Office, a Policy process, nor to the link to budget process and
Innovation Unit in Cabinet priority-setting process, and highly dependent on data and
Office, and the E-Government therefore does not compete information from departments.
Unit (EGU), Office of Public with other central units. Treasury, however, does have
Sector Reform (OPSR), and a very public outcomes for each
Better Regulation Committee. department on the web. Often
IU staff pulled off to deal with
crises due to expertise.
Degree of Precariousness Clearly driven by the Prime Unsure of role at first, largely Key challenges: dependent on
Minister, and has regular because of departure of its departments for information;
engagement with him. Not a progenitor. However, has early identity crisis because did
support for Cabinet per se; a emerged as a ‘ginger group’ not report directly to the
means for the PM to interact informing PM of status of Premier; had to work through
and negotiate directly with initiatives. Another tool used PCOs, so had low profile, and,
agencies – effectively an end by an experienced PM running because of staff expertise in
run around ministers and a disciplined cabinet. It seems policy and research, often were
departments. that portfolio secretaries do not pulled off to fire-fight on crises
mind the reporting– helps with engaging the Beattie
delivery agencies. In part, CUI government. Gap in leadership
exists due to disinterest on the for four months.
part of DOFA on program
management, implementation,
and program evaluation in
recent years.
Organising for Policy Implementation

243
244
Dimension United Kingdom – Prime Australia – Cabinet Queensland
Minister’s Delivery Unit Implementation Unit –Implementation Unit
Impact to Date Perhaps the best evidence of PM-driven process; ministers Mixed reviews: evidence of
impact is the amount of time not keen to be ‘shamed’ in raising awareness of PCOs and
that the PM spends with the Cabinet. However, increased departments, but could be
PMDU and the agencies in awareness and discussion of another check-off provision.
Improving Implementation

priority areas, but this is not delivery and implementation,

the same as indicated that particularly among policy and
better performance has been delivery staff in departments.
secured with agencies. More project management units
However, it has fostered a shift in agencies. PM likes the
in emphasis from process to regime – part of running a
outcomes, and from relying on disciplined Cabinet system. Led
departments to the PM to to collecting more data on
oversee agencies in the priority delivery, such as third parties.
areas.
Prospects Appears highly contingent on Clearly driven by current PM Depends on the Premier. Might
proclivities and energy of the and DPMC Secretary. Three persist, or capabilities may be
current Prime Minister. One possibilities are the status quo, directed to take up other suite
possibility is for the capability for CUI to move to DOFA, or of tasks. Its new leader is
to move more squarely into the emerge as a joint central unit to moving IU more into realm of
domain of the Treasury. connect reporting to budget risk assessment.
decisions, risk assessment, and
the challenge function.
 Organising for Policy Implementation

The case studies suggest several similarities in how the implementation units
came to be created, how they were conceived and initially located, and what
have constituted their ‘bread and butter’ activities. All of them were introduced
by experienced first ministers with had considerable experience running their
respective governments, and therefore had a good sense of implementation issues
and gaps. For two, lesson-drawing was at play, with Australia tapping into the
UK-PMDU experiment, and Queensland officials learning from both the British
and the Commonwealth of Australia initiatives. Each first minister had top
political and bureaucratic support and engagement for building capacity to
improve implementation, but this implicitly reflected either disinterest or
insufficient capacity on the part of other central agencies in the respective
systems, such as budget offices or management boards, to take up this
responsibility. The units each appeared to have relatively narrow scope – their
creation did not entail, for example, absorbing other functions from other central
units and they were carefully kept separate from the budget process. None of
the units played exclusively in the upstream or downstream of policy
implementation; rather, they were all in vetting policy proposals before cabinet
decisions ere taken and in the downstream monitoring of implementation.
Monitoring involved a strong focus on identifying milestones and reporting on
priority initiatives; the horizon for the milestones seems to be around a year,
and this functioned, as intended, an early warning system for first ministers.
This vetting and oversight was motivated by the aspiration of educating and
raising the awareness of ministers, central agencies, and the leadership of
departments and delivery agencies about the need to anticipate and deal with
implementation issues.
Despite these similarities there were differences. The size of the implementation
units vary considerably – PMDU (40), Queensland (15), and Australia (10) – and
so does their composition, with the Australian and Queensland units tapping
more into public servants with generalist policy skills, whereas the UK PMDU
assembles expert teams for each of the priority areas from central agencies,
departments, and the private sector, presumably reflecting the specialist expertise
for certain priority monitoring. The more substantial size and composition of
the PMDU reflects an oversight regime that, in addition to the monitoring of
milestones and general reporting to cabinet, is deeper and more aggressive,
working with the Prime Minister to plan, negotiate, and oversee the performance
of delivery agencies, circumventing the traditional roles of departments. Not
surprisingly, the PMDU is very prominent, clearly an agent of the Prime Minister
in dealing with delivery agencies. In contrast, the Queensland IU has a low
profile, working through other parts of the DPC to liaise with departments. This
represents an interesting anomaly, since the Premier has made much of the need
to improve the quality of the public service and to ensure follow-through on
service delivery. However, the Queensland IU has a latent function, assisting

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 Improving Implementation

the Premier with crisis issues, because of its staff capabilities also included policy
and ‘fire-fighting’ experience.
Finally, notwithstanding the engagement of first ministers with the
implementation units, and evidence that they seem to be playing significant
transactional and education roles, the case studies seem to indicate their existence
is somewhat precarious. Implementation units are inventions of particular first
ministers, who often reorganise or structure their central capabilities in their
personal and cabinet offices. It is not clear that these units have built a strong
constituency beyond the respective first ministers – it seems unlikely that
ministers, central agencies, or executives in departments and agencies would
strongly argue for the offices to be maintained once the current first ministers
left office.

Implementation Units: What and why?

One purpose of the case studies is to determine more precisely the role and
functions of implementation units that have emerged in recent years, realising
that the label could encompass a variety of activities. Accordingly, this section
returns to the hypotheses set out earlier in the chapter to determine whether
implementation units emphasise one stream of potential activities over others,
and whether this differs significantly across the cases. This section also ventures
ideas about why implementation units have emerged in the way they have, and
at this particular juncture.
Table 2 demonstrates that, based on the evidence provided in the case study
papers, the implementation units do not seem to focus on only one or two aspects
of implementation, such as only monitoring government policy commitments
or fixing delivery problems as they emerge. Rather, they seem multi-functional,
designed to accomplish multiple goals. To be sure, the accounts suggest that
each unit has different emphases: arguably the UK PMDU is more squarely
focused on challenging agencies to develop robust timetables and to address
problems, and has the capacity to do so; Australia’s CUI devotes more time in
the upstream reviewing cabinet policy proposals for the quality of
implementation analysis; and Queensland’s IU seems more focused on ensuring
more complete cabinet proposals (as opposed to closely vetting proposals) and
reporting. These emphases get revealed not only in the balance of activities, but
also the number and staff capabilities associated with each implementation unit.

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 Organising for Policy Implementation

Table 2 – Findings on Hypotheses re Rationale and Roles

Hypotheses UK – PMDU Australia – CUI Queensland – IU
1. Meeting Yes – a monitoring Yes – a monitoring Yes – a monitoring
government system for tracking system for tracking system for tracking
commitments progress on top progress on top progress on top
policy policy policy
commitments commitments. commitments.
2. Asserting Yes, asserting Somewhat: its Not really:
political control control was an focus is on designed not to
over bureaucracy important reviewing and over-complicate
motivation behind monitoring – it the work of
its creation, work, does not departments, yet
& staffing problem-solve like send a message
arrangements. UK’s PMDU. about priorities.
3. Anticipating PMDU focus more Implementation Hired staff with
policy design on identifying analysis in policy and
challenges targets and realistic upstream an reporting
timetables than important role for background; not
implementation CUI – reviews all hired for
analysis. Cabinet policy implementation
proposals. analysis; focus on
better cabinet
documents.
4. Navigating PMDU involved Mainly provides an Provides an early
implementation not only in early warning warning system;
challenges monitoring but system for PM; presumably the
also in negotiating issues likely DPC-PCOs and
and making addressed by the ministers deal with
adjustments portfolio delivery issues.
through JAP. secretaries.
5. Addressing Not simply optics, No, other ways to Does seem more
political optics but does seem a secure symbolic and IU
factor – PM invests optics…about diverted to fight
considerable time injecting better political fires.
negotiating analysis, avoiding However, there is
milestones for surprises, and less an educative and
priority initiatives. about solving monitoring roles at
delivery problems. play.

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 Improving Implementation

It bears repeating that the goals encapsulated by these hypotheses can be

achieved by governments using other capabilities and processes; in other words,
there could be central units and processes that are very much concerned about
implementation but undertake the work without the ‘implementation’ label.
Identifying such functional equivalence does not fall within the scope of this
exploratory study.
Having explored the patterns in genesis and modus operandi of implementation
units, we can now step back and consider broader questions like: Why entities
with these labels and responsibilities emerged at this point in time? What
accounts for the different emphases of the units in each jurisdiction? Why have
some central agencies not seemed threatened or taken on the responsibility for
implementation advising and oversight? Here I venture several different broad
speculations in response to these questions. 3
• Governance challenges, results, and responsible government. At the outset of
this chapter it was observed that the emergence of this handful of
implementation units across jurisdictions was not stimulated by any recent
manifesto from the scholarly literature (if anything, it appears to be a triumph
of circumstance with a tapping into a general concept, well-established for
several decades). And, it seems that relatively little attention has been paid
to the literature in designing and carrying out the mandate of the units. A
better explanation may emerge from the complexity of governance challenges
and the expectation that governments need to identify commitments and
demonstrate results. In parliamentary systems first ministers are answerable
for the progress of the government in implementing its agenda, even if the
responsibility for implementation for specific initiatives rests with ministers,
departments, and the associated service delivery agencies. In the face of such
complexity, first ministers must demonstrate that their governments are
making progress on commitments, and react as required if things go wrong.
This pressure only increases with demonstrable failures or implementation
gaps, particularly so when first ministers were caught unawares.
Implementation units can be seen as entirely pragmatic response to
contemporary governance pressures.
• The demonstration effect. It may be true that the staff of implementation units
have not tapped into the implementation literature (and this may be because
the literature does not attempt to speak to central institutional designers and
agents), there can be no doubt that they have emulated other governments.
In designing the PMDU, Prime Minister Blair emulated the approach taken
in previous central initiatives associated with public sector reform in the
UK, and, subsequently, both Australia and Queensland quickly adopted
variants on the theme, even if not as potent and directive as the British model.
The point is that all governments in the OECD countries are under similar

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 Organising for Policy Implementation

governance pressures from Opposition parties and citizens; the emergence

of an approach that promises to symbolically and substantively deal with
some of those pressures will get examined more closely, and particularly so
given the close ties between Australian and British officials.
• Governance traditions matter. The PMDU seems more robust and aggressive
than the CUI and IU in Australia. One explanation seems interesting, and
this involves the ‘style’ of handling public service reform. Modern British
prime ministers have developed a tradition of creating strong central units
that tap into a mix of internal and external expertise to design and implement
major corporate initiatives (consider the Rayner scrutinies, the Financial
Management Initiative, and Next Steps). The PMDU reflects this tradition.
Creating such a significant central capability would be far less likely in
Australia or Canada, for that matter.
• Implementation and budget offices. Earlier we noted that results discourse
would explain why first ministers might be anxious to demonstrate
symbolically and in real terms how their governments have progressed on
key commitments. First ministers and their central governments have strong
incentives to get out in front of external auditors and the public before
problems with implementation and delivery arise. However, this does not
explain the disinterest of budget offices and treasury board agencies, which
creates the need and room for implementation units. One answer is that these
offices are far more focused on meeting financial targets and working with
the principles of accrual accounting, to the exclusion of program management
– in other words, programs that ‘under-perform’ by not getting enough
services out the door to target audiences mean that the programs are within
tolerances and do not pressure budgets. An implementation frame leads to
different, more managerial questions; concern emerges if deliverables or
milestones are not met.
• Fragmented service delivery and fighting guerrillas/knaves. Another perspective
casts the emergence of implementation units as a response to a failure to
effect change in the culture and performance of the organisations actually
delivering public services, particularly in the context of significantly
fragmented service delivery systems. This perspective is consistent with the
second hypothesis, that there are recalcitrant or hard-to-change service
delivery bureaucracies, but is more elaborate because it points the finger
towards ministers and core departments (see David Richards and Martin
Smith, 2005). One way to see this argument is that implementation units are
devices employed by first ministers to bolster or force ministers and
departments more closely monitor and manage the performance of delivery
agents, whether departments, agencies, or third-party providers at other
levels of government or in the non-profit or for profit sectors – or to use a
phrase from Canada, to ‘make the managers manage’. Aidan Vining suggested

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 Improving Implementation

that we depict the predictable resistance of service providers as ‘guerrilla

warfare’ which requires a coordinated, strategic response and the cache of
first ministers to make a dent in the problem. In this view, first ministers
establish implementation units as ways to stiffen the resolve and create
incentives for ministers and top officials to more closely manage service
delivery capabilities. In the case of the UK, the Prime Minister is clearly
attempting to circumvent ministers and department on priority issues.
The explanatory power and worth of these suggestions is clearly conditioned
by the very small number of cases at hand, but they are intriguing nonetheless.
At the very least, the three exploratory cases put some interesting questions on
the table, and constitute prisms through which we can view larger forces at
play.

Functional equivalents and the seeds of destruction

This chapter has been informed by a small, but interesting, set of cases for
exploring the role and the evolution of implementation units. There is variation
in jurisdictional complexity, ranging from sub-national jurisdictions
(Queensland), to a unitary national system (the United Kingdom), and to a federal
system (Commonwealth of Australia).
At the level of nation-states, it appears that implementation units have emerged
mainly in parliamentary systems, although this is a very small sample from which
to draw any firm conclusions. It is well understood that first ministers in many
parliamentary countries have sought to exert further increase control over
government priorities and managing the public service as a whole even as the
challenge of doing so seems to steadily grow more daunting (Savoie, 1999; Weller,
2003; Burch and Holliday, 2004). This suggests that jurisdictions with ‘strong’
centre traditions are more disposed to such experimentation (Peters, 2003;
Lindquist, 2000), in contrast to the more autonomous agency traditions and
weaker central institutions often associated with Western European governments.
A comparative methodological perspective leads one to acknowledge that the
small number of cases explored in this collection implies that most parliamentary
national and sub-national jurisdictions have not established policy implementation
units. This brute fact is even more interesting because there is likely considerable
awareness in different cabinet offices around the world of the delivery and
implementation units in the UK and Australia, since both governance systems
are often considered exemplars of reform. Many first ministers and political or
bureaucratic advisors have undoubtedly examined implementation units in the
UK and Australia and decided not to emulate or adapt the concept in their
jurisdictions. 4
There are several reasons why an implementation unit may not be perceived as
desirable or needed. First, such oversight can be seen as the responsibility of a

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 Organising for Policy Implementation

budget office or management board, responsible for overseeing the budget and
the management of the government and its programs. Second, the normal
guidance given to ministers and their deputy ministers by first ministers, as well
as the performance review and accountability process could be seen as sufficient
for ensuring that a government’s priority initiatives are on track and
implemented. Finally, having an implementation unit working out of the cabinet
office, it could be argued, might be inconsistent with its mission as a coordinating
agency and muddy the conventions of ministerial accountability.
Whether or not one agrees with these reasons, it points to the fact that creating
policy implementation units are not the only way to improve implementation
analysis and monitoring from the centre. There are other ways that this can be
done, including the strengthening of the monitoring and challenge capabilities
of finance departments, budget offices, and management boards. Moreover, the
secretariats to cabinet committees could insist on higher-quality implementation
analysis in the upstream of decision-making. This suggests that ministers and
senior officials in some jurisdictions may recognise the latest incarnation of the
implementation challenge, but find other institutional and process solutions for
grappling with them (but we must recognise that many jurisdictions may simply
have gaps in this regard). It is either the existence or the possible emergence of
functional alternatives that, in jurisdictions that do have implementation and
delivery units, may lead to competition, rivalry, or too much clutter or irritation,
and the prospect of a first ministers either dissolving them or absorbing them
into other central agencies.

Lessons for designing Policy Implementation Units

The three case studies of recently created implementation units, as well as the
more theoretical discussions, have practical implications for those who wish to
design similar processes or capabilities. They suggest the following:
• First minister support is critical. It is obvious that to create implementation
units (or the functional equivalent in monitoring capabilities) requires the
interest and authority of the first minister, and locating them so that they
carry the authority of the position. However, it is equally important that
first ministers tap into the advice and reports of implementation units;
otherwise their credibility will likely diminish quickly.
• Create focused capabilities. The progenitors of implementation units thought
carefully about their mandate and limited the scope of their activities with
respect to the number of initiatives and how long the monitoring takes place.
In part, this is sensible gardening of the ecology of central capabilities, but
it can be seen as a shrewd strategy for overstretching resources, building
credibility for assembling data and reporting, and avoiding overlap and
conflict with other central actors.

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 Improving Implementation

• Systematic reporting. Although the units may rely heavily on departments

and delivery entities for data, following through with regular reporting on
progress on key initiatives is bound to increase awareness and focus on
implementation in the system. At the very least it creates rhetorical awareness
of implementation issues and, if there is gamesmanship in reporting by
delivery agencies and departments, then the responsibility for poor
performance will rest on those departments and agencies, even if it will
undoubtedly constitute a test for the entire government.
• Possible role expansion. While implementation units may be precarious, there
is a scenario that could see them take up more responsibility consistent with
current mandates in the longer term. The upstream vetting, setting and
monitoring the achievement of milestones, and reporting all constitute
‘transactions’ that can increase the knowledge of a central agency unit. After
a handling a few cycles, implementation units should build considerable
expertise on different strategies for developing indicators and clearing the
path for initiatives. This is a medium term strategy, which could lead to a
deeper role for such units, consistent with their mandate and capacities.
• Enhanced role, more capacity. The case studies suggest that, if implementation
units are expected to more deeply evaluate and aggressively negotiate the
nature of implementation regimes for specific priority initiatives, then they
should have ways to supplement generalist expertise in the units. The UK
PMDU provides a good example of how this can be accomplished.
The lessons outlined above presume an interest in creating implementation units,
but they could also apply to functional equivalents. Similar capabilities,
processes, and reporting could be created or enhanced in other parts of cabinet
offices, budget offices, or treasury or management board entities.

Conclusion: Prospects and implications

This chapter has contrasted and analysed the findings of three detailed case
studies of implementation and delivery units associated with the cabinet offices
of the United Kingdom, Commonwealth of Australia, and Queensland. It
demonstrated that these units were multi-faceted and similar in many ways, and
two benefited from cross-fertilisition of ideas and practices across jurisdictions,
but were nevertheless distinctive in key ways. The chapter sought to explain
their emergence and observed patterns, and, to the extent these seemingly
precarious capabilities have survived to date, identified lessons on design for
building similar capabilities committed to improving implementation analysis
and oversight, and elaborating those in place.
There is certainly more research to be done. Beyond monitoring the fortunes of
cabinet implementation units, there is a need to carefully explore whether and
how functional equivalents in other governance systems handle implementation

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analysis and monitoring. Another fertile area to explore would be detailed case
studies on the effect of particular efforts by implementation units to influence
and monitor policy departments and delivery agencies; some interesting work
on the UK experience has been reported (Kelman, 2005), but this should also be
contrasted with experience from other jurisdictions. Finally, the advent of cabinet
implementation units should be understood alongside the emergence of gateway
reviews in the UK and the adoption of this approach to learning and oversight
in Australia at the Commonwealth and state levels.
What are the prospects for implementation units? Earlier it was suggested that
there was great potential for competition and possibility of absorption, but it
bears noting that the same could be said for many central secretariats and
adhocracies not directly connected to the transactions associated with managing
a cabinet system. What is remarkable is the extent to which these units have
survived and taken root, albeit in circumscribed ways, and not been attacked.
However, their first real test will be to see if they survive once the experienced
first ministers who created them step down; if they survive that test, perhaps
with changes in roles and repertoires, it would show that successor first ministers
(who might have been ministers monitored through those units by the previous
first minister!) see their value as another instrument for managing government
mandates and ministerial colleagues, and that there are some real political and
control imperatives calling for this distinct functional capability. Moreover, the
jury is still out in other jurisdictions; they might emerge elsewhere as new
governments take power or new issues associated with implementation emerge.
On the other hand, the experiment with distinct implementation units could
melt away, joining a long list of efforts to more systematically improve the
decision-making of governments, and we would be left with the time-honoured
question of how to inject good implementation analysis into policy
decision-making.
If one were to speculate about sources of competition for implementation units,
or places where the units might be transferred to, there are two strong
possibilities: the divisions in cabinet offices responsible for general planning
and managing of government mandates, and budget offices and management
boards. As noted earlier, implementation units can be seen as a critique of existing
central agencies, particularly since first ministers and governments are under
great pressure to deliver on promises and demonstrate performance, and the
critique came from a powerful quarter. This critique suggests that it is not enough
for cabinet offices to keep a checklist of whether government commitments are
met on schedule nor for budget offices to keep track of financial flows associated
with these priorities – there needs to be more thought and effort expended in
the upstream and downstream to ensuring that initiatives get the attention they
deserve.

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 Improving Implementation

It is hard to imagine that this pressure will lessen in the years to come. However,
while it might seem natural for cabinet offices and budget offices to take on
more responsibility for implementation analysis and monitoring, like any
organisation they may resist taking on tasks that threaten to complicate their
mission or do not play to the strengths and competencies of staff (Wilson 1989).
Cabinet offices may see a conflict between their responsibility for policy advising
and managing the decision-making system, and budget offices may want to focus
on financial perspectives as opposed to management questions. Even if required
to absorb implementation units (or in jurisdictions with functional equivalents),
there may be strong incentives to create distinctive units for this purpose. An
open question would be whether the implementation units could gain or maintain
credibility without the direct support of the first minister; presumably this
would require linking the function to key decision-making processes (that is,
cabinet decision-making, budget approvals, regular review of programs, and so
forth); otherwise, they could quickly lose their effectiveness and, at best, become
symbolic nods towards the desire and principles of ‘good implementation’
thinking and practice.
Finally, it is worth reminding ourselves that the genesis of these units was not
inspired nor informed by the modern policy implementation literature, although
undoubtedly the recourse to the notion of implementation and alertness to some
issues attached to the concept hearkened back to the insights generated during
the 1960s and 1970s. There was little evidence from the case studies that the
recent progenitors of the implementation and design units surveyed the most
recent implementation literature nor did they contact the current gurus in the
field. Indeed, one wonders, if asked, what lessons or advice would have been
proffered. Arguably, there would have been a blind spot or disinterest based
on the modern literature on implementation, which has devoted considerable
attention to managing networks and identifying strategies for mutual adjustment
and cooperation, insights of considerable sophistication and importance. Early
on, the literature could be characterised as against, in principle, the idea of
developing strategies for fostering top-down change, let alone advising and
monitoring across the sweep of a government’s mandate. Political and
bureaucratic leaders regularly innovate without reference to any scholarly work,
of course, but there has been a missed opportunity to distil from the literature
good advice for central authorities about how better to advise on, coordinate,
and monitor multiple initiatives, as well as strategies for adjusting those not
working. Perhaps the call for improved implementation by first ministers may
lead scholars in the field to consider this vantage point and provide an
opportunity for recent implementation insight to be coupled with policy advising.

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ENDNOTES
1 See Hill and Hupe (2002) for an excellent description of the genesis of this literature, including
precursors to the work of Pressman and Wildavsky.
2 This chapter contextualizes and sets out a conceptual framework for the three case studies, and
interprets them. The case studies will be published as a special issue in the Journal of Comparative Policy
Analysis.
3 Many of these ideas arose from discussants, observers, and paper-givers at the Second International
Comparative Policy Analysis Forum at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, BC, on October 3, 2005.
4 For example, while testifying at Canada’s Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and
Advertising Activities hearings earlier this year, the Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet
indicated his office had considered but rejected the notion of an implementation unit, arguing that the
Treasury Board cabinet committee and its Secretariat had this responsibility (Canada, 2004). This despite
several other recent and high-profile examples of where far better implementation analysis and monitoring
was surely warranted (e.g. the gun registry fiasco, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, etc.).

255
Appendix A: Annex: A Guide for
Drafting Case Study Papers
The goal of this collection of papers is to describe and analyse the emergence
and roles of implementation and delivery units in the UK, Australia and Europe,
to understand how they differ from each other, and how they evolved and fared.
Their arrival undoubtedly reflected broader developments in the management
and evolution of central institutions in each jurisdiction, so some background
on this would be useful.
I hope each of the case study papers might address the points identified below,
but let me hasten to add that each author or team of authors should feel free to
develop their analysis and narrative in the way that makes most sense to them
– in other words, do not let the checklist get in the way of a good story! Here
are the areas that would be useful to cover:
• What was the rationale for establishing these units? Did they reflect the
specific interests of first ministers or other leaders? Did particular failures
or scandals lead to their creation, or what there a more general critique in
the air? Was their emergence partially as a critique of the inability of other
central agencies to make these kinds of assessments?
• What is the location of implementation and delivery units in the immediate
organisational ecology of the core executive? Did this evolve over time?
Why?
• What kind of leaders and staff were chosen to fill these units? What was the
size of these units? Did the type of leader change over time?
• What is the specific role of the units in policy development, agenda
management, and oversight processes by first ministers and their
governments? Does the label ‘implementation unit’ really reflect their role?
Are they working the upstream of developing policy initiatives, or do they
operated more fully in the downstream with the actual implementation of
initiatives, or both? Or are they monitoring the progress of other entities –
such as departments, ministries or agencies – as they seek to implement a
policy initiative? Are they reserved for only dealing with certain kinds of
policy initiatives?
• How do these units carry out their mandates in complicated, shifting
institutional environments with a multitude of delivery agents but also a
good number of other core executive agencies and units? Can you point to
instances where these units successfully carried out their roles? Are there
instances where they were marginal or ineffective? Has their effectiveness
evolved over time?
• Are there functional equivalents or competitors to implementation units,
such as central processes or other units and central agencies that provide

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implementation thinking in the upstream of policy development and then

monitor progress?
• Has ‘lesson-drawing’ taken place across jurisdictions (Rose, 1993), when the
units were created or as they took up their mandates?
• What does the future appear to hold in store for these units? Is the existence
of these units precarious, at the whim of first ministers and certain
governments? Or do they appear have promise of becoming institutionalised?
If so, where?

References
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Barrett, Susan M. 2004, ‘Implementation Studies: Time for a Revival? Personal
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Berman, Paul 1978, ‘Macro- and Micro-Implementation’, Public Policy, v.26
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Bridgman, Peter and Glyn Davis 2000, The Australian Policy Handbook, Allen
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Burch, Martin and Ian Holliday 2004, ‘The Blair Government and the Core
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