CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, PATNA

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
B.A., LL.B. (H) & B.B.A., LL.B. (H) (Semester V)

Academic Year 2025-26

COURSE PORTRAYAL:
The Constitution is the founding legal document, the touchstone, against which all other laws in India are
scrutinized for their validity. Broadly, it serves two important purposes. The first is to protect rights which
are indispensable to living a civilized, dignified life. These rights have evolved over a period of time, in
response to attempted abuse of state power. The second is to create and preserve a political scheme which
ensures efficient governance. Therefore, on the one hand, it regulates the relationship between the state and
the citizens, and on the other, it regulates the relationship between the different components of the state. As
an academic discipline, constitutional law is multidimensional. The diligent student will learn how sociology,
history, language and law can meet in one document, often with fascinating outcomes. The purpose of this
course is to introduce the students to the jurisprudence of fundamental rights, enumerated in Part III of the
constitution. The nature of these rights cannot be understood in isolation, since it is not static. Social
circumstances have changed since the constitution came into force, and significant events, like the
emergency, have strongly influenced the meaning of these rights. The course will help students understand
how the supreme court has transformed the constitution over the years, while trying not to depart from the
intention of the framers. To this end, the course will also enlighten students on the institutional value of the
supreme court and the practice of judicial review, and the concepts underlying such review- namely, the rule
of law, separation of powers and interpretive principles such as originalism and textualism. Each of the rights
enumerated in Part III will be learnt threadbare, with the aid of precedents. Students are expected to
understand, in the finest detail, the opinions in all the judgments taught in class. Both the majority and
minority opinions are to be read with diligence, and the law culled out from these judgments is not only to
be learnt, but also applied. In sum, the course will prepare students to analyze challenges posed by the
government to the citizens’ autonomy.
COURSE OBJECTIVES:
The objective of the course is to help students learn the first principles of constitutional law and interpret,
with an eye for detail, provisions enumerated in Parts III and IV of the constitution and understand the
role of constitutional courts.
OUTCOMES
A. Knowledge
On completion of the course, students are expected to intimately know and comprehend the
provisions of the Indian constitution. Further, it is also expected that students will be
familiar, in passing, with corresponding constitutional provisions of other jurisdictions, such
as the United States, Australia and South Africa.
B. Skills
i. Cognitive:
The most important takeaway from the course would be the skill of comprehending the law
laid down in precedents, followed by its application. Another noticeable skill that students
are expected to acquire is the use of related disciplines to broaden their legal understanding.
ii. Employability:
The skills of legal reasoning, research and argumentation, cultivated during the course, will
contribute to the employability of the student.
TEACHING AND LEARNING METHODOLOGY:

Methodology

Choice of materials:
The judgments chosen will help students understand formal articulations of each right, and cultivate an eye
for detail. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in the judgments prescribed for each class will be
discussed, along with the arguments advanced; the law culled out from these judgments will be applied to
propositions presented by the instructor. The readings have been curated to help students understand the
social context in which each of the rights is located. To this end, discussions on some of these readings will
also veer into its philosophical antecedents. For instance, on the right to freedom of religion, the discussion
will cover not just the social and political circumstances contributing to the development of secularism in
India, but also the abstract question on the role of religion in law more generally. They have been curated to
broaden the discussion on particularly sensitive themes.

Delivery:
Students are expected to be familiar with the judgment and the reading prescribed. Given the constraints of
time, the reading for the judgments will comprise handouts prepared for the purpose by the tutor, and, where
available, comments from the Annual Survey of Indian Law (ASIL). Each session will be
participative; the class will begin with a description of the judgment, and the reading, followed by discussions,
in the form of a dialogue led and moderated by the instructor.
LECTURE PLAN:

Module I Ideas of Constitutionalism 5 hours

Modules II & Citizenship, the ‘State Action’ Doctrine and Remedies 8 hours
VIII
Module III Equal Protection and Anti-Discrimination Provisions 9 hours
Module IV Enumerated Freedoms and 'Personal Liberty' 8 hours
Module V Rights Against Exploitation 1 hour
Module VI Right to Freedom of Religion 9 hours
Module VII Educational and Cultural Rights 2 hours
Module IX Directive Principles of State Policy 4 hours
Module X Fundamental Duties 2 hours
 MODULE I: IDEAS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
Constitutionalism is broadly understood to mean the practice of limiting the powers of the
government by invoking the constitution in different ways; the first module will engage with the
methods of interpretation, relying on the trifecta provided by Prof. Baxi: while C1 refers to the
constitutional text, C2 refers to the interpretation of the text by the Courts and C3 refers to the
ideological underpinnings of the Constitution. It is essential to the task of comprehending all the
three modalities of constitutionalism that the Constitution be understood in historical terms;
speaking in terms of the text of the Constitution, a perusal of the Constituent Assembly Debates
will help students comprehend the semantic logic underlying the choices of certain words in
provisions; speaking in terms of interpretation, the respect accorded to such a choice, guided by
the principle of originalism needs to be evaluated carefully, especially in the Court’s vigor in
developing a ‘living constitution’ in the post-Maneka era. While the ideological strands of the text
might have been informed by our experience of colonialism and the need to claim, as a collective,
our nationhood, and as individuals, our liberty, the ideology of judicial interpretation is informed
by historical events too- the experience of the emergency dramatically changed the trajectory of
constitutional interpretation, with far reaching consequences not just for how fundamental rights
have come to be understood, but also for the remedies which make good the violation of such
rights. The purpose of the sessions engaging with these modalities is to examine them critically,
and in doing so, dismantle some of the popular myths that characterize constitutionalism today- for
instance, have constitutional courts been adequate to the task of realizing the rights enshrined in
Part III, or has the exercise of interpretation been a reactionary one, with addling consequences?
Such are the questions one must seek to answer in any meaningful discussion about the larger
purpose of the Constitution.
Required Readings:
Mahendra Pal Singh, Constitutionalism in the Indian Comparative Perspective, 11 NUJS L. REV. 647 (2018).
S. Choudhry, M. Khosla, & P.B. Mehta, Locating Indian Constitutionalism in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 1 (S. Choudhry, M. Khosla & P.B. Mehta ed., 2016);

Recommended Readings

Uday S. Mehta, Indian Constitutionalism Crisis, Unity and History in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
INDIAN CONSTITUTION 38 (S. Choudhry, M. Khosla & P.B. Mehta ed., 2016).
S. Subramanian & K. Kannabiran, 'On Rights and Duties-Two Essays', The Hindu Centre for Politics and
Public Policy (February 21, 2022).
• Achyuth Chetan, 'Introduction: Towards a Feminist Reading of the Making of the Constitution'
in Founding Mothers of the Indian Republic: Gender Politics of the Framing of the Constitution
(Cambridge University Press, 2023).

• Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘What is Constitutional Morality?’, 615 Seminar (November

2010).
• Aditya Nigam, ‘A Text without Author:Locating Constituent Assembly as Event’, 39
(21) Economic and Political Weekly 2107-2113 (May 22-28, 2004).
• Upendra Baxi, ‘Universal Rights and Cultural Pluralism: Constitutionalism As The Site
of State Formative Practices’, 21 Cardozo Law Review 1183-1210 (2000) [Concentrate
on pp. 1187-1193].
• Rohit De, ‘Constitutional Antecedents’, pp. 17-37 in Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla &
Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford
University Press, 2016).
• C.L. Ten, ‘Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law’, pp. 493-502 in Goodin, Pettit & Pogge
(eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Second Edition (Blackwell
Publishing, 2007).

Advanced Readings:
• Richard Fallon, ‘The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’, 97
Columbia Law Review 1-56 (1997).
• Bruce Ackerman, ‘The Rise of World Constitutionalism’, 83 Virginia Law Review 771-
797 (1997).
• Samuel Issacharoff, ‘Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies’, 82 Texas
Law Review 1861-1892 (2004).
 MODULES II AND VIII: CITIZENSHIP, THE ‘STATE ACTION’ DOCTRINE AND THE
RIGHT TO CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
An overview of the constitution must be followed by a close perusal of the actors sought to be held accountable
by it. Evaluating the judicial developments related to the state action doctrine will help the students comprehend
both the reach of the constitutional courts and the range of ways in which governmental activity percolates the
everyday lives of citizens. The questions surrounding the reach of Article 12 have been complex, beginning with
the difference between statutory and non-statutory bodies, to the degree of financial control by the government,
and the purpose and function of the entities in question. However, none of these lines of inquiry respond to the
normative issue of the place of the doctrine in the constitutional scheme, which is a gap that the module seeks to
address. In learning about the need for a horizontal enforcement of fundamental rights, students will be led to
think about the doctrine from a standpoint of first principles, such as the variations in the nature of rights enshrined
in the constitution, the interplay of constitutional interpretation and design and the broader philosophical values
informing Part III. Having armed students with the comprehension of ‘state actors’ under Article 12, the ensuing
classes seek to help them investigate the myriad actions scrutinized for constitutional adherence under Article 13.
The complexities of transitioning to the post-constitutional period are captured in deliberations on how Part III
operated for pre-constitutional statutes; the effect of the Courts’ determination of unconstitutionality are
understood by a discussion of the doctrines of waiver and severability, both of which will encourage students
discover fascinating aspects of constitutional design. The familiarity with state actors and actions will enable
students to comprehend the remedies available against the infringement of rights in Part III. Beginning with the
place of judicial review in the constitutional scheme, students will understand how the exercise of review by
constitutional courts redresses specific a variety of harms, from the infringement of liberty to erroneous decisions
by subordinate courts, and also the relationship between constitutional courts inter se.

Required Readings:
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1985-1986).
• Gautam Bhatia, 'Citizenship and the Constitution', pp. 46-81 in Gautam Bhatia et al., On
Citizenship (Aleph Book Company, 2021).
Recommended Readings:
Ananth Padmanabhan, 'Rights: Scope and Applicability', pp. 581-599 in Choudhry, Khosla & Mehta (eds.),
The Oxford Handbook of The Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2016).
 • • Niraja Gopal Jayal, 'Citizenship', pp. 163-189 in Choudhry, Khosla & Mehta (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of The Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2016). Anupama Roy, 'Citizenship
Regimes, Law and Belonging', 729 Seminar (May 2020).
• Linda Bosniak, 'Citizens and Persons in Constitutional Thought', 8(1) International Journal of
Constitutional Law 9-29 (January 2010).

Advanced Readings:
• Jeremy Waldron, ‘Rights’, pp. 745-754 in Goodin, Pettit & Pogge, A Companion to
Contemporary Political Philosophy (Blackwell Publishing, 2007).
• Udai Raj Rai, Fundamental Rights and their Enforcement (PHI Publishers, 2011), pp. 688-753.
• Sudhir Krishnaswamy, ‘Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights and State Action in
India’, pp. 47-73 in K. Chockalingam & C. Raj Kumar (eds.), Human Rights, Justice and
Constitutional Empowerment (Oxford University Press, 2007).
• Stephen Gardbaum, ‘Horizontal Effect’, pp. 600-613 in The Oxford Handbook of the Indian
Constitution (OUP, 2016).
• Ashish Chugh, ‘Fundamental Rights–Vertical or Horizontal?’, 7 SCC Journal 9-18 (2005).

Key cases:
 Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2920.

 Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 783.

 Bhikaji v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 781.
 Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 648.
 State of Gujarat v. Sri Ambika Mills, AIR 1974 SC 1300.
 Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, (1975) 1 SCC 421.
 Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111.
 Zee Telefilms Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2677.
 Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.
 MODULE III: EQUAL PROTECTION AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS

The non-discrimination provisions will help students draw deep from the well of constitutional interpretation for
a number of reasons. The developmental arc of equality law begins with the Supreme Court’s enunciation of
reasonable classification, and what appeared to be a progression to the non-comparative test of arbitrariness.
However, as scholar Tarunabh Khaitan argues, each of these tests have doctrinal deficiencies, which is further
complicated by the Court’s move to arbitrariness as the prevalent standard. Critiquing the Court’s approach is the
first step in helping students cultivate a sound theoretical understanding of non-discrimination; as scholar Sandra
Fredman argues, the framework of substantive equality urges us to problematize discrimination not just in terms
of rationality, but also in terms of values. While formal equality, marked by consistency of treatment, places a
premium on rationalization, substantive equality seeks a more intuitive approach to interpretation, by intertwining
equality with other constitutional values such as dignity. As Fredman further argues, it also helps us recognize
that discrimination is a layered phenomenon, demonstrated most vividly by the scholarship on intersectionality
theory. Such a framework will encourage students to think about the ultimate goals of equality law- be it that of
redistribution or recognition. Once the students acquire the theoretical vocabulary, a series of the Supreme Court’s
most notable decisions will be dissected to have them apply their learnings and identify shortcomings in the
decisions. The ensuing provisions on the prohibition of discrimination in matters of education and public
employment are derivatives of the general principles of equality under Article 14. Students will be familiarized
with the need for affirmative action by an introduction to Ambedkar’s writings on caste-based discrimination and
his conversations in the Constituent Assembly on the relevant provisions, which will be followed by a survey of
the Court’s most notable dcisions, concluding with the decision on sub-classification in Davinder Singh v. State
of Punjab.
Required Readings:
• Tarunabh Khaitan, ‘Equality: Legislative Review under Article 14’, pp. 699-719 in The Oxford
Handbook of the Indian Constitution (OUP, 2016).
• Sandra Fredman, Direct and Indirect Discrimination: Is there Still a Divide? in FOUNDATIONS
OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION LAW 31, 36 (Hart Publishing, 1st ed., 2018).
• Tarunabh Khaitan, ‘Beyond Reasonableness–A Rigorous Standard of Review for Article 15
Infringement’, 50(2) Journal of Indian Law Institute 177-208 (2008).
• Dhruva Gandhi, Nitisha v. Union of India: Furthering a Discussion on Discriminatory Intent, 14
NUJS L. REV. 177 (2021).
• Abhinav Chandrachud, ‘Enter Mandal and Sawhney’ in These Seats are Reserved: Cate, Quotas
and the Constitution of India (India: Penguin Random House, 2023)
• Mahendra Pal Singh, ‘Ashoka Kumar Thakur: A Divided Verdict on an Undivided Social Justice
Measure’, 1(2) NUJS Law Review 193-218 (2009).
Recommended Readings:
• Richard J. Arneson, ‘Equality’, pp. 593-611 in Goodin, Pettit & Pogge, A Companion to
Contemporary Political Philosophy (Blackwell Publishing, 2007).
• Udai Raj Rai, Fundamental Rights and their Enforcement (PHI Publishers, 2011), pp. 450-569.

• Ratna Kapur, ‘Gender Equality’, pp. 742-755 in The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution
(OUP, 2016).
• Parmanand Singh, ‘Equality and Compensatory Discrimination’, pp. 126-152 in K.
Chockalingam & C. Raj Kumar (eds.), Human Rights, Justice and Constitutional Empowerment
(Oxford University Press, 2007).
• Report of the National Commission for the Scheduled Castes (Reservations in Promotions for
Members of Scheduled Castes). Available at the following link:
<[Link]
• Asha Das, ‘Dissent Note: Conferment of Scheduled Caste Status on SC converts to Christianity
 and Islam’, Vijayvaani (August 24, 2010); Available at the following link:
<[Link]

Advanced Readings
• Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in Modern India
(University of California Press, 1984).
• Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory of Anti-Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2014).
• Sasheej Hegde, 'The Many Truths of Reservation Quotas in India: Extending The Engagement',
43(3/4) Social Scientist 61-104 (2015).

Key cases:
The first phase ('Reasonable Classification')
• State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 65.
• Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538.
The ‘New Doctrine’ (Checking Arbitrariness)
• Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
• Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829.
Introducing 'Strict Scrutiny':
• Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1.
• Navtej Johar v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4321.
• RIT Foundation v. Union of India, 2022 SCC Online Del 1404.
• Tinku v. State of Haryana 2024 INSC 867
• Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India 2024 INSC 753
• Om Rathod v. The Director General of Health Services 2024 INSC 836
• Rajive Raturi v. Union of India 2024 INSC 858
• Nipun Malhotra v. Sony Pictures Films India Pvt. Ltd. 2024 INSC 465

Significant Judgments on Reservations:

• State of Madras v. Champakan Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226.
• M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649.
• State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310.
• Soosai v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 733.
• Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477 (opinion of B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.).
• E. V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2005)1 SCC 394.
• M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212.
• Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1 (opinion of K.G.
Balakrishnan, C.J.)
• Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. v. Rajesh Kumar & Ors.,(2012) 7 SCC 1.
• B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India (II), 2019 SCC Online SC 694.
• Dr. Jaishree Laxmanrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC Online SC 170.
• State of Kerala v. Leesamma Joseph, 2021 SCC Online SC 435.
• Neil Aurelio Nunes v. Union of India, 2022 SCC Online SC 75.
• State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh 2024 INSC 562
• Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta, 2022 SCC Online SC 96.
• Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, 2022 SCC Online 1540.
 MODULE IV: ENUMERATED FREEDOMS AND 'PERSONAL LIBERTY'

While the previous modules teach the students to engage with constitutional text and philosophy, the freedoms
guaranteed under Article 19 of the constitution lends itself to comparative constitutionalism as an interpretive
technique. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on Article 19 draws heavily from the First Amendment corpus of
the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS). However, the right to freedom of speech and expression in India
developed in the colonial context of the curtailment of the press during the pre-independence period; while the
freedom of the press has continued to be a pressing concern for the Court, and some of the colonial era
curtailments such as sedition have been a persistent malaise, the invasive presence of technology has meant that
the Court needs to reimagine its jurisprudence in some areas such obscenity and hate speech. Further, with the
recognition of sexuality as dimension of the freedom of expression, the Court has paved the way to interlock
Article 19 with equality law and the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. Engaging with the
constitutional value of dignity should be a natural progression from learning about substantive equality and the
various freedoms under Article 19. As Fredman argues, a value-based conception of equality prizes dignity as an
interpretive groundswell. However, before students can do this, they need to learn the shortcomings arising of the
Supreme Court’s muddled understanding of the right to life; as Prof. Anup Surendranath argues, the theoretical
basis on which the Court interlocks the triad of Articles 14, 19 and 21 leaves much to be desired; further, the
Court has invoked dignity as a placeholder to quantitatively expand the meaning of the right to life, while the
doctrinal foundations of dignity remain underdeveloped, which is a gap that the module seeks to address in the
hope that students acquire not just context-specific interpretive skills (such as learning to distinguish between
vagueness and overbreadth in free speech law), but also learn to read the constitution as a cumulative whole.

Required Readings:
• Granville Austin, ‘Free Speech, Liberty and Public Order’, pp. 40-68 in Working A Democratic
Constitution: The Indian Experience (OUP, 2002).
• Arvind P. Datar & Rahul Unnikrishnan, Interpretation of Constitutions: A Doctrinal Study, 29
NAT'l L. SCH. INDIA REV. 136 (2017).
• V Sudhish Pai, ‘Construing the Sounds of the Constitution’s Speech: Meanings Beyond Text’ in
Constitutional Supremacy: A Revisit (Oakbridge, 2019)
• Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 183
(2011).
• Anup Surendranath, 'Life and Personal Liberty', in Sujit Choudhry and others (eds), The Oxford
 Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press 2016) 756-776
• Mrinal Satish and Aparna Chandra, ‘Of Maternal State and Minimalist Judiciary: The Indian
Supreme Court’s Approach to Terror-Related Adjudication’, 21(1) National Law School of India
Review 51-87 (2009).
Recommended Readings (Article 19):
• Ronald Dworkin, ‘Constitutional Cases’, pp. 163-184 in Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard
University Press, 1977).
• Aharon Barak, ‘Determining the Scope of Constitutional Rights’, pp. 45-82 in Proportionality:
Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
• Erin Daly, Dignity Rights: Courts, Constitutions and The Worth of the Human Person
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), pp. 11-52.

• Gautam Bhatia, Offend, Shock or Disturb: Free Speech Under the Indian Constitution (Oxford
University Press, 2015).
• Rajeev Dhavan, 'The Press and The Constitutional Guarantee of Free Speech and Expression',
28(3) Journal of The Indian Law Institute 299-385 (1986).
• Rajeev Dhavan, Publish and be Damned: Censorship and Intolerance in India (Tulika Books,
2008).
• K.G. Kannabiran, ‘Conspiracies of Association: Associational Offences, Associational Freedoms
and the Rule of Law’ in Kalpana Kannabiran & Ranbir Singh (eds.), Challenging the Rules(s) of
Law’: Colonialism, Criminology and Human Rights in India (Sage Publishers, 2009).
• Fali S. Nariman, ‘The Way Forward’, 615 Seminar (November 2010).
• From The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (OUP, 2016):
• Lawrence Liang, ‘Free Speech and Expression’, pp. 814-833.
• Anirudh Burman, ‘Movement and Residence’, pp. 849-866.
Vikramaditya Khanna, ‘Profession, Occupation, Trade, or Business’, pp. 867-884.

Recommended Readings (Article 21)

 • P.K. Tripathi, ‘The Fiasco of Overruling A.K. Gopalan and Worse’, AIR 1990 Journal 1.

• Ram Jethmalani, ‘Detention without Trial’, Chapter 16 in Kirpal, Desai, Subramanium, Dhavan
& Ramachandran (eds.), Supreme but not Infallible: Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of
India (OUP, 2000).
• T.R. Andhyarujina, ‘The Evolution of Due Process of Law by the Supreme Court’, Chapter 11 in
Kirpal, Desai, Subramanium, Dhavan & Ramachandran (eds.), Supreme but not Infallible: Essays
in the Honour of the Supreme Court of India (OUP, 2000)
• From The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (OUP, 2016):
- Abhinav Chandrachud, ‘Due Process’, pp. 777-793.
- Aparna Chandra and Mrinal Satish, ‘Criminal Law and the Constitution’, pp. 794-813.

Key Cases:
Speech and expression:
• Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
• Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, (1960) SCR (2)
821.
• Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 740.
• Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.
Assembly: Ram Lila Maidan vs Home Secretary, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
Association: State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196. Movement:
Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295. Residence:
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushalya Devi, AIR 1964 SC 416.
Profession: T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481. Reading
rights together:
• A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
• Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
• Selvi Murugeshan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263.
• Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1.
• Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (Privacy).
• Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1 (Aadhar).
Other important cases:
• Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788 (dissent).
• Bijoe Emmanuel vs State of Kerala , AIR 1987 SC 748.
• S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.
• R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632.
• People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301.
• Hardhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 198.
• A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271.
• Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 24. (opinion of P.N. Bhagwati, J.).
• Nandini Sundar & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 7 SCC 547.
• Suchita Srivastava & Anr. v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1.
• Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaugh v. Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 454.
• National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438.
• Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523.
• Subramaniam Swamy v. Union of India, AIR 2016 SC 2728.
• Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 761.
• Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, 2019 SCC Online SC 1725.
• Anjum Kadari & Anr. V. Union of India
 MODULE V: RIGHTS AGAINST EXPLOITATION

As Chemerinsky argues, the inapplicability of fundamental rights to private entities would be a constitutional
travesty. The horizontal application of the provisions against trafficking, bonded labour and child labour recognize
that the social malaise sought to be addressed by Articles 23 and 24 is entrenched; the case laws surveyed in this
regard will help students further their understanding of the constitutional values of dignity and liberty, acquired
from the previous module.

Required Readings

 Gautam Bhatia, The Freedom to Work: PUDR vs. Union of India and the Meaning of “Forced
Labour” Under the Indian Constitution, (2017), [Link] (last
visited Sep 6, 2024).
 Modhurima Dasgupta, Public Interest Litigation for Labour: How the Indian Supreme Court
Protects the Rights of India’s Most Disadvantaged Workers, 16 CONTEMPORARY SOUTH
ASIA 159 (2008).
 James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997).
 Thomas Paul, Child Labour – Prohibition v. Abolition: Untangling the Constitutional Tangle. 50
Journal of the Indian Law Institute 143 (2008)

Recommended Readings
 Isiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1969)
 Julie Novkov, Historicizing the Figure of the Child in Legal Discourse: The Battle over the
Regulation of Child Labor, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 369 (2000).
 Katherine Cox, The Inevitability of Nimble Fingers--Law, Development, and Child Labor, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'l L. 115 (1999).

Advanced Readings

 F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press 1978)

 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971).

 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books 1977)

 Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse As Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment
 Response to DeShaney , 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992).

Key Cases

PUDR vs Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235

Sanjit Roy v. The State of Rajasthan AIR 1983 SC 328

Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802

M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1997 SC 699

Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of India AIR 2011 SC 3361

Other important cases

Ram Kumar Misra v State of Bihar and Others AIR 1984 SC 537.

P. Sivaswamy v. State of A.P. AIR 1988 SC 1863

Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of M.P. AIR 1984 SC 1099

Labourers Working on Salal Hydro Project vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others (1983) 2 SCC
181.

Rajangam, Secretary, District Beedi Workers’ Union and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others
(1992) 1 SCC 221
 Modules VI and VII
The Right to Freedom of Religion and Cultural and Educational Rights
The sessions on the right to freedom of religion begin with an overview of the Constituent Assembly’s opinion
on the interaction between religion and the state; broadly speaking, there is the principle of ‘equal respect’, also
understood to be the indigenous, Nehruvian idea of tolerance, and the Western idea of separation between the
church and the state. The question of which of these has been espoused by the Constitution, is one that will be
answered by relying on constitutional text and precedent, beginning with the developmental arc of the rights under
Articles 25 and 26 with a perusal of the ‘essential practices’ test. The test has been refined by the Supreme Court
in a line of decisions, commencing with Shirur Mutt.1 Whether the Court’s activism was warranted or constituted
judicial overreach will be one of the key aspects covered in this regard. This will be followed by an evaluation of
what it means to exercise the right to propagate religion, in the context of anti-conversion law, concluding with
the pending challenge before the Supreme Court2, with a focus on the Court’s articulation of the principle of
dignity as being constitutive of the right to choose one’s religious beliefs.
In the ensuing sessions, the exposition of secularism under Article 28 will be examined, by tracing the divide
between ‘religious instruction’ and ‘religious education’, beginning with conversations in the Constituent
Assembly, and culminating with the Court’s recent decision in Anjum Kadari v. Union of India.3 This will be
followed by a discussion on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on personal laws, working through their gradual
subjection to fundamental rights, with a close reading of Shayara Bano V. Union of India 4, and concluding with
discussions on the Uniform Civil Code. The sessions on cultural and educational rights will unfold along two
axes: what is the constituency that Articles 29 and 30 seek to protect, as a matter of constitutional history, text
and design; and what are the protections available under the provisions; in this regard, the most notable decisions
of the Supreme Court, culminating with the AMU5 decision, rendered last year, will be examined. The overarching
purpose of the sessions covering these modules is to instill bin students the idea that secular constitutionalism
thrives at the intersection of political philosophy, history and constitutional interpretation.

Required Readings

• Rajeev Bhargava, 'The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism', pp. 20-53 in T.N. Srinivasan (ed.),
The Future of Indian Secularism (OUP, 2006).
• Rochana Bajpai, 'Multiculturalism in India: An Exception', pp. 127-149 in Richard T. Ashcroft

1
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindar Tirtha Swamiyar of Shri Shirur Mutt AIR 1954 SC
282
2
Citizens for Justice and Peace v. State of Uttar Pradesh, WP (Crl) 428/2020
3
2024 INSC 831
4
(2017) 9 SCC 1
5
Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors., 2024 INSC 856
 & Mark Bevir (eds.), Multiculturalism in The British Commonwealth: Comparative Perspectives
on Theory and Practice (University of California Press, 2019).

• Faizan Mustafa & Jagteshwar Singh Sohi, 'Freedom of Religion in India: Current Issues and The
Supreme Court Acting As Clergy', 9(4) Brigham Young University Law Review 915-955 (2018).
• A.G. Noorani, 'Supreme Court Denies Justice', FrontLine Magazine (December 6, 2019).
• Ajaz Ashraf, Interview with Faizan Mustafa on Minority Status of Aligarh Muslim University
(Available on [Link], January 16, 2016).
• Dushyant Kishan Kaul, Excessive State Intervention in Regulating Minority Educational
Institutions (2022), [Link]
• Virendra Kumar, 'Minorities Right To Run Educational Institutions: T.M.A. Pai Foundation in
Perspective', 45(2) Journal of The Indian Law Institute 200-238 (2003).

Recommended Readings

• Marc Galanter, ‘Hinduism, Secularism and the Indian Judiciary’, 21(4) Philosophy East and West
467-487 (1971).
• Rajeev Dhavan and Fali Nariman, ‘The Supreme Court and Group Life: Religious Freedom,
Minority Groups and Disadvantaged Communities’, Chapter 14 in Supreme but not Infallible:
Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of India (OUP, 2000).
• Thomas Pantham, ‘Indian Secularism and its Critics: Some Reflections’, 59(3) The Review of
Politics 523-540 (1997).
• Faizan Mustafa, A Progressive UCC Must Protect the Child’s Best Interests, THE HINDU, Aug.
31, 2023, [Link]
best-interests/[Link]
• Udai Raj Rai, Fundamental Rights and their Enforcement (PHI Publishers, 2011), pp. 638-687.
• Aarthi Ramakrishnan and Sanjay Bavikatte, Minority Educational Institutions: A Need for
Prudential Regulation 8 NAT'l L. SCH. INDIA REV. 160 (2022).
• Determination of Minority Status: Court in Review, SUPREME COURT
OBSERVER, [Link]
review/
•

Advanced Readings
 • Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, ‘Secularism’s Last Sigh? The Hindu Right, the Courts and
India’s Struggle for Democracy’, 38(1) Harvard International Law Journal 113-170 (1997).
• Robert D. Baird (ed.), Religion and Law in Independent India, Second Edition (Manohar
Publishers and Distributors, 2005) [First Edition, 1993]
• Rajeev Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and its Critics (Oxford University Press, 1998).
• Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Wheel of Law: India’s Secularism in Comparative Constitutional
Context (Princeton University Press, 2003).

• Ronojoy Sen, Articles of Faith: Religion, Secularism and the Indian Supreme Court (Oxford
University Press, 2010).
• Akeel Bilgrami, Secularism, Identity and Enchantment (Harvard University Press, 2014).
• From The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (OUP, 2016):
 Ronojoy Sen, ‘Secularism and Religious Freedom’, pp. 885-902.
 Flavia Agnes, ‘Personal Laws’, pp. 903-920.
• Ranu Jain, ‘Minority Education: Reflections on Article 30 of the Indian Constitution’ 2005 40
(24) Economic and Political Weekly
• TAHIR MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF MINORITY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: LAW AND REALITY IN
THE SUBCONTINENT (2007).

• I. P. MASSEY, MINORITY RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN INDIA (2002).

• Mohammad Shahabuddin, Decolonising Minority Rights Discourse (2023),
[Link]
• Parmanand Singh, ‘Academic and Administrative Freedom of Minority Educational
Institutions in India', 19(3) Journal of the Indian Law Institute 296-312 (1977).

Key Cases

• State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84.

• Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirath
Swamiar, (1954) SCR 1005.
• Mohammed Hanif Qureshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731.
• Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 2 SCR 611.
• Mohammed Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556.
• Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, 2018 (8) SCJ 609.
• Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., AIR 2018 SC 1933.
 • Aishat Shifa v State of Karnataka, Supreme Court of India (October 13, 2022).
• T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481.
• P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 8 SCC 139.
• Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2014) 8 SCC 1.
• In Re The Kerala Education Bill, AIR 1958 SC 956.

Other important cases

• Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.
• Sastri Yagnapurushadji v. Muldas Brudardas Vaishya, AIR 1966 SC 1119.
• State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Qureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534.
• Azeez Basha v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 662.
• D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, (1971) 2 SCC 269.
• St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558.
• Aligarh Muslim University v. Malay Shukla, (2006) 1 AWC 992.
• Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal 2024 INSC 856

• Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society v. District Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Urban),

(2005) 5 SCC 632.
• Noorjehan Safia Niaz & Zakia Soman v. State of Maharashtra, Bombay High Court (August 26,
2016).
• Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.
• M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1. (Ayodhya Title Dispute)
 MODULE IX: THE DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY

Upendra Baxi, writing of the Directive Principles of State Policy in 1967, outlined two approaches
prevalent at the time they were conceived: the first was the one taken by T.T. Krishnamachari, relegating
the principles as a “dustbin of sentiments”, which has been echoed by Prof. Baxi; the other, is to view
the principles as the fulcrum of social revolution. Interestingly, in cultivating a third approach, Prof. Baxi
was of the opinion that the Principles themselves need to be first scrutinized to identify those which have
been foregrounded by the state as the most important ones, and to this end, calls for a survey of not just
state and central laws purporting to implement the said principles, but also of election manifestos; this is
necessary, Prod. Baxi argues, since the judiciary remains at the periphery as regards the characterization
of the Principles. However, post the Supreme Court’s decision in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of
Kerala, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Principles have taken center stage, so much so that
Prof. Baxi has claimed that it gave rise to the myth that the Fundamental Rights are obstructing the
realization of social justice embodied in the Directives. Therefore, in engaging with Part IV, one must
first dismantle the confusion and understand its true place in the constitutional scheme, which is to aid
the realization of fundamental rights; to this end, the Supreme Court’s harmonious construction of the
relationship between Part III and the Directives will be examined, followed by the different interpretive
strands by which the Principles have informed Part III, such as the role of Article 39(a) and 39(e) in the
development of the rights to livelihood and health respectively, as a facet of the right to live with dignity,
under Article 21. While this lone of interpretation is consonance with the conception of the Constitution
as a “living” document, the sessions will also sound a note of caution; the Directives are primarily meant
to guide policy-making, which is an administrative niche, and the judiciary must realize its limits in the
exercise of judicial review of Part IV.

Required Reading:
• Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in
Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 227-264.
• Paul O' Connell, 'The Death of Socio-Economic Rights', 74(4) Modern Law Review 532-554
(2011).
• Gopal Sankaranarayanan, ‘The Fading Right to Property in India,’ 44(2) Verfassung Und Recht in
Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 220-236 (2011).
• Upendra Baxi, ‘Directive Principles And Sociology Of Indian Law-A Reply To Dr. Jagat Narain.
11(3) Journal of the Indian Law Institute 245-272 (1969).

• Pradyumna K. Tripathi, 'Right to Property after the 44th Amendment: Stronger than Before',
 AIR 1980 Journal 49
Recommended Readings:
• Namita Wahi, ‘Property’ The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (OUP, 2016)
• S.P. Sathe, ‘Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy’ in Constitutional
Developments since Independence, <[Link]
• Upendra Baxi, ‘The Little Done, The Vast Undone-Some Reflections On Reading Granville
Austin’s ‘The Indian Constitution', 9(3) Journal of the Indian Law Institute 323-430 (1967).

• Upendra Baxi, ‘Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India’,
4 Third World Legal Studies 107-132 (1985).
• Arun K. Thiruvengadam, ‘The Global Dialogue among Courts: Social Rights Jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court of India from a Comparative Perspective’, pp. 264-309 in K. Chockalingam & C. Raj
Kumar (eds.), Human Rights, Justice and Constitutional Empowerment (OUP, 2007).
• Tarunabh Khaitan, ‘Directive Principles and the Expressive Accommodation of Ideological
Dissenters’, 16(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 389-420 (2018).

Key Cases:
• State of Bihar v. Kameswar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 52.
• State of West Bengal v Bela Banerjee, AIR 1954 SC 170.
• Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564.
• Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530.
• Jilubhai Nanbhai Kachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Suppl (1) SCC 5 96.
 MODULE X: FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES

In order to understand the place of fundamental duties in the scheme of the constitution, it is first necessary
to peruse the development of the notion of duties in Indian political thought, culminating in discussions in
the Constituent Assembly, with the revelation that there were a plurality of purposes for which these duties
were conceived. Thereafter, it is imperative to closely look at the role of these duties in judicial
interpretation, and their interplay with fundamental rights and directive principles.

Required Readings
 Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, Constitutional Law of India, 846-862 (2nd ed. 2015)
 Arpitha H.C. and Subhaia, Chitra. Enforceability of fundamental duties: A balancing act. Supreme
Court Journal (Apex Court Expression-Reverted SCJ). (2009) Vol.2(11): 36-43p.

Recommended Readings

 Rao, V K R V, and Sardar Swaran Singh. “Fundamental Duties and Directive Principles Under the
Proposed Amendments to the Constitution [with Concluding Remarks by the Chairman Sardar
Swaran Singh].” India International Centre Quarterly 3, no. 4 (1976): 266–84.
[Link]

 Panigrahi, S.K., Panda, S.A. (2022). Facilitating the Convergence of Directive Principles of State
Policy and Fundamental Duties Through the Gandhian Interpretation of ‘Dharm’. In: Mittal, R.,
Singh, K.K. (eds) Relevance of Duties in the Contemporary World. Springer, Singapore.
[Link]

 Singh, C.S.P. (2022). Jurisprudence of Duty, Fundamental Duties and Gandhian Philosophy. In:
Mittal, R., Singh, K.K. (eds) Relevance of Duties in the Contemporary World. Springer,
Singapore. [Link]

Key Cases

A.I.I.M.S Students Union v. A.I.I.M.S, AIR 2001 SC 3262

State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534
N.T.R University of Health Sciences, Vijayawada v. [Link] Rajendra Prasad, AIR 2003 SC 1947
Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana, AIR 2003 SC 2000 Ram
Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1988 All 309 Mohan
Kumar Singhania v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1

*****