Right of the accused person to have an expeditious trial Justice delayed is justice denied.
This is all the more true in a criminal trial
where the accused is not released on bail during the pendency of the trial and the trial is
inordinately delayed. However, the Code does not in so many words confer any such right
on the accused to have his case decided expeditiously. As seen earlier, if the accused is in
detention and the trial is not completed within 60 days from the first date fixed for hearing he
shall be released on bail. 40 But this only mitigates the hardship of the accused person but
does not give him speedy trial and secondly this rule is appli-cable only in case of
proceedings before a Magistrate. The Code has given a more positive direction to courts
when it says:
In every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as pos-sible, and in
particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued
from day to day until all the witnesses in attend-ance have been examined, unless the court
finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to
be recorded. [S. 309(1)]
13.1
A criminal trial which drags on for unreasonably long time is not a fair trial. The court may
drop proceedings on account of long delay even in a case where the delay was caused due
to the mala fide moves of the accused. But in such a case the court may make the accused
to suffer exemplary costs. Section 309(1) gives directions to the courts with a view to have
speedy trials and quick disposals. The right of the accused in this context has been
recognised but the real problem is how to make it a reality in actual practice. Section 309(1)
came to be amended in 2013 as follows:
38. See, Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 14 SCC 115: (2010) : SCC (Cri)
1301: 2009 Cri LJ 2824.
39. Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad, 1954 Cri LJ 338: AIR 1954 SC 51, 601
Ronald Wood Mathams v. State of W.B., 1954 Cri LJ 1161, 1764: AIR 1954 SC 455;
Narayana Mudaly v. Emperor, ILR (1907) 31 Mad 131; Also see observations in T.N.
Janardhanan Pillai v. State of Kerala, 1992 Cri LJ 436 (Ker); Sreedhar Pillay v. P.J.
Alexander, 1992 Cri LJ 3433 (Ker).
40. See supra, S. 437 (6), para. 12.3 (d).
41. T.J. Stephen v. Parle Bottling Co. (P) Ltd., 1988 Supp SCC 458: 1988 SCC (Cri) 690:
1988 Cri LJ 1095.
This disqualification can be removed by obtaining the permission of the appellate court. The
appellate court while granting permission will have to be very careful and cautious so as not
to impinge upon fair trial.
The judge or Magistrate cannot hear an appeal from any judgment or order passed by him;
and this disqualification cannot be removed by obtaining permission from higher appellate
court.
The expression "personal interest" does not mean only private inter-est; it may well include
official interest also. Further, it is not every inter-est that would disqualify under Section 479.
In order to disqualify, the interest must be active and not passive. A mere formal grant of
sanction which is necessary only for the purpose of fulfilling a technical statutory requirement
may not amount to "personal interest" within the meaning of Section 479. In many such
cases the sanction is given or refused for considerations which are extraneous to the merits
of the case; on the other hand, if the interest consists of a direction to initiate criminal
proceed-ings, the bar under Section 479 operates since the interest taken is active and is
concerned with the merits of the case."
A distinction may also be drawn between pecuniary interest and preju-dice. The smallest
pecuniary advantage is a bar to the justice acting. But where the interest is not pecuniary,
the question arises whether the inter-est is of such a substantial character as to make it
likely that the judge or Magistrate has a real bias in the matter. What then has to be
considered is the effect likely to be produced upon the minds of the public as to the fairness
of the administration of justice and this is a question of degree to be decided in every case.
23
Two more somewhat connected provisions may also be considered here. These are also
aimed at keeping the judges and Magistrates away from any real or suspected bias.
1. Section 480 provides that "no pleader who practises in the court of any Magistrate shall sit
as a Magistrate in that court or in any court within the local jurisdiction of the court". A lawyer
cannot both practice law and also be in judicial service. He cannot possibly be appointed
even as a Special Judicial Magistrate (honorary) in view of the essential requirements for
being appointed as a Special Judicial Magistrate. 24 Section 480, though it incorporates a
basic principle, it is submitted, is more or less superfluous in the context of the present
set-up of our criminal courts.