Ayoniz Model United Nations Presents:
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY – LEGAL
REGULATING AI IN WARFARE AND
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS
STUDY GUIDE
3RD-5TH MAY 2025
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Contents
Committee Details:
Letter from the Chairs 3
Background: LEGAL Committee 4-5
Topic: Regulating AI and AWS in Warfare:
Background: AI and AWS 5-6
The Issue 7-8
Questions, challenges and solutions 8
Helpful resources 9
Special thanks
Bibliography 10-11
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Letter from the Chairs
Thank you for choosing Ayoniz Model United Nations and the Legal
Committee of the General Assembly. We, the chairs, are excited to welcome
beginner delegates and answer any questions you might have about the
topic or Model UN.
The LEGAL Committee at the General Assembly is designed to promote a
rules-based international order and to raise questions about some of
today's most pertinent topics. We have made this study guide brief to
encourage you to use it as a jumping point for research.
As delegates, you will be tasked with questioning the future of our world
and security through technology development.
Your actions have great consequences in this simulation, so we ask:
Where will you take the world?
As changemakers, will you strive for human rights and protections as
diplomats or accelerate the AI arms race? At Ayoniz MUN, the chairs want
to see you improve in this committee, above all in your presentation, public
speaking, and diplomatic skills. The best way to get an award is to be
accurate, diplomatic and influential without being aggressive or
exclusionary. We also greatly value delegates who stay as close to their
country’s official position as possible. The Chairs prefer that your position
papers be originally researched, and credit will be given to documents
researched without writing from generative AI.
Delegates, act with decorum and ensure you make new connections.
We want to reassure delegates that the loudest voices aren’t necessarily
going to be the most important or praised. Think about what you are
saying and what you are motioning for. Be measured and confident, and
most of all, enjoy yourselves!
Luke, Aaleyah, Rudra
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Background – UN Legal
Committee
The United Nations Legal Committee, or the Sixth
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly “C6”,
is designed to tackle legal questions in the General
Assembly. In alignment with the United Nations Charter,
the General Assembly is mandated to scrutinise and
negotiate international laws and treaties. The LEGAL
Committee is where this occurs at the General Assembly.
All United Nations Member States are entitled to
representation on the Sixth Committee. (United Nations,
2024), which allows for an inclusive and diverse Committee to model at Ayoniz Model
United Nations.
Negotiations are conducted informally before a Resolution is presented; in turn, the
Chairs will permit unmoderated caucuses. The delegates of the Sixth Committee are
legal advisors or diplomats with law experience. It is currently in its 79th Session, and
the Sixth Committee negotiated important laws like the 1998 Rome Statute establishing
the International Criminal Court. Most legal work undertaken by the United Nations and
related bodies originates in the Sixth Committee, and the Committee consults on issues
with legal aspects such as criminal tribunals and the sanctioning of states.
Your powers on the Committee consist of negotiating agreements and setting
international norms by elaborating, adapting, and recommending the adoption of
international treaties.
The Legal Committee at Ayoniz MUN will refer to a
recommendation of an
amendment or addition to
the Convention on the
Prohibition or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons that may be deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, which is referred to as the CCW, or the
“Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons".
The CCW was negotiated on October 10, 1980, with
three Protocols, and came into effect in 1983. New
protocols were added in 1995 and 2003, and
amendments were made in 1996 to apply to non-
international warfare. It exists to protect civilians
and personnel from the inhumane use of
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conventional weapons, and prohibits weapons that are indiscriminate against their
targets or may cause unnecessary human suffering.
The most recent state to ratify or accede the treaty was Singapore in 2023. Notable non-
party States include Iran, Syria, Thailand, Rwanda, Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea and Indonesia.
Topic: Regulating AI in Warfare and
Autonomous Weapons Systems
Background: AI and AWS
At Ayoniz MUN, your job as a Delegate is to negotiate the addition or absence of new
international legislation on AI and AWS. Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) have
no cohesive definition, but various States adopt their own definitions (Taddeo and
Blanchard, 2022).
Some notable definitions are adopted by:
NATO (2020), “Autonomous system: a system that decides and acts to accomplish desired
goals, within defined parameters, based on acquired knowledge and an evolving
situational awareness, following an optimal but potentially unpredictable course of
action”;
International Committee of the Red Cross (2016), “Any weapon system with
autonomy in its critical functions. That is, a weapon system that can select (i.e. search for
or detect, identify, track, select) and attack (i.e. use force against, neutralise, damage or
destroy) targets without human intervention.”
Future of Life Institute (2015): “Autonomous weapons select and engage targets
without human intervention. They might include, for example, armed quadcopters that
can search for and eliminate people meeting specific pre-defined criteria, but do not
include cruise missiles or remotely
piloted drones for which humans
make all targeting decisions.”
Most autonomous weapons
systems in historical use are
defensive: antivehicle and
antipersonnel landmines are
clear examples (United Nations,
2024b). With the development of
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computational systems that can act intelligently, these weapons are very different in
modern use.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is quickly advancing, and concerns are rising about its
autonomy and human rights implications
when used in warfare, especially in
offensive circumstances. (Wilson, 2020)
For example, leading AI and robotics
developers like Google and Boston
Dynamics promised their AI would not
be used for AWS due to these concerns.
The international debate around
Autonomous Weapons began with
Human Rights Watch (2012), demanding legal restrictions and
a ban by the UN on ‘Killer Robots’.
The ICRC argued that inconsistent definitions and the use of
‘autonomous’ implied that technology has agency and reasoning
to take a human life in the same manner as a human would. The
issue would require an agreed-upon definition to apply
comprehensively in international law for accountability
purposes (cited by Iwan, 2022).
Concerning the United Nations, the first committee of the UN General Assembly –
Disarmament - adopted the first AWS resolution in 2023. It requested reports on their
efficacy and human rights implications: 12 years since Human Rights Watch called for a
ban. It details adopting AWS in the provisional agenda for the 79th Session of the
General Assembly (UNGA, 2023).
Thus far, minimal history is to be noted on AI and AWS at the United Nations. It is an
emerging issue that world diplomats will debate in the coming years as technology
accelerates. As such, Delegates will have to navigate their Resolutions and debates
carefully and consider the impact their initial
arguments will have on international legal
precedent. Furthermore, no UN document
standardises a working definition for either
AI or AWS to follow. This is concerning, as
problems require clear definitions to tackle.
You may choose to officially identify what the
world means by AI or AWS in your final
Resolution.
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The Issue
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions codifies modifying
international law when adopting new technologies. Many states assert that AWS is a
prime example of necessary updates to international law, while nations such as the
Russian Federation posit that an update is unnecessary, because the CCW
outlines that law applies
to all future
conventional weapons.
Member States who
disagree with the use of
Autonomous Weapons Systems in
warfare call for a ban or regulation
for various reasons. A standard
criticism is that AWS violates
human dignity and moral responsibility and gives artificial intelligence agency
over human life.
AWS could mean war waged without consultation of the populace by removing the
need for personnel (Mcfarland, 2022), and power asymmetry in warfare, leading to
terrorist activity becoming more prominent and extreme (Klincewicz, 2018). Both of
these conditions would heighten the risk of restricted freedoms, human rights abuses,
war crimes and genocide; and possibly cause democratic backsliding.
However, AI’s ability to quickly gather information enables it to target weapons systems
with high accuracy, and reduces the risk of nuclear mutually assured destruction
(Lohn and Geist, 2018). The benefits of such intelligence could mean AI acts with
reasoning and efficiency, enough to reduce overall impacts of warfare. Furthermore, the
use of AWS could mean no emotion involved in violence to prevent bloodlust and sexual
violence, could lead to fewer civilian casualties if used ethically, and protect some
soldiers from harm (Verbruggen, 2019).
The issue of AI and AWS is gravely important as its acceleration and use in wars such as
and Ukraine, with quick indiscriminate
use of automated weapons
technologies, is creating a new
humanitarian crisis affecting both
civilians and personnel. For example,
Israel’s alleged use of indiscriminate AI-
powered warfare. The CCW’s main aim
is to prevent human suffering and ban
the use of indiscriminate weaponry. In
turn, it is necessary to understand that
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some States believe the issue is a present legal threat that, without it, fails the purpose
of the CCW.
Delegates should consider this in their positions and solutions to the debate question.
Questions, Challenges and Solutions
The CCW has problems, and adopting a new version may not fix them. It does not
include all States, with only 127 high contracting parties and four signatories.
Adopting a new form of International Humanitarian Law requires a consensus of
parties, and a negotiation in the General Assembly must address various, often
contradictory, concerns from many States. International law may not always be effective
at getting timely justice for victims of humanitarian crises, or preventing some rogue
States from violating treaties.
The CCW has some evidence for its protocols preventing the use of banned conventional
weapons, such as the international community respecting the ban on blinding laser
weapons. It has also pushed states into complying with guidance on the use of
landmines, preventing the use of more inhumane warfare. The main question as a
Delegate for making a position is whether AI and AWS are inhumane warfare, and also if
they aren’t covered by existing legal outlines.
The trade-off for a united
front is often a weaker
Resolution with fewer
humanitarian protections. As
a Delegate, you may question
whether an international
approach is better or an
approach that holds some
states accountable. Balancing
these priorities is key.
Some scholars also call for
transparency codified in international humanitarian law as part of reforms and
changes to the Autonomous Weapons discourse, and argue that transparency should
form cooperation in the global community (Iwan, 2022).
The CCW has also been pointed to as an aspect of humanitarian law that is often ignored
and underpunished. States can also withdraw from the Convention and violations whilst
a member remain unaddressed. There are no known state trials of violators of the CCW.
Consider a novel framework or addition to AWS legislation previously not suggested or
an approach backed by prominent academics.
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Research resources:
Position paper advice
General blocs:
Since this is a beginner committee, we have provided guidelines on where some
significant nations may align on a resolution towards AI and AWS.
As a delegate, you decide your positions. If your stance is well-researched and aligned
with your nation, please do not fret if you deviate from these.
Bloc Guide 1: Ban or restrict AWS in law
Signatories to the Berlin Communiqué, Austria, New Zealand, Palestine, Pakistan, Egypt,
Ireland, Switzerland, Indonesia, Viet Nam
Bloc Guide 2: Caution on AWS, may lean toward Blocs 1 or 3
France, Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, China
Bloc Guide 3: No update to international law
United Kingdom, South Korea, Russian Federation, Israel, United States of America,
India, Turkey, Australia
Starting links:
We recommend that you access these web pages when beginning your research.
Intro to the CCW
Comparative analysis of AWS definitions
Anti-AWS organisation
General Assembly Resolution on AWS
Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons Systems:
Pro AWS speech
Human Intervention in AI Warfare
Regulating AI and AWS
Special thanks
We want to express our gratitude to the consultation of Dr Michał Hędrzak and Dr
Dominika Iwan-Sojka, experts on International Law and Autonomous Weapons
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Systems International Humanitarian Law, respectively, at the University of Silesia in
Katowice.
The Head Chair personally thanks them for their expertise.
Bibliography
References are categorised in the Harvard (Manchester) style.
Gibson, T. T. and Jefferson, K. W. (2024). 'Chapter 12: Autonomous systems applications in
weaponry and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: ethics and conflict',
International Security Studies and Technology: Approaches, Assessments, and Frontiers:
Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 196-207.
Hrw (2012) Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots. Human Rights Watch. Available at:
[Link]
(Accessed).
Icrc 1980 CONVENTION ON CERTAIN
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW). Available at:
[Link]
ntion_on_ccw.pdf (Accessed).
Icrc (2016) AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASING AUTONOMY IN
THE CRITICAL FUNCTIONS OF WEAPONS. International Committee of the Red Cross.
Versoix, Switzerland. Available at: [Link]
content/uploads/2017/11/4283_002_Autonomus-Weapon-Systems_WEB.pdf
(Accessed).
Iwan, D. (2022). ‘Is Transparency Excluded Where Autonomous Weapons Systems Are
Concerned?’ Democracy and Security, 18 (3), pp. 203-227
[Link]
Klincewicz, M. (2018). ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems, Asymmetrical Warfare, and Myth’ Civitas.
Studia z Filozofii Polityki, 23 (0), pp. 179-195 [Link]
Lohn, A. J. and Geist, E. (2018) Will artificial intelligence undermine nuclear stability?: Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists. Available at: [Link]
intelligence-undermine-nuclear-stability/ (Accessed).
Mcfarland, T. (2022). ‘Minimum Levels of Human Intervention in Autonomous Attacks’ Journal
of Conflict and Security Law, 27 (3), pp. 387-409 [Link]
Nations, U. (2024) Sixth Committee (Legal). Available at: [Link]
(Accessed).
Taddeo, M. and Blanchard, A. (2022). ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Definitions of Autonomous
Weapons Systems’ Science and Engineering Ethics, 28 (5), p. 37
[Link]
Un (2024b). ‘Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)’ UNODA, Available at:
[Link]
weapons/background-on-laws-in-the-ccw/.
Unga (2023) Draft Resolution: Lethal Autonomous Weapons. Available at:
[Link] (Accessed).
Verbruggen, M. (2019) Regulating autonomy in weapon systems. Institute for European Studies.
Available at:
[Link]
[Link] (Accessed).
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Walsh, T. (2015) Autonomous Weapons Open Letter: AI & Robotics Researchers. Future of Life
Institute. Available at: [Link]
weapons-ai-robotics/ (Accessed).
Wilson, C. (2020) Artificial Intelligence and Warfare. 21st Century Prometheus: Managing CBRN
Safety and Security Affected by Cutting-Edge Technologies 125-140. Cham: Springer
International Publishing. Available at: [Link]
(Accessed).
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