longer reflects current global emissions and economic power, causing

international courts and tribunals to attempt to clarify obligations against

the background of CBDR-RC.
● Japan’s effort averages a tenth of a fair distribution, and the (I)NDCs of
the EU and the US are approximately a fifth of their estimated fair
portion. Brazil represents an exception among emerging economies,
covering about two thirds of its equitable part of the global effort,
whereas the targets proposed by India is approximately in line with its
fair share (Oxfam, 2015). By contrast, in both assessments developing
countries’ contribution generally corresponds to their fair share or even
exceed it.
● While carbon pricing is important, it must equally be emphasised that
subjecting developing country exports to additional fiscal burden
through a carbon tax is in direct contravention of another foundational
climate law principle of ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility and
Respective Capabilities’(CBDR)
● Firstly, the CBAM will not provide an exemption for least developed countries
(LDCs). This contrasts with the EU’s Everything but Arms (EBA) scheme which
removes tariffs and quotas for all imports of goods (except arms and ammunition)
coming to the EU from LDCs. Secondly, the revenues of the CBAM will not be
used to finance LDCs efforts towards de-carbonisation. Despite the European
Parliament having originally adopted such position, Member States did not
support the proposal and the latter was dropped in the final text.
● CBAM will have impacts on developing countries, in terms of reductions in trade
levels and loss in GDP. CBAM will have impacts on developing countries, in
terms of reductions in trade levels and loss in GDP. A joint study between the
LSE and the African Climate Foundation estimated that Africa would be the
most-negatively affected of the major economies/ regions. CBAM could result in
a decrease in exports from Africa to the EU in aluminium by up to 13.9%, iron
and steel by 8.2%, fertiliser by 3.9% and cement by 3.1%, although some of
these exports would be diverted to other destinations including China and India.
GDP and income across the continent could be reduced by 0.5% (this may
sound small but its four times as large as the EU GDP benefits of its Japan trade
deal). Some countries (and sectors) which export high volumes of the affected
products to the EU will be more impacted than others. In a previous analysis at
CGD, we estimated that CBAM could lead to a 1.6% fall in Mozambique’s GDP;
though the more comprehensive approach of the LSE modelling suggests this
would be much lower as its exports are diverted.
 ● The Paris Agreement's lack of a protocol-based structure, particularly
the absence of legally binding emission reduction targets for all nations,
has been a point of contention, with some arguing it disproportionately
affects developing countries. While the agreement emphasizes
"common but differentiated responsibilities," the flexibility in Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the reliance on voluntary actions
raise concerns about the level of ambition and fairness, potentially
hindering developing nations' ability to address climate change
effectively.

I would like to start off my speech by talking about the CBDR or common but
differentiated responsibilities principle. As the name suggests, this principle
recognises the fact that the developed nations have already caused a lot of
carbon emissions. Hence, it clearly states that each country should take
responsibilities but developed countries should bear primary responsibilities as they
have contributed to the largest proportion of historical and current Greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions.

NDCs and carbon taxes are not inherently discriminatory because they are nationally
determined and allow each country to act based on its own capacity and circumstances.
The Paris Agreement encourages flexibility for developing nations and mandates
support through finance and technology from developed countries. Carbon taxes, when
implemented domestically, can generate revenue for poverty reduction and green
infrastructure, making climate action both equitable and opportunity-driven rather than
punitive.

GSL
Honourable Chair, distinguished delegates,

The delegation of Japan is honoured to participate in this UNEP session on the

disproportionate impact of climate change on developing countries. Aligned
with Common But Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR-RC) under the
UNFCCC, Japan reaffirms that industrialized nations bear both a historical and
resource-based obligation to support global climatic resilience .

Though climate change affects all, the poorest contribute least but suffer
most—ODI data reveals that developing countries suffer the majority of climate losses
despite contributing under 1% of greenhouse emissions

Today, Japan calls for urgent action to bridge gaps in Paris implementation,
enhance the Global Stocktake, unlock the full potential of the Green Climate Fund,
and assess NDC ambition disparities between Global North and South. Our
approach will be guided by the 4A framework—ensuring availability, accessibility,
affordability, and adaptability of resources to those most in need.

Japan stands ready to partner with all stakeholders—international, regional, and

local—to deliver equitable climate solutions.

Speech 1 – CBDR, NDCs, and the Paris

Implementation Gap
Madam Chair, fellow delegates,

Japan underscores the enduring importance of CBDR‑RC, enshrined in UNFCCC

Article 3 and reaffirmed in the Paris Agreement Despite this, the absence of a binding
implementation protocol in the Paris framework has led to divergent NDC
ambition—Global North pledges far exceeding those of Global South, exacerbating
climate vulnerability.

Using the 4A lens:

● Availability: Climate technology, finance, and expertise must be pre-positioned

in the Global South.

● Accessibility: Climate adaptation funds must be streamlined and decentralized.

● Affordability: Public grants over loans must finance adaptation policies to

avoid debt traps.
 ● Adaptability: NDCs should be regularly updated and ratcheted upwards in
response to evolving science.

Japan calls for a legal COP decision operationalizing CBDR-RC in global stocktakes,
with clearer differentiation and support commitments from high-capacity states.

Speech 2 – Strengthening the Green Climate Fund

and Financial Justice
Madam Chair, esteemed members,

Japan reaffirmed its fair share in climate finance—among the few developed countries
meeting the $100 billion annual pledge . However, ODI reports show that much of
global climate finance goes to mitigation rather than adaptation, which developing
countries urgently require .

Applying the 4A principles:

● Availability: Japan will double its contributions to the Green Climate Fund
(GCF) targeting adaptation and resilience projects.

● Accessibility: We support a simplified application and disbursement

framework for Small Island Developing States and LDCs.

● Affordability: We emphasise grants over loans and use concessional funding

modalities.

● Adaptability: Funding instruments must be flexible to evolving local needs,

climate shocks, and feedback loops.

We urge the GCF Board to adopt policies that prioritize the most climate-vulnerable
nations and align finance flows with mitigation–adaptation balance.

Speech 3 – Carbon Credit Tax and North–South NDC

Disparities
Madam Chair, distinguished delegates,
In recognition of continuing emissions inequality—where the Global North bears
disproportionate carbon responsibility—Japan proposes exploring a carbon credit tax
mechanism, anchored in CBDR-RC, wherein high-emitting Annex I countries
contribute mandatory levies toward adaptation funds .

Employing 4A analysis:

● Availability: Tax revenues channelled directly to developing country adaptation

funds.

● Accessibility: Transparent global registry ensures equitable allocation.

● Affordability: Taxation should be progressive—higher carbon footprinters pay

more.

● Adaptability: Tiered tax levels adjust dynamically based on emissions

trajectories and GDP.

Japan invites consideration of global carbon pricing solidarity taxes to close the justice
gap in NDC implementation and resource mobilization.

Speech 4 – Regional and International Stakeholder

Collaboration
Madam Chair, fellow delegates,

Japan emphasises that multi-stakeholder cooperation is critical to closing the

implementation gap:

● REGIONALLY: Collaborate via APEC, ESCAP, and ASEAN to develop shared

adaptation hubs and technical assistance platforms.

● INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS: Engage UNFCCC Secretariat, UNEP,

World Bank, ADB, civil society, and private sector innovators.

In line with 4A:

● Availability: Joint funding of climate innovation labs in Asia-Africa regions.

 ● Accessibility: Shared data platforms and early-warning systems.

● Affordability: Subsidized climate finance via multilateral development banks.

● Adaptability: Iterative learning and community-derived adaptation strategies.

Finally, Japan proposes launching a UNEP‑led Taskforce on Climate Equity,

comprising donor countries, recipient governments, GCF, and scientific experts, to
monitor delivery of 4A commitments and ensure the Paris Agreement becomes
actionable for all.

Japan’s policies
● In July 2025, Designated Offshore Wind Promotion Zones in Hokkaido, These
designations are part of Japan's broader strategy to increase renewable energy,
particularly offshore wind, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and lower carbon
emissions.
● Implemented the green steel incentive scheme in february 2025,which included
a 50,000 yen subsidy for each clean energy vehicle (CEV) using green steel.
● Strategic Energy Plan outlines the nation's long-term energy policy, aiming to
balance energy security, economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, and
safety.
● Japan's Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures, revised in February 2025,
outlines strategies to achieve its ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction
targets
● Implemented the Feed-in tarrifs, a policy designed to support the development of
renewable energy sources by guaranteeing an above-market price for producers

JAPAN GLOBAL
● The JCM aims to facilitate diffusion of leading decarbonizing technologies and
infrastructure, etc., through investment by Japanese entities, thereby contributing to
 GHG emission reductions or removals and sustainable development in partner
countries.
● Official Development Assistance (ODA) via JICA

Kathmandu: Japan-funded early warning system reduced flood fatalities.

Indian Smart Cities: Solar street lights and water-efficient irrigation.

Philippines: Major infrastructure projects (e.g., flood tunnels) reduced typhoon

damage.

● Japan-UNDP Support Programme for Climate Resilience

apan contributed over $100 million to UNDP’s climate window.

Positive impacts

Coastal adaptation in Bangladesh protected 100,000+ households.

Cyclone shelters and elevated housing in the Pacific.

Agricultural drought insurance schemes introduced in Laos.

While Japan is the world’s third-largest economy, it also has:

● The highest public debt-to-GDP ratio among developed nations (over 260% in 2024).

● A prolonged period of low economic growth and deflation, worsened by COVID-19

and rising energy imports due to nuclear shutdowns after Fukushima.

Japan channels much of its climate finance through bilateral aid, such as via JICA (Japan
International Cooperation Agency) and its own climate partnerships like the “Asia Energy
Transition Initiative (AETI)”.
 ● This avoids multilateral mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which
Japan finds slow, bureaucratic, and not always aligned with its strategic priorities.

Japan emphasizes technology transfer and co-investment (e.g., smart grids, clean
hydrogen, nuclear innovation, carbon capture) rather than outright grants or concessional
finance.

● For instance, Japan promotes the “GX League” (Green Transformation)—a

domestic–foreign strategy that links Japan’s decarbonization industries with
overseas deployment.

● Japan views itself as a provider of solutions, not just a donor of funds.

- Energy Security for Partners: Japan argues that developing nations

still face energy poverty, and affordable, reliable energy (like LNG) is
essential for their economic development.

- Transition Fuel: Japan views natural gas as a “transitional fuel” that is

cleaner than coal and helps countries move incrementally toward
renewables.

- High-Efficiency Technologies: Japan supports “ultra-supercritical” coal

and CCS (carbon capture) technologies, claiming these are much
cleaner than conventional plants.

- Avoiding Instability: A sudden cut-off in fossil financing could lead to

economic and political instability in vulnerable partner nations.

- Bilateral, Not Multilateral Approach: Japan channels funding through

JICA and bilateral initiatives, which it argues are faster and more
accountable than multilateral bodies like the GCF.

Japan counts LNG pipelines and gas-fired power plants as part of its climate finance
portfolio.

Japan’s Explanation:

● Cleaner than Alternatives: These projects replace coal or diesel power, reducing
emissions per unit of energy.
● Real-World Energy Mix: Japan believes realistic transitions in many developing
countries require interim solutions like gas to avoid blackouts or economic shocks.

-
 POIs
1. To Developed Nations (e.g., USA, EU, Canada):
How does your delegation reconcile its historical emissions footprint
with your current NDC ambitions, and what safeguards have you
proposed to prevent a widening implementation gap under the Paris
Agreement?

2. To Major Emitters (e.g., China, India, Brazil):

While we acknowledge your developmental needs, how do you plan
to ensure that your emissions trajectory aligns with a 1.5°C pathway
without placing undue pressure on already climate-vulnerable
nations?

3. To Donor Countries in the Global North:

Could your delegation explain the mechanisms in place to ensure the
availability and accessibility of climate finance for frontline
adaptation in Least Developed Countries and SIDS?

4. To GCF Contributors:
Given the complexity of disbursement procedures, what reforms
does your country support to streamline affordable and direct access
to GCF funds for community-level climate resilience initiatives?

5. To Global South Coalitions (e.g., African Union, CARICOM):

How does your region plan to collaborate internally to improve the
adaptability of national adaptation plans (NAPs), especially in areas
of agriculture, coastal defense, and climate-induced displacement?

6. To Countries Opposing Carbon Credit Tax Proposals:

If a carbon credit tax is not acceptable, what alternative climate
justice financing mechanisms would your delegation support to
uphold the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities?
7. To Nations Lagging in NDC Submissions:
What barriers is your country facing in submitting updated, ambitious
NDCs, and how can Japan or UNEP assist in making the process
more accessible and data-driven?

8. To Opponents of Binding Enforcement Mechanisms:

In the absence of an implementation protocol in the Paris
Agreement, what viable international legal or reporting instruments
would your delegation endorse to promote accountability?

9. To Regional Powerhouses (e.g., South Africa, Indonesia, Saudi

Arabia):
As key voices in your regions, how are you promoting equitable
intra-regional adaptation financing and infrastructure-sharing for
available and affordable resilience solutions?

10. To All Delegates:

How does your national policy ensure that the 4A
principles—availability, accessibility, affordability,
adaptability—are being reflected in both your domestic climate
agenda and international aid partnerships?

11. AFGHANISTAN
● Why do u feel it is wrong to cut afghanistan off from global climate funding over
Taliban’s rights record
● Afghanistan has made its case for full party status in future negotiations and
access to international climate funds, but don't you think that whether
world
can deliver aid to Afghanistan without recognising a regime
that stands in direct opposition to human rights values. Any
participation by the Taliban has led to a global pushback in
the past.
● How is Afghanistan ensuring environmental governance
amid ongoing instability?
12. ALGERIA
● Could the Algerian delegation clarify why a comprehensive National Adaptation
Plan has not been finalized or published, when the UNFCCC recommends this
as a priority for countries facing desertification and water scarcity?
● Given Algeria’s extraordinary solar potential, what steps is your government
taking to address the affordability and availability gaps in renewable energy
deployment, when less than 1 GW has been installed so far?
● What mechanisms exist to ensure that small farmers and rural communities can
access climate-resilient agricultural technologies, considering the lack of targeted
credit lines or subsidies?

13. ARGENTINA
● Given Argentina’s continued investment in the Vaca Muerta shale oil and gas project,
how does your delegation justify locking in decades of fossil fuel dependency while
demanding greater climate finance for adaptation from the international community?
● What regulatory frameworks has Argentina put in place to monitor and reduce methane
leakage from shale gas extraction, especially considering its direct link to global warming
and the country’s mitigation obligations?
● With Argentina facing some of the worst agricultural droughts in recent history, what
targeted national adaptation programs exist to support small and subsistence farmers
who lack access to drought-resilient seeds or irrigation?
● In light of Argentina’s debt crisis and economic instability, how does your delegation
ensure that international climate finance reaches vulnerable rural communities rather
than being absorbed by administrative or institutional costs?
● What efforts are being made to protect Argentina’s Indigenous and rural
communities—such as the Mapuche and Qom peoples—whose livelihoods and cultural
heritage are disproportionately threatened by land degradation and changing rainfall
patterns?
● Why has Argentina still not finalized a robust National Adaptation Plan, despite being
among the Latin American countries most vulnerable to extreme weather and prolonged
drought
● Argentina continues to push fossil fuel expansion while simultaneously asking for
increased adaptation support from the Global North. How can the international
community take such demands seriously when Argentina is increasing its own emissions
footprint?
14. AUSTRALIA
● Delegate, Australia plans to co-host COP31- the 2026 UN climate talks, but dont
you think you ongoing expansion of coal and gas risks jeapordising australia’s
legitimacy as a climate leader
● Delegate, your expended mines will emit 7.5 times more carbon than all pacific
island nations produce in 1 year. Don't you think this makes a mockery of the
‘family’ australia claims o call the pacific.
 ● How does Australia justify expanding coal projects despite being a developed
nation?
●
15. BANGLADESH
● Given that nearly 20% of Bangladesh’s land area is projected to be underwater
by 2050 due to rising sea levels, what concrete actions is your delegation taking
to relocate at-risk coastal populations, and how are these measures affordable
and accessible to the most vulnerable?
● Bangladesh receives significant international climate aid—what independent
monitoring mechanisms exist to ensure this support is effectively distributed and
not lost to bureaucratic inefficiency or local corruption?
● Despite being a leading advocate for climate justice, Bangladesh has yet to
establish a fully transparent national system for tracking adaptation finance—how
can the international community be confident that funds reach local
communities?
● Bangladesh is often portrayed as a climate victim—but what accountability exists
for domestic failures, such as weak enforcement of wetland protection laws, or
continued approval of industrial projects in flood-prone zones?
● How does Bangladesh justify expanding coal-fired power plants—like
Rampal—near the Sundarbans UNESCO World Heritage Site, while also calling
for stronger global climate action and funding?
● How can Bangladesh continue to claim climate leadership while contributing to
environmental degradation through unchecked industrialization, pollution of
rivers, and coal-based energy development? HOW SHOULD I ADD CBDE IN
THIS Q
16. BELGIUM
● Demand-based emissions, which include imported goods, are higher than
Belgium’s production-based emissions—indicating outsourcing of carbon. What
policies has Belgium implemented to address this inequity? EXPLANAON OF
THIS Q
[Link]
e6fe6-en/belgium_72dc2ddb-[Link]?utm_source=[Link]
● Despite increasing climate funding, civil society in francophone Africa reports
limited accessibility to local adaptation outcomes. How does Belgium ensure
affordability and availability of funds for on‑ground communities?
● Belgium has increased its climate finance contributions—but according to
independent analyses, your fair share remains unmet. How does underfunding
adaptation in vulnerable nations not contribute directly to worsening the
disproportionate impact of climate change in the Global South?
● Outsourcing emissions through imported goods may make Belgium’s domestic
numbers look cleaner, but the environmental burden is borne by developing
countries. How is this not a continuation of colonial-era environmental
exploitation? ???????
 [Link]
e6fe6-en/belgium_72dc2ddb-[Link]

17. BRAZIL
● After a year marked by Brazil’s worst drought ever and a tragic flooding in
the South, the fight against deforestation and climate change received the
lowest budget among the government’s priorities for 2025. In addition, the
creation of a Climate Authority to advise public bodies on climate change
issues, promised by Lula in the 2022 electoral campaign, has yet to come
off the [Link] do you justify these
● While Brazil champions initiatives like the Tropical Forest Forever Facility or its
Amazon Fund, a Reuters investigation revealed that many carbon credit projects
under these schemes are linked to deforestation by previously penalized actors.
How can developing countries trust such programs when oversight remains
inadequate?
● Illegal loggers profit from brazil’s carbon credit projects What are ur views about
it.
[Link]
n-credit-projects-2025-07-07/ ????? link
● How can Brazil lead COP30 as a beacon of climate leadership when its policies
still allow deforestation compensation mechanisms, weak safeguards, and permit
expansion of oil and highway projects threatening the same forest it's meant to
protect?
18. CANADA
●
19. E
20. E
21. E
22. E
23. E
24. E
25. E
26. E
27. E
28. e
 7. Calls Upon Member States and financial institutions to:

○ Integrate climate funding mechanisms within national budgets, ensuring

affordability of implementation;

○ Offer technical aid and concessional loans through regional development

banks (e.g., ADB, AfDB);

8. Encourages partnerships with international stakeholders, including:

○ UNFCCC, GCF Secretariat, World Bank, ADB, UNEP FI (Finance Initiative),

and non-state actors (NGOs, academia) to provide innovation in adaptable
solutions;

9. Recommends the use of the 4A Framework as a standard evaluation metric for all
UNEP-supported adaptation and mitigation projects;

United Kingdom
1. Climate Finance vs Fossil Subsidies
“In the context of this UNEP agenda, how does the UK justify annually subsidizing
fossil fuel production and consumption (~£17.5 bn/year), while requesting adaptation
and mitigation funding from vulnerable nations?”
➤ Why it matters: Fossil subsidies undermine equitable climate finance and erode
trust in demands made of developing countries.
2. Export Financing of Fossil Fuels
“UK Export Finance continues supporting overseas oil and gas projects—despite
global pleas for green transitions. How does this align with the agenda’s call for
climate equity?”
➤ Why it matters: Export credit support deepens fossil lock‑in in climate-vulnerable
states.
3. Rosebank Approval & Net-Zero Credibility
“Approving new offshore oil projects like Rosebank directly contradicts climate
mitigation goals. How can the UK credibly demand developing countries limit
emissions while expanding production domestically?”
➤ Why it matters: It weakens the UK's moral authority in mitigation leadership.
4. Failing Vulnerable Groups in Adaptation
“The UK’s adaptation plans have been legally challenged for excluding disabled and
elderly populations. How does this undercut the agenda’s expectations for inclusive
adaptation support?”
➤ Why it matters: Adaptation must serve all demographics to meet 4A mandates.

Spain
5. Domestic Fossil Fuel Subsidies vs International Moral Leadership
“Spain spent over €3 bn on fossil fuel subsidies in 2020. How does this affect its
standing when demanding sustainable transitions from developing countries?”
➤ Why it matters: Contradictory climate policies weaken Spain’s equity position.
6. Renewable Mega‑Projects & Local Displacement
“Large solar and wind developments in rural Spain have forced land grabs. How
does this reconcile with EU standards of inclusive adaptation and respect for local
communities?”
➤ Why it matters: Displacement violates the 4A principle.
7. Agribusiness Water Misuse vs Climate Resilience Advocacy
“Spanish agribusiness now uses seven times more water than households, depleting
aquifers. How can Spain credibly advise arid nations on sustainable agriculture?”
➤ Why it matters: Resource overuse in the North undercuts equity in the South.
8. Migrant Labour Exploitation in Agricultural Exports
“Spain’s dependence on undocumented migrant labour—often under hazardous
conditions—reflects systemic injustice. Should developing nations take climate
lessons from such a model?”
➤ Why it matters: Social injustice disproves global credibility on climate justice.
 China
9. New Coal Plants Amidst Climate Pledges
“China continued approving new coal-fired power plants at a rapid rate even
post-2030 peak pledge. How does this not directly undermine global mitigation and
the space available to developing nations for clean growth?”
➤ Why it matters: Limits global ‘carbon headroom’ for poorer countries.
10. ‘Clean at Home, Fossil Abroad’ Policy
“While China expands renewables domestically, it continues to finance coal abroad
in developing nations. How is this equitable under international climate justice
norms?”
➤ Why it matters: These actions propagate fossil dependencies overseas.
11. Opaque, Debt-Financed ‘Climate’ Projects
“Over 90% of Chinese climate-related financing is non-concessional debt. Doesn’t
that compromise the affordability—and thus the adaptability—mandated under the
4A framework?”
➤ Why it matters: Debt-based aid limits free access and imposes new burdens on
vulnerable states.
12. Monocultural Affairs as Flawed Adaptation Model
“China’s ‘Great Green Wall’ monoculture plantations have been criticized for
worsening water scarcity. How can Beijing promote this model internationally when it
may increase ecological vulnerability?”
➤ Why it matters: Poorly designed adaptation projects can exacerbate local harm.
13. Continued Overseas Coal Support Despite Pledge
“Despite a 2021 promise to end overseas coal financing, 26.2 GW of coal plants
have been built with Chinese support since. What accountability mechanisms
enforce compliance with such pledges?”
➤ Why it matters: Trust in pledged transitions is eroded without transparency.
14. Weak Domestic Reform for Fossil Fuel Subsidies
“China provided $96 bn in fossil fuel subsidies while renewable firms faced delayed
payments. How does this distort both domestic and global clean energy markets?”
➤ Why it matters: Distorted subsidies impede fair competition and transferability to
developing contexts.

Africa
Egypt
 ● How does Egypt reconcile its continued expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure with
the call for affordable and accessible adaptation finance for African nations hardest
hit by desertification?
● Given persistent water mismanagement in the Nile Delta, how does Egypt plan to
ensure food availability under worsening climate impacts?

Nigeria

● Despite being Africa’s largest oil producer, Nigeria faces severe energy poverty.
What steps are being taken to improve energy access sustainably without replicating
fossil fuel dependence?

South Africa

● South Africa remains among the top coal emitters globally. How does this align with
the principle of adaptability for poorer neighbouring countries facing drought?

Sudan

● With internal displacement driven by climate-related conflicts, what measures is

Sudan adopting to support cultural resilience and socio-economic adaptation?

Asia (Selected)
Afghanistan

● How will Afghanistan secure climate adaptation financing amid political instability to
safeguard the basic availability of water and agriculture?

Bangladesh

● Given that Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to sea-level rise, how does the
government plan to guarantee affordable relocation options for displaced
communities?

India

● India continues to expand coal production while seeking adaptation funds. How do
you justify this dual approach under equitable climate responsibility?

Indonesia
 ● Indonesia’s deforestation for palm oil exports has aggravated emissions. What
measures are being implemented to make mitigation policies more transparent and
accessible?

China

● How does China’s construction of overseas coal plants in developing nations align
with its climate leadership commitments?

Myanmar

● Given Myanmar’s vulnerability to cyclones and conflict, how are adaptation

resources reaching marginalized ethnic groups?

Europe
France

● Despite climate leadership claims, France subsidises aviation fuels. How does this
align with the 4A principle of affordability in adaptation financing for former colonies?

Germany

● Germany’s reliance on coal despite Energiewende commitments undermines

mitigation leadership. How can developing nations trust Germany’s climate funding
pledges?

Netherlands

● Given your role in historical colonial emissions, how will the Netherlands guarantee
equitable financing to restore climate resilience in the Global South?

Spain

● Spain continues large-scale agribusiness water extraction in arid zones. How does
this impact the credibility of your advice to developing nations on sustainable
agriculture?

United Kingdom
 ● How does the UK justify fossil subsidies and North Sea oil expansion while calling for
emission cuts from least developed countries?

Americas
Argentina

● Argentina’s soy export model is linked to deforestation. How do you plan to adapt
agriculture without undermining the food security of vulnerable communities?

Brazil

● Despite pledges, deforestation in the Amazon persists. How does this impact the
global carbon budget essential for the survival of developing nations?

Canada

● Canada has among the highest per capita emissions. What steps are being taken to
make adaptation support accessible and affordable to small island nations?

United States

● With the USA’s historic emissions, how do you plan to contribute to loss and damage
financing to restore availability of resources in the most affected countries?

Middle East
Saudi Arabia

● Saudi Arabia continues large-scale fossil fuel extraction. How does this align with
climate justice obligations to fund adaptation in drought-stricken regions?

United Arab Emirates

● How does the UAE reconcile expanding oil production with hosting climate summits
and promoting mitigation pathways for developing nations?
 Nordics & Small States
Denmark

● Denmark’s overseas investments sometimes contradict domestic green policies.

How will you guarantee policy coherence to build trust in adaptation financing?

Sweden

● Sweden’s consumption-based emissions remain high. How do you address the

impact of imported emissions on the vulnerability of producer countries?

Other
I can provide tailored questions for any remaining countries you wish to prioritise (e.g.,
Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Iceland, Syria, etc.).

AFRICA (continuing)
Congo

● Given ongoing deforestation in the Congo Basin, what policies has your government
implemented to make forest protection funding transparent and accessible to local
communities?

AMERICAS
Colombia

● How does Colombia reconcile oil and coal exports with its commitments to protect
vulnerable Afro-Colombian and Indigenous populations from climate-driven
displacement?
Guatemala

● Given high poverty and reliance on subsistence farming, how will Guatemala
guarantee affordable adaptation measures for indigenous communities facing
drought and crop failure?

Mexico

● How does Mexico plan to improve availability of early-warning systems and

infrastructure for rural communities most affected by hurricanes and flooding?

Venezuela

● In light of severe economic crisis, what concrete actions is Venezuela taking to make
climate adaptation financing accessible to marginalized populations?

ASIA (continuing)
Iran

● How does Iran’s water mismanagement crisis align with the responsibility to protect
livelihoods and food security in neighboring developing regions affected by shared
rivers?

Iraq

● With rising desertification and power shortages, how is Iraq addressing energy
accessibility while transitioning away from fossil dependence?

Jordan

● Given your country’s extreme water scarcity, what measures are being taken to
ensure affordable water access and build adaptive capacity among low-income
communities?

Kazakhstan

● Kazakhstan’s fossil fuel exports continue to grow. How do you balance economic
interests with funding adaptation measures for climate-vulnerable neighbors?

Malaysia
 ● With persistent palm oil-driven deforestation, what steps is Malaysia taking to make
mitigation efforts credible and transparent?

North Korea

● Given recurring floods and droughts, how does North Korea ensure the availability
and accessibility of adaptation resources to prevent humanitarian crises?

Philippines

● How is the Philippines strengthening adaptation infrastructure and affordable

insurance mechanisms for the poorest communities hit by repeated typhoons?

Thailand

● Thailand’s dependence on high-emission industries continues. How does your

government plan to fund equitable adaptation without compromising livelihoods in
rural areas?

Vietnam

● With rising Mekong Delta salinization, how is Vietnam ensuring that adaptation
solutions remain affordable and accessible to smallholder farmers?

EUROPE (continuing)
Belgium

● Despite your country’s climate finance pledges, Belgium’s domestic emissions have
been slow to decline. How will you build trust with developing nations requiring
adaptation funds?

Cyprus

● Given your vulnerability to heatwaves and water scarcity, what role do you see
Cyprus playing in sharing affordable adaptation technologies with less developed
neighbors?

Greece
 ● With recurrent wildfires, how is Greece ensuring that adaptation planning includes
vulnerable rural communities and migrants?

Hungary

● Hungary has opposed stronger EU climate targets. How does this reluctance support
the global effort to secure adaptation resources for developing countries?

Iceland

● Iceland’s per capita emissions are among Europe’s highest. How does your
government reconcile this with calls for climate justice and support to vulnerable
nations?

Italy

● Italy has struggled to meet renewable energy targets. How will you guarantee that
developing nations receive adequate technology transfer and financing?

Netherlands

● As a major historical emitter through colonial trade, how does the Netherlands plan
to fund adaptation without imposing conditionalities on developing countries?

Norway

● Norway profits heavily from oil exports while promoting a green image. How does
this contradiction impact trust in your commitments to adaptation funding?

Poland

● Poland’s reliance on coal undermines EU emissions goals. What are you doing to
accelerate a just transition and increase resources for poorer nations facing climate
shocks?

Portugal

● Portugal has faced severe droughts, yet adaptation planning remains underfunded.
How will you strengthen this to be a model for countries with fewer resources?

Romania

● Given agricultural vulnerabilities and limited climate investment, how does Romania
intend to secure affordable adaptation for rural communities?
Russian Federation

● Russia’s ongoing fossil fuel expansion fuels global warming. How do you justify this
while the Arctic melt disproportionately threatens developing coastal nations?

Spain

● Spain’s industrial agriculture consumes scarce water resources. How does this align
with commitments to equitable climate resilience globally?

Sweden

● Sweden’s consumption-based emissions remain high. What steps are you taking to
support mitigation in producer countries whose emissions you outsource?

Switzerland

● Switzerland’s climate finance contributions lag behind its economic capacity. How
will you scale up support to countries in urgent need of adaptation funding?

Ukraine

● Given the war’s environmental impact, how will Ukraine prioritize adaptation for
internally displaced and impoverished communities?

MIDDLE EAST
Syrian Arab Republic

● With conflict-driven environmental degradation, how does Syria plan to protect food
availability and adaptation for its most vulnerable populations?

United Arab Emirates

● The UAE continues expanding oil production. How does this impact your credibility
as a climate leader and supporter of developing nations?

PACIFIC
Australia

● Australia’s coal exports drive emissions overseas. How do you plan to support small
island states who suffer disproportionate impacts of sea-level rise?

New Zealand

● While New Zealand promotes a green image, agriculture remains highly emissive.
How do you ensure equitable adaptation support to Pacific neighbors?

ASIA-PACIFIC (continuing)
Singapore

● Singapore’s per capita emissions are among Asia’s highest. What measures are you
taking to increase adaptation financing for developing nations?

South Korea

● Despite technological progress, coal remains a significant energy source. How will
you accelerate your phase-out to reduce harm to developing countries?