Mode of Investment

Analysing the political, economic and regulatory risks across different

modes of investment to make a final recommendation for a Chinese based
firm’s investment in Chile’s lithium mining sector.

1. Joint Ventures (30/70 partnership with PSU): Low risk

Political Risks: Low
JVs mitigate much of the political backlash that foreign firms face in Chile
because they comply with the legal requirement for majority state
ownership of strategic salars. Partnering with CODELCO or another state-
owned entity provides political legitimacy and aligns Chinese investment
with Chile’s national development goals. However, the JV model can
expose investors to slower decision-making, as consensus is needed
between public and private stakeholders, and to shifts in political
sentiment if future governments seek greater control. There is also the
possibility of tensions if foreign partners perceive themselves sidelined in
governance, as in the Tianqi-SQM-Codelco disputes.
Economic Risks: Medium
Economically, JVs reduce the financial burden of capital-intensive lithium
extraction by distributing costs and risks between state and private
entities. This is particularly important in Chile, where external debt is
elevated and foreign exchange volatility may affect profitability. Sharing
costs with the state can insulate Chinese firms from broader
macroeconomic instability, but profits are tied to commodity price
fluctuations, exposing JVs to market risk. Additionally, if the state partner
(e.g., CODELCO, which carries high debt) experiences financial strain,
reinvestment capacity and project efficiency may suffer, indirectly
affecting JV performance.
Regulatory Risks: Low
JVs are the legally preferred model for strategic salars, which hold over
90% of Chile’s lithium reserves, and thus face lower regulatory barriers
compared to wholly owned subsidiaries. They provide easier navigation of
Chile’s permitting systems and improve compliance with Indigenous
consultation and environmental standards. However, reputational risks
remain high: JV projects are still subject to litigation from local
communities and NGOs, and strict water-use regulations in the Atacama
Desert make environmental compliance costly. Transparency concerns,
especially in previous SQM operations, could also complicate governance
and expose foreign partners to reputational damage.
Recommendation:
For Chinese investors, the most suitable JV structure would be a 30–40%
minority stake with a state-owned partner (e.g., CODELCO or ENAMI)
holding 60–70%. This ensures compliance with Chile’s legal requirement
for majority state ownership while giving the Chinese firm meaningful
equity participation and profit-sharing rights. A stake in this range
balances the need for political acceptability with the ability to influence
operational decisions, while reducing the risk of being perceived as
exerting foreign control. Minority ownership also helps insulate Chinese
investors from direct political pressure if public opposition arises, yet
provides sufficient exposure to benefit from long-term lithium demand
growth.

2. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs): Medium Risk

Political Risks: Medium
PPPs reduce political exposure because the state retains 100% ownership
of the resource and simply contracts the private partner to deliver
services (such as building or operating a processing facility, or providing
desalinated water for lithium extraction). This is more politically
acceptable than equity stakes but vulnerable to renegotiation or
termination if governments shift priorities. For Chinese firms, the lack of
equity stake may make their role appear less threatening but also less
secure in the long term.
Economic Risks: Medium
Economically, PPPs provide predictable, contract-based revenues that are
not directly tied to volatile lithium prices, reducing market risk. This is
attractive in Chile’s context of high debt and peso volatility. However, the
downside is capped upside potential: revenues are limited to contract
terms rather than lithium sales, which may underperform in a booming
market. PPPs also place financing and operational risk on the private
partner during the contract period, requiring significant upfront capital
investment with potentially long payback horizons.
Regulatory Risks: Medium
PPPs face fewer ownership-related regulatory hurdles than JVs since the
state retains legal control of resources, but they still operate within Chile’s
strict environmental and Indigenous consultation frameworks. Projects in
ecologically sensitive areas like the Atacama Desert remain exposed to
litigation and delays, and reputational risks are high if PPP operators are
perceived to undermine community rights or water resources. Permitting
and compliance requirements still apply, and without equity, private
partners may have less leverage.
Recommendation:
For Chinese investors, the most suitable PPP structure would be one
focused on downstream or supporting infrastructure (e.g., lithium refining
plants, battery precursor facilities, or desalination plants) rather than
direct extraction. A build–operate–transfer (BOT) model lasting 15–25
years would work best, allowing the private firm to recover its investment
and earn predictable revenues before transferring full operational control
back to the state. This structure minimizes political risk by reinforcing
state ownership of resources while giving Chinese firms a clear role in
Chile’s broader lithium value chain.

3. Portfolio Investments: Low Risk

Political Risks: Low
Portfolio investments carry very low direct political risk because they do
not involve operational control of lithium projects. Instead, Chinese firms
would gain exposure through equity stakes or debt instruments in listed
Chilean companies (e.g., SQM, Albemarle Chile) or funds with lithium
holdings. As passive investors, they avoid nationalist backlash but remain
exposed to wider political shifts like resource nationalism or strikes.
Economic Risks: Low
Economically, portfolio investments limit downside risk by avoiding heavy
capital commitments and operational liabilities. Returns depend on the
financial performance of the companies invested in and, more broadly, on
lithium price cycles, which can be volatile. They are less affected by
Chile’s macroeconomic issues since funds can diversify and repatriation is
easier. The main economic limitation is that passive investors capture only
financial returns, not operational control or integration into the lithium
value chain, which may weaken long-term strategic positioning.
Regulatory Risks: Low
Regulatory exposure is minimal in portfolio investments since the investor
does not directly operate projects or apply for concessions. However, they
are still subject to Chile’s foreign investment regulations, taxation on
dividends, and reporting requirements. Legal risks are transferred to the
investee companies, but portfolio investors may still face reputational
spillovers if invested firms are involved in environmental or corruption
scandals. For Chinese firms, this mode avoids the most burdensome
compliance risks but limits the ability to influence how risks are managed
on the ground.
Recommendation:
For Chinese investors. portfolio investments are not sufficient on their own
for a long-term strategic presence; they can complement joint ventures or
downstream WOS by diversifying risk and providing financial returns with
minimal operational exposure.

4. Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOS): High Risk

Political Risks: High
WOS face the highest political risk in Chile’s lithium sector because
strategic salars—which hold over 90% of reserves—are legally restricted
to majority state ownership. Any attempt by a Chinese firm to pursue a
fully foreign-owned extraction project would likely provoke regulatory
rejection and public backlash, given the nationalistic sensitivities around
lithium. Even outside strategic salars, wholly foreign-owned projects may
be seen as resource appropriation and politically unviable. At best, WOS
could be considered for downstream operations (processing, refining, or
value-added industries), where the political stakes are lower.
Economic Risks: High
While WOS offer full control over operations and profit retention, they also
place the entire financial burden and risk on the investor. In Chile’s
macroeconomic context—with elevated external debt, currency volatility,
and a history of inequality-driven protests—this amplifies exposure to
shocks and reputational risks. Large-scale projects are costly, and without
a partner, overruns and opposition can escalate quickly. That said, in
downstream projects WOS could be economically attractive since they
allow full capture of higher-margin activities in the lithium value chain.
Regulatory Risks: High
From a regulatory standpoint, WOS are essentially not permitted for
extraction in strategic salars due to Chile’s classification of lithium as a
strategic resource. In commercial salars (10% of reserves), concessions
may allow WOS but with strict conditions and scrutiny. WOS also lack the
political cover and local legitimacy that joint ventures or PPPs enjoy,
making them more vulnerable to environmental litigation, Indigenous
challenges, and bureaucratic hurdles. In downstream processing, however,
WOS are more feasible, as the state does not restrict ownership in refining
or industrial projects, though these still require full compliance with
environmental and labor laws.
Recommendation:
For Chinese investors, a wholly owned subsidiary would not be
recommended as strategic salars would be ruled out and only commercial
salars or downstream investment would be possible, not aligning with
investor strategy.

5. Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A): Medium Risk

Political Risks: Medium
M&A in Chile’s lithium sector faces medium-to-high political risk,
particularly if it involves acquiring controlling stakes in companies that
operate in strategic salars. Full takeovers by foreign entities, especially
Chinese firms, could trigger nationalist backlash, political resistance, and
heightened scrutiny from regulators, as illustrated by controversies
surrounding Tianqi’s 24% stake in SQM. Minority acquisitions are more
acceptable, giving access without threatening state dominance. Still,
political risk remains since governments may impose restrictions on
foreign ownership, tighten oversight, or push for renegotiations in
strategic industries.
Economic Risks: Medium
M&A provides rapid entry and access to established operations, permits,
and infrastructure, which reduces entry barriers and project development
risks compared to greenfield investment. However, acquisitions are costly
and expose Chinese investors to Chile’s macroeconomic vulnerabilities—
such as exchange rate volatility and external debt pressures—that may
affect valuations and returns. M&A also exposes investors to liabilities like
remediation, labor, and debt. While minority acquisitions reduce these
risks, they also limit operational control, making economic benefits
dependent on the governance and performance of local partners.
Regulatory Risks: Medium
From a regulatory perspective, M&A is heavily scrutinized in the lithium
sector, especially for foreign investors in strategic salars. Acquisitions may
face lengthy approval processes from competition authorities, resource
regulators, and possibly political actors. Chile’s evolving lithium
governance framework adds uncertainty, as new policies may impose
limits on foreign control or expand state participation. Chinese firms also
risk reputational damage if targets face corruption or environmental
issues. While minority acquisitions face fewer regulatory hurdles, they still
subject investors to Chile’s complex oversight environment.

Recommendation:
For Chinese investors, the most suitable M&A strategy would be to pursue
minority stakes (20–30%) in established lithium producers like SQM or
Albemarle Chile, rather than attempting full takeovers. This approach
balances political acceptability with access to operations, infrastructure,
and profit streams, while reducing exposure to regulatory rejection and
nationalist opposition.

Final Recommendation: Joint Ventures

The most effective and sustainable mode of investment for a Chinese
company in Chile’s lithium sector is a joint venture with a state-owned
entity such as CODELCO or ENAMI, ideally structured as a 30–40%
minority stake. This approach aligns with Chile’s National Lithium
Strategy, which mandates majority state ownership of strategic salars that
hold over 90% of reserves. JVs provide political legitimacy, reduce the risk
of regulatory pushback, and ensure access to strategic resources while
sharing financial and operational risks. Although they limit autonomy, JVs
strike the best balance between compliance, profitability, and long-term
stability. Although Portfolio Investments also carry low risk, they do not
provide strategic control for a Chinese firm looking for long term
investment in Chile’s Lithium Mining sector.

Part 5: Three Alternate Scenarios for Chinese

Investment in Chilean Lithium Mining
Chinese investment in Chile’s lithium mining sector must be planned with
a clear view of the possible political, economic, regulatory, environmental,
social, operational, and global-demand outcomes. This section outlines
three alternate futures—Best Case, Base Case, and Worst Case—to
illustrate the range of conditions investors may face. Each scenario
narrative spans the seven drivers to provide a comprehensive, nuanced
context for strategic decision-making.

5.1 Seven Key Drivers

 1. Political & Geopolitical stability and policy orientation in Chile,
including Chile–China relations and external great-power
influences

2. Economic & Market conditions, encompassing global lithium

price cycles, Chile’s macroeconomic health, and financing
environment

3. Legal & Regulatory framework, covering Chile’s lithium policy,

permitting, contract sanctity, and evolving royalty/tax regimes

4. ESG & Environmental safeguards, addressing water use,

ecosystem impacts, technology adoption, and regulatory
compliance

5. Social & Community relations, focusing on Indigenous

consent, benefit sharing, local employment, and social license
to operate

6. Operational & Technological readiness, including infrastructure

availability, extraction/process technology, supply-chain
resilience, and labor skills

7. Global Demand & Supply Chain dynamics, reflecting EV

growth trajectories, competing lithium supply sources, and
logistics

5.2 Scenario Narratives

Driver Best Case Scenario Present Scenario Worst Case
Scenario
Political & • In the Best Case, • The Base Case • The Worst
Geopolitical Chile reaffirms its envisions a realistic, Case combines
stability position as the moderately sharply adverse
world’s premier challenging political, market,
lithium destination environment where and social
through calibrated Chile remains developments
policy, robust fundamentally open that jeopardize
institutions, and but grapples with project viability.
proactive policy Politically, a
stakeholder implementation nationalist
engagement. delays and social administration
Politically, a tests. Politically, a revises lithium
centrist coalition center-left laws to
endorses government mandate 80
the National maintains percent state
Lithium Strategy, democratic stability, ownership,
transforming but parliamentary unilaterally
lithium into a debates over renegotiating
flagship public- lithium reforms legacy contracts
private sector extend legislative and imposing
 collaboration. timelines. The state a 20
Chinese investors requires 51 percent windfall
formalize long- percent participatio tax on past
term JVs with n in new lithium JVs, profits.
Codelco and prompting Uncertainty
CORFO under negotiation but no about contract
stable royalty and outright blockages. sanctity triggers
tax terms, AD-hoc ministerial investor exodus;
cemented by changes sometimes political risk
“stability send mixed signals, indices fall to
agreements” necessitating agile mid-50s.
guaranteeing no investor
unilateral contract engagement.
changes for 15
years. Chile’s
geopolitical
nonalignment
continues, with
both the United
States and China
viewing Chile as a
neutral, reliable
partner; no
punitive measures
or unofficial
pressures arise.
• the China–Chile
offtake
agreements
secure 1.2 million
tpa of lithium
carbonate
equivalents for
Chinese battery
manufacturers,
with optional
allocations for
European and U.S.
customers under
free-trade
protocols.
Diversified
shipping routes
(Biobío – Shanghai
via Panama /
Valparaíso –
Rotterdam via
Suez) ensure
reliability.
Economic & • EV demand • lithium prices • a global
Market remains buoyant, correct to $15 000– lithium glut
conditions and lithium prices 18 000/ton by 2025 materializes by
stabilize in the $20 as new supply from 2026 as multiple
000–25 Australia and new sources—
 000/ton range— Argentina enters from Africa to
comfortably above the market. Chile’s recycled supply
operating costs— GDP growth slows —enter the
thanks to global to 2–3 percent, market, driving
EV adoption inflation hovers at 4 prices below $8
targets and percent, and the 000/ton, well
modestly peso moves within a under marginal
controlled supply bounded range (±5 costs. Chile’s
growth. Chile’s percent), requiring economy
economy grows moderate hedging. stagnates,
at 3.5–4 Profit margins contracting 1
percent annually, compress to 15–20 percent amid
with inflation near percent, though commodity price
the central bank’s economies of scale falls. High
3 percent target and cost-efficiency interest rates
and the peso measures maintain (12 percent) and
exhibiting limited attractive returns 8 percent
volatility (±2 for disciplined inflation further
percent yearly). investors. penalize
Investors operating
achieve double- margins, leading
digit IRRs, to negative free
supported by cash flow for
access to local most producers.
financing and
policy bank loans
from China.
Legal & • the new National • permitting follows • permitting
Regulatory Lithium new environmental nearly halts.
framework Company operates and social impact Courts grant
transparently, frameworks, indefinite
managing state adding 3–6 injunctions on
equity alongside months to new concessions
private partners in timelines. Taxes citing Indigenous
specially created and royalties rise rights;
PPP vehicles. by 1 percent—the permitting
Permitting trade-off being timelines extend
timelines shrink enhanced social to 18–24
to 6–9 benefits. The months or more.
months through a National Lithium The state
single-window Company, while still unilaterally
“Lithium Desk” new, works freezes new
under the Ministry alongside private projects.
of Mining. New firms, though Contract
mine concessions growing pains lead disputes
are awarded to occasional escalate; several
competitively, with coordination legacy JVs face
clear bottlenecks. Permits arbitration. Rule-
environmental and are eventually of-law
social granted but require perceptions
requirements supplementary plummet,
codified. consultations, deterring foreign
adding complexity. capital.
• ESG &
 Environmental
performance
improves
incrementally.
Companies invest
in 30 percent of
production via DLE,
with the remainder
still reliant on
evaporation. Water-
recycling rates
average 40 percent,
though local
groundwater levels
show minor stress,
prompting new
mitigation
agreements.
Regulatory agencies
fine minor
infractions but allow
corrective action
plans, not
shutdowns.
ESG & • On ESG & • ESG & • ESG &
Environmental Environmental Environmental Environmental
safeguards fronts, Chinese performance challenges
firms deploy Direct improves become acute.
Lithium Extraction incrementally. Severe
(DLE) plants Companies invest groundwater
powered by solar in 30 percent of depletion around
and wind. production via DLE, the Atacama
Independent third- with the remainder triggers state-
party audits verify still reliant on mandated
water-use evaporation. Water- shutdowns of
reductions of 60 recycling rates evaporation
percent compared average 40 percent, ponds.
to evaporation though local Environmental
ponds. A groundwater levels complaints lead
collaborative Wate show minor stress, to temporary
r-Restoration prompting new stoppages of 3–6
Fund finances mitigation months on key
ongoing research agreements. sites. NGOs
and groundwater Regulatory agencies mount
replenishment. fine minor international
Environmental infractions but allow campaigns
incidents are corrective action against Chile’s
negligible. plans, not lithium sector,
shutdowns. eroding social
license.
Social & • Community • community • widespread
Community Development sentiment is split; protests and
relations Agreements alloca while many blockades by
te 3 percent of welcome jobs, some Indigenous
 mine revenues to Indigenous leaders groups and
local Indigenous protest over environmental
councils, fund perceived activists cause
schools, clinics, inadequate benefit multi-week
and micro- sharing. Companies shutdowns of
enterprise grants. respond by critical logistics
Community expanding direct corridors.
Advisory Boards, payments and Violence erupts
co-chaired by strengthening griev at picket lines,
Indigenous leaders ance mechanisms, requiring state
and company reducing protest security
executives, meet frequency to 1– interventions.
quarterly, ensuring 2 events per year. Grievance cases
timely resolution Grievance in environmental
of minor resolution courts multiply,
grievances. Local averages 45 days, and forthright
employment up from 30 in the social dialogue
quotas ensure 40 Best Case. collapses under
percent of the mutual mistrust.
workforce is drawn
from nearby
communities, with
career-
development
pathways for
skilled roles.
Operational & • joint R&D • chain congestion • strikes,
Technological centers in or permit delays. security threats
readiness Antofagasta pilot Infrastructure to pipelines, and
advanced DLE and projects—such as a supply chain
modular planned power- disruptions force
processing units, transmission line— repeated
achieving a 20 experience design- shutdowns.
percent uplift in phase adjustments, Expat staff face
lithium recovery stretching visa denials;
rates. Co-financed completion local hiring is
infrastructure from 18 to 24 mont hampered by
projects upgrade hs. Pilot DLE trials community
roads and power yield 10 boycotts.
grids, reducing percent water-use Technology
logistics lead times reductions, though pilots are
by 30 percent. full rollout is abandoned, and
Equipment deferred pending equipment
stockpiles and technical validation. deliveries stall
dual-sourcing Productivity rates due to trade
strategies mitigate rise steadily toward frictions. Safety
global industry incidents rise as
semiconductor and benchmarks, with morale
chemical supply LTIFR at 1.0. plummets; LTIFR
delays. High worsens to 2.5.
standards of
safety and
productivity (LTIFR
< 0.5; output > 95
 percent of plan)
are maintained.
Global Demand • joint R&D • demand remains • Global demand
& Supply Chain centers in healthy but volatile. softens as EV
dynamics Antofagasta pilot Offtake contracts adoption slows
advanced DLE and with Chinese majors due to economic
modular cover 70 percent of headwinds.
processing units, planned output, the China
achieving a 20 remainder sold spot reprioritizes
percent uplift in or to emerging EV domestic supply
lithium recovery markets in India and and advanced
rates. Co-financed Southeast Asia. battery
infrastructure Shipping disruptions recycling,
projects upgrade (e.g., canal reducing
roads and power congestion) cause reliance on Chile
grids, reducing minor delays, by 50 percent.
logistics lead times mitigated by buffer Trade barriers
by 30 percent. stocks and split- and elevated
Equipment route strategies. shipping
stockpiles and insurance rates
dual-sourcing further constrain
strategies mitigate exports.
global
semiconductor and
chemical supply
delays. High
standards of
safety and
productivity (LTIFR
< 0.5; output > 95
percent of plan)
are maintained.

Part 6: Risk Mitigation Strategies (Tabular

Format)
This section prescribes tailored mitigation strategies for each driver under
the three scenarios. Structured tables ensure clarity and direct linkage
between specific risks and actionable responses.

6.1 Mitigation for Different Scenarios

Driver Best Case Present Scenario Worst Case
Political &
Geopolitical  Form a  Engage in all  Leverage
stability permanent legislative China’s
Chile–China consultations on diplomatic
Lithium lithium law missions to
Council for amendments negotiate
 ongoing  build bipartisan contract
policy support through terms
dialogue transparent  invoke CIADI
 support community- arbitration for
shared benefit modeling unilateral
national Implementation contract
infrastructure Notes: changes
projects (e.g.,  Submit position  diversify
lithium- papers at each lithium
powered parliamentary investments
microgrids) hearing into
Implementatio  host public town Argentina/Afri
n Notes: halls to illustrate ca
 Council to job creation and Implementatio
meet tax revenue gain n Notes:
quarterly with  Lobby via
senior high-level
officials state visits
 showcase  prepare legal
pilot filings
microgrid in  maintain an
local alternative
communities supply-
to build security
national roadmap to
goodwill de-risk single-
country
dependence
Economic &
Market  Secure 10-  Hedge 50 percent  Temporarily
conditions year offtake of production via suspend
agreements futures/options production if
with price-  pursue cost prices drop
floor and audits quarterly below cash
inflation-  negotiate tax cost
linked incentives for  negotiate
escalators local processing royalty relief
 optimize investments  pivot to
costs via Implementation recycling and
automated Notes: battery-
DLE  Retain a materials
integration dedicated recycling
and energy treasury team for Implementatio
efficiency hedging n Notes:
Implementatio  partner with BOI  Define cash-
n Notes: on tax breaks for cost threshold
 Lock in 75 a pilot battery shutdown
percent of materials plant protocols
production  employ state-
under fixed- bank
price emergency
contracts financing
 retrofit 40  secure a
percent of recycling JV
 energy to with domestic
solar by Year battery
3 recyclers
Legal &
Regulatory  Sign “stability  Participate in  Proactively
framework pacts” drafting renegotiate JV
guaranteeing environmental/so equity vs.
taxes/royaltie cial regulations offtake
s for 15 years via mining balance
 co-create associations  enforce
streamlined  maintain an in- stability
permitting house compliance clauses via
guidelines team for zoning, international
with water, and labor arbitration
regulators permits  safeguard IP
Implementatio Implementation and
n Notes: Notes: proprietary
 Draft stability  Staff local processes off-
clauses under legal/compliance shore
CIADI/ICSID office with Implementatio
frameworks bilingual experts n Notes:
 establish a  use industry  Offer state-
“Lithium association minority
Desk” for memberships to equity in
expedited influence exchange for
permit review regulation guaranteed
(≤ 6 months) offtake
 register core
IP in neutral
jurisdictions
 engage ICSID
challenge if
needed
ESG &
Environmental  Scale DLE to  Conduct  Implement
safeguards 80 percent of continuous water- emergency
capacity balance modeling water-import
 invest in salt-  co-finance or
flat community water desalination
restoration projects  publicly
programs  publish monthly commit to
(target 100 environmental third-party
ha/year) dashboards remediation
 commission Implementation of damage
independent Notes:  suspend high-
audits  Engage impact
Implementatio independent operations
n Notes: NGOs for bi- while
 Target 60 annual audits remediation
percent  fund two local plans roll out
water-use desalination pilot Implementatio
reduction by sites within n Notes:
Y4 community water  Mobilize
 fund a joint programs rapid-
 research response task
endowment force
with Chilean  allocate 5
universities percent of
 audit results contingency
published funds to
annually environmenta
l repairs
 contract
UN/NGO
oversight for
credibility
Social &
Community  Institutionaliz  Strengthen FPIC  Convene
relations e Community processes via mediated
Development third-party forums with
Agreements mediation community
allocating 3  hire local cultural leaders
percent of liaisons  offer equity
revenues  adjust benefit- stakes/revenu
 form local sharing to reflect e shares to
advisory community local groups
boards with feedback  if irreparable,
veto power on Implementation divest specific
key decisions Notes: sites in
Implementatio  Contract a exchange for
n Notes: reputable community
 Reserve 25 mediator reinvestment
percent of  set up rotating Implementatio
management liaison teams n Notes:
roles for embedding  Hire global
community community conflict-
candidates representatives resolution
 subsidize experts
local  structure a
scholarships community
in STEM fields investment
trust
 develop site-
exit plans
designed to
minimize
reputational
fallout
Operational &
Technological  Build a  Deploy phased  Maintain
readiness Chilean joint modular caretaker
R&D center to processing units operations
pilot  qualify at least with minimal
advanced three equipment crews
processes suppliers  secure
 co-finance  co-invest with emergency
renewable government in air freight
energy and critical supply lines
 port upgrades infrastructure for critical
 maintain 6 upgrades spares
months of Implementation  accelerate
critical spares Notes: off-site bulk
on site  Phase 1 modular processing to
Implementatio plant by mid-Y2 reduce on-
n Notes:  execute supplier site footprint
 Establish R&D agreements with Implementatio
facility in penalty clauses n Notes:
Antofagasta for delays  Define
by Y2 minimal
 contribute 30 staffing and
percent of safe-mode
capital to a protocols
solar array  contract
powering specialized air
mine carriers
operations  fast-track
enabling
works for off-
site
processing
Global Demand
& Supply Chain  Invest in local  Monitor global  Propose an
dynamics cathode/refin oversupply informal
ery facilities  coordinate with consortium-
(20 percent of Chile’s mining level
output) consortium on production
 diversify moderated cut with
shipping via production Chilean peers
multiple ports  diversify to stabilize
(Valparaíso, customer base to prices
Lirquén) include EU, Korea  coordinate
Implementatio Implementation with
n Notes: Notes: sovereign
 Target 15  Establish a investor
percent local market- groups to
value addition intelligence unit create a
 engage three  negotiate small strategic
carriers under "strategic stockpile
long-term reserve"  explore
logistics purchases with alternative
contracts Chile’s sovereign markets
wealth fund (industrial,
grid-storage)
Implementatio
n Notes:
 Initiate
discussions
through the
Chilean
Mining
Council
 secure a
 government-
backed
reserve
purchase
facility
 allocate 10
percent of
volume to
non-EV
markets