INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

MODULE 03

Dr. Pandhare Balasaheb Dashrath

LL.M. Ph.D
Module 03 Subsidiary Rules of Interpretation:
1. Same word same meaning
2. Use of different words
3. Rule of last antecedent
4. Non-obstante clause
5. Legal fiction
6. Mandatory and directory provisions
7. Conjunctive and disjunctive words „or‟ and „and‟
8. Construction of general words - Noscitur a Socis
9. Rule of ejusdem generis
10. Words of rank
11. Reddendo Singula Singulis
1. Same word same meaning
Where a Legislature uses same expression in the same statute at two
places or more, then the same interpretation should be given to that
expression unless the context otherwise requires.
But the application of the rule of "same word, same meaning" may
be excluded by the context.
If one construction will lead to an ambiguity while another will give
effect to what common sense would show was obviously Intended,
the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be
rejected even if same words used In the same section and even in
the same sentence have to be construed differently.
 In construing the word "statement" in section 157 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, the Supreme Court referred to the use of the
same word in sections 17 to 21, 32, 39 and 145, and came to the
conclusion that the word in all these sections meant "something
that is stated" and communication was not necessary in order that
it may be a statement; and the same meaning was attributed to the
word as occurring in section 157 of the Act.
 It was, therefore, held that notes prepared by a prosecution
witness recording the conversation that took place between him
and other witnesses, was a statement which could be used for
corroboration under section 157. Bhogilal Chunnilal Pandya v
State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 356
Another illustration of this principle is found in the interpretation of
the word "sum" in section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.
Section 31(7)(a) provides that where an award is made for the
payment of money, the Arbitral Tribunal may include, in the "sum"
for which the award is made, interest from the date of cause of
action to the date of the award.
A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, by majority, held that
the word "sum" used in this provision has not been qualified by
using the word "principal" before it, and hence may include
"principal" and "interest" or one of the two, and once the meaning
of the word "sum" is clear,
the same meaning must be ascribed to the word in section 31(7)(b)
of the Act, which provides that a "sum" directed to be paid by an
award shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest at the
rate of 18% per annum from the date of award to the date of
payment.
Therefore, it was held that the "sum" directed to be paid by the
award under section 31(7)(b) is inclusive of interest pendente lite,
and that the Tribunal may direct interest to be paid on such "sum"
for the post-award period. Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd v Governor,
State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189
In interpreting the words "the grounds on which the order has
been made" as they occur in section 3(3) and section 7(1) of the
Preventive Detention Act, 1950, the Supreme Court held that the
words do not bear the same meaning in these two provisions for
communicating to the detenu, the grounds of detention under
section 7(1), the authority can withhold facts which it considers
against the public interest to disclose, [vide section 7(2)]; whereas
in reporting to the State Government the grounds of detention
under section 3(3), these facts are likely to figure more
prominently. Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v District Magistrate,
Thana, AIR 1957 SC 23
For instance, section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, provides that an arbitral award may be set aside if it is in
conflict with the "public policy of India", and section 48(2)(b) of the
Act also provides that enforcement of a foreign award may be
refused if it is contrary to the "public policy of India".
Overruling an earlier decision of a two Judge Bench in Phulchand
Exports Ltd v OOO Patriot, (2011) 10 SCC 300
A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the wider
meaning given to the expression "public policy of India" occurring
in section 34(2)(b)(ii) in the decision of Oil and Natural Gas Corp
Ltd v Saw Pipes Ltd, (2003) 5 SCC 705
is not applicable where an objection is raised to the enforcement of
a foreign award under section 48(2)(b).
The expression "public policy of India" was therefore given a
narrower meaning for the purposes of section 48(2)(b), consistent
with the narrow interpretation given to the expression "public
policy" in section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act, 1961.
Shri Lal Mahal Ltd v Progetto Grano SpA, (2014) 2 SCC 433
Even when the same word is used at different places in the same
clause of the same section it may not bear the same meaning at
each place having regard to the context of its use.
Ramnarayan Mor v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1964 SC 949
Section 117(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950, authorises the State Government to declare that
hats, bazars and melas which had vested in the State shall vest in
the Gaon Sabhas. Interpreting this section, it was held by the
Supreme Court that although the vesting in the State was absolute,
the vesting in the Sabha was limited to possession and management
subject to divestiture by Government.13.
The case illustrates that a word which is used more than once in the
same sub-section of a section may connote and denote divergent
things depending upon the context.
2. USE OF DIFFERENT WORDS
When in relation to the same subject-matter, different words are used
in the same statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the
same sense.
Similarly, while construing the word "gain" under section 3(ff) of the
Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which uses the words
"profit or gain", the Supreme Court relied on the dictionary meanings
of the words to hold that the word "gain" is not synonymous with the
word "profit" as it is not restricted to pecuniary or commercial profits,
and that any advantage or benefit acquired or value addition made by
some activities would amount to "gain". Brihanmumbai
Mahanagarpalika v Willingdon Sports Club, (2013) 16 SCC 260
A further example of the application of the rule may be seen in an
another decision of the Supreme Court where the phrase "rendered
illegal" occurring in section 42 of the Central Provinces and Berar
Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947 was construed to bear a
different meaning from the phrase "held illegal" used in sections
43, 44 and 45 of the same statute. Labour Commissioner, MP v
Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd, AIR 1964 SC 1687
On the same principle the words "test" and "analysis" used in rule 40
of the Central Rules made under the Drugs Act, 1940, were given
different meanings and the requirement of stating "full protocol of the
tests applied" was held to be not applicable to "analysis". TA
Krishnaswamy v State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1022
Similarly the expressions "at the end of the previous year" and "in
the course of such previous year" occurring in the Explanation to
section 23A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 were construed
differently; the former expression meaning the last day of the
previous year and the latter expression meaning throughout the
previous year. CIT, v East West Import & Export Pvt Ltd, Jaipur,
AIR 1989 SC 836
3. Rule of last antecedent
As a corollary to the rule that phrases and sentences in a statute are
interpreted according to the grammatical meaning. relative and
qualifying words, phrases and clauses are applied to the antecedent
immediately preceding.
The rule is, however, subordinate to context and may be better stated
by saying that a qualifying phrase ought to be referred to the next
antecedent which will make sense with the context and to which the
context appears properly to relate it
Last antecedent rule is a doctrine where a court interprets a
qualifying clause to refer to the immediately preceding words or
phrases.
For example, when interpreting the phrase “letters or emails drafted
by a clerk,” a court would read the qualifying modifier “drafted by a
clerk” as referring to “emails” but not “letters.”

The rule was applied in construction of section 1 of the Indian

Contract Act, 1872, which reads: "Nothing herein contained shall
affect the provisions of any statute, Act or Regulation, not hereby
expressly repealed, nor any usage or custom of trade, nor any
incident of any contract not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act".
Interpreting this section, Lord Macnaghten observed: The words
'not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act' are not to be
connected with the clause 'nor any usage or custom of trade'.
Both, the reason of the thing and grammatical construction of the
sentence, if such a sentence is to be tried by any rules of grammar,
seem to require that the application of those words should be
confined to the subject which immediately precedes them.28
In another case where the question for construction involved was of
section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts)
Act 1951, which reads "notwithstanding anything contained in the
Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, or in any other law regulating the
conditions subject to which a person not entered in the roll of
Advocates of a High Court may be permitted to practise in that High
Court, every Advocate of the Supreme Court shall be entitled as of
right to practice in any High Court whether or not he is an advocate of
that High Court",
Patanjali Shastri CJ said: Having regard to the words 'anything
contained' and the preposition 'in' used after disjunctive 'or', the
qualifying clause cannot reach back to the words 'Bar Council Act'.
It was held that the adjectival clause "regulating the conditions etc.",
qualified the word "law" and not the words "Bar Council Act".30
while construing the definition of "premises" in the Bombay Land
Requisition Act, 1948, which reads "any building or part of a
building let or intended to be let separately", it was held that the
words "let or intended to be let separately" did not qualify the word
"building" but only the words "part of a building".31.
The rule is subordinate to context.
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay v Shree
Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co, Bhandara, AIR 1962 SC 1536,
This principle may be illustrated by a decision of the Supreme Court
relating to the construction of section
1(3)(a) of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 which reads:
"Subject to the provisions contained in section 16, it (the Act) applies
to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry
specified in Schedule I and in which fifty or more persons are
employed".
The contention before the court was that the requirement that the
workmen employed should be fifty or more governed the word
"industry" and not the word "factory";
and in support of this it was urged that the pronoun "which", must
under the ordinary rules of grammar qualify the noun immediately
preceding it and that took it to the word "industry" rather than to the
word "factory".
This contention was rejected on the basis of the context; and it was
held that the requirement as to the prescribed number qualified the
word "factory" and not the word "industry".
In overruling the contention Gajendragadkar J, observed:
If the context definitely suggests that the relevant rule of grammar is
inapplicable then the requirement of the context must prevail over the
rule of grammar.
State of Bombay v RMD Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699
section 2(1)(d) of the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions
Control and Tax Act, 1948, which reads: "prize competition
includes:
(1) Crossword Prize Competition,
(2) Missing Word Prize Competition,
(3) Picture Prize Competition,
(4) Number Prize Competition, or
(5) any other prize competition, for which solution is or is not
prepared beforehand by the promoters or for which the solution is
determined by lot or chance".
The qualifying clause in the 5th item beginning with "for which the
solution" was construed by the Supreme Court to apply to all the
five items and it was observed: "There is grammatically no
difficulty in reading the qualifying clause as lending colour to each
of those items."
4. Non-obstante clause
The word non-obstante stems from Latin and it means
notwithstanding or despite a law.
When we see the words “notwithstanding anythіng contaіned іn
thіs Act” or “notwithstanding anything contained in some particular
Act” or “notwithstanding anythіng contaіned іn some partіcular
provіsіon іn the Act”, we can call such a clause as a non-obstante
clause.
This is always inserted at the beginning of a provision with the
objective of giving the provision an overriding effect over the
statute or provision mentioned in the non-obstante clause.
It essentially means that in spite of the provision or Act mentioned
in the non-obstante clause being in force, the provision that comes
after that would be fully enforced without being restricted by the
provision or Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause.
Such a clause is used to modify the Act or provision it carries or
restrict its application in certain circumstances.
Interpretation of a non-obstante clause
It is the opposite of the phrase “subject to” that we see
commonly in statutes. When the words “subject to” are used, it
means that the provision yields to another provision that is
mentioned in the clause. This was affirmed in the decision
of T.R. Thandur v. Unіon of Іndіa (1996).
It is also noteworthy that this clause is distinct from phrases
such as „wіthout prejudіce‟. When this phrase is used, it means
that the other provision mentioned in the clause is still operative
and any action taken under the enacting part of the section must
not be inconsistent with the other provision.
This was affirmed in the case of Punjab Sіkh Motor Servіce,
Moudhapara, Raіpur v. R.T.A., Raіpur (1966).
Non-obstante clauses can sometimes help with ambiguous
sections. However, it cannot be used in a way that limits or
widens the scope of the enacting part of the section more than
what is necessary, particularly when the section is very clear on
its scope. While trying to interpret such sections, one should not
go beyond the intentions of the legislature. This view was taken
in the cases of South Іndіa Corporatіon Pvt. Ltd. v. Secy., Board
of Revenue, Trіvandrum (1964) and Kerala State Electrіcіty
Board v. Іndіan Alumіnum Co. (1976).
In the case of І.T.O. v. Gwalіor Rayon Sіlk Manufacturіng
(Weavіng) Co. Ltd. (1976), it was viewed that while interpreting
a section with a non-obstante clause, the court should also find
the extent to which the legislature intended to give the
overriding effect.
In cases where two or more provisions applied to the same area
contain non-obstante clauses, there arises confusion as to which
provision will prevail over the others. In such instances, the
court must look into the object and purpose of all the laws
involved. The court must apply the rule of harmonious
construction while interpreting the conflicting laws.
This view was taken in the case of Shri Swaran Singh and Anr.
v. Shri Kasturi Lal (1977).
In the case of Bipathumma and Ors. v. Mariam Bibi (1966), the
Court took the view that non-obstante clauses do not have a
repealing effect. They do not completely supersede the other
provisions of law. Such a clause simply performs the function of
removing impediments created by the other provisions from
affecting the enforcement of the enacting part of the concerned
section it is attached to.
In the case of RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment
Co. Ltd. (1987), Justice Chinnappa Reddy observed that non-
obstante clauses must be interpreted in a manner that both the
context and the textual interpretation match. He was of the
opinion that both the text and the context are the basis of the
interpretation. He further expressed that both are very relevant
to the interpretation of a non-obstante clause and neither of them
can be missed out. A statute can be interpreted the best when we
know the intention or the reason behind why it was enacted.
Examples of non-obstante clauses
There are several provisions in the Indian Constitution that carry
non-obstante clauses. The following are some of such provisions:
Articles 5 to 11 of the Indian Constitution deals with the right of
citizenship.
Article 5 entitles the right of citizenship to anyone born or born to
parents who were born in India, or anyone staying in India for more
than five years.
Article 6 deals with the citizenship of persons who have migrated
from Pakistan to India.
The Article begins with the words “rights of citizenship of certain
persons who have migrated to India from Pakistan Notwithstanding
anything in Article 5” before we see its enacting part. It essentially
means that the provision in Article 6 prevails over the provision in
Article 5 for those who have migrated from Pakistan to India. The
same can be seen in Article 7 which states “notwithstanding
anything in Article 5 and 6”.
Article 34 of the Indian Constitution deals with the restriction of
Fundamental Rights when martial law is imposed.
It uses the words “notwithstanding anything in the foregoing
provisions of this Part” to indicate that the provision in Article 34
will prevail over the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the
preceding provisions in situations where martial law has been
imposed.
In the cases of RS Raghunath v. State of Karnataka (1992)
and Dominion of Іndіa v. Shrіnbaі Іranі (1954), the Court held that
when the words “notwithstanding anything contained in the
Constitution” has been added to a provision by a constitutional
amendment, the provision must still be interpreted harmoniously
with the basic features of the Constitution.
However, it cannot be held void on the ground that it infringes any
constitutional provision.
This is because the non-obstante clause protects the provision from
such impediments.
In the case of Chief Information Commissioner v. High Court of
Gujarat (2020), the Court held that a general law cannot override a
special law that is already existing even if the general rule has a
non-obstante clause attached to it.
The judgement stated that the High Court Rules framed
under Article 225 of the Indian Constitution that provides a
mechanism for invoking the Right to Information in a particular
manner can be preserved and followed.
The judgement also stated that this mechanism is not overridden or
discontinued merely because of the subsequently enacted Right to
Information Act, 2005.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the non-obstante clause in the Right
to Information Act will cause the Act to override the provision in
Article 225 of the Indian Constitution, only in cases where the two
statutes are inconsistent.
The object of the Right to Information Act is to protect the right to
information of the citizens and enforce it in a manner that only
requires the use of minimum resources.
The procedure laid down by the High Court rules is unsophisticated
and uses very few resources.
The procedure simply involves filing an application along with the
court fee and a statement, citing the reasons behind filing the
application.
Non-obstante clauses in other statutes
Section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High
Courts) Act, 1951, contained a non-obstante clause that
states “notwіthstandіng anythіng contaіned іn the Іndіan Bar
Councіls Act, 1926, or іn any other law regulatіng the condіtіons
subject to whіch a person did not enter іn the roll of Advocates of
a Hіgh Court may be permіtted to practіce іn that Hіgh Court”.
In the case of Ashwіnі Kumar Ghosh v. Arabіnda Bose (1952), a
question arose regarding the interpretation of this provision. In
this case, the petitioner was an advocate practising in Calcutta
High Court and also in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act,
1951 is the Act that authorizes advocates of the Supreme Court with
the right to practice in any High Court.
When he wanted to appear before Calcutta High Court and act for
his client, he could not as the High Court Rules and Orders allowed
such an advocate to only plead and not to act.
The petitioner argued that as an Advocate of the Supreme Court he
had a right to practice, which included the right to act as well as to
appear and plead, without being instructed by an attorney.
This argument of the petitioner was accepted.
The Supreme Court observed that the enactment has an overriding
effect over any law that is mentioned in the non-obstante clause if it
is inconsistent.
Where both laws cannot be interpreted harmoniously, the enacting
law must be given an overriding effect.
The case of Kanwar Raj v. Pramod (1956) dealt with Section 12 of
the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. This Section
contains the words “notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force the Custodian may terminate
any lease, etc.”. In this case, the custodian of an evacuee Property
cancelled a lease granted by him, under Section 12 of the
Administration of Evacuee Property Act.
It was argued that the power of the custodian to cancel leases
could be exercised only in a manner that it overrides a restriction
imposed by any other law in force, but not the terms in the
contract under which the lease is granted. It was held that this
power of the custodian was absolute and unqualified.
We can find a non-obstante clause in Section 32A of
the Narcotіcs Drugs and Psychotropіc Substances Act, 1958 as
well. As per this Section, “notwіthstandіng anythіng contaіned іn
the Code of Crіmіnal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the
tіme beіng іn force no sentence awarded under thіs Act shall be
suspended or remіtted or commuted”.
In the case of Maktool Sіngh v. State of Punjab (1999), a question
arose as to whether the Hіgh Court could exercіse іts powers of
suspendіng the sentence as granted under Sectіon 389 of Chapter
XXІX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court
held that the High Court does not have the power to suspend the
sentence awarded under the NDPS Act.
PEK Kalliani Amma v K Devi AIR 1996 SC 1963
Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which legitimatises
children born of void marriages, opens with a non obstante clause
"notwith-standing that a marriage is null and void under section 11",
but having regard to the language and beneficient purpose of the
enacting clause it was held to be not restricted to marriages that were
void under section 11 and children born of all void marriages were
held to be legitimatised.
5. Legal fiction
The Legislature is quite competent to create a legal fiction, in other
words, to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming
existence of a fact which does not really exist
Although the word "deemed" is usually used, a legal fiction may be
enacted without using that word. For instance, the words "as if" can
also be used to create a legal fiction
In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the court is to
ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created
A legal fiction in terms enacted "for purposes of this Act" will
cover the entire Act but is normally restricted to that Act and cannot
be extended to cover another Act.14.
Legal fictions may not be created only by the Legislature and
delegated legislation may also create such fictions.
Further, a legal fiction created in a State Act by borrowing a
definition from a Central Act in the concurrent field will be
restricted for purposes of the State Act and will not have the effect
of widening the definition in the Central Act unless that definition
is properly amended with due compliance with Article 254 of the
Constitution.18.
Thus section 161 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act,
1961, by which officers under the Act are deemed to be public
servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 was held to be ineffective to widen the definition of public
servant in section 21 of the Penal Code for purposes of offences
under the Penal Code or the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.19