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Ricardo's Visa Rights Under EU Law

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
9 views3 pages

Ricardo's Visa Rights Under EU Law

Uploaded by

smokeball13
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Ricardo may refer to Paragraph 2 Article 5(2) Directive 2004/38 which states that ‘Member States shall

grant such persons every facility to obtain the necessary visas. Such visas shall be issued free of charge
as soon as possible and on the basis of an accelerated procedure.’ Following the Directive, Ricardo’s Visa
Application should not have been as complicated and as time consuming as it is. Compared to Rodrigo’s
visa application in 2021, the time taken to process Ricardo’s visa is questionably long. Article 288 TFEU
provides that a Directive shall be binding upon implementation by the national courts. Adhering to EU
Law, Ricardo may be able to make a claim of breach of the Directive by French Immigration Authorities
through the principles of Direct Effect, Mangold and Indirect Effect to access his rights and obtain
compensation. Alternatively, state liability can also be considered, if it applies, Ricardo and Paula may
obtain financial compensation.

Direct Effect:

A remedy Ricardo may consider is to directly make a claim through national courts in order to access his
rights. The primary case of Van Duyn, provided the tripartite test to determine whether a Directive
would have direct effect. Similarly to the conditions required of primary legislation for Direct Effect to
apply as set out in Van Gend en Loos, the wording of the directive must be ‘sufficiently clear and precise’
to give rise to an identifiable right, and ‘unconditional’ such that it is not dependent on subsequent
measures being taken by the European Union and that it should ideally be absolute; no discretion is
given in giving rise to the right in question. Articles 1 to 2 of the Directive, give rise to a clear right that
grants Ricardo and Paula the right to free movement and the right to reside within the territory of the
Member States as a Union citizen and their family members, in this case a spouse, not relying on any
additional legislation.

Secondly, Ratti declared that direct effect may only apply when the deadline for implementation of a
directive has expire, or where the member state fails to implement the directive correctly, as confirmed
in Inter-Environment Wallonic. In Ricardo’s case, the date of implementation of the Directive has long
expired on the 29th of April 2006 and France has implemented the directive in LAW n° 2006-911 of July
24, 2006 relating to immigration and integration. For Direct Effect to apply in Ricardo’s case, it must first
prove that France has implemented the law in its national legislation wrongly. Ricardo may argue that
the new french decree goes against the Directive by tightening the Visa Application Procedure.

Thirdly, for Direct Effect of Directives to apply, it must be against the State or an emanation of the State
as it can only operate vertically (Marshall). To determine whether an authority is an emanation of the
State, the CJEU in Foster established a tripartite test to determine that an emanation of the State is ‘a
body, whatever its legal form, if, (1) it is made responsible by the state, for (2) providing a public service
under the control of the state, and (3) has for that purpose, special powers.’ However, Farrell contend
that fulfilling just one condition of the tripartite test is sufficient. In this case, the French Immigration
authority is a body which is made responsible by the state to provide a public service, providing visas to
individuals who wish to enter the state with the power to approve and disapprove applications, by
following guidance and laws provided by the state. Therefore, it is an emanation of the State.
Considering Ricardo’s situation complies with the requirements for Direct Effect of the Directive to
apply, Ricardo may rely on direct effect to access his rights to obtain the necessary visa and join Paula in
France.

Indirect Effect:
Alternatively, Ricardo may rely on the doctrine of Indirect Effect introduced in Von Colson, it differs from
the Doctrine of Direct Effect in that it is capable of applying horizontally, against a private individual
(Marz). Indirect Effect requires national courts to read and intepret national law, ‘as far as is possible’, in
the wording and purpose of EU Law. The French Domestic Courts would then have to interpret the
meaning and scope of the new national law outlining the newly tightened visa requirement in
consideration of the Directive. Following the wording of the Directive which states that ‘Member States
shall grant such persons every facility to obtain the necessary visas’, the court may infer that the
requirement set out in the new law should not apply to Ricardo to allow for an easier application
process. In addition to this, the new requirement has also incurred a fee of 1000 euro on applicants to
obtain the necessary documents for the application averse to the para 2 of Art 5(2) of the directive
which states that ‘Such visas shall be issued free of charge‘. The courts would also find that the
prolonged duration it takes to process Ricardo’s visa application is opposed to the wording of the
Directive. Ricardo may then rely on the doctrine of Indirect Effect to access his right if he is unable to
utilise the doctrine of Direct Effect on the basis that the French Immigration Authority is not found to be
an emanation of the State.

Mangold Principle:

Thirdly, Ricardo may make a claim of infringement of a general principles of fundamental rights provided
by EU Law in national courts (Mangold Principle), allowing a de facto horizontal direct effect through the
general principle. Directive 2004/38 concerns the rights of citizens of the Union and their family
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States which constitutes one of
the fundamental freedoms of the internal market. However, the right concerned is breached by the
French Immigration Authority through its failure to grant Ricardo the visa required for him to enter
France and join his wife. The Mangold principle would apply, allowing a de facto direct effect for Ricardo
to access his rights.

State Liability:

Lastly, Ricardo may seek financial compensation from the state instead of access to his rights through
state liability for his losses following the breach of the Directive by the Member state. The primary case
of Francovich held that in certain cases of violation of EU law made by the State, they may be held liable
to compensate losses caused to individuals. Haim then further added that State Liability not only holds
liable the member state itself but also to a public-law body, in making reparation for any damage
caused. Which suggests that Ricardo may rely on State Liability and make a claim of breach against the
French Immigration Authority as it would classify as a Public-Law body. To determine whether State
Liability applies, the test to follow is the tripartite test in Brasserie; ‘(1) the concerned rule should grant
rights on individuals, (2) the breach must be sufficiently serious, and (3) there is a

causal link between the breach of the obligation and the damage or loss sustained’. In Ricardo’s case,
the rule of law infringed would be Directive 2004/38. In determining the seriousness of the breach,
Brasserie defined what entails a ‘sufficiently serious breach’ by taking into consideration ‘the clarity and
precision of the rule breached, and the measure of discretion given to the national courts’ (56). Article
35 of the Directive however, provides Member State the discretion to adopt any necessary measures to
refuse, terminate or withdraw any right conferred by this Directive in the case of abuse of rights or
fraud, such as marriage of conveniences. Therefore, although the right set out in the directive is clear,
precise and absolute, discretion is given in cases such as those mentioned in the article. Adhering to
Article 35, the passing of the new French decree requiring the use of recognised translation companies
to translate documents necessary for the visa application into French, is in line with the discretion given
to national courts by the directive. Brasserie, clarified that the role of determining whether there is
causal link between the breach and the damage sustained is on the national courts (65). In a favourable
situation, where the court finds that the French Immigration Authority’s failure to grant Ricardo his
required visa as soon as possible, and on the basis of an accelerated procedure is a sufficiently serious
breach, a causal link between the breach and the damage sustained by Ricardo, specifically the time loss
in which he could not enter the Member State and join his wife, can easily be established. Ricardo would
then be able to rely on State Liability to obtain financial compensation.

In conclusion, Ricardo and Paula may be able to rely on any of the doctrines mentioned above, but
should choose to rely on the doctrine of Direct Effect or Mangold for a more certain remedy to access
their rights for Ricardo to enter France and reside within its territories with Paula.

Common questions

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Ricardo could pursue several strategies if he alleges that France's implementation of Directive 2004/38 is incorrect. Firstly, he could directly challenge the national law's compatibility with the directive using the Direct Effect doctrine, arguing that the French law fails to comply with the directive's requirements such as issuing visas promptly and without charge. Secondly, he might invoke Indirect Effect, persuading national courts to interpret the domestic law in a way that aligns with the EU directive. Lastly, Ricardo could apply for state liability by showing serious breach and damage caused by France's implementation insufficiencies, thus seeking compensation through national courts .

For a successful claim using the doctrine of Direct Effect based on Van Duyn, Ricardo must satisfy that Directive 2004/38 is sufficiently clear, precise, and unconditional. The directive clearly outlines rights of movement and residency for EU citizens and their families, fulfilling these conditions. Moreover, the directive's implementation deadline has long passed, ensuring further compliance with the necessary conditions. However, Ricardo would need to demonstrate any incorrect national implementation or contravention by France. Success hinges on showing that the French Immigration's extended visa procedures directly infringe on the directive’s provisions, thus constituting valid grounds for direct effect .

Ricardo can use the principle of Direct Effect to address his visa application issue by directly making a claim through national courts, as long as certain conditions are met. According to the Van Duyn case, the directive in question must clearly and precisely grant rights, be unconditional, and its deadline for implementation must have expired without proper national law alignment. In Ricardo's case, Directive 2004/38, which grants him the right to free movement as an EU citizen, has a clear and precise wording and France's implementation deadline was April 2006. Additionally, if France's national law contravenes the directive by overly complicating visa procedures, Ricardo could argue for Direct Effect against the French State, an emanation of the State per the Marshall case .

Article 35 of Directive 2004/38 plays a crucial role by allowing Member States discretionary powers to refuse or terminate rights in cases like fraud or abuse, which impacts the assessment of state liability. It implies that discretion is permissible within certain limits, and states can set conditions like document translations into French in Ricardo's case. If France’s actions exceed what is deemed reasonable or necessary under Article 35, leading to an undue breach of the directive, that could constitute a 'sufficiently serious breach' for state liability purposes, factoring into overall liability assessments .

In Ricardo's case, applying the Francovich state liability involves three criteria: the directive must confer rights on individuals, there must be a clear and serious breach by the state, and a direct causal link between the breach and Ricardo's damage. Directive 2004/38 does confer such rights, as they pertain to freedom of movement. If the French authorities’ actions are deemed to have unreasonably delayed the visa process, causing loss of time and possibly damages, it may constitute a serious breach. Ricardo needs to establish that these administrative procedures directly resulted in damages, creating a viable state liability claim under Francovich .

Ricardo could invoke State Liability for compensation if he can demonstrate that Directive 2004/38, which grants individual rights, was breached in a "sufficiently serious" manner by the French authorities, causing him measurable loss. The Brasserie tripartite test outlines three conditions: the breached rule must confer rights on individuals, the breach must be sufficiently serious, and there must be a direct causal link between the breach and the damage sustained. If the French Immigration Authority failed to provide the visas promptly and without charge as per the directive, Ricardo can potentially claim that these failures constitute a sufficiently serious breach leading to his losses .

The Mangold principle expands Ricardo's possibilities by allowing him to argue for the enforcement of fundamental rights derived from EU law even in national courts. This principle allows for a form of horizontal effect by applying EU principles directly when directives fail to do so. In Ricardo's case, the Mangold principle can be used to argue that even without direct effect through Directive 2004/38, the fundamental rights of free movement enshrined as EU principles are being directly infringed by the French authorities, allowing Ricardo to access his entitlements .

The concept of Indirect Effect is important for Ricardo as it allows him to seek the correct application of EU law through national courts by requiring them to interpret domestic laws in line with EU directives. If Direct Effect is unavailable, perhaps because the French Immigration Authority is not considered an emanation of the State, Ricardo could argue that the French courts should interpret the national visa procedures to align with Directive 2004/38, which mandates that member states facilitate visa acquisition without excessive charges or delays .

Ricardo can argue for Indirect Effect by emphasizing that national courts are obligated to interpret domestic laws in a manner consistent with EU directives. He would need to highlight any discrepancies between the national implementation and the EU Directive 2004/38. Ricardo should argue that the French visa requirements, such as fees and delays, contradict the directive's stipulations for expedited, cost-free processing. By leveraging the doctrine of Indirect Effect, Ricardo's case would push for an interpretative alignment of French national law with EU principles, ultimately facilitating his visa acquisition .

The Foster tripartite test helps determine if an authority is an emanation of the State by evaluating whether the body is responsible by the state for providing a public service, operates under state control, and possesses special powers for that purpose. In Ricardo's case, the French Immigration Authority meets these conditions as it is state-sanctioned to manage visa applications, operates under national immigration laws, and has discretion over visa approvals. Therefore, it qualifies as an emanation of the State, making it possible for Ricardo to invoke the principle of Direct Effect .

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