Introduction

When it is time, we will hit and we will hit hard. We did that to Pakistan with our

response to the terrorist attack on the Army cantonment in Uri. A sound message

has been sent out to the world that we are a responsible nation but we would not

tolerate any activity which is against the sovereignty of our nation. To be surrounded

by two neighbours who are nuclear powers and who have border issues with you, is

not easy, especially so when the two are strong strategic allies. Till date, we

concentrated only on having a strong military presence on the Western front.

However, with the rise in our economy and our military might, we have created

reasonable deterring force in the east, which if need be, is capable of providing a

suitable response to any aggression by China along the Eastern Front.

China has steadily risen to be a global superpower both militarily and economically.

It developed its arsenal in all dimensions and is aggressive in asserting its will

whenever its economic and political will are jeopardised. Be it challenging the

autonomy of Taiwan or sending military aircraft over Senkaku in Japan. US military

presence in South China Sea was given a vociferous and unpleasant response.

China knows with the volume of International Trade it holds in its hands, most

countries will look the other way should it choose to launch an offensive against a

country.

China also acknowledges India as an emerging global competition primarily due its

robust economy.
Sino-Indian relationship has been not so amicable since 1965 with China occupying

Aksai Chin and cozying with Pakistan. China also refuses to acknowledge the

McMahon line in India and accusing India of illegal occupation in Arunachal Pradesh.

In past few decades China has had a visibly aggressive strategy against India which

includes the String of Pearls, the militarisation of COCO islands, development of

Gwadar Port in Karachi and CPEC in POK. China has never tried to conceal the

offensive nature of its strategy against India.

It is therefore highly probable that China might impose a conflict on India. The

reasons may be to economically bleed India to weaken its global standing or it may

be a political signalling for India to not interfere in the Western sector which may

actively affect its ambitious CPEC project.

China knows that diplomatic channels are closed until issues like AKSAI CHIN,

ARUNACHAL PRADESH and TIBETAN Govt in exile in India are resolved.

It may therefore seek an armed conflict as per panacea. An all-out war as a primary

option is infeasible as it would severely hit its economy and would invite massive

trade embargo from across the globe. Also an all-out war with a nuclear capable

state will lead to its global isolation which China can ill afford at this stage.

It may look to provoke India intro a first attack but given our military and strategic

philosophy even that is very improbable.

Now the China’s concept of operations after their economic and diplomatic coercions

not yielding results points towards military operations.

The exercising of the option of waging a full-fledged war in not a possibility for

various reasons like the effect on economy, global pressure and escalation. The
Chinese have also known to provoke the adversary to react. However, our patience

level and self analysis will ensure that we will not attack first. There by giving them a

chance to retaliate in full force. The most possible military option that they will

exercise is limited incursion capturing territory and thereafter using that territory to

negotiate for their interest.

Therefore for this presentation we have assumed the worst case scenario of this

military operation. They have released the water from the dam and flooded the

Brahmaputra valley; simultaneously with artillery strike destroyed our two bridges.

This has been timed along with incursion to occupy territory.

In such a situation where the movement of Army from south of the river has been

rendered impossible by road, we as an Airforce will have to rise to the occasion and

provide an air bridge for foot soldiers to defend our territory.

To provide such a support we have to use full fledged runways as mounting bases

and ALGs like Mehchuka, Tuting as deploying bases.

The ALGs become very important in situations where swift deployment of troops is

required.

Thus the aim of this presentation is to analyse the threat, and use of ALGs in support

of ground operations and also recommend detailed execution plan and suggest

methods for max utilization of ALGs for transport aircraft operations.

We intend to analyse the enemy assets, their ingress routes and do a SWOT

analysis. Also before planning, we need to see our own intent, assets and
capabilities. Keeping these things in mind we will further see the planning and

naturally arrive at the challenges in terms of OPS, Maint and Adm for such planning.

Thereafter we will make few recommendations to enhance our capabilities and

potencyl and in the end if there are any queries, we will try to answer.

The restructuring of Chinese military regions as theatre commands has been done

and facing us the largest theatre command of Chengdu region.

Possible ingress routes based on terrain. There are total of 20 Divs in the region with

06 Divs as rapid reaction force in RALP region. The locations are as shown in blue at

the valley mouths of possible incursion routes. The other Divs can be mobilised from

interiors.

The Chinese airfield which can be used for faster mobilisation is as shown in the

slide.

The air Defence cover adjacent to eastern Sector is shown. The 29 Radar Battalion

at Linzhi

As far as Army is concerned, the Eastern AOR is divided into three sections. Tawang

Sector looked after by 33 Corp located in Sikkim. The Kameng Sector by 4 Corp

located in Tezpur and largest area i.e Rest of Arunachal Pradesh by 03 Corp located

in Dimapur.

SWOT

Strengths
China has a numerical and technological edge over the Indian Armed forces.

Moreover all troops positioned in the TAR are acclimatised for high altitude warfare

and six Divs are available to move. They also have a well developed road and

mobility infrastructure in the TAR. China is known for its engineering capability, and

can create new infrastructures like roads and small tunnels at lightning speed. In the

offensive Indian airfield staging bases are well equipped with their artillery and

airborne assault operation and lastly the Chinese have a well oiled logistic machinery

to support their troops.

Weaknesses.

China like every military has its weakness. Primary being non availability of any

entrenched defences since they will be fighting in our territory. Also Indian

dominance in Sikkim and Kameng will channelize them to launch an offensive attack

from a relatively narrow and predictable area. Valley ingress routes could spell doom

if Indian forces can create a bottleneck and hold them there.

Opportunities.

China can exercise multiple areas for simultaneous offensive ops. They have the

advantage of terrain and superiority in numbers shifting the balance in their favour.

China can also fan internal disturbance in Assam and Nagaland to divert the

attention and dilute the force concentration to counter its offensive.

Threat.

China faces major threat from Indian air strikes from its fighters..
SWOT(India)

Having analysed the enemy, we now need to look homewards and see where we

stand.

Strengths.

India has well entrenched defences in Sikkim and Kameng thus effectively denying

the enemy an axis to attack. Indian troops occupy high grounds thus they have a

10:1 defender to attacker ratio in their favour. The advance of troops in valleys will

lead to troop concentration in a small area. Thus leading to choke points which can

be exploited by India. Indian airfields and ALGs are at a relatively lower altitudes

thus providing better payload and higher efficiency of air landed ops.

Weakness.

India will have to be careful about the gaps in defences in the RALP region mainly

due to lack of roads and other infrastructure. This leads to severe dependence on air

maintenance, offensive enemy AD can cause this area to be completely cut off. Lack

of adequate integral AD and artillery with the army units may prove expensive.

Threats.

Chinese time to mobilize will be much less than India. This inertia could lead to a

large chunk of own territory being occupied before Indian army reaches fighting

positions. While Indian troops may take up to seven days to acclimatise, Chinese will

be well adjusted for high altitude warfare. This accompanied by large numbers will

pose a formidable threat to Indian Army. The airborne operations in RALP will be

vulnerable to Indian army. Thus after seeing the intent and capability of enemy and

analysing the strengths and weakness including our own, the envisaged operation in
support of ground forces for us will be to mobilise at least one Division of 03 Corp in

the affected theatre as far as possible to pose a credible deterrence.

For planning the same we have three tiers of airfields. First tier is the airfields in

Brahmaputra valley mainly Jorhat and chabua.

Second tier is close to foothills like Tezpur, North Lakhimpur, Pssighat and Tezu.

Finally the ALGs which will be the deploying bases depending on the thrust axis of

China.

Therefore the study team analysed the amount of load required to be lifted to move

one Div. The task will be of the order of 15000 personnel and their equipments as

shown in the slide. It is obvious that this will require a major effort and army will

prioritise the load. Thus the joint planning becomes very important.

Analysis of a typical ALG with the load absorption rate was done. ALG like

Menchuka/Tuting will be able to handle 05 sorties of C17, 10 Sorties of C-130 and

15 Sorties of An-32 taking ground time of 1 ½ to 2 hrs for C-17, around one hour for -

130 and half an hour for An-32. Presently the infrastructure doesn’t permit landing of

any other aircraft if C-17 is on the ALG. So sortie absorption rate have been worked

out keeping these things in mind.

The air assets required in terms of transport based on the Sortie absorption rate of a

typical ALG is as shown. Here C-17 & C-130 100% serviceability is assumed and in

case of un serviceability they can be augmented from mainland expeditiously. The

IL-76 and An-32 serviceability has been assumed to be 75%.

understand that presently only Menchuka is Operational However the other ALGs

dimensions define the compatibility. Trials for few like Along, Passighat have been

done. Few ALGs like Tuting is under construction and Walong is incompatible due to

runway direction.

C-130 is compatible with ALGs excluding Walong. An-32 is also compatible with all

except Walong. IL-76 is incompatible with ALGs and will be primarily used to move

troops and heavy equipment to mounting bases. The major force multiplier is C-17

with its heavy lift capability and good short field performance. The tonnage which

individual platforms can lift is worked out as per the SOPs of individual aircraft.

Having seen the planning considerations lets see how the operations will flow. The

flow would be decided by the requirements of 03 Corp stationed at Dimapur. Out of

their 03 Divs two are stationed in AOR i.e Zakhama and ----------------

The major staging bases for army would be Dimapur, Imphal, Silchar, Agartala. The

Bn and Brigades will be positioned at these air heads and will be transported to

Jorhat and Chabua with Tezpur, Lilabari and Passighat as alternate intermediate

bases. Jorhat and Chabua have been selected as the hub centres because of their

handling capabilities of the platforms and personnel. The payload carrying is also

maximum from these airfields due to proximity to the ALGs.

Subsequently from Jorhat and Chabua the troops and equipments will be airlifted to

three ALGs( Along, Tuting and Menchuka).

The idea is to swiftly position as many troops and associated equipment in the

general area of interest. In case Menchuka valley is ingresses/compromised own

required to augment inter valley troop transfer. The heavy equipment should be

positioned in a way that they are not required to be transferred inter valley.

The option of moving troops by road from Along to both the axis is also possible.

Evan passighat has road connectivity to Along and further to individual valleys.

The basing of the aircraft has been decided keeping in mind the technical support

required. Therefore one type has been kept on one Airfield except An-32 which has

been divided between Chabua and Jorhat. IL-76 would be used transfer men and

material from staging bases to Jorhat and Chabua.

The team analysed the capabilities of teh aircraft if only one type is used to lift the

total amount if it is capable of.

For example to lift 15000 personnel An-32 will carry 30 troops per sortie and no of

sorties required will be 508. Similarly C-130 and C-17 will require 166/82 sorties.

Heavy vehicles would have to be carried by C-17 mandatorily.

From this table and ALG occupancy the team studied and prepared the flow and

amount we can transport in a period of 24 hrs. The slots have been divided in the

block of 02 hours and it is assumed that C-139 would be able to carry out night

operations.

The planning has been done keeping in mind that in initial wave more troops are

transported who are available to sanitise the ALG and offload the further
equipments. This load planning is very vital and should be done in coordination with

Army. With C-130 carrying personnel and stores, An-32 for personnel only and C-17

initial wave’s personnel and thereafter heavy equipments. A realistic figure per day

has been worked out.

Around 11.3% of personnel and stores, 4.2% of LMV and 4.9% of HMV can be

transported in a period of 24 hrs. However, the priority of transportation should be

worked out with Joint planning Cell and there is an urgent need to have a joint SOP.

Therefore a credible deterrent can be established in a period of 4-5 days (20% of

Dic) with further augmentation taking place in another two weeks. Thus a period of

three weeks can be assumed to be realistic period to move one Div by pure air effort.

This show the importance of int and carrying out pre emptive air transportation of

the required troop. Also importance of having a joint SOP and exercises for such

movement cannot be over emphasised.

Recommendations

Having gone over the various aspects of planning, execution, limitation and various

other attributes of the exercised. It is observed that certain aspects could be

addressed so as to enhance the efficiency operation both on ground and in air.

OPS
1. Requirement of a joint doctrine for operations between the ground and Air

force. A set of laid down procedure would help in effective planning and

execution.

2. JPC- A joint Planning cell needs to be established at Jorhat which will be

manned by personnel from both services. JPC will hold collective

responsibility of Admin and operations. They will act as single point of contact

for both the forces. They will maintain communication between ALGs, forward

bases as well as Div Hqs. An effective JPC will be pivotal to the success of

the exercise.

3. Positioning of ADSO, Met assistants at the ALGs and forward bases.

Additional ADSOs with R/T equipment both VHF and HF should be

positioned. He will provide realtime communication to aircraft coming in for

landing , weather information and will be in constant communication with the

JPC. A met assistant will provide actual weather for safe operations since

weather changes are rapid and unpredictable in this region. Suitable

augmentation of manpower will thu thus be required.

4. Augmentation of aircraft and qualified /experienced aircrew. Huge number of

aircraft will be required to stage sufficient troops at required bases in

reasonable time frame hence aircraft will have to be augmented from other

squadrons. A machine is as good as its crew hence crew who have

experience of flying in NE sector must be augmented since the terrain and

weather may pose significant problems.

5. Up gradation of equipments: Most of flying in NE is VFR which essentially

gives 10hrs of daylight from sunrise to sunset. This surely affects the no of

sorties an aircraft can fly in one day. As of today no aircraft other than C-130
 is capable of landing at any ALG at night. It is therefore recommended that

one C-17 platform be developed to be capable of flying at night in the ALGs,

NVGs and other associated equipments may be procured and crew training

carried out.

TERCOM capabilities may be procured which allow the aircraft to fly nearly

NOE and evade enemy AD radars and achieve more safety and an additional

element of surprise.

6. Procurements of pallets – Palletisation of load will reduce turn around time of

C-130 and C-17 by upto one hour which means every aircraft can undertake

one more sortie every day. Also on ground time in ALGs is reduced to a

minimum and ALG efficiency will increase

7. As we have seen that any credible amount of force will reach the TBA at least

6 days after the start of conflict which will give enemy an enormous leverage

over us. Therefore more exercise of such nature should be conducted so that

we are prepared and any hurdles which we may encounter during actual ops

may be ruled out. The efficiency of the air effort increases and the enemy gets

the message that we are prepared.*

*That leaves China with third and final option to carry out a swift strike in the

Arunachal and adjoining area and capture maximum territory which will be later used

for negotiations.

This is most feasible for China and we have therefore painted a scenario concluding

this option that includes major ground offensive and limited air support. The used air

power will be minimal since it may escalate the conflict into a total war.
For any such authority. India can only have an advantage if we can pre-empt this

kind of a strike and mobilize out forces before the D-day. This will provide use will

operational road network and give us strategic depth to deny the enemy entering

deep into our territory.

Maint

1. Augmentation of manpower- augmentation of technical staff will be a primary

concern to service increased number of aircrafts and also to carry out

rectification. Contingencies like out station un servicability and tech detts to

ALGs can be efficiently addressed only if sufficient manpower available.

2. Refueling at ALGs – IOCL and other agencies will have to be informed well in

advance for fuel requirements at the ALGs so as to maximize payload.

Admin

1. Security of men/material/protection from sabotage and espionage: the

operation will be thousands of man entering and leaving the airfield and

aircraft maneuvering area, the security must be beefed up to ensure no rogue

element enters and jeopardizes the operation.

2. Boarding, lodging and food for transiting personnel: Weather and aircraft

unserviceability may lead to personnel in huge numbers concentrating at the

airfield/ Jorhat town. Sufficient space and food arrangements may be required

to be done at short notice. The administration may seek assistance from civil

administration in these aspects at the airfield.

groundcrew at the ALGs in case of weather or any unserviceability.

4. Medical facilities: Augmentation of medical personnel e.g. doctors/ nurses

will be required as they would require to man hospitals at all ALGs to cater for

any casualties and at the AFH in Jorhat for any evacuated and sick personnel.

PASTE here

Conclusion

The ALGs in the EAC AOR can be effectively utilised as air heads for the transfer of

troops and war fighting equipment to the LAC with reasonable speed and in

formidable strength. The efficacy of these ALGs can enhanced with proper planning

of reception of the load and manpower and onward transfer to the fighting location.

The limitations in terms of availability of the ALG can be addressed by proper

coordination between the various agencies on ground that is to say the Army,
Airforce and the civil administration. The challenges posed are strong but with a

determined mindset supported by quality output, they can be handled well. Building

better infrastructure at the ALGs for handling men and material will go a long way in

enhancing the war fighting potential in the far reaches of the lower Himalayas. As we

brought out during the presentation it is possible to build credible force within a short

span of time if the ALGs are utilised effectively. Towards this the various platforms

must operate from these ALGs on a regular basis to build a pool of aircrew who are

cleared to operate to these ALGs as the vagaries of terrain and weather are

immense. Once we are able to hone this ability the ALGs can be optimally utilised in

the support of the Army to protect the nation against any aggression on Eastern

border.