CHAPTER V

Advaita Critique of Simkhya

The Sarilkhya theory advocates the creation of this world

through Prakr:ti i.e. Prakr:ti is the sole cause for world's origination,
which is technically called Pradhanakara(Jatavada~ According to
Sarilkhya Prakr:ti has got dynomocity for which creation is possible.
It is already stated that Sarilkhya admitted two categories of reality
- Prakr:ti and Puru$a. For creation an effort is needed and Prakr:ti
has got the same on account of the fact that Puru$a is indifferent,
motionless and actionless. For the sake of the enjoyment of the
Puru$a Prakr:ti evolves herself in creation spontaneously. This theory
is called Pralqtikara(Jatavada or Pradhanakara(Jatavada.

Sankaracarya in his Tarkapada Chapter of the bha$ya has

tried to establish Brahman as the cause of this world, which is called
Brahmankara(Jatavada as opposed to [Link](Jatavada by
Sarilkhya. In order to refute the other systems regarding the
creation of this world Sankara first attacked the Samkhya as per
principle to defeat the prime wrestler (Pradhana-malla-nirbahana-
nyaya). In the case of fighting, a wrestler normally attacks the
prime one among the opponents in order to demoralize others in
the group. In the same way, if there is intellectual battle one should
attack the strongest opponents to show his supremacy among the
argumentators. Sankara thinks that among the opponents Sarilkhya
is more firm footed than other opponents so far as their

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argumentation is concerned. That is why Sankara takes the strong
opponent i.e. Sarhkhya system at the very outset.

Sankara is of the opinion that the ultimate cause from which

the world has originated is Brahman. If Sarhkhya view of Prak~i is
taken into account as the cause of the universe, it will lead to many
philosophical problems. It has been argued by Sarhkhya that the
characteristic features of the cause should remain as it is in all the
effects. As for example all products made of earth like pot etc. have
got the common character earthiness in it and hence their prime
cause is to be taken as earth in general. The internal and external
world of experience in our daily life has got the common
characteristic features like pleasant, unpleasant and dull
(infatuative). From these three types of experience we may come to
the conclusion that the ultimate cause of these experiences
common with those which are constituted by pleasure, pain and
dullness. In our daily life Sarhkhya believes, we have a feeling of
enjoyment which may be of pleasant type, unpleasant type and dull
type. This ultimate common cause is called Prak~i or Pradhana
bearing three-fold characteristic features of pleasure, pain and
dullness and it is unconscious just like a lump of clay capable of
being transformed. For the sake of the enjoyment of conscious spirit
or Purusa.
. The unmanifest Pradhana or Prakrti
. is manifested in
different kinds on effect.

The first objection raised by Sankara against Samkhya is of

the following type. To him, this wonderful world cannot be

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originated from the unconscious Pradhana or Prak(ti. It is contrary
to our experience that an object is originated from an
unconsciousness stuff. It is found in the external world that an
unconscious object without being guided by a conscious agent
cannot produce something. It is not possible for the unconscious
object Pradhana to create this wonderful world where diverse needs
of diversified persons are fulfilled. It is a matter of our experience
that houses, beds etc are made by some intelligent person with
the help of the materials like brick, cement etc that are
unconscious in nature. These things like bed etc are meant for the
enjoyment of human beings. People want to have these in order to
get enjoyment as well as to avoid pain. The external world is
created in such a manner that an individual can enjoy his results of
action performed by him. He will enjoy happiness for the good
actions and pain for the bad ones. The material elements like earth,
water etc help to build this world which is the place for the
enjoyment of the result of actions. Even the bodies of human beings
and those of other animals are created in a planned way so that
there is an internal coordination among the parts. This related
coordination among the created parts makes a human being or an
animal survive in this world. The organs are made in such a manner
that they can easily function to avail diverse experience. Such a
planned body is impossible to create for a man having a keen
intelligence. In other words, a person having highest intelligence
cannot conceive of such a preplanned body for the sake of
enjoyment and day to day function. If it is true, how can
unconscious Pradhana create this wonderful world? 1 This problem
remains unanswered by the Samkhya philosophers.

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 The material objects like earth, stone etc. should be
presented in a fashionable manner if they are designed artistically.
This has been done by an intelligent potter or sculpture. In the
same manner if we think that world is created beautifully, we should
presume for the existence of a conscious being like an artist behind
this. If Pradhana is taken as material cause of this universe, it must
be guided and controlled by some intelligent being in order to
produce the effect. It is quite natural that the material cause can
not create the universe without being guided by the efficient cause.
In other words, earth, stone, etc may be taken as efficacious for
production, if there is the association with the efficient causes like
potter, carpenter etc. While emphasizing the material cause one
should not ignore the importance of efficient cause. Hence, we must
accept some intellectual agency as the ultimate cause of the world.
If we do not accept this, it will go against the scriptural injunction.
Because it is said in the sruti that there is an idea of an intelligent
agent behind the creation of this world. To accept Pradhana, the
ultimate cause of the world is to go against the sruti. Moreover, the
wonderful creation of the world presupposes, the diverse intellectual
agency which is beyond the capacity of pradhana. In the sruti text it
is said that peacocks are painted by the divine being (MayOrascitrita
yena). From this example it follows that the beautiful animals like
peacock etc. are made so with the help of various colourful
combinations and constituents which are beyond the capacity of an
unconscious element like Prakrti to make hence, an intelligent agent
like Brahman has to be accepted as the creator. 2

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 From the internal and external effects, we have a feeling of
pleasure, pain and dullness and therefore the ultimate cause of this
i.e. Pradhana should have the same feeling. But it is contrary to
what we experience in our life. Actually we feel Pleasure, Pain, etc.
in our inner states and hence they cannot characterize external
objects. The external objects have got their own characteristics like
colour, sound etc. which are unlike pleasure, pain etc. The external
qualities of things become instrumental to the causes of pleasure
and pain. But they are not pleasant or painful themselves. The
Advaitins have raised another problems in this connection. One and
the same object may seem to be pleasant or painful for a particular
individual depending on their different mental conditions. The same
colour or sound may seem to be pleasant or painful to someone and
may not be the same to others. It depends on the psychological
make up of the person concerned. Had the object been taken as
having inherently pleasant, it would have created pleasure to all
coming in contact to that, but not pleasant to some or painful to
others. This is due to different types of mental conditions of
different people. If an object were endowed with pleasure, it would
uniformly provide a soothing feeling to all the perceivers but in the
actual world it is not found.

In response to the above reasoning Samkhya might rejoin the

following :

The internal and external objects are limited and have some
finite capacities and that is why they are distinct from each other.

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Now the question arises how do we feel that these are limited
objects? They are limited by virtue of the fact that they are
constituted by the conjunction of several elements.

Let us take an example of a limited object. Roots, sprout etc.

are to be taken as limited because they are composed of several
elements which are instrumental to their production. These objects
are complex in nature due to having several elements for their
creation. If Brahman is taken as the cause of creation it would be
misleading because the nature of Brahman is simple and
undifferentiated having no scope of any plurality of elements. Hence
Brahman can never be the cause of multiple products of this earth.
On the other hand Pradhana can be their cause because it is of
complex nature having three elements - sattva, rajas and tamas.
From this it is concluded that the complex Pradhana having three
elements can create the objects having such elements.

The Advaitins are of the opinion that if a limited object is

having conjunction of several elements, then sattva, rajas and
tamas having the same limited character would have conjunction
and have been produced by several elements. But according to
Sarhkhya the three gu!JcrS do not require any other cause but they
themselves constitute the ultimate reality, Pradhana. 3

Apart from the above Sankara says it is not reasonable to

substantiate that the unconscious Pradhana can be established as

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the cause of all the objects of experience through the simple
relation of cause and effect. Though the causal relation remains in
beds and chairs, they are not produced by unconscious material
object but by an intelligent being. Any type of causal relation should
not be confined within the material cause, but it can be extended to
intelligent operation also. If so the effect would come into being.

If we keep the question of creating this wonderful world aside

even then Sarilkhya position is not problem free. A new problem
may come on the way of our understanding. How can there be an
activity in an unconscious Pradhana through which it can create or
produce the world. At the state of equilibrium no activities are found
in Pradhana. Activities possible when one or the three constituents
predominates another. That is not the state of equilibrium. The
creative activity begins when the state of equilibrium is disturbed
through the prominence of one quality over another. But at the
state of equilibrium no creation is possible. The activity as
interpreted by Sarilkhya is unintelligable or inconceivable on account
of the fact that an activity is not found to be originated in an
unconscious object like wood or clay, if not associated with the
conscious being. So an activity is not found in an unconscious object
like Pradhana and hence it can not be taken as an independent
cause of the universe. 4

The Sarilkhya is of the view that in a solely intelligent object

activity cannot be found. Activity is possible in an unintelligent
object associated with intelligent or conscious being. Had there

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been an activity in mere intelligence, there would arise a problem of
locus of that intelligence. The intelligence needs some locus for its
activity. There can not be intelligence in the void i.e. without the
association of conscious being. Hence, the theory that an activity
remains only in intelligence as supported by Sankara is not tenable.
It can be explained with the metaphor of chariot. Just as activity is
found in an unconscious object like chariot, which is associated with
a conscious being, activity is generated in an unconscious body
which is associated with a conscious being.

It is the conjecture of the Advaitins that in the external world

activity is not always found in intelligence or consciousness even
when it is connected with unconscious object. One may be confused
if activity remains in conscious object or not. In reply Sarhkhya
argues that there is no confusion regarding the locus of existence
of activity. Normally the activity lies there where it is found to exist
since the movement of an object or its motion are the matters of
direct perception if it is said that consciousness is the seat of
activity, it will be misleading because motion is found in a chariot
but not in the conscious being. In the same way it can be said that
the activity is found in the body alone. That is why the Carvakas
argue that consciousness belongs to body because the marks of
consciousness like motion etc are found in the body. It is
remarkable contribution of the Sarhkhya to the Philosophy of
materialism when they support Carvaka in favour of their thesis. As
the Carvakas are in favour of the Sarhkhya, they will find their
position more firm - footed. Being empowered by Carvakas,

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Sarhkhya can safely declare that activity really belongs to the
material object i.e. Prak~i. 5 The Vedantins are of the view that it is
true the movement etc are seen in an unconscious object as
pointed out by Samkhya. But the question is, can unconscious
object alone generate movement? Certainly not. The unconscious
object can produce movement etc. if and only if it is associated with
consciousness. The properties of burning and lighting are found to
be existent in a piece of wood which is burning but not found in
mere fire. Fire is not available when fuel is isolated and hence
nobody thinks that the properties of burning and light are caused by
wood. It is a fact that the properties are due to fire on account of
the fact these are found when fire exists. In like manner the activity
is due to consciousness though it is found in an unconscious object.
This position has also been accepted by Carvakas because they
believe that consciousness is found in a man which is an
amalgamation of body and consciousness. In other words, it is
found as belonging to the body when body is conjoined with
consciousness. Therefore, consciousness is the ground of all
activities. 6

Samkhya has raised another difficulty in the above argument.

Self is wholly inactive by nature. If it is so how can it be active
being associated with an unconscious body because inactive object
cannot initiate action in anything. This difficulty can easily be
removed if it is realised that an object which is not active itself
makes other active, if it is in contact with the appropriate thing. As
for example, a magnet without moving itself can make the iron

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particles move towards it, if they are brought in close proximity.
Colour etc., make eye and other sense-organs receptive towards
them while they are themselves inactive. In like manner, God
without being active Himself activates all beings and things in the
world. Another difficulty would come of in the following manner. 7 If
God is the unmoved mover of this world, it would imply that there is
duality between God, the mover and the universe to be moved. It
will go against the Vedantins' doctrine that the ultimate reality is
one and non-dual (Ekameva advitiyarh). Hence, the Vedantins'
position can not be sustained. According to them, Brahman alone is
real and hence there is no distinction ( bheda) either homogeneous
(sajatlya), heterogeneous (bijatiya) or internal (svagata).

In response to this problem, the Advaitins may rejoin in the

following manner. The above-mentioned problem of mover and the
moved (i.e. distinction or duality), may occur in the level of
phenomenal reality, which is endowed with names and forms as
the product of nescience or ignorance. But at the level of ultimate
reality there is no question of dichotomy or distinction between the
mover and the moved. As there is no world as separated from
Brahman, there is unity but not diversity and hence there does not
arise any question of duality as shown by the Sarhkhya. Though the
world is an appearance according to them from the empirical point
of view, it has to be taken as the effect of our ignorance. As soon as
ignorance is dispelled by knowledge of Brahman, the duality
ceases. 8

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 The Sarhkhya-thinkers have argued in favour of their position
quite consistently. To them the activity found in Prakrti is not due to
some external force or agent but spontaneous. In order to prove
the spontaneity of the action of Prakrti they have taken two
metaphors - milk and water. Just as the milk flows automatically
from the cow for the enjoyment or survival of the calf and water
flows downwards spontaneously for the benefit of human beings,
Prakrti can move by itself without being unconscious and is capable
of fulfilling human needs spontaneously. 9

The Advatins try to refute this standpoint by saying that the

movement found in the milk and water is not spontaneous, but due
to the existence of some consciousness. It is already an established
fact that an inanimate chariot cannot move forward without the
association of a conscious being. In like manner, the present case
can be justified. In the case of milk we find some consciousness in
the animal i.e. cow. The spontaneous discharge of milk is not so in
the true sense of the term but due to its desire to feed the calf who
will suck it. In like manner it can be said that water flows down due
to low level of land but not spontaneously as suggested. When any
movement is found in an inanimate being, it is due to some
extraneous condition or factor. Hence it is decided that for all types
of movement found in an unintelligent being is due to the existence
of some conscious principle, which is also supported in the Sruti
text. It is said in the B~hadaranyakopani~ad that it is the conscious.
Principle or God who guides and controls the activities and
movements of water and rivers. 10

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 Moreover, the Samkhyas cannot explain the fact why
Pradhana who is taken to be independent moves to activity. By
virtue of being independent Prakrti is not supposed to be affected
by external factors. Pradhana is constituted by three guoa-s which
remain in perfect equilibrium and hence there is no external cause
through which this equilibrium may be disturbed. So Pradhana is not
supposed to move. Puru~a again is absolutely indifferent and
inactive. Hence, Puru~a cannot be the cause for Pradhana's
movement. We do not find any external cause which makes or does
not make Prakrti to modify itself into various effects like mahat etc.
To the Advaitins such problem does not arise because God is taken
as all known and all powerful. For this reason He can be active or
inactive depending on the demand of the situation with the help of
his magical power (maya) producing appearances. 11

The Sari1khya may say that Prakrti can transform itself into
mahat etc. naturally without the help of any efficient or auxiliary
cause, just as grass changes itself into milk without the help of any
other causes.

This view does not stand in the eye of logic according to the
Advaitins. A process is certainly necessary for the transformation of
grass into milk. It is found in experience that grass taken by a cow
may be transformed into milk, otherwise not. Hence it is not natural
as claimed by the Sari1khya. 12

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 The Sarilkhya reiterates the earlier position and says that the
transformation of grass into milk does not need any other factor.
We do not find any factor affecting this change. If this factor were
known to us, we would have applied this and got milk in the need of
hour. But actually it is not found and hence the change of grass into
milk is a natural phenomenon. In a similar manner it can be proved
that Pradhana transforms itself independently and naturally. 13

The Advaitins do not agree again. To them the above change

is not natural on account of the fact that it is transformed into milk
when taken by a cow. If it is taken by a bull, it is not transformed
into milk. From this it is known to us that some external factor
works in making grass into milk. A man cannot transform grass into
milk. From this, it is not proved that such transformation is natural
and independent. It is found from our experience that some of the
changes are caused by a human agent and some are performed by
the Divine will. It is not true that human agency fails in transforming
grass into milk. It is found that people feed the cows in a better
way for having more quantity of milk. In the same way we can say
that the theory of the Sarilkhya is not true, because of the unreality
of the fact that Pradhana changes itself into effects naturally or
independently. 14

Again the Advaitins argue that even if it is admitted that

Pradhana is capable of changing itself into various effects
independently, we do not find any motive behind this
transformation. Pradhana does not need any auxiliary cause or any

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helping cause for its modification. If it is admitted, it will be
tantamount to not having any motive or purpose of its own.

If this be the case, the Samkhyas may assert that Pradhana

has some purpose of fulfilling the ends of Puru$a and for this reason
it undergoes changes. Pradhana does not need any cause for its
modification. From this, it does not follow that it will have no
purpose behind. 15

If this view is admitted the Advaitins may ask : what is this

purpose? Is it the enjoyment of Puru~a or his release? If it is said
that it is the enjoyment (bhoga) of Puru~a, it is not seen. That is,
we fail to see the enjoyment of Puru$C3 in this world. Apart from
this, if Puru~a's enjoyment is the fundamental to Pradhana's activity,
the Puru~a will not receive freedom from bondage of enjoyment. If
the Puru~a's freedom from enjoyment is the main intention of
Pradhana's activity, the Puru~a may be free before the activities of
Prakrti start, Prakrti's activity would seem to be useless and
unnecessary, because the purpose for which the activity of
Pradhana is started is already fulfilled in Puru~a. Moreover, if the
achievement of freedom is the end, there would be no enjoyment at
all. If both enjoyment and freedom are end there would be no limit
to enjoyment leading to non-attainment of freedom, because the
items of enjoyment are infinite and endless. If it is admitted that the
activity of Pradhana is only to meet its curiosity or satisfaction, the
question arises whose satisfaction or curiosity it is. Because
Pradhana being unconscious in nature cannot have satisfaction or

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curiosity of its own. As Puru~a is indifferent and passive it cannot
have curiosity. If Pradhana is not active the creative power of
Pradhana and cognitive power of Puru~a would become purposeless
and useless. In order to justify this, the Sarhkhya must admit a
generative power in Pradhana just like cognitive power in Puru~. If
it exists, there would be no final freedom. Due to all such
complications it is not reasonable to say that Pradhana becomes
active for the enjoyment and release of Puru~a. 16

Now the Samkhya is trying to explain the world of experience

with the help of the cooperation between Puru~a and Prakrti. It has
explained this with the analogy of blind and lame men and magnet
and iron. Just as through mutual cooperation a blind man can go
through the road smoothly being guided by the lame man who is on
his shoulder, Prakrti, though unconscious can have inclination
towards creation for the enjoyment of Puru~a being guided by
Puru~a who is inactive. This cooperation between Puru~ and Prakrti
is analogous to that of blind and lame man. A blind cannot see, but
is capable of walking while a lame can see but not capable of
walking. That is why, they are compared with Puru~a and Prakrti.
Just as a magnet, without moving itself, can easily move other iron-
particles towards itself, Puru~a may lead Prakrti for inclination
towards activity. 17

If this view is taken for granted, it will go against the basic

presupposition of the Sarhkhyas. The 5arhkhya claims that Prakrti
becomes active independently i.e., without any external pressure.

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But if it is said that Prakrti is led by Puru~a, then Pradhana's
activities are not to be taken as independent, but due to external
pressure. Morever, if Puru~a engages Prakrti to certain activities, it
will be presumed that it has lost its indifference and inactive
character, which is unusual. Moreover, the metaphor of blind and
lame man cannot be applied here. Puru~ cannot be compared with
a lame man, because a lame man can guide the blind with the help
of his words and directions, but Puru~ lacks this power due to his
inactivity. If it is argued that Puru~a may lead Prakrti to perform
certain activities due to their proximate existence just as a magnet
can influence the iron-particles due to their proximate existence,
they will have to admit that the activity should continue for endless
or longer period of time due to their proximity, which is not
possible. It is known to us that the magnet can move the iron-
particles due to their proximity, but this is always occasional,
transitory but not atemporal. The necessary proximity between
them has to be brought with the help of some other actions.
Moreover, all magnets are not always capable of creating actions in
iron-particles. They can do so if they are cleaned and maintained
from time to time. Hence, the analogy of a magnet and iron-particle
does not match with Puru~a and Prakrti. 18

One may extend one's argument by saying that a relation

. and Prakrti
between Purusa . cannot be conceived because Purusa
. is
indifferent and Prakrti is unconscious. How can an indifferent
substance be related to an unconscious one? There is no third
agency through the interference of which the said relation is

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possible. If it is said that only their capability of being related is
taken as a relating factor, their relation will continue for ever or
endlessly leading to the cessation of release of Puru$a. If the
release of Puru$a is desirable, it will be accepted that no relation
between Puru$a and Prakrti is admissible. From this, it is proved
that relation is not possible between them for metaphysical reason
also.

Moreover, the earlier objections raised against the inclination

of Puru$a towards activities will stand as they are. It is not
understandable why Puru$a will feel for performing activities. In the
Advaita framework this is easily explained. Puru$a, though
essentially indifferent and inactive, can involve in activities through
the illusory creative power called Maya.

It is admitted by Samkhya that Prakrti has three constituents

- sattva, rajas and tamas, which remains at first in equilibrium
without overpowering one another. At this stage there is no
subordination of the one by another, because all the constituents
remain in equilibrium. Hence, they are having independence in the
true sense of the term. It is very difficult to understand why they
have left their independent status and started subordinating one
another. Due to this loss of equilibrium there is subordination of one
constituent over another, on account of which there is creation and
activity. But the question remains : who has disturbed this
equilibrium and why? There is no external agency to disturb them

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leading to the land of creativity. The Salilkhya cannot provide
suitable reply to this. 19

The Salilkhya still argues that Pradhana and its constituents

are not imagined but experienced in their life. They have seen the
world and inferred the characteristics of the primordial cause of the
world. The three constituents of Prak~i are not to be taken as
inactive and changeless. To them these three constituents are
changing themselves and it is true even at the state of equilibrium.
Hence, there always remains a possibility of disturbing the state of
equilibrium.

Even if these are admitted, the creation of this beautiful world

would quite be impossible from an unconscious and unintelligent
agent, Prakrti. If the Samkhya gives an attribute of intelligence to
Prakrti, their position would be taken as equal to the Advaitins. To
Samkhya, even at the stage of equilibrium or the state of equipose
may be disturbed and the constituents of Prakrti, may be distributed
unequally. For this reason it may be said that such disturbance
would not happen without a cause, which is not found anywhere. If
it is said that such disturbance may occur any time without any
cause, it would continue for endless period of time. If it continues,
the creation of this world would continue for endless period of time
leading to the cessation of dissolution ( Pralaya). If it is taken for
granted, the final release would become virtually impossible. For all
these reasons the Samkhya system is accepted as unacceptable to
the Advaitins because it is full of inconsistent statements. 20 Now

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the Advaitins are pointing out so many contradictory statements in
other cases also. The Sarhkhya sometimes opines that sense organs
are seven in number, sometimes eleven. They sometimes subscribe
to the view that the subtle elements ( tanmatras) originate from the
evolute Mahat and sometimes from the ego (Aharhkara). So far as
internal sense organ is concerned, some say that it is three in
number and sometimes one. Moreover, the Advaitins thinks that the
Sarhkhya view is not honoured by the orthodox systems on account
of the fact that it is opposed by Sruti which believes in the existence
of God as the ultimate cause of the universe and also by Smrti
following Sruti. 21

Now the Sarhkhya has shown its critique to the Advaita view.
To the Sarhkhyas the system of Adaita Vedanta is not free from
various logical defects. According to Advaita Vedanta, one unitary
principle called Brahman or Atman is the sufficient cause of the
origin, maintenance and destruction of the whole universe. If it is
admitted, the sufferer and causes of suffering would not belong to
different categories but two modes of the same self. If this view is
accepted, the self would never be free from two modes because
they are identified with it. It is said in the scripture that an
individual will be free from suffering through the right knowledge of
self. If the Self is not free from these two special modes the above
mentioned scriptural injunction would be in vain. A characteristic
feature of an object cannot be separated from the object where it
remains just as heat and light cannot be separated. It may be
argued by the Vedantins that there is dichotomy between water and

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its agitated states in the forms of waves and ripples. It may seem
two at this condition. When the water remains calm and non-
agitated condition, the said dichotomy vanishes. In like manner, it
may be said that though initially there is suffering in Self it may get
rid of the same afterwards. This view is also not acceptable to
Samkhya. To ~hem water can never be made free from waves and
ripples, which may appear or disappear, but they remain as
identified with water. In the same way, the sufferer and cause of
suffering remain in the same Self. The Advaitins seem to ignore this
point. The multiplicity (nanatva) of world has been explained by
them with the single unitary principle called Brahman. 22

It is also true that the distinction between a seeker and

sought is always prominent and hence they can be kept separate.
One can seek an object which is completely different from oneself.
It is a matter of a contradiction if someone seeks something which
remains within oneself and forms the constituting part of oneself. A
lamp does seek for light because it remains within itself. Had there
been no object which is not distinct from oneself, one would be
taken virtually as seeker of oneself. That is, under this
circumstance, he will seek for his own self to justify himself as
'seeker', because there is nothing in the external world other than
himself. This is quite unnatural or rather unusual. 23

Moreover, the seeker and the sought are taken as relative

terms, because the property of being a seeker is determined
(nirOpita) in terms of the object sought for and vice-versa. For this

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reason we m~st admit a relation between them, which always
remains in two as per the definition - 'dvi?tha/J sambandha/J' (i.e.
relation abiding in two). The relation cannot be established if there
is only one object. Hence the distinction between a seeker and the
sought must remain for the sake of their relationship and hence
they are to be taken as separate entities. 24

The Samkhya is forwarding another argument in favour of the

distinction between suffering and the causes of it. There are two
types of object whom we want to obtain and want to avoid. In
order to distinguish between the two it is necessary to accept their
separate existence. In these two the former is called good and the
latter bad or evil. What affects us favourably is called our good
generating happiness (anukO!a vedanlyarh sukharh) while that which
affects us unfavourably is called evil generating misery (pratikO/a-
vedaniyarh duhkharh). If we look to the external world, we shall see
that the objects generating happiness are very few in comparison to
those generating misery. Hence, it has been presumed that all
objects of our desire in one way may be called evil, which generates
pain or misery. The object which seems to be pleasant is not so in
the true sense of the term, because ultimately it leads to our
suffering. Hence self is the sufferer. If the sufferer and the cause of
suffering are not kept separate, but identified as done by the
Advaitins while admitting a unitary principle of all objects, there is
no possibility of availing freedom in the sense of emancipation or
release. If an individual identifies himself with the objects of
suffering, he will remain in the midst of suffering leading to the non-

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attainment of liberation. If suffering and the cause of it are kept in a
separate way, an individual can see the situation and explore the
possibility of eradicating sufferings. He would succeed in removing
the suffering if he would be able to remove the causes of it. If
causes are removed there would be no suffering, which ultimately
leads him to the attainment of liberation.

The objections may be raised by the Samkhya are to be taken

in a true spirit if the sufferer and the causes of suffering are taken
to be related as subject and object. But actually such relationship
cannot be found between them. In an absolute unity no such
relation is possible according to Advaita Vedanta. The Advaitins
have tried to elaborate their view points with the help of fire. Fire
which is one and which has got heat and light, does not illumine or
burn itself. In the same manner, there is only one immutable
Brahman under which the relation between sufferer and the causes
of suffering is not at all possible.

A question may be raised; where shall we find the relation of

the sufferer and the causes of suffering? If the meaning of the
Sanskrit 'tapa is taken literally, it may denote both 'heat' and
'suffering'. From this we can take human body as being heated i.e.,
having suffering or sufferer and the sun is taken as the cause of the
heat or suffering. It may be noted here that suffering is possible for
an intelligent being only, but not for an unintelligent body. Had
suffering belonged to body, it would have been vanished as soon as
the body is destroyed. In other words, after the cessation of body

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individual would attain release or freedom. If it be so, no man
would try to undergo spiritual training for the removal of pain or to
get liberation. 25

But it is not logically possible to believe that suffering belongs

to soul. Because, to suffer entails undergoing some changes or
·modification. It is not possible in Pure Self. We cannot say similarly
that the body and self constitute a composite whole, because such
combination is not allowed for Self. If self is associated with body
and makes a composite whole, it would lose its pure character. Self,
if pure, cannot be conjoined with body. It is also meaningless to say
that suffering suffers itself.

The Sarilkhya may justify their standpoint by explaining the

possibility of suffering. They may explore the relation between a
sufferer and the cause of suffering in the following manner. The
Sarilkhyas may say that one of the constituents of Prakrti i.e. sattva,
the cause of the experience of light and darkness, is the sufferer
and the other constituent called rajas which is the cause of all
activities, movements and painful experience is the cause of
suffering. The Self which alone has got the 'feeling' cannot feel
identified with these constituents and hence cannot share the
suffering caused in them or by them. Sarilkhya would argue that
Self appears to be suffering while actually the sattva constituent
suffers. Self is reflected in sattva constituent of Pradhana and thinks
itself sufferer being identified with the suffering of sattva element.

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 It is known so far that self does not suffer really. Though it is
true, self appears itself to be sufferer due to ignorance. This
standpoint is quite acceptable to the Advaitins also. But Samkhya
like Vedantins cannot admit that suffering is not real but apparent.
To Samkhya the experience of suffering is as true as other real
objects. If it is admitted, it would be difficult for Samkhya to believe
in final release of the Self. If this status of suffering is taken for
granted, it would lead them to admit that there would be no release
of Self. For, the causes of suffering, being constituents of Prakrti,
are eternal. Hence there will always be the possibility of its
suffering.

In order to solve this problem Samkhya adds that though the

capacity of suffering in the self and the causes of suffering in the
constituents of Pradhana are there the real suffering occurs when
there is a specific conjunction between self and Pradhana. This
specific conjunction follows from a cause, which is the non-
discrimination of Pradhana and the Self. When the cause in the form
of non-discrimination is removed, the possibility of further suffering
comes to an end.

The above-mentioned solution is not a solution in the true

sense of the term. The Advaitins think that even the non-
discrimination, the cause of suffering, is itself caused by the tamas
- constituent of Prakrti. This constituent, being always there, there
is always the possibility of suffering.

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 The Advaitins are now challenging Samkhyas on their basic
presuppositions. They believe that creation starts, when there is
lack of equilibrium among three constituents of Prak(ti. In other
words, it has been admitted by them that, when the three gu(la-s
are disturbed, one or the other gu(la-s of these gets overpowered
over the rest. It is quite illogical that it is left undetermined how and
when this preponderance of one over another happens. If it is not
determined, the specific conjunction and disjunction of self with
Pradhana which points to creation and destruction of the whole
world remain undetermined. From this it follows that there is an
uncertainty of getting one's final release. The theory of Pradhana-
KaraQata is thus refuted by the Advaitins. 26

REFERENCES:-

1. BrahmasOtra : 2.2.01. Sankarabha?yaon 2.2.01

2. Ibid

3. Ibid

4. 'Pravrttesca'- BrahmasOtra, 02/02/02.

5. Sarhkarabha?ya on 02/02/02.

6. Ibid

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7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. 'Payo'mbuvaccetatrapi' BrahmasOtra- 02/02/03.

10. Sankarabha?ya on 02/02/03

11. 'Vyatirekanavasthitescanapef?atvat'
BrahmasOtra 02/02/04 Sankarabha?ya on 02/02/04.

12. 'Anyatrabhavacca na tr (Ia chivat

BrahmasOtra - 02/02/05.

13. Sankarabh§?ya on 02/02/05.

14. Ibid.

15. ''abhyupagame'pyarthabhavat';
BrahmasOtra- 02/02/06. Sankarabha?ya 02/02/06.

16. Ibid.

17. Puru?asmavaditi cettathapi BrahmasOtra- 02/02/07.

18. Sarhkarabha?ya on 02/02/07.

19. Ibid

20. 'viprati?edhaccasamanjasarh' BrahmasOtra -02/02/10.

112
21. Sankarabha?ya on 02/02/10.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

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