RULE 126 Section 8.

Search of house, room, or premise to be made in

Search and Seizure presence of two witnesses. — No search of a house, room,
or any other premise shall be made except in the presence
Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or
order in writing issued in the name of the People of the in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age
Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace and discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)
officer, commanding him to search for personal property
described therein and bring it before the court. (1) Section 9. Time of making search. — The warrant must
direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall asserts that the property is on the person or in the place
be filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be
with the following: inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. (8)

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was Section 10. Validity of search warrant. — A search warrant
committed. shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter it
shall be void. (9a)
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer
the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed
court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in
enforced. whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the
absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found
action is pending. (n) the seized property. (10a)
Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of court; return and proceedings thereon. — (a) The officer
personal property: must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who
(a) Subject of the offense; issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof
duly verified under oath.
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or (b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the
issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made,
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant
an offense. (2a) was issued and require him to explain why no return was
made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with
search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause and shall require that the property seized be delivered to
in connection with one specific offense to be determined him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has
personally by the judge after examination under oath or been complied with.
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched (c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who
Philippines. (3a) shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other
actions of the judge.
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and (11a)
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person
record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
submitted. (4a) anything which may have been used or constitute proof in
the commission of an offense without a search warrant. (12a)
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the
judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to
application is based or that there is probable cause to suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a
believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained
be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. (5a) thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court
where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by
The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be
any part of a house or anything therein to execute the resolved by the latter court. (n)
warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein. (6)
 ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3.

1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

CONCLUSION
1. Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967 – (SEARCH WARRANT – SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED THE
OBJECTS)

FACTS: Petitioners received 42 warrants issued to search their home and company they are officers and seize anything that is
related to their business due to violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code), and Revised
Penal Code.

COURT: The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in
our Constitution. There was grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants by its
description authorizing the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal.

Moreover, the Court abandoned the Moncado rule which that even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.

2. People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991 – (THE VIOLATION OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE MUST BE
COMMITTED BY GOVERNMENT – NOT BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL)

FACTS: Job Reyes, opened the package (which contains drugs) and was to be sent by Marti to Switzerland and reported this to
NBI. He said that it is inadmissible as the act has violated his right against unreasonable search and seizure.

COURT: The Court said that it was valid as there is no government interference during the search of the illegal drugs from
his package. The Constitution does not govern relationships between private individuals but relationships between private
individuals and the Government. The modifications only relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-
a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof and in no manner deviated as to whom restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. Hence, the evidence is admissible for it does not violate the constitutional
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizure for it was a private individual who effected the search and seizure.

3. Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989 - (CHECKPOINT [WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND
SEIZURE] IS VALID)

FACTS: Petitioner Valmonte and ULAP Assocation filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and
banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints,
for the protection of the people.

COURT: Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to
be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Furthermore, the Court stressed that the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved.

4. Burgos v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984 – (GENERAL SEARCH WARRANT IS INVALID)
FACTS: The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were searched and its office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized based on the strength of the two [2] search warrants issued
by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano.

COURT: The search warrants were null and void. When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.

5. Nala v. Barroso, G.R. No. 153087, August 7, 2003 – (WRONG NAME DOES NOT INVALIDATE SEARCH WARRANT
AS LONG AS THERE ARE FURTHER DETAILS)

FACTS: The warrant issued against the petitioner doesn’t have the correct name. first name was erroneously stated therein as
“Romulo” and not as “Bernard”.

COURT: The warrant is valid; however, the Nala was acquitted as the evidence seized were not included on the warrant
that was issued by the respondent judge. The failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first name of
petitioner, which is “Bernard” and not “Romulo” or “Rumolo”, does not invalidate the warrant because the additional description
“alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon” sufficiently enabled the police officers to
locate and identify the petitioner. What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and not one which, as in the instant
case, contains a descriptio personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused without difficulty

6. Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, November 25, 1986 - (THE ITEMS TO BE SEIZED MUST BE PARTICULARLY
IDENTIFIED)

FACTS: On May 10, 1984, respondent Judge Romulo T. Gonzales issued a search warrant (SW) against herein petitioner Josefino
S. Roan. • The petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. o
However, the officers found on the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated, leading to
petitioner’s prosecution for illegal possession of firearms.

COURT: SC ruled that the search warrant was invalid. To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be
determined by the judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No
less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and
indiscriminate use of the warrant.

7. People v. Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004 – (PLAINVIEW DOCTRINE THROUGH LAWFUL
INTRUSION IS VALID)

FACTS: Police operatives received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and appellants Jogy Lee
and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking.

COURT: The Court ruled that evidence are admissible. Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles
belonging to the appellant and Lao which were not described in the search warrants. However, the seizure of articles not listed in a
search warrant does not render the seizure of the articles described and listed therein illegal; nor does it render inadmissible in
evidence.

An example of the applicability of the ‘plain view’ doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area
for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character. An object that
comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a
warrant. Finally, the ‘plain view’ doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

8. People v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003 – (CONSENTED SEARCH SHOULD BE A VALID
WARRANTLESS SEARCH PROVIDED THE ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT)

FACTS: Hearsay by Salier. Both Tudtud and Bolong claimed they were framed-up and only met each other at the police station
after their arrest.

COURT: Arrest is not valid. The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise,
such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the constitutional provision enshrined in Section 2 Article III, and any
evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding." (Sec. 3, Art. III).

As the search of appellant’s box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana
leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting
officers and their informant, the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.

Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the following requisites are present:
  It must appear that the rights exist;
 The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
 Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced
themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana,
appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself.

9. People v. Exala, G.R. No. 76005, April 23, 1993 – (CHECKPOINT IS A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST)

FACTS: On November 2, 1982, around 8:15 p.m., a jeep driven by Restituto Bocalan was stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite
City. o Accompanying Bocalan were Jaime Fernandez and Rodelio Exala. • A routine inspection was conducted by Pfc. Ricardo
Galang, who noticed a black leather bag with bulging sides. • Upon questioning, no one answered what the bag contained, and all
three appeared nervous and uneasy. o Pfc. Galang ordered to open the bag and found over 2 kilos of marijuana.

COURT: There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest.
An illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which
has already been upheld by this Court.

According to the Court, lest it be misunderstood, the foregoing doctrine is not intended to do away with the general rule that no
person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and belongings, or his residence except of virtue of a search
warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. This case, however, is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful “stop-and-search” at a
military or police checkpoint.

Elements of Checkpoints:

(1) Must be well-lighted, properly identified, and manned by uniform personnel

(2) Reason for the checkpoint
(3) Only visual search (look) is allowed

10. Posadas v. CA, G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990 – (STOP AND FRISK – AS VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST)

FACTS: On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of
the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a
surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City o They spotted petitioner, a minor, carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to
be acting suspiciously.

COURT: The Court ruled that the arrest is valid. In the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering
that it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.

The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the
identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information.

11. People v. Veloso, G.R. No. 23051, October 20, 1925 – (SEARCH WARRANT MUST HAVE A NAME NOT JUST JOHN
DOE)

FACTS: Search warrant has John Doe instead of Veloso.

COURT: Blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John
Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to
be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best
description personae (description of person) possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this
description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should
state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by
means of which he can be identified.

12. People v. Macarios, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010- (SEARCH AND SEIZURE – VALID IN IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO)

FACTS: Mariacos apprehended. the agent described a backpack bag with an “O.K.” marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said
jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an “O.K.”
marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other
passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.

COURT: Search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc
had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the
search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant.
Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination. Also, the arrest is lawful as there is a
probable cause. The night before appellant’s arrest, the police received information that marijuana was to be transported and had
set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects.

13. Fajardo v. People, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011

FACTS:

COURT:

14. People v. Calantiao, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014 – (WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE INCIDENTAL TO A
LAWFUL ARREST)

FACTS: Edwin Lojera narrated that while driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a
traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th avenue street.
Thereat, the passengers of said taxicab, one of them is Medario Calantiao (accused), alighted and fired their guns.

COURT: The arrest was valid. Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by the revised rules of criminal
procedure. In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not
only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows
the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.

15. People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014

FACTS:

COURT:

16. People v. Alagaban, G.R. No. 244842. January 16, 2023

FACTS:

COURT:

17. Lopena v. People, G.R. No. 234317, May 10, 2021 (PROBABLE CAUSE

FACTS: This Court resolves the Petition for Review assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the conviction6 of petitioner Virgilo Evardo y Lopena (Evardo) for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

COURT: ACQUIT THE ACCUSED. Probable cause should precede an extensive search; it cannot come after an extensive search
has commenced or been completed. The cause must occur prior to the effect. By sheer chronological logic then, Algozo's
supposed attempt could not have been the probable cause to induce the police officers' resolve to conduct an extensive search and
have passengers disembark in order to facilitate such a search.

18. People v. O’cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018

FACTS: In the final security checkpoint inside the Laoag City International Airport, the Security Screening Officer conducted a pat
down search on the accused, a 53-yearl old Irish national married to a Filipina. Two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves,
weighing less than a gram was seized from his possession. Eanna was charged with and convicted of illegal possession of
marijuana under Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

COURT: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure at the airport premises was valid. YES, However the accused
was acquitted. In general, airport screening search is a constitutionally reasonable administrative search. The search and seizure
of an illegal drug during a routine airport inspection made pursuant to the aviation security procedures has been sustained by this
Court in a number of cases. However, the instant case does not qualify as a legitimate administrative search in an airport. What
was seized from the accused were illegal drugs, not explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous substances or materials, or
dangerous elements or devices that may be used to commit hijacking or acts of terrorism. Airport search is reasonable when limited
in scope to the object of the Anti-Hijacking program, not the war on illegal drugs.

19. Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019 (STOP AND FRISK)

FACTS: Manibog was standing Municipal Tourism office with gun in his waistband.

COURT: The Supreme Court ruled that the search conducted was a valid “stop and frisk” search. In the present case, the
Dingras policemen searched the accused not only because of a tip - a very specific one - that he was at that moment standing in
front of the nearby Municipal Tourism Office with a gun on his waist. More importantly, PCI Beniat testified that at a distance of
about two to three meters from the accused, he saw the latter's bulging waistline indicating the "distinct peculiar contour" of a
firearm tucked on his waist. Citing his experience as a police officer, PCI Beniat testified that he could distinguish a firearm from any
other object tucked on the waist of a person. In the language of Justice Panganiban's separate opinion in People v. Montilla, the
Court finds that the bulging waistline of herein accused constituted "an outward indication" that clearly suggested he was then
carrying a firearm.
 1. Chavez v. Gonzales,[Link].168338, February15, 2008

Facts: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the conversation
discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Bunye
held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings
of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that
the contents of the second compact disc had been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.

However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s voice in the compact discs was not President Arroyo’s
after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming possession of the genuine copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent
Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic Act No.
4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a ” cause for
the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations” issued to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers
met with officers of the broadcasters group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement
expressing commitment to press freedom

On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the “acts, issuances, and orders”
of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct violated freedom of
expression and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution,
and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and television stations against airing the Garci Tapes.

ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005
constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression. (THE RESTRAINT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL)

1. Standing to File Petition - Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as
in the present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a government action in
violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the government action is directed at such citizen. Freedom of
expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a free, open and democratic society, is of transcendental importance
that must be defended by every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity.

2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment - Freedom of expression is the
foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition to the exercise of
almost all other civil and political rights. Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public
officials. Freedom of expression allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office.

Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of expression:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the Constitution commands that freedom
of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out
of necessity.

The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of
expression, namely:

 pornography,
 false or misleading advertisement,
 advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
 danger to national security.
 All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.

Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior restraint on
protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected
from censorship. Thus, there can be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on the
ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on proposed amendments to the Constitution.

If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it burdens expression. A
content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time, place or manner of the expression in public places without any
restraint on the content of the expression. Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. An example of a
content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and route of a rally passing through busy public streets. A content-
neutral prior restraint on protected expression which does not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of
validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.

Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or low-value expression. By definition, prior restraint on
unprotected expression is content-based since the restraint is imposed because of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are
currently only four categories of unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized false or
misleading advertisement as unprotected expression only in October 2007.

Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint on unprotected expression must
hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden of
proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint.

Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent punishment. Although subsequent
punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are disseminated to the public. Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of
ideas to the public.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be subject to subsequent punishment,27 either
civilly or criminally. Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not warrant prior restraint, the same expression may still be subject
to subsequent punishment, civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected expression.

However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of subsequent punishment, logically it cannot also be subject
to the more severe restriction of prior restraint. Thus, since profane language or “hate speech” against a religious minority is not
subject to subsequent punishment in this jurisdiction, such expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.

If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is subject to subsequent punishment. There
must be a law punishing criminally the unprotected expression before prior restraint on such expression can be justified.

The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action imposing prior restraint on three
categories of unprotected expression – pornography,31 advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security – is
the clear and present danger test.32 The expression restrained must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a
substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, and such danger must be grave and imminent.

Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms – it may be a law, administrative regulation, or impermissible pressures
like threats of revoking licenses or withholding of benefits.34 The impermissible pressures need not be embodied in a government
agency regulation, but may emanate from policies, advisories or conduct of officials of government agencies.

3. Government Action in the Present Case - The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the
airing or broadcasting of the Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a “cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations” issued to radio and television stations. The NTC warning, embodied in a
press release, relies on two grounds. First, the airing of the Garci Tapes “is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to radio and TV stations.” Second,
the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated, and subsequent investigation may establish that the tapes contain false
information or willful misrepresentation.

The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression that may be subject
to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what substantive evil the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior restraint on
the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil, of grave and imminent character, that the State has a right and duty to prevent.

The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a continuing violation
of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. There is also the issue of whether a wireless cellular phone conversation is covered by the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.

Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were not even given an opportunity to be heard by the NTC. The NTC did not
observe basic due process as mandated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.

The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as accurate or truthful. The NTC also concedes that only
“after a prosecution or appropriate investigation” can it be established that the Garci Tapes constitute “false information and/or
willful misrepresentation.” Clearly, the NTC admits that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes contain false information or willful
misrepresentation.

4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case - The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-
based prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might
contain “false information and/or willful misrepresentation,” and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the
restraint is content-based.

5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case - The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it
does not fall under any of the four existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing
 of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly
improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections.

Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is
indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. In any event, public discussion on all political issues
should always remain uninhibited, robust and wide open.

The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. On this
ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping,
illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be subject
to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national
security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State.

The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the Garci Tapes is a matter of important
public concern. The Constitution guarantees the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The remedy of any
person aggrieved by the public airing of the Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law after the
commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.

While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be subsequent punishment for protected expression under
libel, tort or other laws. In the present case, the NTC action seeks prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes, not punishment of
personnel of radio and television stations for actual violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint - The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior
restraint on expression. The charter of the NTC does not vest NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio
and television stations.

In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never be subject to prior restraint. However,
even assuming for the sake of argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression, only the courts have
the power to adjudicate on the factual and legal issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and present danger
of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint.

Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior adjudication by the courts on whether the prior restraint
is constitutional. This is a necessary consequence from the presumption of invalidity of any prior restraint on unprotected
expression.\

7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity

Respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior restraint on the public airing of the Garci Tapes. The
respondents claim that they merely “fairly warned” radio and television stations to observe the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent
NTC circulars on program standards. Respondents have not explained how and why the observance by radio and television
stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars constitutes a compelling State interest justifying prior restraint on
the public airing of the Garci Tapes.

Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal statute, can always be subject to criminal prosecution after
the violation is committed. Respondents have not explained how the violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, or of the pertinent NTC
circulars, can incite imminent lawless behavior or endanger the security of the State.

8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint - The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the
airwave permits of radio and television stations constitutes impermissible pressure amounting to prior restraint on
protected expression. Whether the threat is made in an order, regulation, advisory or press release, the chilling effect is
the same: the threat freezes radio and television stations into deafening silence. Radio and television stations that have
invested substantial sums in capital equipment and market development suddenly face suspension or cancellation of their
permits. The NTC threat is thus real and potent.

9. Conclusion - In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression. There
can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This rule has no exception.
 2. Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Dy, G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411, April 2, 2009

Petitioners applied for the renewal of the mayor’s permit on 2002. Bagnos Maximo [the City Zoning Administrator-Designate]
required the petitioner to submit "either an approved land conversion papers from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land, or an approved resolution from the
Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the re-classification of the property from agricultural to commercial
land." Petitioners had never been required to submit such papers before, and from 1996 to 2001, the OMPDC had consistently
certified that the property had been classified as commercial.

Due to this refusal by Maximo to issue the zoning clearance, petitioners were unable to secure a mayor’s permit. Petitioners
filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City to compel the issuance of the 2002 mayor’s
permit.

RTC denied the application of the petitioners; CA dismissed the case due to the availability of other speedy remedies with the trial
court.

Then DAR Region II Director Abrino L. Aydinan (Director Aydinan) granted the application [of the petitioner] and issued an Order
that stated that "there remains no doubt on the part of this Office of the non-agricultural classification of subject land before the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

On 16 January 2003, petitioners filed their applications for renewal of mayor’s permit for the year 2003, attaching therein the DAR
Order. Their application was approved. However, on 4 March 2003, respondent Felicisimo Meer, Acting City Administrator of
Cauayan City, wrote to petitioners claiming that the DAR Order was spurious or void, as the Regional Center for Land Use Policy
Planning and Implementation (RCLUPPI) supposedly reported that it did not have any record of the DAR Order.

The controversy continued into 2004. In January of that year, petitioners filed their respective applications for their 2004 mayor’s
permit, again with the DAR Order attached to the same. A zonal clearance was issued in favor of petitioners. Yet in a letter dated 13
January 2004, respondent Meer claimed that no record existed of DAR Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-002 with the Office of the
Regional Director of the DAR or with the RCLUPPI. As a result, petitioners were informed that there was no basis for the issuance
in their favor of the requisite zoning clearance needed for the issuance of the mayor’s permit.

On 17 February 2004, respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, arrived at the property
and closed the radio stations. Petitioners proceeded to file a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking
enforcement of the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibited the closure of radio stations during the then-pendency of the election
period. On 23 March 2004, the COMELEC issued an order directing the parties to maintain the status prevailing before 17 February
2004, thus allowing the operation of the radio stations, and petitioners proceeded to operate the stations the following day.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech,
expression or of the press.

Held: Yes.

Ratio: Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality,
not all prior restraints on speech are invalid.

That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of respondents who happen to
be members of the press is clear enough. There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning
that governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at
most other forms of behavior.

At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards; and a content-based restraint or
censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated
as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression. Content-
neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.

ANOTHER VERSION

ISSUE: Whether or not there is prior restraint against DZNC.

HELD: YES. Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of denial of the right to free speech and
of the press. In their tale, there is undeniable political color. They admit that in 2001, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the
widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political
dynasty. Respondent Ceasar Dy is the brother of Faustino Dy, Jr., governor of Isabela from 2001 until he was defeated in his re-
election bid in 2004 by Grace Padaca, a former assistant station manager at petitioners own DZNC Bombo Radyo. A rival AM radio
station in Cauayan City, DWDY, is owned and operated by the Dy family. Petitioners likewise direct our attention to a 20 February
2004 article printed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer where Dy is quoted as intending to file disenfranchisement proceedings against
DZNC-AM.

Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. Petitioners have been aggressive in exposing
the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such
statement manifests and confirms that respondent’s denial of the renewal applications on the ground that property is commercial
and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice. This is a
blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.

Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents, we can identify the bare acts of closing
the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press. Prior
restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination. While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior
restraints on speech are invalid.

All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents to ultimately shut down petitioners radio station
were ultimately content-based. The United States Supreme Court generally treats restriction of the expression of a particular point
of view as the paradigm violation of the First Amendment.[53] The facts confronting us now could have easily been drawn up by a
constitutional law professor eager to provide a plain example on how free speech may be violated.

Content-neutral regulation: i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well-defined standards.

Content-based restraint or censorship: i.e., the restriction based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech

The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict scrutiny from the Court, the test which
we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on free speech, as well as for laws dealing with freedom of
the mind or restricting the political process, of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.[54] The immediate implication of the application of
the strict scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to prove that their actions do not infringe
upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason,[55] the
burden lies with the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression.