Question:
Leading money center banks in the United States have accelerated their investment banking
activities all over the globe in recent years, purchasing corporate debt securities and stock from
their business customers and reselling those securities to investors in the open market. Is this a
desirable move by banking organizations from a profit standpoint? From a risk standpoint? From
the public interest point of view? How would you research these questions? If you were
managing a corporation that had placed large deposits with a bank engaged in such activities,
would you be concerned about the risk to your company's funds? Why or why not?
Answer:
In the 1970's and early 1980's investment banking was so profitable that commercial bankers
were lured into the investment banking business largely because of its greater profit potential
than possessed by more traditional commercial banking activities. Later foreign banks,
particularly the British and Japanese banking firms, began to attract away large corporate
customers from U.S. banks, who were restrained by regulation from offering many investment
banking services. Thus, U.S. banks ran into severe difficulty in simply trying to hold onto their
traditional corporate credit and deposit accounts because they could not compete service-wise in
the investment banking field. Today, banks are allowed to underwrite securities through either a
subsidiary or through a holding company structure. This change occurred as part of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (Financial Services Modernization Act).
Unfortunately, if investment banking is more profitable than traditional banking product lines, it
is also more risky, consistent with the basic tenet of finance that risk and return are directly
related. That is why the Federal Reserve Board has placed such strict limits on the type of
organization that can offer these services. Currently, the underwriting of most corporate
securities must be done through a subsidiary or as a separate part of the holding company so that,
in theory at least, the bank is not responsible for any losses incurred. For this reason there may be
little reason for depositors (including large corporate depositors) to be concerned about risk
exposure from investment banking. Moreover, the ability to offer such services may make U.S.
banks more viable in the long run which helps their corporate customers who depend upon them
for credit.
On the other hand, opponents of investment banking powers for bank operations inside the U.S.
have some reasonable concerns that must be addressed. There are, for example, possible conflicts
of interest. Information gathered in the investment banking division could be used to the
detriment of customers purchasing other bank services. For example, a customer seeking a loan
may be told that he or she must buy securities from the bank's investment banking division in
order to receive a loan. Moreover, banks could gain effective control over some nonbank
industrial corporations which might subject them to added risk exposure and place industrial
firms not allied with banks at a competitive disadvantage. As a result the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act has built in some protections to prevent this from happening.