BACKGROUND GUIDE

United Nations Security

November 2024
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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC)

CONTENTS

I. Letter from the Executive Board

II. The United Nations Security Council

III. Rules of Procedure

IV. Stakeholder Analysis

V. History of the Conflict

VI. Legal Aspects

VII. Directional Assistance

VIII. Nature and Proof of Evidence

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Letter from the Executive Board

It is with profound honor and immense pleasure that we welcome you to the United Nations Security Council at
SNISMUN 2024. As the Executive Board, we are dedicated to ensuring a seamless and enriching committee
experience over the next two days. Your roles as representatives of member nations are critical as you engage in
meaningful debates, deliberations, and consensus-building on our agenda.

This background guide has been crafted to provide you with a foundational understanding to kickstart your
research. However, it is imperative that you do not rely solely on this document. We expect you to expand upon
the information provided here by conducting thorough and independent research from credible sources.
Engaging in comprehensive and pragmatic debates throughout the sessions is essential for the success of our
committee.

The Executive Board will refrain from interfering in the flow of debate unless absolutely necessary. Thus, the
responsibility to maintain a dynamic and productive committee lies with you, the delegates. We are confident
that with meticulous research and active participation, you can navigate the discussions effectively and drive the
committee toward significant outcomes.

Additionally, please refer to the addendum attached to this letter for details on the nature of evidence required
in this simulation. We urge you to approach this conference not as a zero-sum game but as a collaborative
learning experience.

The success of our committee depends on the active involvement of each delegate. We believe in your potential
to excel and lead, whether you are a first-time participant or a seasoned veteran. We encourage you to speak
and participate actively, as it would bring us immense satisfaction to see each delegate leave with greater
knowledge and confidence than when they arrived.

With best wishes for a successful conference,

Adithya Krishna Arjun Sarathi Shishir Simha

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The United Nations Security Council

The core mandate of the Security Council, contained in Article 24 (1) of the UN Charter,
gives it “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.

The Security Council acts on behalf of the entire UN and has the authority to bind all members of the
organization. The Security Council aims to peacefully resolve international disputes in accordance with Chapter
VI of the UN Charter, which authorizes the Security Council to call on parties to seek solutions via negotiation,
arbitration, or other peaceful means. Failing that, Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to take more
assertive actions, such as imposing sanctions or authorizing the use of force “to maintain or restore international
peace and security.”

The Council is composed of 15 Member States, with five permanent members –China, France, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States –and ten non-permanent members who are elected for
2-year terms. A/RES/1991 (XVIII) distributes the non-permanent seats regionally: 5 African and Asian Member
States –one seat conventionally reserved for an Arab Member State, 1 Eastern European Member State, 2 Latin
American and the Caribbean Member States, and 2 Western European and other Member States.

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Rules of Procedure
A Model UN is built upon its rules of procedure. With no proper conduct, we fail the
entire point of a mock UN. This section of the Background guide will cover all the ROPs
required to know the basic happenings of a conference.

1. Research :- Each delegate must research the nation's profile, agenda background, previous international
action and country foreign policy along with possible solutions that relate to the agenda. These five
aspects serve as the cornerstones of the research made by the delegate.

2. Roll call :- A delegate can vote either ‘present’ or ‘present and voting’. ‘Present’ grants the delegate to
abstain from voting upon the draft resolution whereas ‘Present and voting’ does not grant the delegate
the same power of abstaining.

3. The General Speakers List :- The GSL refers to a speech of merely 90 seconds that talks about the
agenda or summarizes one's position paper. It is to be of relevance to one's nation and the agenda.

4. Time Yields :- If a delegate has an amount of time remaining in their speech, they may yield their time in
the following ways:
• Yield to the EB
• Yield to the floor for questions
• Yield to comments
• Yield to another delegate

5. Moderated Caucus :- A moderated caucus refers to speech made to cover a sub-topic of the agenda. It
requires a majority of committee votes to pass. It requires specific verbatim to make it valid. For
example :- “The delegate of XYZ would like to motion for a moderated caucus on the topic XYZ for a
total time period of X providing X to each speaker.

6. Unmoderated Caucus :- During this caucus, delegates are free to lobby, discuss future moderated
caucuses, make allies, working papers etc. it is often referred to as informal debate.

7. Points :- There are four points that are used in a conference. They are as follows-
• Point of information - POI’s are questions directed to a delegate's speech in accordance to the agenda
and are strictly required to be relevant.
• Point of order - Under a point of order a delegate may raise either a ‘logical fallacy’ or ‘factual
inaccuracy’.
• Logical fallacy - When a delegate has mentioned something in their speech with logically fallacious we
refer to it as a logical fallacy.
• Factual inaccuracy - When a delegate has mentioned a fact which is wrong or inaccurate of any sort, we
refer to it as a factual inaccuracy.

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• Point of parliamentary enquiry -: A POE may be raised to clarify any doubts and misunderstandings with
regards to the proceedings of the committee.
• Point of personal privilege -: A Point of Personal Privilege must refer to a matter of personal comfort,
safety and/or well being of the members of the committee.

8. Documentation
• Position paper :- Refers to a paper that is to be submitted prior to the dates of the conference. It
contains the stance of your nation and must answer the following:
○ Current position of the nation
○ Past actions
○ Possible solutions
• Draft resolution :- Resolutions are a commuted compilation of the solution discussed in committee that
are presented to the world community as an actionable or suggestion to curb a certain issue.
• Working Paper :- Working papers are an outline of the solutions proposed.
○ They are usually to be submitted prior to the tabling of the DR.

9. Voting
• There are 5 types of voting methods. All being :-
○ Yes
○ No
○ Yes with rights
○ No with rights
○ Abstain

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Stakeholder Analysis
“Everyone who does not agree with me is a traitor and a scoundrel.” - George III, King of Great Britain and
Ireland (1760-1820), Colonizing Connoisseur

Greece:

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes in its articles fundamental
principles for the delimitation of maritime boundaries and the attribution of sovereign rights over maritime
areas. In general terms, this document grants states sovereign rights over the waters off their coasts up to a limit
of 12 nautical miles. In addition, the convention addresses the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),
granting coastal states exclusive rights over natural resources in this area, which extends up to 200 nautical
miles from the baseline.

From agreement with the convention, Greece would have the right to declare up to 12 nautical miles around its
many islands as its own sovereignty. But if it did so, it would assume almost complete control over navigation in
the Aegean, making it a de facto Greek inland sea and significantly limiting Turkey's access to it. Since the
Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits are vital for communicating the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the loss of
freedom of navigation through these channels is seen by Turkey as a direct threat to its national interests.

The Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, announced in 2020 the signature of agreements with Cairo and
Rome for the expansion of the coastal zone westward from 6 to 12 miles which saw the Greek Parliament
following article 3 of the Law of the Sea Convention. Ankara does not recognize this expansion and has carried
out explorations in the area which, according to Turkish authorities, belongs to its continental shelf. The
European Union and Greece have condemned these actions.

Turkey:

Turkey claims that the threat of extending Greek territorial waters beyond their present width of 6 miles, the
remilitarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands placed under demilitarized status by virtue of the very
agreements ceding them to Greece, a 10 mile "national air space" over territorial waters of 6, abuse of the FIR
service responsibility as if it confers sovereignty (request of flight plans from state aircraft and allegations of
"violations of" Athens FIR) can be counted among the issues which are the real underlying causes of the Turco-
Greek conflict in the Aegean.

Turkey holds the view, unlike most other states, that no islands can have a full Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
and should only be entitled to a 12 nautical mile reduced EEZ or no EEZ at all rather than the usual 200 miles
that Turkey and every other country are entitled to. In this context, Turkey, for the first time on 1 December
2019, claimed that the Greek island of Kastellorizo shouldn't have any EEZ at all, because, from the equity-based
Turkish viewpoint, it is a small island immediately across the Turkish mainland (which, according to Turkey, has
the longest coastline), and isn't supposed to generate a maritime jurisdiction area four thousand times larger

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than its own surface.

Furthermore, according to Turkey's Foreign Ministry, an EEZ has to be coextensive with the continental shelf,
based on the relative lengths of adjacent coastlines and described any opposing views supporting the right of
islands to their EEZ as "maximalist and uncompromising Greek and Greek Cypriot claims". On 20 January 2020,
the Turkish President Erdogan challenged even the rights of Crete, Greece's largest island and 5th largest in the
Mediterranean, stating that "They talk about a continental shelf around Crete. There is no continental shelf
around the islands, there is no such thing, there, it is only sovereign waters."

While Greece bases its position on the Law of the Sea Convention, Ankara appeals to customary international
law, which is binding on countries such as Turkey that are not signatories to the convention, and which includes
principles such as freedom of navigation and the equitable delimitation of maritime boundaries. This discussion
on the extension of territorial waters and the EEZ also involves a dispute over the airspace over these extended
waters.

Cyprus:

The Cyprus conflict further adds oil to the flame with respect to the Aegean Sea dispute. After the
decolonisation of Cyprus, conflict between Greeks and Turks broke out on the island. In the 1950s, the pursuit of
enosis became a part of Greece's national policy. Taksim became the slogan by some Turkish Cypriots in
reaction to enosis. Tensions between Greece and Turkey increased, and the ambivalence towards Cyprus by the
Greek government of George Papandreou led to the Greek military coup. In 1974, the Greek government staged
a coup against the Cypriot president and Archbishop Makarios by invading Cyprus and establishing a Greece-
controlled Cyprus government. Soon after, Turkey—using its guarantor status arising from the trilateral accords
of the 1959–1960 Zürich and London Agreement—invaded Cyprus. The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was
declared one year later.

The increasingly unfriendly discourse of both sides’ elites and politicians after the 1974 Cyprus War increased
distrust between two nations. T. Pangalos, the former Greek Foreign Minister, and E. Gonensay, the former
Turkish Foreign Minister, both made “degrading” and “hostile” declarations regarding each other and destroyed
the foundations of their dialogue by causing increasing distrust and suspicion in both societies toward each
other. Furthermore, Greece used every opportunity to degrade
Turkey in its relationship with the EU, which also further increased suspicion and distrust in Turkish society
toward Greece and increased the unfriendly atmosphere between the two countries. In addition to the Cyprus
dispute, the treatment of Greek minorities in Turkey and of Turkish minorities in Greece also increased the
hostility and distrust between two nations.

Russia:

Russia has been skillful and successful in seeking opportunities to engage the region, cultivating rising political,
economic, religious, or cultural decision makers in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. It now has a clear presence in the
Eastern Mediterranean that cannot be ignored. Russia has been able to compartmentalize its differences with
Turkey to develop a working accommodation in Syria and the South Caucasus, even as the two countries

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operate largely as competitors in Libya and Ukraine. Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system
exacerbated frictions with the United States of America, throwing NATO into an internal crisis and leading to
Turkey’s expulsion of the F-35 and Patriot missile programs.

For Russia, the sale was not only a symbolic win for its arms industry; it succeeded in stoking fissures in the
Western alliance and complicating its weapons development programs. Nonetheless, while the Russo-Turkish
relationship might appear robust, it is neither deep nor wide, and it is largely dependent on the two countries’
authoritarian leaders.

Russia’s engagement with Greece has been less successful. Once described as Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe,
Athens pivoted back sharply toward its European and NATO partners after the 2018 exposure of Russian
attempts to interfere in Greek politics and to upend its rapprochement with North Macedonia. Despite its
promises of financial assistance, Moscow lacks the economic clout to help address Greece’s decade-long
financial crisis.

The Blue Stream and Turkstream gas pipelines have created energy dependencies between Russia and Turkey,
that have helped stabilize ties, including after the Turkish military downed a Russian fighter jet in 2015. That
incident led to a nine-month downward spiral in relations with Russia banning produce imports from Turkey and
curtailing tourist travel to the country, a key revenue source for Ankara.

United States of America:

The U.S. position is that the passages between Greek islands that are international waters qualify as
international straits and are therefore exempt from innocent-passage restrictions. Turkey and other maritime
nations take the same view. In 1994, after the objectionable seabed mining articles were modified, U.S. policy
on the LOS Convention underwent a sharp reversal. On 7 October 1994 President Bill Clinton signed the
Convention and sent it to the Senate for approval, although the Senate has yet to act. A 1996 Department of
Defense publication stresses that access to the oceans, including areas of foreign coasts at great distances from
the United States, is vital to U.S. security and economic interests. In regard to the Aegean dispute, the DoD
document states that "the LOS Convention provides both Greece and Turkey with normative rules and dispute
resolution machinery."

If the United States cannot force the disputing parties to settle their differences within the
framework of the LOS Convention, either alone or in concert with NATO partners, what
other avenues remain? An attempt to play the superpower and pressure Greece and
Turkey into a settlement outside the LOS Convention would require the United States to
frame compromise settlements and force them on two NATO allies, each with substantial
political leverage in Washington.

United Kingdom:

The British position can be seen plainly in an Foreign and Commonwealth Office brief in 1977: ‘It happens that
the British Government’s view of the issue is much closer to the Greek than the Turkish view. In particular,

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Britain supports the entitlement of islands to have a continental shelf.’

The backstage reality is however better encapsulated in the following extract from an FCO paper: ‘We should
also recognise that in the final analysis Turkey must be regarded as more important to Western strategic
interests than Greece and that, if risks must be run, they should be risks of further straining Greek rather than
Turkish relations with West.’

Although the US is still trying, with the UK (and, until recently, Germany) to force Greece and Turkey to talk to
each other on an equal footing, this is precisely what Turkey wants, so as to avoid its claims going to the
International Court at the Hague.

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History of the Conflict

The conflict revolves around the struggle between the Turks and Greeks to establish and/or extend their zones
of jurisdiction over the Aegean Sea and this struggle has been dragged on for centuries.

Turkey and Greece are the only two countries whose coasts are washed by the Aegean waters and thus have
respective vital economic, social, political and security interests in the Aegean Sea. For that reason they have to
somehow harmonize their rights and interests in the Aegean Sea and have to live together in a good
neighborhood. Despite such a concrete reality, they have numerous undeniable disputes concerning their
respective sovereign rights over the use of the Aegean Sea in many respects such as the maritime areas, aerial
spaces, and certain islands, islets and rocks of the Aegean Sea. These are, in addition to the Cyprus case, the
status and the minority rights of Western Thrace Turks.

Early History:

Starting from the taking of Rhodes Island by the Turks in 1522 to Greece gaining its independence from the
Ottoman Empire in 1832, the Aegean Sea was totally under the control of the Turks. Then, after Greece's
independence and the Balkan Wars (1912), the Turks lost their control over the Aegean Sea and the Greeks
established zones of influence over it.

Following the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923), which established the current Turkish and Greek

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borders, and the signing of the Treaty of Friendship between two countries in 1930, which lasted until the end of
1950s, there was no struggle between Turks and Greek over the Aegean Sea for over 40 years.

Mid 20th Century:

However, starting in the early 1960s, especially after the 1974 Cyprus War, the struggle between two countries
to establish and extend their zone of influence over the Aegean Sea restarted again and further escalated in the
mid-1990s.

In the present day, the Aegean Sea issue is one of the main problems between Greece and Turkey as well as the
European Union (EU) and Turkey. Due to the increasing debates over the sources and statues of the Aegean Sea
and East Mediterranean, the struggle between the Turks and Greeks to establish and extend their zones of
jurisdiction over the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas continues to be a fundamental issue between Greece and
Turkey and the EU and Turkey.

To further this, the problematic relationship between the EU and Turkey prevents the EU from having a positive
impact on the Turkish-Greek conflict as well as Turkey’s policy toward the Aegean issue. The quality and peace
of EU-Turkey relations are and will be, therefore, determinant in the solution of this long standing dispute
between these factions as well as the transformation of Turkey’s policy toward the Aegean issue.

The first dispute over the Aegean Sea emerged in 1974 when Turkey sent an oceanographic vessel accompanied
by several warships to explore part of Aegean Sea where, according to the claim of Ankara and Athens, the
continental shelf overlapped. Greece sent a diplomatic note to Turkey and sent out a naval force.

In 1976, Ankara sent a seismic ship, also accompanied by a warship, to collect seismic data around Lesbos Island.
Greece put its armed forces on full alert. The UK calmed down Athens and Ankara, and then in 1976, Greece
applied to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which dismissed the case in 1978, and to the United Nation
Security Council (UNSC) which called the two sides together to reduce tension and start a dialogue to solve the
issue (UN Resolution 395)

Late 20th Century:

Later on, the two countries came close to war again in 1987, when Greece announced it would search for oil in
the eastern Aegean, and in 1996, when Greece’s parliament gave the government authority to extend their
territory from 6 to 12 miles in the Aegean Sea by referring international agreements, including the UNCLOS.

In the 121th Assembly (General Assembly of Turkish Parliament, 1995) Turkey reacted to this by declaring that if

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Greece unilaterally extended its territory beyond the current 6 nautical miles, then it would be considered an act
of war. In December 1995, a Turkish bulk carrier ran aground about 4 nautical miles off the West coast of Turkey
on the Kardak/Imia islet. Both Turkey and Greece insisted that the ship was in their territory and directed their
navies to the islet. Only mediation and diplomatic pressure from the United States prevented a war between
two countries at the last minute.

After the Greece-backed coup in Cyprus that was intended to carry out Enosis, which resulted in Turkey’s 1974
Cyprus intervention, Greece’s anxieties increased regarding the safety of hundreds of its islands in the Aegean
Sea located closer to the Turkish mainland than its own. Turkey, on the other hand, worried that Greece might
unilaterally extend the width of its territory to 12 miles in the Aegean Sea and establish new maritime and aerial
zones of jurisdiction. This would close the corridor through international waters for shipping and would thus
prevent Turkey from having access to the Aegean Sea and from ensuring the safety of its west coast.

The increasingly unfriendly discourse of both sides’ elites and politicians after the 1974 Cyprus War increased
distrust between two nations. T. Pangalos, the former Greek Foreign Minister, and E. Gonensay, the former
Turkish Foreign Minister, both made “degrading” and “hostile” declarations regarding each other and destroyed
the foundations of their dialogue by causing increasing distrust and suspicion in both societies toward each
other.

Furthermore, Greece used every opportunity to degrade Turkey in its relationship with the EU, which also
further increased suspicion and distrust in Turkish society toward Greece and increased the unfriendly
atmosphere between the two countries.

In addition to the Cyprus dispute, the treatment of Greek minorities in Turkey and of Turkish minorities in
Greece also increased the hostility and distrust between two nations.

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Legal Aspects
“The great sea makes one a great skeptic.” - Richard Jefferies

Contradictions are painful issues that require sufficient clarity, multiple contradictions present to us the
problematic affair between Greece and Turkey, the Aegean Dispute. Turkey and Greece lie adjacent to each
other geographically, quite the opposite geopolitically. The Aegean dispute is a battle not just for maritime
zones, but for the very soul of sovereignty. It’s a theatre where the cold clarity of international law clashes with
the heated pulse of history, identity, and power. Here, legal principles are bent to political wills, and centuries-
old grievances stir beneath the surface, giving rise to a tension that is both judicial and visceral. The sea becomes
a symbol of unclaimed rights, national pride, and a delicate balance teetering on the edge of war and peace.

Preliminary Reading

“The sea is like a wild woman who never ages. She’ll seduce you, thrash you, and leave you aching for more,
laughing at your misery.” - Charles Bukowski

Geography

The Aegean Sea is surrounded by the Greek and Turkish land mass expanding north and westward and
eastward, with Evros demarcating the land boundary between the two States. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in
1923, played a dominant role for bringing an end to several territorial disputes between the two States.

Aegean Sea is particularly narrow, with its width is ranging from 150 nm (mid- section) to 200 nm. Greek islands,
rocks, low tide elevations and islets that pervade the Aegean Sea compose a mosaic of maritime features which
complicates the Aegean delimitation. Exacerbating the noteworthy complications, some of the Eastern Greek
islands are located remarkably near the Turkish Coastline, e.g. Samos's distance from the Turkish coast is
approximately 1 nm. It was cited that the Greek territorial sea covers 43.68 % of the Aegean as opposed to 7.4%
under Turkey, with the remaining enjoying the status of high seas.

Summary of Arguments

The Maritime Boundaries and the Breadth of Territorial Waters in the Aegean as well as the Aegean Continental
Shelf disputes concern the Aegean Seas two coastal states: Turkey and Greece. Turkey perceives each as a
genuine issue requiring examination and resolution. Greece’s position has been that the only legitimate dispute
that needs to be settled between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean is the delimitation of the Aegean continental
shelf.

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Introduction

“The sea is the same as it has been since before men ever went on it in boats. It is not a safe place; it is
indifferent, and that’s what makes it so dangerous.” - Ernest Hemingway

Greece and Turkey are two littoral states that neighbour the Aegean Sea. The physical proximity of these two
nations, as well as their historical and cultural relationship, has resulted in many serious problems pertaining to
international law. Though the Parties have come together numerous times to reach an agreement on these
matters, the conflict in the region continues to create an increasingly tense atmosphere day by day. The
preeminent disputes are those regarding maritime delimitations in the Aegean.

The main problems in the Aegean are delimitation of territorial waters and the continental shelf, and the legal
status of some islands. Greece owns more than two thousand islands in the Aegean and some of them are within
five miles of the Turkish coast. Obviously, Greece has a great interest in these islands regarding national
sovereignty and security. On the other hand, the island's geographical proximity to Turkish shores has security
implications for Turkey, as well. While Greece is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Turkey did not ratify the Convention, even to date.

The conflict between Greece and Turkey escalated in 1995 when Greece ratified the Convention. UNCLOS
provides for the right to territorial waters up to twelve nautical miles. Turkey claims six nautical miles of
territorial waters in the Aegean Sea and has been strongly opposing any Greek claim larger than six nautical
miles. For this reason, Turkey interpreted the ratification of UNCLOS by Greece serious enough to regard it a
casus belli.

Post the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Cyprus Invasion, an incident in 1996 over the islets of Imia revived
the Aegean issues. Even though these islets do not have any economic or geopolitical significance, their legal
status is crucial for the determination of the ownership of several islands, islets and rocks around the
Dodecanese. Due to this altercation, two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, move towards the islets with their
naval powers.

Apart from these aforementioned ongoing crises, there are also other conflicts taking place between these two
countries in the Mediterranean. Greece and Turkey cannot agree on maritime zone delimitation of their
exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in the Mediterranean. In recent years, it has been claimed that
the east Mediterranean Sea may possess rich oil and natural gas fields, and such claims have resulted in the
escalation of a tense atmosphere in the Mediterranean.

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Conceptual Analysis

This section of the guide covers certain concepts under International Maritime Law which every delegate is
expected to be acquainted with. The executive board would favourably look forward to greater deliberations
that assimilate these concepts and augment debate towards issues arising from the same.

• UNCLOS:
I. Territorial Sea: UNCLOS envisages the right to the Coastal States to exercise and expand their sovereignty
over 12 nm over its territorial seas as well as its seabed, subsoil, and airspace, under article 2 and 3.

II. Continental Shelf: UNCLOS accords exclusive sovereign rights to coastal States over their Continental Shelf
(which may extend beyond 200 miles under conditions) for exploring and exploiting petroleum reserves. The
‘exclusive’ rights denote that no other State may undertake E&P operations, thus exploring and exploiting the
Continental Shelf.

III. Exclusive Economic Zones: UNCLOS introduced the concept of EEZ which constitutes a maritime area
extending up to 200 nm. It is postulated that the concept is enunciated from State practice. EEZ exists ipso jure
(after the Coastal State promulgates the EEZ) and confers sovereign rights to the Coastal States (and Islands) to
explore, exploit and manage petroleum reserves (the rights accorded expand to living and non-living natural
resources of the water column, seabed, and subsoil of the area).

IV. Islands: UNCLOS confers equal sovereign rights to the foregoing maritime zones to Islands under article 121.
The Law of Sea explicitly denies EEZ or continental shelf to rocks. Rocks are explicitly defined as not supporting
human life or economic life of their own. The Convention dictates no other qualification or condition or a
measurable bar for a sea feature for laying a claim to the foreign maritime zones.

• Continental Shelf:
A practical or legal definition existed for the concept of continental shelf at the beginning of the 20th century.
The continental shelf started to be debated years after the question of the extension of the territorial sea was
discussed in the international community and only after the exploitation of the resources on the seabed and
subsoil were on the agenda. The Truman Proclamation was the initial point in the development of the legal
concept of the continental shelf, as it provided a model for a succession of similar claims by other [Link]
United Nations Conference on the Law of Sea that was held in 1958, along with other issues of the law of the
sea, attempted to formulate an agreed legal definition of the continental shelf, since delegates were reluctant to
accept uncertain criteria as “exploitability” for a description. A compromise was reached including both the
International Law Commission’s exploitability criteria and more precise depth criteria in the definition of the
continental shelf.

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This definition contained the criteria of adjacency to the coast and of exploitability, however was still regarded
as imprecise and open-ended nature in terms of delimitation. Moreover, as for the debates on effective control
and exploitation, the coastal state rights over the shelf were not based on notions of occupation or expressed
claims made by states. Thus, Article 2 of the Geneva Convention proposed that states had this right ipso jure:
32 International Boundary Cases: The Continental Shelf (1992) p. 3.

1. The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal state does
not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities,
or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State.
3. The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or
notional, or on any express proclamation.

The legal concept of continental shelf laid down in 1958 was first considered by the ICJ in 1969, with the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases. When the Court was asked to lay down the principles of international law
applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea between the Netherlands, Germany and
Denmark; it also used the term “natural prolongation”. This situation in turn had implications on the subsequent
jurisprudence, changing the focus from the water depth and exploitability criteria to the geological
characteristics of the seabed.

In addition, it referred to an element of proportionality for delimitation between the extent of the continental
shelf areas appertaining to that state and the length of its coast measured in the general direction of the coast
line.

Later however, it was generally agreed that an international regime needed to be established for the deep
seabed and it was necessary to overcome the vague points and uncertainties of the definition for the outer limits
of the shelf made in the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf in 1958.

Article 76(1) of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea contained the following new definition of the
continental shelf:

The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend
beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.

In sum, there is no single rule applicable to all delimitation cases. Nonetheless, the manner in which the 1958
and 1982 Conventions are interpreted along with customary international law, points to a single practice that is

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to be affected “...by agreement, in accordance with equitable principles and taking into account all relevant
circumstances in order to achieve an equitable solution”.

Claims

• Greece: The Greek government is, first of all, critical of the Turkish attitude in solving the delimitation
problem. Turkey argues that the delimitation of the continental shelf areas between Greece and Turkey
concerns the partition of the entire Aegean and insists that it should acquire those areas that fall west of
the Greek islands up to the middle of the Aegean Sea. This understanding of delimitation, according to
Greece, falls far from having a legal character, making the issue one of a political. Greece maintains that,
without any reference to international law and practice, Turkey tries to realize its aspirations in the
Aegean Sea with ill grounded propositions. With a pure legal stance, firstly, Greece states that all Greek
islands, including the Eastern Aegean islands belonging to it, have a right to claim continental shelf.
There is no reason for these territories should be denied the legal right just as mainland Greece has. This
is in total conformity with international treaty and customary law, mentioned openly in the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf Article 1(b). “Greece notes that, it is necessary to respect rights
acquired under the existing international Conventions, especially those adopted under the auspices of
the UN”.

• Turkey: Turkey is persistent in arguing for a delimitation in the Aegean that concerns the whole of the
semi-enclosed sea. Contrary to Greek propositions, Turkey in its part has legal justifications of its own,
again arguing for a settlement in accordance with international law. It is important here to note that
Turkey is not a party to the 1958 Geneva Convention as well as to the 1982 Convention, although Greece
is a party to both. As a result the dispute needs to be dealt with within the context of customary
international law. Together with rules of international customary law, the Turkish position is also
inspired by the jurisprudence of the ICJ, particularly the 1969 judgment of the North Sea Continental
Shelf Case.

Turkey argues for an agreement to be reached between the two Aegean states with regard to the
delimitation of the continental shelf. Also being mentioned in the two major conventions on the law of
the sea, the first attribution for a settlement is affected by an agreement. Regardless of customary law,
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea and Articles 74-83 of the 1982 Convention
attach considerable emphasis on the agreement of parties in formulating rules on delimitation of the
seabed or maritime areas. As also stated in the Jan Mayen Case of 1993, the delimitation of the
continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts, is to be affected “by agreement on
the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, in order to achieve an
equitable solution.”. This perspective is in line with Turkish policy in the Aegean, where Turkish policy
makers always sought to achieve an agreement with its Greek counterparts on several meetings,
including ministerial level ones.

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Directional Assistance
“The sea calls to you, but it demands tribute—a pound of flesh for each wave you conquer. True freedom is
found in this relentless labor, and only those who toil can claim mastery over themselves.” - Jack London

This guide barely dents the gigantic corpus of legalese and International Law that exists within the ambit of the
agenda. The Executive Board, choosing not to hand out a silver platter, has restricted the presentation of
legalities surrounding the dispute to mere concepts that fuel further queries and arguments. However,
considering the extraordinarily technical character of the agenda, the EB has chosen to provide some help with
regards to how delegates can take committee forward. Mentioned below are certain important topics that
require severe analysis to gain a better understanding of the situation itself and for plausible solutions to take
form.

1. Geographical Dictation
2. North-South Depression
3. Right of Islands to their Own Continental Shelf
4. Semi-Enclosed Nature of the Aegean Sea
5. Principle of Equity and Fairness
6. Non-Encroachment
7. Enclave
8. Equality of Title
9. Proportionality of Coastal Lengths
10. Obligation to Negotiate

*Note: This guide is for reference only. Nothing mentioned in this guide or any other
publication by the EB can be used as proof of fact.

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Nature and Proof of Evidence

1. Reuters: Any Contentious remarks made in committee will be supported or refuted by records and
stories from the Reuters News agency.

2. Al Jazeera: Reports and news articles from this agency shall be used to corroborate or refute any
allegation made in the committee.

3. UN Documents: All UN agencies' documents should be regarded as adequate evidence. All UN bodies'
reports, including those derived from treaties, shall be accepted.

Other sources, such as Wikipedia, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty. International newspapers like the
Guardian, Washington Post, and so on, will not be recognized as reliable evidence. However, they can be used to
gain a better understanding of any topic and may even be brought up in a debate if the information they provide
is consistent with the views of a delegate or a government.

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GOOD LUCK TO ALL

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