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Investigation findings and lessons learned in the west fertilizer explosion

Article in Journal of Fire Sciences · September 2017

DOI: 10.1177/0734904117715649

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Special Issue Article
Journal of Fire Sciences
Investigation findings and 2017, Vol. 35(5) 379–395
Ó The Author(s) 2017
lessons learned in the west Reprints and permissions:
[Link]/[Link]

fertilizer explosion DOI: 10.1177/0734904117715649

[Link]/home/jfs

Scott Davis, Tom DeBold and Claudio Marsegan

Date received: 8 November 2016; accepted: 13 May 2017

Abstract
On 17 April 2013, an explosion occurred at the West Fertilizer Company storage and distribution
facility in West, Texas. The explosion at West Fertilizer resulted from an intense fire in the seed
and storage area of the facility that led to the detonation of approximately 30 tons of ammonium
nitrate stored inside a wooden receiving bin. The explosion occurred while emergency services
personnel were responding to a fire at the facility. Fifteen people were killed, more than 250 were
injured, and numerous buildings were damaged or destroyed. This article presents the results of
our investigation into the cause and origin of the explosion event, which included (1) early video
footage which showed the room where the initial fire originates and (2) applying advanced blast
techniques to determine the quantity of ammonium nitrate that likely detonated during the blast.
These techniques included near-field blast effects (e.g. the resulting crater left by the blast) as well
as the far-field blast damage resulting in the neighboring community.

Keywords
Ammonium Nitrate Detonation, Blast Explosion Modeling, West Fertilizer Explosion
Investigation, Cause and Origin, Emergency Response

Introduction
The West Fertilizer Company was owned by Adair Grain Inc. and parts of the property were
located in West, Texas. The Seed and Fertilizer building (Figure 1) was built in 1958 and
supplied (not produced) fertilizer and seed to farmers up until the date of the incident. In
general, the company stored liquid fertilizers (including anhydrous ammonia) in tanks, seed

GexCon US, Bethesda, MD, USA

Corresponding author:
Scott Davis, GexCon US, Bethesda, MD 20814, USA.
Email: sgdavis7@[Link]
380 Journal of Fire Sciences 35(5)

Figure 1. West Fertilizer facility – viewed from the west (upper) and east (lower).

in silos, and solid fertilizer and seed. Figure 2 shows the layout of the Seed and Fertilizer
building, which included an ammonium nitrate (AN) storage bin neighboring the seed room,
as well as an empty bin used for AN storage, and bins containing AN, K-Mag (fertilizer mix
of potassium, magnesium and sulfur), potash, ammonium sulfate, DAP (diammonium phos-
phate), and a bin for potassium chloride along the west wall. This building was capable of
receiving rail shipments directly from the rail car by means of a rail spur junction and an
underground conveyor belt and bucket elevator; the bucket elevator dumped directly into
the northern AN storage bin or onto a conveyor belt feeding the bins along the west wall. A
cross section of the underground conveyor belt, pit, and bucket elevator is provided in
Figure 2.
On 17 April 2013, at approximately 7:29 pm, a fire was reported and fire fighters
responded to the fertilizer plant.1 All operations were already stopped for the day and
employees had left the plant at about 5:30–6:00 pm. The temperature at the time of the inci-
dent was between 78 and 80°F, and the wind was coming from the SSE at approximately
19 mile/h. GexCon obtained several videos that recorded the progression of the initial fire.
Figure 3 shows the initial fire as viewed from the east; note that the highest point on the
building represents the location of the bucket elevator by the northern AN storage bin. The
Davis et al. 381

Figure 2. Layout of the Seed and Fertilizer building (left). Cross section of the underground conveyor
belt, pit, and bucket elevator (right).

Figure 3. Close up of the Seed and Fertilizer building during fire (viewed from east).

image shows that the fire is isolated to the northern section of the building, which includes
the seed room and portions of the northern AN storage bin containing about 30 tons of AN.
At approximately 7:50 pm, a massive explosion occurred at the fertilizer plant. Figure 4
shows images from a video taken from the high school parking lot to the southeast. Based
on the videos from the day of the incident, there were actually two explosions: one smaller
blast followed by a larger blast roughly 300 ms later.2
Fifteen people were killed as a result of the explosion, which included voluntary firefigh-
ters, and over 250 people were injured.3 Damage was extensive throughout the neighboring
community, which included homes, schools, an apartment building, and a nursing home.

Investigative evidence
Explosion damage
The blast at the fertilizer plant was massive. It completely destroyed the Seed and Fertilizer
and office buildings, as well as the neighboring silos. A rail car on the rail spur junction with
382 Journal of Fire Sciences 35(5)

Figure 4. View of the explosion (viewed from southeast).

Figure 5. Blast damage (viewed from the southeast).

100 tons of AN was knocked over and the main rail road was deformed as the blast propa-
gated toward the neighborhood (see Figure 5). The blast caused a crater approximately 90 ft
wide and 10 ft deep1 directly under the northern storage bin containing approximately
30 tons of AN.
Davis et al. 383

Figure 6. Blast damage to the basketball court and apartment complex west of the plant (viewed from
the east).

Figure 7. Half-mile radius from the epicenter of the explosion.

The blast was so powerful that it caused significant damage to the town, which included
multiple houses, schools, a nursing home, and an apartment complex. Figure 6 shows dam-
age to the apartment complex that was directly west of the facility, just over the train tracks.
Windows were broken in houses over a half-mile (;1 km) away from the explosion
(Figure 7).

AN
AN, NH4NO3, is a white crystalline or granular solid that readily absorbs moisture. AN is
predominantly used in agriculture as a high-nitrogen fertilizer, but it is also an ingredient in
384 Journal of Fire Sciences 35(5)

the manufacture of blasting agents. AN is not combustible but is a strong oxidizer, which
means it can support the combustion of other materials, even in the absence of oxygen.
When AN is heated below its melting point, it starts to dissociate into ammonia and nitric
acid, which is an endothermic process.
Once heated past its melting point, however, the decomposition reactions are all exother-
mic; thus, they all contribute to heat generation, further melting the solid AN, and present-
ing possible runaway conditions. The total energy liberated as the decomposition reactions
proceed is known as the heat of explosion. This energy release may ultimately result in a tem-
perature rise of approximately 1800°C–2000°C (3272–3632°F) in the immediate vicinity of
the explosion.4 Since the products of these reactions are all gases, this rapid energy results in
a near instantaneous expansion of the gases. These rapid volume expansions will typically
produce a shock wave that can result in considerable area damage.
The conditions necessary for detonation are not precisely known and have a large varia-
tion. However, data suggest that detonations are promoted by severe shock or by heating
with confinement. The literature supports the theory that uncontaminated fertilizer grade
AN may only detonate under a unique set circumstances that include a severe shock, heat-
ing, and/or confinement.4
Heating AN to its melting temperature (169.6°C/337.3°F) is a major risk because the
decomposition gases create a pressure build-up that needs to be vented. AN in the molten
state is also sensitive to explosive decomposition.5 Molten AN was shown to explode if a sig-
nificantly powerful force was applied.6 In addition, pools of molten AN may form in the
event of fire, and if the molten mass becomes confined (e.g. in drains, pipes, plant, or
machinery), it could explode; this hazard is exacerbated if the AN is contaminated.7

Blast modeling
GexCon performed a blast analysis to determine whether the reported quantities of AN
present in the northern AN bin could cause the observed blast damage at the scene. For
aboveground explosions like that in West, Texas, the damage to neighboring structures is
dominated by the blast wave (air blast) and the damage caused by ground shock is only sec-
ondary. Similar studies8–10 have agreed with this assessment; therefore, only the blast wave
analysis was performed and compared with damage to neighboring structures. This was
accomplished by computation fluid dynamic solver, FLACS-Blast (discussed below), which
solves the fluid motion and does not have models for the ground blast. The results from this
blast analysis were also compared with two previous studies8,10 and TNT blast correlations.
Blast damage imparted on the ground was assessed using a crater analysis.
When estimating the blast effects of explosives, many blast correlations were developed
based on the mass of TNT. Therefore, the ‘‘equivalent’’ mass of TNT that would offer simi-
lar blast effects as that for a given mass of AN was estimated. The TNT equivalency is typi-
cally given in %TNT (by weight). While there have been many explosion tests involving AN,
the reported values for %TNT equivalent vary over a broad range from 0.42 to 1.0.11–13
GexCon conservatively chose the lower end value of the range (0.42), which results in smaller
amounts of TNT in the blast modeling. It is estimated that at least 30 tons of AN were in
the larger AN storage bin adjacent to the Seed Room, so this analysis assumes that 30 tons
of AN detonated, which is equivalent 12.6 tons of TNT (11,430 kg).
Davis et al. 385

The main structure evaluated in the blast analysis was the apartment complex that suf-
fered significant damage due to the air blast, as shown in Figure 6. Based on the magnitude
of damage, the resulting side-on overpressures generated by the detonating AN pile need to
be at least 0.15–0.21 barg (2.15–3.0 psig), which corresponds to ‘‘partial collapse of walls
and roofs of houses,’’ ‘‘lower limit of serious structural damage,’’ ‘‘concrete or cinder block
walls, not reinforced, shattered,’’ and ‘‘50% destruction of brickwork of house.’’14 Therefore,
the goal of the present study was to determine whether 30 tons of AN at the conservatively
lower 0.42%TNT is sufficient to yield the observed damage. Other groups have set the dam-
age threshold side-on overpressures to be greater than 0.21 barg (3.0 psig) for the apartment
complex.8,10

FLACS-Blast
FLACS-Blast is a module of FLACS that simulates the propagation of blast waves from
detonation of high explosives.15 The code does not model the actual detonation process,
but solves the Euler equations with a conservative shock-capturing scheme, the so-called
flux-corrected transport (FCT) scheme.16 The FLACS-Blast solver uses the SOLA-ICE
algorithm with second-order flux correction, instead of the SIMPLE algorithm used by the
standard FLACS solver. FLACS-Blast treats the explosive like a bursting ‘‘balloon,’’ which
starts with the initial condition of a sphere of high temperature and pressure gases at zero
velocity.17–19 The base state is estimated based on heat of reaction and temperature of
products of combustion (for TNT detonations), which is then isentropically compressed to
pressure of 808 bar (consistent with the TNT blast curve) and 10,340°C.
The equation of state is the ideal gas law. Standard TNT blast curves have been used to
establish the empirical scaling relation for the source volume (e.g. effective ‘‘balloon’’ size),
which is proportional to the mass of explosive material. FLACS-Blast has been demon-
strated to match established data for TNT curves. A recent publication further describes the
methodology and has shown very good agreement between experimental results involving
C4 detonations in complex environments and the predictions using FLACS-Blast.20 In order
to accurately predict pressures in the far field (up to approximately 1/2 mile or 800 m), a
uniform cubical grid was required. This resulted in relatively long computational times of
approximately 30 days on eight threads. The FLACS-Blast predictions for the current arti-
cle agreed very well with free-field explosion pressures predicted by TNT curve correlations,
as will be discussed later.

FLACS geometry model of west fertilizer and neighborhood

Using topographical data obtained from aerial flyovers and photographs taken of the site
(e.g. Google or Bing), GexCon constructed a three-dimensional (3D) model of the plant and
surrounding neighborhood. The model included the plant, almost the entire town of West,
Texas and neighboring areas (Figure 8).

FLACS simulations
Using FLACS-Blast, GexCon has evaluated the strength of the blast based on a given mass
of detonating AN and compared the results with the observed damage. This analysis focused
on the overpressure damage to the apartment complex and various homes in the far field in
386 Journal of Fire Sciences 35(5)

Figure 8. View of the model of the fertilizer plant (viewed from the east).

Figure 9. Simulations of a 3D blast wave propagating from 30 tons of detonating ammonium nitrate (red
is pressures . 0.5 barg (7.25 psig) and blue = 0.069 barg (1 psig)).

West, Texas. It was estimated that at least 30 tons of AN were present in the larger bulk stor-
age bin before the explosion; hence, GexCon used 30 tons of AN as an estimate of the quan-
tity of AN that detonated. Also, recall that we chose the lowest reported equivalent mass of
TNT (0.42), which resulted in approximately 12.6 tons of TNT that was used as the input to
the FLACS-Blast simulations.
Figure 9 shows an example of the resulting blast waves propagating in 3D from the
FLACS-Blast simulations of detonating 30 tons of AN. Figure 10 shows a blast wave hitting
the apartment complex just west of the facility: the upper overpressure limit is set at 0.5 barg
Davis et al. 387

Figure 10. Simulations of a 3D blast wave propagating from 30 tons of detonating ammonium nitrate (red
is pressures . 0.5 barg (7.25 psig) and blue = 0.069 barg (1 psig)).

Figure 11. Reflected pressures predicted on the apartment complex based on an equivalent TNT mass of
approximately 12.5–12.6 tons from ABS Consulting10 (left) and the current FLACS-Blast (right).

(;7.25 psig shown in red) which results in an approximate side-on pressure approaching
0.25 barg (;3.6 psig), which are in excess of the threshold overpressures necessary to cause
such damage, yet are still consistent with the damage observed to the apartment complex
shown in Figure 6.
These results agree very well with a previous study,10 who determined that 12.5 tons
(11,363 kg) of TNT was required to reconcile various blast damage indicators near the site.
This study also determined that the equivalent %TNT was approximately 42%, despite orig-
inally estimating 60%. As expected, the reflected blast pressures predicted on the apartment
complex by this study’s computational fluid dynamics analysis10 and the current FLACS-
Blast analysis were greater than approximately 0.5 barg (;7.0 psig), as shown in Figure 11.
The resulting side-on pressures from these results would be greater than 0.25 barg (3.5 psig),
which is consistent with the observed damage levels.
Another study8 determined that the threshold side-on overpressures necessary to cause
the damage to the apartment complex were in excess of 0.2 barg (3 psig) and used this
threshold to determine the required equivalent TNT. They further determined using the
widely accepted correlation for TNT blast curves that the required equivalent TNT
388 Journal of Fire Sciences 35(5)

Figure 12. Simulations of a 3D blast wave propagating varying the amount of ammonium nitrate
detonated (red is pressures . 0.5 barg (7.25 psig) and blue = 0.069 barg (1 psig)).

necessary to cause the observed blast damage was 10 tons (9072 kg). This is also consistent
with simulating an equivalent TNT of 10 tons using FLACS-Blast, which resulted in
reflected overpressures at the 0.5 barg threshold (7.2 psig) or equivalently 0.25 barg
(3.6 psig) side-on pressures. Figure 12 shows a comparison of the resulting reflected pres-
sures with TNT mass detonations of 9072 and 11,430 kg. These results are not surprising as
the blast pressure decay varies as the mass of TNT raised to the 1/3 power. Hence, the pres-
ent results show that entire 30 tons pile of AN did not need to detonate and quantities less
than this were ample to cause the resulting blast damage.
Figure 13 shows that the free-field overpressures greater than 0.01 barg extend well
beyond identified homes with broken windows. The results of the FLACS analysis are con-
sistent with observed damage in and around the West Fertilizer facility; therefore, confirm-
ing that 30 tons of uncontaminated AN would be sufficient to generate the far-field blast
effects that occurred on 17 April 2013. The current results using a slightly higher mass of
TNT (11,430 kg) are in good agreement with those reported in Huang et al.8 using a lower
mass (9072 kg) and the ideal TNT curves, as shown in Figure 14. It should be noted that the
ideal TNT curves were centered on the silo8 and are slightly offset from the facility.

Crater analysis
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) performed a detailed cra-
ter survey utilizing standard surveying equipment to obtain critical crater features, which
included but was not limited to apparent crater depth and diameter. The ATF also requested
that the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC)21 performs an
additional photogrammetric crater survey as well as 3D scan of the crater and surrounding
area using a Riegl model VZ-400 LiDar scanner. The crater was noted to be quite asym-
metric. The ATF crater contours from data collected between 28 April 2013 and 8 May 2013
(Figure 15) gives a crater depth of 10.045 ft below the AN bin and 6.676 ft below grade.22
The crater diameter was reported as 93 ft for this cross section.
While the ERDC reported that the three surveying techniques (standard, photogram-
metric, and LiDar) resulted in similar measurements, they reported standing water at the
Davis et al. 389

Figure 13. Maximum pressure from blast wave propagated from detonating ammonium nitrate (red is
pressures . 0.5 barg (7.25 psig) and blue = 0.01 barg (0.15 psig)).

Figure 14. FLACS-Blast simulations using a TNT mass of 11,430 kg compared to the ideal blast curves
reported in Huang et al.8 using a lower TNT mass of 9072 kg (and centered on the silo).

lower portions of the crater that caused the LiDar scans and photogrammetric to show
slightly smaller crater depths. As these techniques do not penetrate past the water surface,
they will only report depths to the top of the water’s surface and resulted in shallower depths
by 0.6–0.7 ft.
390 Journal of Fire Sciences 35(5)

Figure 15. ATF crater cross section.

Figure 16. Crater overlaid on a diagram of Dry Fertilizer Building based on ERDC crater survey.

Figure 16 shows the ERDC and the ATF crater23 overlaid on the GexCon Dry Fertilizer
Building floor plan; the lip of the crater is outlined in red, with the deepest portions in blue.
Figure 16 shows the significant asymmetry of the crater, and that the deepest portions of the
crater were located under a portion of the bucket elevator pit, a section of the northern AN
storage bin and one area at the northern side of the same AN storage bin. The placement of
the crater is consistent with those recreated at the scene (see Figure 171).
GexCon analyzed the ERDC LiDar data coupled with the ATF surveying measurements
for the crater using ESRI’s software ArcSceneÓ 10.4.5524. By isolating the crater portion of
the dataset and setting the deepest location to 6.676 ft below grade, the volume of earth dis-
placed was calculated to be approximately 11,456 ft3 (324 m3).
ERDC also performed an analysis aimed to define the properties of the materials that cra-
tered during the explosion.21 A series of samples were obtained from both inside and outside
the crater and at different depths. A rapid soil analysis was conducted on the samples and
Davis et al. 391

Figure 17. Crater at the West Fertilizer facility.

they indicated that the near-surface geology of the crater was somewhat variable, but deter-
mined that the near-surface material profile consisted of a concrete slab (8-in in the sampled
area) underlain by approximately 1.5 ft of moist to wet clay that was underlain by rock. The
ERDC further reported that based on soil maps, the soil is classified as a silty clay 10- to 30-
in deep overlying rock.21 The ERDC further reported that the near-surface rock in the explo-
sion area is from the Austin Chalk formation, which is primarily composed of limestone with
varying amounts of chalk. The ERDC team noted that small pieces of the slab and rubblized
concrete were seen in and around the crater. However, no intact slabs from the pit or north-
ern AN storage bin were found in their original location within crater.
T. J. Flanagan performed a series of experiments to find a correlation between the dimen-
sions of craters created from different TNT charges on the surface of dry-lake playa at
Frenchman Flat at the Nevada Test Site in 1966.24 The results of the experiments and the
subsequent scaling analysis gave the following first-order correlation between the volume of
the crater V (m3) and the mass of TNT W (kg)

V = 0:0143 W 1:11160:018

Using the volume of the crater calculated with the LiDar data and an exponent in the pre-
vious formula of 1.111, the mass of TNT is given by

324 m3 = 0:0143 W11:111 ! W1 = 8319 kg = 9:17 tons

Based on the AN/TNT equivalence of 0.42 described previously, the mass of ammonium
nitrate is approximated as
9:17
WAN = = 21:8 tons
0:42
392 Journal of Fire Sciences 35(5)

Adushkin and Khristoforov25 also performed experimental studies of craters of chemical

surface explosions with commensurable heights of the center of mass and TNT equivalents
on soils of different types. According to their study, the following empirical dependence of
the crater volume as a function of the TNT equivalence in soft soils with shallow and deep
bedding of rocks is given by

V = 18:86q1:104

where V is the crater volume (m3) and q is the TNT equivalent (tons) (1 < q < 100 tons).
Using the calculated crater volume and TNT equivalence, the required mass of AN is given
by

324 m3 = 18:86q1:104
1 ! q1 = 13:14 tons TNT = 31:29 tons AN

Both correlations are consistent with the quantity of AN reported at the plant and
expected to have been stored in the northern AN bin. The correlations also resolve the near-
field damage observed at the site for the detonation of approximately 30 tons of AN.
Another correlation between the equivalent mass of TNT, the geology of the terrain and
the volume of the resultant crater due to various high explosives developed by Gould and
Tempo13 was applied. Due to the complexity of the geology at West (concrete, wet clay,
limestone), the correlation based on ‘‘dry soft rock’’ geology, which was used to estimate the
average soil conditions present.
Dry soft rock
!
Va H
= 800  exp 5:2  1=3
W Va

where Va is the expected apparent crater volume (ft3), W is the TNT-equivalent explosive
weight (tons), and H is the height-of-burst (ft).
The results shown in Figure 18 as an ‘‘x’’ are based on the ERDC LiDar data coupled
with the ATF surveying measurements for the crater volume of 11,456 ft3, a TNT-equivalent
explosive weight of 12.6 tons (corresponding to 30 tons of AN and an 0.42 TNT equivalent),
and a height-of-burst of 2 ft. The correlation by K. E. Gould and K. Tempo is consistent
with what was observed in the West, Texas incident.

Regulations and safety culture

Assistance in the form of code requirements and enforcement for the West Fertilizer facility
was limited. In fact, there are no fire or building codes for the County of McLennan or the
City of West, Texas.1 The state of Texas is still one of two states (also Missouri) that lacks a
state fire code.26 Texas even goes so far as to only allow counties with populations exceeding
250,000 or counties adjacent to one meeting the population requirement, to adopt a fire
code.1 NFPA 400 Hazardous Materials Code, which pertains to the storage and handling of
AN, contains a retroactivity clause which exempts the West Fertilizer facility (and many
other similar facilities) since it was built prior to the issuance of the code.27 The West
Fertilizer facility was thus not required to follow National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) or Internal Code Council (ICC) recommendations for the storage of AN.
Davis et al. 393

Figure 18. Near-surface HE cratering efficiency in dry soft rock.

There are approximately 1300 facilities similar to West Fertilizer located throughout the
United States under numerous jurisdictions.26 Regardless of the jurisdictional landscape, the
existing codes have proven to be limited regarding the safe storage of AN. It is unreasonable
to expect an employee of a fertilizer storage facility to have the specialized training and edu-
cation to understand the complex decomposition of AN, which still lacks agreement in the
scientific community, and apply codes and regulations that may or may not be enforced in
their region. Nevertheless, West Fertilizer stored AN and handled it safely for over 50 years.
As many other facilities in the country have similar practices, it is imperative that the staff of
these facilities, and the firefighters committed to protecting these communities, receive train-
ing on the hazards associated with AN to prevent similar events from occurring in the future.

Conclusion
The explosion at West Fertilizer caused 15 deaths, over 250 injuries, and damage to homes
over ½ mile away from the facility. The blast resulted in a large crater centered on the
northern AN storage bin of the Dry Fertilizer Building. Detailed 3D blast modeling and
experimental correlations confirm that 30 tons of AN are capable of causing the observed
damage in both the near and far fields. Current codes and regulations are lacking in provid-
ing the industry with safe storage and handling procedures for AN. While these codes are
improved and adopted, it is imperative that a better understanding of the unique set of cir-
cumstances that lead to the detonation of AN is developed and spread throughout the
industry. Employees of fertilizer facilities storing AN and the firefighters serving these
394 Journal of Fire Sciences 35(5)

locations need to be educated on the hazards associated with AN and safe storage practices
in order to prevent and manage future incidents.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.

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Davis et al. 395

Author biographies
Scott Davis is the president of GexCon US and specializes in mechanical and aerospace engineering,
and the engineering analysis and testing of combustion, thermal, and fluid processes. Dr Davis applies
his expertise to the investigation, prevention, and risk assessment of fires, explosions, and dispersion
hazards such as flammable vapors and carbon monoxide exposures. He is responsible for fire and
explosion-related consulting activities, which include post-incident investigative work as well as per-
forming risk assessments and safety studies for offshore Oil & Gas installations, petrochemical facili-
ties, and various other industries. Dr Davis develops and delivers worldwide industrial seminars to
owners, operators, safety engineers, and regulatory agencies, on the hazards associated with gas explo-
sions, dust explosions, and LNG.

Tom DeBold is an engineer within the Explosion and Fire Safety group at GexCon US. He specializes
in fire protection, mechanical, thermal, and fluid engineering. Mr DeBold performs post-incident
investigative work related to fires and explosions. Mr DeBold has experience in evaluating cause and
origin in residential and commercial fires and explosions. He performs incident reconstruction, on-/
off-site testing, and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) to assist in establishing credible accident sce-
narios. Additionally, Mr DeBold uses CFD to aid in safety studies including gas dispersion and explo-
sion consequence analysis.

Claudio Marsegan is an engineer at GexCon US and specializes in modeling consequences of industrial

accidents. Using the GexCon’s Computational Fluid Dynamics software FLACS, Claudio finds solu-
tions to mitigate the consequences of flammable and toxic vapor cloud dispersion and vapor cloud
explosions, to allow the safe design of facilities in compliance with applicable regulations.

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