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AOL Equity Analysis During Internet Bubble

The document discusses the speculative nature of the Internet Bubble during 1998-2000, focusing on America Online (AOL) as a case study. It highlights AOL's financial performance, high market capitalization, and the debate over its justified valuation compared to established firms. Additionally, it touches on the contrasting performance of traditional industrial stocks versus high-tech stocks, suggesting potential arbitrage opportunities in the market.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
40 views3 pages

AOL Equity Analysis During Internet Bubble

The document discusses the speculative nature of the Internet Bubble during 1998-2000, focusing on America Online (AOL) as a case study. It highlights AOL's financial performance, high market capitalization, and the debate over its justified valuation compared to established firms. Additionally, it touches on the contrasting performance of traditional industrial stocks versus high-tech stocks, suggesting potential arbitrage opportunities in the market.

Uploaded by

FORHAD ABIR
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Chapter 1 Introduction to Investing and Valuation 31

Minicase M1.1
Critique of an Equity Analysis:
America Online Inc.
The so-called Internet Bubble gripped stock markets in 1998, 1999, and 2000, as discussed in
the chapter. Internet stocks traded at multiples of earnings and sales rarely seen in stock mar-
kets. Start-ups, some with not much more than an idea, launched initial public offerings (IPOs)
that sold for very high prices (and made their founders and employees with stock options very
rich). Established firms, like Disney, considered launching spinoffs with “[Link]” in their
names, just to receive the higher multiple that the market was giving to similar firms.
Commentators argued over whether the high valuations were justified. Many concluded
the phenomenon was just speculative mania. They maintained that the potential profits that
others were forecasting would be competed away by the low barriers to entry. But others
maintained that the ability to establish and protect recognized brand names—like AOL,
Netscape, Amazon, Yahoo!, and eBay—would support high profits. And, they argued, con-
sumers would migrate to these sites from more conventional forms of commerce.
America Online (AOL) was a particular focus in the discussion. One of the most well-
established Internet portals, AOL was actually reporting profits, in contrast to many Internet
firms that were reporting losses. AOL operated two worldwide Internet services, America
Online and CompuServe. It sold advertising and e-commerce services on the Web and, with
its acquisition of Netscape, had enhanced its Internet technology services. See Box 1.3.
For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1999, America Online reported total revenue of
$4.78 billion, of which $3.32 billion was from the subscriptions of 19.6 million AOL and
CompuServe subscribers, $1.00 billion from advertising and e-commerce, and the remain-
der from network services through its Netscape Enterprises Group. It also reported net
income of $762 million, or $0.73 per share.
AOL traded at $105 per share on this report and, with 1.10 billion shares outstanding, a
market capitalization of its equity of $115.50 billion. The multiple of revenues of 24.2 was
similar to the multiple of earnings for more seasoned firms at the time, so relatively, it was
very high. AOL’s P/E ratio was 144.
In an article on the op-ed page of The Wall Street Journal on April 26, 1999, David D. Alger
of Fred Alger Management, a New York–based investment firm, argued that AOL’s stock price
was justified. He made the following revenue forecasts for 2004, five years later (in billions):
Subscriptions from 39 million subscribers $12.500
Advertising and other revenues 3.500
Total revenue 16.000
Profits margin on sales, after tax 26%
To answer parts (A) and (B), forecast earnings for 2004.

A. If AOL’s forecasted price-earnings (P/E) ratio for 2004 was at the current level of that for
a seasoned firm, 24, what would AOL’s shares be worth in 1999? AOL is not expected to
pay dividends. Hint: The current price should be the present value of the price expected
in the future.
B. Alger made his case by insisting that AOL could maintain a high P/E ratio of about 50
in 2004. What P/E ratio would be necessary in 2004 to justify a per-share price of $105
in 1999? If the P/E were to be 50 in 2004, would AOL be a good buy?
C. What is missing from these evaluations? Do you see a problem with Alger’s analysis?
Chapter 3 How Financial Statements Are Used in Valuation 105

Minicases M3.1

An Arbitrage Opportunity? Cordant


Technologies and Howmet International
Cordant Technologies, based in Salt Lake City, manufactures rocket motors, “fasteners”
(bolts), and turbine engine components for the aerospace industry. For the first half of
1999, its sales were $1.28 billion, up 7 percent on the same period for the previous year.
Net income was $85.7 million, or $2.34 per share, up 16 percent. Cordant’s gas turbine
business was growing, but production cuts and inventory buildup at Boeing forecast a
slowdown in the firm’s revenues from other aerospace products. Other data on the firm are
as follows:

Rolling 12-month eps to June 30, 1999 $4.11


Book value per share, June 30, 1999 $7.76
Rolling 12-month sales per share to $67.20
June 30, 1999
Profit margin 7.4%
Price per share, September 30, 1999 $32
Market capitalization of equity $1.17 billion

Analysts were forecasting earnings of $4.00 per share for the full 1999 year and $4.28 for
2000.
Cordant’s financial statements consolidate an 85 percent interest in Howmet Interna-
tional, another manufacturer of turbine engine components. Howmet reported net income
of $65.3 million for the first half of 1999, up 33 percent, on sales of $742.4 million. Other
data on Howmet are:

Rolling 12-month eps to June 30, 1999 $1.21


Book value per share, June 30, 1999 $4.25
Rolling 12-month sales per share to $14.28
June 30, 1999
Profit margin 8.7%
Price per share, September 30, 1999 $14
Market capitalization of equity $1.40 billion

Analysts were forecasting earnings of $1.24 for 1999 and $1.36 for 2000.
Both firms were categorized by some analysts at the time as “neglected” or “ignored”
stocks. Their claim was that the market was irrational not only in overpricing the new tech-
nology stocks, but also in underpricing the old, “blue-collar” industrial stocks. For refer-
ence, firms like Micosoft, Dell, Yahoo!, and AOL traded at multiples of over 50 times
earnings at the time, whereas aerospace firms traded at 11 times earnings.
Calculate price multiples for Cordant and Howmet. Do you see an arbitrage opportu-
nity? What trading strategy do you recommend to exploit the opportunity? Would you call
it a riskless arbitrage opportunity?
106 Part One Financial Statements and Valuation

M3.2

Nifty Stocks? Returns to Stock Screening


In the early 1970s a widely publicized list of the “Nifty Fifty” stocks was drawn up. This
list, which included Avon Products, Polaroid, Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Walt Disney, Amer-
ican Express, and Xerox, was touted as a set of “good buys.” Most of the firms traded at
high multiples. Their P/E ratios were as high as 70 to 90, with an average of 42, while the
S&P 500 traded at a multiple of 19 times earnings. Burton Crane, a New York Times
reporter, wrote the famous words at the time: “Xerox’s multiple not only discounts the
future but the hereafter as well.”
Unfortunately, many of those Nifty Fifty stocks lost considerable value in the subse-
quent 1970s bear market. Avon’s stock fell 80 percent, as did Polaroid’s. Coca-Cola, IBM,
and Xerox fell dramatically.
The multiples of the Nifty Fifty in 1972 bear a strong resemblance to those of the “nifty”
technology stocks of the late 1990s, and indeed to those of mature “quality” firms such as
Coca-Cola, General Electric, Pfizer, Merck, and Walt Disney (all of which were in the orig-
inal Nifty Fifty of 1972). Morgan Stanley published a new set of Nifty Fifty stocks in 1995
that included these stocks. Here are some of the firms with high earnings multiples in
September 1999, with their per-share prices at that date:

P/E Price per Share ($)


Microsoft (MSFT) 64 90
Dell Computer (DELL) 70 44
Lucent Technologies (LU) 75 64
America Online (AOL) 168 104
Analog Devices (ADI) 65 56
Mattel (MAT) 72 21
CBS Corp. (CBS) 72 46
Cisco Systems (CSCO) 110 68
Home Depot (HD) 51 69
Motorola (MOT) 95 87
Charles Schwab (SCH) 56 34
Time Warner (TWX) 185 61

Track the return to these stocks from October 1999. You might use a price chart that
tracks stock splits (for example, Big Charts at [Link]
How have these nifty stocks fared?
Here are some less nifty stocks at the time, all of which were in the S&P 500. They have
low P/E ratios.

P/E Price per Share ($)


Centex (CTX) 7 28
ITT Industries (ITT) 2 32
Seagate Technology (SEG) 7 30
U.S. Airways (U) 3 26
Conseco (CNC) 6 20
Hilton Hotels (HTL) 8 10

How have these stocks fared?


(Note: This case was written in October 1999, without any idea of the outcome.)

Common questions

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The high P/E ratios during the Internet Bubble, particularly for companies like AOL, were influenced by speculative mania and investor expectations that internet companies would secure substantial future profits due to their brand recognition and consumer migration from traditional commerce to online platforms. Despite many firms reporting losses, companies like AOL were profitable, which further fueled investor enthusiasm. Moreover, the market's willingness to apply high multiples to these stocks was driven by the belief in sustained growth due to the innovative nature of the internet sector, despite its low barriers to entry, which could potentially lead to extensive competition eroding those future profits .

A major weakness in David D. Alger's analysis of AOL's stock price lies in his assumption of maintaining an exceedingly high P/E ratio of 50 in 2004 without considering the possibility of market corrections or increased competition that could erode profit margins. Alger's assumptions may overlook potential challenges, such as market saturation, changes in consumer behavior, and the impact of new entrants into the market, which could all significantly impact AOL's profitability and justify a lower P/E ratio. Additionally, his analysis does not address the risks associated with maintaining high profit margins, given the low barriers to entry in the industry .

Arbitrage opportunities could arise by shorting overvalued technology stocks, like those with excessively high P/E ratios, while going long on undervalued traditional industrial stocks with low P/E ratios. This strategy banks on a market correction that would realign valuations more closely with actual earnings and growth prospects. Given the disparity in valuations between tech stocks and industrial firms like Cordant and Howmet, investors could exploit the potential for revaluation as speculative bubbles deflate and traditional firms gain recognition for their stable earnings amidst overbought tech sectors .

Market expectations significantly influence the future valuation prospects of a firm like AOL, as speculative assumptions about growth and profitability drive investor sentiment and stock prices. In AOL's case, high expectations of subscriber growth, advertising revenues, and the shift to online commerce elevated its stock valuation through a high P/E ratio. However, if actual performance fails to meet expectations due to heightened competition, market saturation, or evolving technology, the stock's value can decline sharply. Hence, maintaining realistic forecasts and managing market expectations is vital for firms to sustain their long-term valuation in volatile sectors .

The main lesson from both the 'Nifty Fifty' and the late 1990s technology stocks is the high risk associated with investing in stocks with high P/E ratios, as they are often based on optimistic growth projections that may not materialize. The 'Nifty Fifty' stocks experienced severe declines in value during the bear markets of the 1970s, highlighting the danger of assuming perpetual growth. Similarly, many technology stocks from the late 1990s did not sustain their high valuations, suffering significant losses post-bubble. This underscores the importance of valuing fundamental financial performance and market dynamics over speculative future growth .

During the late 1990s, there was a pronounced disparity between the valuation of 'new technology' companies and 'blue-collar' industrial stocks. Technology firms, such as AOL, were trading at very high earnings multiples, often above 50 times earnings, due to speculative investment behavior and high growth expectations driven by technological advancements. In contrast, traditional industrial stocks, like those in aerospace from companies like Cordant and Howmet, were undervalued with lower P/E ratios, around 11 times earnings, reflecting the market's focus on new high-growth sectors while potentially neglecting steady but slower-growth industrial firms. This divergence suggests an underlying market irrationality or speculative excess in favoring potential future growth over stable current earnings .

Both the Nifty Fifty stocks of the 1970s and the technology stocks of the late 1990s were characterized by high P/E ratios, indicating investor expectations of substantial future earnings growth. In the 1970s, the Nifty Fifty had P/E ratios as high as 70 to 90, while in the late 1990s, technology stocks like AOL had valuations with P/E ratios upwards of 168. Both periods reflect a market trend where specific groups of stocks were valued significantly higher than the general market due to their perceived roles as leaders in their respective fields .

Brand recognition and market shift expectations played a crucial role in justifying high valuations for Internet companies like AOL. Investors believed that well-established brands could secure a loyal consumer base in the rapidly expanding digital market and maintain a competitive edge through brand loyalty. The expectation that consumers would increasingly shift from conventional commerce to online platforms further justified high valuations, as these companies were perceived to be at the forefront of this transformative change in consumer behavior. Brand strength was seen as a buffer against easy market entry by new competitors, potentially sustaining high profit margins despite market volatility .

When assessing the long-term investment value of a company like AOL during the Internet Bubble, investors should prioritize metrics such as sustainable profit margins, revenue growth, realistic P/E ratios, and industry competition factors. Additionally, an analysis of market conditions like the company’s ability to maintain brand loyalty and protect its market share in a low-barrier to entry industry is crucial. Evaluating the potential for regulatory impacts, technological changes, and shifts in consumer preferences can also provide insight into the future viability and earnings potential of the company .

The market's irrational valuation of stocks, particularly favoring high-growth technology stocks over traditional industries, led analysts and investors to adopt speculative strategies focusing on short-term price appreciation rather than fundamental value. This environment fueled IPOs and investments in companies with little to no earnings but high growth narratives. However, some contrarian strategies also emerged, where investors recognized the undervaluation of traditional 'blue-collar' firms and sought to capitalize on their stable earnings at lower multiples. This dichotomy influenced diverse investment approaches, from chasing speculative bubbles to seeking value in neglected sectors .

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