UNCLASSIFIED

EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT

DPKO/OMA/MPS/LM2D-0790
Dated

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)

MILTARY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

References:

A. DPKO / DFS Policy on Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Missions

dated 01 January 2017.
B. Kalari Peace Treaty (KPA) dated 19 May 2017.
C. DPKO Assessment and Planning Directive, Planning for a United Nations
Peacekeeping Operation in Carana dated 21 May 2017.
D. Report of the UN Technical Assessment Mission to Carana, 31 May 2017
E. UN Integrated Strategy on Carana (notional).
F. UNAC Mission Concept dated (draft).
G. UN Security Council Resolution 1544 (draft).

STATUS

1. This is the final draft of the Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and
follows the approval the Mission Concept by the USGs of DPKO and DFS which
it supports. It has been written by DPKO Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in
coordination with the Peacekeeping Planning Team, the Force Commander and
available Military Component staff. It will be presented jointly with the Police and
Support Concepts to USGs DPKO and DFS for approval. One approved, the
Force Commander is to produce an Operation Order to operationalise the Military
CONOPS.

SITUATION

2. General Political and Strategic Situation. On 19 May 2017, after years

of violent conflict in Carana a ceasefire agreement, called the Kalari Peace
Agreement (KPA), was signed between the country’s government and the main

1
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT
rebel forces – the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) in the West and the
Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC) in the South West.

a. The KPA calls for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces, a

mechanism to verify and control the ceasefire, the formation of a
Government of National Reconciliation (GNR). It commits to elections
within a year, the disarmament of rebel forces and the integration of some
of their soldiers into a restructured national armed force. The GNR
replaces the largely one party, one ethnicity, repressive governance of
President Ogavo whose actions contributed to the start of the conflict.

b. The KPA was brokered by the 8th Continent Regional Coalition

(CRC) who have provided a light observer Mission called the CRC
Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC) to assist in overseeing and
verifying the ceasefire. CRCAC will be incorporated within UNAC

c. GNR had already invited a French force, Op INTRÉPIDE, to deploy

to SW CARANA on the RIMOSA border with a 6-month mandate to
counter Islamist activities. Op INTRÉPIDE will remain a separate Mission.

d. UNSCR 1544, Ref G, authorizes a multi-dimensional mission, the

UN Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC) to assist the GNR to implement
the provisions of the KPA and to contribute to the creation of an
environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and
stability in a united Carana.

e. The ceasefire has largely held although the forces have not
significantly withdrawn leaving the potential for a swift return to conflict.

f. The GNR, while mostly united, is struggling with its responsibilities,

and there are security vacuums in the country. There are areas controlled
by Carana National Police, Carana Defence Forces (CDF) and state
security agencies; areas controlled by MPC, areas loosely controlled but
not administered by the CISC; and about a third of the country
ungoverned. Internal security functions such as immigration, customs and
port authority barely function.

g. Crime rates are high. Organized and transnational crime is evident

in the narcotics and diamond trade. The suburbs of the capital, GALASI,
are under the control of youth gangs. In AKKABAR there is open conflict
between miners and the police. In LEPPKO province there is radicalized
and sectarian violence involving elements of the CISC but also
uncontrolled armed groups (not party to the KPA).
2
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT

h. There is a significant humanitarian situation. There are an

estimated 100,000 refugees and 100,000 IDPs. Most IDPs have fled to the
coastal cities and are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns
with inadequate health and sanitation. Almost no medical infrastructure
exists in the rural areas. Some areas are not accessible to humanitarian
agencies due to the security situation.

i. The countries surrounding CARANA are also part of the CRC.

Relations between ARANA and SAMOSA are traditionally good, however
those with KATASI have been strained as CARANA has accused KATASI
of supporting the rebel MPC. Relations with RIMOSA, which has its own
civil war, are also strained with one of the rebel groups, the Lassi
Liberation Front, having loose links with the Combatants.

3. Threat Environment. Following the signing of the KPA, the MPC, CISC
and the CDF have generally remained where they were, but at reduced strength,
unwilling to concede any gains made. While no significant violations of the
ceasefire have been reported, the close proximity of opposing forces poses a
significant risk for a return to conflict. Less predictable is the increasing presence
of Islamist extremists operating out of LEPPKO Province, particularly in the
mountainous South West adjacent to the RIMOSA border; as well as the
activities of radicalized non-signatory armed groups / criminal gangs operating in
HANNO and LEPPKO who are responsible for a continued level of violence
against civilians.

a. Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC). The MPC is a well-

structured and efficient military opposition that has achieved some local
success over the CDF and has appeared better prepared than many of its
CDF counterparts. It has gained increasing support from the local
population in its area of influence. It currently has no aspirations beyond
the western provinces. The official HQ of MPC is in ALUR and following
the ceasefire, this has increased in importance and become a basic
administrative centre for the region as the MPC takes over government
and basic administrative functions providing some basic needs and
security for the population in the West. However, the MPC has no
coherent political strategy other than the removal of the Ogavo
government (now achieved) and better representation for non-Caran
ethnicities, although it is now developing a political platform on which to
campaign in the elections. The MPC has a total strength of around 10,000
fighters. Since the ceasefire about 5000 have returned home but are on
short notice to return to their formations if required.

3
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT
Assessment:

Most Likely: The MPC leadership continue to support the KPA, this will
include disarming their combatants in expectation of the inclusion of some
of their fighters in the reformed CDF. Continue representation in the GNR
and participation in the elections

Most Dangerous: MPA lose faith in the KPA and a multi-ethnic

government and return to political and military confrontation with the
Government with aspirations for the separation of the western provinces
from CARANA.

Response to UNAC Deployment: MPC will remain supportive as long as

UNAC is seen as impartial and effective

b. Combattants Indpéndants de Sud Carana (CISC). The CISC is an

unstructured formation of rebels of diverse backgrounds. Unlike the MPC,
the CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions or exercise
control in the region except by force. The total strength is estimated to be
around 3,000 fighters. It has a weak command and control structure and
discipline and internal cohesion is low, as is the standard of training.
However, an influx of experienced, extremist, foreign fighters upped the
tempo and quality of CISC operations before the treaty. The movement
has been successful in recruiting young men from the local population,
due to its military successes and reaction against the brutality of the
government’s counter-insurgency campaign, which indiscriminately
targeted Tatsis in the Southern region. Its area of influence is confined to
LEPPKO Province, with less influence on the Leppko coast.

Assessment:

Most Likely: Within the limitations or its organisational capability, CISC will
support the KPA and accept GNR governance and the expansion of law
and order into LEPPKO Province provided it is impartial. Due to a record
of CISC atrocities, few combatants are likely to be accepted into the CDF,
those rejected may return to the field in splinter groups. These will
continue violence against non-Tatsi, non-Muslim, populations.

Most Dangerous: Spurred on the foreign radical Islamist fighters and

external support the CISC becomes more radical and more capable.
CISC resumes operations against CARANA forces in order to allow it the
freedom of manoeuvre to conduct its own operations against Caran and
other minorities in order to secure the primacy of Tatsi, Muslim authority.

4
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT
Response to UNAC Deployment: CISC are unlikely to welcome UNACs
presence, particularly as they are already under the vigilance of Op
INTRÉPIDE in the SW of LEPPKO Province. Some elements are likely to
be hostile to UNAC and force protection will need to be assessed
accordingly.

c. Other Groups. There are a number of relatively small armed

groups / armed criminal gangs who have taken advantage of the security
vacuum and operate in their local areas. They were not part of the KPA
process and are likely to continue their activities until UN / Carana
Government security deployments prevent them. In the coal mining area
of AKKABAR, the miners are in open conflict with the national police and
have also attacked government institutions. Although not an armed group,
the miners have links to criminal cartels which are a major destabilising
influence in HANNO Province. Lastly the Republican Guard, not part of
CDF, remains a threat in GALASI; its intentions remain unclear.

4. Friendly Forces and Cooperative Actors.

a. CRC Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC). CRCAC military

observers are currently part of the Cease-Fire Joint Liaison Teams (JLT)
reporting back to the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC).

b. Op INTREPIDE. The French Op INTREPIDE is operating in S

CARANA. It is a short term Mission. Their Area of Operations overlaps with
UNAC’s although their mission and tasks are different.

c. Carana Defence Forces (CDF). The CDF are, at present,

cooperative actors. Although there may be some rogue elements. The
reform of the CDF identified in the KPA offers the opportunity to weed out
uncooperative elements and make space to accept MPC and CISC ex
combatants, in order to make the CDF more representative of all the
ethnicities in CARANA.

5. UN Strategic Objective in Carana. The overall objective of the UN 1 in

Carana is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national
reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united CARANA, where human rights
are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which IDPs and
refugees can return home in safety and in dignity; and to contribute to the
protection of civilians at risk.

1 UNAC and the UN Country Team

5
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT
6. UNAC Operational Objectives in Carana.

a. To support the implementation of the KPA

b. To Protect of Civilians

c. To support Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance

d. To support Security Sector Reform (SSR)

e. To support the wider implementation of the Peace Process.

7. UNAC Concept of Operations.

a. During the Mission Start-Up Phase, UNAC will establish its HQ in

GALASI in order to strengthen dialogue with GNR, government
departments and national security bodies. It will assume the chair of the
Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) in accordance with the KPA and
support the GNR’s DDRR programme.

b. It will establish close coordination and sharing of information with

the UNCT and implement a Senior Leaders Forum.

c. The first UNAC Field Offices will be established in FARON and

MUKA to engage with local authorities including the leadership of MPC
and CISC.

d. After establishing a security presence in GALASI, the Military

Component is to support the GNR to ensure that the military aspects of
the KPA are implemented. It is to ensure Freedom of Movement of the
JLTs so that the JCC has the situational awareness to respond quickly to
any threats to the KPA. A return to civil war is the greatest threat to
civilians. The Military Component is to deter, pre-empt and if necessary
respond to breaches of the military aspects of the KPA, initially in areas
where MPC and CDF, and CISC and CDF are most likely to clash (hot
spots) but elsewhere as resources allow. Thereafter the Military
Component will operate where it is best able to support the Mission
Objectives.

e. CRCAC observers, who meet UN Standards, will be re-designated

to UNAC as soon as UNAC’s capabilities permit.
6
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT

f. Protection of Civilians is UNACs priority task and against which the

Mission will be judged. UNAC will conduct actions across Tier 1 (Dialogue
and Engagement), Tier II (Physical Protection) and Tier III (Establishing a
Protective Environment) to mitigate the risks to civilians.

g. UNAC will build on the coordination with the UN Country Team and
the humanitarian agencies to continue to identify areas where UNAC may
support humanitarian access and human rights assistance access
including, when requested, and as a last resort, the provision of security to
the delivery of humanitarian aid.

h. UNAC will support the GNR’s SSR (identified in the KPA) in

particular the restructuring of the police force and the formation of a new
and restructured Carana military, both of these tasks will be in cooperation
with the interested organisations and states.

i. Supporting the wider implementation of the Peace Process will

include assisting the GNR to establish national authority throughout the
country; assist in the preparation and conduct of national elections and
assist in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions,
including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional
institutions.

8. UN Communication Strategy. Strategic Communications will be directed

from UNHQ New York. An initial comprehensive communication strategy has been
developed in consultation with UN partners in order to be implemented in advance
of UNAC’s deployment. It will aim to promote an understanding of UNAC’s
peacekeeping role in CARANA, its impartiality but also its robust approach to the
protection of civilians.

9. Assumptions made by the Military Component. In developing the

Military CONOPS the following assumptions have been made2:

a. Host Nation will secure entry points.

b. Majority of CRCAC Observers will meet UN standards.
c. DDRR will not begin until after the Military Component is effective in
the areas of confrontation.

2 Assumptions made in the Mission CONOPs are assumed to be fact

7
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT
MISSION STATEMENT

10. Military Component Mission. The Military Component will support the
implementation of the military aspects of the KPA including SSR and assist in the
provision of a sufficiently secure and safe environment for other partners to operate
in order to support peace and stability efforts in CARANA.

OPERATIONAL DESIGN

11. Commander’s Intent.

My priority is the protection of civilians. Initially this is best achieved by deterring,

pre-empting and if necessary responding robustly to breaches of the ceasefire in
order to prevent a return to conflict.

Thereafter I will utilize our military capabilities to provide security in areas

prioritized by the Mission; this will involve close cooperation at both the operational
and tactical level with other UNAC components. My decisions need to be informed
by up to date knowledge of the security risks in the AOR. Military units and Military
Observers will have a key role in this through their engagement with the civil
population and local leaders including those of the armed groups. This will enable
us to be proactive in protecting civilians.

While the military component’s focus is on the armed groups and the reform of the
CDF, we must recognize the primacy of the Carana National Police (CNP) in
delivering security, which is a Police Component lead, and the need to tackle
Security Sector Reform (SSR) holistically as a whole of Mission effort in support of
GNR.

12. Military End State. The threats from armed groups reduced and CDF
reformed so that it can support the government of Carana it neutralising these
threats without assistance from UNAC’s military component. Thus providing a
sufficiently secure and safe environment after UNAC’s departure so that
peacebuilding and humanitarian activities continue and all civilians are protected.

13. Operational Objectives. To achieve this end state, the military

component will pursue three inter-linked lines of operation to achieve the following
objectives in line with the Mission CONOPS:

#1 To support the implementation of the military aspects of the KPA

Criteria for Success: MPC and CISC are no longer a military threat

#2 To support SSR for the CDF

8
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT

Criteria for Success: An ethnically representative and democratically accountable

CDF that can be an effective part of CARANA’s security forces accepting the
primacy of the police.

#3 To enable a sufficiently secure and safe environment (SASE) for other

partners activities to take place.

Criteria for Success: Humanitarian access, UNAC staff freedom of movement,

security sufficient for extension of state authority, security environment to
encourage return of IDPs and Refugees, security sufficient for free and fair
elections – freedom of movement for all

14. Scheme of Operations. The Force will establish three Sectors (see Annex
F) with an HQ in Galasi within UNAC HQ. The operation will be in four phases:
Initial Deployment, Expansion, Consolidation, Capacity Building and Drawdown.
The first three phases are explained below:

a. Phase 1 – Initial Deployment. By M+90 (M is date of SCR)

(1) Aim. To establish FHQ, assume OPCON of CRCAC Military

Observers and UNAC military units in theatre, meet JLT
requirements3 and establish an effective armed presence in the most
likely areas of confrontation between the armed groups.

(2) Method. See Deployment table at Annex F.

(a) Deployment of Force HQ. The UN will commence security

operations in CARANA once the UN Force HQ has established
presence and assumes operational responsibility. The Force
Commander, Chief Military Observer and a core group of military
staff officers for key staff positions will deploy to GALASI by
M+15 following pre-deployment training and necessary
reconnaissance. FC will assume leadership of the JCC by M+20.
UNAC Force HQ is to exercise C2 of all forces in theatre by
M+30.

(b) Deployment of Force Troops. Initial force troops will include

lead elements of a light communications battalion, the Force
Reserve battalion (-), FHQ Defence Company, a Level II medical
unit and an aviation unit comprising attack and transport

3 The JLT includes UNAC MILOBs.

9
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT
helicopters. These force troops will be deployed from M+15 and
complete in theatre NLT M+90.

(c) Deployment of Sector HQs, Initial Battalion and UNMOs .

Sector HQs are to collocate with UNAC Field Offices

Sector 1: GALSI
Sector 2: FARON
Sector 3: MUKA

By M+35, each Sector will have a communications detachment,

UNMOs and an infantry battalion. Sector 1 will focus on
protection of UN in GALASI. Sector 2 and 3 will meet the JLT
commitment, provide a QRF for the protection of the JLTs and at
least an infantry company to deter, pre-empt and respond to
violations of the ceasefire. An additional battalion and UNMOs
to be available for Sectors 2 and 3 by M+90.

(g) Effort. Force’s main effort is to project military presence into

the most likely areas for confrontation between MPC and CDF
and CRSC and CDF. This needs to be enabled by effective FHQ
and Sector HQs and sufficient force protection (infantry
manoeuvre units and medical). UNAC presence on the ground
and effective and timely reporting to the JCC will reduce the
possibility of a return to confrontation.

(3) End State. This first phase will be accomplished when FHQ and
Sector HQs are established, CRCAC have transferred to UNAC,
UNMOs have joined the JLTs, there is an UNAC armed military
presence in likely areas of confrontation, and designated Force
Troops are effective.

(4) Tasks. In this phase, tasks for the Force will include:

(a) Establish Force HQ and assume OPCON of military

component units and UNMOs including CRCAC.
(b) Chair JCC.
(c) Establish key liaisons with Government Security Sector in
Galasi.
(d) Force Reserve of one infantry company in GALASI
(e) Establish three Sector HQs and assume OPCON of assigned
forces and UNMOs.

10
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT
(f) In coordination with Field Offices, Sectors to establish key
liaisons with armed groups, local authorities and protection
actors including humanitarians and civil society.
(g) Establish liaison with Op INTREPIDE
(h) Contribute to and enable JLTs
(i) Provide military presence in likely confrontation areas (deter,
pre-empt, respond).
(j) Protect UNAC personnel and assets
(k) Within capabilities, protect civilians under threat of physical
violence in areas of deployment, including UN staff and
humanitarian workers.
(j) Support planning for DDRR.
(k) Support planning for SSR

b. Phase 2 –Expansion. M+90 to M+180.

(1) Aim. To continue to build capacity in all three Sectors and Force
Troops so that the military component can be effective throughout
Carana.

(2) Method. This phase will bring HQs and units deployed in Phase
I to full strength and provide addition units / capabilities.

(3) Effort. Priority will be given to deployments to areas of likely

confrontation between the parties (Sector 2 and 3) and establishing
a robust presence in MPC and CISC dominated areas. Sectors will
provide the security to enable MPC and CISC to have the
confidence to move to from the front line to cantonment areas and
disarm and for CDF to move to barracks as part of the national
DDRR plan. Additional forces will provide Sectors with a permanent
presence in major population centres to provide security and enable
the extension of state authority. Sectors will also have the reach to
provide security in limited areas of western and southern Carana
where humanitarian access is required.

(4) End State. The Military Component will be at 75% of authorised

strength with a presence throughout Carana. Disarmament has
begun, armed groups are cantoned, and CDF are in barracks.
Humanitarian access to some key areas in western and southern
Carana but not throughout Carana. Some armed group activity
(CISC splinter groups and other factions) in LEPPKO province is
likely to continue. Internal security challenges in GALASI and
FELLARI and HANNO provinces likely to remain as a lower priority
for UNAC than support to the KPA.
11
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT

(5) Tasks. Tasks in this phase will include:

(a) Continuation of relevant Phase 1 tasks.
(a) Sector 1 presence in MARONI, AKKABAR and TEKKLA
(b) Sector 2 presence in KOLONI, MAHBEK and TERENI
(c) Sector 3 presence in FOLSA, XALKSA and MAUI
(d) Force Reserve of on battalion
(e) Sector reserves of one company
(f) Be prepared to support humanitarian access
.
c. Phase 3 – Consolidation. M+ 180 onwards.

(1) Aim. To support GNR is providing sufficient security for National

Elections

(2) Method. Freedom of Movement for all Carana’s citizens is a pre-

condition for elections. Whilst continuing to enable the provisions of
the KPA, the military component will support Carana in providing
sufficient security for this movement. A supporting plan will be
issued to cover UNAC and the military component’s support to
elections.

(3) Effort. Main Effort continues to be the implementation of the

KPA. However resources will be allocated to areas of CARANA
where there are additional security risks to civilians and the conduct
of the elections. This is likely to be the western part of Sector 2, the
southern part of Sector 3 and potentially within GALASI. Forces will
need to be flexible and expect redeployment in line with remaining
threats.

(4) End State. The conditions for the end of this phase are sufficient
security for elections and the implementation of the military aspects
of the KPA sufficient forward that it is an irreversible process. MPC
and CISC will have fully demobilized and ex-combatants selected
for inclusion in the reformed CDF have moved to CDF barracks.
Conditions are set for Phase 4 with the emphasis on capacity
building and a gradual reduction in military forces. It is
acknowledged that conditions for transition to Phase 4 will also
depend on developments in other areas of the security sector
including the reform of the Carana National Police (CNP).

(5) Tasks. Tasks in this phase will include:

(a) Continuation of relevant tasks from the preceding phases.

12
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT
(b) Be prepared to support election security

15. Preconditions for success.

a. Capacity building in the Carana security sector provides an effective
CNP to assume security primacy as UNAC’s military component drawdown
and the CDF assume the traditional role of external security
b. GNR accept delay in elections if security is insufficient for free and fair
elections

16. Operational Risk Management.

a. Force Protection in Phase 1. In Phase I forces are deployed widely

with long lines of communication to the sole Level 2 Medical facility in
Galasi. This risk is being mitigated by the early deployment of aviation
MEDEVAC / CAEVAC capability.

b. Credibility of the Force. Taking the CRCAC observers under UN

Command carries the reputational risk that they may not meet UN standards
of behavior or competence. This risk is mitigated by a two day induction
package and coordination with the contributing countries..

SUPPORT CONCEPT

14. Equipment and Capabilities. Units are to deploy to meet the criteria for
personnel, equipment and self-sustainment identified in their MOU.

15. Sustainment. Units are to be prepared to deploy with 21 days of rations, 2

of bottled water, water treatment capability and 60 days of medical supplies. DFS’s
Logistic Support Plan will detail when the Field Mission will be able to provide food,
fuel, defence stores and Level II Medical.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

16. Command and Control.

a. Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) retain FULL COMD of their troops

at all times.

b. The SRSG exercises operational authority over all UN peacekeeping

operations and activities within the Mission.

13
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
Revised Oct 2017

FINAL DRAFT
c. The Force Commander has Operational Control (OPCON) over all
assigned troops and personnel but may delegate troops TACOM or TACON
on a temporary or permanent basis by written order. The Force
Commander exercises OPCON through the Force and Sector HQs and
Chief UNMO in the form of recognized plans, directives and orders.

17. Locations. FHQ will be located with UNAC HQ in Galasi

18. Signals and Communication. Separate Annex.

SIGNATURE BLOCK:

AUTHENTICATION:

Annexes: (See Carana Slide Pack)

A. Map of Carana – Topography.

B. Map of Carana – Roads and Lines of Communications.

C. Map of Carana – Rebel held areas

D. Map of Carana – Humanitarian Situation

E. Map of Carana – Risk assessment

F. Map of Carana - Force Layout.

14
EXERCISE UN CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED