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Module 5

The document discusses various voting methods and their implications, including majority voting, Condorcet paradox, and rank order voting. It highlights the challenges of achieving fair social preferences through decision-making mechanisms and presents examples of how different voting methods can yield different winners. Additionally, it touches on the complexities of individual preferences and the potential for manipulation in voting outcomes.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
2 views12 pages

Module 5

The document discusses various voting methods and their implications, including majority voting, Condorcet paradox, and rank order voting. It highlights the challenges of achieving fair social preferences through decision-making mechanisms and presents examples of how different voting methods can yield different winners. Additionally, it touches on the complexities of individual preferences and the potential for manipulation in voting outcomes.

Uploaded by

anurag.ae2527
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF or read online on Scribd
‘XN JAAN ‘ [> Agaregatio D_ ct _ Preferences, majosity Voting. : | 3 persons —» | A 51 Ba c 4 Frobiems —» — XoYeand z: Condorcet Paradox ‘auaaane i 2. Ordenng, O S jo Se ab Ae BL & x y zx 4 be & x Zz x y. Comparisons 2 > x Vs ¥ = x has 2votey sy hasid vote Yo vs => Wass 2 votes sz has t vere a VS — Zz nas 2 vory x has i vote. eee 1 21 ad ig Here we see -that there is. Ciceulariby 19 “Therefore -ransitivity wilt not lot. -Thisl is cated Ane prePrencea - ConDoecet: PawiAnon Corsarisivivi ty St. prerences) idhoes Nok» wore mostly « =P The order which youLvole may atso afPect the result: t | : Hence aggregation won't ork: Therefore Majority Voting 40 = V. ing above examipie Ss writes winnet z y 4) X vey ——» x vs & ——ad l ocdenng : To changes oa. Sninnet i wire \ FELT . - ge Vi VgnZs—— an) _o Vere RX | ( 2:| Rank Order Voting - 14 — A and 8 _ 2 persons | voters Bundle —» x2y aod %* ac PrePrences 3 = fc a , x Q ae 4 z Zz x - iP we remove x 20d look at individuars pretoencey. > vorer [ele a LL, ade asa tie breaker: [ bunctie OUSAE Your competing ob Fe _B Hoiceh to Yast = 224 han % a g2 Zz A= 8 ——— wey ys 3 — > Y is the winner Crighes pref Bee a5 90 93 Ms have bring in _an_astute deme nt to ok ee always get ay COs adswier: ement ¢ a Astute Lome fk can ateo be an aement of Tnaniipulation a wots: TO eg tay gee thal ne inrdued ot zeny oe vorers to choose Y which may nok be the best ion: | poe Coaptete =r tit ot prc pimebleyive, =o Jane . ae GW Soria ‘checision Making» ‘ eat hteast — yen any set of completes reRexive and transitive prefrencey the Aecision Mechanism should result'in social: prePrences that | eptisty the same properties: al 2 “if everyone prefers altecnative Kito abtesnahve Ye then the —~ | gocian_prefeence should rank x ahead ot: La a aa | ; | | = ; = | peoprs Qlrennarives (owe shoutdn'b add astute element) < pre _geeRrences et? * andy should depend only on ne how we crank x VS Y and Oost oo now hey rank other s > MHA Bis BANG os AN hese 3 requirements seem possipies bur it Ag AifRicult ro Lind a mechanism that sariPien tinese ad. 31 i From here WE |_get frrrowsS impossibility “TWheerem = seanores 4 _ Prrrows Amposs\bi Vly. Teorey 1 dod (2 a Social decision Making satishiem properties 42 and $ ahen it musk we o Aictatosship — ail Soctar Fagkings are the GS raneings kk 2 individual: fa lc Nlo- of Voters 16 4 Yon Fon 26 rnngshlongigenmny ce ¢ Bor Bre uM pA cyte otk ds Bh oo My ot oe 8 elipratpen iiMY o Boas or NYY Bist Eon oe a LT ee OE Chena 23175 t4Yos 16a rr cv Re Bangalore -» blt'2 = GiB} 49 1 7 Mumbai a ust255 Fe GB 7 |e Pluraity en Utes Abace' - “To check’ ma jority: aninners We Wave to check Plurarl winner id more than 50 “le ++) Total voters) +» 800 4 ¥ fe & . Majoai hy winner = N@4 1 = 560393" ]o» x He Ohi ee , iy - | But, ik is not nececs for Winner! to ahways | vs ee ee foe _paisaar oo Problems: ' ot ot oe | erect PH ATW ig peal rat a Chole _could loose but when compared iq _a 4 to 4 comparison, uoould be preferred over the plus winnes: This virle! jhe __Enieness Cervera: Which brings us to the Conperé! CRITERIA, which states that if there is a choices that is prefer! in a 4 Vs 4 comporisons wiantl a : {2 then that shoutd be the | — ella sh als aah 40: [hiss \s' Caled tne Convoeser ra ss FP a NP Sam CN 4 votes where > B = 75 144 443 ~ 212 — B>c = Hitiz+2 = 38 fe C ig winner: vs _ ™\ : no: of votes Wher 2C>M I) = 15 raul? = 18) S (Moe c= Bl bu3sre25= 14 fo C_ ig winner: vs M E ‘ No ot vote, Where B7M = THF Si 412 +138 M?B = 4U+Mr 43 425 = 142 ce B Mis winner) > Note: Here ¢ is Si Condoscet woinner. but ik is not neces ary fora plurality poinner to be a Condorcet winner. ] (3) Boeda Count Method + 4S* Choice > 3 points and choice —@ 2 points : L 3f_Choiee 1-2 4 points: Points ot Chennai —» (15 * eal a xa)t (51 x$) + (2x2) | + (u3x2) + (26 x1) = Gad | Points sf Bangatore =>) (15x22) ts Min cis + (2x3) | + (usw) t+ (26%2) = 52€ naar | eee Points ot Mumbai (75 x1) (au x2) +-(51x2) TC). (u3x3) + (2 > Bau. Chennaig is the Winner: H, x 45 choice x %. 4 Bi % Yo 24 cenpice + Yorn 3 5 Z Ky sinh Yi - niatonpes oc Xe sco _% Fg ~ —» 8 i a a — Rip a One _ 7 ~ s D7 EWG 7 ~ xX is the winder 8 7 x aj ori ty woinnern = 185) =) UFFo : +h ' 1T ; — Soltis nota engjotity wloner- (2) Concdorcet voinnes: 8.05. oes! | de & vas) 7 a eoypory ry ts ! J you = 2to Q\s) winners wate - BPE dS Ut Wraten 5 } ot SL zyrMe us) ar ETD 2: % vez = ; 2. Zis_ winner | co, | , 4 = 10 t Ze > >a, S44 2 : SPA tear tal om ss ay ay eases t < condorcet wi hs [(ay_Gomdoreet JAfnneios dno) a) [ x = + Cux2) + (2X0) + C5 x4) +(2 x0) 3 6 tbagish aes fibro | y =e CW Ad) € Guxoyt Cone) + C5 xo} t (221) xz 2 C4 to) 4: Ca) + Cavin 15 22) + C202) = 20 g XA WS + Hh at a 3 & 8 c D> iS jae to 5s a4 prace se vu 18:0 sic? oo nh » L att piace 20 (0 Qo 50 uth place 26 35 15 25° (3 Pluratity Winner _——? fAL_voins (2 five 5 40's) Majority Winner ——» No_ene (2) Condorcet Method eae ; | comparing 18 cinpicet “fox att > [ene a eonine > ices Spain lh fevg co —2 A wins BVsD = Wing i yoy aay em ERED oC VS Ds 32 Cousing 44 ape |. l fr_is_the conclosceh vornnets th a | = pee Camun) + (2X go) (4x20) 4Cox25) = £00 cw | Bet (agxa)yr + (eok2y + Cox) t: (6x35) = 125 sone 5 | C= (3x20) t (2x20) + 4X20}5 + (OXI) = 1260 D = (3x15) + (2x30) + (i t5o) +66 x25) = So Tai = A “FE wing iD the ®ordaoun! Method - “a e tofu, 5 sia 2 aul 5 Gti a Puncti le hea ae 2Vo\ = Minfe ay ancl lttn —> {WlelPare Maximisation: oo) os 5 iy ac an Baa ectitn=s sok geodss, t LAW AVA | r+ Fox the lie that, the ey bility Wei M\ For the 180 welfare function we are using the a ShiF © Uy +U2 (1) we = Api te2u2 (2) curve to look iso welFare - = t ne max W Such that > xe = x! Sum st ath goodss wo * cic ss Wafare te ore ind x : uo i m™m = wy = yi mm Sum ot att Goods tae: Heal, for_o individual, “ey fan’ ona WE wo ave = ae toting Hee art WE should oe Cobb clouglas (awe u2u8) AN. competitive seq% are paret oPficient- Tous L2E-EAH aby that att compentive eq are welfare Maxima or ais sl maxima ave Competitive eq (Follows From {St welt 4heocem —= cri= exchange} sit merit bnieinay ina ce a ate at Gh | : indwidy WP ________walbare ig maximise @ Aife- x - “This is captured ig _ At swe — we a = ur(at) _ a 4 seis : Od. Person x a eid ANd GQ. i (pie en att happiness a es He “te Phe ite im \ned Ubidityade pends On No aks Ulli cated +o them. ee eas Oe \ a ha aie Ohere_A_unids “dre attocated to 2 o Sol IB sis cnthancacivatcaene nt iene a ey fe ‘PodaveieCorgiser | SWE 5A 20.1020, ---- Bo. Determine ator of = | fa ae esis epee 38 eae | E | owe | | @sks 0 a — | ult): axb0-150) etseericaety = “tal = otI50 = 150 poles bit | @ A 210 Ulyj= 2710 £20 u(y): Bx Yo =120 | “Total = 20 ¢120 = Yo : @A=20 ! u(g)+ 2420 « YO Vo si - uly) 2 9x30 40 E “Total = yo rqo =130 - | oe | 4 r J E Z ga) ule) = na fr 20,10, 20, €0 21a u(y) = 2% Ago to X aod (Go-A) goes to 4 Q sasel a a? ix a6 poten ah fe lo a(¥) = 2 (Go-10) = 100 Ab A220. 2 © >O% UCy) = 2 (a0-30\ = go} OL Ocia OR OF Ear 4 max jo, 4o, 80,604 280 7 5.2 \ ao x gets 20 V gets yo. 0.5 We v) ; D4 Soe a / Sl = o+ou Sa. ¥s 7 : _

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