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The document discusses various voting methods and their implications, including majority voting, Condorcet paradox, and rank order voting. It highlights the challenges of achieving fair social preferences through decision-making mechanisms and presents examples of how different voting methods can yield different winners. Additionally, it touches on the complexities of individual preferences and the potential for manipulation in voting outcomes.
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[> Agaregatio D_ ct _ Preferences,
majosity Voting. :
| 3 persons —» | A 51 Ba c
4
Frobiems —»
— XoYeand z:
Condorcet Paradox
‘auaaane
i 2. Ordenng,
O
S jo Se ab
Ae BL &
x y zx
4 be & x
Zz x y.
Comparisons 2 >
x Vs ¥ = x has 2votey sy hasid vote
Yo vs => Wass 2 votes sz has t vere
a VS — Zz nas 2 vory x has i vote.
eee
1 21 ad ig
Here we see -that there is. Ciceulariby 19
“Therefore -ransitivity wilt not lot. -Thisl is cated
Ane prePrencea -
ConDoecet: PawiAnon Corsarisivivi ty St. prerences)
idhoes Nok» wore mostly «
=P The order which youLvole may atso afPect the result:
t |
: Hence aggregation won't ork: Therefore Majority Voting
40 = V. ing above examipie Ss
writes winnet z y
4) X vey ——» x vs & ——ad l ocdenng
: To changes
oa. Sninnet i wire \ FELT .
- ge Vi VgnZs—— an) _o Vere RX | (2:| Rank Order Voting - 14
— A and 8 _
2 persons | voters
Bundle —» x2y aod %* ac
PrePrences 3 =
fc a ,
x Q ae
4 z
Zz x -
iP we remove x 20d look at individuars pretoencey. >
vorer [ele a
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OUSAE Your competing
ob
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to Yast =
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g2 Zz A= 8 ———
wey
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ay
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ement ¢ a
Astute Lome fk can ateo be an aement of Tnaniipulation a
wots: TO eg tay gee thal ne inrdued ot zeny
oe vorers to choose Y which may nok be the best
ion: |
poe Coaptete =r tit ot prc
pimebleyive, =o Jane .
ae
GW
Soria ‘checision Making»
‘ eat hteast —
yen any set of completes reRexive and transitive prefrencey the
Aecision Mechanism should result'in social: prePrences that
| eptisty the same properties:
al
2
“if everyone prefers altecnative Kito abtesnahve Ye then the
—~ | gocian_prefeence should rank x ahead ot:
La
a
aa
|
;
|
| =
; =
| peoprs
Qlrennarives (owe shoutdn'b add astute element) <
pre _geeRrences et? * andy should depend only on ne how
we crank x VS Y and Oost oo now hey rank other
s > MHA Bis BANG os
AN hese 3 requirements seem possipies bur it Ag AifRicult ro
Lind a mechanism that sariPien tinese ad. 31 i From here WE
|_get frrrowsS impossibility “TWheerem =
seanores 4
_ Prrrows Amposs\bi Vly. Teorey 1 dod
(2 a Social decision Making satishiem properties 42 and $
ahen it musk we o Aictatosship — ail Soctar Fagkings are the
GS
raneings kk 2 individual:
fa lcNlo- of Voters 16 4 Yon Fon 26
rnngshlongigenmny ce ¢ Bor Bre uM
pA cyte otk ds Bh oo My ot oe 8
elipratpen iiMY o Boas or NYY Bist Eon
oe a LT ee OE
Chena 23175 t4Yos 16a rr cv Re
Bangalore -» blt'2 = GiB} 49 1 7
Mumbai a ust255 Fe GB 7
|e Pluraity en Utes Abace' -
“To check’ ma jority: aninners We Wave to check
Plurarl winner id more than 50 “le
++) Total voters) +» 800 4 ¥ fe & .
Majoai hy winner = N@4 1 = 560393" ]o»
x He Ohi ee , iy -
| But, ik is not nececs for Winner! to ahways |
vs ee ee foe _paisaar oo
Problems: ' ot
ot oe | erect PH ATW ig peal rat a Chole
_could loose but when compared iq _a 4 to 4 comparison,
uoould be preferred over the plus winnes: This virle!
jhe __Enieness Cervera: Which brings us to the Conperé!
CRITERIA, which states that if there is a choices that is prefer!
in a 4 Vs 4 comporisons wiantl
a : {2 then that shoutd be the | —ella sh als aah
40:
[hiss \s' Caled tne Convoeser ra ss
FP a NP
Sam
CN
4 votes where > B = 75 144 443 ~ 212 —
B>c = Hitiz+2 = 38
fe C ig winner:
vs _ ™\ :
no: of votes Wher 2C>M I) = 15 raul? = 18)
S (Moe c= Bl bu3sre25= 14
fo C_ ig winner:
vs M E ‘
No ot vote, Where B7M = THF Si 412 +138
M?B = 4U+Mr 43 425 = 142
ce B Mis winner) >
Note: Here ¢ is Si Condoscet woinner. but ik is not neces
ary fora plurality poinner to be a Condorcet winner. ]
(3) Boeda Count Method +
4S* Choice > 3 points
and choice —@ 2 points : L
3f_Choiee 1-2 4 points:
Points ot Chennai —» (15 * eal a xa)t (51 x$) + (2x2) |
+ (u3x2) + (26 x1) = Gad
| Points sf Bangatore =>) (15x22) ts Min cis + (2x3) |
+ (usw) t+ (26%2) = 52€
naar |
eeePoints ot Mumbai (75 x1) (au x2) +-(51x2) TC).
(u3x3) + (2 > Bau.
Chennaig is the Winner: H,
x 45 choice x %. 4 Bi %
Yo 24 cenpice + Yorn 3 5 Z Ky sinh Yi -
niatonpes oc Xe sco _% Fg
~ —» 8 i
a a —
Rip a One _
7 ~
s D7 EWG 7 ~
xX is the winder 8 7
x aj ori ty woinnern = 185) =) UFFo : +h
' 1T ; —
Soltis nota engjotity wloner-
(2) Concdorcet voinnes: 8.05. oes! |
de & vas) 7
a eoypory ry ts ! J
you = 2to
Q\s) winners wate
- BPE dS Ut Wraten 5 } ot
SL zyrMe us) ar ETD
2: % vez = ;
2. Zis_ winner| co,
|
, 4 = 10
t
Ze >
>a, S44
2 : SPA tear tal om ss ay ay
eases t < condorcet wi hs
[(ay_Gomdoreet JAfnneios dno) a)
[ x = + Cux2) + (2X0) + C5 x4) +(2 x0)
3 6 tbagish aes fibro
| y =e CW Ad) € Guxoyt Cone) + C5 xo} t (221)
xz 2 C4 to) 4: Ca) + Cavin 15 22) + C202)
= 20
g XA WS + Hh at a
3 & 8 c D>
iS jae to 5s
a4 prace se vu 18:0 sic? oo nh »
L att piace 20 (0 Qo 50
uth place 26 35 15 25°
(3 Pluratity Winner _——? fAL_voins
(2 five 5 40's)
Majority Winner ——» No_ene(2) Condorcet Method eae
; | comparing 18 cinpicet “fox att >
[ene a eonine > ices Spain
lh fevg co —2 A wins BVsD = Wing
i yoy aay em ERED oC VS Ds 32 Cousing
44 ape |.
l fr_is_the conclosceh vornnets
th a
| =
pee Camun) + (2X go) (4x20) 4Cox25)
= £00 cw
| Bet (agxa)yr + (eok2y + Cox) t: (6x35)
= 125 sone 5
| C= (3x20) t (2x20) + 4X20}5 + (OXI)
= 1260
D = (3x15) + (2x30) + (i t5o) +66 x25)
= So Tai = A
“FE wing iD the ®ordaoun! Method -“a e
tofu, 5 sia 2 aul
5
Gti
a Puncti
le hea ae
2Vo\ = Minfe ay ancl lttn
—> {WlelPare Maximisation: oo) os 5 iy
ac an Baa
ectitn=s
sok geodss,
t
LAW AVA
|
r+ Fox
the
lie that, the
ey bility Wei
M\ For the 180 welfare
function we are using the
a
ShiF © Uy +U2 (1)
we = Api te2u2 (2)
curve to look
iso welFare
- = t
ne max W Such that > xe = x! Sum st ath goodss
wo * cic ss Wafare te ore ind
x :
uo i m™m
= wy = yi mm Sum ot att Goods
tae: Heal, for_o individual,
“ey fan’ ona
WE wo ave = ae
toting Hee
art
WE should oe Cobb clouglas (awe u2u8)AN. competitive seq% are paret oPficient- Tous L2E-EAH aby
that att compentive eq are welfare Maxima or ais
sl
maxima ave Competitive eq (Follows From {St welt
4heocem —= cri= exchange} sit merit bnieinay
ina ce a ate at Gh
| : indwidy
WP
________walbare ig maximise @ Aife- x - “This is captured ig _
At swe —
we a
= ur(at) _
a 4
seis :Od. Person x a
eid ANd GQ. i
(pie en att happiness a es He
“te
Phe ite im
\ned Ubidityade pends On No
aks Ulli cated +o them.
ee eas Oe
\
a
ha aie
Ohere_A_unids “dre attocated to 2 o Sol
IB sis cnthancacivatcaene nt iene
a
ey fe ‘PodaveieCorgiser
| SWE 5A 20.1020, ---- Bo. Determine ator of = |
fa ae esis epee 38 eae |
E | owe |
| @sks 0 a
— | ult): axb0-150) etseericaety
= “tal = otI50 = 150 poles bit |
@ A 210
Ulyj= 2710 £20
u(y): Bx Yo =120 |
“Total = 20 ¢120 = Yo :
@A=20 !
u(g)+ 2420 « YO Vo si -
uly) 2 9x30 40
E “Total = yo rqo =130 -
| oe
| 4
r J
E Zga) ule) = na fr 20,10, 20, €0 21a
u(y) = 2% Ago to X aod
(Go-A) goes to 4 Q
sasel a a?
ix a6 poten ah fe lo
a(¥) = 2 (Go-10) = 100
Ab A220. 2 © >O%
UCy) = 2 (a0-30\ = go}
OL Ocia OR OF Ear 4
max jo, 4o, 80,604 280 7
5.2 \
ao x gets 20 V gets yo. 0.5 We v) ;
D4 Soe a /
Sl = o+ou Sa. ¥s 7
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