Monotonicity in Plurality Voting
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johnce1981Monotonicity in Plurality Voting
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Powered by AIIn a Top-Two IRV example, candidate A may receive the most first-place votes, while B and C are close next. In standard IRV, all candidates except the one with the fewest top votes are retained and re-evaluated based on redistributed votes until one achieves a majority. Unlike standard IRV, Top-Two IRV immediately reduces to candidates A and either B or C, bypassing intermediate elimination of candidates in between rounds, which could lead to candidate B being eliminated early, whereas in standard IRV, B could win if votes redistributing from an eliminated candidate favor B over C. Thus, Top-Two IRV can lead to a different winning candidate based on the same initial votes .
The IRV method generally does not uphold the Condorcet criterion as it eliminates candidates based on plurality rounds rather than direct head-to-head matchups. A Condorcet winner, who can beat every other candidate in a one-on-one contest, might be eliminated early in IRV rounds if they do not secure enough initial support to survive early round cuts, despite being preferred in pairwise comparisons. Thus, IRV can result in Condorcet losers winning if initial vote distributions are unfavorable to the Condorcet candidate .
The Pairwise Comparison method aligns with the Pareto Principle as it only selects candidates who can win all head-to-head contests against the others, ensuring a candidate not universally preferred cannot win. However, it can fail the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) criterion, as the introduction or removal of non-winning candidates can influence the outcome among remaining candidates due to changes in the preference orderings used in pairwise comparisons .
In the Plurality method, a candidate can win by simply having the most first-place votes, regardless of being ranked last by a majority of voters. This situation arises especially in a situation with many candidates where votes are split among several non-majority preferences. Thus, a widely unpopular candidate could theoretically win because the method doesn't account for overall voter dissatisfaction represented in ranks other than first .
The Plurality method does not always satisfy the Condorcet criterion because it can result in a candidate winning without being preferred over every other candidate by a majority of voters. A Condorcet winner is a candidate who would win a one-on-one election against each of the other candidates, yet the plurality system only considers the number of first-place votes. Consequently, a candidate could win by plurality even if they lose head-to-head against other candidates .
The Borda Count method does not always adhere to the Majority criterion, because a candidate with more than 50% of first-place votes might not have the highest total points. This occurs because every rank contributes to the total score, meaning a candidate who is consistently ranked evenly, though not first, could accumulate more points overall than a majority-preferred candidate who only earns points from first-place rankings .
Top-Two IRV might adhere more closely to certain fairness criteria by simplifying the voter’s choices in terms of head-to-head matchups directly between two most popular candidates, potentially improving majority representation due to a straightforward comparison. However, it might compound biases inherent in initial rounds like disregarding intermediate preferences and can still breach monotonicity or Condorcet criteria if an early eliminated candidate could have won against the final top candidate when all preferences were considered. Thus, while simplifying certain aspects, it may exacerbate or introduce others fairness challenges compared to standard IRV .
The Borda Count method fails the IIA criterion because the presence or absence of a non-winning candidate can alter the outcome of the election among the remaining candidates. For example, a candidate who initially loses can become the winner if a less-preferred candidate is removed from the race since the scores are recalculated based on the reduced number of candidates. This dependency on irrelevant alternatives contradicts the IIA criterion .
A new method might fail to meet the Pareto Principle if it allows a candidate that no voter prefers over another still to win due to procedural rules that do not eliminate such candidates when they should be. This could occur if aggregated ranking points or complex choice transfers override unanimous disfavor, leading to an outcome where universally less-preferred candidates are elevated against the collective will. This indicates a fairness defect in capturing genuine voter preferences, potentially undermining democratic satisfaction and legitimacy .
Ranked choice voting violates the monotonicity criterion because there are situations where improving a candidate's position in some ballots causes them to lose, or worsening their position causes them to win. For instance, if candidate A wins an election and then a voter changes their preference to rank A higher, it could cause A to lose. This occurs if the redistribution of preferences changes as a result of ballots being altered leading to a different candidate emerging as the winner, thereby violating the monotonicity criterion .