ROJAVA AT 4
EXAMINING THE EXPERIMENT IN WESTERN KURDISTAN
Workshop Proceedings
About the Middle East Centre
The LSE Middle East Centre opened in 2010. It builds on LSE’s long engagement with
the Middle East and provides a central hub for the wide range of research on the region
carried out at LSE.
The Middle East Centre aims to enhance understanding and develop rigorous research
on the societies, economies, polities, and international relations of the region. The Centre
promotes both specialised knowledge and public understanding of this crucial area and
has outstanding strengths in interdisciplinary research and in regional expertise. As one
of the world’s leading social science institutions, LSE comprises departments covering
all branches of the social sciences. The Middle East Centre harnesses this expertise to
promote innovative research and training on the region.
MEC Publications Editor: Ribale Sleiman Haidar | Editorial Assistant: Emma Pearson
ROJAVA AT 4: EXAMINING THE
EXPERIMENT IN WESTERN KURDISTAN
Workshop Convenor and Rapporteur: Robert Lowe
Workshop Proceedings
August 2016
The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily rep-
resent those of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) or the Middle East Centre.
This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s) and the LSE Middle
East Centre should be credited, with the date of the publication. While every effort has been made to
ensure the accuracy of the material in this paper, the author(s) and/or the LSE Middle East Centre will not
be liable for any loss or damages incurred through the use of this paper.
The London School of Economics and Political Science holds the dual status of an exempt charity under
Section 2 of the Charities Act 1993 (as a constituent part of the University of London), and a company
limited by guarantee under the Companies Act 1985 (Registration no. 70527).
Workshop Proceedings 5
Executive Summary
In July 2012, Kurds in northern Syria began taking control of territory. This led to the
creation of the largely self-governing areas known collectively as Rojava (Western Kurd-
istan), and a new experiment in local government which has deep significance for Syrian,
Kurdish, Middle Eastern and international geopolitics. Four years on from this unprece-
dented development, the LSE Middle East Centre convened a workshop on 19 July 2016
to examine the progress and nature of the Rojava project. Nine specialists on Kurdish,
Syrian and Turkish politics presented short papers and contributed to rich discussions over
the day. Colleagues from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Depart-
ment for International Development also made valuable contributions. The healthy level
of debate was testament to the complexity and nuance of the issues and this report seeks
to introduce the key themes which emerged and provide new insights into Rojava.
The workshop was split into four sessions. The first sought to understand Rojava through
analysis of the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party, PYD) and its party
complex, the new political and social architecture, and the structure and operations of its
armed force, the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Defence Units, YPG). The second session
examined the parties of the other Kurdish faction, the Kurdistan National Council (KNC),
Rojava’s relationship to the Syrian regime and its engagement with other Syrian actors.
The third session moved north to consider the ambitions held for Rojava by the Partiya
Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK), which is the mother party of the
PYD, and also Turkish scenarios for dealing with its Rojava problem. The final session
explored Rojava’s activities and relationships in the wider international arena. This report
provides a distillation of the presentations and discussions.
Understanding Rojava
The PYD has unilaterally created Rojava and established itself as the dominant force in
Kurdish areas. Understanding the party is therefore central to understanding its political
construct. The PYD’s origins lie in the decision made by the PKK to broaden its support
for the Kurdish struggle beyond Turkey to the whole region. Building on earlier support
for the PKK among some Kurds in Syria, the PYD was founded in 2003 as the Syrian
branch of the movement and has since been transformed from a fringe offshoot of the
PKK to the leading Kurdish party in Syria. The PYD was not founded or developed
with any expectation of gaining power. Rather, it has shown remarkable opportunism and
organisation to exploit the war in Syria and to implement its programme. It is notable that
the first attempt to put Abdullah Öcalan’s ideas of democratic confederalism into practice
is occurring in Syria, a country not previously to the fore of Kurdish political development.
The PYD’s relationship to its mother party is a defining and pervasive feature of Rojava.
Its claim that the PKK’s influence is fraternal and ideological, but without operational
aspects, is unlikely to be accurate. Instead, this relationship remains unclear and is
6 Rojava at 4: Examining the Experiment in Western Kurdistan
contested through three broad theories: shadowy PKK figures tell the PYD what to do;
the PYD makes the decisions, but with PKK help; and some PYD members are tired of
PKK interference and are struggling against this.
The PYD’s structure as a political party is very clearly laid out and the party is proud of
its highly consultative nature. For example, rules state that decisions must be agreed by
two thirds of party members. Whether this system functions as such is another matter, not
least because of the problematic question of the relationship with the PKK. The PYD
claims that it is but one political party within a broader socio-political movement known
as TEV-DEM (Tevgera Civaka Demokratîk, Movement for a Democratic Society), but in
practice the distinction between the two is vague.
Another problematic aspect of the PYD project is the party’s inclination towards author-
itarianism. The PYD denies this – or pleads for understanding in conditions of war – but
its inability, or refusal, to work with the many other Kurdish parties in Syria has con-
tributed to polarisation and tension. As Rojava continues to strengthen, it is possible this
will increase. Alternatively, as the PYD takeover becomes complete, its opponents may
become reconciled to the project as the only viable option for Kurds, though this may also
encourage further PYD domination.
Despite the emphasis on the political and social achievements of the popular movement,
the PYD and Rojava would not have been successful without the victories of the YPG.
While many Syrian Kurds had fought with the PKK or with the Kurds in Iraq, there was
no history of armed Kurdish insurgency in Syria until the civil war. Some groundwork
was laid from 2007, when the ceasefire in Turkey allowed the PKK more time to focus
on the movement in Syria. Since the ‘Rojava revolution’ began in July 2012, the YPG
has steadily conducted the ‘liberation’ of Kurdish areas when it took control of Kobane,
followed by Afrin and some towns in the Jazira.
The YPG’s successful defence of Kobane against Islamic State (IS) in 2014–2015 has
proved highly significant as it forced the US to start providing military support to the
Kurds, demonstrated the ability of the YPG, and provided a powerful rallying point for
the Kurdish movement. Subsequent military gains have enabled the spread of Rojava
across two contiguous cantons, with the YPG now emboldened to try to link the third in
the west and create an enlarged and unbroken Rojava across the length of northern Syria.
The current military operation to take the town of Manbij from IS is crucial to this plan
and is about to succeed.
However, this push further westwards is frowned upon by the US, whose support or dis-
approval is important to the YPG. The decision in 2015 to create the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF), a larger coalition of militias which includes non-Kurds but is dominated
by the YPG, was a clear attempt to win international backing and to calm the fears of
Arabs and other groups in northern Syria of a Kurdish takeover. The move, however, was
not purely cynical packaging, as there are non-Kurdish forces fighting within the SDF,
including an Arab militia taking part in the Manbij operation. The Arab brigades include
tribes with old relationships to the PYD, those expelled from Raqqa by IS who are seeking
revenge, and groups created by the US who have been forced to join.
Workshop Proceedings 7
The YPG may be a stronger actor than the PYD; it certainly appears to have more popu-
lar support as the defender of Kurdish communities. Not all members of the YPG follow
PYD ideology. Another notable aspect of the YPG is the presence of Kurdish fighters
from Turkey and Iran. This may be causing some tensions in Rojava. There is also a
new phenomenon of Kurds from Turkey who are not members of the PKK crossing the
border to fight for the YPG. The extent to which PKK fighters control the YPG is not
agreed but it is clear that Syrian Kurdish veterans of the PKK have fought for the YPG
and it is possible, based on YPG casualty data, that 50 percent of its fighters could be
Turkish based. With around 50,000 fighters, the YPG is now much larger than the PKK’s
8,000-member armed wing.
The Kurdistan National Council Parties
The parties of the KNC, the older Kurdish political movement in Syria, have fallen into
the shadow of the PYD. By 2011, the KNC parties were already losing popular support
due to societal changes and the compelling narrative of the PYD has created a blinkered
view of Kurdish politics in Syria. The PYD insists that other parties recognise its system,
effectively making the opposing KNC parties illegal, exactly as they had been under the
Baʿath regime. The PYD’s restrictions and harassment expose the shortfalls in democracy
in the Rojava system. The pressure to sign up to the PYD project has split the KNC and
some of its parties have switched sides and committed to Rojava.
Despite their weakness, the KNC parties remain relevant. Within Kurdish society, the
KNC has taken on the important role of opposition to the PYD’s rule, in which issues
including forced conscription, conscription of minors and arbitrary arrest have emerged.
In the wider Syrian and international field, it is positioned in support of the Syrian upris-
ing and has an important role to play in the Syrian National Council (SNC) in ensuring
Kurds are represented and the question of the status of Kurdish areas is properly consid-
ered. However, their relationship with the SNC is still uncomfortable as the latter is often
hostile to Kurdish interests and opposes Kurdish autonomy. This could force the KNC to
leave the SNC and seek agreement with the PYD. Kurds of both factions feel there should
be a Kurdish delegation in the peace talks, in addition to the SNC, as they form a national
group rather than a political party.
The KNC is stuck between the PYD and the SNC, with no likelihood of improving either
relationship. It is focussing its efforts on internationalising its role and gaining legitimacy.
The KNC has also added federalism as a demand alongside constitutional recognition of
Kurdish identity. However, its version of federalism differs from that of the PYD in that
it is ethnic rather than democratic confederal and would not be unilaterally imposed.
Instead, the KNC aims for a binding international agreement that guarantees federalism
alongside Kurdish rights. The KNC is backed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
in Iraq that hosts the KNC’s militia, the ‘Rojava Peshmerga’, which the PYD views as a
rival and will not allow to enter Syria.
8 Rojava at 4: Examining the Experiment in Western Kurdistan
Relations between Rojava and Damascus
The relationship between the PKK and the Syrian regime dates back to the 1980s when
Hafez al-Assad provided sanctuary to the movement. In 2003, Syrian intelligence watched
as Syrian PKK supporters they were familiar with reconstituted themselves as the PYD.
After the Kurdish unrest and deaths in 2004, the two sides agreed new dynamics of com-
munication to avoid future violence. In 2011, under pressure from the popular uprising,
Bashar al-Assad made some overtures to Kurds, including granting citizenship to the large
group of stateless people. In July 2012, the YPG took control of some Kurdish towns the
day after the regime was rocked by a serious bomb attack in Damascus. At the time, the
PYD opposed foreign intervention but wanted regime change.
The regime’s mentality is focussed on security as much as politics and this has influenced
its approach to Rojava. It kept security forces in Qamishli as arrangements developed
ad hoc, government salaries continued to be paid by Damascus, and services were still
provided by the Syrian state. The regime–PYD relationship is a marriage of convenience
which has a very rocky existence, as seen in fatal clashes in Qamishli in April 2016. After
the trouble, the regime sent senior people to talk to the PYD who agreed to let the regime
operate unmolested in defined areas.
As both the regime and the PYD became increasingly threatened by Jabhat al-Nusra and
IS, their mutual cooperation increased and this continues in patches. For example, there
is close coordination in Sheikh Maqsood in Aleppo against Jabhat al-Nusra and other
groups, while there is a smaller regime presence in Kobane and Afrin. The most import-
ant factor on the ground is who is killing whom on a certain day.
There are two main views in Damascus of the Kurdish project. The first is that Syria will
return to being a centralised state and Rojava will disappear. Bashar Jaafari, a hardliner,
has stated that Saleh Muslim (the Co-Chair of the PYD) can leave Syria when Rojava is
abolished. Another regime view is looking at decentralisation more broadly as a possible
model for holding the state together. As the ruling group is from the Alawi minority, the
value is apparent. In both views, Damascus largely ignores the political developments and
grand claims made in Rojava. The international exclusion of the PYD has only benefitted
the regime. However, there is a greater risk of a clash between the regime and Rojava if
the hardliners in Damascus win. The fate of the town of Manbij is again very significant.
Rojava and the Opposition in Syria
Relations between the PYD and the opposition in Syria are poor and complicated. The
fall of the regime is a much lower priority for the PYD than for the rebels. The only reason
the rebels and the PYD are not fighting much is because the rebels lack the capacity to
open another front, but more bloody fights are probable. Despite this, a war economy and
Workshop Proceedings 9
trade between all sides exist and will continue. The PYD and IS are the best-structured
and organised of the actors in northern Syria, competing for resources as well as territory
and power.
Arab tribes in the north are divided and are neither totally pro- or anti-PYD. Rebels in
Hasakah see the spread of Rojava as a PYD invasion. There is a historical legacy of ten-
sions between Kurds and Arabs, with micro-conflicts on the ground having deep historical
and tribal elements, such as the settling of scores from a 1934 land dispute in Ras al-Ayn.
Events in Tel Abyad in 2015 are instructive for the PYD’s approach to areas with high
Arab populations. The PYD imposed its own governance structure after Kurdish forces
captured the town from IS. An attempt was made to negotiate for a 65 percent Arab quota
as representative of the population, but the PYD refused and Tel Abyad was joined to the
Kobane canton. Many Arabs feel treated as second class citizens in PYD areas, considered
guilty of supporting IS until proven otherwise. What happens after Manbij falls is there-
fore very important; will the PYD allow the local rebels to govern themselves?
The Importance of Rojava for the PKK
It is essential to consider the PKK’s ideology and political plan in order to understand
developments in Rojava. The party proposes a system of democracy which exists in
parallel to state structures. This is non-territorial based, although it involves territorial
control. It is non-ethnic and is organised through the communities. The PKK argues for
‘demoi-cracy’, democracy of many different people, rather than one, through democratic
autonomy. To them, it is not a question of states, but of popular democracies. Since 2010,
the PKK has moved away from demanding an independent state for Kurds, proclaiming
that many groups can co-exist within the same entity and democratic autonomy.
The developments in the Kurdish conflict in Syria are seen by the PKK as part of a grad-
ual move towards transforming the Kurdish conflicts in Turkey and finding a peaceful
resolution. The implementation of democratic autonomy and self-rule in Rojava provides
a base to influence political developments in Turkey and, in the long-term, to build a
regional consensus on securing Kurdish rights.
The PKK believes that the Kurdish entity in Syria will contribute positively to the reso-
lution of problems in Turkey, as Turkey cannot continue to repress Kurdish culture and
rights. It also believes these solutions should be applied to the Kurdish questions through-
out the whole region, including Iran. The PKK wants Kurdish national unity within a
hybrid structure, rather than nation states.
A great weakness of the Kurdish movement in Turkey has been its lack of international
support. If the international community engages with Rojava, which then gains legiti-
macy, it will anchor the PKK more firmly in the pro-democracy and moderate camp.
This would give the PKK complex the chance to network with bigger powers and better
influence regional players.
10 Rojava at 4: Examining the Experiment in Western Kurdistan
The idea of democratic autonomy was previously sneered at. Now, there is an example which
can work in practice, hence the PKK’s argument across Kurdish communities and political
debates is strengthened. Miracles cannot be expected in Rojava where there is a desperate
fight against IS’ genocidal campaign. But there are clear signs of resilience and positivity,
including the increase in non-Kurdish representation and promotion of gender equality.
Turkey’s Rojava Problem
For Turkey, Rojava is a multi-layered and multi-dimensional issue. Turkey’s policies
towards the Kurds in Syria are utterly inseparable from Turkish domestic Kurdish poli-
cies, as are the two Kurdish populations. The Turkish state has a strong historical tradition
of seeing any Kurdish polity as a threat to its own Kurdish issue. The PKK and its allies
pose a threat to the security and territorial unity of the republic and this is the key factor
ahead of all. This doctrine is institutionalised and is not questioned.
Turkey sees three terrorist groups as threats: hard leftists, Islamists and the PKK. Hence,
it is very natural to expand this definition to include the PYD, which is part of the PKK
monster. The PKK is fundamentally seen as the greatest challenge and its ideology of a
parallel political and social structure is very scary. Turkey defines terrorism in a way that it
can use expansively and apply broadly to extend beyond active PKK members. There are
some similarities to its concern over the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in the 1990s but
Kurdistan-Syria is different because of the involvement of the PKK. The KRI became a
digestible Kurdish option because of its enmity to the PKK.
Turkey sees the growth of Kurdish power across its south and south-east borders as a
threat to its integrity and is suspicious of foreign scheming to undermine its authority.
Turkey has so far made a huge investment in opposing Assad, which is hard to give up.
However, the Turkish attempt to equate the PYD with the PKK and delegitimise it inter-
nationally has failed. In the aftermath of the botched coup in July 2016 and IS attacks
inside Turkey, the Turkish army was ordered into northern Syria. The operation was
ostensibly against IS but clearly also aimed to curb the gains made by the Kurds.
Four scenarios may be laid out for Turkey in dealing with its Rojava problem:
• Invasion or military operation to extinguish Rojava: The current military intervention
is a blow to Rojava, but it is not fatal. A much deeper Turkish assault is unlikely be-
cause international support would not be forthcoming, the Syrian war is too complex
and Turkish domestic issues are too challenging. It would likely draw Turkey into long
and difficult fight with the PKK/YPG inside Syria and would also cause an escala-
tion of the conflict inside Turkey. It could also cause large scale displacement of the
Kurdish population in Syria.
• Wiping out the PKK, Rojava will then collapse: Turkey is not likely to eliminate the
PKK. However, its fight against the group is further destabilising Turkish domestic
politics. This is the option Turkey currently chooses.
Workshop Proceedings 11
• Coming to terms with Rojava: This scenario is not compatible with Turkey’s secu-
rity doctrine.
• The Syrian war ends with an international peace deal: This would have to include
the Kurds. The Turkish response will be negative, refusing to accept a Kurdish entity
and it will scupper the PYD’s involvement. Turkey’s position will delay the chance of
a Syrian peace deal.
Rojava in the International Arena
Despite its remarkable gains, Rojava is highly fragile and desperately short of friends.
All other actors in Syria are hostile, as are the KRI and Turkey. In such a deeply hostile
neighbourhood, any support Rojava can gain internationally is vital. Hence the emerging
autonomous region has made notable efforts to craft and spread a narrative which appeals
to international governments and publics.
The narrative promoted by the PYD has two themes. The first is that of the wicked ene-
mies of Rojava. Under this, Rojava is the heroic underdog fighting for the survival of the
Kurdish minority against overwhelming and rather evil enemies. Rojava was established
only for self-defence but now offers protection. It is easy to depict IS within this narrative
and it plays well to Western ears.
The 6-month siege and victory over IS in Kobane in 2014–2015 was momentous as it
changed the Kurdish narrative to heroic martyrdom and, rarely in the Kurdish move-
ment, to one of victory. It also transformed Rojava’s relations with the West, especially the
US, and proved it could be a useful ally.
Turkey shares an equally negative status for Rojava, and is consistently condemned for
its hostility to peaceful, democracy-loving Kurds and in particular for supporting IS. The
Assad regime is vicious and illegitimate and the Syrian opposition is led by expatriates
motivated by personal ambition who do not support democracy. The KRI does not help
Kurds as it is in the pocket of Turkey.
The second theme is Rojava’s self-narrative of its wholesome alternative as democratic,
popular, secular, gender-equal and well organised. The PYD is acutely aware of the ques-
tion of Kurdish ethnic domination of northern Syria and boasts of its inclusion of ethnic
and religious minorities, quotas and official language status for Arabic and Syriac. The
appearance of ‘Northern Syria’ in the name of the autonomous region is part of this effort
to downplay its Kurdishness, as is the creation of the SDF as a multi-sectarian force worthy
of international backing, especially given the alternatives. And in 2016 the movement’s
international representation is being officially separated into PYD and Rojava offices.
There is also, interestingly, a strong emphasis on loyalty to Syria and claims of Syrian
patriotism. This is wholly compatible with the ideology of democratic autonomy which is
intended to be of benefit to all peoples, not just Kurds.
12 Rojava at 4: Examining the Experiment in Western Kurdistan
For Western states, there lies a conflict between the imperative to stop IS and acute sensi-
tivities to Turkey. There are many reasons for Western hesitation, like the importance of
the use of Turkish air bases. The lines of Syria’s existing borders should not be endangered
by an autonomous movement. The US and EU powers oppose the unilateral actions of
the PYD and its distance from the Syrian Arab opposition. The West also criticises the
PYD for its authoritarian behaviour and prefers to sponsor the KNC, which is a member
of the SNC, recognised by them as the legitimate representation of the Syrian people
since 2012.
However, Rojava has become attractive to international powers operating in the Syrian
war. Most importantly for Western states and Russia, it is proving effective against IS. The
tipping point for the West was the battle for Kobane which halted IS at a time it appeared
unstoppable. The US and its allies continued to carry out supportive air strikes and there
is currently a small but apparently growing US military presence in Kurdish areas coordi-
nating the support and providing advice.
In addition, Rojava offers a model of government much more in sympathy with Western
ideals than any alternative operating in Syria. The PKK is on Western terrorist lists but
the PYD is not and despite Turkish pressure, not likely to be. Russia, so far free from Turk-
ish pressure, is Rojava’s strongest international state supporter. Russia does not publically
back Kurdish ambitions but pushes harder for PYD inclusion in Syria’s peace talks.
Concluding Points
In May 2016, the SDF launched an offensive to capture the strategically significant town
of Manbij from Islamic State. By early August, they were in control of most of the town.
Many of the questions thrown up by the four years of the Rojava experiment are reflected
in this military operation and its political outcome.
One of these is the extent of the PYD’s commitment to inclusiveness and power sharing
with the large non-Kurdish communities of northern Syria. Manbij is a majority Arab
town and Arab fighters in the SDF are leading the attack. The US, which is supporting
the operation, intends that Arabs will govern the town after its fall. However, the YPG
and PYD may impose a council of their own choosing as they did in Tel Abyad. The
PYD’s refusal to accommodate the Kurdish parties of the KNC is consistent with its
determination to maximise any power it can take. A stronger Rojava could cause further
authoritarianism and polarisation among Kurds.
Related to this is the key question of the growth of Rojava into a contiguous territory.
The gaps between the three pockets of Kurdish-majority areas have been a weakness of
Western Kurdistan. Two have been joined through the success of the YPG and there is
an obvious desire to connect the third. This would mean absorbing more non-Kurds into
Rojava and establish it as a solid block on the map of Syria. The deep tensions in the
relationship between Rojava and the Baʿathist regime are also visible in Manbij. Kurdish
expansion into the corridor to the east of Aleppo would not be welcomed by Damascus
as it eyes an ever more entrenched rival administration.
Workshop Proceedings 13
A contiguous federal region of Rojava would run along the vast majority of Turkey’s
border with Syria. Turkey would furiously oppose this expansion on its southern flank but
its options to intervene appear limited, other than by increasing pressure on its allies. The
awkwardness of the position for the US and its partners would be even more exposed as
they attempt to defeat IS while keeping the PYD in check. Greater foreign dialogue with
the PYD could prove useful in reinforcing messages of the actions it should take, and there
are signs that the PYD is receptive to this.
Whatever the developments after the Manbij offensive, the question of the constitutional
relationship between Kurdish communities and the Syrian state is pressing. There cannot
be a peaceful settlement in Syria without the inclusion of its Kurdish population. Despite
the difficulties presented by Syrian opposition to federalism and the complications of Syr-
ia’s make-up, mechanisms need to be examined for a constitutional agreement with the
autonomous area within the eventual settlement.
14 Rojava at 4: Examining the Experiment in Western Kurdistan
Abbreviations
IS Islamic State
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party
KNC Kurdistan National Council
KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq
PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
PYD Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party)
SDF Syrian Democratic Forces
SNC Syrian National Council
TEV-DEM Tevgera Civaka Demokratîk (Movement for a Democratic Society)
YPG Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Defence Units)
Workshop Participants
Harriet Allsopp Freelance Researcher
Cengiz Gunes Associate Lecturer, Open University
Haid Haid Freelance Syrian Researcher
Zeynep Kaya Research Fellow, Middle East Centre, LSE
Zelal Kızılkan Assistant Professor, Mardin Artuklu University
and Visiting Fellow, Middle East Centre, LSE
Rana Khalaf Academy Senior Fellow, Chatham House
Robert Lowe Deputy Director, Middle East Centre, LSE
Ghadi Sary Academy Fellow, Chatham House
Wladimir van Wilgenburg Middle East Analyst, Jamestown Foundation
Cover image: A Kurdish man guards a checkpoint on the road to the northwestern
Syrian city of Afrin, August 2012. © ARIS MESSINIS/AFP/Getty Images.
Middle East Centre
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
[Link]/mec | @LSEmiddleeast
[Link]/middleeastcentre