Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
ACCEPTABLE
RISK
“Acceptable-risk problems are
decision problems; that is, they
require a choice among alternative
courses of action. What distinguishes
an acceptable-risk problem from
other decision problems is that at
least one alternative option includes a
threat to life or health among its
consequences. We shall define risk as
the existence of such threats.“
(Fischhoff et al., 1978:2)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
MEANING...?
“...the explorations of
“acceptable risk” often
explicitly or implicitly opine
that any probability higher
than some particular
dividing line is
“unacceptable...”
(Finkel & Johnson, 2023:1173)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
IN PRACTICE
“... the acceptability of risk is a relative concept
and involves consideration of different factors.
Considerations in these judgments may include:
The certainty and severity of the risk;
the reversibility of the health effect;
the knowledge or familiarity of the risk;
whether the risk is voluntarily accepted or
involuntarily imposed;
whether individuals are compensated for
their exposure to the risk;
the advantages of the activity; and
the risks and advantages for any alternatives.”
(EPA, 1988)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
RISK ENVIRONMENT
“The risk associated with the most acceptable
option might be defined as an acceptable risk.
However, that definition ignores the conditional,
context-dependent nature of the choice. Decision
makers using different decision rules, believing
different information, or considering different
options could make quite different decisions
regarding what options (and associated risks) to
accept. As a result, there are no universally
acceptable options (or risks). In particular, no
level of risk can be specified such that risks less
than that level are acceptable and risks greater
than that level are unacceptable.“
(Fischhoff et al., 1978: 8)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
ZERO RISK
“The myth of zero risk
combines with our
general risk illiteracy to
result in some rather
distorted priorities“
(Philley, 1992:220)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
RISK REDUCTION
“We can thus reduce the
risk to a “reasonable”
and acceptable low
level; however, we will
never achieve absolute
zero.“
(Philley, 1991:32)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
4 LINES OF INVESTIGATION
“In assessing risk,
measurements are made in
order to:
1. Define the conditions of
exposure;
2. Identify the adverse effects;
3. Relate exposure with effect;
4. Estimate the overall risk.”
(Lowrance, 1976:18)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
RISK ANALYSIS
“The various elements of
consideration of any analysis at
arriving at health, safety, and
welfare, acceptable risk decision
levels involve six general factors,
two processes that tend to
integrate and weight the general
factors, and six generic goals that
need to be cost and risk-balanced”
(Hall & Wiggans, 2000:180)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
RISK FACTORS
1. Social
2. Technical
3. Administrative
4. Political
5. Legal
6. Economic
(Hall & Wiggans, 2000:180)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
RISK PROCESSES
1. Risk Analysis
2. Decision Analysis
(Hall & Wiggans, 2000:180)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
RISK OPTIMISATION
1. Cost minimisation
2. Ecologic Enhancement
3. Environmental Protection
4. Effectiveness of the Technology
5. Energy use Minimisation
6. Safety from Injury or Death
(Hall & Wiggans, 2000:180)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
MEASURING RISK
“There is nothing absolute about
such decisions. All that we have a
right to expect at the time they are
made is that they should be the
products of scientific competence
and experience, mature judgements
and full possession of all the existing
data”
(Lowrance, 1976:44)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
BENEFITS
“...we needed to caution subjects
about offering doctrinaire answers
that would either refuse to consider
any risk level “tolerable,” or that
would accept substantial probability
of harm out of concern that limiting
risk would deprive the subject of
important benefits.”
(Finkel & Johnson, 2023:1179)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
BENEFIT TO WHOM
“A technology has a
societally acceptable level
of risk if its benefits
outweigh its risks for
every member of
society.”
(Fischhoff, 1994:5)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
EXPOSURE
“The same risk exposure level
that is generally acceptable to a
group may not be at all
acceptable to the person who
experiences the occasional
negative consequence.”
(Philley, 1991:33)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
DICHOTOMY
“A double standard of individual vs.
corporate acceptable risks exists for
safety behavior. A person can legally
operate a lawn mower at home while
barefoot after drinking a few beers,
yet the same behavior (same risk)
would be illegal on the job.“
(Philley, 1991:35)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
EXPERT INPUT
“... one cannot rely on risk
professionals’ speculations
regarding “what the public wants”.
Professionals contact the public so
irregularly, and their life experiences
are so different that they cannot
claim accurate knowledge. ”
(Fischhoff, 1994:9)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
CAUSE & EFFECT
“Unavoidably, proofs of causality
are tenuous. Findings are always
open to new interpretation as
additional experiments are
completed or as other knowledge
becomes available. The problem is
greater with long-range, delayed
effects.”
(Lowrance, 1976:57)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
STATISTICS & METRICS
“Statistical methods cannot
establish proof of causal
relationship in an association.
The causal significance of an
association is a matter of
judgement which goes beyond
any statement of statistical
probability.”
(Lowrance, 1976:57)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
CAUSAL SIGNIFICANCE
1. The consistency of the association
2. The strength of the association
3. The specificity of the association
4. The coherence of the association
(Lowrance, 1976:57)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
RISK SIGNIFICANCE
“Determining risk is a
business of making
comparisons.”
(Lowrance, 1976:60)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
EXPRESSING RISK
“All the complicated
detective work we have been
reviewing converges to meet
the single purpose of
estimating the probabilistic
measure, risk. ”
(Lowrance, 1976:60)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
OPTIONS
“Risk can be
expressed in
several ways ”
(Lowrance, 1976:70)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
EFFICACY
“...some environmental/health interventions
impose intolerable costs while only reducing
diffuse and trivially small risks. These result in
outcomes that are inefficient, unjust, and thus
unethical. Equally or more importantly, other
failures to intervene (or half-hearted, weak
interventions) fail to reduce intolerable risks, for
the sake of avoiding trivial and eminently
manageable costs. These perpetrate outcomes
that are inefficient, unjust, and thus unethical”
(Finkel & Johnson, 2023:1204)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
INVESTMENT
“Responsible management must
ask not only which dangers are
the worst but which are most
amenable to treatment. Even if a
safety measure is cost-beneficial,
greater benefits may be reaped
with a like expenditure
elsewhere.”
(Fischhoff et al., 1979:36)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY
“Any assessment of an
exceedingly complex
technological problem requires
making many assumptions and
involves analytical methods
whose very nature must be
questioned. “
(Lowrance, 1976:73)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
JUDGING SAFETY
“...we deliberately avoided the word
‘safety’ altogether, because of its
vagueness and long history of misuse.
Safety is not measured. Risks are
measured. Only when those risks are
weighed on the balance of social values
can safety be judged: a thing is safe if its
attendant risks are judged to be
acceptable.”
(Lowrance, 1976:75)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
APPROACHES
“Four approaches are most frequently
used in attempting to make this
assessment (acceptable risk). They are:
1. Cost-benefit analysis,
2. Revealed preferences,
3. Expressed preferences, and
4. Natural standards.
(Fischhoff et al., 1979:18)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
UTILITY THEORY
“...significant uncertainties in the
consequences cannot be
adequately handled by standard
cost-benefit analyses.
Applications of the cautionary
and precautionary principles
are required”
(Aven, 2007:309)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
ACCEPTABILITY EMPIRICAL CRITERIA
1. Exposure relative to natural
background.
2. Occupational exposure
precedent.
3. Public referenda and
polling.
4. Comparison with
accustomed hazards. ”
(Lowrance, 1976:85-86)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
CONSIDERATIONS
(Lowrance, 1976:87)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
RISK MATRIX
“The Military Standard for
System Safety Programs
(MIL- STD-882B) uses a risk
evaluation technique called
the RISK MATRIX...
thus producing a 5 x 4 risk
matrix”
(Philley, 1992:221)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
PRACTICALITIES
“...inherent difficulties
that exist with the
concept of ‘acceptable
risk’ and with any attempt
to build policy
instruments around it”
(Fischhoff, 1983:559)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
PERIODIC REVIEW
“ ... the matter of acceptable risk
needs to be examined periodically...
to accommodate new information,
conditions, theory, or regulations.
Then the action(s) believed to be the
best appropriate at the time need to
be executed. Common sense
requires it. Today’s litigious society
demands it.”
(Hall & Wiggins, 2000:185 )
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
MAKE HASTE
“ The risks are
changing. Menaces are
upon us. Time is short.
Decisions have to be
made...”
(Lowrance, 1976:85-175)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
NOT WASTE
“Successful progress will
always involve discovery,
evaluations and decisions
on the acceptability of
risks”
(Philley, 1992:223)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
APPLICATION
“The disciplinary training of scientists
shows them how to get the right answers
to a set of specially defined problems. The
problems raised by hazard management
are too broad to be solved by any one
discipline. No one knows how to
get the right answer. All we can do is
avoid making the particular mistakes to
which each of us are attuned.”
(Fischhoff et al., 1979:37)
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
REFERENCES:
Aven, T. (2007). On the ethical justification for the use of risk acceptance criteria. Risk
Analysis: An International Journal, 27(2), 303-312.
Environmental Protection Agency, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants..., 53 Fed. Reg. 28,495 (1988)
Finkel, A. M., & Johnson, B. B. (2023). At last, empirical elicitations of the magnitudes of
those risks (and costs!) too small to matter and those too large to abide. Human and
Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal, 29(9-10), 1163-1211.
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Read, S., & Combs, B. (1978). How safe is safe
enough? A psychometric study of attitudes towards technological risks and benefits.
Policy sciences, 9, 127-152.
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1979). Weighing the risks: Risks: Benefits
which risks are acceptable?. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable
Development, 21(4), 17-38.
Fischhoff, B. (1983). “Acceptable risk”: The case of nuclear power. Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management, 2(4), 559-575.
Fischhoff, B. (1994). Acceptable Risk: A Conceptual Proposal, Risk Health, Safety &
Environment, 5, 1.
Hall, W. J., & Wiggins, J. H. (2000). Acceptable Risk: A need for periodic review. Natural
Hazards Review, 1(3), 180-187.
Lowrance, W. W. (1976). Of acceptable risk: Science and the determination of safety.
William Kaufman Inc.
Philley, J. O. (1991). Acceptable risks?. Professional Safety, 36(5), 32.
Philley, J. O. (1992). Acceptable risk—an overview. Plant/Operations Progress, 11(4),
218-223.
U.S. Department of Defense, MIL-STD-882B, 1984, Military Standard System Safety
Program Requirements, U.S. DOD, Wash. D.C.
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Tony Ridley MSc CSyP CAS FSyl SRMCP
Risk, Resilience, Security, Safety & Management Sciences (Applied)
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