Observation Note
Candidate: FRIDAY GIFT EYAKENO Job Title: OIL/GAS ISOLATION OPERATIONS
Location: PHC TC Assessor: Livinus Okeke
Unit Observed: OGTS-P25
Assessor Observation: Witness Testimony: Personal Statement
Description of Activity Observed:
Isolation is the ability to prevent de-energized plant / equipment from becoming energized or inadvertently operated.
P1.1 Describe the reason for carrying out isolations
On 08th September, 2023 By 0908hrs, I Observed FRIDAY GIFT EYAKENO carry out process plant Isolation in order to
eliminate or minimize the risks of fatalities, injuries and events arising from hazardous spill release/contact at SPIE Oil-
Water Separation Facilities through providing guiding processes to isolate the spill source
P1.2 Describe the hierarchy and purpose of type of isolations
GIFT understood that all works involving the isolations are risk assessed completely before completion of the task and
where applicable an isolation instruction. She ensured specific risk controls were implemented to manage the risks of
working near moving parts. She preferred the use of double valve isolations as trusted method for isolating liquids, gasses
or vapours. She understood that double valve isolations are implemented for all work activities where there is a risk of
engulfment in a confined space. She noted that in a situation where this is not reasonably practicable, additional risk controls
is identified and documented in a risk assessment (e.g., isolation points. She learned that the isolation point is visually
monitored continually, while opening valves).
She watched me isolate all confined space work activities undertaken under the control of a single point isolation before She
entered the confined space. She maintained the isolation until all the reading observation was completed before She left the
space. Where GIFT was performing isolations, I guided Hers with the CRO and the duty plant operators, we agreed on how
the isolations was managed and performed; and completed in accordance with approved procedure. GIFT documented
the steps for isolating, testing for dead and de-isolating on either an isolation instruction logsheet while using lockout
equipment to secure all isolation points.
P1.3 Outline typical isolation devices and methods of installations
GIFT carried out pipeline isolations for SPIE Process Separation Plant. There was a hierarchy of mechanical security for the
three isolation methods She used. First and foremost, She did double block and bleed (DBB) isolation once installed,the
reliability became greatest while that for single block and bleed (SBB) was least.
She based Hers choice on risk assessment. This was as a result of Hers experience and understanding that as the complexity
of an isolation scheme increases, the opportunities for error also increase
P1.4 Outline isolation and de-isolation procedures
Isolation
GIFT was designated to isolated the plant. She undertook the planning to confirm that She identified and followed all risk
control requirements, understood all impacts of the isolation on the plant including the isolation point (e.g., pumps, valves,
etc.) while reviewing the job. She followed guidelines.
I made all tools and equipment available to Hers. GIFT identified the energy sources and isolate [Link]
contacted me to confirm that the isolation can proceed as planned.
She Stopped the plant in a controlled manner and restrained the plant, materials and an energy source from dissipating by
unplugging power leads, disconnecting water hoses, turning off and alerted the CRO of the need to stop the pumps. She
deenergized the VSD and secured the isolation points with a red isolation lock and isolation tag and small plug lockout
device, hasp to secure the isolation point
GIFT verified the effectiveness of the isolation before commencing work by visually checking the local disconnection of
leads, hoses, by confirming the local isolator is in the off position and by checking the ignition of the item of plant. She also
confirmed that air is released from pressure vessels, water drained from discharge pipes. GIFT restrained and chocked the
electric motor in place to prevent it from moving.
She recorded the isolation report sheet all the work activity and again checked and tested the still isolated equipment to
safeguard against inadvertent re-energization.
She approved work on the plant following the verification of a simple isolation, in accordance with job order.
She couldn’t complete the work activity in a single shift, so She notified me that the item of plant is out of service. She attached
a yellow out of service lock and tag to the isolation point and control point for the item of plant to confirm that the plant is
not safe to operate.
De-isolation
Before reinstating an item of plant, GIFT contacted me to confirm that the item of plant can be reinstated as planned. She
confirmed that maintenance crew who participated in the oil-water separation operation have completed their duty and
are clear of the plant, all tools and equipment have been removed and the plant is safe to return to service. She then
removes all of the red isolation locks and tags from the isolation points in accordance with the requirements of the Isolation
instruction. She destroyed all isolation tags used as part of the isolation and disposed them after the work activity was
completed. GIFT reinstated the energy sources (in a controlled manner)
She tested and confirmed operational status of plant and followed isolation instructions and recorded the process
implemented to protect everyone from hazardous spill/emission while performing isolation.
She tested and reinstated the electric motor, valve and drain vents in accordance with the requirements of the isolation
instruction, include carrying out correct connection and function testing while taking precautions to ensure that other plant
is not inadvertently energized
She confirmed that the item of plant is safe to return to service, checked to ensure all workers, tools, equipment and waste
have been removed from the work area and also ensured that all guards have been replaced and the plant is safe for use.
She re-established the plant’s energy sources and removed restraints applied to the plant.
GIFT Confirmed that the plant is available for normal operations and the DCS/ICSS alarms have been disabled to perform
as the isolation was reinstated. She started the plant in a controlled manner as permitted.
P2.1 Carryout a task/job risk assessment and record safety control measures
GIFT maintained documents (risk assessment records, method statements, permits, isolation certificates) on site for a
specified time after completion and then archived, to enable effective monitoring, audit and review of the isolations
systems. She included depressurization and, draining/venting, purging and washing out, installation/removal and proving of
the isolation , the integrity of the isolation during intrusive work, and the compatibility of any nearby work or operations
on shared systems; and requirements for testing and reinstatement of plant (eg pressure/leak testing, purging, controlled
depressurization/refilling).
GIFT identified any need for additional mitigating measures, taking into account: what could go wrong to lead to a loss of
containment; the possible consequences of a loss of containment e.g., fire, human harm, environmental damage, how likely
it is and how bad it could be; and anything else that can be done to reduce risk to ALARP levels
GIFT considered the storage conditions (e.g., temperature), additional risk reduction measures and whether using of a
‘variation’ is appropriate, e.g., for short term isolations while carrying out the risk assessment.
P2.2 Carry out an isolation selection risk assessment
GIFT considered measures such as reducing pressure and/or temperature, reducing inventory, detailed planning of the
work: – to minimize the duration of exposure to broken containment; – to reduce the duration of the isolation; and – to
ensure that the correct type and quantity of PPE .She restricted incompatible and non-essential work nearby, access around
the worksite by barriers, reduced the number of people working on the plant, monitored the isolation more frequently,
attended throughout the isolation increasing supervision. She understood that the process for testing the
isolations is effective, sources of stored energy have been dissipated and a zero-energy state achieved. She recorded the
isolation verification process on the isolation sequence sheet and plant Isolation control sheet for the work activity.
GIFT achieved the verification of isolations through Visual inspection of push buttons, switches engaged/activated
, electrical switches or contactors to ensure that they are in the open position, valves are in the operating mode defined on
the isolation instruction, suspended parts are lowered to a resting position or blocked to prevent movement, moving parts
are restrained ,flows have ceased from drain or scour valves, locks and/or tags are in place to secure the isolation points
and Tested to see that the electrical equipment is de-energized and that all electrical energy are dissipated, opened drain
or scour valves to ensure fluids have been drained
P2.3 Identify plant/equipment to be isolated from P&IDs
GIFT checked the isolations against the current P&ID for the plant and marked on a suitable copy of the P&ID. She
discovered that the current P&ID did not match the installation, She reassessed the isolation requirements and confirmed
it on a corrected P&ID, and a schematic formally revised and reissued at the earliest opportunity. GIFT used appropriate
documentation to identify the actual location of the isolation point, within the isolation certificates, and managed the
isolations safely.
She adopted the isolation certificate to support a safe isolation procedure by documenting the status of specified isolations
as part of a PTW system, especially where the isolation work required is not detailed on the PTW itself. She understood that
the certificates are designed for ease of understanding and use, and to support the main permit.
P2.4 Compile an Isolation job/work pack
GIFT identified the equipment to isolate as well as the isolation points, marked a copy of the plant P&ID showing which
items are isolated and attached to the lockout/tagout plan. She ensured that all items required for safe isolation were
isolated from energy source by the highest method of isolation as reasonably practicable and meeting the minimum
isolation requirement. She also locked out and tagged the pump motor. She clearly marked and locked the area requiring
isolation to ensure valves are secured in a safe position from inadvertent operation.
She placed warning tags at all isolation points, to forbid the operation of the energy control device and associate equipment,
then communicated the reason points, to name of the person who applied the tag and the date the tag was applied. GIFT
vented, depressurized and broke the contaminant of the pipeline, cleaned the filter vessels and captured the contaminated
water. She checked all bleeds, vents and drains to be free from blockage before testing it. She tested the valves and the
isolated points to prove effective isolation.
P3.1 Prepare to Isolate equipment (vent/depressurize and drain)
GIFT was carrying out a routine pigging operation, She opened the tell-tale bleed valve to ensure that the launcher was
free of toxic and flammable gases. The gas test was negative. She then realized that She had omitted part of the procedure,
requiring the interspace between the kicker line isolation valve and the pipeline isolation valves to be vented to flare. She
opened the vent valve to depressurize the line and checked all the bleeds, vents, drains and checked if it is free from
blockages during the contaminated fluid draining. She tested the isolation to confirm that the system is bled, vented,
drained and locked.
She regularly tested and monitored the system under isolation at interval stipulated in the permit to work, risk assessment
and procedure for the task.
P3.2 Isolate plant and equipment in accordance with procedures
GIFT interpreted ‘routine’ with caution and defined its meaning recorded in procedures. I allowed Hers access over the
company standards, procedures and reference information involved in planning and conducting the isolation.
Following accurate reference information, She updated to all plant modifications, is necessary for planning and
implementing isolations including piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), process system schematics – unlike a P&ID
these provide an overall view of the Plant, piping general arrangements and/or piping isometrics, cause and effect
diagrams; and loop diagrams. She depressurized and purged the line considering the safety of this initial isolation scheme
while selecting the final isolation method.
She ensured every person around is secured from a release of substance from the plant during the intrusive activity. She
encouraged all operator trainee including Her self to wear personal protective equipment in order to mitigate against any
undetected failure of the initial isolation, or liquid or vapour trapped between the valve and the flange.
She used appropriately rated blank flanges, plugs to close off open pipework and ensured there were properly installed with
the correct gaskets and securing bolts so that they can withstand the system pressure, if required, without leaking due to
thrust.
She ensured that the isolations remained secure through the duration of the intrusive task and placed lockout/tagout as to
prevent accidental or unauthorized removal of the isolation.
She reviewed procedure for isolation of the oil-water separation system, noted lock out points in left column (attach P&ID
or equipment drawing indicating isolation points), and identified all hazards that are to be controlled, She assessed the
failures that occurred during the isolation activity, the likelihood of these failures, and their consequences, then the
selected the appropriate type and level of controls.
She identified and prepared the pumps and valves involved in the task, having vent and drains the lines. She clearly
understood and communicated the effects of the isolation to the shift crew.
GIFT installed isolation scheme at each point which is required to allow installation of the final isolation. She safely drained
the contaminated fluid out of the system, having proved the integrity and effectiveness of isolations before intrusive work
begins. She secured, monitored and maintained the isolations throughout the intrusive activity. She understood that it is
necessary to maintain isolation integrity throughout this step.
She placed lock and tag on the valves, blind flange VSD switches and fittings, She had accessed to withstand environmental
conditions, following isolation requirement on the work permit, work clearance and procedure. She strived and understood
potential hazard related to the SPIE Process Separation facilities under consideration. She recognized technical
defects/omissions in the task and the adverse implications for health and safety caused by the hazards and omission
P3.3 Carry out pressure or service test if required
GIFT checked on overall plant integrity following major intrusive work as per plant overhauls. She understood the
involvement of pressure testing to confirm that the plant is ‘leak tight’. She carried out further temporary changes to the
overall isolation scheme. She admitted a high standard of control over the final de-isolation, following the pressure test. She
checked if the venting and has a positive isolation installed/removed because She understood that such intrusive work will
Other Units Covered:
Candidate Signature: Date:
Witness Signature: Date:
Assessor Signature: Date: