AGENDA - .

Developing Frameworks for the Peaceful Use of Emerging Military

Technologies (e.g., Quantum and Hypersonics).
 INDEX
TOPIC
1. Letter from the Executive Board
2. Rules of Procedure (ROP)
3. Introduction to the committee
4. Introduction to the Agenda
5. Existing Frameworks
6. Emerging Technologies
7. Case Studies
8. QARMA
 LETTER FROM EXECUTIVE BOARD
Greetings, Delegates!
It is our utmost pleasure to welcome you to the Disarmament and International
Security Committee (DISEC) at the DEMUN 25 conference. We are honored to have
you join us in this dynamic forum, where the world’s most pressing security challenges
are addressed by the leaders of tomorrow.

The incidence of armed conflicts, the number of displaced refugees, and the widening
of economic disparities are all seen to be growing exponentially as a result of the
world's rapid evolution. The obvious reaction to such circumstances is to use violent
weapons, which were ultimately somewhat constrained by a number of UN-established
legal frameworks.

However, new technologies like hypersonic missiles and quantum encryption offer
both complicated hazards and previously unheard-of advantages. We must consider a
critical requirement to fill the regulatory void surrounding ground-breaking
innovations in order to combat their exploitation. As the first committee of the United
Nations General Assembly, DISEC’s mandate is pivotal in shaping the future of arms
control, conflict prevention, and responsible technology governance.

It is anticipated that each delegate will approach the discussion with a spirit of
diplomacy, critical thinking, and thorough investigation. In addition to the interests
of the country to which you are assigned, your contributions should show a
commitment to global security and ethical responsibility. Cooperation, creativity, and
tolerance for differing opinions will be key components of our team's success.

To ensure fairness and foster genuine engagement, the use of AI-generated content in
speeches or any form of committee communication is strictly prohibited. All
submissions and interventions must be your own original work. Delegates found
violating this rule will face strict actions taken against them.

Keep in mind that the solutions you offer here could spur actual change as you get
ready for committee. We urge you to question presumptions, look for agreement, and
exercise integrity in your leadership. The vision and commitment of young diplomats
like you are critical to the future of global peace and security.

"Diplomacy is the art of building bridges where walls once stood." - Anonymous

Once again, a very warm welcome to DEMUN 25 and this very committee,

Regards,
B S Chetan Swaroop Reddy (Chairperson)
Ananya Jha (Vice Chairperson)
Ronit Mannava (Moderator)
 RULES OF PROCEDURE (RoP)
Before the conference days, we expect the delegates to
acknowledge themselves with the rules of procedure,
structure and verbatim of debate. They are expected to go
through this section of the background guide carefully,
please note that the delegates will be briefed about this
during the delegate training session and first committee
Session as well.

Language

• Delegates are expected to speak in English throughout the

committee session during the formal and informal debate.

• Delegates are encouraged to refrain from using personal

pronouns and address themselves as their allocated country.

• Instead of saying "I believe that the agenda..." use the

verbatim, "The delegate of (your country) believes that the
agenda..."

• Delegates are expected to use formal respectful and topic-

related jargon to express their views. Use of offensive,
derogatory, informal, inappropriate or abusive language is
highly discouraged by the EB and will result in
consequences.

• Delegates will be recognized through the raising of their

placards and will be given the chance to address the EB to
communicate their point or motion.
 Formal Debate

The formal debate consists of three sections, the General

speaker's list, Moderated Caucus and Special Speaker's
List. During the formal debate, delegates are expected to
remain seated and act following the expectations of
behavior and diplomacy.

General Speaker's List (GSL)

The GSL is a time when all the delegates wishing to

speak can address the agenda as a whole or as a specific
part of the agenda. This time can be used to discuss their
country's stance, agenda's scope, other country's stance,
or specific facets of the agenda to familiarize the
committee with their stance and overarching ideas. The
GSL is non-exhaustive meaning it will be a continuing
list throughout the two days and the exhaustion of the
GSL leads to the failure of the committee.

Moderated Caucus (Mod Cauc)

The moderated caucus is another part of the formal

debate but unlike the GSL it is the discussion of a
specific part of the agenda that the committee agrees to
discuss. Moderated caucuses are a great way to enhance
debate and delve deeper into the various aspects of the
agenda. Moderated causes can be used to share
resolutions to the agenda, discuss the impact of the
agenda, or discuss historic events or treaties concerning
the agenda. The main purpose is to engage in effective
debate through sub-topics and simplifications of the
agenda.
 Special Speaker's List (SSL)

The Special Speaker's List follows the same structure as

the GSL. The SSL is established during a crisis and
delegates are expected to discuss the crisis during their
speeches. The delegates can address their country's
stance, and other countries' actions or investigate the
crisis during this time.

Informal Debate

Unmoderated Caucus

An unmoderated caucus is a period where the delegates

can move around the committee and lobby with other
delegates. This time can be used for discussion on the
agenda, moderated caucus topics, resolution paper
writing, bloc building or crisis discussion. Delegates are
encouraged to make the most of this time to strengthen
the quality and flow of debate during the formal session.
 Motions & Verbatims

• Motion to start roll call:

• "The delegate of (your country) would like to motion to start roll call"

• Motion to start a formal debate:

• "The delegate of (your country) would like to motion to start a formal
debate "

• Motion to establish the General Speaker's list:

• "The delegate of (your country) would like to establish the General
Speaker's List with total speaker's time of 60/90 seconds"

• Motion to raise a moderated caucus:

• "The delegate of (your country) would like to raise a motion for a
moderated caucus on the topic (your topic), with a total time period of
(___ minutes) and individual speaker's time (__-seconds)"

• Motion to establish the Special Speaker's list:

• "The delegate of (your country) would like to raise a motion to
establish the special speaker's list with individual speaker's time 60/90
seconds"

• Motion to adjourn committee: used to end a committee session in the

middle of the conference day
• "The delegate of (your country) would like to raise a motion to adjourn
this committee session"

• Motion to suspend committee: used to end a committee session at the

end of the day
• "The delegate of (your country) would like to raise a motion to suspend
the committee session"

• Motion to raise an unmoderated caucus:

• "The delegate of (your country) would like to raise a motion for an
unmoderated caucus for a total time period of - - minutes "

•Motion for entertainment:

• "The delegate of (your country) would like to raise a motion for
entertainment"
 Points

• Point of parliamentary inquiry: Used to ask the EB questions

regarding the parliamentary procedure
"Point of parliamentary inquiry, what is the SSL?"

• Point of personal privilege: Used to address the delegate's

discomforts
"Point of personal privilege, the delegate is inaudible"

• Point of information: Used to ask another delegate a question

regarding their speech or stance
"Point of information, what is your country's stance on the
agenda?"

• Point of order: Used to address a factual inaccuracy or a logical

fallacy made by another delegate
"Point of order, the delegate of ___ stated that " Joe Biden is the
current President of the United States" this is factually incorrect
as the current President of the United States is Donald Trump"

• "An example of logical fallacy is:- Dogs are good pets. Coyotes
are dogs. Therefore coyotes are good pets.
 Yields

Yields are used to allocate the remaining time from a delegate's

speech.

Yield to the EB: The time is yielded to the EB, the EB may
proceed with the next speaker or might recognise Points of
Information for the current delegate at their discretion.

Yield to Points of Information: The time is yielded for points

of information and the committee is allowed to ask questions
to the delegate.

Yield to another delegate: The remaining time is yielded to

another delegate to address their speech. Please note this can
only be done if the other delegate is informed in advance.
 Draft Resolution

A draft resolution is a formal proposal that outlines potential

solutions or actions to address a specific issue or problem within a
governing body or organization. The key components of a draft
resolution are:

• Title and Preambulatory Clauses: The title briefly summarizes the

subject of the resolution. Preambulatory clauses provide context,
background information, and justification for why action is
necessary. They often start with phrases like "Recognizing," "Taking
into consideration," or "Mindful of."

• Operative Clauses: These clauses contain the specific actions or

recommendations that the draft resolution proposes. Each operative
clause starts with an action verb (e.g., "Calls upon," "Encourages,"
"Requests") followed by a detailed description of what is to be done.
These clauses are where the concrete proposals for action are laid
out.

• Signatories and Sponsors: At the end of the draft resolution, there

is usually a section for signatories and sponsors. Signatories are
those who formally support the resolution, while sponsors are
typically the primary authors or supporters who have played a
significant role in drafting the resolution.

• Amendments: Delegates can propose changes (amendments) to

resolutions being discussed, and these amendments are debated and
voted upon.

• Voting: Resolutions and amendments are voted on by the

committee. Depending on the type of committee, different voting
procedures might be used (simple majority, consensus, etc.).
 Nature and proof of evidence

• Documents from the following Sources will be considered as

credible proof for any allegations made in committee or
statements that require verification:

• Reuters: Appropriate Documents and articles from the Reuters

News agency will be used to corroborate or to refute statements
made in the committee.

• UN Documents: Documents by all UN agencies will be

considered sufficient proof. Reports from all UN bodies
including treaty-based bodies will also be accepted.

• National Government Reports: Government Reports of a given

country used to corroborate an allegation on the same
aforementioned country will be accepted as proof. The
documents stated above will hold a binding nature of
establishment.

• NGO: Documents or reports made by non governmental

organizations like amnesty will be considered as rightful proof or
evidence to support a speech or document.

• Other sources like Wikipedia, International, or newspapers like

the Guardian, so on and so forth will not be accepted as credible
proof ; but maybe used for a better understanding of any issue
and even be brought up in debate, if the information given in
such sources is in line with beliefs of the government or a
delegate.
 Introduction to the committee
The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is
the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.
Established in 1946, it serves as a primary forum for deliberating on
issues related to disarmament, global challenges, and threats to
international peace and security. DISEC aims to promote stability
and prevent conflicts by fostering cooperation among member
states on matters of arms control, non-proliferation, and the
peaceful resolution of disputes.

DISEC's core mandate involves considering all disarmament and

international security questions within the scope of the UN
Charter. This includes reviewing principles governing disarmament
and the regulation of armaments, promoting cooperative
arrangements for maintaining international peace and security, and
making recommendations to UN member states or the Security
Council. DISEC resolutions are not legally binding; instead, they
serve as recommendations reflecting the collective will and
concerns of the international community.

A crucial aspect of DISEC's work is its ability to discuss and

recommend actions on a wide range of security threats. This
encompasses conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs) like nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and
emerging threats such as cybersecurity and the weaponization of
artificial intelligence. The First Committee sessions are structured
into three distinctive stages:
1. General debate
2. Thematic discussions
3. Action on drafts
It is the only Main Committee of the General Assembly entitled to
verbatim records coverage pursuant to Rule 58 (a) of the rules of
procedure of the General Assembly.
 Mandate
The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)
operates as one of the crucial General Assembly committees within
the broader framework of the United Nations. Its primary function,
aligning with that of other GA committees, involves a thorough
examination and analysis of international issues, particularly those
pertaining to disarmament, global security challenges, and related
threats to international peace.

Unlike the Security Council, DISEC does not possess the power to
directly impose sanctions or authorize military interventions through
its resolutions. Instead, its core function lies in serving as a platform
for UN member states to articulate their perspectives, concerns, and
proposed solutions on critical security matters. Through
comprehensive debates, deliberations, and the eventual adoption of
resolutions.
 Introduction to Agenda
With rapid advances in military-related technologies, such as hypersonic
weapons, artificial intelligence, remote controlled drones and cyber warfare,
the global community faces new challenges that traditional disarmament
frameworks do not adequately cover. These technologies have the potential
to revolutionize warfare, enhance national security, but also destabilize
global power balances and increase the risk of an arms race.

Quantum Technologies

The theory of quantum mechanics, developed by a group of brilliant minds

in the early twentieth century, revolutionized our understanding of
microscopic phenomena. This breakthrough led to the invention of
technologies such as nuclear weapons, the global positioning system (GPS),
lasers, semiconductors, and modern communication technologies, all of
which have profoundly impacted modern warfare. For instance, radar and
GPS enable ballistic missiles to target any location globally, while internet-
equipped computers facilitate near-instant global communication, creating
the new domain of cyberspace warfare. The potential consequences of these
weapons pose some of the most significant threats to the world today.

Drone Warfare

Drones include both unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and counter UAV
systems. These systems range in size and functionality, from small units
for reconnaissance to larger models for direct interventions, including
weapon deployment and explosives. Automation levels vary from fully
manual to fully autonomous. These levels of automation influence the
effectiveness and potential risks of drones for different applications. The
growing use of UAS in conflicts like those in Ukraine, Armenia-
Azerbaijan, and the regional war in the Middle East reflects their
increasing significance.
 Hypersonic Weapons

A hypersonic weapon refers to one which travels faster than Mach 5, or five
times the speed of sound. There are two types: Hypersonic glide vehicles
(HGV) are launched from a rocket, similar to regular ballistic missiles, before
gliding to a target, whereas Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered
throughout their flight after acquiring their target. HGVs do not follow a
parabolic trajectory to their target, making their re-entry into the Earth’s
atmosphere much quicker. They can then glide to their target while executing
evasive manoeuvres. Additionally, HGVs can have ranges up to thousands of
kilometres. Hypersonic cruise missiles also fly at lower altitudes, around 200
feet above the ground, and also possess evasive manoeuvers and speed.
Hypersonic weapons can bypass most traditional defence systems, and their
detection poses a serious challenge. The threat is only amplified by the fact
that they are capable of carrying both traditional and nuclear warheads.
 Existing Frameworks
Existing frameworks provide valuable precedents for regulating military
technologies through binding definitions, transparency measures, and
restrictions on inhumane weapons. These instruments demonstrate the
importance of multilateral consensus, verification mechanisms, and clear
accountability structures. As emerging technologies like AI, hypersonics, and
biotechnology pose novel risks, these frameworks can inspire new
agreements by adapting their core principles—such as human control, non-
proliferation, and civilian protection—to modern contexts, ensuring
responsible development, deployment, and international oversight of next-
generation weapon systems.

[Link] weapons include a broad array of military equipment such

as armored vehicles, combat aircraft, warships, small arms, landmines,
cluster munitions, and artillery. They are the most widely used
armaments in conflicts worldwide. Despite their prevalence, global
binding regulations on their trade and use are limited. Key legal
frameworks include conventions targeting specific weapons, such as the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the Mine Ban
Treaty, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. These instruments
seek to limit humanitarian harm and enhance transparency in military
usage. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), adopted in 2013, is the first legally
binding international instrument establishing common standards for the
international transfer of conventional weapons. It covers seven categories
of arms, ammunition, and parts, requiring states to regulate exports,
prevent diversion, and maintain records. Transfers are prohibited if they
would violate international obligations or facilitate genocide, crimes
against humanity, or certain war crimes. States must conduct risk
assessments, refusing exports if there is an overriding risk of serious
violations. The ATT promotes transparency, cooperation, and
responsible arms transfers, aiming to reduce illicit trafficking and armed
violence globally.
[Link] of mass destruction (WMD) encompass nuclear, chemical, and
biological arms, each capable of inflicting large-scale death and destruction.
Their military use is tightly restricted by international legal frameworks to
prevent proliferation and promote disarmament. Key treaties include:
a. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
comprehensively bans the development, testing, production,
acquisition, possession, stockpiling, use, and threat of use of nuclear
weapons, as well as their deployment and assistance with prohibited
activities
b. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons prohibits
deployment, assistance, and transfer of such weapons, mandates
declarations, victim assistance, and environmental remediation, and
requires parties to maintain IAEA safeguards. The treaty also outlines
procedures for nuclear-armed states to join, mechanisms for
amendments, and regular meetings to review implementation and
progress toward global nuclear disarmament.
c. The Biological Weapons Convention is a multilateral treaty that
prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer,
stockpiling, and use of biological and toxin weapons. It requires States
Parties to adopt national measures, consult on issues, and cooperate
on investigations and assistance
d. The Chemical Weapons Convention mandates destruction of all
chemical weapons and production facilities, declarations, inspections,
and international cooperation for peaceful chemistry uses
e. There is no legally binding multilateral treaty specifically limiting
missile use for military purposes. Controls exist mainly through
bilateral U.S.-Russia agreements, the Arms Trade Treaty, and reporting
under the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Voluntary regimes like
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code
of Conduct (HCOC) aim to prevent proliferation, but are not legally
binding. Security Council resolution 1540 requires national export
controls to prevent non-State actors’ acquisition of WMD delivery
systems. Overall, multilateral legal frameworks remain limited and
fragmented.
[Link] space weapons are subject to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the
foundational legal framework for international space law. This treaty
prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction in orbit, on celestial bodies, or stationing them in outer
space. It mandates the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies
exclusively for peaceful purposes, banning military bases, weapon
testing, and maneuvers there. While it does not explicitly ban all
conventional weapons in space, the treaty establishes principles of
peaceful use, non-appropriation, and benefit for all countries, forming
the basis for ongoing multilateral arms control efforts.

[Link] arms and light weapons (SALW) are regulated internationally

through the United Nations Programme of Action (PoA), which
obligates states to strengthen national laws, import/export controls, and
stockpile management to combat illicit trade and misuse. The PoA also
encourages international cooperation, assistance, and regular reporting.
Complementing this, the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)
requires proper marking, record-keeping, and cooperation in tracing
illicit weapons. These frameworks, while not legally binding treaties,
establish strong political commitments and practical standards for states
to regulate, trace, and control SALW in military and civilian contexts,
supporting sustainable peace and security.
Emerging Military Technologies
Innovations such as artificial intelligence (AI), big data analytics, lethal
autonomous weapons (LAWS), low-cost drones, quantum computing,
biotechnology, and directed energy weapons—are rapidly transforming the
nature of warfare worldwide. These advances could increase combat
efficiency, accelerate the pace of conflict, and shift the balance between
offense and defense, sometimes favoring attackers with swarming
unmanned systems, or defenders with advanced countermeasures. The
integration and interaction of these technologies may produce new
military capabilities and unforeseen consequences, including system
failures or violations of international humanitarian law. Complex systems
like AI and LAWS raise significant ethical and legal concerns, particularly
regarding accountability, human judgment in the use of force, and the risk
of unintended civilian harm. The Martens Clause and principles of
humanity are often invoked in debates over the morality of such
technologies, while the weaponization of biotechnology raises additional
ethical issues. As these technologies evolve, they demand new strategies,
oversight, and possibly new legal frameworks.

Lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs), often called "killer robots," are

military systems capable of identifying and engaging targets without
direct human intervention, using artificial intelligence and advanced
sensors. Despite rapid technological development, there is currently
no internationally agreed legal definition or specific treaty regulating
LAWs. Their military use is discussed under the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which provides a forum for
states to consider new protocols, but no binding rules on LAWs exist
yet. Existing international humanitarian law, especially the principles
of distinction, proportionality, and necessity, remains the primary
legal framework governing their use.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly integrated into military
systems, enabling autonomous weapons that can select and engage
targets without direct human intervention. This raises significant legal
and ethical concerns, including risks of escalation, loss of human
control, and accountability for unintended harm. Currently, there is no
global treaty specifically regulating military AI use. Instead, binding
frameworks include international humanitarian law (IHL), which
mandates compliance with principles of distinction, proportionality,
and necessity, and requires legal reviews of new weapons under Article
36 of Additional Protocol I. National regulations, export controls, and
internal policies supplement these, but international consensus on
further regulation is still evolving. UNESCO’s Recommendation on the
Ethics of Artificial Intelligence sets global standards for ethical AI,
emphasizing human rights, transparency, accountability, non-
discrimination, and sustainability. It promotes oversight, risk
assessment, stakeholder participation, and gender equality, guiding
responsible AI governance and policy actions.

Hypersonic weapons - There are no specific multilateral or bilateral

treaties that directly and comprehensively regulate or prohibit the
military use of hypersonic weapons. Existing legal frameworks may
apply only if certain criteria are met. The Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) aims to limit the proliferation of missiles and related
technologies, including some hypersonic systems, but its controls are
restricted by payload and range thresholds, leaving many hypersonic
weapons outside its scope. International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
applies to hypersonic weapons through general principles such as
distinction, proportionality, and necessity, and requires legal reviews of
new weapons under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, but only if
states are party to these agreements. The UN Charter’s prohibition on
the use of force also applies, but only when hypersonic weapons are
used in ways that threaten international peace or violate sovereignty. If
hypersonic weapons are equipped with nuclear warheads, treaties like
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons may apply, but only to those weapons
that meet their definitions and criteria. Thus, these frameworks are
only relevant to hypersonic weaponry when their specific requirements
overlap with the characteristics or use of the weapon in question.
Directed energy (DE) weapons use concentrated electromagnetic
energy—such as lasers or microwaves—to incapacitate, damage, or
destroy enemy equipment, facilities, or personnel. They offer
advantages like low cost per shot and nearly unlimited ammunition,
making them effective for short-range air defense, counter-drone, and
counter-missile missions. High-powered microwave weapons can
disable electronics or serve as nonlethal crowd control tools. Legally,
DE weapons are bound by international humanitarian law (IHL),
including principles of distinction and proportionality, and must
undergo legal reviews under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions. No specific international treaties currently
regulate DE weapons.

Biotechnology leverages advances in life sciences—such as gene

editing, synthetic biology, and genome modification—for military
applications, including enhancing or degrading soldier performance,
adaptive camouflage, self-healing armor, and potentially creating new
biological or chemical weapons. While these innovations can improve
operational effectiveness, they also raise significant ethical, legal,
and security concerns, especially regarding privacy, informed
consent, human rights, and the risk of bioterrorism or proliferation
of biological weapons. However, existing legal frameworks do not
provide comprehensive or robust regulation of biotechnology usage
for military purposes. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
prohibits the development and stockpiling of biological weapons, but
enforcement and compliance are inconsistent, and the treaty does not
address many new biotechnological advancements or dual-use
research. National laws and military directives often contain
significant loopholes, such as waivers for informed consent or
exceptions for military necessity, allowing research and deployment
without adequate oversight or ethical safeguards. Furthermore,
current frameworks inadequately address issues like genetic privacy,
data protection, and human rights in the context of military
biotechnology. As a result, there is a pressing need for new, specific
international and national regulations to ensure responsible, ethical,
and transparent use of biotechnology in military settings, closing
existing gaps and addressing emerging risks and ethical concerns.
Quantum technology - No dedicated international treaties or
binding legal frameworks specifically regulate the military use of
quantum technology. Its deployment is only indirectly governed by
general international humanitarian law, which applies if quantum
applications cause harm to civilians or violate the principles of
distinction and proportionality. Comprehensive regulation tailored
to quantum technology’s unique risks and capabilities does not yet
exist.
 Case studies on emerging
military technology
In 2020, Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated using a
remotely operated, AI-assisted robotic sniper system, reportedly controlled via
satellite. The weapon, attributed to Israeli operatives, combined advanced
robotics and artificial intelligence to enable precise, remote targeting without
direct human presence at the scene. This incident is notable as one of the first
publicly reported uses of an AI-assisted autonomous weapon for targeted
killing. The lack of an international treaty specifically regulating lethal
autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) or the use of AI in targeted
assassinations means such actions escape clear legal scrutiny, raising concerns
about accountability, escalation, and the erosion of norms against assassination.

Project Maven, launched by the United States Of America in 2017, uses artificial
intelligence to analyze drone surveillance footage and identify potential targets.
While the project’s stated aim is to assist human analysts, concerns have arisen
that AI could be used for autonomous strike decisions, potentially reducing
human oversight and raising ethical and legal questions about accountability for
mistakes or unlawful targeting. The absence of binding international law on
military AI use means such programs operate in a legal gray zone, with only
general IHL principles—such as distinction and proportionality—providing
limited guidance. This regulatory vacuum has sparked debate within the tech
community and among policymakers.

North Korea’s state-sponsored Lazarus Group has conducted major

cyberattacks, including the 2014 Sony Pictures hack and the 2017 WannaCry
ransomware attack, which affected hospitals, banks, and infrastructure
worldwide. These cyber operations targeted civilian and financial systems, yet
North Korea has largely escaped meaningful international consequences due to
the absence of a binding global treaty on cyber warfare.
In 2018, Chinese scientist He Jiankui announced the birth of gene-edited babies,
claiming to have used CRISPR to confer HIV immunity. While the stated intent was
medical, the case sparked global concern about the potential for military
applications, such as enhanced soldiers or a biotechnology arms race. No binding
international agreement specifically prohibits military genetic modification or sets
standards for human gene editing in a defense context, leaving the door open for
controversial research and potential misuse.

During its occupation of Ukrainian regions, Russia reportedly deployed AI-based

facial recognition systems to monitor dissent, identify targets, and automate
repression. The use of civilian biometric data for military surveillance raises serious
privacy and human rights concerns. Yet, there is no international ban or regulation on
the use of AI surveillance technologies in occupied territories, allowing such practices
to proceed unchecked and without accountability.

Iran has supplied loitering munitions and semi-autonomous drone swarms to proxy
groups like the Houthis in Yemen. These drones have been used to strike civilian
targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel, demonstrating the destabilizing potential of cheap,
networked unmanned systems. The absence of international treaties controlling the
transfer, use, or swarming capabilities of military drones enables such proliferation
and attacks, complicating efforts to protect civilians and maintain regional stability.

Germany has faced significant scrutiny over the export of surveillance technologies,
notably the FinSpy spyware developed by Munich-based company FinFisher, to
authoritarian regimes such as Turkey and Egypt. Despite EU and German laws
requiring export licenses for such dual-use technologies since 2015, FinFisher
allegedly sold FinSpy to Turkey without authorization. Investigations revealed that
Turkish authorities used FinSpy to target opposition activists and journalists,
especially during the 2017 protests, by infecting devices through a fake opposition
website. The spyware enabled authorities to access private communications, GPS
data, and more, posing severe risks to civil society and press freedom. Following
criminal complaints by NGOs, German prosecutors charged several FinFisher
executives and seized company assets, leading to its insolvency. However, this case
exposed the inadequacy of current export controls, as surveillance tools continued to
surface in repressive states, highlighting the urgent need for stronger, binding
international regulations on dual-use surveillance technology exports.
 Questions A Resolution Must
Answer (QARMA)
1. How can the international community define and categorize emerging
military technologies in a way that ensures clarity, applicability, and legal
accountability across jurisdictions?

2. Should a new, binding international legal instrument or treaty be established

specifically to govern the development, transfer, and use of emerging military
technologies?

3. What verification, reporting, and compliance mechanisms can be introduced

to ensure transparency and prevent covert development and misuse by states
and non-state actors?

4. How can we ensure meaningful human control and accountability in the

deployment of AI-based and autonomous weapon systems?

5. Should restrictions or bans be placed on specific high-risk technologies (e.g.,

lethal autonomous weapons, gene-editing for combat, or untraceable cyber
weapons)?

6. How can international law address the cross-border impact of cyber,

quantum, or space-based military systems that challenge traditional ideas of
sovereignty and warfare?

7. What role should non-state actors (e.g., tech firms, private militaries,
research labs) play in complying with new international norms, and how can
states be held responsible for their proxies?

8. How can the international community promote the responsible use of

upcoming technologies for civilian purposes while preventing their misuse for
military or terrorist objectives?