Bazarbayeva Aigerim

Report on Greg Cashman’s “What Causes War?” Second Edition

Chapter 9: The Dyadic Level of Analysis, Part III: Game Theory, Bargaining, and

Deterrence Theory

Introduction

In the realm of international relations, understanding the dynamics of conflict and

cooperation is essential for maintaining global stability. Central to this understanding
are deterrence theory, game theory, and bargaining theory—three frameworks that
offer valuable insights into the behaviors and interactions of states.
Game theory complements this by providing a structured approach to analyzing
strategic decision-making, where the actions of one state directly influence the
choices of others. Bargaining theory explores how states negotiate and resolve
conflicts, emphasizing the roles of information, perceptions, and the complexities of
commitment in diplomatic interactions. Meanwhile, deterrence theory focuses on
preventing aggression through the threat of retaliation, operating under the
assumption that states act as rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of their
actions.
This report synthesizes key concepts from these theories, examining their
interconnections and implications for understanding state behavior in the context of
both nuclear and conventional deterrence. By analyzing empirical research, cognitive
factors, and the strategic interplay of these frameworks, the report aims to highlight
the complexities of deterrence and the challenges faced by states in their pursuit of
security and stability in an increasingly unpredictable world.
Game Theory

Game theory originates from logic and mathematics and serves two main
purposes:
1. Practical and normative: To help decision-makers develop rational strategies in
real-world situations.
2. Theoretical and empirical: To explain why certain actions occur in specific
situations.
Game theory is particularly useful in understanding international interactions, such as
crisis situations, diplomatic negotiations, arms races, deterrence, prewar
mobilizations, and decisions leading to war. However, like all social sciences, game
theory is based on simplifying assumptions. The two key assumptions are:
1. Rationality: People and governments are considered rational, meaning they seek to
maximize their own interests.
2. Utility: The value or payoff of each outcome can be measured on a scale of
desirability, which allows strategies to be compared based on their potential to
maximize interests.
Chicken games
A non-zero-sum game where both conflict and cooperation are present. Unlike
zero-sum games where one player’s gain equals another’s loss, non-zero-sum games
allow for the possibility of mutual gains or mutual losses. States may have common
interests, such as avoiding nuclear annihilation or increasing trade, but they also strive
to outdo each other. The Chicken game is used as a metaphor to describe situations
where both sides face high stakes, and one must back down to avoid a disastrous
outcome.
In a typical Chicken game scenario, both players have two options:
1. Drive straight ahead, leading to a potentially catastrophic collision.
2. Swerve to avoid the crash, but at the cost of being seen as a "chicken" and
suffering mild humiliation.
The minimax strategy suggests that, assuming the worst of the other player, it is
better to swerve and minimize losses than risk a fatal crash. However, if a player
wants to win, they need to convince their opponent that they will not swerve under
any circumstances. This strategy involves establishing credibility by showing
commitment to not swerving, even at the risk of mutual destruction.
The "winning" strategy in a Chicken game depends on convincing the opponent
that you are committed to a course of action, often by signaling irrational behavior.
This is sometimes referred to as the "madman" strategy, where success relies on
making the opponent believe you are irrational and willing to face extreme negative
outcomes to avoid humiliation.
An example of the Chicken game in international relations is the Cuban Missile
Crisis. The United States signaled its willingness to use force, including nuclear
weapons, if Soviet missiles weren’t removed from Cuba. The U.S. established
credibility through President Kennedy’s public statements, the naval blockade, and
military alerts. The Soviet Union, realizing its weaker position, backed down. The
U.S. softened the Soviets' retreat by promising not to attack Cuba and secretly
agreeing to remove American missiles from Turkey. This example shows how
reducing negative payoffs for the opponent can lead to successful outcomes.
The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Frequently used to explain various international relations scenarios, particularly
those involving cooperation and conflict. This game highlights situations where
mutual cooperation would be beneficial, but individual self-interest often leads
players (or states) to choose defection, resulting in mutual harm. The structure of this
dilemma is reflected in multiple international decisions, such as prewar mobilization,
alliance formation, or trade policies.
Significant application of the Prisoners’ Dilemma is seen in arms races. The
rivalry between India and Pakistan serves as a classic example. Both countries face
the decision of whether to develop a new strategic weapon system. Mutual restraint
would benefit both by reducing the arms race, lowering defense spending, and
reducing regional tensions. However, each country fears being caught off guard if the
other side builds the weapon while they refrain, leaving them vulnerable. This fear
drives both to arm, even though mutual arming leads to increased tensions, greater
costs, and wasted resources.
In this scenario, building weapons is the dominant strategy for both sides, as it
minimizes the potential for great loss and gives a military advantage if the other
exercises restraint. Yet, this leads to a mutual disaster as neither side is better off, and
the arms race escalates.
Critical Analysis
The section on game theory presents a robust framework for understanding
international relations. Its strengths lie in its clear articulation of complex concepts
and the use of relevant historical examples, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the
India-Pakistan arms race. These examples effectively demonstrate the practical
applications of game theory, illustrating how states navigate high-stakes situations.
However, the reliance on assumptions of rationality and utility poses a significant
weakness. The premise that states always act in their self-interest overlooks the
influence of emotions, ideology, and misperceptions in decision-making processes.
For instance, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, domestic political pressures and
perceptions of vulnerability may have influenced decision-makers beyond mere
rational calculations.
Theoretical Implications
The theories presented align well with rationalist approaches in international
relations, emphasizing strategic calculations and the pursuit of national interests.
Nonetheless, there is a need for integration with alternative perspectives, such as
constructivism. Constructivist theories emphasize the importance of social identities
and norms, which can affect how states perceive threats and make decisions. By
acknowledging these factors, the analysis could provide a more nuanced
understanding of international interactions.
Real-world Application
The real-world applications of game theory highlighted in this section underscore
its relevance in contemporary international affairs. The dynamics of arms races and
crisis management remain pertinent as new geopolitical tensions arise, such as those
involving nuclear proliferation in North Korea or territorial disputes in the South
China Sea. However, to fully capture the complexities of these situations, it is
essential to consider how emerging technologies and cyber warfare challenge
traditional game-theoretic assumptions. For example, the digital landscape introduces
uncertainties that can complicate signaling and credibility, necessitating an adaptation
of existing theories to account for these developments.
TIT-FOR-TAT
Robert Axelrod used computer tournaments to test strategies for iterated Prisoners’
Dilemma games, and the winning strategy in both tournaments was TIT-FOR-TAT,
submitted by Anatol Rapoport. TFT follows a simple rule: it begins by cooperating,
and then mimics the opponent's previous move. If the opponent cooperates, TFT
continues to cooperate, but if the opponent defects, TFT defects in the next round.
This approach rewards cooperation and punishes defection, balancing both traits
effectively.
TFT's success is attributed to four key features:
1. Niceness: TFT never defects first, promoting cooperation.
2. Provocability: TFT retaliates immediately if the opponent defects, discouraging
further defection.
3. Forgiveness: After punishing a defection, TFT quickly returns to cooperation if the
opponent does so.
4. Clarity: TFT’s straightforward strategy makes it easy for opponents to understand
that cooperation is the best long-term option.
The effectiveness of TFT depends on the values in the payoff matrix. TFT requires
that cooperation yields better outcomes than mutual defection. In real-world
scenarios, such as the lead-up to World War I, misperceptions among European
leaders altered the payoff structures. Leaders believed that defection, rapid
mobilization, and offensive strategies were more advantageous than cooperation.
These distorted perceptions reduced the appeal of cooperation and increased the
incentive for defection, making TFT ineffective in preventing the conflict.
In summary, while TFT excels in promoting cooperation in many settings, its success
is context-dependent. Adjustments like tFT or recognition of situational factors (e.g.,
misperceptions of opponents’ intentions) are necessary to address its limitations in
complex, real-world scenarios.
TFT and GRIT Compared
The TIT-FOR-TAT strategy and the GRIT strategy share several similarities, but they
also have key differences in how they handle conflict and cooperation in Prisoners’
Dilemma situations.
Similarities
1. Encouraging Cooperation: Both TFT and GRIT aim to promote cooperative
behavior through a combination of rewards for cooperation and punishment for
defection, blending a "carrot-and-stick" approach.
2. Communication of Intentions: Both strategies convey their intention to
cooperate and respond to actions with either reciprocation or retaliation. This makes
them effective in situations where trust and cooperation are fragile.
Differences
1. Communication Style:
- TFT: Relies solely on nonverbal communication through actions. It starts with
cooperation and then mirrors the opponent’s behavior.
- GRIT: Uses explicit verbal communication, allowing for more direct
messaging to signal conciliation or retaliation. This provides an advantage in
conveying intentions clearly.
2. Response to Defection:
- TFT: Responds immediately to any defection with defection, potentially leading to
a prolonged cycle of retaliation if the opponent continues to defect.
- GRIT: Although it retaliates against defection, GRIT takes the lead in returning to
cooperation after a defection, making it more likely to break the cycle of tit-for-tat
retaliations.
3. Tolerance for Exploitation:
- TFT: Does not tolerate any exploitation and retaliates after every defection, which
can escalate conflicts.
- GRIT: Allows for some exploitation without immediate retaliation, giving the
opponent time to respond positively before retaliation is enacted.
While TFT is a simple and clear strategy that works well in repeated games, GRIT’s
proactive and communicative approach makes it more suited to complex and real-
world political scenarios. GRIT’s ability to tolerate some exploitation and its reliance
on explicit communication give it an edge in promoting long-term cooperation in
international relations.
Real-world Application
The practical applications of both TFT and GRIT are evident in contemporary
international relations, where trust-building and conflict resolution are paramount.
The relevance of these strategies can be observed in various diplomatic efforts, such
as nuclear negotiations or trade agreements. Understanding how these strategies play
out in real-world scenarios can inform policymakers on the best approaches to foster
cooperation and manage conflicts.
Critique of Game Theory
1. Assumptions of Rationality: Game theory assumes that policymakers engage in
rational decision-making, but this is often unrealistic. Decision-makers may not
always behave logically due to emotions, cognitive biases, or incomplete information.
This assumption ignores the complexities of human behavior.
2. Difficulty in Assigning Values: It is challenging to assign precise numerical values
to goals and hypothetical outcomes, which game theory requires. Predicting outcomes
and assigning clear desirability to them is often too complex, especially in
international relations where multiple variables influence decision-making.
3. Challenges in Understanding Opponents: Accurately evaluating the opponent's
goals and strategies is difficult. Misperceptions, misunderstandings, and the inability
to "read" an opponent's mind hinder game theory’s effectiveness. Misjudgments often
occur in diplomacy and international conflicts, making it harder to predict an
opponent's actions.
Despite its limitations, game theory can still provide value by helping policymakers
understand different scenarios, analyze alternatives, and develop strategies, but it
should not be treated as a definitive explanation for behavior in international relations.
Bargaining Theory
Bargaining theory suggests that wars arise not from a failure of diplomacy but as
a continuation of it. War is seen as part of an ongoing bargaining process, where
military conflict provides information about a state's capabilities and resolve,
ultimately influencing future negotiations.
Key Concepts
While some issues may seem indivisible, territorial disputes are often negotiable.
However, they can take on social and psychological dimensions that complicate
bargaining. Robert Powell argues that perceived indivisibility is often a disguise for
commitment problems, where states cannot trust each other to uphold agreements.
Information asymmetry can lead to miscalculations about the other's intentions or
capabilities, affecting the bargaining process.
Challenges to Bargaining Theory
Decision-making can be influenced by emotions and biases, which may lead to
irrational choices and misperceptions about the opponent. War may also stem from
social constructions, such as national identity, which are not accounted for in
traditional bargaining models. The influence of domestic groups complicates
negotiations, as leaders may engage in diversionary wars to consolidate power.
Two-Level Game Theory
Putnam’s framework highlights that negotiators must satisfy domestic political
constituencies (Level II) while seeking agreements at the international level (Level I).
The size of each country’s win-set, determined by domestic politics, affects the
potential for successful negotiations.
Deterrence Theory and Concepts
Deterrence theory posits that peace can be achieved through a readiness to use
force if necessary. The principle "If you seek peace, prepare for war” encapsulates this
approach. Deterrence aims to prevent undesirable actions through credible threats of
retaliation.
Defense vs. Deterrence:
1. Defense: Involves protecting assets through physical means (e.g., security forces)
to make it difficult for an adversary to achieve their goal.
2. Deterrence: Focuses on creating a credible threat of retaliation to dissuade potential
aggressors. It is about making the costs of aggression outweigh any possible gains.
Deterrence, as a strategy to prevent war, reveals several insights:
 Deterrence is not infallible; it sometimes works and sometimes fails.
Identifying the reasons for failure is challenging.
 Instances where deterrence appears successful raise questions about the actual
threats and the role of deterrence versus other factors.
 Wars can still occur even when deterrent strategies are in place, indicating that
deterrence is not always effective.
 While nuclear weapons may prevent large-scale nuclear conflict, their
effectiveness in deterring conventional attacks is questionable.
 Credibility is vital for deterrence, but establishing it is complex. Deterrence
may fail even with a strong reputation, as challengers might not regard it
seriously.
 Efforts to enhance deterrence can provoke escalation. Balancing credibility
with the need to avoid provoking adversaries is crucial.
 Deterrence often struggles against non-nuclear states, which may feel
emboldened to act aggressively.
 Deterrence relies heavily on perceptions and psychological dynamics, which
can diverge from rational assessments.
 Groupthink and internal politics can hinder the effectiveness of deterrent
threats, leading to risky decisions.
 Deterrence is a social construct influenced by shared norms and historical
interactions, suggesting a learning process over time.
 The post-Cold War landscape complicates deterrence, with multiple state and
non-state actors involved in asymmetric threats.
Overall, while deterrence plays a role in maintaining stability, it is fraught with
complexities that challenge its reliability as a war-prevention strategy.
Real-world Application
In practical terms, the challenges of deterrence are particularly relevant in today’s
multipolar world, where both state and non-state actors operate in unpredictable ways.
The complexities highlighted in your section—such as the risks of escalation and the
difficulties of addressing non-nuclear threats—underscore the need for nuanced
strategies. Policymakers must tread carefully, balancing the need for a credible
deterrent with the risk of provoking aggression.
Moreover, the discussion about groupthink and internal politics emphasizes that
decision-making is rarely straightforward. Deterrent threats can be undermined by
domestic pressures or misjudgments, illustrating that the human element in
international relations cannot be overlooked. The idea that deterrence is a social
construct shaped by norms and historical context further reinforces the notion that
understanding the past is crucial for navigating the future.
In summary, while deterrence remains a vital tool for maintaining stability, its
complexities challenge its reliability as a standalone strategy. Acknowledging these
challenges allows for a more comprehensive approach to peace and security, one that
considers not only military capabilities but also the intricate web of perceptions,
psychology, and historical interactions that shape state behavior.

The summary of the chapter is well done. You have also given comments and
evaluations. However, the comments and evaluations are a bit too short. For instance,
you could present your views on the relationships between the theories presented in
the chapter or offer own view on the topic and suggestions for further research.