INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

FISCAL
MONITOR
Putting a Lid on Public Debt

2024
OCT
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

FISCAL
MONITOR
Putting a Lid on Public Debt

2024
OCT
 ©2024 International Monetary Fund

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Title: Fiscal monitor.
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Disclaimer: The Fiscal Monitor is a survey by the IMF staff published twice a year,
in the spring and fall. The report analyzes the latest public finance developments,
updates medium-term fiscal projections, and assesses policies to put public finances
on a sustainable footing. The report was prepared by IMF staff and has benefited from
comments and suggestions from Executive Directors following their discussion of the
report on October 8, 2024. The views expressed in this publication are those of the
IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Directors
or their national authorities.

Recommended citation: International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2024. Fiscal Monitor:

Putting a Lid on Public Debt. Washington, DC: IMF, October.

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Errata
November 4, 2024

This web version of the Fiscal Monitor has been updated to reflect the following changes to the
version published online on October 23, 2024:

- On page 5, footnote 10: “Crump and others 2022" was corrected to “Crump and others 2018."
- On page 22, the reference to "Crump and others" was corrected to: "Crump, Richard, Miro Everaert,
Domenico Giannone, and Sean Hundtofte. 2018. "Changing Risk-Return Profiles," Staff Reports 850,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York."
CONTENTS

Assumptions and Conventions v

Further Information vi

Preface vii

Foreword viii

Executive Summary x

Chapter 1. Putting a Lid on Public Debt 1

Introduction 1
How Are Risks Surrounding Public Debt Projections Distributed? 2
Fiscal Policy to Get Debt Under Control 10
Summary and Policy Implications 18
References 21
Economy Abbreviations 25

Glossary 27

Methodological and Statistical Appendix 31

Data and Conventions 31
Fiscal Policy Assumptions 34
Definition and Coverage of Fiscal Data 39
Table A. Economy Groupings 39
Table B. Advanced Economies: Definition and Coverage of Fiscal Monitor Data 43
Table C. Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies: Definition and
Coverage of Fiscal Monitor Data 44
Table D. Low-Income Developing Countries: Definition and Coverage of
Fiscal Monitor Data 45
List of Tables
Advanced Economies (A1–A8) 46
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies (A9–A16) 54
Low-Income Developing Countries (A17–A22) 62
Structural Fiscal Indicators (A23–A25) 68
Selected Topics 71

IMF Executive Board Discussion of the Outlook, October 2024 87

Figures
Figure 1.1. Public Debt-to-GDP Ratio, 2000−29 2
Figure 1.2. Three-Year Forecast Errors of Public Debt Projections, 1990−2021 2
Figure 1.3. Quantile Regression Results: Future Debt-to-GDP Ratio and
Financial, Political, and Economic Variables 4
Figure 1.4. Global Debt-at-Risk and Its Evolution 5

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 iii

FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.5. Initial Debt and Debt-at-Risk 5

Figure 1.6. Debt-at-Risk across Income Groups 6
Figure 1.7. Financial Conditions and Debt-at-Risk across Income Groups 6
Figure 1.8. Primary Balance and Debt-at-Risk by Fiscal Rules 6
Figure 1.9. Strong Co-movements of Sovereign Bond Yields 7
Figure 1.10. Share of Total Variance in Sovereign Bond Yields Explained by Global Factors 7
Figure 1.11. Correlation of Selected Indicators with Global Sovereign Bond Yield Volatility 8
Figure 1.12. Key Drivers of Global Volatility of Sovereign Bond Yields 8
Figure 1.13. Distribution of Unidentified Debt Excluding Exchange
Rate Movements, 1991–2023 9
Figure 1.14. Components of Unidentified Debt, 2010−23 10
Figure 1.15. Components of Unidentified Debt 10
Figure 1.16. Increase in Unidentified Debt after a Banking Crisis and Financial Stress 10
Figure 1.17. Selected Key Indicators of Debt Vulnerabilities 11
Figure 1.18. Median Fiscal Adjustment and Probability of Stabilizing or
Reducing Debt by 2029 12
Figure 1.19. Median Fiscal Adjustment across Scenarios: Baseline, Historical, and
High Probability to Stabilize Debt 12
Figure 1.20. Distributive Impact of Fiscal Adjustment across Households 14
Figure 1.21. Impact of Fiscal Adjustment on Aggregate Output and Consumption 14
Figure 1.22. Illustrative Preferred Fiscal Adjustment between an Advanced Economy and an
Emerging Market Economy 15
Figure 1.23. Correlations between Fiscal Institutions and Unidentified Debt 17
Figure 1.24. Unidentified Debt and Their Relationships with Budget Transparency and
Compliance with Fiscal Rules 18
Online-Only Annexes
Online Annex 1.1. Debt-at-Risk Framework
Online Annex 1.2. Global and Local Drivers of Sovereign Bond Yields
Online Annex 1.3. Unpacking Unidentified Debt in Debt Dynamics
Online Annex 1.4. Optimal Fiscal Reaction Function
Online Annex 1.5. Fiscal Adjustments and Probability of Debt Stabilization
Online Annex 1.6. Fiscal Adjustments under the Heterogenous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) Model

iv International Monetary Fund | October 2024

ASSUMPTIONS AND CONVENTIONS

The following symbols have been used throughout this publication:

. . . to indicate that data are not available
— to indicate that the figure is zero or less than half the final digit shown, or that the item does not exist
– between years or months (for example, 2008–09 or January–June) to indicate the years or months
covered, including the beginning and ending years or months
/ between years (for example, 2008/09) to indicate a fiscal or financial year
“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
“Basis points” refers to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to ¼ of
1 percentage point).
“n.a.” means “not applicable.”
Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.
As used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as
understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are
not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 v

 FURTHER INFORMATION

Corrections and Revisions

The data and analysis appearing in the Fiscal Monitor are compiled by IMF staff at the time of publication.
Every effort is made to ensure their timeliness, accuracy, and completeness. When errors are discovered, corrections
and revisions are incorporated into the digital editions available from the IMF website and on the IMF eLibrary.
All substantive changes are listed in the Table of Contents of the online PDF of the report.

Print and Digital Editions

Print
Print copies of this Fiscal Monitor can be ordered from the IMF Bookstore at [Link]/551781.

Digital
Multiple digital editions of the Fiscal Monitor, including ePub, enhanced PDF, and HTML, are available on the
IMF eLibrary at [Link]/FM.

Download a free PDF of the report and data sets for each of the figures therein from the IMF website at
[Link]/publications/fm, or scan the QR code below to access the Fiscal Monitor web page directly:

Copyright and Reuse

Information on the terms and conditions for reusing the contents of this publication are at [Link]/
external/[Link].

vi International Monetary Fund | October 2024

PREFACE

The projections included in this issue of the Fiscal Monitor are drawn from the same database used for the
October 2024 World Economic Outlook and Global Financial Stability Report (and are referred to as “IMF staff
projections”). Fiscal projections refer to the general government, unless otherwise indicated. Short-term projections
are based on officially announced budgets, adjusted for differences between the national authorities and the IMF
staff regarding macroeconomic assumptions. The fiscal projections incorporate policy measures that are judged by
the IMF staff as likely to be implemented. For countries supported by an IMF arrangement, the projections are
those under the arrangement. In cases in which the IMF staff has insufficient information to assess the authorities’
budget intentions and prospects for policy implementation, an unchanged cyclically adjusted primary balance
is assumed, unless indicated otherwise. Details on the composition of the groups, as well as country-specific
assumptions, can be found in the Methodological and Statistical Appendix of the October 2024 Fiscal Monitor.
The Fiscal Monitor is prepared by the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department under the general guidance of Vitor
Gaspar, Director of the Department. The project was directed by Era Dabla-Norris, Deputy Director, and
Davide Furceri, Division Chief. The main authors of Chapter 1 in this issue are W. Raphael Lam (team lead)
and Jeta Menkulasi (team lead), Yongquan Cao, Daniel Garcia-Macia, Camilo Gomez Osorio, Faizaan Kisat,
Anh Dinh Minh Nguyen, Felipe Palmeira Bardella, Sergejs Saksonovs, Alexandra Solovyeva, and Bryn Welham;
with contributions from Vybhavi Balasundharam, Javier Bianchi (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis), Luca
Bettarelli (University of Palermo), Domenico Giannone, Pablo Ottonello (University of Maryland), Ignacio Presno
(Federal Reserve Board), Yongzheng Yang, and Chenlu Zhang. Hongchi Li, Xueqi Li, and Zhonghao Wei provided
excellent research assistance. Meron Haile and Andre Vasquez provided excellent coordination and editorial
support. The chapter also benefited from discussions with Jean-Marc Atsebi, Gabriel Hegab, João Jalles (University
of Lisbon), Manabu Nose, Graham Prentice, Julien Reynaud, and Alessandro Scipioni.
The Methodological and Statistical Appendix was prepared by Xueqi Li under the guidance of Alexandra
Solovyeva. Axana Abreu Panfilova, Wala’a El Barasse, and Gemma Diaz from the Communications Department
led the editorial team and managed the report’s production, with editorial and production support from Michael
Harrup, Lucy Scott Morales, Katy Whipple, Harold Medina, Absolute Service, Inc., and The Grauel Group.
Inputs, comments, and suggestions were received from other departments in the IMF, including area
departments—namely, the African Department, Asia and Pacific Department, European Department, Middle
East and Central Asia Department, and Western Hemisphere Department—as well as the Communications
Department, Institute for Capacity Development, Legal Department, Monetary and Capital Markets Department,
Research Department, Secretary’s Department, Statistics Department, and Strategy, Policy, and Review
Department. Chapter 1 of the Fiscal Monitor also benefited from comments by Tobias Broer (Paris School of
Economics), Michele Cavallo (Federal Reserve Board), Canlin Li (Federal Reserve Board), Josefin Meyer (DIW
Berlin), Ugo Panizza (Geneva Graduate Institute), and Eric Parrado Herrera (Inter-American Development Bank)
in the IMF workshop on “Putting a Lid on Public Debt” in July 2024.
Both projections and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and should not be attributed to workshop
participants, Executive Directors, or to their national authorities.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 vii

 FOREWORD

A
fter COVID-19, the most vigorous fiscal change and economic transformation, climate, and
and monetary response ever seen, regional demographics—and challenging politics at national,
wars, turbulence in energy and food continental, and global levels; (2) optimism bias
markets, and the largest surge of inflation in debt projections; and (3) intrinsic uncertainty
in decades, the world economy seems on its way to a associated with economic, financial, and political
soft landing (October 2024 World Economic Outlook). developments.
Inflation is approaching its target in major economies The Fiscal Monitor presents a novel framework—
and is close to prepandemic levels. Monetary policy debt-at-risk—that provides a summary of risks
has already moved past its pivot, and policy easing around the most likely debt projection over one to
is projected to continue. Financing conditions are five years ahead. The quantification of risks allows
generally easy (October 2024 Global Financial Stability policymakers to grasp the likelihood of relevant
Report). The time is ripe to take a medium- to long- alternatives, particularly in a severely adverse scenario.
term view on public finances. Such quantification makes it possible for policymakers
The October 2024 Fiscal Monitor offers important to take precautions to evade undesirable outcomes.
insights on public debt and deficits in the world According to our estimates, the difference between the
economy. It focuses on medium-term prospects and baseline and a severe adverse scenario corresponding
risks. The bottom line: now is the time for a strategic to the projection for the 95th percentile in the public
pivot in fiscal policy.1 debt-to-GDP ratio, at a three-year horizon, opens a
Deficits are high, and global public debt is very high gap of 20 percentage points.
and rising, projected to go above $100 trillion at the In most countries, fiscal adjustments currently in
end of 2024. If it continues at the current pace, the the pipeline are insufficient to deliver, with confidence,
global debt-to-GDP ratio will approach 100 percent by stable or declining public debt ratios. Additional
the end of the decade, rising above the pandemic peak. efforts are necessary. Delays are costly and risky, and it
Indeed, public debt is higher and projected to grow matters how it is done. The IMF’s Managing Director
faster in about one-third of the countries covered by urges an approach focused ultimately on people and
World Economic Outlook projections, but they represent growth.2 Countries that are sufficiently away from
more than 70 percent of world GDP. Countries where debt distress should adjust in a sustained and gradual
debt is expected to rise faster than in the prepandemic way to ensure debt declines without unnecessary
period include not only China and the United States adverse effects on growth and employment. The Fiscal
but also other large countries such as Brazil, France, Monitor quantifies the relative effects of different fiscal
Italy, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. In instruments. It finds, for example, that cuts in public
contrast, for most countries, that is not the case. investment have severe effects on growth. However, it
But the message of high and rising debt masks is unfortunately often the most politically expedient
considerable diversity. We live in a world of contrasts. way to axe spending. Earlier work in the Fiscal Affairs
If we simply take out China and the United States, Department shows that countries with strong fiscal
the global public debt-to-GDP ratio would be about institutions are able to protect public investment even
20 percentage points lower. in crises.3
The Fiscal Monitor identifies three reasons why
public debt may be worse than it looks: (1) spending
pressures from underlying trends—technological 2Kristalina Georgieva, “A Low-Growth World Is an Unequal,
Unstable World,” IMF Blog, July 23, 2024.
3Gerd Schwartz, Manal Fouad, Torben S. Hansen, and Genevieve
1Gita Gopinath, “A Strategic Pivot in Global Fiscal Policy,” Verdier, Well Spent: How Strong Infrastructure Governance Can
speech at the Central Bank of Ireland’s Whitaker Lecture, Dublin, End Waste in Public Investment (Washington, DC: International
September 18, 2024. Monetary Fund, 2020).

viii International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 Foreword

Many of the aspects relevant for policymakers can and financing is tighter. To give an illustration, IMF
be summarized in a fiscal policy trilemma.4 In an staff estimate spending pressures in these countries
environment of high deficits and high and rising debt, amount to 17.5 percent of GDP between 2023 and
governments everywhere face a seemingly impossible 2030. Spending is necessary to eliminate extreme
choice involving three incompatible imperatives: poverty and hunger and to invest in people and
(1) irresistible pressures to spend more in a variety of infrastructure.
areas, such as defense, climate change, competitiveness, Fiscal and other structural policies (Chapter 3
growth, education, health, and infrastructure; (2) an of the October 2024 World Economic Outlook)
absolute political resistance to taxation; and (3) the can help deliver sustainable and inclusive growth
objective of macroeconomic stability encompassing thereby alleviating the trilemma. In this foreword,
public debt sustainability, monetary stability, and we have already mentioned the importance of public
financial stability. The trilemma puts countries in a investment and public investment institutions
bind: if a country caves to spending pressures without and practices. But there is much more. The Fiscal
raising taxes, deficits and debt will continue to rise, Monitor in the past has looked at policies to favor
which will eventually prove unsustainable and cause innovation and research (Chapter 2 of the April
instability. 2024 Fiscal Monitor). Other recommendations here
Nowhere is the trilemma more dramatic than include promoting good governance and eliminating
in the poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa.5 Tax vulnerabilities to corruption, improving the tax system,
capacity is weaker, debt-carrying capacity is lower, and prioritizing education and health.
The trilemma is a test. It does not need to be a trap.
4Vitor Gaspar, “Solving the Global Fiscal Policy Trilemma,”

Foreign Policy, September 23, 2024.

5Abebe Aemro Selassie, “A Moment of Peril,” keynote speech at Vitor Gaspar
the Oxford Africa Conference, University of Oxford, May 28, 2021. Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 ix

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Global public debt is very high. It is expected to projections of the World Economic Outlook, reaching
exceed $100 trillion (93 percent of global GDP) in 115 percent of GDP in 2026. This is because high
2024 and to keep rising through the end of the decade debt levels today amplify the effects of weaker growth
(approaching 100 percent of GDP by 2030). Although or tighter financial conditions and higher spreads on
debt is projected to stabilize or decline in about two- future debt levels.
thirds of countries, it will remain well above levels Debt-at-risk varies significantly across countries.
foreseen before the pandemic. Countries where debt is For advanced economies as a group, three-year-ahead
not projected to stabilize account for more than half of debt-at-risk has declined somewhat from pandemic
global debt and about two-thirds of global GDP. peaks and is estimated at 134 percent of GDP,
There are good reasons to believe that future debt whereas debt-at-risk has increased to 88 percent of
levels could be higher than currently projected. The GDP for emerging market and developing economies.
political discourse on fiscal issues has increasingly Differences within and across country groups reflect
tilted toward higher government spending in recent an initial higher level of debt in advanced economies
decades. Fiscal policy uncertainty has increased, and and large primary deficits in systemically important
political redlines on taxation have become more economies such as China and the United States.
entrenched. Spending pressures to address green Financial conditions, however, play a greater role
transitions, population aging, security concerns, and in adding to debt risks in emerging market and
long-standing development challenges are mounting. developing economies.
Further, past experience shows that projections tend to The chapter shows that global factors increasingly
systematically underestimate debt levels: realized debt- drive the fluctuations in government borrowing costs
to-GDP ratios three years ahead are, on average, higher across countries. This suggests that high debt levels and
than projected by 6 percentage points of GDP. uncertainty surrounding fiscal and monetary policy in
This chapter shows that risks to the debt outlook systematically important countries could increase the
are heavily tilted to the upside and much larger fiscal volatility of sovereign yields and debt risks for other
adjustments than currently planned are required countries.
to stabilize (or reduce) debt with high probability. Unidentified debt—the change in debt not
Rebuilding fiscal buffers in a growth-friendly manner explained by interest-growth differentials, budgetary
and containing debt is essential to ensure sustainable deficits, or exchange rate movements—is another
public finances and financial stability. reason why debt outturns could be higher than
projected. The chapter finds that unidentified debt
has historically been large, averaging 1.0–1.5 percent
Elevated Upside Risks to the of GDP per year and increasing by up to 7 percentage
Debt Outlook points of GDP following financial system stress. This
The chapter presents a novel approach—the “debt- stems primarily from the materialization of contingent
at-risk” framework—for assessing risks surrounding liabilities and fiscal risks as well as arrears.
the baseline debt projections and how they vary
across countries and over time. The framework
shows how changes in economic, financial, and Rebuilding Fiscal Buffers and
political conditions can shift the distribution of Safeguarding Debt Sustainability
future debt-to-GDP ratios. Global debt-at-risk—the Current fiscal adjustment plans fall far short of
level of future debt in an extreme adverse scenario— what is needed to ensure that debt is stabilized (or
is estimated to be nearly 20 percentage points of reduced) with high probability. Now is an opportune
GDP higher three years ahead than in the baseline time to rebuild buffers. With inflation moderating

x International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 Executive Summary

and central banks expected to ease monetary policy, • Calibrating the pace. Gradual but sustained fiscal
economies are better placed to absorb the economic adjustment would strike a balance between
effect of fiscal tightening. Moreover, delaying is containing debt vulnerabilities and maintaining the
costly: in countries where debt is projected to increase strength of private demand. Fast-track consolidation
further—such as Brazil, France, Italy, South Africa, would also require politically unfeasible hikes in tax
the United Kingdom, and the United States—delaying rates as well as spending cuts. That said, economies
action will make the required adjustment even larger. with high risk of debt distress and those that have
Waiting is risky: country experiences show that lost market access need front-loaded adjustment,
high debt can trigger adverse market reactions and although how it is designed will matter.
constrains room for budgetary maneuver in the face • Building credibility. Governments need deliberate
of negative shocks. Key elements of the needed fiscal fiscal plans, framed within credible medium-term
adjustments involve the following: fiscal frameworks and modern public financial
• Identifying the size. Cumulative fiscal adjustment management systems to anchor their adjustment
of 3.0–4.5 percent of GDP, on average, is needed paths and reduce fiscal policy uncertainty.
to stabilize or reduce debt with high probability. Strong independent fiscal oversight can reinforce
The magnitude of the required fiscal adjustment government credibility.
is higher than that currently projected, and almost • Strengthening fiscal governance. Countries must avoid
twice the size of past adjustments, especially in those unidentified debt. Assessing contingent liabilities,
countries where debt is not projected to stabilize. including those associated with state-owned
In countries with more benign debt outlooks, enterprises, and monitoring them closely are critical
optimizing fiscal space while maintaining debt in this regard. Strengthening expenditure controls
sustainability is a priority. and active cash management can limit overspending.
• Designing the composition. Careful design of fiscal Governments should also provide the public with
adjustment can prevent countries from falling into more transparent, granular, and timely information
a prolonged period of anemic growth. Key elements on debt, including the composition of creditors and
of fiscal adjustment vary across countries. Advanced instruments, and exposure to risks.
economies should reprioritize expenditures, advance • Addressing debt distress. For countries facing debt
entitlement reforms, increase revenues through distress or unsustainable debt, timely and adequate
indirect taxes where taxation is low, and remove restructuring is needed, along with fiscal adjustments
inefficient tax incentives. Emerging market and to restore debt sustainability. Recent IMF reforms
developing economies have greater potential to to its debt and lending frameworks, combined
increase tax revenues by upgrading tax systems; with efforts from creditor committees and the
broadening tax bases, including by reducing Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, have helped
informality; and enhancing revenue administration streamline sovereign debt restructuring and shortened
capacity. On the expenditure side, efforts to restructuring timelines. Further strengthening these
rationalize large government wage bills, strengthen processes is crucial for facilitating efficient debt
social safety nets, and safeguard public investment restructuring. To support low-income developing
are key to limiting the negative impact on output, countries, greater coordinated efforts are necessary
protecting vulnerable households, and supporting to ensure the provision of concessional financing to
debt reduction. avoid undue fiscal tightening.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 xi

 1
CHAPTER

PUTTING A LID ON PUBLIC DEBT

Introduction the debt buildups in emerging market and developing

economies (Comelli and others 2023; Schuster and
Public debt levels are elevated around the world
others 2024). Materialization of these upside risks to
and expected to exceed $100 trillion in 2024. After a
already high debt levels in many parts of the world
decline in 2021−22, global public debt edged up again
poses significant concerns.
in 2023 and is projected to approach 100 percent of
High debt reduces fiscal space and the governments’
GDP by 2030, with the world’s two largest economies,
ability to respond to economic downturns, crowds out
China and the United States, largely driving the
necessary growth-enhancing investments, and raises
increase. Although debt is projected to stabilize or
the risk of sovereign distress (Brunnermeier and others
decline by 2029 in about two-thirds of the world’s
2016; Brunnermeier and Reis 2023; Mitchener and
countries, it remains higher than before the pandemic
Tresbesch 2023; Farhi and Tirole 2018). Notably,
(Figure 1.1).1
sustained debt buildups can raise the probability
Significant upside risks to this baseline outlook
of debt distress or broader financial crisis (Kose
imply that debt levels could be even higher than
and others 2021). Even in countries where debt is
currently projected. The political discourse on
projected to decline, planned fiscal adjustments remain
fiscal issues has increasingly tilted toward higher
uncertain, and public debt is expected to remain well
government spending over the last three decades
above prepandemic levels. Further, these countries
(Cao, Dabla-Norris, and Di Gregorio 2024). Fiscal
are exposed to adverse real and financial spillovers
policy uncertainty has increased (Hong, Ke, and
from elevated debt and uncertainty surrounding fiscal
Nguyen 2024). Further, mounting spending pressures
policies in systemically important economies.2
(for example, for the green transition, defense,
Against this backdrop, this chapter answers the
costly industrial policies, population aging, and UN
following questions:
Sustainable Development Goals)—not fully accounted
1. What is the distribution of risks around baseline
for in current debt projections—are likely to lead to a
projections for public debt?
further buildup of public debt.
2. How should countries that need to get public
As it is, debt projections are subject to an
debt under control conduct fiscal policy? How
optimism bias. Past experience shows that they tend
should they design fiscal adjustments—in terms of
to systematically underestimate debt levels: realized
size, pace, and composition—to strengthen debt
debt-to-GDP ratios three years ahead are higher than
sustainability while limiting their adverse impact on
projected by 6 percentage points of GDP, on average
output and income distribution?
(Figure 1.2). Forecast errors tend to be even larger in
3. How can governments tackle unidentified debt?
cases in which debt is initially projected to decline
(Estefania-Flores and others 2023).
The chapter employs new data and modeling
Unidentified debt—that is, the change in
techniques to answer these questions. These are the key
government debt that is not explained by budgetary
findings:
deficits, interest-growth differentials, and exchange
• Distribution of risks around the baseline public debt
rate movements—is large and often a key driver of
projections. A novel unified “debt-at-risk” framework
is used to assess the risks surrounding baseline debt
1Decomposition of government debt ratios for 2024−29 into
projections and how they vary across countries and
their macroeconomic drivers shows that interest-growth differentials
are projected to continue to support debt reduction on average over time. The analysis suggests that changes in
across country groups, but sustained primary deficits and stock-flow
adjustments will weigh on debt. However, debt dynamics vary across
countries. The expected debt stabilization for many economies, 2Indeed, evidence suggests that uncertainty surrounding US fiscal

excluding China and the United States, is premised on still-favorable policy drives the global financial cycle in an important way, even
interest-growth differentials and planned fiscal restraint. For China and after controlling for US monetary policy shocks (Hong, Ke, and
the United States, sizable fiscal deficits are driving the increase in debt. Nguyen 2024).

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 1

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.1. Public Debt-to-GDP Ratio, 2000–29 Figure 1.2. Three-Year Forecast Errors of Public Debt
(Percent of GDP) Projections, 1990–2021
(Percent of GDP)
140 Interquartile range
Global median 20
120 Global average Mean Median
100 United States
China 15
80
10
60
40 5
20
Projection 0
0
2000 05 10 15 20 25 29
−5
All countries Countries for which debt is
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database. projected to decline

Source: Estefania-Flores and others 2023.

Note: Forecast errors are defined as the projected debt-to-GDP ratio relative to the
economic, financial, and political conditions can shift realized outcome for each country. The bars show the interquartile range at the
the distribution of future debt-to-GDP ratios. Global three-year horizon.

debt-at-risk, defined as the level of future debt in an

extreme adverse scenario, is estimated to be nearly 20
percentage points of GDP higher three years ahead
than current World Economic Outlook projections. and thus entail varying trade-offs between output
High current debt levels amplify the effects of weaker and inequality. A well-designed adjustment—
economic growth and tighter financial conditions on combining both expenditure and revenue
debt-at-risk. Global factors, which correlate with US measures—can significantly mitigate the adverse
sovereign yield volatility and US fiscal and monetary impacts on both output and inequality and is more
policy uncertainty, increasingly drive the fluctuations likely to be socially acceptable. Key elements of
in government borrowing costs across countries. a well-designed adjustment vary across countries,
Unidentified debt, another important risk for the but the pace of adjustment should be gradual and
debt outlook, has been historically large averaging sustained to strike a balance between fiscal risks and
around 1.0−1.5 percent of GDP per year, and up to the strength of private demand. For countries with
7 percentage points of GDP in the wake of financial benign debt outlooks, optimizing fiscal space while
system stress. This stems from the materialization of maintaining debt sustainability is a priority.
contingent liabilities and fiscal risks as well as from Strengthening fiscal governance is critical to limit
arrears. unidentified debt. Greater budget transparency and
• Fiscal policy to get debt under control. Our analysis compliance with fiscal rules—key elements of sound
shows that current fiscal adjustment plans fall public finances—are found to significantly mitigate
short of what is needed to stabilize or reduce the manifestation of unidentified debt during
debt with high probability for many countries. periods of financial stress.
Cumulative adjustments will need to be
3.0–4.5 percent of GDP on average over the
medium term to stabilize (or reduce) debt at a How Are Risks Surrounding Public Debt
high probability. The magnitude of adjustment Projections Distributed?
needed in most countries is greater than what is Debt forecasts, like other macroeconomic projections,
currently projected and by historical standards for typically reflect average estimates of the future debt path
many countries, especially in those where debt is in an economy. However, understanding the uncertainty
not projected to stabilize. surrounding debt dynamics requires quantifying
New analysis highlights how fiscal instruments both downside and upside risks to the forecast and
have a differential impact on different households monitoring their evolution over time. This section

2 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 CHAPTER 1 Putting a Lid on Public Debt

provides a unified framework for quantifying the risks economies accounting for more than 90 percent
surrounding debt projections and zooms in on two of global government debt. Figure 1.3 shows that
factors that are salient for debt risks: sovereign bond adverse financial and political developments are
yields and unidentified debt. consistently associated with higher debt risks up
to a forecast horizon of three years.6 In particular,
tighter financial conditions disproportionately affect
Debt-at-Risk Framework the right tail of the distribution of future debt (red
This section introduces a novel debt-at-risk bars in Figure 1.3, panel 1), with the strongest
framework for assessing the role of economic, effects seen over a three-year horizon.7 For example,
financial, and political factors in driving debt a significant tightening in financial conditions—
dynamics. The analysis builds on and advances the like the one Spain experienced in 2011—is
“growth-at-risk” methodology (Adrian, Boyarchenko, associated with an increase in debt-at-risk of about
and Giannone 2019; Adrian and others 2022), 3 percentage points of GDP after three years.
examining the dynamics of the global debt This largely reflects the effects of tighter financial
distribution over a projection horizon of one to five conditions on the left tail of the growth distribution,
years (Online Annex 1.1).3 The approach augments as adverse financial conditions raise defaults and
and complements existing tools for examining debt reduce lenders’ risk-bearing capacity (October 2017
risks by first going beyond the proximate drivers Global Financial Stability Report).
of debt (interest-growth differentials and primary In addition, tighter financial conditions are
balances) to investigate salient underlying factors— associated with greater “interest rate-at-risk”—the
such as financial stress or increased uncertainty 95th percentile of the interest rate distribution—in
regarding policies—that affect government debt and the near term, because higher sovereign yields raise
its proximate drivers.4 Second, it assesses whether debt-servicing costs, pushing future debt levels
these factors have asymmetric or nonlinear effects on upward (Lorenzoni and Werning 2019). Sovereign
the future distribution of debt-to-GDP. The analysis spreads also significantly predict upside debt risks in
helps policymakers gauge how debt could rise in a the near term (one to three years).8 For example, an
highly adverse scenario and provides the following increase in sovereign spreads—like the one observed
insights: in Sri Lanka in 2022—is associated with an increase
• Observable financial, political, and economic in debt-at-risk of about 2 percentage points of GDP
conditions predict debt risks, with impacts varying after three years. Higher sovereign yields also affect
depending on the time horizon. Estimates of debt- both growth-at-risk and interest-rate-at-risk. This
at-risk—defined as the 95th quantile of projected is consistent with the literature documenting that
debt—are obtained from panel quantile regressions higher sovereign spreads raise borrowing costs for
of future debt-to-GDP ratios on contemporaneous both households and firms, depressing economic
values of the variables of interest (Machado and activity (Gourinchas, Phillippon, and Vayanos 2016;
Santos Silva 2019; Adrian and others 2022).5 Arellano, Bai, and Bocola 2017) and evidence that
The analysis is based on a sample of 74 advanced sovereign bond markets have priced in other factors
economies and emerging market and developing (for example, a decline in productivity) that worsen
debt dynamics.
3All online annexes are available at [Link]/en/Publications/FM.
4The analysis complements current tools in assessing debt 6While it is not feasible to compare the statistical significance of

vulnerabilities, such as the IMF Sovereign Risk and Debt different coefficients on the 5th, 50th, and 95th quantiles in a panel
Sustainability Framework (SRDSF). The debt-at-risk framework setting, the results plotted in Figure 1.3 are consistent across various
does not examine debt sustainability but complements other tools forecast horizons and country samples. In addition, the distribution
by forecasting empirically the probability distribution of the global of country-level ordinary least squares coefficients is also generally
debt path in a way that allows for nonlinearity, asymmetry, and state right skewed for the variables that are associated with an asymmetric
dependence. effect across quantiles of debt.
5The use of the 95th quantile to quantify debt risk is consistent 7Consistent with the literature on growth-at-risk, the confidence

with the growth-at-risk literature (which uses the 5th quantile of bands for the median and 5th percentile, in some cases, overlap with
the growth distribution) as well as with the broader value-at-risk those for the 95th percentile.
approach in finance literature. 8Similar results are obtained for sovereign bond yields.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 3

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.3. Quantile Regression Results: Future Debt-to-GDP Ratio and Financial, Political, and Economic Variables
(Coefficients on conditioning variable in panel quantile regressions across forecast horizons)

5th percentile Median 95th percentile

1. Financial Variables—Financial Conditions Index 2. Financial Variables—Sovereign Spreads 3. Political Variables—Social Unrest
6 6
6

4 4
4

2 2 2

0 0 0

−2 −2 −2
1 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 5
Horizon (number of years ahead) Horizon (number of years ahead) Horizon (number of years ahead)

4. Economic Variables—Initial Debt Levels 5. Economic Variables—Primary Balance 6. Economic Variables—Economic Growth
0 0
1.0

0.8 −2 −2

0.6
−4 −4

0.4
−6 −6
0.2

0 −8 −8
1 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 5
Horizon (number of years ahead) Horizon (number of years ahead) Horizon (number of years ahead)

Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: The figure shows the estimated coefficients for 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles based on panel quantile regressions on selected financial, political, and economic variables for
74 countries for the period 2009–23. Bars denote estimated coefficients. All variables except for initial debt are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one
to ensure comparability across coefficients. The whisker in each bar shows the 90 percent confidence interval for the estimated coefficient (see Online Annex 1.1 for details).

Furthermore, economic uncertainty and uncertainty • Economic factors have persistent and asymmetric
regarding policies affect the distribution of future debt, effects on the debt distribution. Results show that the
with larger effects on the left tail (Online Annex 1.1; initial debt level and primary balance have long-
October 2024 Global Financial Stability Report). lasting and asymmetric effects on the right tail of
Beyond financial variables, political developments the distribution of future debt. Higher primary
such as social unrest—measured as the frequency of balances reduce debt across all quantiles of the debt
protests reported in the media—raise debt risks in the distribution, underscoring the positive impact of
near term by raising economic and policy uncertainty, fiscal adjustment on debt risks. Furthermore, higher
and impacting investor sentiment (Barrett, Boulton, inflation reduces debt-at-risk in both the short and
and Nixon 2023) and consumption (Hadzi-Vaskov, medium term (Online Annex 1.1).
Pienknagura, and Ricci 2021).9 • Global debt-at-risk is currently elevated, partly owing
to high debt levels. Estimates from the analysis
9Elections are also associated with moderately higher debt risks:
are used to construct a conditional probability
when an election takes place, it is associated with both growth-at-risk distribution of future debt for the world, as well as
and deficit-at-risk (Online Annex 1.1). separate distributions for advanced and emerging

4 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 CHAPTER 1 Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.4. Global Debt-at-Risk and Its Evolution Figure 1.5. Initial Debt and Debt-at-Risk
(Probability density of three-year-ahead government debt-to-GDP ratio) (Coefficient on real GDP growth in panel quantile regressions for
three-year-ahead debt-to-GDP ratio)
0.005
2009 2020 2023
0.5 Low initial debt High initial debt
0.004
0
0.003
−0.5
0.002
−1.0
0.001
−1.5
0.000
30 50 70 90 110 130 150 170 −2.0
General government gross debt (percent of GDP) 5th percentile Median 95th percentile

Source: IMF staff calculations. Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: The probability density functions are estimated using panel quantile regressions Note: The figure shows estimated coefficients for 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles
of the debt-to-GDP ratio on various political, economic, and financial variables. The based on panel quantile regressions of the debt-to-GDP ratio on real GDP growth
global sample comprises 74 countries—accounting for more than 90 percent of global differentiated by low initial debt (first quartile) and high initial debt (fourth quartile).
debt—for which data on the conditioning variables are available from 2009–23. The Bars denote estimated coefficients. Whiskers in bars show 90 percent confidence
quantile estimates are fitted to a skewed t distribution for every year in the sample (see intervals for estimated coefficients.
Online Annex 1.1 for details).

a result consistent with literature documenting

market and developing economies.10 Global debt- how the debt distribution varies with debt levels
at-risk is estimated at 115 percent of GDP three (Mian, Straub, and Sufi 2021). For example,
years ahead, about 20 percentage points of GDP whereas an increase in growth of 1 percentage
higher than the 2026 projection in the current point decreases debt-at-risk three years ahead by
World Economic Outlook (Figure 1.4).11 The global about 1.3 percentage points of GDP when debt
debt distribution is skewed to the right side, with is above 70 percent of GDP, the effect is about
risks also sizable at the 75th percentile of the 0.5 percentage point of GDP and less precisely
distribution (7 percentage points higher than the estimated when initial debt is lower than that
baseline projection, reaching 103 percent of GDP threshold (Figure 1.5).
three years ahead). In addition, debt-at-risk remains • Debt-at-risk varies significantly across countries
as right skewed as it was during the global financial and country groups. Three-year-ahead debt-at-risk
crisis.12 This reflects two main factors. First, is estimated at about 134 percent of GDP for
debt levels are higher now than in 2009. Second, advanced economies and 88 percent for emerging
financial and economic factors have a larger impact market and developing economies (Figure 1.6),
on debt risks when initial debt levels are higher: with important differences across countries. For
systemically important advanced economies such as
the United States, in which the primary deficit is the
10The construction has three steps: country-specific quantile
largest driver of debt-at-risk, three-year-ahead debt-
estimates are aggregated using GDP weights, the unconditional
distribution is recentered around the debt forecast in the World
at-risk is estimated to exceed 150 percent of GDP,
Economic Outlook database, and the conditional global debt 20 percentage points higher than the baseline debt
distribution is generated using the out-of-sample predictive power of projection in the October 2024 World Economic
each conditioning factor (Crump and others 2018).
11Global debt-at-risk is 119 percent of GDP five years ahead, Outlook (Online Annex Figure 1.1.4; Online Annex
about 20 percentage points higher than currently projected for 2028 Table 1.1.2).
in the World Economic Outlook database.
12The model predicts median global public-debt-to-GDP ratios of
Whereas debt-at-risk in advanced economies as a
85 percent for 2009 versus 97 percent for 2023. The corresponding
predicted 95th quantile of global public debt is 104 percent of GDP group has broadly retreated from pandemic peaks,
for 2009 versus 115 percent for 2023. it has increased in emerging market and developing

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 5

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.6. Debt-at-Risk across Income Groups Figure 1.7. Financial Conditions and Debt-at-Risk across
(Probability density of three-year-ahead government debt-to-GDP ratio, 2023) Income Groups
(Coefficients on financial conditions index for three-year-ahead debt-to-GDP
Advanced economies (2020) ratio)
Advanced economies (2023)
Emerging market and developing economies (2020) Advanced economies
0.006 Emerging market and developing economies (2023) Emerging market and developing economies
10
0.005
8
0.004

0.003 6

0.002 4
0.001
2
0
30 50 70 90 110 130 150 170 0
General government gross debt (percent of GDP) 5th percentile Median 95th percentile

Source: IMF staff calculations. Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: Probability density functions are estimated using panel quantile regressions Note: The figure shows estimated coefficients for 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles based
of the debt-to-GDP ratio on various political, economic, and financial variables for on panel quantile regressions of the debt-to-GDP ratio on the financial conditions
2009–23. The quantile estimates are fitted to a skewed t-distribution for every year index for advanced economies and emerging market and developing economies. Bars
in the sample. Dots indicate the predicted 95th quantile of the debt-to-GDP ratio for denote estimated coefficients. Whiskers in bars show 90 percent confidence intervals
each country group. for estimated coefficients.

economies. Differences in debt risks between the low-income developing countries need to make large
two country groups reflects an initial higher level of investments, on the order of 3 and 11 percent of GDP
debt in advanced economies and the heterogeneous per year, respectively, to close development gaps and
impact of conditioning factors across country groups. meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals (April
For example, financial conditions (as measured by 2023 Fiscal Monitor). Accounting for these ballooning
a financial conditions index and sovereign spreads), spending needs highlights the challenges of reducing
social unrest, and world uncertainty have larger debt risks in the coming years.
medium-term effects on debt-at-risk in emerging
market and developing economies than in advanced
economies, consistent with recent empirical evidence Figure 1.8. Primary Balance and Debt-at-Risk by Fiscal Rules
that finds the former to be less resilient to financial (Coefficients on primary balance for three-year-ahead debt-to-GDP ratio)
(Ahir and others 2023) and uncertainty shocks (Ahir,
Fiscal rule No fiscal rule
Bloom, and Furceri 2022) (Figure 1.7). The analysis 1
also finds that a higher primary balance is associated
with lower debt-at-risk, especially when countries
have fiscal rules in place, as well-designed fiscal rules 0
mitigate the risk of fiscal slippages (Figure 1.8).
Model-estimated debt-at-risk does not fully
−1
reflect mounting spending pressures arising from
the green transition, entitlements related to aging
and health care, defense, and energy security. These −2
could exacerbate the upside risks to debt projections. 5th percentile Median 95th percentile
For example, achieving net zero emissions by Source: IMF staff calculations.
midcentury is expected to increase government debt Note: The figure shows estimated coefficients for the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles
by 10–15 percentage points of GDP relative to the based on panel quantile regressions (Online Annex 1.1). It shows the results for the
primary balance for country-years in which fiscal rules are in place versus those in which
baseline (Garcia-Macia, Lam, and Nguyen 2024). they are not. Whiskers in bars show 90 percent confidence intervals for estimated
Governments in emerging market economies and coefficients.

6 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 CHAPTER 1 Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.9. Strong Co-movements of Sovereign Bond Yields Figure 1.10. Share of Total Variance in Sovereign Bond Yields
(Percent) Explained by Global Factors
(Share of total variance)
10-year bond (advanced economies)
10-year bond (local currency; emerging market and developing economies) 10-year bond (advanced economies)
Foreign-currency-denominated bond (emerging market and 10-year bond (local currency; emerging market and developing economies)
developing economies) Foreign-currency-denominated bond (emerging market and
14 100 developing economies)
12 90
80
10 70
8 60
6 50
40
4 30
2 20
0 10
0
2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Sources: Global Financial Data; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; Sources: Europace AG/Haver Analytics; Global Financial Data; IMF, International Financial
and IMF staff calculations. Statistics database; JPMorgan; Nguyen, Solovyeva, and Zhang (forthcoming); Organisation
Note: The figure shows medians of 10-year sovereign bond yields for 27 advanced for Economic Co-operation and Development; and World Bank.
economies, 10-year local currency sovereign bond yields for 18 emerging market Note: The figure shows the unweighted average contribution of global factors to the
and developing economies, and median foreign currency sovereign bond yields for time-varying variance of sovereign bond yields across country groups. For each country,
13 emerging market and developing economies. Shaded areas indicate interquartile the contribution of global factors corresponds to the median global factor share from
ranges. retained Gibbs-sampling draws (see Online Annex 1.2).

Fluctuations in Sovereign Yields and the yields for emerging market and developing economies,
Role of Global Factors as well as more than 30 percent of fluctuations in local-
currency-denominated bond yields in emerging market
Sovereign yields contribute in a crucial way to upside
and developing economies, on average (Figure 1.10).
risks in debt projections. The evolution of sovereign
These findings are consistent with the literature
yields shows a notable and growing co-movement
suggesting that global factors drive bond yields
across countries, as the tight interquartile range for
(Diebold, Li, and Yue 2008; Gilchrist and others 2022)
sovereign yields for individual countries in Figure 1.9
and also attest to the presence of a global financial cycle
shows.13 Indeed, new empirical evidence based on a
(Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 2020).14
dynamic factor model with time-varying parameters
Global factors play a varying role, however, in
and stochastic volatility suggests that global factors
explaining fluctuations in sovereign yields, both
play a key role in driving fluctuations in sovereign
over time and across countries. First, this role has
yields. According to this model, global factors explain
increased over time, notably during the pandemic
more than 50 percent of fluctuations over the past
and the recent spike in global inflation. Moreover,
two decades in sovereign bond yields for advanced
the volatility of global sovereign yields—that is, the
economies and foreign-currency-denominated bond
portion of the variance in sovereign bond yields
13Sovereign yields were on a declining trend after the global that global factors explain—correlates highly with
financial crisis, then rose after the pandemic, before moderating since measures of global and US financial volatility,
mid-2023 but remaining elevated by historical standards (October
including the volatility of US sovereign yields,
2024 Global Financial Stability Report). Several factors account for
these patterns, including globalization, the evolution of natural uncertainty surrounding US fiscal and monetary
interest rates, inflation expectations, and risk premiums (Diebold, Li, policy, and to a lesser extent, geopolitical risks
and Yue 2008; Summers 2015; Del Negro and others 2019). Before
the pandemic, increased globalization had lowered import costs and
reduced the correlation between unemployment and inflation—
that is, it had flattened the Phillips curve (Hazell and others 2022; 14The increasing role of global factors suggests that sovereign

Kohlscheen and Moessner 2022)—and risk premiums across countries yields co-move in both levels and volatility—that is, both the first
were declining with inflation expectations (Brixton and others 2023). and second moments of the distribution in sovereign yields.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 7

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.11. Correlation of Selected Indicators with Global Figure 1.12. Key Drivers of Global Volatility of Sovereign
Sovereign Bond Yield Volatility Bond Yields
(Pairwise correlation coefficients) (Effects on the volatility of sovereign bond yields explained by global factors
given a change from 25th to 75th percentiles in selected variables)

Global financial uncertainty

Domestic nonbank investorsʼ share
Foreign investorsʼ share

Adavanced
economies
VIX
Ratio of interest expense to tax revenue
US financial uncertainty
Fiscal policy uncertainty

US monetary policy uncertainty Ratio of government expenditure to GDP

EMDE 10-year
local currency
Ratio of interest expense to tax revenue
US fiscal policy uncertainty
Primary deficit surprise

Volatility of US sovereign yields Foreign investorsʼ share

EMDE foreign
currency
Domestic nonbank investorsʼ share
Geopolitical risk index Change in debt-to-GDP ratio

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20

Sources: Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2016; Caggiano and Castelnuovo 2023; Caldara and Sources: Europace AG/Haver Analytics; Global Financial Data; Hong, Ke, and Nguyen
Iacoviello 2022; Europace AG/Haver Analytics; Global Financial Data; Hong, Ke, and 2024; IMF, Sovereign Debt Investor database; IMF, World Economic Outlook database;
Nguyen 2024; IMF, International Financial Statistics database; JPMorgan; Ludvigson, JPMorgan; S&P Global Ratings; World Bank; and IMF staff calculations.
Ma, and Ng 2021; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Note: The figure shows the differential impact on variance of sovereign bond yields driven
Bank; and IMF staff calculations. by global factors when the variable of interest moves from the 25th to the 75th percentile.
Note: The figure shows pairwise coefficients on the correlations between various indicators Estimates are obtained using the weighted-average least squares method for 26 advanced
and the global sovereign bond yield volatility index, defined as simple averages of economies and 16 emerging market economies over 2009–22 (De Luca, Magnus, and
sovereign bond yield volatilities (that is, standard deviations) driven by global factors Peracchi 2018), with a panel regression model estimated separately for each country
calculated across countries and bond instruments. The correlation coefficient for the group and bond instrument. The dependent variable is the average global component of
geopolitical risk index is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. All other correlation the variance for respective sovereign yields. A variable is a “robust” contributing factor if
coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. VIX = Chicago Board Options Exchange the associated t-statistic is greater than one in absolute value. “Primary deficit surprise” is
Volatility Index. the difference between the actual primary deficit and that projected one year ahead. See
Online Annex 1.2. EMDE = emerging market and developing economy.

(Figure 1.11; Online Annex 1.2).15 The high

correlations suggest increasingly integrated capital countries could increase the volatility of sovereign
markets, with global institutional investors playing yields and debt risks for other countries.
a major role as well as spillovers from systemically Differences in fiscal positions, uncertainty regarding
important countries, such as the United States.16 policy, and debt structures are key determinants
These results suggest that uncertainty surrounding explaining cross-country heterogeneity in the
fiscal and monetary policy in systematically important contribution of global factors (Online Annex 1.2).
Global factors are more relevant for fluctuations in
15The model is estimated for 45 advanced economies and
sovereign yields in countries with larger shares of
emerging market and developing economies. The method has the
advantage of obtaining time-varying and country-specific estimates foreign and nonbank investors (Figure 1.12). For
of the globally driven volatility of sovereign yields explained by example, fluctuations in sovereign yields explained
global factors. See Online Annex 1.2 for a detailed description of the by global factors increase by 15 percent for advanced
data and the methodology.
16Longstaff and others (2011) argue that strong co-movements economies if the share of nonbank investors increases
in sovereign spreads are related largely to their sensitivity to funding from the 25th to the 75th percentile. Furthermore,
needs of major investors in sovereign bond markets. This aligns with higher interest burdens as a share of tax revenues are
models such as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), in which
associated with greater exposure of local-currency-
funding shocks institutional investors experience can lead to liquidity
shocks in other financial assets. Hong, Ke, and Nguyen (2024) denominated sovereign yields to global factors.
find that a one-standard-deviation increase in a US fiscal policy These results make it clear that reducing uncertainty
uncertainty index—corresponding to the increased uncertainty surrounding fiscal policy, along with sound public
observed during the 2012 debt ceiling deliberations—is associated
with increases in sovereign spreads of 5 basis points in advanced debt management, can mitigate adverse fluctuations in
economies and 40 basis points in emerging market economies. sovereign yields and spillovers driven by global factors.

8 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 CHAPTER 1 Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.13. Distribution of Unidentified Debt Excluding The analysis suggests that materialization of
Exchange Rate Movements, 1991–2023 contingent liabilities and fiscal risks accounts for nearly
(Density) 40 percent of unidentified debt. These liabilities and risks
0.3
stem largely from losses of state-owned enterprises as
Advanced economies
Emerging market economies
well as from bank recapitalizations and loan guarantees
Low-income developing countries typically implemented during banking crises and periods
of financial stress (Figure 1.14; Online Annex 1.3).18
0.2
Other important sources include arrears, recognition
of debt from institutional changes in the perimeter
of government, and extrabudgetary spending. These
0.1 reflect weaknesses in the capacity of fiscal institutions to
monitor arrears and extrabudgetary activity, which could
explain why low-income developing countries tend to
0.0 have the highest unidentified debt, on average. In some
−10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Stock-flow adjustment (percent of GDP) cases, they also arise because of governments’ incentives
to underrepresent debt and deficits in their official
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff compilations.
statistics.
Note: Positive (negative) stock-flow adjustments contribute to higher (lower)
debt-to-GDP ratios. Unidentified debt refers in the chapter to the stock-flow Although the share of unidentified debt that can be
adjustments, which reflect the change in debt not explained by budgetary deficits, attributed to each source has remained broadly stable
interest-growth differentials, and exchange rate movements.
over time, the underlying sources show significant
heterogeneity across countries (Figure 1.15). For
example, in Honduras, delays in recognizing arrears
Unidentified Debt resulting from operational losses of the ailing state-
Unidentified debt is another important source of owned electricity company as well as, until 2022,
risks to the debt outlook. Historically, unidentified extrabudgetary spending through trust funds have
debt has been high—at about 1–1.5 percent of GDP primarily driven unidentified debt, whereas weak
per year on average (Figure 1.13) in emerging market governance and debt management have been the main
and developing economies—and their materialization factor in Mozambique.
has significantly increased public debt (Afonso and Unidentified debt tends to be significant in the
Jalles 2020). wake of financial system stress. An analysis of its
Despite the significance of the sources and evolution following episodes of financial stress suggests
drivers of unidentified debt, there have been few that banking crises result in large materializations
systematic analyses of them. This subsection explores of unidentified debt of 7 percent of GDP in the
the issue using two complementary analyses. First, crisis year, and another 2 percent of GDP in the
it uses a narrative approach to identify the main following year. Similarly, increases in financial stress
sources of unidentified debt by examining published are associated with an increase in unidentified debt
IMF Country Reports for 17 emerging market of 2½ percent of GDP after one year (Figure 1.16;
and developing economies for 2000–23 (Online Online Annex 1.3).19 Overall, these large and
Annex 1.3).17 It then classifies these sources into six significant effects are consistent with the narrative
categories: contingent liabilities and fiscal risks; arrears; evidence indicating that unidentified debt often
extrabudgetary spending, such as that through various materializes when a crisis unfolds and largely takes
funds in public entities; institutional changes, such as the form of bank recapitalization, calling of loan
changes in debt perimeters; unaccounted debt; and
statistical discrepancies. 18State-owned enterprises can incur losses or have negative
equity but continue to operate through government transfers
or by servicing their own debt without its being recognized as
government debt. Later recognition of the debt as government
17The 17 countries are taken from a larger sample of 33 countries debt requires a large positive stock-flow adjustment related to the
with the largest stock-flow adjustments (unidentitifed debt) in transaction.
2010–23 for which IMF Country Reports can identify more than 19In addition, increases in financial stress raise the 95th percentile

30 percent of the adjustments (Online Annex 1.3). of the distribution of unidentified debt (Online Annex 1.1).

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 9

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.14. Components of Unidentified Debt, 2010–23

(Percent of total identified components, percentage points)

Debt unaccounted for

(11%) Other
(4%)
Legal claims against the state (8%)

Materialization Natural disasters (7%)

Institutional of contingent
changes liabilities and
fiscal risks SOE-related
(20%)
(38%) Bank recapitalization (51%)
(16%)

Extrabudgetary Loan guarantees (14%)

spending Arrears
(6%) (25%)

Source: IMF staff calculations, based on data from the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
Note: Components are based on reviews of IMF Country Reports for 17 emerging market and developing economies identified within a sample of 33 countries that had large unidentified
debt during 2010–23. The set of countries was selected based on the size of their unidentified debt, computed from the IMF World Economic Outlook database, as well as on the criterion
that IMF Country Reports include information that can document more than 30 percent of their unidentified debt. “Debt unaccounted for” includes statistical discrepancy. SOE = state-owned
enterprise.

Figure 1.15. Components of Unidentified Debt Figure 1.16. Increase in Unidentified Debt after a Banking
(Percent of GDP per year, average between 2010 and 2023) Crisis and Financial Stress
(Percent of GDP)
1.4
1.2 1. Systemic Banking Crisis 2. Financial Stress
1.0 12 12
0.8 10 10
0.6 8 8
0.4 6 6
0.2
4 4
0
2 2
−0.2
Contingent Institutional Arrears Extrabudgetary Statistical 0 0
liabilities and changes spending discrepancy −1 0 1 2 −1 0 1 2
fiscal risks Years after shock Years after shock

Source: IMF staff calculations. Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: The figure shows key components of unidentified debt across countries (Online Note: Year 0 is the year of the banking crisis (increase in financial stress). Solid black
Annex 1.3). Yellow markers refer to averages, and blue bars are the interquartile ranges lines denote the response. Shaded areas denote 90 percent confidence bands. Results
for each measure; lines in bars show median levels. are based on the analysis described in Online Annex 1.3.

guarantees, and recognition of losses in state-owned stabilization, ensuring debt sustainability, addressing
enterprises (Dovis and Kirpalani 2020; Battersby and distributional concerns, and supporting long-term
others 2022). growth. The appropriate balance for a country between
macroeconomic stabilization and debt sustainability,
for instance, depends on the level and the composition
Fiscal Policy to Get Debt Under Control of its public debt (in terms both of its maturity and
Fiscal policy often faces difficult trade-offs among of the creditors to whom the debt is owed), its gross
multiple objectives: providing macroeconomic financing needs, and its economic growth path (Online

10 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 CHAPTER 1 Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.17. Selected Key Indicators of Debt Vulnerabilities

1. Primary Balance 2. Interest Payment to Total Revenues 3. Gross Financing Needs
(Percent of GDP) (Percent) (Percent of GDP)

6 Interquartile range Emerging market and developing 50 Advanced economies

Global median economies (excluding China) 45 Emerging markets
3 Global average Global 40 Low-income developing
20 Advanced economies (excluding countries
0 35
the United States) 30
15
−3 25
10 20
−6 15
−9 5 10
5
−12 0 0
2000 05 10 15 20 25 29 2000–08 2009–19 2020–23 2024–29 2015 17 19 21 23 25 27 29

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.

Annex 1.4; Bianchi and others 2024).20 Deterioration (Georgieva 2024), which underscores the importance of
in many of these factors in recent years (Figure 1.17) the composition of adjustment.
and the associated upside risks to debt projections This section focuses on the role of fiscal policies in
suggest that many countries should orient their fiscal containing debt risk along three key dimensions. First,
policy toward rebuilding fiscal buffers and containing it quantifies the size of fiscal adjustments needed for
debt vulnerabilities. Low unemployment rates and a high probability of stabilizing (or reducing) debt.
easing of monetary policy rates provide an opportune Second, it examines how governments can design
environment. Historically, financial repression has fiscal adjustments to mitigate their adverse impacts on
contributed to debt reduction, but it is neither viable output and inequality, thereby increasing their social
nor desirable, as caps on interest rates and restrictions acceptability. Third, given the prevalence of unidentified
on the capital account are less feasible in globally debt in emerging market and developing economies,
integrated capital markets (Arslanalp and Eichengreen it discusses policies to limit their materialization,
2023; Chari, Dovis, and Kehoe 2020). including during periods of financial stress.
Fiscal adjustments will need to be decisive, deliberate,
and well designed. Decisive action is required because
most countries have depleted their fiscal buffers, and Size of Fiscal Adjustment Needed to
some will potentially need to make large adjustments. Contain Debt Vulnerabilities
Delaying would be both costly and risky. The required Large primary deficits are one of the key drivers of
adjustment will only become larger and may even global debt-at-risk, as shown earlier in the chapter.
become untenable if markets react negatively or if an This implies that fiscal adjustments will not only
adverse shock hits the economy. Governments will reduce debt levels but also attenuate debt risks—raising
need deliberate plans to balance trade-offs and garner the likelihood that debt will stabilize. The size of the
public support because fiscal adjustments often lead adjustments needed depends on initial debt levels as
to near-term declines in output and employment. At well as the likelihood debt can be stabilized, which
the same time, countries need to design adjustment is especially important in a context of significant
carefully to keep from falling into a prolonged period of uncertainty and upside risks surrounding debt
anemic growth that entrenches poverty and inequality projections.
To examine how fiscal adjustments could reduce
20Online Annex 1.4 presents an illustrative model-based analysis risks to the debt outlook and raise the probability
formalizing some of these trade-offs and how various economic of stabilizing or reducing debt, a stochastic
factors shift the balance between macroeconomic stabilization and approach based on the IMF’s Sovereign Risk and
debt sustainability. The analysis does not determine an optimal set Debt Sustainability Framework is applied. The
of fiscal measures for a given size of adjustment, because countries
have different social preferences, and measures need to account for approach quantifies the size of the “proactive” fiscal
country-specific circumstances. adjustment—measured in terms of an improvement

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 11

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.18. Median Fiscal Adjustment and Probability of Figure 1.19. Median Fiscal Adjustment across Scenarios:
Stabilizing or Reducing Debt by 2029 Baseline, Historical, and High Probability to Stabilize Debt
(Probability for median and interquartile range in percent) (Percent of GDP)

100 Median adjustment projected in WEO (2024–29) 5

90
4
80
70 3
60
50 Median 2
United States
40 1
China
30
20 0
WEO Historical High WEO Historical High
10 baseline probability baseline probability
0 to stabilize to stabilize
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 Countries with debt projected to Countries with debt not projected to
Cumulative fiscal adjustment (percent of GDP) stabilize stabilize

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database. Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: The cumulative median fiscal adjustment in the World Economic Outlook (WEO) Note: “Historical” fiscal adjustment refers to adjustments in a country that change the
is about 1 percentage point of GDP cumulative over six years (2023–29). Additional primary balance in a positive direction over a six-year rolling window. “WEO baseline”
fiscal adjustments are the same for all countries and are applied to those countries’ adjustment is the difference between the projected primary balance in 2023 and that
baseline projections. A country’s probability of keeping debt from rising is calculated in 2029 in the World Economic Outlook (WEO). “Adjustments to stabilize debt with
as the number of debt paths for which the baseline primary balance is higher than or high probability” refers to the adjustments that set the probability of stabilizing debt
equal to the debt-stabilizing primary balance as a percent of the total number of debt at 80 percent (see Online Annex 1.5).
paths (See Online Annex 1.5).

adjustment is needed in the United States compared

in primary balances during 2023–29—to stabilize with China because its deficit projected for 2029 is
debt or put it on a downward path with high closer to the debt-stabilizing level. In addition, in
probability (Online Annex 1.5). The model suggests countries with low debt and a strong primary balance,
that this probability increases with the size of the a more limited adjustment is needed to achieve a high
adjustment.21 For example, a 1 percent of GDP probability of debt stabilization.
cumulative fiscal adjustment over the next five Placing these estimates in a historical context
years—the projected magnitude for a median country gives a sense of the challenge policymakers are
in the current World Economic Outlook forecast— facing. Keeping debt-to-GDP ratios from rising,
implies a 60 percent probability that a country’s with an 80 percent probability of success, entails
debt will stabilize or decrease by 2029 (Figure 1.18). a fiscal adjustment significantly higher than
Increasing this probability to 80 percent for a median what most countries have achieved in the past
country (a meaningful, but not extreme increase (2½ percent of GDP) or what most are currently
in the likelihood of debt stabilization) requires a planning (Figure 1.19). This is particularly true for
cumulative adjustment of 3−3½ percent of GDP over countries that are delaying fiscal adjustment and
the medium term. whose debt the current World Economic Outlook
How additional fiscal adjustment affects the baseline does not project will stabilize. These
probability of debt stabilization varies markedly across countries account for nearly 60 percent of global
countries and depends on projected fiscal deficits debt. Having a high probability of stabilizing debt
and the interest-growth differential. For example, in these countries requires an adjustment of 4½
whereas both China and the United States have low percent of GDP over the medium term—almost
probabilities of stabilization by 2029, a smaller twice the size of past adjustments. Importantly,
delaying fiscal adjustment is costly, requiring an
21The analysis considers plausible magnitudes of fiscal adjustments
additional adjustment of about 0.2 percentage
over several years without analyzing the general equilibrium effects point of GDP per year. The median adjustment
on growth and interest rates. The pace of fiscal adjustments in the
new EU economic governance reforms also considers the stochastic for countries where debt is projected to stabilize or
nature of debt risk and debt sustainability. decline is lower, at 3.6 percentage points of GDP,

12 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 CHAPTER 1 Putting a Lid on Public Debt

but still considerably higher than what countries income, via wage income and transfers; interest
have achieved in the past. As the space for fiscal rates; and asset revaluation. The interplay among
maneuver narrows, not only will governments need these channels, combined with financial frictions
to adhere earnestly to commitments to achieving households face (for example, the inability to access
fiscal consolidation targets, but they will need to liquidity when needed), leads to large variations
make the additional adjustments warranted to among households in propensity to consume, which
contain debt vulnerabilities with a high probability. amplify aggregate economic effects.
To illustrate the importance of structural differences
in designing fiscal adjustments, the model is calibrated
Design of Fiscal Adjustments to match the data on household income and wealth
Fiscal adjustments inevitably involve difficult distributions for a representative advanced economy
output-inequality trade-offs. Although different (United States) and a representative emerging market
factors affect the success of fiscal adjustments economy (Peru). The model captures the more limited
(including the time, pace, and composition), a ability for households to insure against economic
key objective is to mitigate their negative impact adversity in emerging market and developing
on output and inequality.22 This implies that the economies and differences in households’ exposure to,
design needs to be well calibrated to account for the and the volatility and persistence of, income shocks
policy mix and its heterogeneous impact according across country groups. The analysis provides important
to households’ income (consumption) and wealth insights on the impact of different fiscal instruments
distribution. and transmission channels:
• Expenditure and revenue measures. Different
A Model Framework Accounting for fiscal measures affect households differently and
Household Heterogeneity therefore the aggregate economy as well. Cuts in
This subsection presents a Heterogeneous Agent transfers directly reduce household consumption,
New Keynesian (HANK) model to illustrate the especially cuts in transfers targeted to low-income
impact of various fiscal measures on output and households (Figure 1.20). By contrast, a reduction
inequality and alternative policy packages, accounting in government consumption (for example, in
for country differences. The model incorporates compensation to public sector employees and in
household income and wealth characteristics that purchases of goods and services) has a sizable impact
shape the way fiscal measures affect inequality in on output because it directly reduces aggregate
both output and consumption (Online Annex demand. Public investment cuts have an even larger
1.6). The analysis extends Auclert, Rognlie, and negative impact on output because they hamper
Straub (forthcoming) by considering different fiscal production and aggregate supply (Figure 1.21).
instruments: government consumption, public If taxes are progressive, raising them leads to
investment, subsidies, transfers (both targeted and smaller output losses than cuts in government
untargeted), and progressive income taxes. Fiscal transfers because high-income households reduce
measures affect household consumption and aggregate their consumption by less, given their larger asset
output through multiple channels: disposable holdings (Figure 1.21).
• Impacts across countries. The magnitude of the
22Previous episodes suggest that in countries that have undertaken decline in output and consumption varies across
fiscal adjustments, the average size has been 1–2 percent of GDP economies, reflecting differences in country
(Figure 1.20). The majority of adjustment episodes have lasted two
to three years, although on a few occasions, they have lasted longer
characteristics. For example, energy subsidies
than six years (Online Annex Figure 1.1.1). Emerging market and are regressive (that is, they benefit richer
developing economies have been more likely to initiate adjustments households disproportionately) in emerging
during periods of economic expansion, whereas advanced economies
market and developing economies (Coady and
have often undertaken them in periods of weaker growth (Clements
and others 2023). Measures have also varied across countries: others 2015), but the benefits accrue largely
whereas emerging market and developing economies have typically to middle-income households in advanced
scaled back public investment while retaining regressive subsidies economies. Thus, reducing energy subsidies
(Ardanaz and others 2021), adjustments in advanced economies have
usually relied on expenditure-based measures—mostly cuts in public tends to have a larger impact on high-income
investment, although tax hikes have also been used in some cases. households in emerging market economies and on

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 13

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.20. Distributive Impact of Fiscal Adjustment across Figure 1.21. Impact of Fiscal Adjustment on Aggregate
Households Output and Consumption
(Percent of initial consumption) (Percent of steady-state GDP)

0 0.0

−1
−0.5

−2

−1.0
−3
AEs: Low-income
households
−4 AEs: Middle class EMs: Low-income households
AEs: High-income EMs: Middle class −1.5
households EMs: High-income households Aggregate output
−20
−5 Aggregate consumption
Untargeted Targeted
−2.0
Government Government Transfers Energy Income tax Government Government Untargeted Targeted Energy Income tax
consumption investment subsidies consumption investment transfers transfers subsidies

Source: IMF staff calculations. Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: Simulation results are based on a temporary one-off fiscal adjustment of Note: Simulation results are based on a temporary one-off fiscal adjustment of
1 percentage point of steady-state output for each measure in a representative 1 percentage point of steady-state output for each measure in a representative
advanced economy (see Online Annex 1.6). Transfers are separated into “Untargeted” advanced economy (see Online Annex 1.6). Transfers are separated into “Untargeted”
(for all households) and “Targeted” (to low-income households: 5th percentile and (for all households) and “Targeted” (to low-income households: 5th percentile and
below in the income distribution). Energy subsidies are calibrated based on energy below in the income distribution). Energy subsidies are calibrated based on energy
consumption across households. Income tax is assumed to be progressive. The figure consumption across households. Income tax is assumed to be progressive. The
shows the impact for each type of fiscal measure (an increase in taxes or an expenditure figure shows the impact for each type of fiscal measure (an increase in taxes or an
cut), measured in terms of initial consumption for each type of household. Bars (dots) expenditure cut), measured in terms of steady-state GDP.
show the effects for a representative advanced economy (emerging market economy).
AEs = advanced economies; EMs = emerging markets.

Illustrative Fiscal Adjustment Packages

low- or middle-income households in advanced
economies (Figure 1.21). With these insights in mind, this section illustrates
• Transmission channels. Fiscal adjustments affect the effects on output and inequality of two alternative
households’ consumption and aggregate output fiscal adjustment packages for advanced and emerging
mainly through the disposable-income channel— market economies. The first is an undesirable
that is, wages or income from government transfers. adjustment package that relies on cuts in public
Spending cuts and the associated fall in disposable investment rather than in government consumption
income reduce consumption among low- and and retains most untargeted subsidies—the type of
middle-income households. It is because these adjustment governments have often put forward
households lack adequate liquid financial assets to in the past. The second is a preferred adjustment
compensate for the resulting income shortfall, in package that mitigates its adverse impacts on output
line with the findings in Ben Zeev, Ramey, and and inequality. The latter combines revenue and
Zubairy (2023); Bayer, Born, and Luetticke (2024); expenditure measures, safeguards public investment,
Bilbiie (2020, 2024); and Broer, Krusell, and protects vulnerable households through targeted
Öberg (2023). Adjustments generally have smaller transfers, and phases out untargeted subsidies
effects through the interest rate and asset valuation (Figure 1.22).23 Preferred fiscal measures vary
channels, and those effects are concentrated mostly
in high-income households, given their asset 23The analysis does not determine an optimal set of fiscal measures

holdings (Online Annex 1.6). However, the relative for a given size of adjustment because countries have different social
strength of these channels varies, with greater preferences, and measures need to account for country-specific
circumstances. Rather, it uses model-guided principles and illustrates
importance in advanced economies compared with how to design adjustment measures to mitigate adverse impacts on
emerging market and developing economies. aggregate output and inequality (Online Annex 1.6).

14 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 CHAPTER 1 Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.22. Illustrative Preferred Fiscal Adjustment between an Advanced Economy and an Emerging Market Economy
(Percent of steady-state output, unless stated otherwise)

Government consumption Public investment Transfers (untargeted) Targeted transfers Income tax Subsidy Primary deficit
1. Undesirable Adjustment 2. Preferred Adjustment
(Change in primary deficits) (Change in primary deficits)
2.1. Emerging Market 2.2. Advanced Economy
0.4 0.4 0.4
0.2 0.2 0.2
0 0 0
−0.2 −0.2 −0.2
−0.4 −0.4 −0.4
−0.6 −0.6 −0.6
−0.8 −0.8 −0.8
0 1 2 3 4 5 Long 0 1 2 3 4 5 Long 0 1 2 3 4 5 Long
term term term
Years Years Years

3. Output Effects 4. Decline in Consumption across Income Groups and Fiscal Adjustment
Undesirable adjustment Preferred adjustment Scenarios
(Percent of initial consumption levels)
3.1. Emerging Markets 3.2. Advanced Economies 0
Adjustment Adjustment −0.2
0 period 0 period −0.4
−0.4 −0.4 −0.6
−0.8 −0.8 −0.8
−1.0
−1.2 −1.2
−1.2 Top 5th percentile
−1.6 −1.6 −1.4 Bottom 50th percentile
−2.0 −2.0 −1.6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Long 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Long Undesirable Preferred Undesirable Preferred
term term Emerging market economy Advanced economy
Years Years

Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: The simulation is based on extending the model of Auclert, Rognlie, and Straub (forthcoming). The model is calibrated to a representative advanced economy and emerging
market economy by matching respective data (see Online Annex 1.6 for details). The size of the fiscal adjustment is set identically at a cumulative 3 percent of steady-state GDP over
six years for comparison, but the composition varies across scenarios (undesirable and preferred) and income groups (advanced economy and emerging market economy).

across countries, depending on differences in social (Figure 1.22).24 Output falls because fiscal adjustment
preferences and political feasibility considerations not inevitably reduces aggregate demand as governments
captured in the model. cut expenditures and collect more taxes. The resulting
The size of the adjustment is set to be the same decline in wages and transfers reduces household
across scenarios at a cumulative 3 percent of GDP income, which in turn curtails consumption, more so
over six years (about 0.5 percent of GDP annually), for low-income households.
informed by the analysis in the previous section.
24The near-term output loss resulting from fiscal adjustments
The calibrated model shows a reduction in the debt-
is consistent with the findings from the vast literature (Blanchard,
to-GDP ratio of about 4 percentage points by the end Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro 2010; Erceg and Lindé 2013; Guajardo,
of the adjustment period in both scenarios (Online Leigh, and Pescatori 2014; Alesina and others 2018; Ağca and
Annex 1.6). Igan 2019; Banerjee and Zampolli 2019; Balasundharam and
others 2023). The adverse impact affects low- and middle-income
Model results show that fiscal adjustments weigh households disproportionately, sharply increasing consumption
on near-term activity and raise levels of inequality inequality (Ball and others 2013).

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 15

FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Nonetheless, the preferred fiscal adjustment public investment to limit the impact on output
mitigates the adverse impact on output and as well as targeted transfers to protect vulnerable
consumption and limits increases in levels of households.
inequality, compared with the undesirable package. Although the model does not capture this directly,
For example, in the preferred fiscal adjustment, in some countries (for example, Brazil, India, and
output drops about 0.8 percent of steady-state South Africa), adjustment would require reforms to
GDP, relative to 1.3–1.6 percent in the undesirable tackle budget rigidities to reallocate expenditure to
package (Figure 1.22), partly because the preferred where it is most needed. As energy subsidies typically
adjustment safeguards public investment which has a benefit the rich in emerging market and developing
large impact on output (Ardanaz and Izquierdo 2022; economies (for example, the price caps and broad-
Magud and Pienknagura 2024).25 The preferred fiscal based energy subsidies in Saudi Arabia and Thailand),
adjustment also mitigates the adverse impact on low- phasing out untargeted or regressive subsidies can help
and middle-income groups: consumption among the limit cuts in government consumption (Republic of
bottom 50th percentile is reduced by an average of Congo and Togo, for example) (Coady and others 2015;
0.7–0.8 percentage point, only about half than those Black and others 2023). The greater tax potential in
in the undesirable package of adjustments. In addition, emerging markets implies that measures should include
the preferred adjustment also mitigates the adverse revenue mobilization (Benitez and others 2023),
impact on consumption inequality as the decline in which reduces the need for expenditure cuts for an
consumption is broadly the same across household adjustment of a given size and can help finance needed
income groups, while it is much larger for low- and public investment and targeted transfers.
middle-income groups than high-income households Measures vary according to an economy’s tax
in the undesirable adjustment scenario (Figure 1.22, structure. For example, countries with low tax-to-
panel 4). This reflects the increase in targeted GDP ratios (for example, Mexico) should assess
transfers in the preferred package, which helps protect existing tax rates and thresholds comprehensively,
vulnerable hand-to-mouth households during the in particular those relating to value-added taxes
adjustment period, when wage income falls (Fabrizio and personal income taxes. Increasing value-added
and Flamini 2015). tax rates (Nigeria, Thailand ), reintroducing goods
The preferred fiscal adjustment scenario is designed and services taxes (Malaysia), and rationalizing tax
differently for advanced and emerging market expenditures or tax exemptions (Brazil, Egypt, Kyrgyz
economies. Given the same set of measures in the Republic) would help mobilize revenues durably to
undesirable packages in both economies, the adverse finance development needs and poverty alleviation
impact on output and inequality is larger for an programs, and in some cases to address chronic
emerging market economy (Figure 1.22, panels 3 revenue weaknesses.
and 4). This reflects mainly the greater fraction of Adjustments in advanced economies that have
households in emerging market economies that lack already high tax burdens (for example, France) should
the ability to insure themselves against economic rely more on reprioritizing expenditures (for example,
adversity, consistent with Hong (2023), which finds through broad-based expenditure reviews) within an
a larger marginal propensity to consume among overall cut in government expenditure. Entitlement
households in emerging market economies (Online reform is a key priority in many advanced economies,
Annex 1.6).26 This in turn implies that adjustments as expenditures on entitlements account for a large and
in emerging markets should emphasize safeguarding rigid share of their budgets. In countries where there is
scope to raise revenues (for example, United Kingdom
25Over the long term, the preferred package increases output and United States) stabilizing (or reducing) debt may
slightly, with a decline in debt-to-GDP ratios, in line with some require operating on both spending and revenue
findings in Rother, Schuknecht, and Stark (2010) that ensuring measures (Figure 1.22). Actions can include raising
debt sustainability supports output, although the effects of fiscal indirect taxes and progressively increasing income
adjustments on long-term output are not conclusive.
26Other structural differences, such as the degree of informality in
taxes (United States), removing tax exemptions (such as
an economy and social protection systems, are not modeled here and value-added tax exemptions in the United Kingdom),
could affect these estimates. and improving the efficiency of tax expenditures

16 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 CHAPTER 1 Putting a Lid on Public Debt

(Spain). For the European Union, sustained political Figure 1.23. Correlations between Fiscal Institutions and
support is needed in member states to successfully Unidentified Debt
implement the fiscal adjustment required by the new (Correlation coefficients)
EU economic governance reform. Medium-term
fiscal and structural plans should be underpinned by Government effectiveness
a credible fiscal strategy with high-quality measures.
On the other hand, countries with long-standing fiscal Budget transparency
prudence and benign debt outlooks should continue to
preserve debt sustainability and tackle downside risks Frequency of compliance

Debt rule
(Indonesia, Sweden).
Have debt rule
The analysis also highlights the merits of gradual
but sustained fiscal adjustments. A fiscal adjustment

Budget balance
Frequency of compliance
of the same size but implemented aggressively in half

rule
the time—that is, in three rather than six years—will Have budget balance rule
lead output to contract and consumption inequality
to increase more sharply (Online Annex 1.6). Such −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2
a fast-track adjustment would require politically Sources: Davoodi and others 2022; and International Budget Partnership, Open Budget
unfeasible spending cuts and hikes in tax rates. That Survey.
said, front-loaded adjustment may be necessary to Note: Solid (light colored) bars denote statistically significant correlation coefficients at
the 5 percent level (correlation coefficients that are not statistically significant).
reduce an economy’s likelihood of debt distress,
especially in economies that have acute funding
pressures and have lost market access, but appropriate
design can help mitigate adverse impacts on output aspects of fiscal governance—budget transparency
and inequality. Several countries that have not fully and compliance with fiscal rules—are found to
withdrawn fiscal support in response to the 2022 significantly reduce the unidentified debt during
energy price spikes should also pursue up-front fiscal periods of banking crisis (Figure 1.24). In countries
adjustments. with weaker fiscal governance, banking crises are
Although not directly captured in the model- associated with statistically significant and sizable
based analysis, credible fiscal adjustments can help increases (of 10–15 percentage points of GDP) in
lower funding costs and increase financial stability. unidentified debt. By contrast, the materialization of
Although the model analysis focuses on the short-term contingent liabilities and fiscal risks during banking
impact on output and inequality, governments should crises is smaller in countries characterized by strong
calibrate fiscal adjustments to replenish fiscal buffers fiscal governance. This suggests that strengthening
and generate policy space to address long-standing fiscal governance is key to mitigating the buildup of
structural challenges that affect long-term growth. unidentified debt and containing debt vulnerabilities
Other important aspects not considered in the analysis, in periods of heightened financial stress and at other
such as the political economy of adjustment, degree times as well. Policy priorities include the following:
of informality in an economy, strength of its social • Assessing and managing contingent liabilities.
protection systems, and labor market characteristics, Governments should enhance their assessment and
also shape the aggregate and distributional effects of monitoring of contingent liabilities, including those
fiscal adjustments. associated with state-owned enterprises (Baum and
others 2020). For example, Mozambique publishes
the consolidated accounts and incorporates fiscal
Tackling Unidentified Debt risks from state-owned enterprises within its annual
Empirical evidence suggests that indicators published reports. Appropriate risk mitigation
of fiscal governance correlate negatively with policies—such as timely and reliable reporting and
unidentified debt (Figure 1.23). Countries with stress-testing the financial viability of state-owned
stronger fiscal governance tend to have less enterprises—are also key to identifying and
unidentified debt, on average. In addition, certain monitoring fiscal risks.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 17

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Figure 1.24. Unidentified Debt and Their Relationships with arrears, policymakers should establish a system for
Budget Transparency and Compliance with Fiscal Rules tracking arrears, undertake regular audits to ensure
(Percent of GDP) the validity of claimed arrears, and set a clearance
1. Tax Transparency 2. Compliance with Debt Rule
strategy—for example, Sierra Leone published a
Low tax transparency Low compliance with debt rule strategy in 2023 to clear past arrears verified by
High tax transparency High compliance with debt rule the national auditor, as well as the annual reports
25 25 on arrears, and reconciled interagency arrears.
20 20 Moreover, compliance with well-designed fiscal
15 15
rules can keep expenditures within rule limits
(Caselli and others 2022) and avert persistent
10 10
increases in unidentified debt after a crisis
5 5 (Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate 2016; Perrelli,
0 0
Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Wei, forthcoming).27
• Increasing fiscal transparency. Governments should
−5 −5
−1 0 1 2 −1 0 1 2 provide timely and quality budgetary information
Years after shock Years after shock to enhance public scrutiny—including providing
Sources: Davoodi and others 2022; IMF, Fiscal Rules Dataset, 1985–2021; International
open access to key budget documents, engaging
Budget Partnership, Open Budget Survey; and IMF staff calculations. the public regarding fiscal issues, and strengthening
Note: “Compliance with fiscal rules” refers to the frequency of compliance with debt independent fiscal oversight (IMF 2023; Vasquez
rules. Tax transparency is sourced from the Open Budget Survey Index. Year 0 is the
year of a banking crisis. Solid black (red) lines denote the response to a banking crisis;
and others 2024). Analyzing and reporting stock-
shaded areas (dashed lines) denote 90 percent confidence bands. See details in Online flow adjustments in fiscal outturns would improve
Annex 1.3. fiscal transparency and raise awareness about
unidentified debt.

• Broadening institutional coverage. Reducing the Other supportive mechanisms need to be in

impact of institutional changes on unidentified place to contain the materialization of contingent
debt requires instituting broad coverage of budget liabilities such as those arising from banking sector
aggregates and expanding the institutional coverage recapitalizations. In this case, countries should
of debt management to encompass the broader strengthen bank supervision and regulation and
public sector. This includes reflecting all borrowing establish resolution tools to minimize the fallout on
(including that by local governments and public public finances.
entities with public guarantees) in the budget
process and accounting for it in debt statistics
(Battersby and others 2022): for example, Mongolia Summary and Policy Implications
has included the liabilities of its development This chapter makes a strong case for fiscal policies
bank in its public debt reporting since 2015. to prioritize debt sustainability and rebuild fiscal
More broadly, preparing a public sector balance buffers, now rather than later. Global public debt is
sheet that covers assets and liabilities is useful in set to rise over the medium term. Even for countries
assessing debt risk. Fiscal rules with broad coverage where debt-to-GDP ratios are projected to stabilize (or
can also limit the hiding of debt (Davoodi and decline), planned fiscal adjustments are uncertain and
others 2022). debt levels are higher than before the pandemic.
• Strengthening core expenditure control functions There is no room for complacency. Risks surrounding
and compliance with fiscal rules. Strengthening debt projections are elevated and highly tilted to the
expenditure controls—improving budget upside. Global debt-at-risk is estimated to be nearly
credibility, applying effective controls to
limit overspending, and moving toward cash
27The presence of fiscal rules is not sufficient to mitigate
management—is key to avoiding accumulation
unidentified debt, and it may generate misplaced incentives to
of arrears, which are found to be key sources of circumvent the rules. Fiscal rules should be well designed to have
unidentified debt (Figure 1.14). To manage existing broad coverage to limit such circumvention.

18 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 CHAPTER 1 Putting a Lid on Public Debt

20 percentage points of GDP higher three years ahead with high risk of debt distress or acute pressures on
than currently projected. And elevated debts levels market access need more front-loaded adjustments. But
today amplify the negative effects of weaker growth or design matters.
tighter financial conditions on future debt ratios. For Key elements of the needed adjustment packages
emerging market and developing economies, high debt vary across countries. Advanced economies should
levels combined with sizable gross financing needs can adjust expenditure priorities within an overall
raise the probability of sovereign distress—more than expenditure cut, giving special attention to reforms to
two-thirds of these economies are already in or at high entitlements that entail a large and rigid share of the
risk of debt distress (IMF 2024). Although advanced budget. In advanced economies with relatively low
economies typically have higher debt tolerance, elevated taxes, revenue measures such as raising indirect taxes
debt levels and uncertainty surrounding fiscal policy in and progressively increasing income taxes, removing
systemically important countries, such as China and the tax exemptions, and rationalizing tax expenditures
United States, can generate significant spillovers in the should complement expenditure measures.
form of higher borrowing costs and debt-related risks in Emerging market and developing economies have
other economies. great potential for raising revenue and should rely
Cumulative fiscal adjustment will need to be in the more on revenue measures, including increasing
range of 3.0–4.5 percent of GDP over the medium indirect taxes, rationalizing tax exemptions, and
term, on average, to stabilize (or reduce) debt with broadening their tax bases. Measures should be framed
high probability. This is higher than the adjustment within a revenue mobilization strategy to upgrade
currently projected and by historical standards for tax systems and strengthen revenue administration
many countries and even more so in the case of capacity, possibly through leveraging the benefits
countries where debt is not projected to stabilize. of digital technology. On the expenditure side,
An adjustment of this magnitude represents about efforts to rationalize government wage bills, reduce
20 percent of total revenues in low-income developing fragmentation of social safety nets, and phase
countries and about 13 percent of total revenues in out costly fuel subsidies—preferably framed in a
other economies. Countries with long-standing fiscal comprehensive expenditure review—will generate
prudence and benign debt outlooks will not require savings that these economies can use to scale up
such a large adjustment but should continue to needed public investment and transfers to protect
preserve debt sustainability and tackle downside risks. vulnerable households.
Now is an opportune time. With major central Governments in all countries need deliberate fiscal
banks pivoting to a less restrictive stance this year and plans, framed within credible and well-communicated
economies better positioned to absorb the economic medium-term fiscal frameworks, to anchor their
effects of fiscal tightening, a decisive push toward adjustment paths and reduce uncertainty regarding
rebuilding fiscal buffers is warranted for many countries. fiscal policy. Strong independent fiscal oversight can
Delaying adjustment would be costly. With debt reinforce government credibility by helping ensure that
risks elevated in most countries and debt growing at fiscal plans are effectively implemented.
a faster pace than in the prepandemic years in large To contain debt vulnerabilities, governments should
countries (United Kingdom, United States), postponing mitigate unidentified debt arising from arrears and
adjustments would only make the required correction materialization of contingent liabilities. Strengthening
larger. Even more, waiting would also be risky. fiscal governance is key. Governments should enhance
Country experiences suggest that high debt and the their assessment and monitoring of contingent
lack of credible plans for dealing with it can trigger liabilities, including those associated with state-
adverse market reactions and leave little fiscal room for owned enterprises. More granular, transparent, and
maneuver in the face of adverse shocks. timely disclosure regarding debt, including creditor
Gradual but sustained adjustment can strike a balance composition, instruments, exposures to risks, and the
between debt sustainability risks and the strength of government perimeter included in debt reporting,
private demand by limiting the adjustment’s near-term would allow more granular assessment of fiscal risks,
impact on output and inequality. Careful design of fiscal invite closer scrutiny, and mitigate the buildup of
adjustments is critical in this regard. That said, countries unidentified debt.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 19

FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

For countries facing debt distress or unsustainable concessional financing to support low-income
debt, timely and adequate restructuring is needed, developing countries to avoid undue fiscal tightening.
alongside fiscal adjustments to restore debt Governments should also implement complementary
sustainability (Patel and Peralta-Alva 2024). Recent reforms to address debt vulnerabilities. Structural
IMF reforms to its debt and lending frameworks, reforms—such as business deregulation, enhancing social
combined with efforts by creditor committees and protection systems, and reducing labor and product
the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, have helped market distortions and barriers to trade in goods and
streamline sovereign debt restructuring and shortened services—should complement fiscal adjustments to
restructuring timelines. Further strengthening support long-term growth and bring lasting reductions
these processes is crucial to facilitate efficient debt in debt-to-GDP ratios, by increasing fiscal revenues and
restructuring (Pazarbasioglu and Saavedra 2024). lowering borrowing costs (Aligishiev and others 2023;
Greater coordinated efforts are necessary to ensure Budina and others 2023).

20 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 CHAPTER 1 Putting a Lid on Public Debt

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via Moments.” Journal of Econometrics 213 (1): 145–73. Washington, DC.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 23

ECONOMY ABBREVIATIONS

Code Name Code Name

AFG Afghanistan DOM Dominican Republic
AGO Angola DZA Algeria
ALB Albania ECU Ecuador
AND Andorra EGY Egypt
ARE United Arab Emirates ERI Eritrea
ARG Argentina ESP Spain
ARM Armenia EST Estonia
ATG Antigua and Barbuda ETH Ethiopia
AUS Australia FIN Finland
AUT Austria FJI Fiji
AZE Azerbaijan FRA France
BDI Burundi FSM Micronesia, Federated States of
BEL Belgium GAB Gabon
BEN Benin GBR United Kingdom
BFA Burkina Faso GEO Georgia
BGD Bangladesh GHA Ghana
BGR Bulgaria GIN Guinea
BHR Bahrain GMB Gambia, The
BHS Bahamas, The GNB Guinea-Bissau
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina GNQ Equatorial Guinea
BLR Belarus GRC Greece
BLZ Belize GRD Grenada
BOL Bolivia GTM Guatemala
BRA Brazil GUY Guyana
BRB Barbados HKG Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
BRN Brunei Darussalam HND Honduras
BTN Bhutan HRV Croatia
BWA Botswana HTI Haiti
CAF Central African Republic HUN Hungary
CAN Canada IDN Indonesia
CHE Switzerland IND India
CHL Chile IRL Ireland
CHN China IRN Iran
CIV Côte d’Ivoire IRQ Iraq
CMR Cameroon ISL Iceland
COD Congo, Democratic Republic of the ISR Israel
COG Congo, Republic of ITA Italy
COL Colombia JAM Jamaica
COM Comoros JOR Jordan
CPV Cabo Verde JPN Japan
CRI Costa Rica KAZ Kazakhstan
CYP Cyprus KEN Kenya
CZE Czech Republic KGZ Kyrgyz Republic
DEU Germany KHM Cambodia
DJI Djibouti KIR Kiribati
DMA Dominica KNA St. Kitts and Nevis
DNK Denmark KOR Korea

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FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Code Name Code Name

KWT Kuwait RUS Russian Federation
LAO Lao P.D.R. RWA Rwanda
LBN Lebanon SAU Saudi Arabia
LBR Liberia SDN Sudan
LBY Libya SEN Senegal
LCA St. Lucia SGP Singapore
LKA Sri Lanka SLB Solomon Islands
LSO Lesotho SLE Sierra Leone
LTU Lithuania SLV El Salvador
LUX Luxembourg SMR San Marino
LVA Latvia SOM Somalia
MAR Morocco SRB Serbia
MDA Moldova SSD South Sudan
MDG Madagascar STP São Tomé and Príncipe
MDV Maldives SUR Suriname
MEX Mexico SVK Slovak Republic
MHL Marshall Islands SVN Slovenia
MKD North Macedonia SWE Sweden
MLI Mali SWZ Eswatini
MLT Malta SYC Seychelles
MMR Myanmar SYR Syria
MNE Montenegro TCD Chad
MNG Mongolia TGO Togo
MOZ Mozambique THA Thailand
MRT Mauritania TJK Tajikistan
MUS Mauritius TKM Turkmenistan
MWI Malawi TLS Timor-Leste
MYS Malaysia TON Tonga
NAM Namibia TTO Trinidad and Tobago
NER Niger TUN Tunisia
NGA Nigeria TUR Türkiye
NIC Nicaragua TUV Tuvalu
NLD Netherlands, The TWN Taiwan Province of China
NOR Norway TZA Tanzania
NPL Nepal UGA Uganda
NRU Nauru UKR Ukraine
NZL New Zealand URY Uruguay
OMN Oman USA United States
PAK Pakistan UZB Uzbekistan
PAN Panama VCT St. Vincent and the Grenadines
PER Peru VEN Venezuela
PHL Philippines VNM Vietnam
PLW Palau VUT Vanuatu
PNG Papua New Guinea WSM Samoa
POL Poland YEM Yemen
PRT Portugal ZAF South Africa
PRY Paraguay ZMB Zambia
QAT Qatar ZWE Zimbabwe
ROU Romania

26 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

GLOSSARY

Arrears Total outstanding obligations due for Debt distress Situation in which a borrower,
payment that the government has failed to discharge. typically a country or an entity, faces significant
challenges in meeting its debt obligations, leading to
Automatic stabilizers Revenue and some
concerns about its ability to service or repay its debts
expenditure items built in the budget that adjust
without experiencing severe financial difficulties or
automatically to cyclical changes in the economy—
defaulting on its obligations.
for example, as output falls, revenue collections
decline and unemployment benefits increase, which Debt restructuring Process by which the terms
“automatically” provides demand support. and conditions of existing debt obligations are
modified or renegotiated between borrowers and
Balance sheet Statement of the values of the stock
creditors to address financial difficulties and improve
positions of assets owned and liabilities owed by a unit,
the borrower’s ability to meet its debt obligations. It
or group of units, drawn up in respect of a particular
can take various forms and may involve changes to the
point in time.
repayment schedule, interest rates, principal amount,
Bank recapitalization See Equity injections by or other terms of the debt agreement.
the public sector
Debt-servicing costs Interest payments on
Benefits/transfers Government social assistance outstanding debt.
provided in cash or in-kind.
Debt-stabilizing primary balance Level of
Common framework for debt restructuring primary balance that would stabilize the ratio of debt
Multilateral initiative launched by the International to GDP in the previous year given the values of the
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in November nominal effective interest rate and growth rate in the
2021 aiming to provide a coordinated and contemporaneous year.
comprehensive approach to address the debt
Disposable income Household disposable income
vulnerabilities and sustainability challenges faced by
is the sum of household final consumption expenditure
low-income countries (LICs).
and savings. Income includes wages and salaries, and
Contingent liabilities Obligations that are not mixed income.
explicitly recorded on government balance sheets and
Energy subsidies Reflect measures that keep
that arise only in the event of a particular discrete
prices for end users below supply costs, including
situation, such as a crisis.
transport and distribution costs, and for producers
Countercyclical fiscal policy Discretionary above this level.
changes in expenditure and tax policies to smooth
Entitlement Any spending program where
the economic cycle (by contrast with the operation of
expenditure is open-ended (usually transfer/grant
automatic stabilizers); for instance, by cutting taxes or
payments) and where recipients must be paid or
raising expenditures during an economic downturn.
given transfers/grants if they meet certain criteria.
Cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) Some common examples are found in social security
Cyclically adjusted balance excluding net interest programs, unemployment programs, and poverty
payments (interest expenditure minus interest revenue). programs.
Debt-at-risk Debt-at-risk is defined as the Equity injections by the public sector Purchase
95th percentile of the predicted quantile of the debt- of shares (ownership) of a firm by governments or
to-GDP ratio over a given forecast horizon based on a public corporations to provide it with the required
set of financial, economics, and political variables. capital to continue operations.

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FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Expenditure control functions Reflect a exogenous change in the fiscal deficit with respect to
managerial process that includes the political and their respective baselines.
administrative levels and horizontal and vertical
Fiscal restraint See Fiscal adjustment
relationships within government organizations with
the aim to contain public expenditure within the Fiscal rules Lasting constraints on fiscal policy
authorized limits and spent as intended. through predetermined numerical limits on aggregate
fiscal indicators (such as the budget balance,
Extrabudgetary funds Accounts held by
government expenditure, debt).
government bodies but not included in the
governmental budget; expenditures from such accounts Fiscal slippage A situation where a government’s
are often financed by earmarked revenues or user fees actual fiscal performance deviates from its planned or
and charges. targeted fiscal targets, usually resulting in higher-than-
expected budget deficits, increased public debt, or a
Financial conditions index Gauges how easily
combination of both.
money and credit flow through the economy via
financial markets by examining indicators such as Fiscal space The room for undertaking
borrowing costs, risk spreads, asset price volatility, discretionary fiscal policy (increasing spending or
exchange rates, inflation rates, and commodity prices. reducing taxes) relative to existing plans without
endangering market access and debt sustainability.
Financial repression Direct government
intervention that alters the equilibrium reached in the Fiscal tightening See Fiscal adjustment
financial sector with the aim of providing cheap loans General government All government units and all
to companies and governments, reducing their burden nonmarket, nonprofit institutions that are controlled
of repayments by lowering returns to savers below the and mainly financed by government units comprising
rate that otherwise would prevail. Examples include the central, state, and local governments; includes
ceilings on interest rates, directed credits to certain social security funds and does not include public
industries, or constraints on the composition of bank corporations or quasi corporations.
portfolios.
Global factors Unobserved variables that capture
Financial stress Periods of impaired financial common movements or shared dynamics across
intermediation. multiple macroeconomic or financial time series,
Fiscal adjustment Fiscal policy that aims to reflecting global and systemic influences.
reduce government deficits and government debt. It Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable Brings
usually involves a cut in government expenditures or a together debtor countries and creditors with the
rise in government taxation revenues. objective to build greater common understanding
Fiscal buffer Fiscal space created by saving among key stakeholders on debt sustainability and debt
budgetary resources and reducing public debt in good restructuring challenges, and ways to address them.
times. Government guarantees Governments can
Fiscal consolidation See Fiscal adjustment undertake payment of a debt or liabilities in the
event of a default by the primary creditor. The most
Fiscal framework The set of rules, procedures,
common type is a government-guaranteed loan, which
and institutions that guide fiscal policy.
requires government to repay any amount outstanding
Fiscal governance Includes a set of rules, on a loan in the event of default. In some contracts,
regulations, and procedures that influence the fiscal governments provide a revenue or demand guarantee.
policy preparation, approval, implementation, The budget costs related to guarantees are usually
reporting/disclosures, and monitoring. not recognized in the budget without any upfront
cost, but they create a contingent liability, with the
Fiscal multiplier Measures the short-term impact
government exposed to future calls on guarantees and
of discretionary fiscal policy on output. Usually
fiscal risks.
defined as the ratio of a change in output to an

28 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 Glossary

Gross debt All liabilities that require future (GFSM 2001). Does not include policy lending. For
payment of interest and/or principal by the debtor to some countries, the overall balance is still based on
the creditor. This includes debt liabilities in the form the GFSM 1986, which defines it as total revenue and
of special drawing rights, currency, and deposits; debt grants minus total expenditure and net lending.
securities; loans; insurance, pension, and standardized
Primary balance Overall balance excluding net
guarantee programs; and other accounts payable.
interest payments (interest expenditure minus interest
(See the IMF’s 2001 Government Finance Statistics
revenue).
Manual and Public Sector Debt Statistics Manual.)
The term “public debt” is used in the Fiscal Monitor, Progressive (or regressive) taxes Taxes that feature
for simplicity, as synonymous with gross debt of an average tax rate that rises (or falls) with income.
the general government, unless specified otherwise. Public debt See Gross debt
(Strictly speaking, public debt refers to the debt of the
public sector as a whole, which includes financial and Public debt management It is the process of
nonfinancial public enterprises and the central bank.) establishing and executing a strategy for managing
the government’s debt in order to raise the required
Gross financing needs Overall new borrowing amount of funding to achieve its risk and cost
requirement plus debt maturing during the year. objectives, and to meet any other sovereign debt
Indirect taxes Taxes levied on goods and services, management goals the government may have set, such
not individual payers, and collected by the retailer as developing and maintaining an efficient market for
or manufacturer. Sales and value-added taxes are two government securities.
examples of indirect taxes. Public sector Includes all resident institutional
Inflation A general increase in the price level of units that are deemed to be controlled by the
goods and services in the economy leading to a fall in government. It includes general government and
the purchasing value of money. resident public corporations.

Interest rate-at-risk The 95th percentile of the Risk premium It refers to the extra expected
interest rate probability distribution function. return on an asset that investors demand in exchange
for accepting the higher risk associated with the asset.
Net debt Gross debt minus financial assets
corresponding to debt instruments. These financial Social protection The social protection system
assets are monetary gold and special drawing rights; consists of policies designed to reduce individuals’
currency and deposits; debt securities; loans, insurance, exposures to risks and vulnerabilities, and to enhance
pensions, and standardized guarantee programs; and their capacity to manage negative shocks such as
other accounts receivable. In some countries, the unemployment, sickness, poverty, disability, and old
reported net debt can deviate from this definition age. It has three broad categories: (1) social safety net
based on available information and national fiscal programs (noncontributory transfer programs to ensure
accounting practices. a minimum level of economic wellbeing), (2) social
insurance programs (contributory interventions to
Nonbank investors Nonbanks include insurance
help people better manage risks), and (3) labor market
companies; pension funds; and other financial
programs to insure individuals against unemployment
intermediaries such as asset managers (hedge funds,
risks and improve job search prospects.
mutual funds, and other investment funds), finance
companies, and investment banks (broker-dealers). Social safety nets Noncontributory transfer
programs financed by general government revenue.
Output gap Deviation of actual from potential
GDP, in percent of potential GDP. Sovereign bond spreads Difference in yields
between the government bonds of different countries,
Overall fiscal balance (also “headline fiscal
typically measured against a benchmark such as the
balance”) Net lending and borrowing, defined as the
bonds of Germany and the United States. They
difference between revenue and total expenditure, using
represent the additional yield investors demand for
the IMF’s 2001 Government Finance Statistics Manual

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 29

FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

holding the bonds of a particular country compared to in 2015 covering global warming, poverty, health,
a safer or more stable reference bond. education, gender equality, water, sanitation, energy,
urbanization, environment, and social justice. Each
Sovereign bond yields An interest rate that a
goal has a set of targets to achieve, and in total there
national government pays to service its outstanding
are 169 targets.
bonds.
Unidentified debt The change in debt that is
State-owned enterprise (SOE) recapitalization
not explained by interest rate and growth differentials,
See Equity injections by the public sector
primary balance, or movements of exchange rates. It is
Stock-flow adjustments Change in the gross the components of stock-flow adjustments that do not
debt explained by factors other than the overall fiscal reflect valuation changes.
balance (for example, valuation changes).
Valuation effects Reflect changes in net external
Sustainable Development Goals A collection of assets of a country arising from movements in
17 goals set by the United Nations General Assembly exchange rates or asset returns.

30 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

This appendix comprises four sections. “Data and group based on the size of their GDP in current US
Conventions” describes the data and conventions dollars. Data for the full list of economies can be found
used to calculate economy group composites. “Fiscal at [Link]
Policy Assumptions” summarizes the country-specific FM. The seven largest advanced economies as measured
assumptions underlying the estimates and projections by GDP (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
for 2024–29. “Definition and Coverage of Fiscal Data” United Kingdom, the United States) constitute the
summarizes the classification of countries in the various subgroup of major advanced economies, often referred
groups presented in the Fiscal Monitor and details the to as the Group of Seven. The members of the euro area
coverage and accounting practices underlying each are also distinguished as a subgroup. Composite data
country’s Fiscal Monitor data. Statistical tables on key shown in the tables for the euro area cover the current
fiscal variables complete the appendix. Data in these members for all years, even though membership has
tables have been compiled on the basis of information increased over time. Data for most European Union
available through October 16, 2024. (EU) member countries have been revised following
their adoption of the updated European System
of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010).
Data and Conventions Low-income developing countries are countries that
Country-specific data and projections for key have per capita income levels below a certain threshold
fiscal variables are based on the October 2024 World (set at $2,700, as of 2016, as measured by the World
Economic Outlook database, unless indicated otherwise, Bank Atlas method), structural features consistent with
and compiled by IMF staff. Historical data and limited development and structural transformation, and
projections are based on the information IMF country external financial relationships insufficiently open for the
desk officers gather in the context of their missions and countries to be considered emerging market economies.
through their ongoing analysis of the evolving situation Emerging market and middle-income economies
in each country; data are updated continually as more include those not classified as advanced economies
information becomes available. Structural breaks in or low-income developing countries. See Table A,
data may be adjusted to produce smooth series through “Economy Groupings,” for more details.
splicing and other techniques. IMF staff estimates serve Most fiscal data for advanced economies refer to
as proxies when complete information is unavailable. the general government, whereas data for emerging
As a result, Fiscal Monitor data may differ from official market and developing economies often refer to only
data in other sources, including the IMF’s International the central government or the budgetary central
Financial Statistics and the Government Finance Statistics government (for specific details, see Tables B–D). All
Manual (GFSM 2014). fiscal data refer to calendar years, except in the cases
Sources for fiscal data and projections not covered of The Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan,
by the World Economic Outlook database are listed in Botswana, Dominica, Egypt, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji,
the respective tables and figures. Haiti, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Country classification in the Fiscal Monitor divides the India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Lesotho,
world into three major groups: 41 advanced economies, Malawi, the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia,
96 emerging market and middle-income economies, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Pakistan, Palau,
and 58 low-income developing countries. Fiscal Monitor Puerto Rico, Rwanda, Samoa, Singapore, St. Lucia,
tables display 37 advanced economies, 41 emerging Thailand, Tonga, and Trinidad and Tobago, for which
market and middle-income economies, and 39 low- data refer to the fiscal year. For economies whose
income developing countries. The countries in the tables fiscal years end before June 30, data are recorded in
generally represent the largest countries within each the previous calendar year. For economies whose fiscal

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 31

FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

years end on or after June 30, data are recorded in the adjusted to exclude the unfunded pension liabilities of
current calendar year. government employees’ defined-benefit pension plans.
Composite data for country groups are weighted Bahrain: Fiscal balance estimates are based on total
averages of individual-country data, unless specified financing flows (including changes in central
otherwise. Data are weighted by annual nominal GDP bank claims on the government). The estimates
converted to US dollars at average market exchange are usually lower than the balance that is derived
rates as a share of the group GDP. by subtracting budget expenditures from budget
For the purpose of data reporting in the Fiscal revenues. Data are on a calendar year basis.
Monitor, the Group of Twenty member aggregate refers Bangladesh: Data are on a fiscal year basis.
to the 19 country members and does not include the Brazil: The Brazil team is transitioning to GFSM
European Union. 2014, with adjustments for the period 2001–09.
In most advanced economies, and in some large Municipalities’ primary balances follow below-the-
emerging market and middle-income economies, fiscal line borrowing requirements from 2001 to 2022.
data follow the GFSM 2014 or are produced using a Accrual data for non-interest revenues are not
national accounts methodology that follows the 2008 available. Gross public debt includes the Treasury
System of National Accounts (SNA) or ESA 2010, bills on the central bank’s balance sheet, including
both broadly aligned with the GFSM 2014. Most those not used under repurchase agreements. Net
other countries follow the GFSM 2001, but some public debt consolidates nonfinancial public sector
countries, including a significant proportion of low- and central bank debt. The authorities’ definition of
income developing countries, have fiscal data based on general government gross debt excludes government
the GFSM 1986. The overall fiscal balance refers to securities held by the central bank, except the stock
net lending and borrowing by the general government. of Treasury securities the central bank uses for
In some cases, however, the overall balance refers to monetary policy (those pledged as security in reverse
total revenue and grants minus total expenditure and repurchase agreement operations). According to
net lending. the authorities’ definition, gross debt amounted to
The fiscal gross and net debt data reported in the 74.4 percent of GDP at the end of 2023.
Fiscal Monitor are drawn from official data sources and Canada: For cross-economy comparability, gross
IMF staff estimates. Whereas attempts are made to and net debt levels reported by national statistical
align gross and net debt data with the definitions in the agencies for economies that have adopted the
GFSM, data limitations or specific country circumstances 2008 SNA (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong Special
can cause these data to deviate from the formal Administrative Region, the United States) are
definitions. Although every effort is made to ensure the adjusted to exclude unfunded pension liabilities
debt data are relevant and internationally comparable, of government employees’ defined-benefit pension
differences in both sectoral and instrument coverage plans. Canada’s net debt corresponds to net financial
mean that the data are not universally comparable. As liabilities as reported by Statistics Canada and
more information becomes available, changes in either includes equity and investment fund shares, which
data sources or instrument coverage can give rise to data Canada has built up substantially. Statistics Canada
revisions that are sometimes substantial. has made a recent methodological change to value
As used in the Fiscal Monitor, the term “country” assets at market value instead of book value, which
does not always refer to a territorial entity that is a has decreased net debt.
state as understood by international law and practice. Chile: Cyclically adjusted balances refer to the
As used here, “country” also covers some territorial structural balance, which includes adjustments for
entities that are not states but whose statistical data are output and commodity price developments.
maintained separately and independently. China: Deficit and public debt numbers cover a
narrower perimeter of the general government
Australia: For cross-economy comparability, gross than IMF staff estimates in China Article IV
and net debt levels reported by national statistical reports (see IMF 2024 Article IV Staff Report for a
agencies for economies that have adopted the reconciliation of the two estimates). Public debt data
2008 SNA (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong Special include central government debt as reported by the
Administrative Region, the United States) are Ministry of Finance, explicit local government debt,

32 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

and shares of contingent liabilities the government Ireland: For 2015, if the conversion of the
may incur, based on estimates from the National government’s remaining preference shares to
Audit Office estimate. IMF staff estimates exclude ordinary shares in one bank is excluded, then the
central government debt issued for China Railway. fiscal balance is −1.1 percent of GDP. Cyclically
Relative to the authorities’ definition, consolidated adjusted balances reported in Tables A3 and A4
general government net borrowing excludes transfers exclude financial sector support measures. Ireland’s
to and from stabilization funds but includes state- 2015 national accounts were revised as a result
administered funds, state-owned enterprise funds, of restructuring and relocation of multinational
and social security contributions and expenses. companies, which resulted in a level shift of nominal
Deficit numbers do not include some expenditure and real GDP. For more information, see “National
items, mostly infrastructure investment financed off Income and Expenditure Annual Results: 2015,”
budget through local government financing vehicles [Link]
and other off-budget funds. Fiscal balances are not nationalincomeandexpenditureannualresults2015/.
consistent with reported debt, because no time series Japan: Gross debt is on an unconsolidated basis.
of data in line with the National Audit Office debt Mexico: General government refers to the central
definition is published officially. government, social security funds, public enterprises,
Colombia: Gross public debt refers to the combined development banks, the national insurance
public sector, including Ecopetrol and excluding corporation, and the National Infrastructure Fund
Banco de la República’s outstanding external debt. but excludes subnational governments.
Dominican Republic: The fiscal series have the Myanmar: Data are on a fiscal year basis.
following coverage: the public debt, debt service, Nepal: Data are on a fiscal year basis.
and cyclically adjusted or structural balances are Norway: Cyclically adjusted balances correspond to
for the consolidated public sector (which includes the cyclically adjusted non-oil overall or primary
the central government, the rest of the nonfinancial balance. These variables are a percentage of non-oil
public sector, and the central bank). The remaining potential GDP.
fiscal series are for the central government. Pakistan: Data are on a fiscal year basis.
Egypt: Data are on a fiscal year basis. Peru: Cyclically adjusted balances include adjustments
Ethiopia: Data are on a fiscal year basis. Gross debt for commodity price developments.
refers to the nonfinancial public sector, excluding Singapore: Data are on a fiscal year basis.
Ethiopian Airlines. Spain: Overall and primary balances include financial
Fiji: Data are on a fiscal year basis. sector support measures estimated to be 0.3 percent
Greece: General government gross debt follows the of GDP for 2013, 0.1 percent of GDP for 2014,
GFSM 2014 definition and includes the stock of 0.1 percent of GDP for 2015, and 0.2 percent of
deferred interest. GDP for 2016.
Haiti: Data are on a fiscal year basis. Sweden: Cyclically adjusted balances account for
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Data are output gap.
on a fiscal year basis. Cyclically adjusted balances Switzerland: Data submissions at the cantonal and
include adjustments for land revenue and investment commune levels may be subject to sizable revisions.
income. For cross-economy comparability, gross Cyclically adjusted balances include adjustments
and net debt levels reported by national statistical for extraordinary operations related to the banking
agencies for economies that have adopted the sector.
2008 SNA (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong Special Thailand: Data are on a fiscal year basis.
Administrative Region, the United States) are Türkiye: Projections in the Fiscal Monitor are based
adjusted to exclude the unfunded pension liabilities of on the IMF-defined fiscal balance, which excludes
government employees’ defined-benefit pension plans. some revenue and expenditure items included in the
Iceland: Gross debt excludes insurance technical authorities’ headline balance.
reserves (including pension liabilities) and other Turkmenistan: IMF staff estimates and projections of
accounts payable. the fiscal balance exclude receipts from domestic
India: Data are on a fiscal year basis. bond issuances as well as privatization operations
Iran, Islamic Republic of: Data are on a fiscal year basis. in line with GFSM 2014. The authorities’ official

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 33

FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

estimates, which are compiled using domestic Venezuela: Fiscal accounts include the budgetary
statistical methodologies, include bond issuance central government, social security funds, FOGADE
and privatization proceeds as part of government (insurance deposit institution), and a sample of public
revenues. enterprises, including Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.
United States: For cross-economy comparability, (PDVSA). Data for 2018–22 are IMF staff estimates.
expenditures and fiscal balances are adjusted to
exclude the imputed interest on unfunded pension
liabilities and the imputed compensation of Fiscal Policy Assumptions
employees, which are counted as expenditures under Historical data and projections of key fiscal
the 2008 SNA adopted by the United States. Data aggregates are in line with those of the October 2024
for the United States may thus differ from data World Economic Outlook, unless noted otherwise. For
published by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. underlying assumptions other than on fiscal policy, see
In addition, gross and net debt levels reported by the October 2024 World Economic Outlook.
the Bureau of Economic Analysis and national Short-term fiscal policy assumptions are based
statistical agencies for other economies that have on officially announced budgets, adjusted for
adopted the 2008 SNA (Australia, Canada, Hong differences between the national authorities and
Kong Special Administrative Region) are adjusted IMF staff regarding macroeconomic assumptions
to exclude the unfunded pension liabilities of and projected fiscal outturns. Medium-term fiscal
government employees’ defined-benefit pension projections incorporate policy measures judged likely
plans. to be implemented. When IMF staff has insufficient
Uruguay: Starting in October 2018, Uruguay’s public information to assess the authorities’ budget
pension system has been receiving transfers in the intentions and prospects for policy implementation,
context of a new law that compensates persons an unchanged structural primary balance is assumed,
affected by the creation of the mixed pension system. unless indicated otherwise.
These funds are recorded as revenues, consistent with
the IMF’s methodology. Therefore, data for 2018–22 Afghanistan: Data for 2021–23 are reported for selected
are affected by these transfers, which amounted to indicators, with estimates for fiscal data. Estimates
1.2 percent of GDP in 2018, 1.0 percent of GDP and projections for 2024–25 are omitted because
in 2019, 0.6 percent of GDP in 2020, 0.3 percent of an unusually high degree of uncertainty given
of GDP in 2021, 0.1 percent of GDP in 2022, and that the IMF has paused its engagement with
0 percent thereafter. See IMF Country Report 19/64 the country owing to a lack of clarity within the
for further details. The disclaimer about the public international community regarding the recognition of
pension system applies only to the revenues and net a government in Afghanistan.
lending/borrowing series. The coverage of the fiscal Algeria: Projections for 2024–29 are based on IMF
data for Uruguay was changed from consolidated staff estimates, 2024 intrayear budget outturns, and
public sector to nonfinancial public sector with the the authorities’ 2024 budget law and medium-term
October 2019 World Economic Outlook. In Uruguay, budget plans.
nonfinancial public sector coverage includes central Argentina: Fiscal projections are based on the
government, local government, social security available information regarding budget outturns,
funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and Banco budget plans, and IMF-supported program targets
de Seguros del Estado. Historical data were also for the federal government; on fiscal measures
revised accordingly. Under this narrower fiscal announced by the authorities; and on IMF staff ’s
perimeter—which excludes the central bank—assets macroeconomic projections.
and liabilities held by the nonfinancial public Australia: Fiscal projections are based on data from
sector where the counterpart is the central bank the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the fiscal
are not netted out in debt figures. In this context, year (FY)2024/25 budgets published by the
capitalization bonds issued in the past by the Commonwealth Government and the respective
government to the central bank are now part of the state/territory governments, and IMF staff ’s
nonfinancial public sector debt. estimates and projections.

34 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Austria: IMF staff fiscal projections are based on the as IMF staff ’s macroeconomic framework. Structural
authorities’ latest medium-term plans, adjusted to balances are net of temporary fluctuations in some
reflect the IMF staff ’s macroeconomic assumptions revenues and one-offs. COVID-19–related one-offs
and assuming some moderate expenditure restraint are, however, included.
over the medium term in line with historical Denmark: Estimates for the current year are aligned
patterns. with the latest official budget numbers, adjusted
Bahrain: The projections are based on the current where appropriate for IMF staff ’s macroeconomic
policy mix, with the revenue projections additionally assumptions. Beyond the current year, the
incorporating the assumption that the corporate projections incorporate key features of the medium-
income tax is adopted next year, as currently term fiscal plan as embodied in the authorities’ latest
planned. budget. Structural balances are net of temporary
Belgium: Projections are based on the 2024 Budgetary fluctuations in some revenues (for example, North
Plan, and other available information on the Sea revenue, pension yield tax revenue) and one-
authorities’ fiscal plans, with adjustments for the offs (COVID-19–related one-offs are, however,
IMF staff ’s assumptions. included).
Brazil: Fiscal projections are based on the authorities’ Egypt: Fiscal projections are mainly based on
budget proposal, fiscal measures announced by the budget sector operations. Projections are based
authorities, and staff estimates and assumptions. on the budget for FY 2024/25 and the IMF’s
Cambodia: Historical fiscal and monetary data are macroeconomic outlook.
from the Cambodia authorities. Projections are Estonia: The forecast incorporates the authorities’
based on IMF staff ’s assumptions given discussions budget for 2024, adopted tax changes, recent
with the authorities. developments, and staff ’s macroeconomic
Canada: Projections use the baseline forecasts from assumptions.
the Government of Canada’s Budget 2024, the Finland: Fiscal projections are based on the
one-time disbursement for the compensation authorities’ projections which reflect their
and agreement-in-principle for long-term reform latest medium-term fiscal plan, adjusting where
of First Nations Child and Family Services and appropriate for IMF staff ’s macroeconomic and
Jordan’s Principle, and the latest provincial budget other assumptions.
updates. France: Projections for 2024 onward are based on
Chile: Fiscal projections are based on the authorities’ the 2018–24 budget laws, PSTAB 2024–27,
budget projections, adjusted to reflect IMF staff ’s draft medium-term programming bill, and other
macroeconomic projections. available information on the authorities’ fiscal plans,
China: IMF staff ’s fiscal projections incorporate the adjusted for differences in revenue projections
2024 budget as well as estimates of off-budget and assumptions on macroeconomic and financial
financing. variables.
Colombia: Projections are based on the authorities’ Germany: Projections are based on the latest approved
policies and projections reflected in the 2024 federal budget, draft federal budget (if applicable),
Financing Plan, the 2024–2035 Medium-Term EU Stability Programme, and medium-term budget
Fiscal Framework, and draft 2025 Budget Law, plan. They also take into account data updates
adjusted to reflect IMF staff ’s macroeconomic from the federal statistical office (Destatis) and the
assumptions. Ministry of Finance.
Croatia: Projections are based on macro framework Ghana: Government debt and interest rate projections
and authorities’ medium-term fiscal guidelines. are based on a pre-debt restructuring scenario.
Cyprus: Projections are based on staff ’s assessment of Greece: Data since 2010 reflect adjustments in line
authorities’ budget plans and staff ’s macroeconomic with the primary balance definition under the
assumptions. enhanced surveillance framework for Greece.
Czech Republic: The fiscal projections are based on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Projections
authorities’ latest-available convergence program, are based on the authorities’ medium-term fiscal
budget and medium-term fiscal framework, as well projections for expenditures.

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FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Hungary: Fiscal projections include IMF staff ’s Korea: The forecast incorporates authorities’ annual
projections for the macroeconomic framework budget, any supplementary budget, any proposed
and fiscal policy plans announced in the 2024 new budget, the medium-term fiscal plan, and IMF
budgets. staff estimations.
India: Projections are based on available information Lebanon: Fiscal and national accounts data for
on the authorities’ fiscal plans, with adjustments 2022–23, as well as debt data for 2023, are IMF
for IMF staff ’s assumptions. Subnational data are staff estimates and not provided by the national
incorporated with a lag of up to one year; general authorities. Estimates and projections for 2024–29
government data are thus finalized well after central have been omitted due to an unusually high degree
government data. IMF and Indian presentations of uncertainty.
differ, particularly regarding disinvestment and Libya: IMF staff ’s judgments are based on 2023 fiscal
license-auction proceeds, net versus gross recording accounts.
of revenues in certain minor categories, and some Malaysia: Fiscal projections are based on budget
public sector lending. Starting with FY2020/21 numbers, discussion with the authorities, and IMF
data, expenditure also includes the off-budget staff estimates.
component of food subsidies, consistent with the Mali: Fiscal projections are based on approved budget
revised treatment of food subsidies in the budget. and IMF staff estimates for past and current year,
IMF staff adjust expenditure to take out payments authorities’ medium-term fiscal framework, and
for previous years’ food subsidies, which are IMF staff estimates for outer years.
included as expenditure in budget estimates for Malta: Projections are based on the authorities’ latest
FY2020/21. budget document, adjusted for the IMF staff ’s
Indonesia: The IMF staff’s projections are based on macroeconomic and other assumptions.
the latest budget, extrapolating using projected Mexico: The 2020 public sector borrowing
nominal GDP (and its components as needed) with requirements estimated by the IMF staff adjust
application of judgment to reflect the authorities’ for some statistical discrepancies between
spending and revenue policies over the medium term. above-the-line and below-the-line numbers.
Ireland: Fiscal projections are based on the country’s Fiscal projections for 2024 are informed by the
Budget 2024. estimates in Pre-Criterios 2025; projections for
Israel: Projections are subject to significant risks 2024 onward assume continued compliance with
given the unpredictability of the impact of the rules established in the Federal Budget and Fiscal
conflict in the region. Fiscal projections are based Responsibility Law.
on the assumption that in the short term, higher Moldova: Fiscal projections are based on various bases
government spending is used to support the and growth rates for GDP, consumption, imports,
economy and cover military costs, but after 2024, wages, and energy prices, and on demographic
fiscal measures are expected to help contain the changes.
fiscal deficit. The general government balance is Myanmar: Fiscal projections are made based on budget
projected based on the 2024 state budget and partial numbers and changed macro environment.
information on the other components. The Netherlands: Fiscal projections for 2024–29 are
Italy: The IMF staff’s estimates and projections based on the IMF staff ’s forecast framework and are
are informed by the fiscal plans included in the also informed by the authorities’ 2024 budget, the
government’s 2024 Economic and Financial Document 2024 Spring Memorandum, the new government’s
(DEF). All historical national accounts data and coalition agreement, and Bureau for Economic
projections reflect the official published series, updated Policy Analysis projections.
as of October 4, 2024. New Zealand: Fiscal projections are based on the
Japan: The projections reflect fiscal measures FY2023/24 Half-Year Economic and Fiscal
the government has already announced, with Update.
adjustments for IMF staff ’s assumptions. Nicaragua: Fiscal projections use the latest forecast
Kazakhstan: Fiscal projections are based on the budget from Nicaragua’s Finance Ministry and IMF staff ’s
law and IMF staff ’s projections. assumptions.

36 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Niger: Fiscal data contain outturns as of the end of government policies as outlined in the 2024 budget
2022. Fiscal sector projections are based on the and recent official announcements. Export oil
2023 and 2024 budget. revenues are based on World Economic Outlook
Nigeria: Fiscal projections are based on macro database baseline oil price assumptions and IMF
framework, reflecting the authorities’ recent reforms, staff ’s understanding of oil production adjustments
as well as the 2023 budget. under the OPEC+ (Organization of the Petroleum
Norway: The fiscal projections are based on the 2024 Exporting Countries, including Russia and other
budget and subsequent ad hoc updates. non-OPEC oil exporters) agreement and those
Philippines: Revenue projections reflect IMF staff ’s unilaterally announced by Saudi Arabia.
macroeconomic assumptions and incorporate the Singapore: FY2023 projections are based on revised
updated data. Expenditure projections are based on figures based on budget execution through the end
budgeted figures, institutional arrangements, and of 2023. FY2024 projections are based on the initial
current data in each year. budget of February 16, 2024. Staff projections
Poland: Data are based on ESA 95 for 2004 and prior. include (1) an increase in the Goods and Services
Data is based on ESA 2010 beginning in 2005 Tax from 8 percent to 9 percent on January 1, 2024;
(accrual basis). Projections begin in 2024, based on and (2) an increase of the carbon tax from S$5 a ton
the 2024 budgets and subsequently announced fiscal to S$25 a ton in 2024 and 2025 and S$45 a ton in
measures. 2026 and 2027.
Portugal: The projections for the current year are Slovak Republic: The fiscal projection is based on the
based on the authorities’ approved budget, adjusted 2023 Stability Program and takes into consideration
to reflect IMF staff ’s macroeconomic forecast. available data for 2023.
Projections thereafter are based on the assumption South Africa: Fiscal assumptions are informed by the
of unchanged policies. Projections for 2024 reflect 2024 budget. Nontax revenue excludes transactions
information available in the 2024 budget proposal. in financial assets and liabilities, as they involve
Romania: Medium-term projections include primarily revenues associated with the realized
assumptions about gradual implementation of exchange rate valuation gains from the holding
measures and disbursement in the framework of the of foreign currency deposits, sale of assets, and
European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility. conceptually similar items. The Eskom debt relief is
Russian Federation: The fiscal rule was suspended in treated as capital transfer above-the-line item.
March 2022 by the government in response to the Spain: Fiscal numbers for 2023 assume energy support
sanctions imposed after the invasion of Ukraine, measures amounting to 1 percent of GDP, which are
allowing for windfall oil and gas revenues above phased out throughout 2024. Forecasts reflect grants
benchmark to be used to finance a larger deficit in and loans under the EU Recovery and Resilience
2022 as well as savings accumulated in the National Facility disbursed over 2023–27.
Welfare Fund. The 2023–25 budget was based on Sri Lanka: Fiscal projections are based on IMF staff ’s
a modified rule with a two-year transition period judgment.
which set the benchmark oil and gas revenues Sudan: Projections for Sudan assume that the conflict
fixed in rubles at Rub 8 trillion, compared with a will end by the end of 2024, and re-engagement and
fixed benchmark oil price at $40 a barrel under the reconstruction commence shortly thereafter.
2019 fiscal rule. However, in late September 2023, Sweden: Fiscal estimates are based on the authorities’
the Ministry of Finance proposed reverting to the budget projections, adjusted to reflect IMF’s staff’s
earlier version of the fiscal rule from 2024 onward macroeconomic forecasts. Cyclical adjustment on the
to determine the price of oil and gas revenues but fiscal accounts is calculated by accounting for output
set the benchmark oil price at $60 a barrel. The gap.
new rule allows for higher oil and gas revenues to Switzerland: The projections assume that fiscal policy
be spent, but it simultaneously targets a smaller is adjusted as necessary to keep fiscal balances in line
primary structural deficit. with the requirements of Switzerland’s fiscal rules.
Saudi Arabia: IMF staff ’s baseline fiscal projections Türkiye: The basis for the projections is the IMF-
are based primarily on the understanding of defined fiscal balance, which excludes some revenue

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 37

FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

and expenditure items that are included in the Uruguay: Historical fiscal and monetary data are from
authorities’ headline balance. the Uruguayan authorities. Projections are based on
United Kingdom: Fiscal projections are based on the the authorities’ policies and projections, adjusted to
March 2024 forecast from the Office for Budget reflect IMF staff ’s macroeconomic assumptions and
Responsibility and the January 2024 release on assessment of policy plans.
public sector finances from the Office for National Venezuela: Projections for 2024–29 are omitted due to
Statistics. IMF staff ’s projections take the Office for an unusual high degree of uncertainty.
Budget Responsibility forecast as a reference and Vietnam: Projections starting in 2024 use authorities’
overlay adjustments (for differences in assumptions) 2024 budget numbers and IMF staff’s own projections.
to both revenues and expenditures. IMF staff ’s Yemen: Hydrocarbon revenue projections are based on
forecasts do not necessarily assume that the fiscal World Economic Outlook database assumptions
rules announced on November 17, 2022, will be for hydrocarbon prices, authorities’ projections for
met at the end of the forecast period. Data are oil and gas production, and staff estimates. Non-
presented on a calendar year basis. hydrocarbon revenues reflect authorities’ projection
United States: Fiscal projections are based on the June and staff estimates. Over the medium term, we
2024 Congressional Budget Office baseline and the assume conflict resolution, a recovery in economic
latest treasury monthly statement, adjusted for the activity, and additional expenditures associated with
IMF staff ’s policy and macroeconomic assumptions. reconstruction costs.
Projections incorporate the effects of the Fiscal Zambia: Government net and gross debt projections
Responsibility Act. for 2024–29 are omitted due to debt restructuring.

38 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Definition and Coverage of Fiscal Data

Table A. Economy Groupings
The following groupings of economies are used in the Fiscal Monitor. Data for all the economies can be found
here: [Link]
Emerging Market Low-Income Emerging
Advanced G20 Advanced G20
and Middle-Income Developing G7 Countries G20
Economies Countries1 Countries1
Economies Countries Countries
Andorra Albania Afghanistan Canada Argentina Australia Argentina
Australia Algeria Bangladesh France Australia Canada Brazil
Austria Angola Benin Germany Brazil France China
Belgium Antigua and Barbuda Bhutan Italy Canada Germany India
Canada Argentina Burkina Faso Japan China Italy Indonesia
Croatia Armenia Burundi United France Japan Mexico
Cyprus Aruba Cambodia Kingdom Germany Korea Russian
Czech Republic Azerbaijan Cameroon United States India United Federation
Denmark Bahamas, The Central African Indonesia Kingdom Saudi Arabia
Estonia Bahrain Republic Italy United States South Africa
Finland Barbados Chad Japan Türkiye
France Belarus Comoros Korea
Germany Belize Congo, Democratic Mexico
Greece Bolivia Republic of the Russian
Hong Kong SAR Bosnia and Congo, Republic of Federation
Iceland Herzegovina Côte d’Ivoire Saudi Arabia
Ireland Botswana Djibouti South Africa
Israel Brazil Eritrea Türkiye
Italy Brunei Darussalam Ethiopia United
Japan Bulgaria Gambia, The Kingdom
Korea Cabo Verde Ghana United States
Latvia Chile Guinea
Lithuania China Guinea-Bissau
Luxembourg Colombia Haiti
Macao SAR Costa Rica Honduras
Malta Dominica Kenya
Netherlands, The Dominican Republic Kiribati
New Zealand Ecuador Kyrgyz Republic
Norway Egypt Lao P.D.R.
Portugal El Salvador Lesotho
Puerto Rico Equatorial Guinea Liberia
San Marino Eswatini Madagascar
Singapore Fiji Malawi
Slovak Republic Gabon Mali
Slovenia Georgia Mauritania
Spain Grenada Moldova
Sweden Guatemala Mozambique
Switzerland Guyana Myanmar
Taiwan Province Hungary Nepal
of China India Nicaragua
United Kingdom Indonesia Niger
United States Iran Nigeria
Iraq Papua New Guinea
Jamaica Rwanda
Jordan São Tomé and
Kazakhstan Príncipe
Kosovo Senegal
Kuwait Sierra Leone
Lebanon Solomon Islands
Libya South Sudan
Malaysia Somalia
Maldives Sudan
Marshall Islands Tajikistan

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 39

FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A. Economy Groupings (continued)

Emerging Market Low-Income Emerging
Advanced G20 Advanced G20
and Middle-Income Developing G7 Countries G20
Economies Countries1 Countries1
Economies Countries Countries
Mauritius Tanzania
Mexico Timor-Leste
Micronesia Togo
Mongolia Uganda
Montenegro Uzbekistan
Morocco Yemen
Namibia Zambia
Nauru Zimbabwe
North Macedonia
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Samoa
Saudi Arabia
Serbia
Seychelles
South Africa
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Suriname
Thailand
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Türkiye
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
Uruguay
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
West Bank and Gaza
Note: G7 = Group of Seven; G20 = Group of Twenty.
1 Does not include European Union aggregate.

40 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A. Economy Groupings (continued)

Emerging Market
Emerging Market Emerging Market Emerging Market Emerging Market
and Middle-Income
Euro Area and Middle-Income and Middle-Income and Middle-Income and Middle-Income
Middle East, North
Asia Europe Latin America Africa
Africa, and Pakistan
Austria Brunei Darussalam Albania Antigua and Barbuda Algeria Angola
Belgium China Azerbaijan Argentina Bahrain South Africa
Croatia Fiji Belarus Aruba Egypt
Cyprus India Bosnia and Bahamas, The Iran
Estonia Indonesia Herzegovina Barbados Iraq
Finland Malaysia Bulgaria Belize Jordan
France Maldives Hungary Bolivia Kuwait
Germany Marshall Islands Kazakhstan Brazil Lebanon
Greece Micronesia Kosovo Chile Libya
Ireland Mongolia Montenegro Colombia Morocco
Italy Nauru North Macedonia Costa Rica Oman
Latvia Palau Poland Dominica Pakistan
Lithuania Philippines Romania Dominican Republic Qatar
Luxembourg Samoa Russia Ecuador Saudi Arabia
Malta Sri Lanka Serbia El Salvador Tunisia
Netherlands Thailand Türkiye Grenada United Arab Emirates
Portugal Tonga Ukraine Guatemala
Slovak Republic Tuvalu Guyana
Slovenia Vanuatu Jamaica
Spain Vietnam Mexico
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 41

FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A. Economy Groupings (concluded)

Low-Income Low-Income
Low-Income Low-Income Low-Income
Developing Latin Developing Oil Producers
Developing Asia Developing Others Oil Producers
America Sub-Saharan Africa
Bangladesh Haiti Benin Afghanistan Chad Algeria
Bhutan Honduras Burkina Faso Djibouti Congo, Republic of Angola
Cambodia Nicaragua Burundi Kyrgyz Republic Nigeria Azerbaijan
Kiribati Cameroon Mauritania Timor-Leste Bahrain
Lao P.D.R. Central African Republic Moldova Yemen Brunei Darussalam
Myanmar Chad Somalia Chad
Nepal Comoros Sudan Canada
Papua New Guinea Congo, Democratic Tajikistan Congo, Republic of
Solomon Islands Republic of the Uzbekistan Ecuador
Timor-Leste Congo, Republic of Yemen Equatorial Guinea
Côte d’Ivoire Gabon
Eritrea Guyana
Ethiopia Iran
Gambia, The Iraq
Ghana Kazakhstan
Guinea Kuwait
Guinea-Bissau Libya
Kenya Nigeria
Lesotho Norway
Liberia Oman
Madagascar Qatar
Malawi Russian Federation
Mali Saudi Arabia
Mozambique Timor-Leste
Niger Trinidad and Tobago
Nigeria Turkmenistan
Rwanda United Arab Emirates
São Tomé and Príncipe Venezuela
Senegal Yemen
Sierra Leone
South Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

42 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 Table B. Advanced Economies: Definition and Coverage of Fiscal Monitor Data
Overall Fiscal Balance1 Cyclically Adjusted Balance Gross Debt
Coverage Accounting Coverage Accounting Coverage Valuation of
Aggregate Subsectors Practice Aggregate Subsectors Practice Aggregate Subsectors Debt2
Andorra GG CG,LG,SS A ... ... ... GG CG Nominal
Australia GG CG,SG,LG,TG A GG CG,SG,LG,TG A GG CG,SG,LG,TG Current market
Austria GG CG,SG,LG,SS A GG CG,SG,LG,SS A GG CG,SG,LG,SS Face
Belgium GG CG,SG,LG,SS A GG CG,SG,LG,SS A GG CG,SG,LG,SS Face
Canada GG CG,SG,LG,SS A GG CG,SG,LG,SS A GG CG,SG,LG,SS Face
Croatia GG CG,LG A GG CG,LG A GG CG,LG Nominal
Cyprus GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Face
Czech Republic GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Denmark GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Face
Estonia GG CG,LG,SS C GG GG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Finland GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Face
France GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Face
Germany GG CG,SG,LG,SS A GG CG,SG,LG,SS A GG CG,SG,LG,SS Face
Greece GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Hong Kong SAR GG CG C GG CG C GG CG Face
Iceland GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Face
Ireland GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Israel GG CG,LG,SS Mixed GG CG,LG,SS Mixed GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Italy GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Face
Japan GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Current market
Korea CG CG,SS C CG CG,SS C GG CG,SS Nominal
Latvia GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Lithuania GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Luxembourg GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Face
Malta GG CG,SS A GG CG,SS A GG CG,SS Nominal
The Netherlands GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
New Zealand GG CG,LG A GG CG,LG A GG CG,LG Current market
Norway GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Current market
Portugal GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Singapore GG CG C GG CG C GG CG Nominal
Slovak Republic GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Face
Slovenia GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Face
Spain GG CG,SG,LG,SS A GG CG,SG,LG,SS A GG CG,SG,LG,SS Nominal
Sweden GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Switzerland GG CG,SG,LG,SS A GG CG,SG,LG,SS A GG CG,SG,LG,SS Nominal
United Kingdom GG CG,LG A GG CG,LG A GG CG,LG Nominal
United States GG CG,SG,LG A GG CG,SG,LG A GG CG,SG,LG Nominal

International Monetary Fund | October 2024

Note: Coverage: CG = central government; GG = general government; LG = local governments; SG = state governments; SS = social security funds; TG = territorial governments. Accounting practice: A = accrual; C = cash;
Mixed = combination of accrual and cash accounting.
1 In many economies, fiscal data follow the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014. The concept of overall fiscal balance refers to net lending and borrowing of the general government. In some cases, however, the

43
METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

overall balance refers to total revenue and grants minus total expenditure and net lending.
2 “Nominal” refers to debt securities that are valued at their nominal values, that is, the nominal value of a debt instrument at any moment in time is the amount that the debtor owes to the creditor. “Face” refers to the

undiscounted amount of principal to be repaid at (or before) maturity. The use of face value as a proxy for nominal value in measuring the gross debt position can result in an inconsistent approach across all instruments and is
not recommended, unless nominal and market values are not available. “Current market” refers to debt securities that are valued at market prices; insurance, pension, and standardized guarantee schemes are valued according to
principles that are equivalent to market valuation; and all other debt instruments are valued at nominal prices, which are considered to be the best generally available proxies for their market prices.
 Table C. Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies: Definition and Coverage of Fiscal Monitor Data
Overall Fiscal Balance1 Cyclically Adjusted Balance Gross Debt
Coverage Accounting Coverage Accounting Coverage Valuation of

44
Aggregate Subsectors Practice Aggregate Subsectors Practice Aggregate Subsectors Debt2
Algeria CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Face
Angola3 GG CG,LG Mixed ... ... ... GG CG,LG Nominal
Argentina GG CG,SG,SS C CG CG C CG CG Nominal
Bahrain CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Belarus4 GG CG,LG,SS C ... ... ... GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Brazil GG CG,SG,LG,SS C GG CG,SG,LG,SS C GG CG,SG,LG,SS Nominal
Bulgaria GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Chile GG CG,LG A CG CG A GG CG,LG Face
China GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS Face
Colombia5 GG CG,SG,LG,SS Mixed GG CG,SG,LG,SS Mixed GG CG,SG,LG,SS Face
Dominican Republic CG CG,LG,SS,NMPC Mixed PS CG,LG,SS,NMPC Mixed PS CG,LG,SS,NMPC Face
Ecuador NFPS CG,SG,LG,SS,NFPC Mixed NFPS CG,SG,LG,SS,NFPC Mixed NFPS CG,SG,LG,SS,NFPC Nominal
Egypt GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Hungary GG CG,LG,SS,NMPC A GG CG,LG,SS,NMPC A GG CG,LG,SS,NMPC Face
India GG CG,SG C GG CG,SG C GG CG,SG Nominal
Indonesia GG CG,LG C GG CG,LG C GG CG,LG Nominal
Iran CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Nominal

International Monetary Fund | October 2024

Kazakhstan GG CG,LG C ... ... ... GG CG,LG Nominal
FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Kuwait GG CG,SS Mixed ... ... ... GG CG,SS Nominal

Lebanon CG CG Mixed CG CG Mixed CG CG Nominal
Malaysia GG CG,SG,LG C GG CG,SG,LG C GG CG,SG,LG Nominal
Mexico PS CG,SS,NMPC,NFPC C PS CG,SS,NMPC,NFPC C PS CG,SS,NMPC,NFPC Face
Morocco CG CG A ... ... ... CG CG Face
Oman CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Pakistan GG CG,SG,LG C ... ... ... GG CG,SG,LG Nominal
Peru GG CG,SG,LG,SS C GG CG,SG,LG,SS C NFPS CG,SG,LG,SS,NFPC Face
Philippines GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Poland GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Face
Qatar CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Romania GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS Face
Russian Federation GG CG,SG,SS Mixed GG CG,SG,SS Mixed GG CG,SG,SS Current market
Saudi Arabia CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
South Africa6 GG CG,SG,SS C GG CG,SG,SS C CG CG,SG,SS Nominal
Sri Lanka CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Thailand7 GG CG,BCG,LG,SS A GG CG,BCG,LG,SS A NFPS CG,BCG,SS,NFPC Nominal
Türkiye GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS A GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Ukraine GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
United Arab Emirates GG CG,BCG,SG,SS Mixed ... ... ... GG CG,BCG,SG,SS Nominal
Uruguay NFPS CG,LG,SS,NMPC,NFPC A ... ... ... NFPS CG,LG,SS,NMPC,NFPC Face
Venezuela8 GG BCG,NFPC C GG BCG,NFPC C GG BCG,NFPC Nominal
Vietnam GG CG,SG,LG C ... ... ... GG CG,SG,LG Nominal
Note: Coverage: BCG = budgetary central government; CG = central government; GG = general government; LG = local governments; NFPC = nonfinancial public corporations; NFPS = nonfinancial public sector; NMPC = nonmonetary financial public
corporations; PS = public sector; SG = state governments; SS = social security funds. Accounting practice: A = accrual; C = cash; Mixed = combination of accrual and cash accounting.
1 In many economies, fiscal data follow the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014. The concept of overall fiscal balance refers to net lending and borrowing of the general government. In some cases, however, the overall balance refers to total revenue

and grants minus total expenditure and net lending.

2 “Nominal” refers to debt securities that are valued at their nominal values, that is, the nominal value of a debt instrument at any moment in time is the amount that the debtor owes to the creditor. “Face” refers to the undiscounted amount of principal to be

repaid at (or before) maturity. The use of face value as a proxy for nominal value in measuring the gross debt position can result in an inconsistent approach across all instruments and is not recommended, unless nominal and market values are not available.
“Current market” refers to debt securities that are valued at market prices; insurance, pension, and standardized guarantee schemes are valued according to principles that are equivalent to market valuation; and all other debt instruments are valued at nominal
prices, which are considered to be the best generally available proxies for their market prices.
3 Gross debt includes the domestic and external debt of the central government; the external debt of the state-owned oil company, Sonangol, and the state-owned airline, TAAG; public guarantees; and reported external liabilities of other state entities, including

external arrears.
4 Gross debt refers to general government public debt, including publicly guaranteed debt.
5 Revenue is recorded on a cash basis and expenditure on an accrual basis.
6 Coverage for South Africa is consolidated government, which serves as a good proxy for the general government. It includes the national and provincial governments and certain public entities, while local governments are only partly covered. The subnational

government debt is estimated to be limited given the available data from the South African Reserve Bank.
7 Gross debt data for Thailand include debt of the financial public corporations guaranteed by the government.
8 The fiscal accounts include the budgetary central government, social security, FOGADE (an insurance deposit institution), and a sample of public enterprises, including Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). Data for 2018–22 are IMF staff estimates.
 Table D. Low-Income Developing Countries: Definition and Coverage of Fiscal Monitor Data
Overall Fiscal Balance1 Cyclically Adjusted Balance Gross Debt
Coverage Accounting Coverage Accounting Coverage Valuation of
Aggregate Subsectors Practice Aggregate Subsectors Practice Aggregate Subsectors Debt2
Afghanistan CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Bangladesh CG CG C CG CG C CG CG Nominal
Benin CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Burkina Faso CG CG CB ... ... ... CG CG Face
Cambodia CG CG,LG A CG CG,LG A CG CG,LG Face
Cameroon CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Chad NFPS CG,NFPC C ... ... ... CG CG Face
Congo, Democratic CG CG,LG C ... ... ... GG CG,LG,NFPC Nominal
Republic of the
Congo, Republic of CG CG A ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Côte d’Ivoire CG CG,SS Mixed ... ... ... CG CG,NFPC Nominal
Ethiopia GG CG,SG,LG C ... ... ... NFPS CG,SG,LG,NFPC Nominal
Ghana CG CG CB ... ... ... CG CG Face
Guinea CG CG Mixed ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Haiti3 CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Honduras GG CG,LG,SS Mixed GG CG,LG,SS Mixed GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Kenya CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Current market
Kyrgyz Republic GG CG,LG,SS C ... ... ... GG CG,LG,SS Face
Lao P.D.R.4 CG CG C CG CG C CG CG Nominal
Madagascar CG CG,LG CB ... ... ... NFPS CG,LG,NFPC Nominal
Malawi CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG ...
Mali CG CG Mixed ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Moldova GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Mozambique CG CG,SG Mixed CG CG,SG Mixed CG CG,SG Nominal
Myanmar5 NFPS CG,NFPC C ... ... ... NFPS CG,NFPC Face
Nepal CG CG C CG CG C CG CG Face
Nicaragua GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS C GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Niger CG CG A ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Nigeria GG CG,SG,LG C ... ... ... GG CG,SG,LG Current market
Papua New Guinea CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Face
Rwanda GG CG,LG Mixed ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Senegal CG CG C ... ... ... PS CG,LG,SS,NFPC Nominal
Sudan CG CG Mixed ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Tajikistan GG CG,LG,SS C ... ... ... GG CG,LG,SS Nominal
Tanzania CG CG,LG C ... ... ... CG CG,LG Nominal
Uganda CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Uzbekistan6 GG CG,SG,LG,SS C ... ... ... GG CG,SG,LG,SS Nominal
Yemen GG CG,LG C ... ... ... GG CG,LG Nominal
Zambia CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Nominal
Zimbabwe CG CG C ... ... ... CG CG Current market
Note: Coverage: CG = central government; GG = general government; LG = local governments; NFPC = nonfinancial public corporations; NFPS = nonfinancial public sector; SG = state governments; SS = social security funds. Accounting practice: A = accrual;
C = cash; CB = commitments based; Mixed = combination of accrual and cash accounting.
1 In many countries, fiscal data follow the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014. The concept of overall fiscal balance refers to net lending and borrowing of the general government. In some cases, however, the overall balance refers to total revenue

and grants minus total expenditure and net lending.

2 “Nominal” refers to debt securities that are valued at their nominal values, that is, the nominal value of a debt instrument at any moment in time is the amount that the debtor owes to the creditor. “Face” refers to the undiscounted amount of principal to be

International Monetary Fund | October 2024

repaid at (or before) maturity. The use of face value as a proxy for nominal value in measuring the gross debt position can result in an inconsistent approach across all instruments and is not recommended, unless nominal and market values are not available.
“Current market” refers to debt securities that are valued at market prices; insurance, pension, and standardized guarantee schemes are valued according to principles that are equivalent to market valuation; and all other debt instruments are valued at nominal
prices, which are considered to be the best generally available proxies for their market prices.
3 Haiti’s fiscal balance and debt data cover the central government, special funds and programs (Fonds d’Entretien Routier and Programme de Scolarisation Universelle, Gratuite, et Obligatoire), and the state-owned electricity company EDH.
4 Lao P.D.R.’s fiscal spending includes capital spending by local governments financed by loans provided by the central bank.

45
METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

5 Overall and primary balances in 2012 are based on monetary statistics and are different from the balances calculated from expenditure and revenue data.
6 Uzbekistan’s listing includes the Fund for Reconstruction and Development. Gross debt includes publicly guaranteed debt (including from state owned enterprises) and state-owned enterprise borrowing for investment projects.
 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A1. Advanced Economies: General Government Overall Balance, 2015–29

(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average –2.6 –2.6 –2.5 –2.4 –3.0 –10.2 –7.1 –3.0 –4.7 –5.0 –4.5 –4.2 –3.9 –3.9 –3.8
Euro Area –2.0 –1.5 –1.0 –0.5 –0.6 –7.0 –5.1 –3.5 –3.6 –3.1 –3.1 –2.9 –2.8 –2.7 –2.7
G7 –3.0 –3.3 –3.4 –3.4 –3.8 –11.6 –8.6 –3.9 –5.9 –6.2 –5.6 –5.2 –4.8 –4.8 –4.7
G20 Advanced –2.9 –3.1 –3.1 –3.0 –3.7 –11.1 –8.2 –3.8 –5.6 –5.8 –5.3 –4.8 –4.5 –4.5 –4.4
Andorra 1.7 4.1 3.3 2.7 2.3 –1.1 –1.2 4.8 2.3 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4
Australia –2.8 –2.4 –1.7 –1.3 –4.4 –8.7 –6.4 –2.2 –0.9 –1.7 –2.0 –1.3 –0.9 –1.0 –1.0
Austria –1.0 –1.5 –0.8 0.2 0.6 –8.0 –5.8 –3.3 –2.6 –3.4 –3.3 –3.0 –2.8 –2.6 –2.7
Belgium –2.4 –2.4 –0.7 –0.9 –2.0 –9.0 –5.4 –3.6 –4.4 –4.7 –5.1 –5.4 –5.8 –6.0 –6.3
Canada –0.1 –0.5 –0.1 0.4 0.0 –10.9 –2.9 0.1 –0.6 –2.0 –1.0 –1.0 –0.9 –0.7 –0.6
Croatia –3.5 –1.0 0.9 0.3 2.3 –7.2 –2.5 0.1 –0.8 –2.5 –1.9 –1.6 –1.5 –1.4 –1.3
Cyprus1 0.1 0.3 1.9 –3.6 1.3 –5.7 –1.8 2.7 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.1 1.7 1.4
Czech Republic –0.6 0.7 1.5 0.9 0.3 –5.6 –5.0 –3.1 –3.8 –2.9 –2.3 –1.7 –1.5 –1.6 –1.7
Denmark –0.9 0.3 1.7 0.8 4.3 0.4 4.1 3.4 3.3 1.8 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.1 –0.1
Estonia –0.4 –0.9 –1.0 –1.1 0.1 –5.3 –2.4 –1.0 –3.5 –3.0 –4.1 –4.1 –3.9 –3.9 –3.9
Finland –2.4 –1.7 –0.7 –0.9 –1.0 –5.6 –2.9 –0.5 –2.7 –3.7 –3.1 –2.6 –2.4 –2.2 –2.1
France –3.9 –3.8 –3.4 –2.3 –2.4 –8.9 –6.6 –4.7 –5.5 –6.0 –5.9 –5.8 –5.9 –5.9 –5.9
Germany 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.9 1.3 –4.4 –3.2 –2.1 –2.6 –2.0 –1.7 –1.0 –0.8 –0.7 –0.5
Greece –3.0 0.3 1.1 0.8 –0.1 –10.6 –7.5 –2.5 –0.9 –1.0 –0.9 –1.1 –1.3 –1.5 –1.5
Hong Kong SAR 0.6 4.4 5.5 2.3 –0.6 –9.2 0.0 –6.6 –5.7 –4.5 –2.5 –1.3 0.1 1.1 0.9
Iceland –0.4 12.5 1.0 1.0 –1.6 –8.9 –8.5 –4.0 –2.0 –3.1 –1.1 –1.0 –1.0 –1.0 –0.9
Ireland1 –2.0 –0.8 –0.3 0.1 0.4 –4.9 –1.5 1.6 1.5 3.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.1
Israel –1.2 –1.8 –1.1 –3.6 –3.8 –10.7 –3.4 0.4 –4.8 –9.0 –5.4 –4.3 –4.4 –4.4 –4.3
Italy –2.5 –2.4 –2.5 –2.2 –1.5 –9.4 –8.9 –8.1 –7.2 –4.0 –3.8 –3.5 –3.2 –3.1 –3.1
Japan –3.7 –3.6 –3.1 –2.5 –3.0 –9.1 –6.1 –4.4 –4.2 –6.1 –3.0 –2.8 –2.9 –3.5 –4.0
Korea 0.5 1.6 2.1 2.4 0.4 –2.1 0.0 –1.5 –0.7 –0.5 –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Latvia –1.5 –0.5 –0.8 –0.7 –0.4 –3.7 –5.5 –3.7 –3.5 –3.4 –2.9 –2.8 –2.8 –2.8 –2.9
Lithuania –0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 –7.2 –1.0 –0.7 –0.8 –1.6 –1.5 –1.4 –1.4 –1.3 –1.2
Luxembourg 1.3 1.9 1.4 3.0 2.2 –3.4 0.5 –0.4 –1.3 –1.3 –1.6 –1.3 –1.4 –1.5 –1.7
Malta –0.8 1.1 3.1 1.9 0.7 –8.7 –7.0 –5.3 –4.6 –4.0 –3.6 –3.1 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0
The Netherlands –1.8 0.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 –3.6 –2.2 –0.1 –0.4 –1.6 –2.6 –2.8 –2.8 –2.6 –2.9
New Zealand 0.4 1.0 1.4 1.3 –2.5 –4.3 –3.2 –3.5 –3.3 –3.8 –3.5 –2.3 –1.2 –0.2 0.2
Norway 6.0 4.0 5.0 7.8 6.5 –2.6 10.3 25.4 16.4 12.0 11.0 9.8 8.7 7.8 7.1
Portugal –4.3 –1.9 –3.0 –0.3 0.1 –5.8 –2.9 –0.3 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Singapore 2.9 3.3 5.2 3.7 3.8 –6.7 1.1 1.2 3.5 4.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.6
Slovak Republic –2.7 –2.6 –1.0 –1.0 –1.2 –5.3 –5.2 –1.6 –4.8 –5.9 –4.7 –4.2 –4.6 –4.8 –4.8
Slovenia –2.8 –2.0 0.1 0.9 0.7 –7.7 –4.6 –3.0 –2.6 –2.6 –2.6 –2.1 –1.6 –1.6 –1.6
Spain1 –5.3 –4.3 –3.1 –2.6 –3.0 –10.0 –6.7 –4.6 –3.5 –3.0 –2.8 –2.9 –3.0 –2.8 –2.8
Sweden 0.0 1.0 1.4 0.8 0.5 –2.8 0.0 1.1 –0.6 –1.2 –0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3
Switzerland 0.5 0.2 1.1 1.3 1.3 –3.0 –0.3 1.2 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
United Kingdom –4.6 –3.3 –2.5 –2.3 –2.5 –13.1 –7.9 –4.7 –6.0 –4.3 –3.7 –3.5 –3.4 –3.4 –3.3
United States2 –3.5 –4.4 –4.8 –5.3 –5.8 –13.9 –11.0 –3.9 –7.1 –7.6 –7.3 –6.7 –6.2 –6.2 –6.0
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table B. G7 = Group of Seven; G20 = Group of Twenty.
1 Data include financial sector support. For Cyprus, 2014 and 2015 balances exclude financial sector support.
2 For cross-economy comparison, the expenditures and fiscal balances of the United States are adjusted to exclude the imputed interest on unfunded pension

liabilities and the imputed compensation of employees, which are counted as expenditures under the 2008 System of National Accounts (2008 SNA) adopted by the
United States, but not in economies that have not yet adopted the 2008 SNA. Data for the United States in this table may therefore differ from data published by the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis.

46 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A2. Advanced Economies: General Government Primary Balance, 2015–29

(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average –1.1 –1.1 –1.0 –0.9 –1.5 –8.9 –5.7 –1.2 –2.7 –2.7 –2.1 –1.8 –1.5 –1.5 –1.4
Euro Area 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.2 0.9 –5.7 –3.8 –2.0 –2.1 –1.5 –1.3 –1.0 –0.8 –0.6 –0.5
G7 –1.3 –1.6 –1.6 –1.6 –2.1 –10.0 –6.9 –1.6 –3.3 –3.3 –2.6 –2.2 –1.9 –1.9 –1.8
G20 Advanced –1.3 –1.5 –1.5 –1.4 –2.0 –9.6 –6.6 –1.6 –3.1 –3.1 –2.4 –2.1 –1.8 –1.8 –1.6
Andorra ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Australia –1.9 –1.5 –0.8 –0.4 –3.6 –7.8 –5.5 –1.4 0.0 –0.5 –0.8 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.2
Austria 0.8 0.1 0.7 1.5 1.7 –6.9 –4.9 –2.5 –1.8 –2.2 –2.0 –1.6 –1.3 –1.2 –1.2
Belgium 0.2 0.0 1.4 1.0 –0.3 –7.3 –4.0 –2.3 –2.9 –2.9 –3.2 –3.4 –3.6 –3.7 –3.9
Canada 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 –10.5 –3.6 –0.3 –0.2 –1.5 –0.7 –0.6 –0.5 –0.3 –0.3
Croatia –0.4 1.8 3.2 2.3 4.3 –5.5 –1.1 1.3 0.6 –1.1 –0.7 –0.3 0.0 0.0 –0.1
Cyprus1 3.0 2.7 4.2 –1.4 3.3 –3.7 –0.2 4.1 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.4 3.5 3.3 2.9
Czech Republic 0.3 1.5 2.1 1.5 0.8 –5.1 –4.4 –2.5 –3.3 –2.0 –1.4 –0.8 –0.7 –0.7 –0.9
Denmark –0.5 0.5 1.5 0.4 4.0 0.1 3.7 3.1 2.5 1.1 0.1 –0.5 –0.7 –0.9 –1.1
Estonia –0.4 –1.0 –1.0 –1.1 0.1 –5.3 –2.4 –0.9 –3.3 –2.5 –3.6 –3.5 –3.1 –3.1 –3.0
Finland –2.3 –1.4 –0.4 –0.7 –0.8 –5.5 –2.9 –0.6 –2.9 –3.7 –2.9 –2.2 –1.7 –1.5 –1.2
France –2.0 –1.9 –1.6 –0.6 –0.9 –7.7 –5.2 –2.9 –3.7 –4.2 –3.9 –3.5 –3.3 –3.0 –2.8
Germany 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.6 1.9 –3.9 –2.7 –1.6 –1.9 –1.3 –0.8 –0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8
Greece 0.5 3.5 4.2 4.2 2.9 –7.6 –5.0 0.0 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
Hong Kong SAR 0.6 3.6 4.7 1.0 –2.2 –11.1 –2.7 –9.8 –8.0 –6.9 –3.8 –2.0 –0.5 0.6 0.4
Iceland 3.2 15.5 3.9 3.1 0.5 –6.8 –6.2 –0.9 0.9 –1.5 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Ireland1 0.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 –4.0 –0.7 2.2 2.0 4.2 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.5
Israel 0.5 0.1 0.8 –1.4 –1.9 –8.9 –0.8 3.6 –2.1 –6.3 –2.6 –1.5 –1.5 –1.4 –1.4
Italy 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.7 –6.1 –5.6 –4.1 –3.6 –0.1 0.2 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.2
Japan –2.6 –2.5 –2.2 –1.7 –2.4 –8.4 –5.5 –4.0 –4.1 –6.0 –2.9 –2.6 –2.5 –2.5 –2.6
Korea 0.2 1.3 1.7 2.0 –0.1 –2.6 –0.4 –1.7 –0.7 –0.6 –0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Latvia 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.5 –2.9 –4.8 –3.2 –3.0 –2.4 –1.7 –1.5 –1.4 –1.3 –1.5
Lithuania 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.2 –6.5 –0.5 –0.3 –0.2 –0.8 –0.4 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 0.2
Luxembourg 1.1 1.6 1.1 2.8 2.0 –3.6 0.3 –0.6 –1.7 –1.8 –2.1 –1.7 –1.8 –1.9 –2.0
Malta 1.4 3.1 4.8 3.3 2.0 –7.5 –6.0 –4.4 –3.6 –2.8 –2.3 –1.7 –1.5 –1.4 –1.4
The Netherlands –0.8 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.4 –3.1 –1.8 0.4 0.1 –1.0 –1.9 –2.1 –1.9 –1.6 –1.9
New Zealand 1.0 1.6 2.0 1.9 –1.9 –3.7 –2.5 –2.7 –2.0 –1.9 –1.5 –0.3 1.0 2.1 2.4
Norway 3.4 1.5 2.6 5.7 4.5 –4.6 9.1 24.2 13.6 8.7 8.4 7.7 6.9 6.0 5.3
Portugal –0.1 1.9 0.7 2.9 2.9 –3.1 –0.6 1.5 3.1 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1
Singapore ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Slovak Republic –1.2 –1.2 0.2 0.1 –0.1 –4.3 –4.3 –0.9 –4.2 –4.9 –3.5 –2.8 –3.0 –3.1 –3.0
Slovenia 0.0 0.7 2.2 2.7 2.1 –6.3 –3.5 –2.1 –1.9 –1.9 –1.7 –1.2 –0.7 –0.6 –0.6
Spain1 –2.7 –1.9 –0.9 –0.4 –1.0 –8.0 –4.7 –2.5 –1.7 –0.6 –0.3 –0.3 –0.4 –0.2 –0.3
Sweden 0.0 0.9 1.3 0.7 0.5 –2.9 –0.1 1.2 –0.3 –0.8 –0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5
Switzerland 0.8 0.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 –2.9 –0.2 1.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
United Kingdom –3.1 –1.7 –0.7 –0.6 –1.0 –12.0 –5.6 –1.0 –3.5 –2.0 –1.4 –1.0 –0.8 –0.8 –0.6
United States2 –1.7 –2.4 –2.8 –3.1 –3.5 –11.9 –8.7 –1.1 –3.6 –3.7 –3.2 –2.9 –2.5 –2.6 –2.4
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: “Primary balance” is defined as the overall balance, excluding net interest payments. For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table
B. G7 = Group of Seven; G20 = Group of Twenty.
1 Data include financial sector support. For Cyprus, 2014 and 2015 balances exclude financial sector support.
2 For cross-economy comparison, the expenditures and fiscal balances of the United States are adjusted to exclude the imputed interest on unfunded pension

liabilities and the imputed compensation of employees, which are counted as expenditures under the 2008 System of National Accounts (2008 SNA) adopted by the
United States, but not in economies that have not yet adopted the 2008 SNA. Data for the United States in this table may therefore differ from data published by the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 47

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A3. Advanced Economies: General Government Cyclically Adjusted Balance, 2015–29
(Percent of potential GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average –2.3 –2.5 –2.5 –2.6 –3.3 –7.8 –6.7 –4.7 –5.2 –5.2 –4.8 –4.3 –4.1 –4.1 –4.1
Euro Area –0.6 –0.5 –0.7 –0.4 –0.6 –4.3 –4.1 –3.7 –3.6 –2.9 –2.9 –2.8 –2.8 –2.7 –2.7
G7 –2.6 –3.0 –3.2 –3.3 –4.0 –8.9 –7.9 –5.5 –6.2 –6.1 –5.6 –5.1 –4.8 –4.8 –4.8
G20 Advanced –2.5 –2.8 –3.0 –3.0 –3.8 –8.6 –7.5 –5.3 –5.9 –5.8 –5.3 –4.8 –4.5 –4.5 –4.5
Andorra ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Australia1 –3.1 –2.7 –2.0 –1.5 –4.6 –8.2 –6.2 –2.8 –1.7 –2.5 –2.8 –2.0 –1.7 –1.7 –1.8
Austria –0.5 –1.3 –0.9 –0.3 0.2 –6.9 –4.6 –4.1 –2.5 –2.5 –2.5 –2.6 –2.7 –2.6 –2.7
Belgium –2.4 –2.3 –0.8 –1.2 –2.7 –6.3 –5.4 –4.1 –4.8 –4.8 –5.2 –5.5 –5.7 –5.9 –6.3
Canada 0.0 –0.1 –0.3 0.1 –0.2 –9.3 –2.3 –0.2 –0.6 –1.8 –1.0 –1.0 –0.9 –0.8 –0.6
Croatia –3.2 –0.8 0.9 0.3 2.2 –5.4 –3.3 –1.1 –1.8 –3.5 –2.5 –1.9 –1.5 –1.4 –1.3
Cyprus 2.3 1.4 1.9 2.8 1.0 –3.4 –1.7 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.5 1.3 1.1
Czech Republic –5.0 –3.8 –3.8 0.7 –0.8 –4.6 –4.7 –3.3 –3.4 –2.5 –2.2 –1.7 –1.5 –1.6 –1.7
Denmark –0.9 –0.6 –0.1 –0.3 3.7 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.8 1.3 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.1 –0.1
Estonia –0.2 –0.7 –1.4 –1.5 –0.4 –4.8 –3.7 –1.7 –3.0 –2.1 –3.6 –3.8 –3.8 –3.9 –3.9
Finland 0.1 –0.4 –0.9 –1.0 –1.3 –3.7 –2.6 –0.8 –1.4 –1.6 –1.7 –1.6 –1.8 –1.9 –2.0
France –2.4 –2.1 –2.4 –1.8 –2.4 –6.0 –5.2 –4.2 –4.9 –5.6 –5.6 –5.5 –5.7 –5.8 –5.8
Germany 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.5 1.1 –2.9 –2.6 –2.4 –2.4 –1.4 –1.1 –0.8 –0.8 –0.7 –0.5
Greece 4.1 6.7 6.4 4.9 2.8 –2.5 –4.1 –1.9 –0.9 –1.3 –1.3 –1.3 –1.4 –1.4 –1.5
Hong Kong SAR 0.7 4.7 5.5 2.3 0.3 –5.5 1.0 –4.6 –4.4 –3.4 –1.6 –0.6 0.8 2.2 2.0
Iceland 0.1 11.8 0.0 –1.0 –3.3 –5.3 –6.2 –4.7 –3.4 –3.3 –1.3 –1.1 –1.0 –1.0 –0.9
Ireland2 –1.4 –1.5 –1.1 –0.2 0.3 –4.3 –2.5 0.7 1.2 3.5 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.1
Israel –0.9 –1.7 –1.2 –3.8 –4.0 –9.7 –3.5 –0.5 –5.4 –9.1 –5.5 –4.7 –4.4 –4.4 –4.4
Italy 0.2 –0.4 –1.2 –1.2 –0.5 –5.7 –7.0 –8.6 –7.8 –4.4 –4.5 –4.0 –3.6 –3.4 –3.3
Japan –4.5 –4.4 –3.7 –3.0 –3.3 –8.1 –5.4 –4.4 –4.3 –6.2 –3.1 –2.8 –2.9 –3.5 –4.1
Korea 0.7 1.7 2.2 2.5 0.5 –1.4 0.1 –1.6 –0.6 –0.5 –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Latvia –1.8 –1.3 –2.2 –2.5 –1.5 –2.6 –6.3 –4.8 –3.6 –3.2 –2.6 –2.7 –2.7 –2.8 –2.9
Lithuania 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3 –6.0 –1.7 –1.3 –0.6 –1.4 –1.4 –1.4 –1.4 –1.3 –1.2
Luxembourg 2.4 1.8 1.2 2.0 1.1 –1.5 0.5 –0.1 –1.1 –1.3 –1.8 –1.4 –1.6 –1.8 –2.0
Malta –1.7 2.4 1.9 0.7 0.8 –4.7 –8.0 –4.7 –4.9 –4.6 –4.1 –3.3 –3.0 –2.9 –3.0
The Netherlands –1.6 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.5 –1.0 –2.0 –1.6 –0.6 –1.1 –2.3 –2.7 –2.9 –2.6 –2.9
New Zealand –0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 –2.8 –4.7 –4.5 –5.0 –4.7 –4.3 –3.6 –2.4 –1.4 –0.5 –0.1
Norway2 –6.4 –7.2 –7.3 –6.5 –7.3 –11.3 –10.3 –9.2 –9.6 –10.4 –11.1 –11.6 –11.9 –12.1 –12.2
Portugal –1.1 0.2 –2.3 –0.5 –0.7 –2.7 –1.5 –1.4 0.3 –0.4 –0.3 –0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Singapore –0.7 0.7 1.8 0.7 1.7 –7.9 –1.2 –0.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Slovak Republic –3.3 –3.1 –1.5 –1.6 –1.7 –3.9 –4.8 –1.6 –4.7 –5.9 –4.5 –3.9 –4.5 –4.8 –4.8
Slovenia –1.1 –1.1 –0.4 –0.5 –1.0 –6.2 –5.9 –4.2 –3.2 –2.6 –2.6 –2.1 –1.6 –1.6 –1.6
Spain2 –2.1 –2.5 –2.4 –2.2 –3.0 –4.4 –3.9 –4.4 –3.7 –3.4 –3.1 –3.1 –3.1 –2.8 –2.8
Sweden2 –0.6 0.6 1.1 0.5 –0.2 –1.7 –0.5 0.6 –0.5 –0.5 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
Switzerland2 0.5 0.2 1.1 1.0 1.2 –2.3 –0.2 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
United Kingdom2 –3.4 –2.3 –2.1 –2.1 –2.4 –11.0 –7.3 –5.7 –6.2 –4.0 –3.4 –3.3 –3.2 –3.3 –3.3
United States2,3 –3.3 –4.1 –4.7 –5.3 –6.1 –10.6 –10.5 –6.5 –7.6 –7.7 –7.5 –6.8 –6.2 –6.2 –6.0
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table B. G7 = Group of Seven; G20 = Group of Twenty.
1 Data are based on the fiscal year–based potential GDP.
2 Data for these economies include adjustments beyond the output cycle.
3 For cross-economy comparison, the expenditures and fiscal balances of the United States are adjusted to exclude the imputed interest on unfunded pension

liabilities and the imputed compensation of employees, which are counted as expenditures under the 2008 System of National Accounts (2008 SNA) adopted by the
United States, but not in economies that have not yet adopted the 2008 SNA. Data for the United States in this table may therefore differ from data published by the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis.

48 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A4. Advanced Economies: General Government Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance, 2015–29
(Percent of potential GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average –0.8 –1.0 –1.1 –1.1 –1.9 –6.5 –5.3 –2.9 –3.2 –2.8 –2.3 –1.9 –1.7 –1.7 –1.6
Euro Area 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.3 0.9 –3.0 –2.8 –2.2 –2.1 –1.2 –1.2 –0.9 –0.8 –0.6 –0.5
G7 –1.0 –1.3 –1.5 –1.5 –2.2 –7.4 –6.2 –3.2 –3.6 –3.2 –2.6 –2.2 –1.9 –1.9 –1.8
G20 Advanced –0.9 –1.2 –1.4 –1.4 –2.2 –7.2 –5.9 –3.1 –3.4 –3.1 –2.5 –2.0 –1.8 –1.8 –1.7
Andorra ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Australia1 –2.2 –1.8 –1.1 –0.6 –3.7 –7.4 –5.4 –2.0 –0.9 –1.3 –1.5 –0.7 –0.4 –0.5 –0.6
Austria 1.3 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.4 –5.8 –3.7 –3.4 –1.7 –1.4 –1.2 –1.2 –1.2 –1.2 –1.2
Belgium 0.2 0.0 1.3 0.6 –1.0 –4.7 –4.0 –2.8 –3.3 –3.1 –3.3 –3.5 –3.5 –3.7 –3.9
Canada 0.6 0.5 –0.1 0.2 0.0 –8.8 –2.9 –0.6 –0.2 –1.3 –0.7 –0.6 –0.5 –0.4 –0.3
Croatia –0.1 2.0 3.3 2.4 4.2 –3.7 –1.9 0.1 –0.5 –2.0 –1.2 –0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cyprus 4.3 3.2 3.6 4.5 2.6 –1.9 –0.4 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.6 2.5 2.2
Czech Republic –4.0 –2.9 –3.0 1.3 –0.2 –4.0 –4.2 –2.8 –2.8 –1.6 –1.3 –0.8 –0.6 –0.7 –0.9
Denmark –0.5 –0.4 –0.2 –0.8 3.4 2.8 2.8 2.8 1.9 0.6 –0.2 –0.5 –0.7 –0.9 –1.1
Estonia –0.3 –0.8 –1.4 –1.5 –0.4 –4.7 –3.7 –1.7 –2.9 –1.6 –3.1 –3.2 –3.1 –3.1 –3.0
Finland 0.3 –0.1 –0.7 –0.9 –1.2 –3.6 –2.7 –0.9 –1.5 –1.7 –1.5 –1.2 –1.1 –1.1 –1.2
France –0.5 –0.3 –0.7 –0.1 –0.9 –4.7 –3.9 –2.3 –3.2 –3.8 –3.5 –3.2 –3.1 –2.9 –2.8
Germany 2.2 2.0 1.7 2.2 1.7 –2.5 –2.1 –1.9 –1.7 –0.7 –0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8
Greece 7.2 9.5 9.2 8.0 5.6 0.0 –1.8 0.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1
Hong Kong SAR 0.7 3.9 4.7 0.9 –1.3 –7.3 –1.7 –7.7 –6.7 –5.8 –3.0 –1.3 0.2 1.7 1.5
Iceland 3.6 14.7 3.0 1.2 –1.1 –3.3 –4.1 –1.5 –0.4 –1.7 –0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.7
Ireland2 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.6 –3.3 –1.8 1.3 1.7 4.0 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.5
Israel 0.8 0.1 0.7 –1.6 –2.1 –7.9 –0.9 2.8 –2.7 –6.3 –2.7 –1.8 –1.5 –1.4 –1.4
Italy 3.9 3.2 2.3 2.2 2.6 –2.6 –3.8 –4.6 –4.2 –0.5 –0.5 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.9
Japan –3.4 –3.4 –2.7 –2.2 –2.6 –7.5 –4.8 –4.0 –4.2 –6.1 –2.9 –2.6 –2.5 –2.5 –2.8
Korea 0.4 1.5 1.9 2.1 0.0 –1.9 –0.3 –1.8 –0.6 –0.6 –0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Latvia 0.0 –0.1 –1.1 –1.5 –0.6 –1.8 –5.5 –4.3 –3.1 –2.2 –1.5 –1.3 –1.3 –1.3 –1.5
Lithuania 1.7 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.3 –5.3 –1.2 –0.9 0.0 –0.6 –0.3 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 0.2
Luxembourg 2.1 1.5 1.0 1.8 0.9 –1.7 0.3 –0.4 –1.6 –1.8 –2.3 –1.9 –2.0 –2.2 –2.3
Malta 0.6 4.4 3.6 2.2 2.0 –3.6 –7.0 –3.8 –3.9 –3.4 –2.8 –1.9 –1.6 –1.4 –1.4
The Netherlands –0.6 1.1 1.6 1.3 1.1 –0.5 –1.6 –1.1 –0.2 –0.6 –1.6 –2.0 –2.0 –1.6 –1.9
New Zealand 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.8 –2.2 –4.0 –3.7 –4.2 –3.3 –2.4 –1.6 –0.4 0.8 1.7 2.1
Norway2 –9.5 –10.1 –10.1 –9.2 –9.8 –13.5 –11.9 –11.2 –13.4 –14.8 –14.4 –14.3 –14.2 –14.3 –14.3
Portugal 3.0 3.9 1.3 2.7 2.2 –0.1 0.8 0.4 2.2 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1
Singapore ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Slovak Republic –1.8 –1.6 –0.3 –0.5 –0.6 –2.9 –3.9 –0.8 –4.1 –4.9 –3.3 –2.6 –2.9 –3.1 –3.0
Slovenia 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.4 0.5 –4.9 –4.7 –3.2 –2.6 –1.9 –1.7 –1.2 –0.7 –0.6 –0.6
Spain2 0.4 –0.1 –0.2 0.0 –1.0 –2.6 –2.0 –2.3 –1.8 –1.0 –0.5 –0.5 –0.5 –0.3 –0.3
Sweden2 –0.6 0.6 1.1 0.5 –0.3 –1.8 –0.6 0.7 –0.2 –0.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5
Switzerland2 0.8 0.4 1.3 1.1 1.2 –2.3 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
United Kingdom2 –1.9 –0.7 –0.3 –0.4 –1.0 –9.9 –5.2 –2.1 –3.8 –1.8 –1.1 –0.8 –0.7 –0.7 –0.6
United States2,3 –1.5 –2.1 –2.6 –3.0 –3.8 –8.6 –8.2 –3.7 –4.1 –3.7 –3.3 –2.9 –2.5 –2.6 –2.4
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: “Cyclically adjusted primary balance” is defined as the cyclically adjusted balance plus net interest payable/paid (interest expense minus interest revenue)
following the World Economic Outlook convention. For economy-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table B. G7 = Group of Seven;
G20 = Group of Twenty.
1 Data are based on the fiscal year–based potential GDP.
2 The data for these economies include adjustments beyond the output cycle.
3 For cross-economy comparison, expenditures and fiscal balances of the United States are adjusted to exclude the imputed interest on unfunded pension liabilities

and the imputed compensation of employees, which are counted as expenditures under the 2008 System of National Accounts (2008 SNA) adopted by the United
States, but not in economies that have not yet adopted the 2008 SNA. Data for the United States in this table may therefore differ from data published by the US
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
International Monetary Fund | October 2024 49
 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A5. Advanced Economies: General Government Revenue, 2015–29

(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average 36.1 35.9 35.8 35.9 35.6 36.0 36.9 37.1 35.3 35.6 35.8 36.0 36.2 36.2 36.1
Euro Area 46.7 46.5 46.4 46.6 46.5 46.7 47.1 46.8 46.2 46.4 46.4 46.4 46.1 46.2 46.2
G7 36.3 36.0 35.8 35.8 35.6 36.1 36.9 37.1 35.0 35.3 35.6 35.9 36.1 36.1 36.0
G20 Advanced 35.5 35.3 35.1 35.2 35.0 35.5 36.4 36.6 34.6 34.9 35.1 35.4 35.7 35.6 35.6
Andorra 35.0 38.6 38.2 38.6 38.2 41.3 37.9 39.7 38.6 38.4 38.2 38.2 38.3 38.3 38.3
Australia 34.5 34.8 35.0 35.6 34.5 35.7 35.3 35.4 36.3 36.4 36.0 36.0 36.2 36.2 36.2
Austria 50.1 48.5 48.5 48.9 49.2 48.8 50.4 49.7 49.3 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Belgium 51.3 50.8 51.3 51.4 49.9 49.9 49.5 49.7 50.1 50.5 50.3 50.2 50.3 50.4 50.4
Canada 40.0 40.3 40.3 41.0 40.6 41.4 42.5 41.1 41.9 41.3 41.2 41.1 41.2 41.2 41.3
Croatia 43.8 44.6 44.5 44.8 45.9 46.0 45.2 44.5 46.6 46.2 47.3 47.3 45.8 45.2 45.4
Cyprus 39.5 37.5 38.3 39.0 39.4 38.5 40.1 41.5 43.3 44.3 44.2 44.1 43.3 43.3 43.1
Czech Republic 41.1 40.1 39.9 41.0 40.7 40.6 40.1 39.9 39.9 41.5 41.6 41.2 40.4 39.9 39.2
Denmark 53.5 52.7 52.3 51.6 54.1 53.7 53.5 48.3 50.1 49.6 48.8 48.7 48.9 48.9 48.9
Estonia 38.4 37.7 37.5 37.4 38.5 38.8 39.1 38.4 39.6 42.0 41.1 41.0 40.7 40.4 40.6
Finland 54.4 54.4 53.4 52.9 52.7 52.0 53.4 53.4 53.9 53.1 53.4 53.2 52.9 52.8 52.8
France 53.7 53.6 54.3 54.0 53.0 52.8 52.9 53.7 51.5 51.3 51.2 51.2 51.2 51.1 51.1
Germany 45.4 45.9 45.9 46.6 46.9 46.7 47.5 46.9 45.8 46.2 46.6 46.9 47.1 47.3 47.5
Greece 48.5 50.6 49.7 49.6 48.0 49.6 50.2 50.6 48.9 47.6 47.7 46.7 45.5 44.5 44.2
Hong Kong SAR 18.6 22.6 22.9 20.7 20.4 20.7 23.7 21.7 18.1 19.6 20.7 21.5 21.7 22.2 22.2
Iceland 43.1 59.0 45.4 44.8 42.0 42.2 41.0 42.6 43.5 43.6 43.0 42.0 41.9 41.9 41.9
Ireland 26.1 26.7 25.0 24.9 24.3 21.8 22.1 22.2 24.2 27.7 25.4 25.6 25.5 25.5 25.6
Israel 36.3 36.0 37.1 35.5 34.7 33.9 36.4 37.1 34.2 34.9 36.2 35.4 35.4 35.5 35.6
Italy 47.8 46.6 46.3 46.1 47.0 47.4 47.2 46.8 46.6 46.6 46.9 46.3 45.3 45.3 45.1
Japan 33.6 33.6 33.6 34.3 34.2 35.5 36.3 37.5 36.9 36.1 36.8 36.8 36.9 36.9 36.8
Korea 19.3 20.1 20.7 21.7 21.6 21.6 24.1 25.2 22.5 22.1 22.6 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.7
Latvia 35.9 35.6 35.7 37.3 37.3 37.7 37.6 37.2 38.5 38.7 38.7 38.7 38.7 38.9 38.9
Lithuania 34.2 33.5 32.9 33.7 34.0 34.7 36.1 35.4 37.2 38.7 38.8 38.1 37.2 37.0 37.1
Luxembourg 41.7 41.9 42.6 45.3 45.3 43.5 43.4 43.5 46.8 47.0 47.1 47.1 47.3 47.6 47.8
Malta 36.8 36.4 35.9 36.2 35.4 33.2 32.3 32.4 31.4 31.3 31.5 31.6 31.6 31.7 31.7
The Netherlands 43.5 44.1 44.1 43.9 43.9 44.2 43.7 43.2 42.8 42.6 42.2 42.3 42.7 42.9 43.1
New Zealand 37.6 37.4 37.0 37.4 36.3 37.7 38.6 38.4 38.1 38.4 38.1 38.1 38.3 38.3 37.4
Norway 54.2 54.4 54.2 55.5 56.7 54.2 56.6 63.1 62.1 58.1 58.4 58.4 58.1 58.1 58.0
Portugal 43.8 42.9 42.4 42.9 42.5 43.4 44.6 43.8 43.5 43.5 43.2 43.0 42.7 42.7 42.7
Singapore 17.3 18.6 18.9 17.6 17.8 17.4 16.8 16.6 18.6 18.4 18.7 18.7 18.8 18.8 18.9
Slovak Republic 42.9 40.0 38.5 38.7 39.3 39.4 40.2 40.7 43.2 40.9 41.8 41.4 40.3 40.2 40.2
Slovenia 46.7 44.9 44.7 45.0 44.5 44.1 45.3 44.6 43.9 45.2 44.4 44.2 44.3 44.3 44.1
Spain 38.4 37.9 38.0 38.9 39.0 41.4 42.8 41.8 41.8 41.9 41.9 41.6 40.7 40.7 40.8
Sweden 48.7 49.9 50.1 49.9 48.8 48.4 48.3 48.7 46.8 47.0 47.1 46.9 47.1 47.0 47.0
Switzerland 33.0 32.7 33.6 33.0 33.3 34.0 34.1 32.7 32.1 32.1 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0
United Kingdom 35.8 36.3 36.7 36.6 36.3 36.8 38.0 39.4 38.2 39.1 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3
United States 31.5 31.0 30.4 30.0 30.0 30.6 31.6 32.4 29.2 29.9 30.1 30.6 31.2 31.1 31.0
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For economy-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table B. G7 = Group of Seven; G20 = Group of Twenty.

50 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A6. Advanced Economies: General Government Expenditure, 2015–29

(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average 38.7 38.6 38.2 38.3 38.6 46.2 44.0 40.1 40.0 40.6 40.3 40.2 40.1 40.1 40.0
Euro Area 48.7 48.0 47.5 47.1 47.1 53.7 52.2 50.3 49.8 49.5 49.5 49.2 49.0 48.9 48.9
G7 39.3 39.3 39.1 39.2 39.4 47.7 45.6 41.1 40.9 41.5 41.2 41.0 41.0 41.0 40.8
G20 Advanced 38.4 38.4 38.2 38.2 38.6 46.6 44.6 40.4 40.1 40.7 40.4 40.3 40.2 40.2 40.0
Andorra 33.3 34.6 34.9 35.9 35.8 42.3 39.0 34.9 36.3 36.7 36.7 36.7 36.8 36.8 36.9
Australia 37.2 37.3 36.7 36.8 38.9 44.4 41.7 37.6 37.2 38.0 38.0 37.3 37.1 37.1 37.2
Austria 51.1 50.1 49.3 48.8 48.7 56.8 56.2 53.0 52.0 53.4 53.3 53.1 52.8 52.6 52.7
Belgium 53.7 53.1 52.0 52.3 51.9 58.9 54.9 53.3 54.6 55.1 55.4 55.6 56.0 56.3 56.7
Canada 40.0 40.8 40.5 40.7 40.6 52.4 45.4 41.0 42.5 43.3 42.3 42.1 42.0 41.9 41.9
Croatia 47.3 45.6 43.7 44.5 43.6 53.3 47.7 44.4 47.4 48.7 49.2 48.9 47.3 46.6 46.7
Cyprus 39.5 37.3 36.4 42.6 38.1 44.2 41.9 38.8 40.2 41.1 41.0 41.0 41.2 41.5 41.7
Czech Republic 41.7 39.4 38.5 40.1 40.4 46.3 45.0 42.9 43.7 44.3 43.9 42.9 41.9 41.5 41.0
Denmark 54.4 52.4 50.6 50.8 49.8 53.3 49.4 44.9 46.8 47.8 48.0 48.3 48.6 48.8 49.0
Estonia 38.8 38.6 38.5 38.5 38.4 44.2 41.5 39.3 43.1 45.0 45.2 45.1 44.6 44.3 44.5
Finland 56.8 56.1 54.0 53.7 53.6 57.6 56.3 53.9 56.6 56.8 56.5 55.7 55.3 55.0 54.8
France 57.6 57.4 57.7 56.4 55.3 61.7 59.5 58.4 57.0 57.2 57.1 57.0 57.1 57.0 57.0
Germany 44.5 44.7 44.6 44.7 45.6 51.1 50.7 49.0 48.4 48.2 48.3 47.9 48.0 48.0 48.0
Greece 51.6 50.3 48.7 48.9 48.1 60.2 57.7 53.1 49.9 48.6 48.6 47.8 46.8 46.0 45.7
Hong Kong SAR 18.0 18.3 17.4 18.4 21.0 29.9 23.7 28.3 23.7 24.1 23.1 22.8 21.7 21.1 21.3
Iceland 43.5 46.4 44.4 43.8 43.6 51.1 49.5 46.6 45.5 46.7 44.1 43.0 42.9 42.9 42.9
Ireland 28.0 27.5 25.3 24.8 23.9 26.7 23.6 20.7 22.7 23.9 24.6 24.8 25.1 25.3 25.5
Israel 37.5 37.8 38.2 39.1 38.5 44.6 39.8 36.6 39.0 43.9 41.7 39.7 39.8 39.8 39.9
Italy 50.3 49.0 48.8 48.4 48.5 56.8 56.0 54.9 53.8 50.6 50.7 49.9 48.5 48.4 48.2
Japan 37.3 37.2 36.7 36.7 37.3 44.5 42.4 41.8 41.2 42.2 39.8 39.6 39.8 40.3 40.8
Korea 18.8 18.5 18.6 19.3 21.3 23.7 24.1 26.7 23.2 22.6 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.7
Latvia 37.4 36.1 36.5 38.1 37.7 41.4 43.2 40.9 42.0 42.1 41.6 41.5 41.5 41.7 41.8
Lithuania 34.4 33.3 32.4 33.2 33.7 41.9 37.0 36.1 38.0 40.4 40.3 39.5 38.6 38.4 38.3
Luxembourg 40.4 40.0 41.3 42.3 43.1 47.0 42.8 43.9 48.1 48.3 48.8 48.4 48.7 49.1 49.5
Malta 37.7 35.3 32.8 34.3 34.7 41.9 39.3 37.6 36.0 35.3 35.0 34.7 34.6 34.6 34.6
The Netherlands 45.3 43.9 42.8 42.4 42.1 47.8 45.9 43.3 43.2 44.2 44.8 45.1 45.5 45.5 46.0
New Zealand 37.2 36.5 35.6 36.1 38.8 42.1 41.8 41.9 41.4 42.3 41.6 40.5 39.4 38.5 37.1
Norway 48.2 50.4 49.2 47.7 50.2 56.7 46.3 37.6 45.7 46.2 47.5 48.6 49.5 50.2 50.9
Portugal 48.1 44.8 45.4 43.2 42.4 49.2 47.5 44.1 42.3 43.2 43.0 42.8 42.4 42.5 42.5
Singapore 14.4 15.3 13.6 13.9 14.0 24.1 15.7 15.4 15.2 14.0 16.1 16.1 16.3 16.3 16.3
Slovak Republic 45.6 42.5 39.5 39.7 40.5 44.7 45.3 42.4 47.9 46.8 46.5 45.6 44.9 45.0 45.0
Slovenia 49.5 46.9 44.6 44.1 43.8 51.8 49.9 47.7 46.5 47.8 47.0 46.3 45.9 45.9 45.8
Spain 43.7 42.1 41.0 41.5 42.0 51.4 49.5 46.4 45.3 44.8 44.7 44.5 43.7 43.5 43.6
Sweden 48.7 48.9 48.7 49.2 48.3 51.2 48.3 47.5 47.5 48.2 47.5 46.8 46.8 46.7 46.7
Switzerland 32.5 32.4 32.4 31.7 32.0 37.0 34.4 31.6 32.0 31.6 31.7 31.8 31.8 31.8 31.8
United Kingdom 40.4 39.6 39.2 38.9 38.7 50.0 45.9 44.1 44.2 43.4 43.1 42.9 42.7 42.7 42.7
United States1 35.0 35.3 35.2 35.3 35.8 44.6 42.6 36.3 36.3 37.5 37.4 37.4 37.4 37.4 37.1
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For economy-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table B. G7 = Group of Seven; G20 = Group of Twenty.
1 For cross-economy comparison, expenditures and fiscal balances of the United States are adjusted to exclude the imputed interest on unfunded pension liabilities

and the imputed compensation of employees, which are counted as expenditures under the 2008 System of National Accounts (2008 SNA) adopted by the United
States, but not in economies that have not yet adopted the 2008 SNA. Data for the United States in this table may therefore differ from data published by the US
Bureau of Economic Analysis.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 51

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A7. Advanced Economies: General Government Gross Debt, 2015–29

(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average1 102.8 105.2 102.8 102.4 103.4 121.8 115.4 109.9 108.7 109.4 111.0 112.0 112.8 113.6 114.2
Euro Area 90.9 89.8 87.5 85.6 83.6 96.6 94.0 89.9 87.8 88.1 88.4 88.5 88.8 88.9 89.0
G7 116.0 119.1 117.0 116.8 117.8 139.3 132.2 125.3 123.4 124.3 126.5 128.0 129.1 130.2 131.1
G20 Advanced 110.3 113.3 111.0 110.9 112.3 132.8 126.0 119.8 118.2 119.2 121.4 122.7 123.7 124.8 125.6
Andorra 41.0 39.8 37.9 36.3 35.4 46.4 48.6 38.9 36.4 34.5 33.2 32.1 31.1 30.6 30.1
Australia2 37.7 40.6 41.1 41.7 46.7 57.0 55.4 50.3 49.0 49.3 49.6 48.8 47.8 46.9 46.0
Austria 84.9 82.8 78.5 74.1 70.6 82.9 82.5 78.4 77.5 78.7 79.6 79.7 79.8 80.2 80.7
Belgium 105.2 105.0 102.0 99.9 97.6 111.9 107.9 104.3 105.2 105.0 107.1 109.8 112.7 115.8 119.0
Canada2 92.0 92.4 90.9 90.8 90.2 118.2 113.5 107.4 107.5 106.1 103.2 101.2 99.5 97.9 96.3
Croatia 82.8 79.1 76.0 72.6 70.4 86.1 77.5 67.8 63.0 59.9 58.7 57.8 57.0 56.3 55.4
Cyprus 106.8 102.6 92.6 101.1 93.0 114.9 99.3 85.6 77.3 70.6 63.9 59.1 55.3 52.1 49.1
Czech Republic 39.5 36.2 33.8 31.7 29.6 36.9 40.7 42.5 42.4 43.5 43.8 43.6 43.5 43.4 43.5
Denmark 39.9 37.3 35.9 34.1 33.8 42.2 35.8 29.7 29.7 28.2 27.3 27.1 27.1 27.1 27.3
Estonia 9.9 9.8 8.9 8.0 8.3 18.3 17.6 18.3 19.3 21.8 25.4 28.7 31.7 34.6 37.3
Finland 68.7 68.6 66.5 65.3 65.2 75.3 73.1 73.9 77.0 81.4 83.4 84.3 84.8 85.1 85.3
France 95.5 98.1 98.4 98.1 97.6 114.6 112.6 111.1 109.9 112.3 115.3 117.6 119.8 121.9 124.1
Germany 70.6 67.6 64.0 60.7 58.6 67.9 67.9 64.8 62.7 62.7 62.1 60.9 59.9 59.0 57.8
Greece 179.1 183.7 183.2 190.7 185.5 213.2 201.2 179.6 168.9 159.0 152.9 149.1 145.4 142.3 139.4
Hong Kong SAR2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.9 4.3 6.3 9.0 11.3 13.0 13.2 12.8 13.2
Iceland 97.3 82.5 71.7 63.2 66.5 77.5 74.8 67.4 62.2 60.3 55.6 52.9 50.1 47.3 44.8
Ireland 74.0 72.6 65.2 61.5 55.9 57.0 52.6 43.1 43.3 42.4 40.7 39.0 37.8 36.8 35.9
Israel 63.0 61.6 59.6 59.9 59.0 70.7 67.4 60.2 61.4 68.0 69.3 68.8 69.3 69.8 70.1
Italy 134.7 134.1 133.6 134.0 133.6 154.1 145.5 138.1 134.6 136.9 138.7 140.2 141.4 142.0 142.3
Japan 228.3 232.4 231.3 232.4 236.4 258.4 253.7 256.3 249.7 251.2 248.7 246.9 245.7 244.8 245.0
Korea 38.8 39.1 38.0 37.9 39.7 45.9 48.0 49.8 51.5 52.9 54.3 55.4 56.3 57.2 58.2
Latvia 37.0 40.3 38.9 37.0 36.7 42.7 44.4 41.8 43.6 45.2 45.7 46.0 46.3 46.6 46.9
Lithuania 42.7 39.9 39.4 33.7 35.8 46.3 43.4 38.0 38.3 38.1 37.9 37.6 37.4 37.1 36.6
Luxembourg 21.1 19.6 21.8 20.9 22.4 24.6 24.5 24.7 25.7 26.7 27.8 28.4 29.1 29.9 30.6
Malta 55.0 53.1 45.5 41.4 39.2 48.6 49.6 49.3 47.3 47.7 48.2 48.7 49.1 49.4 49.7
The Netherlands 63.8 60.9 56.0 51.6 47.6 53.3 50.4 48.4 45.0 44.3 45.1 46.2 47.2 48.1 49.3
New Zealand 34.2 33.4 31.1 28.1 31.8 43.3 47.5 47.1 45.8 47.2 48.6 49.3 49.2 47.6 45.2
Norway 34.3 37.9 38.3 39.4 40.6 46.1 41.6 36.3 44.0 42.7 42.7 42.5 42.0 41.4 40.6
Portugal 131.2 131.5 126.1 121.5 116.6 134.9 124.5 112.4 99.1 94.4 89.8 86.2 82.8 79.4 76.2
Singapore 102.2 106.5 107.8 109.4 127.8 148.1 142.9 158.2 174.8 175.2 175.8 176.5 177.2 177.9 178.4
Slovak Republic 51.7 52.3 51.5 49.4 48.0 58.8 61.1 57.7 56.0 59.1 57.8 60.6 63.9 66.2 68.5
Slovenia 83.4 79.4 74.9 71.0 66.0 80.2 74.8 72.7 68.4 67.4 66.4 65.5 64.0 62.8 61.6
Spain 102.4 102.0 101.1 99.7 97.6 119.2 115.6 109.4 105.0 102.3 100.7 99.6 99.1 98.0 97.1
Sweden 44.0 42.4 41.1 39.5 35.7 40.3 36.8 33.8 36.4 36.4 35.4 34.4 33.3 32.6 31.7
Switzerland 42.2 40.9 41.8 39.8 39.6 43.2 41.0 37.2 33.3 31.9 30.8 29.8 29.0 28.0 27.3
United Kingdom 87.9 87.8 86.7 86.3 85.7 105.8 105.1 99.6 100.0 101.8 103.8 104.9 106.1 107.3 108.3
United States2 104.7 106.6 105.5 106.8 108.0 131.8 124.5 118.6 118.7 121.0 124.1 126.6 128.4 130.2 131.7
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For economy-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table B. G7 = Group of Seven; G20 = Group of Twenty.
1 The average does not include the debt incurred by the European Union and used to finance the grants portion of the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) package.

This totaled €58 billion (0.4 percent of EU GDP) as of December 31, 2021, and €158 billion (1 percent of EU GDP) as of February 16, 2023. Debt incurred by the
European Union and used to onlend to member states is included within member state debt data and regional aggregates.
2 For cross-economy comparison, gross debt levels reported by national statistical agencies for economies that have adopted the 2008 System of National Accounts

(Australia, Canada, Hong Kong SAR, United States) are adjusted to exclude unfunded pension liabilities of government employees’ defined-benefit pension plans.

52 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A8. Advanced Economies: General Government Net Debt, 2015–29

(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average1 74.8 76.3 73.8 73.6 74.4 86.2 83.3 79.7 80.8 82.3 83.9 85.0 85.8 86.7 87.5
Euro Area 75.0 74.2 72.0 70.3 68.6 78.6 76.7 74.3 73.3 73.9 74.7 75.2 75.7 76.2 76.6
G7 85.8 87.6 85.1 85.3 85.9 99.3 96.8 92.3 93.8 95.8 97.8 99.3 100.4 101.7 102.8
G20 Advanced 80.6 82.4 79.8 79.9 81.0 93.9 91.4 87.5 89.0 91.0 93.0 94.4 95.4 96.5 97.6
Andorra ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Australia2 22.1 23.4 23.3 24.1 27.8 36.0 35.6 31.5 29.5 29.5 30.5 30.0 29.2 28.4 27.5
Austria 58.7 57.1 55.9 50.7 47.9 59.2 60.2 58.2 58.7 60.4 61.9 62.7 63.4 64.3 65.3
Belgium3 92.0 91.2 88.3 86.4 84.7 97.4 93.4 90.7 91.0 91.4 93.9 96.9 100.2 103.7 107.2
Canada2 18.5 18.0 12.7 11.7 8.7 16.1 14.3 15.6 13.1 14.4 14.6 14.7 14.6 14.6 14.6
Croatia 69.6 67.2 64.1 60.8 57.5 69.2 62.5 52.8 45.6 47.4 47.0 46.7 46.4 46.2 45.8
Cyprus 90.6 85.3 76.9 54.2 49.2 59.3 54.9 47.5 41.8 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Czech Republic 27.9 24.7 21.2 19.4 17.8 23.1 25.6 28.8 28.7 29.9 29.9 29.8 29.6 29.2 29.2
Denmark 16.2 17.5 15.8 13.4 12.4 14.8 9.3 5.0 1.7 –0.1 –0.9 –1.3 –1.6 –1.6 –1.5
Estonia –2.0 –1.9 –1.8 –1.7 –2.1 2.9 4.5 3.9 6.5 9.5 13.5 17.4 20.9 24.2 27.4
Finland4 18.5 21.4 22.0 24.6 27.1 33.5 34.6 32.9 34.6 37.3 39.1 40.2 41.1 41.8 42.4
France 88.6 89.9 89.5 89.5 89.0 101.6 100.5 101.0 101.7 104.1 107.1 109.4 111.7 113.7 115.9
Germany 51.2 48.3 44.6 42.0 39.6 45.1 46.0 46.1 45.1 45.6 45.7 45.1 44.6 44.0 43.3
Greece ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Hong Kong SAR2 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Iceland5 78.1 67.7 60.3 50.7 54.4 60.9 59.7 56.0 52.7 51.3 47.0 44.7 42.4 40.1 37.9
Ireland6 63.3 63.7 56.8 52.9 47.9 48.7 43.0 36.1 35.5 34.6 33.3 31.9 31.1 30.3 29.8
Israel 59.9 58.4 56.6 57.1 56.8 66.6 64.2 58.6 59.7 65.2 66.6 66.1 66.6 66.9 67.2
Italy 121.7 121.0 120.8 121.4 121.2 140.8 133.4 126.9 124.1 126.6 128.7 130.5 131.9 132.8 133.4
Japan 144.4 149.5 148.1 151.1 151.7 162.0 156.3 149.8 154.1 155.8 153.9 152.5 151.4 150.8 151.1
Korea 9.0 9.2 9.1 9.0 10.8 17.0 19.1 21.6 22.6 24.0 25.4 26.5 27.4 28.3 29.3
Latvia 31.3 31.1 30.4 28.6 28.2 33.1 33.8 32.6 34.5 36.4 37.4 38.1 38.8 39.4 40.1
Lithuania 35.5 32.9 33.0 27.7 30.3 40.9 38.6 34.0 34.5 34.6 34.5 34.4 34.3 34.1 33.9
Luxembourg –12.5 –12.1 –11.8 –11.8 –14.1 –10.5 –10.8 –7.8 –6.1 –3.4 –0.8 1.2 3.1 4.9 6.7
Malta 46.8 40.6 33.7 31.1 28.4 38.9 40.2 40.3 37.7 38.7 39.8 40.7 41.5 42.2 42.9
The Netherlands 52.6 50.7 45.9 42.2 39.0 43.7 41.3 39.6 36.9 36.3 36.9 37.8 38.7 39.4 40.4
New Zealand 7.3 6.6 5.6 4.7 6.9 10.4 14.0 18.0 20.0 22.4 24.1 24.8 24.6 23.6 22.4
Norway –85.1 –83.7 –78.6 –70.9 –74.2 –79.0 –83.1 –63.9 –110.1 –129.1 –140.3 –149.6 –157.2 –163.8 –169.2
Portugal 121.0 119.4 116.0 113.4 109.9 123.0 117.4 106.7 94.8 90.3 85.9 82.4 79.1 75.9 72.8
Singapore ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Slovak Republic 47.3 46.9 45.8 43.4 43.1 48.9 49.6 48.1 48.9 52.5 54.5 57.6 60.1 62.3 64.4
Slovenia 64.3 63.4 60.8 54.0 50.0 57.1 56.2 55.6 52.3 51.5 50.8 50.1 48.9 47.9 47.0
Spain 85.3 86.5 85.6 84.3 83.2 102.2 96.3 90.4 87.4 85.3 84.2 83.6 83.3 82.9 82.5
Sweden 11.7 9.5 6.9 6.8 5.7 9.6 8.7 9.1 13.0 13.8 13.8 13.7 13.5 13.5 13.4
Switzerland 21.0 21.6 20.8 18.7 17.3 20.4 20.5 16.7 12.9 11.4 10.4 9.3 8.5 7.6 6.8
United Kingdom 79.3 78.8 77.2 76.6 75.8 93.1 91.7 89.8 91.5 91.6 92.4 93.4 94.4 95.5 96.4
United States2 80.9 81.9 80.1 80.8 82.7 97.8 97.3 93.2 95.7 98.8 101.7 104.1 105.8 107.5 109.2
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For economy-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table B. G7 = Group of Seven; G20 = Group of Twenty.
1 The average does not include the debt incurred by the European Union and used to finance the grants portion of the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) package. This totaled

€58 billion (0.4 percent of EU GDP) as of December 31, 2021, and €158 billion (1 percent of EU GDP) as of February 16, 2023. Debt incurred by the European Union and used
to onlend to member states is included within member state debt data and regional aggregates.
2 For cross-economy comparison, net debt levels reported by national statistical agencies for economies that have adopted the 2008 System of National Accounts (Australia,

Canada, Hong Kong SAR, United States) are adjusted to exclude unfunded pension liabilities of government employees’ defined-benefit pension plans.
3 Belgium’s net debt series has been revised to ensure consistency between liabilities and assets. “Net debt” is defined as gross debt (Maastricht definition) minus assets in the

form of currency and deposits, loans, and debt securities.

4 Net debt figures were revised to include only categories of assets corresponding to the liabilities covered by the Maastricht definition of “gross debt.”
5 “Net debt” for Iceland is defined as gross debt minus currency and deposits.
6 “Net debt” for Ireland is defined as gross general debt minus debt instrument assets, namely, currency and deposits, debt securities, and loans. Net debt was previously

defined as general government debt less currency and deposits.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 53

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A9. Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies: General Government Overall Balance, 2015–29
(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average –4.1 –4.4 –3.8 –3.5 –4.4 –8.7 –5.0 –4.9 –5.4 –5.7 –5.6 –5.4 –5.3 –5.3 –5.3
Asia –3.1 –3.7 –3.6 –4.2 –5.7 –9.6 –6.4 –7.2 –6.6 –6.9 –7.0 –7.0 –7.1 –7.1 –7.2
Europe –2.5 –2.6 –1.7 0.4 –0.6 –5.4 –1.7 –2.3 –4.1 –4.2 –3.3 –2.8 –2.5 –2.5 –2.5
Latin America –5.9 –5.4 –5.1 –5.0 –3.7 –8.2 –3.9 –3.6 –5.2 –4.9 –4.2 –3.6 –3.2 –2.9 –2.8
MENA –7.5 –8.6 –4.7 –1.4 –2.3 –8.3 –1.9 3.7 0.2 –1.7 –2.0 –1.6 –1.4 –1.3 –1.1
G20 Emerging –4.2 –4.5 –4.0 –4.0 –5.1 –9.3 –5.4 –6.0 –6.2 –6.4 –6.2 –6.2 –6.2 –6.3 –6.3
Algeria –13.9 –11.8 –7.5 –6.2 –8.5 –10.5 –6.3 –3.0 –5.2 –9.3 –8.6 –7.6 –7.2 –6.8 –6.8
Angola –2.6 –4.0 –5.7 2.0 0.7 –1.7 3.4 0.6 –1.9 1.6 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.8 –0.2
Argentina –6.0 –6.7 –6.7 –5.4 –4.4 –8.7 –4.3 –3.8 –5.4 –0.1 0.2 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.3
Bahrain –17.5 –16.6 –13.4 –11.3 –8.6 –17.3 –10.6 –5.1 –10.6 –7.7 –7.3 –7.7 –8.6 –9.2 –9.6
Belarus –3.0 –1.7 –0.3 1.8 0.9 –2.9 –0.2 –2.1 0.7 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1
Brazil –9.3 –8.0 –8.0 –7.0 –4.9 –11.6 –2.6 –4.0 –7.6 –6.9 –7.3 –6.9 –5.9 –5.5 –5.1
Bulgaria –2.8 1.5 0.8 0.1 –1.0 –2.9 –2.8 –0.8 –3.1 –2.9 –3.0 –3.1 –3.2 –3.2 –3.2
Chile –2.1 –2.7 –2.6 –1.5 –2.7 –7.1 –7.5 1.4 –2.3 –2.3 –1.4 –0.4 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1
China1 –2.5 –3.4 –3.4 –4.3 –6.1 –9.7 –6.0 –7.5 –6.9 –7.4 –7.6 –7.7 –7.9 –8.1 –8.2
Colombia –3.5 –2.3 –2.5 –4.7 –3.5 –7.0 –7.1 –6.2 –2.7 –4.4 –3.8 –3.4 –3.0 –2.5 –2.4
Dominican Republic 0.0 –3.1 –3.1 –2.2 –3.5 –7.9 –2.9 –3.2 –3.3 –3.1 –3.1 –2.8 –2.5 –2.2 –1.9
Ecuador2 –6.9 –10.3 –5.8 –2.8 –3.5 –7.4 –1.6 0.0 –3.6 –2.0 –1.1 –0.2 0.0 0.7 0.9
Egypt –10.4 –11.8 –9.9 –9.0 –7.6 –7.5 –7.0 –5.8 –5.8 –10.1 –10.1 –8.2 –5.6 –4.0 –2.7
Hungary –2.0 –1.8 –2.5 –2.1 –2.0 –7.6 –7.2 –6.2 –6.7 –5.0 –4.6 –3.5 –3.0 –2.8 –2.7
India –7.2 –7.1 –6.2 –6.4 –7.7 –12.9 –9.3 –9.2 –8.3 –7.8 –7.6 –7.4 –7.1 –6.9 –6.6
Indonesia –2.7 –2.6 –2.3 –1.7 –2.1 –6.1 –4.4 –2.2 –1.6 –2.7 –2.5 –2.5 –2.4 –2.3 –2.2
Iran –1.5 –1.8 –1.6 –1.6 –4.5 –5.2 –3.2 –2.8 –2.8 –3.1 –3.4 –3.1 –2.8 –2.5 –2.3
Kazakhstan –6.3 –4.5 –4.3 2.6 –0.6 –7.0 –5.0 0.1 –1.5 –2.3 –2.3 –2.1 –2.1 –2.4 –2.2
Kuwait 16.7 13.3 16.8 17.2 10.9 –3.8 8.5 30.4 29.9 25.6 25.3 24.9 24.3 23.6 22.9
Lebanon –7.5 –8.9 –8.7 –11.3 –10.5 –7.4 –2.7 –6.6 –0.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Malaysia3 –2.5 –2.6 –2.4 –2.6 –2.0 –4.9 –6.0 –4.8 –4.6 –3.6 –3.5 –3.5 –3.5 –3.4 –3.2
Mexico –3.9 –2.7 –1.0 –2.1 –2.3 –4.3 –3.8 –4.3 –4.3 –5.9 –3.5 –2.7 –2.7 –2.7 –2.7
Morocco –4.5 –4.4 –3.2 –3.4 –3.6 –7.1 –6.0 –5.4 –4.4 –4.3 –3.8 –3.3 –3.2 –3.1 –3.1
Oman –13.5 –19.6 –10.5 –6.7 –4.8 –15.7 –3.2 10.3 6.7 5.0 2.5 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.5
Pakistan –4.7 –3.9 –5.2 –5.7 –7.8 –7.0 –6.0 –7.8 –7.7 –6.7 –6.0 –4.7 –3.6 –3.0 –2.8
Peru –2.0 –2.1 –2.8 –2.0 –1.4 –8.3 –2.5 –1.4 –2.8 –3.2 –2.0 –1.4 –0.8 –0.4 –0.4
Philippines 0.1 –0.7 –0.8 –1.5 –1.5 –5.5 –6.2 –5.5 –4.4 –3.9 –3.9 –3.0 –2.4 –2.0 –1.7
Poland –2.6 –2.4 –1.5 –0.2 –0.7 –6.9 –1.8 –3.4 –5.1 –5.7 –5.5 –5.0 –4.6 –4.3 –4.0
Qatar 18.4 –9.2 –6.8 2.3 1.0 –2.1 0.2 10.4 5.6 2.0 2.1 4.0 3.6 3.3 3.5
Romania –1.3 –2.5 –2.9 –2.7 –4.6 –9.6 –6.7 –5.8 –5.6 –7.8 –7.4 –7.2 –7.0 –6.7 –6.5
Russian Federation –3.4 –3.7 –1.5 2.9 1.9 –4.0 0.8 –1.4 –2.3 –1.9 –0.5 –0.6 –0.6 –0.7 –0.8
Saudi Arabia –15.5 –13.7 –8.9 –5.5 –4.2 –10.7 –2.2 2.5 –2.0 –3.0 –3.4 –3.2 –3.1 –3.0 –2.8
South Africa –4.4 –3.7 –4.0 –3.7 –5.1 –9.6 –5.5 –4.3 –5.8 –6.2 –6.3 –5.4 –5.1 –5.1 –5.1
Sri Lanka –6.6 –5.0 –5.1 –5.0 –7.5 –12.2 –11.7 –10.2 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Thailand 0.2 0.4 –0.4 0.2 0.4 –4.5 –6.7 –4.5 –2.0 –2.4 –3.9 –3.0 –2.8 –2.8 –2.8
Türkiye –0.5 –1.7 –1.9 –3.1 –4.8 –4.7 –3.0 –1.1 –5.3 –5.2 –3.6 –3.0 –3.1 –3.0 –3.0
Ukraine –1.2 –2.5 –2.4 –2.1 –2.1 –5.9 –4.0 –15.6 –19.6 –18.7 –19.2 –9.5 –2.7 –2.1 –1.7
United Arab Emirates –6.6 –3.1 –0.2 3.8 2.6 –2.5 4.0 10.0 5.0 4.8 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1
Uruguay4 –1.9 –2.7 –2.5 –1.9 –2.7 –4.7 –2.6 –2.5 –3.1 –3.0 –2.6 –2.5 –2.3 –2.1 –2.1
Venezuela –8.1 –8.5 –13.3 –31.0 –10.9 –6.6 –5.9 –6.8 –4.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vietnam –5.0 –3.2 –2.0 –1.0 –0.4 –2.9 –1.4 0.7 –2.5 –2.6 –2.2 –2.1 –2.0 –1.9 –1.8
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table C. G20 = Group of Twenty; MENA = Middle East and North Africa.
1 China’s deficit and public debt numbers presented in this table cover a narrower perimeter of the general government than IMF staff’s estimates in China Article IV reports

(see IMF 2024 for a reconciliation of the two estimates).

2 The data for Ecuador reflect net lending/borrowing of the nonfinancial public sector.
3 The general government overall balance in 2019 includes a one-off refund of tax arrears in 2019 of 2.4 percent of GDP.
4 Data are for the nonfinancial public sector, which includes central government, local government, social security funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and Banco de

Seguros del Estado. The coverage of fiscal data was changed from the consolidated public sector to the nonfinancial public sector with the October 2019 submission. With this
narrower coverage, the central bank balances are not included in the fiscal data. Historical data were also revised accordingly. Starting in October 2018, the public pension
system has been receiving transfers in the context of a new law that compensates persons affected by the creation of the mixed pension system. These funds are recorded as
revenues, consistent with the IMF’s methodology. Therefore, data for 2018–22 are affected by these transfers, which amounted to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2018, 1.0 percent of
GDP in 2019, 0.6 percent of GDP in 2020, 0.3 percent of GDP in 2021, 0.1 percent of GDP in 2022, and 0 thereafter. See IMF Country Report No. 19/64 for further details. The
disclaimer about the public pension system applies only to the revenues and net lending/borrowing series.

54 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A10. Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies: General Government Primary Balance, 2015–29
(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average –2.4 –2.7 –2.0 –1.7 –2.6 –6.9 –3.3 –3.1 –3.3 –3.5 –3.2 –3.0 –2.9 –2.9 –2.8
Asia –1.9 –2.4 –2.1 –2.7 –4.2 –7.9 –4.8 –5.6 –4.9 –5.1 –5.0 –4.9 –4.8 –4.7 –4.7
Europe –1.3 –1.5 –0.7 1.5 0.4 –4.4 –0.7 –1.4 –2.8 –2.6 –1.5 –1.0 –0.8 –0.8 –0.8
Latin America –1.7 –1.9 –1.3 –1.1 –0.2 –5.0 –0.6 0.3 –0.8 –0.4 0.2 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.1
MENA –7.4 –8.4 –4.6 –0.7 –1.4 –7.6 –0.8 4.3 0.8 –0.4 –0.7 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1
G20 Emerging –2.4 –2.8 –2.2 –2.2 –3.3 –7.5 –3.6 –4.1 –4.1 –4.2 –3.9 –3.8 –3.7 –3.7 –3.6
Algeria –13.7 –11.6 –6.7 –5.7 –8.0 –9.7 –5.7 –1.8 –3.9 –7.6 –6.9 –5.8 –5.3 –4.8 –4.8
Angola –1.0 –1.5 –2.6 6.2 5.7 4.3 8.0 4.1 3.6 6.2 6.0 5.5 4.8 4.4 3.4
Argentina –4.4 –4.8 –4.2 –2.2 –0.4 –6.2 –2.5 –1.7 –2.8 1.8 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.3
Bahrain –15.3 –13.8 –10.0 –7.1 –4.4 –12.4 –6.0 –0.9 –5.7 –2.8 –3.1 –3.6 –4.0 –4.3 –4.6
Belarus –1.3 0.3 1.6 3.8 2.6 –1.2 1.3 –0.6 2.3 2.7 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.3
Brazil –0.9 –2.0 –1.6 –0.9 –0.1 –7.5 2.0 1.3 –2.0 –0.5 –0.7 –0.6 0.1 0.6 1.0
Bulgaria –2.4 1.8 1.2 0.3 –0.8 –2.8 –2.8 –0.8 –3.0 –2.8 –2.6 –2.4 –2.5 –2.6 –2.5
Chile –1.9 –2.4 –2.3 –1.1 –2.4 –6.6 –6.9 1.8 –1.9 –1.7 –0.8 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7
China –2.0 –2.7 –2.6 –3.5 –5.2 –8.8 –5.1 –6.6 –6.0 –6.4 –6.4 –6.4 –6.3 –6.2 –6.2
Colombia –1.7 –0.4 –0.5 –2.5 –1.0 –4.4 –4.4 –2.4 1.1 –0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.4
Dominican Republic 2.3 –0.6 –0.5 0.4 –0.7 –4.7 0.2 –0.4 –0.1 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.5
Ecuador1 –6.4 –9.7 –4.7 –1.4 –1.9 –5.8 –1.4 0.5 –2.7 –0.9 0.2 1.2 1.4 2.2 2.3
Egypt –3.9 –4.1 –2.4 –0.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.4 1.1 2.0 2.9 3.8 4.3 4.3 4.3
Hungary 1.3 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 –5.4 –5.1 –4.0 –3.0 –0.8 –0.7 –0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6
India –2.7 –2.5 –1.5 –1.7 –3.0 –7.3 –4.1 –4.3 –3.0 –2.4 –2.1 –2.2 –2.1 –2.1 –2.0
Indonesia –1.4 –1.1 –0.7 0.0 –0.4 –4.0 –2.4 –0.2 0.5 –0.7 –0.4 –0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
Iran –1.4 –1.3 –1.0 –0.7 –3.4 –4.2 –2.2 –1.9 –1.7 –1.4 –1.4 –1.3 –1.2 –1.1 –1.1
Kazakhstan –5.9 –4.3 –5.2 1.8 –0.8 –7.7 –4.4 0.8 –0.6 –1.3 –0.9 –0.8 –0.7 –0.9 –0.9
Kuwait2 0.0 –4.7 0.0 2.1 –4.6 –23.8 –6.6 15.7 11.3 5.9 4.6 3.7 2.8 1.9 1.1
Lebanon 1.4 0.4 0.8 –1.4 –0.5 –4.4 –1.6 –6.0 0.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Malaysia –0.9 –0.8 –0.6 –0.8 0.0 –3.0 –3.9 –2.7 –2.2 –1.2 –0.8 –0.7 –0.7 –0.5 –0.5
Mexico –1.2 0.3 2.5 1.5 1.4 –0.5 0.0 0.7 1.5 –0.8 1.0 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3
Morocco –2.0 –2.0 –0.9 –1.2 –1.4 –4.6 –3.9 –3.2 –2.3 –1.9 –1.3 –0.9 –0.8 –0.8 –0.8
Oman –14.1 –20.0 –11.1 –5.2 –4.6 –13.0 –1.0 10.9 7.3 5.1 2.6 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.7
Pakistan –0.5 –0.1 –1.4 –1.8 –3.0 –1.5 –1.1 –3.0 –0.9 0.9 2.1 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0
Peru –1.1 –1.2 –1.8 –0.8 –0.2 –6.9 –1.2 0.0 –1.3 –1.6 –0.5 –0.1 0.3 0.7 0.5
Philippines 2.1 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.1 –3.7 –4.4 –3.5 –2.1 –1.3 –1.2 –0.3 0.1 0.5 0.7
Poland –0.8 –0.7 0.1 1.2 0.6 –5.6 –0.7 –1.9 –3.0 –3.4 –3.0 –2.4 –2.1 –1.8 –1.5
Qatar 19.9 –7.7 –5.4 3.7 2.7 0.2 2.0 11.7 7.0 3.3 3.4 5.1 4.7 4.4 4.6
Romania –0.1 –1.3 –1.8 –1.4 –3.4 –8.3 –5.3 –3.8 –3.7 –5.5 –5.1 –5.0 –4.7 –4.3 –4.1
Russian Federation –3.1 –3.2 –1.0 3.4 2.2 –3.7 1.1 –1.1 –2.0 –1.7 –0.3 –0.3 –0.4 –0.5 –0.7
Saudi Arabia –17.5 –16.5 –11.3 –6.0 –4.2 –12.5 –2.0 2.4 –2.0 –2.9 –3.0 –2.6 –2.5 –2.2 –1.9
South Africa –1.4 –0.6 –0.8 –0.4 –1.5 –5.5 –1.3 0.3 –0.9 –0.9 –0.9 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5
Sri Lanka –2.1 –0.2 0.0 0.6 –1.9 –5.9 –5.7 –3.7 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Thailand 1.2 1.3 0.5 1.2 1.4 –3.5 –5.5 –3.1 –0.8 –1.2 –2.6 –1.6 –1.4 –1.4 –1.4
Türkiye 1.3 –0.3 –0.6 –1.7 –3.0 –2.9 –1.2 0.0 –3.5 –2.8 –0.3 0.5 0.1 –0.1 –0.3
Ukraine 3.0 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 –3.0 –1.1 –12.5 –15.7 –13.7 –13.4 –5.8 0.9 1.0 1.2
United Arab Emirates –6.3 –2.9 0.0 4.0 2.9 –2.2 4.3 10.5 5.6 5.5 5.1 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.7
Uruguay3 0.2 –0.3 –0.2 0.5 –0.5 –2.1 –0.6 –0.5 –0.9 –0.7 –0.6 –0.4 –0.3 –0.1 –0.1
Venezuela –6.8 –8.1 –13.2 –30.3 –10.0 –4.9 –4.6 –5.9 –3.3 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vietnam –3.4 –1.6 –0.4 0.5 1.0 –1.5 –0.2 1.7 –1.6 –1.6 –1.2 –1.1 –1.0 –0.9 –0.8
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: “Primary balance” is defined as the overall balance, excluding net interest payments. For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table C.
G20 = Group of Twenty; MENA = Middle East and North Africa.
1 The data for Ecuador reflect primary balance of the nonfinancial public sector.
2 Interest revenue is proxied by IMF staff estimates of investment income. The country team does not have the breakdown of investment income between interest revenue and

dividends.
3 Data are for the nonfinancial public sector, which includes central government, local government, social security funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and Banco de

Seguros del Estado. The coverage of fiscal data was changed from the consolidated public sector to the nonfinancial public sector with the October 2019 submission. With this
narrower coverage, the central bank balances are not included in the fiscal data. Historical data were also revised accordingly. Starting in October 2018, the public pension
system has been receiving transfers in the context of a new law that compensates persons affected by the creation of the mixed pension system. These funds are recorded as
revenues, consistent with the IMF’s methodology. Therefore, data for 2018–22 are affected by these transfers, which amounted to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2018, 1.0 percent of
GDP in 2019, 0.6 percent of GDP in 2020, 0.3 percent of GDP in 2021, 0.1 percent of GDP in 2022, and 0 thereafter. See IMF Country Report No. 19/64 for further details. The
disclaimer about the public pension system applies only to the revenues and net lending/borrowing series.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 55

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A11. Emerging Market and Middle–Income Economies: General Government Cyclically Adjusted Balance, 2015–29
(Percent of potential GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average –3.6 –3.9 –3.6 –3.7 –4.7 –7.3 –5.0 –5.5 –5.7 –6.0 –5.9 –5.9 –5.8 –5.8 –5.8
Asia –2.8 –3.6 –3.5 –4.3 –5.7 –8.0 –5.9 –6.5 –6.1 –6.7 –6.9 –7.1 –7.2 –7.2 –7.3
Europe –2.1 –2.1 –1.6 –0.1 –0.9 –4.6 –1.8 –2.8 –4.5 –4.5 –3.5 –2.9 –2.6 –2.6 –2.6
Latin America –5.9 –4.9 –4.9 –4.3 –3.3 –6.2 –3.6 –3.9 –5.3 –4.9 –4.2 –3.6 –3.2 –3.0 –2.9
MENA –9.7 –9.7 –7.0 –5.0 –5.7 –6.8 –4.5 –2.5 –3.0 –4.5 –5.3 –4.6 –3.8 –3.2 –2.6
G20 Emerging –3.6 –4.0 –3.8 –4.0 –5.0 –7.7 –5.1 –5.7 –6.0 –6.3 –6.2 –6.3 –6.3 –6.4 –6.4
Algeria ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Angola –3.8 –4.6 –6.5 1.5 0.8 0.0 3.6 0.9 –0.6 1.7 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.2 0.4
Argentina –6.2 –6.0 –7.2 –5.0 –3.4 –5.0 –3.4 –4.5 –5.2 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3
Bahrain ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Belarus –2.3 0.0 0.4 1.5 0.3 –3.1 –1.1 –1.4 0.5 0.4 –0.4 –1.3 –2.0 –2.6 –3.0
Brazil –9.1 –6.5 –6.8 –6.3 –4.3 –9.9 –2.1 –3.9 –7.8 –7.3 –7.5 –7.0 –5.9 –5.5 –5.1
Bulgaria –2.7 1.4 0.6 –0.2 –1.9 –1.3 –3.0 –1.4 –3.3 –2.9 –3.0 –3.1 –3.2 –3.2 –3.2
Chile1 0.5 –1.0 –2.0 –1.5 –1.7 –1.6 –11.6 –1.6 –3.4 –2.8 –1.9 –0.6 –0.3 –0.4 –0.4
China –2.2 –3.1 –3.2 –4.1 –5.8 –8.3 –5.7 –6.6 –6.3 –7.0 –7.4 –7.7 –7.9 –8.1 –8.2
Colombia –3.9 –2.4 –2.3 –4.2 –2.2 –3.1 –6.2 –7.0 –2.8 –4.1 –3.6 –3.4 –3.0 –2.5 –2.4
Dominican Republic –4.3 –4.0 –3.9 –3.6 –3.5 –7.6 –3.4 –4.0 –4.2 –5.0 –4.2 –3.8 –3.5 –3.3 –2.8
Ecuador2 –6.4 –10.5 –4.1 –2.7 –3.6 –10.9 –2.7 –0.9 –3.5 –2.1 –0.9 0.1 0.2 0.9 1.1
Egypt –10.8 –11.4 –10.1 –9.0 –7.3 –6.6 –7.2 –6.1 –5.7 –6.6 –9.1 –7.5 –5.1 –3.6 –2.2
Hungary –2.3 –1.8 –2.8 –3.0 –3.7 –6.2 –7.5 –7.3 –6.4 –4.3 –4.2 –3.3 –2.9 –2.8 –2.8
India –7.1 –7.5 –6.5 –7.4 –8.7 –9.4 –8.4 –8.9 –8.3 –7.8 –7.6 –7.4 –7.1 –6.9 –6.6
Indonesia –2.8 –2.5 –2.2 –1.6 –2.1 –5.3 –3.8 –2.0 –1.6 –2.6 –2.5 –2.5 –2.4 –2.3 –2.2
Iran ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Kazakhstan –6.4 –4.2 –4.2 2.3 –1.3 –6.7 –5.1 0.1 –1.7 –2.7 –2.5 –2.2 –2.1 –2.4 –2.2
Kuwait ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Lebanon –11.6 –11.5 –13.7 –12.5 –17.7 –11.4 –3.4 –1.2 –2.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Malaysia –2.6 –2.7 –2.6 –3.6 –4.1 –4.0 –5.2 –5.2 –4.7 –3.7 –3.6 –3.6 –3.5 –3.4 –3.2
Mexico –4.1 –3.9 –2.7 –2.7 –2.7 –3.6 –3.3 –4.3 –4.6 –6.0 –3.5 –2.6 –2.7 –2.7 –2.7
Morocco –3.5 –2.0 –3.0 –2.7 –3.8 –5.6 –6.2 –5.4 –4.6 –4.3 –3.9 –3.3 –3.3 –3.1 –3.1
Oman ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Pakistan ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Peru –1.5 –1.8 –2.2 –2.1 –1.3 –6.6 –4.0 –2.2 –2.5 –3.7 –2.5 –2.2 –1.7 –1.2 –1.2
Philippines 0.2 –0.8 –0.8 –1.5 –1.5 –3.3 –5.3 –5.6 –4.4 –3.8 –3.9 –3.0 –2.4 –2.0 –1.7
Poland –2.2 –1.7 –1.6 –1.5 –2.4 –5.4 –2.1 –4.7 –4.6 –5.1 –5.3 –4.9 –4.6 –4.3 –4.0
Qatar –5.4 –8.0 –3.3 2.2 0.6 –7.4 2.0 7.6 3.3 3.4 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7
Romania –1.0 –1.8 –3.2 –3.7 –5.6 –8.3 –6.5 –6.1 –5.6 –7.5 –7.3 –7.1 –7.0 –6.7 –6.5
Russian Federation –3.1 –3.2 –1.0 2.9 2.0 –4.4 0.5 –1.2 –2.5 –2.4 –0.8 –0.7 –0.7 –0.8 –0.9
Saudi Arabia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
South Africa –4.2 –3.7 –4.1 –4.0 –5.4 –6.6 –4.2 –4.0 –5.9 –6.2 –6.1 –5.4 –5.1 –5.1 –5.1
Sri Lanka ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Thailand 0.4 0.6 –0.4 0.0 0.3 –3.6 –5.6 –3.9 –1.7 –2.5 –3.9 –3.0 –2.8 –2.8 –2.8
Türkiye –0.9 –1.5 –2.6 –3.5 –4.1 –3.1 –3.4 –1.5 –5.9 –5.4 –3.5 –2.8 –2.9 –3.0 –3.0
Ukraine 1.5 –0.9 –1.4 –2.2 –1.7 –4.4 –3.3 –15.0 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
United Arab Emirates ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Uruguay3 –2.1 –2.7 –2.7 –1.9 –2.0 –2.9 –1.5 –2.1 –2.3 –2.6 –2.4 –2.3 –2.1 –2.0 –2.0
Venezuela ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vietnam ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country–specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table C. G20 = Group of Twenty; MENA = Middle East and North Africa.
1 Data for these economies include adjustments beyond the output cycle.
2 The data for Ecuador reflect cyclically adjusted balance of the nonfinancial public sector.
3 Data are for the nonfinancial public sector, which includes central government, local government, social security funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and Banco de

Seguros del Estado. The coverage of fiscal data was changed from the consolidated public sector to the nonfinancial public sector with the October 2019 submission. With this
narrower coverage, the central bank balances are not included in the fiscal data. Historical data were also revised accordingly. Starting in October 2018, the public pension
system has been receiving transfers in the context of a new law that compensates persons affected by the creation of the mixed pension system. These funds are recorded as
revenues, consistent with the IMF’s methodology. Therefore, data for 2018–22 are affected by these transfers, which amounted to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2018, 1.0 percent of
GDP in 2019, 0.6 percent of GDP in 2020, 0.3 percent of GDP in 2021, 0.1 percent of GDP in 2022, and 0 thereafter. See IMF Country Report No. 19/64 for further details. The
disclaimer about the public pension system applies only to the revenues and net lending/borrowing series.

56 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A12. Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies: General Government Cyclically Adjusted
Primary Balance, 2015–29
(Percent of potential GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average –1.7 –2.0 –1.6 –1.8 –2.7 –5.4 –3.2 –3.5 –3.5 –3.6 –3.4 –3.3 –3.2 –3.1 –3.1
Asia –1.7 –2.2 –2.0 –2.8 –4.2 –6.4 –4.4 –5.0 –4.5 –4.9 –5.0 –5.0 –4.9 –4.8 –4.8
Europe –0.8 –1.0 –0.5 1.0 0.1 –3.6 –0.8 –1.9 –3.2 –2.9 –1.6 –1.0 –0.8 –0.9 –0.9
Latin America –1.5 –1.3 –0.9 –0.4 0.2 –3.2 –0.4 0.1 –0.9 –0.4 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.1
MENA –5.9 –5.4 –3.2 –0.8 –1.2 –2.3 –0.3 1.2 0.7 1.1 0.2 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.4
G20 Emerging –1.7 –2.1 –1.8 –2.0 –3.2 –5.9 –3.3 –3.8 –3.9 –4.1 –3.8 –3.8 –3.8 –3.7 –3.7
Algeria ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Angola –2.1 –2.0 –3.2 5.9 5.7 5.3 8.1 4.3 4.3 6.3 6.0 5.5 4.9 4.7 3.7
Argentina –4.6 –4.1 –4.7 –1.8 0.5 –2.8 –1.7 –2.3 –2.7 3.6 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.5 3.3
Bahrain ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Belarus –0.6 1.9 2.3 3.5 2.1 –1.4 0.5 0.0 2.1 1.9 1.2 0.2 –0.6 –1.3 –1.7
Brazil –0.6 –0.7 –0.6 –0.2 0.4 –6.0 2.4 1.4 –2.2 –0.9 –0.9 –0.7 0.0 0.5 1.0
Bulgaria –2.3 1.7 0.9 0.0 –1.7 –1.2 –3.0 –1.4 –3.2 –2.8 –2.6 –2.4 –2.5 –2.6 –2.5
Chile1 0.7 –0.7 –1.7 –1.2 –1.4 –1.1 –10.9 –1.1 –3.0 –2.1 –1.3 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.4
China –1.7 –2.5 –2.5 –3.3 –4.9 –7.4 –4.8 –5.7 –5.4 –6.0 –6.2 –6.4 –6.3 –6.2 –6.2
Colombia –2.1 –0.5 –0.3 –2.0 0.2 –0.9 –3.5 –3.1 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4
Dominican Republic –2.1 –1.5 –1.4 –1.0 –0.8 –4.6 –0.3 –1.2 –1.1 –1.5 –0.7 –0.3 0.0 0.2 0.6
Ecuador2 –5.9 –9.9 –3.0 –1.3 –2.1 –9.1 –2.6 –0.5 –2.6 –1.1 0.3 1.5 1.6 2.4 2.5
Egypt –4.4 –3.7 –2.6 –0.5 1.5 2.0 0.8 0.1 1.1 5.6 3.8 4.5 4.8 4.7 4.7
Hungary 1.1 1.3 –0.1 –0.6 –1.4 –4.1 –5.4 –4.9 –2.6 0.0 –0.2 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.6
India –2.6 –2.8 –1.6 –2.5 –3.8 –4.2 –3.3 –4.0 –3.0 –2.5 –2.1 –2.2 –2.1 –2.1 –2.0
Indonesia –1.4 –1.1 –0.6 0.1 –0.3 –3.3 –1.8 0.0 0.5 –0.7 –0.4 –0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
Iran ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Kazakhstan –6.0 –4.0 –5.2 1.5 –1.5 –7.4 –4.4 0.8 –0.7 –1.7 –1.1 –0.9 –0.8 –0.9 –0.9
Kuwait ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Lebanon –2.8 –2.1 –4.0 –2.0 –7.0 –8.8 –2.4 –0.7 –2.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Malaysia –1.0 –0.9 –0.8 –1.7 –2.0 –2.1 –3.1 –3.0 –2.3 –1.4 –1.0 –0.8 –0.7 –0.5 –0.5
Mexico –1.4 –0.9 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.3 –0.9 1.0 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3
Morocco –1.0 0.5 –0.7 –0.5 –1.7 –3.1 –4.1 –3.2 –3.1 –1.9 –1.4 –1.0 –0.9 –0.8 –0.9
Oman ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Pakistan ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Peru –0.6 –0.9 –1.2 –0.9 –0.1 –5.3 –2.7 –0.9 –1.0 –2.1 –1.1 –0.9 –0.5 –0.1 –0.2
Philippines 2.2 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.1 –1.7 –3.5 –3.6 –2.2 –1.3 –1.2 –0.3 0.1 0.4 0.7
Poland –0.5 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 –1.0 –4.1 –1.0 –3.2 –2.5 –2.9 –2.8 –2.4 –2.1 –1.8 –1.5
Qatar –4.0 –6.8 –2.1 3.6 2.2 –5.7 3.6 9.2 4.8 4.7 2.8 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.8
Romania 0.2 –0.6 –2.1 –2.3 –4.5 –7.0 –5.1 –4.0 –3.8 –5.3 –5.0 –4.9 –4.7 –4.3 –4.1
Russian Federation –2.8 –2.8 –0.5 3.4 2.3 –4.1 0.8 –1.0 –2.2 –2.2 –0.5 –0.4 –0.5 –0.6 –0.8
Saudi Arabia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
South Africa –1.2 –0.6 –0.8 –0.6 –1.8 –2.7 0.0 0.5 –0.9 –0.9 –0.6 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5
Sri Lanka ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Thailand 1.4 1.4 0.6 1.0 1.3 –2.6 –4.3 –2.6 –0.5 –1.2 –2.5 –1.7 –1.4 –1.4 –1.4
Türkiye 1.0 –0.1 –1.3 –2.1 –2.3 –1.4 –1.6 –0.4 –4.1 –3.0 –0.2 0.6 0.3 –0.1 –0.4
Ukraine 5.4 3.0 2.3 1.1 1.3 –1.6 –0.5 –11.8 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
United Arab Emirates ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Uruguay3 0.1 –0.3 –0.3 0.5 0.2 –0.4 0.4 –0.1 –0.2 –0.3 –0.4 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 0.0
Venezuela ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vietnam ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: “Cyclically adjusted primary balance” is defined as the cyclically adjusted balance plus net interest payable/paid (interest expense minus interest revenue) following
the World Economic Outlook convention. For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table C. G20 = Group of Twenty; MENA = Middle East and North
Africa.
1 Data for these economies include adjustments beyond the output cycle. For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table C.
2 The data for Ecuador reflect cyclically adjusted primary balance of the nonfinancial public sector.
3 Data are for the nonfinancial public sector, which includes central government, local government, social security funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and Banco de

Seguros del Estado. The coverage of fiscal data was changed from the consolidated public sector to the nonfinancial public sector with the October 2019 submission. With this
narrower coverage, the central bank balances are not included in the fiscal data. Historical data were also revised accordingly. Starting in October 2018, the public pension
system has been receiving transfers in the context of a new law that compensates persons affected by the creation of the mixed pension system. These funds are recorded as
revenues, consistent with the IMF’s methodology. Therefore, data for 2018–22 are affected by these transfers, which amounted to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2018, 1.0 percent of
GDP in 2019, 0.6 percent of GDP in 2020, 0.3 percent of GDP in 2021, 0.1 percent of GDP in 2022, and 0 thereafter. See IMF Country Report No. 19/64 for further details. The
disclaimer about the public pension system applies only to the revenues and net lending/borrowing series.
International Monetary Fund | October 2024 57
 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A13. Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies: General Government Revenue, 2015–29
(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average 27.5 27.1 27.3 27.9 27.4 25.5 26.6 26.8 26.8 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 26.9
Asia 26.2 26.0 26.1 26.2 25.4 23.5 24.6 24.1 24.3 24.4 24.5 24.6 24.7 24.8 24.9
Europe 33.3 33.5 33.6 35.1 35.0 34.5 34.5 33.8 34.5 35.0 35.2 35.3 35.2 35.1 35.0
Latin America 29.4 29.5 29.2 29.1 29.4 27.4 28.9 30.3 29.5 29.6 29.7 29.7 29.7 29.8 29.9
MENA 26.4 24.0 25.7 29.3 29.3 26.6 28.0 31.1 30.2 29.0 28.4 28.3 27.8 27.3 26.8
G20 Emerging 28.1 28.0 28.1 28.3 27.6 25.6 26.7 26.6 26.7 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.1 27.1 27.1
Algeria 27.0 25.3 28.7 30.1 28.6 27.0 26.2 29.7 32.9 29.2 28.3 28.1 27.4 27.2 27.0
Angola 21.3 15.4 15.3 20.3 18.9 18.3 20.7 20.1 17.4 18.0 16.8 16.1 15.3 14.8 13.7
Argentina 35.4 34.9 34.4 33.5 33.7 33.8 33.6 33.9 32.5 31.9 33.8 34.3 34.1 34.3 34.3
Bahrain 17.4 16.7 17.3 20.8 22.7 17.3 20.1 22.3 19.3 20.7 19.3 18.0 16.9 16.5 16.0
Belarus 38.8 39.0 38.7 39.6 38.3 35.2 36.5 36.4 41.0 42.0 42.0 41.7 41.5 41.4 41.3
Brazil 36.9 37.5 36.3 37.2 38.2 34.5 37.7 39.5 37.8 39.3 39.3 39.1 39.4 39.7 39.8
Bulgaria 34.6 34.3 32.9 34.4 34.9 34.9 35.8 36.9 34.7 36.5 36.5 36.0 35.9 35.9 35.9
Chile 22.9 22.7 22.9 24.1 23.8 22.0 26.1 28.0 25.1 24.7 25.5 26.3 26.4 26.3 26.3
China 29.0 28.9 29.2 29.0 28.1 25.7 26.6 26.0 26.2 26.4 26.6 26.8 27.0 27.1 27.2
Colombia 27.8 27.7 26.8 30.0 29.4 26.6 27.2 27.8 32.3 28.8 28.5 28.5 28.8 29.1 29.3
Dominican Republic 16.6 13.9 14.0 14.2 14.4 14.2 15.6 15.3 15.7 16.3 15.2 15.2 15.2 15.2 15.2
Ecuador1 37.2 33.8 34.7 38.1 36.3 32.8 35.8 38.7 36.7 38.6 37.1 37.3 36.8 36.6 36.1
Egypt 20.9 19.2 20.7 19.7 19.3 18.2 18.6 18.9 17.0 16.6 17.6 19.4 20.7 20.8 20.7
Hungary 48.4 45.0 44.3 44.0 44.0 43.8 41.2 42.7 42.4 43.7 43.5 44.1 44.6 44.2 44.2
India 19.9 20.1 20.0 20.0 19.2 18.2 20.4 20.0 20.8 21.3 21.1 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.5
Indonesia 14.9 14.4 14.2 14.9 14.3 12.4 13.7 15.2 15.0 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.5 14.6 14.6
Iran 14.8 15.3 15.5 13.6 9.7 7.8 11.0 11.1 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.8 11.8 11.9 11.9
Kazakhstan 16.6 17.0 19.8 21.4 19.7 17.5 17.1 21.8 21.7 19.8 19.5 19.3 19.3 19.1 19.2
Kuwait 71.9 67.3 68.3 67.8 60.8 58.7 56.5 69.8 78.6 75.3 74.4 73.4 72.7 72.0 71.3
Lebanon 19.2 19.4 21.9 21.0 20.8 15.8 8.3 5.7 12.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Malaysia 22.2 20.3 19.6 20.2 21.6 20.1 18.4 19.8 19.6 18.2 17.6 17.4 17.5 17.4 17.4
Mexico 22.7 23.8 24.0 22.8 23.0 23.5 23.0 24.3 24.4 24.2 23.9 23.4 23.3 23.0 23.0
Morocco 23.9 24.1 24.6 24.2 23.8 27.0 25.3 28.7 28.4 28.7 27.8 27.2 27.0 26.8 26.7
Oman 31.1 25.0 29.0 31.6 33.9 28.9 33.3 40.7 33.4 32.1 29.1 29.0 28.2 27.5 26.7
Pakistan 13.1 13.8 14.0 13.4 11.3 13.3 12.4 12.1 11.5 12.6 15.4 15.0 15.5 15.8 15.8
Peru 20.1 18.6 18.1 19.2 19.7 17.8 21.0 22.1 19.7 19.2 20.2 19.9 20.0 20.0 20.0
Philippines 17.9 18.3 18.7 19.4 20.2 20.4 21.0 20.4 20.3 20.5 20.2 20.1 20.1 20.1 20.1
Poland 39.1 38.9 39.9 41.2 41.1 41.3 42.3 40.2 41.6 43.4 43.9 44.1 43.2 43.2 42.9
Qatar 57.0 30.9 27.8 31.2 33.5 32.6 29.6 34.7 32.8 27.5 27.7 28.7 27.5 27.0 27.2
Romania 32.8 29.3 28.2 29.0 28.8 28.6 30.4 31.2 31.0 31.5 31.9 32.7 32.2 32.2 32.2
Russian Federation 31.9 32.9 33.4 35.5 35.7 35.2 35.4 34.2 34.3 35.4 36.5 36.5 36.7 36.5 36.5
Saudi Arabia 24.4 20.8 23.2 28.5 29.5 28.4 29.5 30.8 30.3 29.7 29.2 29.1 28.5 27.8 27.1
South Africa 25.8 26.2 25.8 26.4 26.3 25.0 27.0 27.6 26.8 27.0 27.0 27.1 27.1 27.2 27.2
Sri Lanka 12.6 13.2 12.8 12.6 11.9 8.8 8.3 8.4 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Thailand 22.5 21.8 21.1 21.5 21.0 20.4 20.0 20.1 20.9 20.9 20.9 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0
Türkiye 32.0 32.1 30.7 31.2 30.7 30.0 28.2 26.2 27.9 29.2 29.1 28.8 28.9 28.9 28.9
Ukraine 41.9 38.3 39.3 39.8 39.4 39.7 36.5 49.8 54.8 45.1 40.0 40.2 42.1 41.8 41.6
United Arab Emirates 20.7 29.7 28.0 30.5 31.0 28.7 30.4 33.1 28.2 28.3 28.0 27.8 27.6 27.5 27.5
Uruguay2 26.5 27.0 27.2 28.5 27.9 28.1 27.6 27.6 27.7 28.5 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.1
Venezuela 14.9 11.2 8.5 6.9 10.1 4.5 7.2 8.3 10.8 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vietnam 19.2 19.1 19.6 19.5 19.4 18.4 18.7 19.0 17.1 17.6 18.4 18.9 19.1 19.2 19.2
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table C. G20 = Group of Twenty; MENA = Middle East and North Africa.
1 The data for Ecuador reflect revenue of the nonfinancial public sector.
2 Data are for the nonfinancial public sector, which includes central government, local government, social security funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and Banco de

Seguros del Estado. The coverage of fiscal data was changed from the consolidated public sector to the nonfinancial public sector with the October 2019 submission. With this
narrower coverage, the central bank balances are not included in the fiscal data. Historical data were also revised accordingly. Starting in October 2018, the public pension
system has been receiving transfers in the context of a new law that compensates persons affected by the creation of the mixed pension system. These funds are recorded as
revenues, consistent with the IMF’s methodology. Therefore, data for 2018–22 are affected by these transfers, which amounted to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2018, 1.0 percent of
GDP in 2019, 0.6 percent of GDP in 2020, 0.3 percent of GDP in 2021, 0.1 percent of GDP in 2022, and 0 thereafter. See IMF Country Report No. 19/64 for further details. The
disclaimer about the public pension system applies only to the revenues and net lending/borrowing series.

58 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A14. Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies: General Government Expenditure, 2015–29
(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average 31.6 31.5 31.1 31.3 31.8 34.2 31.6 31.7 32.2 32.6 32.5 32.4 32.3 32.3 32.2
Asia 29.3 29.7 29.7 30.4 31.0 33.0 31.0 31.3 30.9 31.3 31.5 31.6 31.8 31.9 32.0
Europe 35.8 36.2 35.3 34.7 35.6 39.9 36.2 36.1 38.6 39.2 38.5 38.1 37.7 37.6 37.4
Latin America 35.3 34.9 34.3 34.1 33.1 35.6 32.8 33.9 34.6 34.5 33.9 33.3 32.9 32.7 32.7
MENA 34.0 32.6 30.3 30.7 31.7 34.9 29.9 27.4 30.0 30.7 30.4 29.9 29.2 28.5 27.9
G20 Emerging 32.3 32.5 32.2 32.3 32.8 34.9 32.1 32.6 32.9 33.4 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.4 33.4
Algeria 40.9 37.2 36.2 36.2 37.1 37.5 32.5 32.7 38.1 38.5 36.8 35.7 34.6 34.0 33.8
Angola 23.9 19.4 21.0 18.3 18.2 20.0 17.3 19.5 19.2 16.4 15.5 15.2 14.4 14.1 13.9
Argentina 41.4 41.5 41.1 38.9 38.1 42.5 37.9 37.7 37.8 32.0 33.7 33.4 33.0 33.0 32.9
Bahrain 34.8 33.3 30.7 32.1 31.2 34.6 30.6 27.4 29.8 28.3 26.5 25.8 25.5 25.7 25.5
Belarus 41.8 40.7 39.0 37.8 37.4 38.0 36.7 38.4 40.3 40.9 41.2 41.3 41.2 41.3 41.3
Brazil 46.2 45.5 44.3 44.2 43.0 46.2 40.4 43.4 45.4 46.2 46.6 46.0 45.3 45.1 45.0
Bulgaria 37.3 32.7 32.0 34.3 35.9 37.8 38.6 37.7 37.7 39.5 39.5 39.0 39.1 39.1 39.0
Chile 25.0 25.4 25.5 25.6 26.5 29.1 33.6 26.6 27.4 27.0 26.9 26.7 26.5 26.4 26.4
China 31.6 32.3 32.6 33.3 34.2 35.4 32.7 33.5 33.2 33.9 34.1 34.5 34.9 35.2 35.4
Colombia 31.3 30.0 29.3 34.7 32.9 33.5 34.3 33.9 35.0 33.2 32.3 32.0 31.8 31.6 31.7
Dominican Republic 16.7 17.0 17.1 16.4 17.9 22.1 18.5 18.5 19.0 19.4 18.3 18.1 17.8 17.4 17.1
Ecuador1 44.1 44.1 40.5 40.9 39.8 40.2 37.4 38.7 40.2 40.6 38.2 37.5 36.8 35.9 35.2
Egypt 31.3 31.0 30.6 28.6 26.9 25.7 25.5 24.7 22.7 26.8 27.7 27.6 26.3 24.9 23.4
Hungary 50.4 46.8 46.7 46.1 46.1 51.4 48.4 48.9 49.1 48.7 48.1 47.6 47.6 47.0 46.9
India 27.1 27.2 26.2 26.3 26.8 31.0 29.7 29.1 29.1 29.0 28.7 28.5 28.4 28.3 28.1
Indonesia 17.6 16.9 16.4 16.6 16.4 18.4 18.1 17.4 16.7 16.9 17.0 17.0 16.9 16.8 16.8
Iran 16.3 17.0 17.1 15.3 14.1 13.0 14.2 13.9 14.4 14.7 15.0 14.9 14.6 14.4 14.3
Kazakhstan 22.9 21.5 24.1 18.8 20.2 24.5 22.1 21.7 23.2 22.1 21.7 21.4 21.4 21.5 21.4
Kuwait 55.2 54.0 51.5 50.6 49.8 62.5 48.1 39.4 48.7 49.7 49.1 48.6 48.4 48.4 48.4
Lebanon 26.7 28.3 30.6 32.3 31.3 23.2 10.9 12.2 13.3 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Malaysia 24.7 22.9 22.0 22.8 23.6 25.0 24.5 24.6 24.2 21.8 21.1 20.9 21.0 20.8 20.6
Mexico 26.6 26.5 25.0 25.0 25.2 27.8 26.8 28.6 28.7 30.1 27.4 26.1 26.0 25.7 25.6
Morocco 28.4 28.6 27.8 27.7 27.4 34.1 31.2 34.1 32.8 32.9 31.6 30.5 30.1 29.9 29.7
Oman 44.5 44.6 39.4 38.3 38.8 44.5 36.5 30.3 26.7 27.0 26.6 25.7 24.8 24.0 23.2
Pakistan 17.8 17.7 19.1 19.1 19.1 20.3 18.5 20.0 19.2 19.3 21.4 19.7 19.0 18.8 18.6
Peru 22.2 20.8 20.9 21.2 21.1 26.1 23.5 23.5 22.5 22.4 22.1 21.4 20.8 20.4 20.4
Philippines 17.8 19.0 19.5 20.9 21.7 25.9 27.2 25.9 24.7 24.3 24.1 23.1 22.5 22.1 21.8
Poland 41.7 41.3 41.4 41.4 41.9 48.2 44.1 43.6 46.7 49.0 49.4 49.1 47.9 47.4 46.9
Qatar 38.6 40.1 34.7 28.9 32.5 34.7 29.4 24.3 27.3 25.5 25.5 24.7 23.9 23.7 23.7
Romania 34.2 31.8 31.0 31.7 33.3 38.2 37.1 37.0 36.6 39.2 39.3 39.8 39.2 38.9 38.7
Russian Federation 35.3 36.6 34.8 32.6 33.8 39.2 34.7 35.6 36.5 37.3 37.0 37.1 37.2 37.2 37.3
Saudi Arabia 39.9 34.5 32.1 34.0 33.7 39.1 31.7 28.2 32.3 32.7 32.6 32.3 31.6 30.8 30.0
South Africa 30.2 29.9 29.9 30.2 31.4 34.6 32.5 31.9 32.6 33.2 33.4 32.5 32.3 32.3 32.3
Sri Lanka 19.3 18.2 17.9 17.5 19.5 21.0 20.0 18.6 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Thailand 22.3 21.4 21.5 21.3 20.6 24.9 26.8 24.5 22.9 23.3 24.8 23.9 23.7 23.7 23.7
Türkiye 32.5 33.8 32.6 34.3 35.5 34.7 31.3 27.3 33.2 34.3 32.7 31.8 31.9 31.9 31.9
Ukraine 43.0 40.8 41.7 41.9 41.5 45.6 40.5 65.4 74.4 63.8 59.2 49.7 44.7 43.9 43.3
United Arab Emirates 27.2 32.8 28.1 26.7 28.4 31.1 26.4 23.1 23.3 23.5 23.7 23.6 23.4 23.4 23.4
Uruguay2 28.4 29.7 29.7 30.3 30.6 32.7 30.2 30.2 30.8 31.5 30.6 30.5 30.3 30.2 30.1
Venezuela 22.9 19.7 21.8 37.9 21.0 11.1 13.1 15.1 15.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vietnam 24.2 22.2 21.5 20.5 19.8 21.3 20.1 18.3 19.5 20.2 20.7 21.0 21.1 21.0 21.0
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table C. G20 = Group of Twenty; MENA = Middle East and North Africa.
1 The data for Ecuador reflect expenditure of the nonfinancial public sector.
2 Data are for the nonfinancial public sector, which includes central government, local government, social security funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and Banco de

Seguros del Estado. The coverage of fiscal data was changed from the consolidated public sector to the nonfinancial public sector with the October 2019 submission. With this
narrower coverage, the central bank balances are not included in the fiscal data. Historical data were also revised accordingly.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 59

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A15. Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies: General Government Gross Debt, 2015–29
(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average1 44.3 49.8 51.9 53.1 55.7 65.5 64.7 64.9 69.4 70.8 73.0 75.0 76.9 78.8 80.6
Asia 45.0 51.7 55.0 56.3 59.5 69.7 70.9 74.4 79.6 83.8 86.4 88.9 91.6 94.3 97.0
Europe 30.3 31.2 29.3 29.0 28.5 37.0 34.4 32.0 33.8 34.4 36.4 38.0 38.9 39.8 40.5
Latin America 56.9 60.6 62.9 66.6 67.6 76.6 70.8 68.3 74.3 69.8 70.3 70.3 70.0 69.8 69.4
MENA 33.7 41.7 41.9 40.1 43.3 54.5 51.4 43.4 44.2 43.9 44.2 44.8 45.3 45.9 46.3
G20 Emerging 43.8 49.9 52.9 54.5 57.5 67.2 66.7 68.1 73.9 75.8 78.4 80.8 83.3 85.8 88.2
Algeria 7.7 18.1 24.0 34.5 40.9 46.0 55.1 48.1 48.6 45.7 50.4 53.9 57.1 59.8 62.3
Angola 50.4 66.7 60.5 82.5 101.4 119.1 74.3 56.1 73.7 59.3 52.1 44.8 38.6 35.0 32.7
Argentina 52.6 53.1 57.0 85.2 89.8 103.8 81.0 84.5 155.4 91.5 78.5 68.0 59.8 54.8 51.5
Bahrain 63.2 77.4 84.0 90.4 97.1 125.7 122.3 111.1 123.3 126.7 129.8 132.3 135.4 138.8 142.1
Belarus 53.0 53.5 53.2 47.5 41.0 47.5 41.2 41.3 40.7 41.4 40.3 40.6 39.9 39.1 38.4
Brazil 71.7 77.4 82.7 84.8 87.1 96.0 88.9 83.9 84.7 87.6 92.0 94.7 96.4 97.4 97.6
Bulgaria 25.4 27.0 22.9 20.1 18.3 22.8 22.5 21.5 22.0 23.7 25.4 27.1 29.0 30.9 32.6
Chile 17.4 21.1 23.7 25.8 28.3 32.4 36.4 37.8 39.4 41.0 41.6 41.4 41.5 41.9 41.8
China2 41.5 50.7 55.0 56.7 60.4 70.2 71.9 77.4 84.4 90.1 93.8 97.7 102.1 106.6 111.1
Colombia 50.4 49.8 49.4 53.6 52.4 65.7 64.0 60.1 54.3 55.8 56.1 56.5 56.6 56.4 56.0
Dominican Republic 44.7 46.6 48.9 50.5 53.6 71.5 63.2 59.5 60.0 59.2 58.1 56.7 55.0 53.2 51.1
Ecuador 36.4 46.1 47.4 49.5 52.1 63.6 61.6 57.0 55.3 56.5 56.5 55.7 54.4 52.4 49.9
Egypt 83.8 91.6 97.8 87.9 80.1 86.2 89.9 88.5 95.9 90.9 84.5 79.1 73.9 69.2 64.5
Hungary 75.8 74.9 72.1 69.1 65.3 79.3 76.7 74.1 73.5 73.5 73.6 73.0 71.9 70.5 69.2
India 69.0 68.9 69.7 70.4 75.0 88.4 83.5 81.7 83.0 83.1 82.6 81.7 80.8 79.7 78.4
Indonesia 27.0 28.0 29.4 30.4 30.6 39.7 41.1 40.1 39.6 40.5 40.7 40.6 40.3 40.0 39.6
Iran 37.0 47.9 45.0 42.9 46.6 48.3 42.4 36.9 34.0 34.6 34.9 35.2 35.3 35.5 35.5
Kazakhstan 21.9 19.7 19.9 20.3 19.9 26.4 25.1 23.5 22.8 24.8 27.6 30.0 32.0 34.4 36.6
Kuwait 4.6 9.9 19.6 14.3 10.5 10.2 7.2 2.9 3.2 7.2 12.9 16.2 19.7 23.9 24.8
Lebanon 140.8 146.4 150.0 155.1 172.1 148.7 357.7 255.2 195.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Malaysia 57.0 55.8 54.4 55.6 57.1 67.7 69.2 65.5 69.8 68.4 68.1 68.2 68.8 69.3 69.6
Mexico 51.0 55.0 52.5 52.2 51.9 58.5 56.9 54.2 53.1 57.7 57.9 57.8 57.9 57.9 58.1
Morocco 58.4 60.1 60.3 60.5 60.3 72.2 69.4 71.5 69.5 68.7 68.0 66.9 66.2 65.6 65.1
Oman 13.9 29.3 40.1 44.7 52.5 67.9 61.9 40.9 36.5 34.1 33.6 31.7 30.4 29.2 29.0
Pakistan 57.9 60.8 60.9 64.8 77.5 79.6 73.5 76.2 77.3 69.2 71.4 69.8 67.4 64.0 60.7
Peru 23.9 24.2 25.1 25.9 26.9 34.9 36.1 34.0 33.0 34.2 35.3 35.7 35.7 35.0 34.4
Philippines 39.7 37.4 38.1 37.1 37.0 51.6 57.0 57.4 56.5 57.6 58.2 58.0 57.1 55.8 54.2
Poland 51.3 54.5 50.8 48.7 45.7 57.2 53.6 49.2 49.6 55.5 60.0 62.9 64.4 65.5 66.3
Qatar 35.5 46.7 51.6 52.2 62.1 72.6 58.4 42.6 43.3 41.2 40.2 38.9 36.8 36.2 36.1
Romania 39.4 39.5 37.1 36.2 36.6 49.4 51.7 51.3 52.1 55.7 59.7 63.1 66.7 69.9 72.9
Russian Federation 15.3 14.8 14.3 13.6 13.7 19.2 16.4 18.5 19.5 19.9 20.4 21.4 22.5 23.7 25.1
Saudi Arabia 5.7 12.7 16.5 17.6 21.6 31.0 28.6 23.9 26.2 28.3 30.6 31.9 33.1 34.3 35.3
South Africa 45.2 47.1 48.6 51.5 56.1 68.9 68.7 70.8 73.4 75.0 77.4 79.1 80.6 82.2 83.6
Sri Lanka 76.3 75.0 72.3 83.6 82.6 96.9 102.7 115.9 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Thailand3 42.6 41.7 41.8 41.9 41.1 49.4 58.3 60.5 62.4 65.0 66.1 66.4 66.3 66.2 66.1
Türkiye 27.2 27.7 27.8 29.9 32.4 39.4 40.4 30.8 29.3 25.2 26.0 26.0 26.0 25.9 25.6
Ukraine 79.3 79.5 71.6 60.4 50.6 60.6 48.9 77.7 82.3 95.6 106.6 107.6 102.6 98.5 94.0
United Arab Emirates 16.1 19.3 21.9 21.3 26.8 41.3 36.3 32.1 32.4 31.4 31.3 30.7 30.2 29.9 29.4
Uruguay4 57.8 56.4 55.8 57.9 59.6 68.1 64.1 60.3 64.5 64.7 65.0 65.2 65.0 64.8 64.7
Venezuela 129.8 138.4 133.6 175.3 206.0 329.1 249.7 160.7 146.3 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vietnam 46.1 47.9 46.6 43.8 41.0 41.3 39.2 34.7 34.4 33.8 33.2 32.6 32.0 31.5 31.0
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table C. G20 = Group of Twenty; MENA = Middle East and North Africa.
1 The average does not include the debt incurred by the European Union and used to finance the grants portion of the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) package. This totaled €58 bil-

lion (0.4 percent of EU GDP) as of December 31, 2021, and €158 billion (1 percent of EU GDP) as of February 16, 2023. Debt incurred by the European Union and used to
onlend to member states is included within member state debt data and regional aggregates.
2 China’s deficit and public debt numbers presented in this table cover a narrower perimeter of the general government than IMF staff’s estimates in China Article IV reports

(see IMF 2024 for a reconciliation of the two estimates).

3 Data cover debt of the central government, social security funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and government-guaranteed debt of the financial public corporations.
4 Data are for the nonfinancial public sector, which includes central government, local government, social security funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and Banco de

Seguros del Estado. The coverage of fiscal data was changed from the consolidated public sector to the nonfinancial public sector with the October 2019 submission. With this
narrower coverage, the central bank balances are not included in the fiscal data. Historical data were also revised accordingly.

60 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A16. Emerging Market and Middle–Income Economies: General Government Net Debt, 2015–29
(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average1 28.4 34.1 35.4 36.3 38.0 45.3 44.9 42.4 42.9 43.9 45.4 46.5 47.0 47.4 47.4
Asia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Europe 28.1 30.1 28.8 29.1 29.2 35.5 36.0 30.3 30.0 30.9 33.1 34.6 35.8 36.6 37.2
Latin America 34.5 39.9 42.2 42.7 43.9 51.0 48.3 48.3 50.2 52.2 54.5 55.9 56.7 57.1 57.3
MENA 12.4 26.6 27.3 28.6 32.8 42.7 45.1 38.0 37.6 38.6 38.3 39.0 39.4 39.7 39.5
G20 Emerging 25.7 31.6 34.6 35.4 37.1 43.9 43.1 40.7 42.5 43.4 45.5 46.9 47.6 48.1 48.3
Algeria –6.8 11.8 19.0 23.1 27.1 38.7 45.4 35.6 33.1 43.1 47.8 51.4 54.1 56.3 58.9
Angola ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Argentina ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Bahrain ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Belarus ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Brazil 35.6 46.1 51.4 52.8 54.7 61.4 55.1 56.1 60.9 61.0 66.4 69.6 71.6 72.9 73.6
Bulgaria 15.4 11.3 10.3 9.0 8.4 13.0 12.7 11.5 13.8 15.8 17.8 19.8 21.9 24.0 26.0
Chile –3.5 0.9 4.4 5.7 8.0 13.3 20.2 20.4 23.2 24.2 25.0 24.6 24.0 23.5 23.0
China2 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Colombia 42.1 38.6 38.6 43.1 43.1 54.6 54.1 51.4 46.2 49.7 49.5 50.4 50.8 50.6 50.3
Dominican Republic 37.2 38.5 40.3 41.4 43.4 57.5 49.5 46.6 46.9 46.7 45.6 44.5 42.9 41.4 39.4
Ecuador ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Egypt 75.3 81.6 86.6 80.7 74.6 80.6 85.2 83.9 91.2 86.2 79.9 74.4 69.2 64.5 59.9
Hungary 68.3 65.5 63.6 60.1 57.4 66.0 65.6 63.7 59.5 59.6 59.7 59.0 58.0 56.6 55.3
India ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Indonesia 22.0 23.5 25.3 26.7 27.0 36.1 37.8 37.3 36.9 38.0 38.4 38.4 38.3 38.2 37.9
Iran 21.6 36.4 32.9 31.5 36.8 40.4 36.9 31.4 28.4 29.8 30.5 31.2 31.6 32.1 32.5
Kazakhstan –30.8 –23.8 –15.7 –14.9 –13.9 –8.6 –3.3 –1.2 0.2 2.0 3.4 4.4 5.6 7.0 8.0
Kuwait ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Lebanon 134.4 140.7 144.4 150.8 166.9 146.1 354.1 251.5 190.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Malaysia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Mexico 44.9 47.2 44.5 43.6 43.3 50.2 49.3 48.1 47.9 52.5 52.7 52.6 52.7 52.7 52.9
Morocco 57.8 59.6 59.9 60.2 60.0 71.6 68.8 71.1 68.6 67.9 67.1 66.1 65.4 64.8 64.3
Oman –37.0 –24.2 –10.4 6.4 11.2 27.7 25.1 10.6 3.5 –1.0 –0.8 –0.9 –1.6 –2.0 –2.9
Pakistan 53.3 55.1 55.9 59.9 70.2 72.9 66.0 68.8 71.2 63.5 65.6 64.6 62.7 59.8 56.9
Peru 5.3 6.9 8.6 10.1 11.1 20.3 19.2 19.4 21.0 23.0 23.9 24.3 24.1 23.4 22.8
Philippines ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Poland 46.4 47.9 44.4 41.5 38.5 44.9 40.7 37.2 38.6 43.7 47.4 49.9 51.9 53.4 54.6
Qatar ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Romania 28.3 26.8 25.9 26.2 28.6 37.8 40.5 39.4 40.5 44.5 48.6 52.3 56.1 59.5 62.6
Russian Federation ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Saudi Arabia –35.1 –16.6 –7.4 –0.1 4.7 15.1 16.9 12.8 15.3 17.7 20.3 22.2 23.9 25.1 26.0
South Africa 41.0 42.1 43.8 46.6 50.6 62.1 62.9 66.2 69.0 72.2 75.2 77.1 78.7 80.4 81.9
Sri Lanka ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Thailand ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Türkiye 22.8 23.3 22.1 24.1 26.5 30.7 34.0 23.5 22.1 20.3 21.8 22.2 22.5 22.7 22.6
Ukraine ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
United Arab Emirates ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Uruguay3 44.4 44.3 44.2 46.6 49.9 57.3 54.1 51.6 55.8 56.1 56.5 56.7 56.7 56.5 56.4
Venezuela ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vietnam ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country–specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table C. G20 = Group of Twenty; MENA = Middle East and North Africa.
1 The average does not include the debt incurred by the European Union and used to finance the grants portion of the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) package. This totaled €58 bil-

lion (0.4 percent of EU GDP) as of December 31, 2021, and €158 billion (1 percent of EU GDP) as of February 16, 2023. Debt incurred by the European Union and used to
onlend to member states is included within member state debt data and regional aggregates.
2 China’s deficit and public debt numbers presented in this table cover a narrower perimeter of the general government than IMF staff’s estimates in China Article IV reports

(see IMF 2024 for a reconciliation of the two estimates).

3 Data are for the nonfinancial public sector, which includes central government, local government, social security funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and Banco de

Seguros del Estado. The coverage of fiscal data was changed from the consolidated public sector to the nonfinancial public sector with the October 2019 submission. With this
narrower coverage, the central bank balances are not included in the fiscal data. Historical data were also revised accordingly.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 61

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A17. Low-Income Developing Countries: General Government Overall Balance, 2015–29
(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average –3.6 –3.7 –3.9 –3.6 –4.0 –5.3 –4.6 –4.4 –3.9 –3.8 –3.3 –3.3 –3.2 –3.2 –3.2
Oil Producers –4.5 –5.2 –5.3 –4.1 –4.4 –5.3 –5.1 –4.8 –3.9 –4.0 –3.9 –3.9 –3.8 –4.2 –4.3
Asia –3.0 –3.2 –3.7 –3.8 –4.6 –5.1 –4.2 –4.0 –4.6 –4.6 –4.2 –4.5 –4.5 –4.6 –4.6
Latin America –1.2 –0.7 –0.7 –1.3 –0.8 –3.4 –2.5 0.4 0.4 1.7 –0.7 –1.1 –0.9 –1.0 –1.0
Sub–Saharan Africa –4.0 –4.5 –4.5 –3.9 –4.0 –5.8 –5.3 –5.2 –3.9 –3.9 –3.1 –2.8 –2.7 –2.7 –2.7
Others –3.1 –2.2 –2.1 –1.8 –2.8 –3.4 –2.0 –2.5 –3.3 –2.9 –2.7 –2.8 –2.7 –2.6 –2.5
Afghanistan –1.4 0.1 –0.7 1.6 –1.1 –2.2 –0.5 –1.0 –1.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Bangladesh –3.3 –3.2 –4.2 –4.1 –5.4 –4.8 –3.6 –4.1 –4.6 –4.6 –4.2 –4.9 –5.0 –5.1 –5.2
Benin –5.6 –4.3 –4.2 –3.0 –0.5 –4.7 –5.7 –5.6 –4.1 –3.7 –2.9 –2.9 –2.9 –2.9 –2.9
Burkina Faso –2.1 –3.1 –6.9 –4.4 –3.4 –5.2 –7.5 –10.7 –6.9 –5.7 –4.7 –3.8 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0
Cambodia –0.6 –0.3 –0.8 0.3 2.2 –2.5 –5.2 –0.3 –2.8 –2.3 –2.1 –2.0 –1.9 –1.9 –1.8
Cameroon –4.2 –5.9 –4.7 –2.4 –3.2 –3.2 –3.0 –1.1 –0.6 –0.5 –0.8 –1.1 –1.1 –1.1 –1.1
Chad –3.3 –1.5 –0.2 1.4 –0.1 1.2 –1.5 4.2 –1.3 –0.7 –2.6 –3.1 –2.8 –2.9 –3.5
Congo, Democratic 0.7 –0.5 0.7 –0.8 –2.5 –3.1 –1.6 –0.5 –1.7 –2.0 –1.2 –1.1 –1.0 –1.2 –1.6
Republic of the
Congo, Republic of –17.8 –14.5 –5.6 5.2 4.3 –1.1 1.6 8.9 5.8 3.8 3.0 2.8 3.6 4.2 4.7
Côte d’Ivoire –2.0 –3.0 –3.3 –2.9 –2.2 –5.4 –4.9 –6.8 –5.2 –4.0 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0
Ethiopia –1.9 –2.3 –3.2 –3.0 –2.5 –2.8 –2.8 –4.2 –2.6 –1.7 –1.7 –2.1 –2.0 –2.0 –2.0
Ghana –4.0 –6.7 –4.0 –6.8 –7.5 –17.4 –12.0 –11.8 –3.6 –4.7 –3.7 –3.1 –2.8 –2.8 –3.1
Guinea –6.6 –0.1 –2.1 –1.1 –0.3 –3.1 –1.7 –0.8 –1.8 –3.0 –2.6 –2.6 –2.5 –2.4 –2.3
Haiti1 –1.5 0.1 –0.3 –1.1 –2.0 –2.1 –2.3 –1.8 0.9 7.1 0.0 –1.3 –1.3 –1.4 –1.5
Honduras –0.8 –0.4 –0.4 0.2 0.1 –4.6 –3.2 1.7 –1.0 –1.5 –1.6 –1.3 –1.0 –1.1 –1.1
Kenya –6.7 –7.5 –7.4 –6.9 –7.4 –8.1 –7.2 –6.1 –5.8 –5.0 –4.3 –4.0 –3.6 –3.3 –3.4
Kyrgyz Republic –2.5 –5.8 –3.7 –0.6 –0.1 –3.1 –0.7 –0.3 1.8 0.5 –1.3 –2.1 –3.0 –3.4 –4.1
Lao P.D.R. –5.6 –5.1 –5.5 –4.5 –3.2 –5.4 –0.7 0.1 0.7 –0.5 –0.1 –0.3 –0.6 –0.7 –0.8
Madagascar –2.9 –1.1 –2.1 –1.3 –1.4 –4.0 –2.8 –5.5 –4.1 –3.8 –3.8 –4.0 –3.8 –3.6 –3.7
Malawi –4.2 –4.9 –5.2 –4.3 –4.5 –8.0 –8.3 –9.3 –9.2 –8.0 –5.6 –3.0 –2.0 –1.6 –1.4
Mali –1.8 –3.9 –2.9 –4.7 –1.7 –5.4 –4.8 –5.0 –3.9 –3.6 –3.3 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0
Moldova –1.9 –1.5 –0.7 –0.9 –1.5 –5.3 –2.6 –3.2 –5.2 –5.0 –3.8 –3.4 –3.1 –2.6 –2.4
Mozambique –6.6 –5.1 –2.0 –5.7 1.7 –4.5 –3.9 –5.1 –4.1 –4.2 –2.0 –0.9 –0.4 1.0 2.6
Myanmar –2.8 –3.9 –2.9 –3.4 –3.9 –5.9 –7.0 –4.6 –5.7 –5.8 –6.1 –5.8 –5.4 –5.3 –4.8
Nepal 0.6 1.2 –2.7 –5.8 –5.0 –5.4 –4.0 –3.1 –5.8 –4.7 –4.1 –3.6 –3.2 –2.9 –2.7
Nicaragua –1.6 –1.9 –1.8 –4.3 –1.1 –2.6 –1.3 0.8 2.5 0.3 0.0 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.4
Niger –6.7 –4.5 –4.1 –3.0 –3.6 –4.8 –6.1 –6.8 –5.4 –4.1 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0
Nigeria –3.8 –4.6 –5.4 –4.3 –4.7 –5.6 –5.5 –5.4 –4.2 –4.6 –4.2 –4.0 –4.3 –4.7 –4.8
Papua New Guinea –4.5 –4.7 –2.5 –2.6 –5.0 –8.9 –6.8 –5.3 –4.3 –3.9 –2.7 –1.5 0.0 0.1 0.4
Rwanda –2.7 –2.3 –2.5 –2.6 –5.1 –9.5 –7.0 –5.7 –5.1 –7.3 –3.7 –2.9 –2.9 –2.8 –2.6
Senegal –3.7 –3.3 –3.0 –3.7 –3.9 –6.4 –6.3 –6.6 –4.9 –7.5 –4.5 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0
Sudan –3.9 –3.9 –6.1 –7.9 –10.8 –6.0 –0.3 –2.1 –3.6 –2.8 –3.8 –3.8 –3.7 –3.3 –3.0
Tajikistan –2.0 –2.9 –5.6 –2.7 –2.0 –4.3 –0.7 –0.2 –1.3 –2.5 –2.5 –2.5 –2.5 –2.5 –2.5
Tanzania –3.2 –2.1 –1.1 –2.0 –2.1 –2.6 –3.5 –3.9 –3.5 –2.9 –2.9 –2.8 –2.7 –2.7 –2.7
Uganda –2.6 –2.6 –3.8 –3.0 –4.8 –7.8 –7.4 –5.9 –4.9 –4.9 –3.8 –1.5 –1.0 –1.0 –1.4
Uzbekistan –0.3 0.7 1.0 1.6 –0.3 –2.9 –4.1 –3.7 –4.0 –3.5 –2.5 –2.6 –2.6 –2.5 –2.5
Yemen –8.7 –8.5 –4.9 –7.8 –5.9 –4.5 –0.9 –2.7 –6.1 –3.5 –4.0 –4.9 –1.9 –1.7 –1.7
Zambia –8.9 –5.7 –7.5 –8.3 –9.4 –13.8 –8.1 –7.8 –6.5 –6.1 –2.8 –3.4 –2.6 –2.2 –1.8
Zimbabwe –2.0 –6.6 –10.4 –5.6 –0.9 0.3 –2.2 –6.0 –6.2 –10.4 –7.9 –7.8 –7.6 –7.4 –7.2
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table D.
1 FY2024 reflects the debt operation with Venezuela.

62 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A18. Low-Income Developing Countries: General Government Primary Balance, 2015–29
(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average –2.3 –2.3 –2.5 –2.0 –2.3 –3.5 –2.6 –2.3 –1.8 –1.6 –1.0 –1.0 –0.9 –1.0 –1.0
Oil Producers –3.0 –3.7 –4.0 –2.5 –2.8 –3.2 –2.8 –2.1 –0.9 –0.7 –0.4 –0.4 –0.3 –0.6 –0.6
Asia –1.6 –1.8 –2.4 –2.3 –3.1 –3.4 –2.4 –2.1 –2.7 –2.7 –2.4 –2.4 –2.3 –2.3 –2.4
Latin America –0.7 –0.2 –0.2 –0.7 0.0 –2.6 –1.6 1.3 1.8 2.7 0.3 –0.1 0.0 0.0 –0.1
Sub–Saharan Africa –2.7 –2.9 –2.8 –2.0 –2.0 –3.7 –2.9 –2.6 –1.4 –1.1 –0.3 –0.1 0.0 –0.1 –0.1
Others –1.8 –1.3 –1.9 –1.7 –2.5 –3.0 –1.8 –2.2 –2.7 –2.1 –1.6 –2.0 –1.8 –1.7 –1.7
Afghanistan –1.3 0.2 –0.6 1.7 –1.0 –2.2 –0.5 –1.0 –1.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Bangladesh –1.6 –1.6 –2.6 –2.5 –3.7 –3.0 –1.6 –2.2 –2.5 –2.8 –2.4 –2.6 –2.6 –2.7 –2.9
Benin –5.0 –3.4 –2.8 –1.4 1.1 –2.7 –3.5 –3.9 –2.5 –1.9 –1.2 –1.2 –1.2 –1.2 –1.2
Burkina Faso –1.5 –2.2 –6.1 –3.3 –2.2 –3.8 –5.7 –8.8 –4.5 –3.8 –2.5 –1.5 –0.7 –1.0 –1.2
Cambodia –0.4 0.0 –0.5 0.5 2.4 –2.3 –4.9 0.0 –2.5 –2.1 –1.9 –1.8 –1.8 –1.7 –1.6
Cameroon –3.9 –5.2 –3.9 –1.5 –2.2 –2.3 –2.0 –0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.2
Chad –2.0 0.0 1.0 2.2 0.6 2.0 –0.6 5.4 –0.2 0.3 –1.1 –2.0 –1.8 –1.9 –2.6
Congo, Democratic 1.0 –0.2 1.0 –0.4 –2.3 –2.9 –1.3 –0.2 –1.4 –1.7 –0.9 –0.7 –0.7 –0.9 –1.2
Republic of the
Congo, Republic of –17.2 –12.7 –4.0 7.0 7.2 0.1 3.7 11.5 8.9 6.9 5.8 5.6 6.0 6.4 6.7
Côte d’Ivoire –0.9 –1.7 –2.0 –1.6 –0.7 –3.6 –2.9 –4.6 –2.7 –1.6 –0.5 –0.7 –0.7 –0.8 –0.9
Ethiopia –1.5 –1.8 –2.8 –2.5 –2.0 –2.4 –2.2 –3.5 –2.0 –1.1 –0.6 –0.9 –0.8 –0.7 –0.7
Ghana 0.9 –1.5 1.2 –1.4 –2.0 –11.2 –4.8 –4.3 –0.3 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3
Guinea –5.7 0.9 –1.2 –0.3 0.2 –2.4 –1.1 0.1 –1.2 –1.9 –1.4 –1.5 –1.4 –1.5 –1.5
Haiti1 –1.4 0.3 –0.2 –0.9 –1.7 –1.9 –2.0 –1.5 1.2 7.3 0.1 –1.3 –1.2 –1.3 –1.4
Honduras 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.8 –3.7 –2.1 2.7 0.9 –0.1 –0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Kenya –4.2 –4.7 –4.2 –3.5 –3.8 –4.2 –3.1 –1.7 –1.0 0.2 1.0 1.4 1.7 2.0 1.6
Kyrgyz Republic –1.7 –4.9 –2.9 0.4 0.8 –2.1 0.0 0.7 2.9 1.7 –0.2 –0.7 –1.4 –1.5 –1.9
Lao P.D.R. –4.8 –4.2 –4.7 –3.3 –1.9 –4.1 0.3 1.5 2.6 2.7 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
Madagascar –2.2 –0.4 –1.4 –0.6 –0.7 –3.2 –2.2 –5.0 –3.4 –2.9 –2.9 –3.0 –2.9 –2.9 –2.9
Malawi –1.9 –1.8 –2.4 –1.6 –1.5 –4.8 –4.3 –4.6 –4.0 –1.6 –0.7 2.9 3.7 3.7 3.8
Mali –1.2 –3.3 –2.0 –3.9 –0.7 –4.2 –3.5 –3.5 –2.3 –1.9 –1.6 –1.3 –1.3 –1.3 –1.3
Moldova –1.2 –0.4 0.5 0.0 –0.7 –4.5 –1.8 –2.2 –3.4 –3.4 –2.1 –1.9 –1.7 –1.2 –1.1
Mozambique –5.4 –2.6 1.0 –1.3 4.9 –1.6 –1.2 –2.2 –0.3 –0.1 0.9 1.5 2.2 3.0 4.2
Myanmar –1.6 –2.6 –1.5 –1.6 –2.4 –4.2 –5.0 –1.9 –3.1 –3.0 –3.3 –2.8 –2.3 –2.1 –1.5
Nepal 0.9 1.5 –2.4 –5.4 –4.5 –4.7 –3.2 –2.3 –4.5 –3.0 –2.5 –2.0 –1.6 –1.4 –1.1
Nicaragua –1.2 –1.3 –0.8 –3.3 0.2 –1.4 –0.1 2.0 4.0 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3
Niger –6.3 –3.8 –3.4 –2.1 –2.6 –3.8 –5.0 –5.5 –4.0 –2.5 –1.1 –1.1 –1.2 –1.4 –1.5
Nigeria –2.7 –3.4 –4.1 –2.6 –3.0 –3.5 –3.1 –2.6 –0.9 –0.9 –0.3 –0.1 –0.2 –0.6 –0.5
Papua New Guinea –2.8 –2.8 –0.4 –0.2 –2.4 –6.2 –4.4 –2.9 –1.8 –1.3 –0.2 1.0 2.5 1.8 1.9
Rwanda –1.8 –1.3 –1.5 –1.4 –3.8 –7.9 –5.2 –3.9 –2.9 –4.7 –1.0 –0.4 –0.6 –0.7 –0.7
Senegal –2.1 –1.6 –1.1 –1.7 –1.9 –4.4 –4.3 –4.4 –1.8 –3.8 –0.9 –0.1 –0.2 –0.5 –0.6
Sudan –3.2 –3.5 –5.6 –7.7 –10.6 –6.0 –0.2 –2.0 –3.6 –2.6 –3.3 –3.4 –3.4 –3.0 –2.7
Tajikistan –1.5 –2.2 –5.2 –1.6 –1.2 –3.4 0.2 0.5 –0.6 –1.7 –1.8 –1.9 –1.8 –1.9 –1.8
Tanzania –1.7 –0.6 0.4 –0.2 –0.3 –0.9 –1.8 –2.0 –1.4 –0.6 –0.4 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3
Uganda –1.2 –0.6 –1.8 –1.2 –2.7 –5.5 –4.6 –2.8 –1.6 –1.3 0.2 1.9 2.2 2.1 1.6
Uzbekistan –0.4 0.6 0.8 1.3 –0.3 –3.0 –4.3 –3.7 –3.7 –2.7 –1.3 –1.7 –1.7 –1.7 –1.7
Yemen –2.6 –3.2 –4.7 –7.8 –5.7 –2.6 0.2 –1.7 –4.4 –1.6 –2.1 –3.2 –0.4 –0.3 –0.5
Zambia –6.0 –2.2 –3.5 –3.5 –2.5 –7.8 –2.1 –1.6 0.6 –0.7 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6
Zimbabwe –1.1 –6.0 –9.4 –4.6 –0.6 0.9 –1.7 –5.7 –6.1 –9.6 –6.5 –6.2 –5.8 –5.5 –5.4
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: “Primary balance” is defined as the overall balance, excluding net interest payments. For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table D.
1 FY2024 reflects the debt operation with Venezuela.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 63

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A19. Low-Income Developing Countries: General Government Revenue, 2015–29

(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average 13.4 12.8 13.1 13.8 13.4 12.8 13.5 14.3 14.2 15.4 15.7 16.0 16.3 16.3 16.4
Oil Producers 8.1 6.0 7.1 9.1 8.5 7.3 7.8 10.0 10.3 14.4 14.0 13.6 14.1 13.5 13.8
Asia 12.9 12.2 11.8 12.5 11.8 11.7 12.1 12.0 11.3 11.7 12.0 12.4 12.5 12.7 12.8
Latin America 20.6 21.7 21.4 20.6 20.9 19.9 20.1 20.9 21.2 21.9 19.7 19.7 19.8 20.0 20.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 12.3 11.7 12.6 13.2 12.9 12.2 12.9 13.7 14.1 15.8 16.3 16.5 16.8 16.8 16.9
Others 18.0 17.1 16.4 19.6 19.5 18.2 19.1 22.7 20.7 21.4 22.2 22.4 22.8 22.8 22.9
Afghanistan 24.6 28.2 27.1 30.6 26.9 25.7 17.4 15.1 15.5 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Bangladesh 8.2 8.4 8.1 8.9 8.1 8.5 9.4 8.9 8.2 8.8 9.1 9.8 9.9 10.0 10.1
Benin 12.6 11.1 13.6 13.6 14.1 14.4 14.1 14.3 15.0 15.2 15.7 16.1 16.5 16.9 17.3
Burkina Faso 18.3 18.6 19.3 19.8 20.0 19.4 20.4 21.7 22.3 21.8 22.8 23.3 23.8 24.1 24.3
Cambodia 13.8 14.9 15.4 16.4 19.8 17.8 15.8 18.1 15.9 15.0 14.9 14.8 14.8 14.9 15.0
Cameroon1 15.8 14.3 14.5 15.5 15.4 13.4 14.1 16.0 16.5 16.0 15.2 15.2 15.4 15.6 15.8
Chad 10.5 9.5 11.1 11.0 10.4 15.5 12.5 18.2 16.8 16.6 15.3 14.5 14.9 14.8 14.3
Congo, Democratic 15.9 13.5 11.1 10.9 11.0 9.4 12.2 17.0 14.8 15.2 13.7 13.9 14.1 14.3 14.2
Republic of the
Congo, Republic of 23.5 24.3 21.0 23.0 24.5 20.0 22.6 31.8 26.5 26.2 25.4 25.1 24.7 24.4 24.2
Côte d’Ivoire 14.5 14.6 14.8 14.7 15.0 15.0 15.6 15.3 16.2 16.8 17.6 17.9 18.1 18.3 18.6
Ethiopia 15.4 15.6 14.7 13.1 12.8 11.7 11.0 8.5 8.2 7.7 9.6 10.3 11.3 11.7 11.9
Ghana 14.6 13.1 13.6 14.1 15.0 14.1 15.2 15.7 16.0 16.9 17.4 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0
Guinea 15.2 16.0 15.3 14.9 14.7 14.0 13.5 13.7 14.2 13.7 13.5 13.9 14.1 14.2 14.4
Haiti 11.3 10.7 9.9 10.1 7.6 7.9 7.0 6.6 7.3 11.7 5.8 5.9 5.7 5.9 6.1
Honduras 25.2 27.0 26.5 26.4 26.0 23.8 25.6 25.7 25.1 25.5 25.7 25.8 25.9 25.9 25.9
Kenya 17.1 17.9 17.8 17.5 17.0 16.7 16.8 17.1 16.9 17.5 18.2 18.9 19.4 19.7 19.8
Kyrgyz Republic 35.6 33.1 33.3 32.5 30.8 29.0 31.4 34.7 37.4 35.8 37.5 34.7 32.6 32.2 31.8
Lao P.D.R. 20.2 16.0 16.3 16.2 15.4 13.0 15.0 14.8 16.4 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5
Madagascar 10.2 12.4 12.8 13.0 13.9 12.4 10.9 10.9 13.8 13.0 11.9 12.6 13.3 13.2 13.3
Malawi 15.4 14.8 15.8 15.0 14.8 14.7 15.3 17.4 19.2 21.3 19.9 21.0 21.7 21.2 21.0
Mali 19.1 18.3 20.1 15.6 21.5 20.5 21.5 20.7 22.3 22.4 22.4 23.1 23.8 24.1 24.2
Moldova 30.0 28.6 30.3 30.7 30.5 31.4 32.0 33.2 34.1 32.4 32.6 33.6 33.8 33.9 34.1
Mozambique 25.6 23.7 26.6 25.5 29.7 27.7 26.9 27.7 29.0 28.3 27.6 27.7 28.0 27.6 27.8
Myanmar 21.4 19.6 17.9 17.6 16.3 16.8 16.4 18.0 17.7 17.6 17.7 18.0 18.3 18.7 19.0
Nepal 18.2 20.1 20.9 22.2 22.4 22.2 23.3 22.9 19.3 19.3 20.2 21.4 22.1 22.7 23.2
Nicaragua 23.8 24.9 25.6 23.3 26.5 26.5 28.9 29.3 28.9 29.0 28.8 28.7 28.8 29.0 29.5
Niger2 17.5 14.9 15.4 18.2 18.0 17.5 18.2 14.8 10.4 12.2 12.6 12.8 12.9 13.1 13.1
Nigeria 7.3 5.1 6.6 8.5 7.8 6.5 7.1 9.0 9.4 13.5 13.2 12.6 12.8 12.1 12.5
Papua New Guinea 18.3 16.1 15.9 17.7 16.3 14.7 15.1 16.7 17.8 18.3 18.5 18.8 19.2 19.4 19.9
Rwanda 23.9 22.9 22.6 23.8 23.1 23.9 24.6 23.9 22.3 22.6 22.9 23.9 23.7 23.5 23.1
Senegal 19.3 20.7 19.5 18.9 20.3 20.2 19.5 19.9 20.9 20.9 21.8 23.1 23.4 23.4 24.0
Sudan 8.5 6.1 6.7 8.9 7.9 4.9 9.5 15.7 4.6 3.7 8.2 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.6
Tajikistan 29.9 29.7 28.1 28.2 26.8 24.8 27.0 27.7 29.8 27.3 28.7 29.2 29.3 28.4 27.9
Tanzania 14.0 14.8 15.2 15.3 15.2 14.9 14.9 15.2 15.5 16.1 16.3 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5
Uganda 12.3 12.5 12.5 13.2 13.5 13.7 14.0 14.2 14.3 14.8 15.9 16.9 17.8 18.1 18.6
Uzbekistan 24.3 24.0 20.9 23.8 24.0 23.1 23.3 27.7 26.2 25.2 24.7 24.9 25.3 25.3 25.3
Yemen 10.7 7.6 3.5 6.4 7.3 6.2 7.3 9.5 6.0 7.4 6.6 11.0 17.2 16.9 17.0
Zambia 18.8 18.2 17.5 19.4 20.4 20.3 22.4 20.4 21.5 21.4 21.8 21.8 21.9 22.5 22.4
Zimbabwe 18.7 17.0 17.5 14.7 10.8 13.3 15.3 16.6 14.6 15.6 15.9 16.2 16.5 16.8 17.0
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table D.
1 General government revenue in this table includes grants.
2 These estimates and projections include grants.

64 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A20. Low-Income Developing Countries: General Government Expenditure, 2015–29

(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average 17.0 16.6 17.0 17.4 17.4 18.1 18.1 18.7 18.1 19.1 19.0 19.3 19.5 19.5 19.7
Oil Producers 12.6 11.3 12.4 13.2 12.9 12.5 12.9 14.8 14.3 18.4 17.9 17.5 18.0 17.7 18.1
Asia 15.9 15.4 15.5 16.3 16.4 16.8 16.3 15.9 15.9 16.3 16.2 17.0 17.1 17.3 17.4
Latin America 21.8 22.4 22.2 21.9 21.7 23.3 22.6 20.4 20.8 20.3 20.4 20.8 20.7 21.0 21.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.3 16.1 17.1 17.1 16.9 18.0 18.2 18.9 18.0 19.6 19.4 19.3 19.4 19.4 19.6
Others 21.1 19.3 18.5 21.5 22.2 21.6 21.1 25.3 24.0 24.4 24.8 25.2 25.5 25.3 25.4
Afghanistan 25.9 28.0 27.7 28.9 28.0 27.9 17.9 16.1 16.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Bangladesh 11.5 11.6 12.2 13.0 13.6 13.3 12.9 13.0 12.8 13.5 13.3 14.6 14.9 15.1 15.3
Benin 18.2 15.4 17.8 16.6 14.6 19.1 19.9 19.9 19.2 18.9 18.6 19.0 19.4 19.8 20.2
Burkina Faso 20.4 21.6 26.3 24.2 23.4 24.5 27.9 32.4 29.2 27.5 27.5 27.1 26.9 27.1 27.3
Cambodia 14.5 15.2 16.2 16.1 17.6 20.3 21.0 18.4 18.7 17.3 17.0 16.8 16.7 16.8 16.7
Cameroon 20.1 20.2 19.2 18.0 18.7 16.6 17.1 17.1 17.1 16.5 16.0 16.3 16.5 16.6 16.9
Chad 13.8 10.9 11.2 9.6 10.5 14.3 13.9 14.0 18.1 17.3 17.9 17.6 17.7 17.7 17.8
Congo, Democratic 15.2 13.9 10.4 11.7 13.4 12.6 13.8 17.5 16.5 17.2 14.9 15.0 15.1 15.6 15.8
Republic of the
Congo, Republic of 41.3 38.8 26.6 17.8 20.2 21.1 20.9 22.8 20.7 22.4 22.4 22.3 21.2 20.1 19.5
Côte d’Ivoire 16.5 17.6 18.1 17.6 17.2 20.4 20.5 22.1 21.5 20.8 20.7 20.9 21.1 21.2 21.6
Ethiopia 17.3 17.9 18.0 16.1 15.4 14.5 13.8 12.7 10.8 9.4 11.3 12.4 13.3 13.7 13.9
Ghana 18.6 19.9 17.6 20.9 22.5 31.5 27.2 27.5 19.6 21.6 21.1 21.1 20.8 20.8 21.1
Guinea 21.7 16.1 17.3 16.0 15.0 17.1 15.2 14.5 16.0 16.7 16.1 16.4 16.6 16.6 16.7
Haiti 12.7 10.5 10.2 11.3 9.6 10.0 9.3 8.3 6.4 4.6 5.8 7.3 7.0 7.3 7.7
Honduras 26.0 27.4 26.9 26.2 25.9 28.4 28.8 24.0 26.1 27.0 27.3 27.2 26.9 27.0 26.9
Kenya 23.8 25.4 25.2 24.5 24.4 24.8 24.0 23.2 22.7 22.6 22.5 22.9 23.1 23.0 23.2
Kyrgyz Republic 38.1 38.9 37.0 33.1 30.8 32.1 32.1 35.0 35.6 35.3 38.9 36.9 35.5 35.6 35.9
Lao P.D.R. 25.8 21.1 21.8 20.7 18.6 18.4 15.7 14.7 15.7 17.0 16.6 16.8 17.1 17.2 17.3
Madagascar 13.0 13.5 14.9 14.4 15.4 16.4 13.7 16.5 17.9 16.7 15.7 16.6 17.0 16.9 17.0
Malawi 19.5 19.7 21.0 19.4 19.3 22.7 23.7 26.7 28.4 29.3 25.6 24.0 23.7 22.8 22.3
Mali 20.9 22.3 22.9 20.3 23.1 25.9 26.3 25.7 26.2 26.0 25.7 26.1 26.8 27.1 27.2
Moldova 31.9 30.1 31.0 31.5 32.0 36.7 34.6 36.4 39.2 37.5 36.4 37.0 36.9 36.5 36.5
Mozambique 32.2 28.7 28.6 31.2 28.0 32.2 30.8 32.8 33.2 32.5 29.6 28.7 28.3 26.6 25.2
Myanmar 24.2 23.4 20.8 21.0 20.3 22.6 23.3 22.6 23.4 23.4 23.8 23.8 23.7 24.0 23.8
Nepal 17.7 19.0 23.6 28.0 27.3 27.6 27.2 26.1 25.2 24.0 24.4 25.0 25.3 25.7 25.9
Nicaragua 25.4 26.8 27.3 27.7 27.7 29.0 30.1 28.5 26.4 28.7 28.8 28.9 29.0 29.2 29.9
Niger 24.2 19.4 19.5 21.2 21.6 22.4 24.3 21.6 15.8 16.3 15.6 15.7 15.9 16.1 16.1
Nigeria 11.0 9.8 12.0 12.8 12.5 12.1 12.6 14.4 13.6 18.1 17.4 16.6 17.0 16.9 17.4
Papua New Guinea 22.8 20.9 18.4 20.3 21.3 23.5 22.0 21.9 22.1 22.2 21.1 20.2 19.2 19.2 19.5
Rwanda 26.6 25.1 25.1 26.4 28.2 33.5 31.6 29.7 27.5 29.9 26.5 26.8 26.6 26.3 25.7
Senegal 22.9 24.0 22.5 22.6 24.2 26.6 25.8 26.6 25.7 28.4 26.4 26.1 26.4 26.4 27.0
Sudan 12.4 10.0 12.8 16.8 18.7 10.9 9.8 17.9 8.2 6.4 11.9 13.8 13.6 12.8 12.6
Tajikistan 31.9 32.7 33.8 30.9 28.8 29.2 27.6 28.0 31.0 29.7 31.3 31.7 31.8 30.9 30.4
Tanzania 17.2 16.9 16.4 17.3 17.3 17.4 18.4 19.1 19.0 19.0 19.2 19.3 19.2 19.2 19.1
Uganda 14.9 15.2 16.3 16.2 18.3 21.4 21.4 20.2 19.2 19.7 19.7 18.4 18.8 19.1 19.9
Uzbekistan 24.6 23.3 19.9 22.2 24.3 26.0 27.4 31.4 30.2 28.7 27.3 27.5 27.8 27.8 27.8
Yemen 19.4 16.1 8.4 14.3 13.2 10.6 8.2 12.2 12.1 10.9 10.6 15.9 19.1 18.6 18.7
Zambia 27.6 23.9 25.0 27.7 29.8 34.0 30.5 28.2 27.9 27.5 24.6 25.1 24.5 24.7 24.3
Zimbabwe 20.8 23.6 27.9 20.3 11.7 13.0 17.6 22.6 20.9 26.0 23.8 24.0 24.1 24.1 24.2
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table D.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 65

 FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Table A21. Low-Income Developing Countries: General Government Gross Debt, 2015–29
(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average 33.9 37.2 39.9 41.3 42.6 49.1 49.1 50.4 53.5 53.2 50.9 49.0 47.7 46.7 45.8
Oil Producers 24.5 28.8 30.1 31.9 33.2 38.4 38.9 41.9 49.0 54.2 52.6 50.9 49.6 49.3 48.9
Asia 30.3 30.3 30.9 32.3 34.0 37.4 41.0 42.5 43.5 43.0 43.7 43.7 43.8 44.0 44.3
Latin America 31.5 32.9 33.9 35.8 38.3 43.2 42.8 42.5 39.6 33.3 31.3 30.5 30.3 29.9 29.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 32.8 36.9 39.7 41.4 42.6 49.0 50.2 52.6 55.3 55.0 54.2 52.0 50.1 48.5 46.9
Others 45.3 51.5 63.2 69.7 68.8 87.8 71.4 63.7 77.3 80.9 62.5 55.9 53.2 51.3 49.8
Afghanistan 9.2 8.4 8.0 7.4 6.3 7.8 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Bangladesh 28.2 27.7 28.3 29.6 32.0 34.5 35.6 37.9 39.3 38.5 39.2 39.5 40.1 40.8 41.7
Benin 30.9 35.9 39.6 41.1 41.2 46.1 50.3 54.2 54.5 54.0 52.6 51.4 50.3 49.5 48.6
Burkina Faso 31.3 32.9 33.9 38.1 41.9 43.8 55.6 58.4 55.9 57.4 56.0 54.8 52.8 50.2 47.5
Cambodia 23.3 21.8 22.6 21.1 20.8 25.2 25.9 25.0 25.7 26.5 26.9 26.6 26.5 26.5 26.3
Cameroon 31.6 32.1 36.5 38.3 41.6 44.9 47.2 45.6 43.2 40.3 38.3 36.8 35.4 33.9 32.7
Chad 32.1 38.1 36.8 33.3 38.0 41.2 42.4 34.5 32.7 31.5 32.4 33.9 34.9 35.9 37.6
Congo, Democratic 16.0 18.8 18.5 14.8 14.8 16.2 15.9 14.3 14.4 11.5 6.0 7.6 6.4 5.3 4.4
Republic of the
Congo, Republic of 74.2 84.6 88.5 71.2 77.6 102.5 97.8 92.5 99.0 93.3 89.0 83.2 77.1 69.7 60.8
Côte d’Ivoire 29.2 31.1 32.6 35.3 37.2 46.3 50.2 56.6 58.1 59.3 55.9 54.1 52.4 51.7 51.1
Ethiopia 50.7 51.8 55.3 58.4 54.7 53.7 53.8 46.9 38.7 33.6 41.8 37.7 35.0 33.0 31.4
Ghana1 53.9 55.9 57.0 62.0 58.3 72.3 79.2 92.7 82.9 82.5 79.5 76.1 72.5 69.3 66.9
Guinea 44.4 43.0 41.9 39.3 38.6 47.8 42.7 40.2 40.8 37.8 34.8 31.6 31.5 30.5 29.5
Haiti 23.9 24.4 22.5 24.1 26.5 22.3 28.9 29.5 28.5 14.0 11.3 10.9 11.1 11.5 12.0
Honduras 38.5 39.6 41.5 42.6 43.5 53.7 51.0 49.8 45.0 43.9 43.2 42.2 40.9 39.3 37.5
Kenya 45.8 50.4 53.9 56.4 59.1 68.0 68.2 67.8 73.1 69.9 72.4 71.9 70.2 68.0 66.1
Kyrgyz Republic 67.1 59.1 58.8 54.8 48.8 63.6 56.2 46.8 44.7 41.8 41.2 41.8 43.1 45.4 50.0
Lao P.D.R. 53.1 54.5 57.2 60.6 69.1 76.0 92.9 130.7 115.9 108.3 118.3 122.7 122.3 124.2 126.7
Madagascar 44.1 40.3 40.1 42.9 41.3 51.9 51.9 53.9 55.6 55.5 55.8 56.3 56.8 57.4 58.9
Malawi 35.5 37.1 40.0 40.8 41.2 53.9 66.5 76.7 91.3 84.5 82.3 78.7 74.8 70.3 65.9
Mali 30.7 37.2 38.2 37.5 40.7 46.9 50.3 53.1 55.9 55.7 55.9 54.9 54.6 54.5 54.4
Moldova 42.4 39.2 34.9 31.8 28.8 36.6 33.6 34.9 35.3 36.9 34.8 32.7 31.7 30.1 28.1
Mozambique 86.0 124.8 103.8 105.5 98.3 120.0 104.3 100.3 93.9 96.0 96.5 93.8 89.0 79.7 69.4
Myanmar 36.4 38.3 40.1 40.4 38.8 40.6 61.3 62.4 59.7 60.8 63.3 64.5 65.2 65.6 65.5
Nepal 25.7 25.0 25.0 31.1 34.0 43.3 43.3 42.7 47.1 49.7 50.4 50.4 50.0 49.3 48.4
Nicaragua 28.9 30.9 33.7 37.9 41.8 47.8 47.1 44.6 41.7 39.3 38.2 38.0 38.2 38.4 38.6
Niger 29.9 32.8 36.5 37.0 39.8 45.0 51.3 50.6 56.6 51.7 49.0 47.9 47.4 47.1 46.9
Nigeria2 20.3 23.4 24.3 27.7 29.2 34.5 35.7 39.7 46.4 51.3 50.0 48.9 48.5 49.0 49.3
Papua New Guinea 29.9 33.7 32.5 36.7 40.6 48.7 52.6 48.3 52.0 51.6 50.8 49.0 45.8 43.4 40.8
Rwanda 32.4 36.5 41.3 44.9 49.9 65.6 66.6 60.6 64.5 71.4 73.3 73.4 71.8 69.1 65.7
Senegal3 44.5 47.5 61.1 61.5 63.6 69.2 73.3 76.0 81.2 84.3 80.5 81.0 81.5 81.0 77.5
Sudan 93.2 109.9 149.5 209.8 216.5 278.3 189.6 186.8 252.2 344.4 237.1 184.7 174.4 167.3 162.0
Tajikistan 35.0 42.2 46.3 46.6 43.5 51.8 42.1 32.5 30.9 30.7 30.1 29.3 28.8 29.1 29.5
Tanzania 39.5 39.8 40.1 42.0 40.4 41.3 43.4 44.9 46.9 47.3 46.3 45.0 43.6 42.2 40.8
Uganda 28.0 31.3 33.6 34.9 37.5 46.3 50.4 50.0 51.0 51.4 50.3 44.8 41.7 39.0 36.3
Uzbekistan 10.0 8.2 17.3 17.5 25.4 33.7 31.7 30.5 32.5 34.3 32.8 31.4 30.7 30.1 29.7
Yemen 57.7 76.5 83.8 86.9 91.5 87.0 75.9 65.8 81.2 85.0 77.7 69.7 58.5 53.5 49.9
Zambia 61.9 58.0 63.4 75.2 94.4 140.0 111.0 99.5 127.3 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Zimbabwe 48.0 49.9 68.9 48.1 82.3 84.5 58.2 102.1 96.7 70.3 58.0 55.4 53.1 52.4 51.2
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table D.
1 Ghana is in the process of restructuring its debt. Government debt projections are based on a pre-debt restructuring scenario.
2 Debt includes overdrafts from the Central Bank of Nigeria and liabilities of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria.
3 From 2017 onward, Senegal data include the whole of the public sector, whereas before 2017, only central government debt stock was taken into account.

66 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Table A22. Low-Income Developing Countries: General Government Net Debt, 2015–29
(Percent of GDP)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Average ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Oil Producers ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Asia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Latin America ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Sub-Saharan Africa ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Others ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Afghanistan ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Bangladesh ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Benin ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Burkina Faso ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Cambodia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Cameroon 27.6 30.5 33.3 35.9 39.5 43.0 45.8 44.1 42.0 38.1 35.0 32.5 30.5 28.5 26.8
Chad ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Congo, Democratic ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Republic of the
Congo, Republic of ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Côte d’Ivoire ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Ethiopia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Ghana1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Guinea ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Haiti ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Honduras ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Kenya 39.7 45.5 49.7 51.8 54.0 63.9 64.4 64.3 70.0 67.6 70.3 70.0 68.4 66.4 64.6
Kyrgyz Republic ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Lao P.D.R. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Madagascar ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Malawi ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Mali 23.1 31.2 33.3 34.1 36.2 40.0 43.4 48.9 52.9 52.3 52.4 51.5 51.4 51.4 51.5
Moldova ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Mozambique ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Myanmar ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Nepal ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Nicaragua ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Niger 25.9 29.5 32.3 34.1 35.9 41.0 45.1 45.5 53.4 49.6 47.6 46.6 45.9 45.5 45.0
Nigeria2 15.9 19.0 19.9 23.5 25.5 34.1 35.3 39.4 46.1 50.7 49.6 48.5 48.2 48.8 49.1
Papua New Guinea ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Rwanda ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Senegal ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Sudan ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Tajikistan ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Tanzania ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Uganda ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Uzbekistan ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Yemen 56.9 74.5 81.4 83.2 87.7 83.3 73.6 63.9 79.2 83.2 76.2 68.6 57.6 52.7 49.3
Zambia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Zimbabwe ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Source: IMF staff estimates and projections. Projections are based on staff assessments of current policies (see “Fiscal Policy Assumptions” in text).
Note: For country-specific details, see “Data and Conventions” in text and Table D.
1 Ghana is in the process of restructuring its debt. Government debt projections are based on a pre-debt restructuring scenario.
2 Debt includes overdrafts from the Central Bank of Nigeria and liabilities of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria. The overdrafts and government deposits at the

Central Bank of Nigeria almost cancel each other out, and the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria debt is roughly halved.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 67

 Table A23. Advanced Economies: Structural Fiscal Indicators
(Percent of GDP, except when indicated otherwise)
Net Present Net Present Average Projected Interest Nonresident Net Financial
Pension Value of Pension Health Care Value of Health Gross Term to Debt to Rate–Growth Prepandemic Projected Holding of General Worth of General
Spending Spending Spending Care Spending Financing Maturity, Average Differential, Overall Overall Government Government,

68
Change, Change, Change, Change, Need, 2024 Maturity, 2024–29 Balance, Balance, Debt, 2024 2021 (percent
2023–301,9 2023–502,9 2023–303a,3b 2023–502 20244 (years)5 20246 (percent) 2012–19 2024–29 (percent of total)7 of GDP)8
Average 0.5 16.2 1.7 71.6 16.5 7.2 16.4 –0.8 –3.1 –4.2 28.4
G7 0.5 14.6 2.0 81.7 20.4 6.9 18.8 –0.7 –4.0 –5.2 27.4
G20 Advanced 0.5 15.1 1.9 80.2 19.2 7.0 18.0 –0.8 –3.6 –4.9 27.2
Andorra 2.0 80.0 0.9 48.2 ... 6.3 5.4 ... 2.2 1.5 ... ...
Australia –0.1 –3.2 1.0 44.0 3.9 6.4 7.7 –0.4 –2.7 –1.3 32.6 –40.6
Austria 1.3 22.3 0.8 39.7 7.2 11.9 6.6 –1.1 –1.2 –3.0 58.3 –55.3
Belgium 0.8 29.0 1.3 61.6 17.9 10.2 10.3 –0.7 –2.4 –5.5 51.7 –90.3
Canada 0.6 12.9 0.8 38.1 7.5 6.2 17.1 –1.1 –0.5 –1.0 21.1 –36.8
Croatia 0.5 4.0 0.8 39.3 ... 5.3 11.4 –2.6 –2.2 –1.7 35.9 –320.3
Cyprus 1.0 40.0 ... ... 3.5 6.3 11.1 –3.2 –1.4 2.4 57.3 –51.8
Czech Republic –0.8 2.1 0.7 29.1 6.5 2.9 15.2 –0.3 –0.6 –2.0 21.3 –13.1
Denmark 0.6 4.0 0.7 28.7 0.6 8.4 3.3 –1.0 0.2 0.6 25.7 –18.3
Estonia 0.3 3.7 0.4 20.2 ... 6.8 3.2 –1.0 –0.5 –3.8 108.8 14.3
Finland 0.2 –4.3 0.8 32.7 11.2 7.4 11.0 –1.3 –1.8 –2.7 46.5 –30.6
France 0.2 0.2 0.8 34.7 10.2 8.1 13.9 –0.8 –3.6 –5.9 46.5 –146.1
Germany 0.6 17.5 0.6 34.4 5.7 6.9 9.0 –1.2 0.9 –1.1 42.0 –69.7
Hong Kong SAR 1.2 56.5 ... ... ... ... ... –0.7 2.5 –1.0 39.9 0.0

International Monetary Fund | October 2024

Iceland 0.8 36.9 0.8 42.0 12.3 6.8 8.9 0.1 1.1 –1.4 15.3 –35.1
FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Ireland 0.5 27.1 0.3 16.5 –1.4 9.7 4.4 –1.9 –2.6 1.0 55.9 –39.4
Israel 0.2 14.7 0.2 10.8 ... 7.7 8.9 –0.8 –2.8 –5.3 17.5 ...
Italy 1.1 26.0 0.4 24.1 22.1 6.9 19.7 0.5 –2.5 –3.5 27.8 –220.2
Japan –0.3 17.2 1.1 41.4 23.0 8.6 29.3 –2.1 –4.7 –3.7 12.5 –160.5
Korea 1.0 47.7 1.6 76.3 1.3 9.9 5.3 –2.4 1.3 –0.1 16.7 –11.7
Latvia –0.5 –17.6 0.6 29.0 ... 6.9 6.6 –1.9 –0.8 –2.9 ... –20.2
Lithuania 1.4 48.7 0.7 34.6 5.9 8.3 4.6 –1.5 –0.6 –1.4 65.9 –16.9
Luxembourg 0.4 30.9 0.6 31.8 ... 7.4 3.6 –2.6 1.6 –1.5 49.5 51.8
Malta –0.7 –13.5 ... ... 6.1 7.2 6.6 –3.1 –0.1 –3.3 23.7 –37.9
The Netherlands 0.7 22.9 1.1 49.4 4.4 8.6 5.1 –1.7 –0.8 –2.5 37.0 –32.8
New Zealand 1.0 32.7 1.0 48.4 8.3 7.4 6.4 1.0 –0.3 –1.8 51.0 ...
Norway 0.9 20.7 1.2 51.9 ... 5.8 7.4 –0.7 7.8 9.4 62.8 274.1
Portugal 1.2 44.2 0.7 30.0 6.7 7.7 12.2 –1.5 –3.5 0.2 45.5 –103.4
Singapore10 0.3 15.6 ... ... 4.6 3.4 51.5 ... 4.6 2.9 0.0 ...
Slovak Republic 0.7 23.7 0.4 19.8 8.2 8.1 7.3 –2.1 –2.3 –4.8 49.2 –50.2
Slovenia 0.7 36.3 0.6 33.1 3.2 9.0 7.5 –2.4 –3.4 –2.0 51.7 –32.6
Spain 0.8 45.8 0.9 43.2 5.4 7.7 13.3 –1.6 –5.4 –2.9 40.9 –99.8
Sweden –0.4 –14.4 0.4 19.9 3.3 3.0 12.3 –2.4 –0.1 –0.1 15.6 26.6
Switzerland 0.4 12.3 1.3 61.4 0.9 11.1 2.9 –1.5 0.5 0.3 9.9 20.3
United Kingdom 0.2 9.6 1.1 46.5 14.3 14.0 7.3 –0.4 –4.2 –3.6 24.7 –141.7
United States 0.6 15.1 2.7 112.4 25.1 5.8 20.9 –0.6 –5.1 –6.7 25.8 –118.6
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Joint External Debt Hub, Quarterly External Debt Statistics; national authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
Note: All economy averages are weighted by nominal GDP converted to US dollars at average market exchange rates in the years indicated and on the basis of data availability. G7 = Group of Seven; G20 = Group of Twenty.
1 Pension projections rely on authorities’ estimates when these are available. When authorities’ estimates are not available, IMF staff projections use the method described in Clements, Eich, and Gupta, Equitable and Sustainable Pensions: Challenges and Experience

(IMF 2014). These pension spending projections may be different from the previous edition of the Fiscal Monitor because of new baseline pension numbers, new authorities’ projections, or updated demographic data from the UN World Population Prospects.
2 For net present value calculations, a discount rate of 1 percent a year in excess of GDP growth is used for each economy.
3a IMF staff projections for health care spending are driven by demographics and other factors. The difference between the growth of health care spending and real GDP growth that is not explained by demographics (“excess cost growth”) is assumed to start at the

economy-specific historical average and converge to the advanced economy historical average by 2050 (0.6 percent).
3b These health expenditure projections have been updated to include new available underlying health and economic data, as well as technical adjustments to the excess cost growth calculation and the age-expenditure profiles. The projections exclude health expen-

diture growth during the COVID-19 pandemic in the underlying trend expenditure growth estimate.
4 “Gross financing need” is defined as the projected overall deficit and maturing government debt in 2024. For most economies, data on maturing debt refer to central government securities. Data are from Bloomberg Finance L.P. and IMF staff projections.
5 For most economies, the average-term-to-maturity data refer to central government securities and are determined by calculating the maturity across government securities, with their respective amounts serving as weights; the source is Bloomberg Finance L.P.
6 The debt-to-average-maturity data are calculated by dividing government securities with the average term to maturity to quantify the average annual debt repayment obligation.
7 Nonresident holding of general government debt data are for the first quarter of 2024 or latest available from the Joint External Debt Hub, Quarterly External Debt Statistics, which include marketable and nonmarketable debt. For some economies, tradable instru-

ments in the Joint External Debt Hub are reported at market value. External debt in US dollars is converted to local currency, and then taken as a percentage of the 2024 gross general government debt.
8 Net financial worth of general government data are for 2021 or latest available from the Public Sector Balance Sheet (PSBS) database.
9 In the case of all EU members, including Slovakia, pension spending projections reflect the estimates published in the latest available Aging Report. Reforms and changes in methodology or assumptions between Aging Report vintages are not incorporated into the

Fiscal Monitor annexes.

10 Singapore’s general government debt is covered by financial assets and is mainly issued to deepen the domestic market, meet the Central Provident Fund’s investment needs, provide individuals with a long-term savings option, and facilitate the transfer of official

reserves not needed by the central bank to the government.

 Table A24. Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies: Structural Fiscal Indicators
(Percent of GDP, except when indicated otherwise)
Net Present Net Present Average Projected Interest Nonresident Net Financial
Pension Value of Pension Health Care Value of Health Gross Term to Debt to Rate–Growth Prepandemic Projected Holding of General Worth of General
Spending Spending Spending Care Spending Financing Maturity, Average Differential, Overall Overall Government Government,
Change, Change, Change, Change, Need, 2024 Maturity, 2024–29 Balance, Balance, Debt, 2024 2021 (percent
2023–301 2023–502 2023–303a,3b 2023–502 20244 (years)5 2024 (percent) 2012–19 2024–29 (percent of total)6 of GDP)7
Average 1.1 58.0 0.5 22.8 5.0 6.9 10.8 –3.1 –3.1 –5.4 12.5
G20 Emerging 1.2 65.1 0.5 22.8 4.7 7.1 11.5 –3.2 –3.5 –6.2 9.7
Algeria 2.5 130.8 0.4 22.0 15.3 6.2 7.4 –3.4 –7.5 –7.7 0.8 ...
Angola 0.1 2.0 0.1 7.3 6.1 6.5 9.1 –7.8 –1.6 0.9 ... ...
Argentina 0.7 46.6 0.8 42.2 6.7 5.6 16.3 –26.8 –5.0 0.8 38.6 ...
Bahrain ... ... 0.3 15.4 27.8 4.8 26.3 –0.6 –11.1 –8.3 ... ...
Belarus 2.8 103.4 0.7 34.7 ... 3.9 10.5 –3.6 –0.3 0.5 56.7 ...
Brazil8 0.3 32.4 0.7 36.5 17.4 5.5 16.0 3.1 –5.9 –6.3 10.8 –148.5
Bulgaria 0.0 –9.7 0.6 30.3 ... 8.2 2.9 –1.6 –0.9 –3.1 44.5 –5.1
Chile 0.8 41.6 0.9 48.2 3.6 8.1 5.0 –2.8 –1.6 –0.7 32.6 ...
China 1.5 90.1 0.4 22.6 ... 6.2 14.6 –3.7 –2.7 –7.8 2.6 ...
Colombia 1.5 75.4 1.0 52.6 7.8 11.1 5.0 1.2 –2.4 –3.3 34.8 –51.8
Dominican Republic 0.1 2.3 0.5 23.0 4.4 8.0 7.4 –2.3 –3.2 –2.6 52.5 ...
Ecuador 0.6 33.2 0.8 40.9 6.6 7.9 7.2 1.6 –6.0 –0.3 68.3 ...
Egypt 1.2 56.8 0.2 10.2 ... 4.7 19.4 –3.9 –10.1 –6.8 31.4 ...
Hungary –0.2 20.4 0.7 31.5 15.2 5.0 14.6 –0.5 –2.3 –3.6 33.3 –55.9
India 0.6 31.1 0.2 8.5 13.8 11.9 7.0 –3.2 –7.0 –7.2 4.6 ...
Indonesia 0.1 6.6 0.3 13.7 5.7 7.5 5.4 –1.6 –2.1 –2.4 34.4 –12.9
Iran 1.0 83.7 0.5 24.0 ... ... ... –18.9 –1.7 –2.9 ... ...
Kazakhstan 1.4 45.4 0.3 12.8 4.5 5.7 4.3 –1.7 –0.1 –2.2 16.0 49.5
Kuwait 1.1 61.7 0.5 25.6 ... 1.0 7.5 1.1 23.9 24.4 ... ...
Lebanon ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... –8.8 ... ... ...
Malaysia 1.1 59.1 0.3 17.1 ... 9.4 7.3 –2.0 –2.7 –3.4 18.3 ...
Mexico 0.7 40.7 0.4 22.4 14.6 6.9 8.4 2.3 –2.9 –3.3 23.3 –72.0
Morocco 1.1 51.4 0.3 15.3 11.9 8.7 7.9 –2.0 –4.4 –3.4 24.1 ...
Oman 0.1 6.1 0.4 18.5 0.0 5.6 6.1 2.6 –6.2 3.5 ... ...
Pakistan 0.1 6.7 0.1 4.1 22.0 3.7 18.8 –3.6 –5.9 –4.5 31.7 ...
Peru ... ... 0.6 29.7 4.5 13.7 2.5 –0.8 –1.0 –1.4 40.1 –22.2
Philippines 0.2 9.0 0.2 11.8 11.1 6.7 8.7 –3.7 –0.4 –2.8 26.8 ...
Poland 0.9 11.2 0.7 31.8 12.6 5.6 9.8 –1.8 –2.4 –4.8 25.8 –37.3
Qatar 0.1 2.8 0.2 10.4 4.0 8.6 4.8 –1.5 5.9 3.1 ... ...
Romania 2.1 48.1 ... ... 13.2 6.9 8.1 –2.1 –2.6 –7.1 42.6 –31.4
Russian Federation 2.0 63.5 0.7 32.5 2.7 7.2 2.8 –3.2 –0.7 –0.8 7.5 16.8
Saudi Arabia 0.8 30.1 0.5 25.5 3.5 9.4 3.0 0.7 –4.2 –3.1 34.1 ...
South Africa 0.3 12.0 0.6 29.0 14.6 10.7 7.0 1.6 –4.1 –5.5 23.2 1.4
Sri Lanka ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... –5.7 ... ... ...
Thailand 2.4 95.5 0.5 25.9 ... 8.1 8.0 –1.9 0.0 –2.9 8.0 ...
Türkiye9 0.1 26.1 0.5 25.5 7.5 5.3 4.7 –8.5 ... –3.5 41.5 0.0
Ukraine 0.8 48.0 0.5 27.1 ... 7.5 12.7 –6.5 –3.0 –9.0 62.9 –32.1
United Arab Emirates 0.1 1.8 0.3 15.4 ... 2.8 11.4 –3.0 1.9 4.3 ... ...
Uruguay10 0.2 –1.5 0.9 45.4 5.7 11.9 5.5 –3.7 –2.3 –2.4 42.2 –52.2
Venezuela ... ... 0.2 9.1 ... 8.3 ... ... –12.5 ... ... ...
Vietnam 1.5 69.3 0.2 10.9 ... 9.9 3.4 –5.3 –3.5 –2.1 ... ...
Sources: Joint External Debt Hub, Quarterly External Debt Statistics; national authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
Note: All country averages are weighted by nominal GDP converted to US dollars at average market exchange rates in the years indicated and on the basis of data availability. G20 = Group of Twenty.
1 Pension projections rely on authorities’ estimates when these are available. When authorities’ estimates are not available, IMF staff projections use the method described in Clements, Eich, and Gupta, Equitable and Sustainable Pensions: Challenges and Experience

(IMF 2014). These pension spending projections may be different from the previous edition of the Fiscal Monitor because of new baseline pension numbers, new authorities’ projections, or updated demographic data from the UN World Population Prospects.
2 For net present value calculations, a discount rate of 1 percent a year in excess of GDP growth is used for each economy.
3a IMF staff projections for health care spending are driven by demographics and other factors. The difference between the growth of health care spending and real GDP growth that is not explained by demographics (“excess cost growth”) is assumed to be the income

group historical average (1.2 percent).

3b These health expenditure projections have been updated to include new available underlying health and economic data, as well as technical adjustments to the excess cost growth calculation and the age-expenditure profiles. The projections exclude health expen-

International Monetary Fund | October 2024

diture growth during the COVID-19 pandemic in the underlying trend expenditure growth estimate.
4 “Gross financing need” is defined as the projected overall deficit and maturing government debt in 2024. Data are from IMF staff projections.
5 Average-term-to-maturity data refer to government securities; the source is Bloomberg Finance L.P.
6 Nonresident holding of general government debt data are for the first quarter of 2024 or latest available from the Joint External Debt Hub, Quarterly External Debt Statistics, which include marketable and nonmarketable debt. For some countries, tradable instru-

69
METHODOLOGICAL AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX

ments in the Joint External Debt Hub are reported at market value. External debt in US dollars is converted to local currency, then taken as a percentage of 2024 gross general government debt.
7 Net financial worth of general government data are for 2021 or latest available from the Public Sector Balance Sheet (PSBS) database.
8 Note that the pension spending projections reported in the first and second column do not include savings from the pension reform approved in October 2019.
9 The average-term-to-maturity data for Türkiye is in accordance with the published data for central government debt securities as of February 2024.
10 Data are for the nonfinancial public sector, which includes central government, local government, social security funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and Banco de Seguros del Estado. The coverage of fiscal data was changed from the consolidated public sector

to the nonfinancial public sector with the October 2019 submission. With this narrower coverage, the central bank balances are not included in the fiscal data. Historical data were also revised accordingly.
 Table A25. Low–Income Developing Countries: Structural Fiscal Indicators
(Percent of GDP, except when indicated otherwise)
Net Present Net Present Average Projected Interest Nonresident Net Financial
Pension Value of Pension Health Care Value of Health Term to Debt to Rate–Growth Prepandemic Projected Holding of General Worth of General

70
Spending Spending Spending Care Spending Maturity, Average Differential, Overall Overall Government Government,
Change, Change, Change, Change, 2024 Maturity, 2024–29 Balance, Balance, Debt, 2024 2021 (percent
2023–301 2023–502 2023–303a,3b 2023–502 (years)4 2024 (percent) 2012–19 2024–29 (percent of total)5 of GDP)6
Average 0.5 20.7 0.1 7.0 7.1 4.0 –6.9 –3.3 –3.1 20.0
Afghanistan ... ... 0.1 3.8 ... ... ... –0.4 ... ... ...
Bangladesh 0.1 8.3 0.0 2.2 10.3 3.8 –6.0 –3.5 –4.8 41.6 ...
Benin 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.5 8.0 6.7 –4.4 –2.6 –3.0 ... ...
Burkina Faso 0.0 2.5 0.3 14.5 4.5 12.8 –3.1 –3.5 –3.9 45.2 ...
Cambodia 0.2 8.4 0.2 10.2 13.4 2.0 –7.6 –0.7 –2.0 88.0 ...
Cameroon 0.0 3.4 0.0 2.3 9.2 4.4 –4.2 –3.7 –0.9 ... ...
Chad 0.0 0.7 0.1 4.2 ... ... –2.1 –1.0 –2.6 ... ...
Congo, Democratic ... ... 0.1 2.9 ... ... –8.2 0.7 –1.4 ... ...
Republic of the
Congo, Republic of 0.2 8.7 0.2 9.1 8.3 11.3 –2.8 –4.3 3.7 ... ...
Côte d’Ivoire 0.1 6.6 0.1 4.9 ... ... –4.0 –2.4 –3.2 62.6 ...
Ethiopia 0.0 1.8 0.1 4.8 ... ... –17.4 –2.3 –1.9 33.4 ...
Ghana7 0.2 8.3 0.2 11.4 6.7 12.2 –6.9 –6.8 –3.4 ... ...
Guinea 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.4 ... ... –9.9 0.8 –2.6 ... ...
Haiti ... ... 0.0 2.2 ... ... –13.6 –1.9 0.3 ... ...

International Monetary Fund | October 2024

Honduras 0.3 17.6 0.4 18.7 5.6 7.8 –2.3 –1.7 –1.3 ... ...
FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Kenya 0.1 11.6 0.2 10.4 8.0 8.8 –1.2 –6.5 –3.9 ... ...
Kyrgyz Republic 3.4 106.3 0.3 14.5 ... ... –5.6 –3.2 –2.2 68.5 –27.7
Lao P.D.R. 0.1 6.9 0.1 3.9 ... ... –14.5 –4.2 –0.5 ... ...
Madagascar 0.1 7.6 0.1 3.8 ... ... –8.4 –2.1 –3.8 49.7 ...
Malawi 0.0 2.8 0.1 7.1 4.2 19.9 –6.8 –3.9 –3.6 ... ...
Mali –0.1 –0.1 0.1 6.2 3.1 18.2 –3.3 –2.7 –3.2 ... ...
Moldova 3.6 90.6 0.5 25.1 ... ... –4.9 –1.4 –3.4 56.0 –9.5
Mozambique –0.2 –2.2 0.3 13.1 9.7 9.9 –7.6 –4.1 –0.7 ... ...
Myanmar 0.2 8.6 ... ... ... ... –3.2 –2.8 –5.5 ... ...
Nepal 0.1 10.1 0.2 10.1 19.5 2.6 –5.9 –1.3 –3.6 41.9 ...
Nicaragua 0.5 35.2 0.7 36.2 26.9 1.5 –3.0 –1.3 –0.1 90.8 ...
Niger 0.0 0.9 0.2 10.4 ... ... –5.8 –3.8 –3.2 ... ...
Nigeria 0.0 0.9 0.1 3.0 8.7 5.9 –5.8 –3.5 –4.4 ... ...
Papua New Guinea 0.1 4.0 0.1 6.4 ... ... –2.3 –4.1 –1.3 ... ...
Rwanda 0.0 0.8 0.3 14.9 11.1 6.4 –7.6 –2.8 –3.7 86.7 ...
Senegal 0.0 2.7 0.1 5.8 9.7 8.7 –4.5 –3.7 –4.0 ... ...
Sudan 0.0 1.8 0.1 3.8 ... ... –30.4 –6.3 –3.4 ... ...
Tajikistan 0.4 13.0 0.2 9.8 ... ... –7.7 –1.8 –2.5 78.5 ...
Tanzania –0.1 3.5 0.1 4.3 14.2 3.3 –4.8 –2.6 –2.8 ... ...
Uganda 0.1 4.4 0.1 5.5 11.5 4.5 –3.7 –3.2 –2.3 51.8 –30.5
Uzbekistan 2.1 73.1 0.3 13.7 ... ... –9.9 1.6 –2.7 66.6 ...
Yemen 0.1 9.7 0.0 2.3 ... ... –14.5 –6.7 –3.0 ... ...
Zambia 0.1 10.4 0.3 15.3 8.7 ... –14.4 –6.8 –3.2 ... ...
Zimbabwe –0.4 –5.5 0.1 4.5 11.4 6.2 –21.9 –3.4 –8.0 ... ...
Sources: Joint External Debt Hub, Quarterly External Debt Statistics; national authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
Note: All country averages are weighted by nominal GDP converted to US dollars at average market exchange rates in the years indicated and on the basis of data availability.
1 Pension projections rely on authorities’ estimates when these are available. When authorities’ estimates are not available, IMF staff projections use the method described in Clements, Eich, and Gupta, Equitable and Sustainable Pensions: Challenges

and Experience (IMF 2014). These pension spending projections may be different from the previous edition of the Fiscal Monitor because of new baseline pension numbers, new authorities’ projections, or updated demographic data from the UN
World Population Prospects.
2 For net present value calculations, a discount rate of 1 percent a year in excess of GDP growth is used for each economy.
3a IMF staff projections for health care spending are driven by demographics and other factors. The difference between the growth of health care spending and real GDP growth that is not explained by demographics (“excess cost growth”) is assumed

to be the income group historical average (1.2 percent).

3b These health expenditure projections have been updated to include new available underlying health and economic data, as well as technical adjustments to the excess cost growth calculation and the age–expenditure profiles. The projections

exclude health expenditure growth during the COVID–19 pandemic in the underlying trend expenditure growth estimate.
4 The average–term–to–maturity data refer to government securities and may not take all the external official debt into account; the source is Bloomberg Finance L.P.
5 Nonresident holding of general government debt data are for the first quarter of 2024 or latest available from the Joint External Debt Hub, Quarterly External Debt Statistics, which include marketable and nonmarketable debt. For some countries,

tradable instruments in the Joint External Debt Hub are reported at market value. External debt in US dollars is converted to local currency, then taken as a percentage of 2024 gross general government debt.
6 Net financial worth of general government data are for 2021 or latest available from the Public Sector Balance Sheet (PSBS) database.
7 Ghana is in the process of restructuring its debt. Government debt and interest rate projections are based on a pre–debt restructuring scenario.
SELECTED TOPICS

Fiscal Monitor Archives

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024
Climate Crossroads: Fiscal Policies in a Warming World October 2023
On the Path to Policy Normalization April 2023
Helping People Bounce Back October 2022
Fiscal Policy from Pandemic to War April 2022
Strengthening the Credibility of Public Finances October 2021
A Fair Shot April 2021
Policies for the Recovery October 2020
Policies to Support People During the COVID-19 Pandemic April 2020
How to Mitigate Climate Change October 2019
Curbing Corruption April 2019
Managing Public Wealth October 2018
Capitalizing on Good Times April 2018
Tackling Inequality October 2017
Achieving More with Less April 2017
Debt: Use It Wisely October 2016
Acting Now, Acting Together April 2016
The Commodities Roller Coaster: A Fiscal Framework for Uncertain Times October 2015
Now Is the Time: Fiscal Policies for Sustainable Growth April 2015
Back to Work: How Fiscal Policy Can Help October 2014
Public Expenditure Reform: Making Difficult Choices April 2014
Taxing Times October 2013
Fiscal Adjustment in an Uncertain World April 2013
Taking Stock: A Progress Report on Fiscal Adjustment October 2012
Balancing Fiscal Policy Risks April 2012
Addressing Fiscal Challenges to Reduce Economic Risks September 2011
Shifting Gears April 2011
Fiscal Exit: From Strategy to Implementation November 2010
Navigating the Fiscal Challenges Ahead May 2010

I. Adjustment
Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1
Inflation and Disinflation: What Role for Fiscal Policy? April 2023, Chapter 2
Capitalizing on Good Times April 2018
Defining and Measuring Fiscal Space April 2017, Annex 1.1

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 71

FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

China: What Do We Know about the General Government’s Balance Sheet? October 2016, Box 1.1
Brazil: Private Debt and the Strength of the Public Sector Balance Sheet October 2016, Box 1.3
Fiscal Consolidations with Progressive Measures April 2014, Box 2.4
Constructing an Index of the Difficulty of Fiscal Adjustment October 2013, Box 1
Medium-Term Fiscal Adjustment in an Uncertain World April 2013, Chapter 2
The Appropriate Pace of Short-Term Fiscal Adjustment April 2013, Box 2
Fiscal Adjustment in the United States: Making Sense of the Numbers April 2013, Box 5
Taking Stock: A Progress Report on Fiscal Adjustment October 2012, Chapter 2
Distributional Consequences of Alternative Fiscal Consolidation Measures: Reading from the Data October 2012, Appendix 1
Easy Does It: The Appropriate Pace of Fiscal Consolidation April 2012, Chapter 3
Experience with Large Fiscal Adjustment Plans in Ireland and Portugal April 2012, Box A2.1
Fiscal Multipliers in Expansions and Contractions April 2012, Appendix 1
Early Lessons from Experiences with Large Fiscal Adjustment Plans April 2012, Appendix 2
Fiscal Adjustment Plans and Medium-Term Fiscal Outlook November 2010, Chapter 3
To Tighten or Not to Tighten: This Is the Question November 2010, Box 1.2
Fiscal Adjustment and Income Distribution in Advanced and Emerging Economies November 2010, Appendix 3
The Fiscal Policy Outlook: Adjustment Needs and Plans May 2010, Chapter 3
Adjustment Measures and Institutions May 2010, Chapter 4
Fiscal Adjustment Requirements: Gross and Net Debt Targets May 2010, Appendix 2

II. Climate Change

Fiscal Support for Green Innovation April 2024, Box 2.2
Addressing Barriers to the Diffusion of Green Technology April 2024, Box 2.3
Climate Crossroads: Fiscal Policies in a Warming World October 2023, Chapter 1
GDP Impact of Climate Mitigation Policies October 2023, Box 1.1
How to Mitigate Climate Change October 2019, Chapter 1

III. Commodities and Energy

The Energy Transition of Fossil Fuel-Exporting Countries October 2023, Box 1.2
How Have Firms Responded to Recent Energy Price Shocks? October 2023, Box 1.3
On the Path to Policy Normalization April 2023, Chapter 1
Helping People Bounce Back October 2022, Chapter 1
Externalities from Energy Pricing Subsidies October 2022,
Online Annex 1.5
Governance in the Extractive Industries April 2019, Box 2.1
Bolivia: Inequality Decline during a Commodity Boom October 2017, Box 1.3
The Fiscal Impact of Lower Oil Prices April 2015, Chapter 1
Reforming Energy Subsidies April 2015, Box 1.2
Reforming Energy Subsidies April 2013, Appendix 1
Fiscal Developments in Oil-Producing Economies September 2011, Box 3
Fuel and Food Price Shocks and Fiscal Performance in Low-Income Countries September 2011, Box 8
Pass-Through and Fiscal Impact of Rising Fuel Prices April 2011, Box 1.2
Reforming Petroleum Subsidies May 2010, Appendix 5

72 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 Selected Topics

IV. Country Cases

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1
US Fiscal Policy Uncertainty and Bond Spreads April 2024, Box 1.1
Reform of the European Union Economic Governance Framework April 2024, Box 1.3
Industrial Policies for Innovation: Lessons from Historical Cases April 2024, Box 2.1
Inflation and Disinflation: What Role for Fiscal Policy? April 2023, Chapter 2
Income Stabilization before and during the COVID-19 Pandemic across EU Countries: October 2022,
A Microsimulation Approach Online Annex 1.2
Brazil’s Emergency Cash Transfer Program October 2022,
Online Annex 1.3
Social Protection and Poverty During the Pandemic April 2022, Box 1.1
Analysis of Poverty, Social Safety Nets, and Informality April 2022, Online
Annex 1.2
Global Spillovers from the Fiscal Packages in the European Union and the United States October 2021,
Online Annex 1.1
Long-Term Distributional Impact of the American Families Plan October 2021, Box 1.1;
Online Annex 1.2
Fiscal Developments in Countries Participating in the Debt Suspension Initiative October 2021, Box 1.2
Persistent Consequences of Wealth Inequality for the Next Generation’s Income: April 2021, Box 2.1
The Case of Norway
A Wave of Protests: Economic Reforms and Social Unrest April 2020, Box 1.2
Fiscal Measures in Selected Economies in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic April 2020, Special Feature
Online Annex 1.1
The Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment: A Model-Based Analysis April 2020, Online Annex 2.1
China: State-Owned Enterprises Remain Key Players April 2020, Online Annex 3.1
Brazil: A Complex and, at Times, Turbulent Relationship between SOEs and the Government April 2020, Online Annex 3.2
Ghana: Risks in SOEs Can Spill Over to Other Sectors and the Budget April 2020, Online Annex 3.5
How to Get the Most Out of SOEs: The Nordic Example April 2020, Online Annex 3.7
China: How Can Fiscal Policy Support Economic Activity and Rebalancing? April 2019, Box 1.2
The Distributional Effects of Income Tax Cuts in the United States April 2018, Box 1.2
International Tax Policy Implications from US Corporate Tax Reform April 2018, Box 1.3
General Government Debt and Fiscal Risks in China April 2018, Box 1.4
Digital Government April 2018, Chapter 2
Digitalization Advances in Revenue Administration in South Africa and Estonia April 2018, Box 2.1
The Digitalization of Public Finances: Country Case Studies April 2018, Annex 2.1
Bolivia: Inequality Decline during a Commodity Boom October 2017, Box 1.3
Adopting a Universal Basic Income to Support Subsidy Reform in India October 2017, Box 1.6
Model Simulations October 2017, Annex 1.3
Making Growth More Inclusive in China April 2017, Box 1.3
Colombia: Labor Tax Reform and the Shift from Informal to Formal Employment April 2017, Box 2.2
Mozambique: Differential Tax Treatment across Firms April 2017, Box 2.3
Innovation in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) October 2016, Box 2.4
Lowflation and Debt in the Euro Area October 2014, Box 1.1
Fiscal Challenges in the Pacific Island Countries April 2014, Box 1.3
Fiscal Reforms to Unlock Economic Potential in the Arab Countries in Transition October 2013, Box 2

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Fiscal Adjustment in the United States: Making Sense of the Numbers April 2013, Box 5
Lessons from Sweden October 2012, Box 2
The “Two-Pack”: Further Reforms to Fiscal Governance in the Euro Area October 2012, Box 6
Ireland: The Impact of Crisis and Fiscal Policies on Inequality October 2012, Box 8
The “Fiscal Compact”: Reforming EU Fiscal Governance April 2012, Box 5
Experience with Large Fiscal Adjustment Plans in Ireland and Portugal April 2012, Box A2.1
Subnational Government Response to the Financial Crisis in the United States and Canada April 2012, Box A3.1
The Dog That Didn’t Bark (So Far): Low Interest Rates in the United States and Japan September 2011, Chapter 3
United States: Government-Sponsored Enterprises and Contingent Liabilities September 2011, Box 1
Fiscal Aspects of EU Economic Governance Reforms April 2011, Box 4.1
The U.S. National Commission Report April 2011, Box A5.1
The European Union: Reforming Fiscal Governance November 2010, Box 3.2
Increasing Social Expenditures and Household Consumption in China May 2010, Box 4
Health Care Reforms in the United States May 2010, Box 5

V. Crises and Shocks

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1
How Have Firms Responded to Recent Energy Price Shocks? October 2023, Box 1.3
On the Path to Policy Normalization April 2023, Chapter 1
Inflation and Disinflation: What Role for Fiscal Policy? April 2023, Chapter 2
Helping People Bounce Back October 2022, Chapter 1
Countercyclical of Fiscal Policies October 2022, Annex 1.1
Designing Government Support to Firms during a Crisis October 2022, Box 1.2
Fiscal Policy from Pandemic to War April 2022, Chapter 1
Evaluating How Well Scenarios in Debt Sustainability Analyses Capture Key Fiscal Risks October 2021, Box 2.1
Financing Constraints and the Strategy for Investment October 2020,
Online Annex 2.1
Assessing the Impact of the COVID-19 Crisis on Monthly Investment Budgets October 2020,
Online Annex 2.2
Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic October 2020, Online Only
An Unprecedented Fiscal Response: A Closer Look October 2020, Box 1.2
Policies to Support People During the COVID-19 Pandemic April 2020, Chapter 1
Fiscal Measures in Selected Economies in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic April 2020, Online Annex 1.1
Fiscal Implications of Potential Stress in Global Financial Markets April 2019, Box 1.1
Learning from the Crisis? Taxation and Financial Stability October 2013, Box 3
Ireland: The Impact of Crisis and Fiscal Policies on Inequality October 2012, Box 8
The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Subnational Government Finances April 2012, Appendix 3
The Evolution of Seigniorage during the Crisis April 2012, Box 4
Subnational Government Response to the Financial Crisis in the United States and Canada April 2012, Box A3.1
The Legacy of the Crisis: How Long Will It Take to Lower Public Debt? September 2011, Chapter 5
The G-20 Economies: Crisis-Related Discretionary Fiscal Stimulus November 2010, Box 1.1
Update on Crisis-Related Discretionary Fiscal Stimulus in G-20 Economies May 2010, Appendix 1
The Impact of the Crisis on Subnational Governments May 2010, Appendix 4

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 Selected Topics

VI. Emerging Markets

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1
Expanding Frontiers: Fiscal Policies for Innovation and Technology Diffusion April 2024, Chapter 2
Accelerating Technology Diffusion Across Countries April 2024, Online Annex 2.6
Accelerating Diffusion of Innovation across Firms – The Role of Government Policies April 2024, Online Annex 2.7
The Energy Transition of Fossil Fuel-Exporting Countries October 2023, Box 1.2
Inflation and Disinflation: What Role for Fiscal Policy? April 2023, Chapter 2
Brazil Emergency Cash Transfer Program October 2022,
Online Annex 1.3
General Government Debt and Fiscal Risks in China April 2018, Box 1.4
Digitalization Advances in Revenue Administration in South Africa and Estonia April 2018, Box 2.1
The Digitalization of Public Finances: Country Case Studies April 2018, Annex 2.1
Innovation in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) October 2016, Box 2.4
Nonresident Holdings of Emerging Market Economy Debt April 2014, Box 1.2
Potential Sources of Contingent Liabilities in Emerging Market Economies April 2013, Box 4
Fiscal Fundamentals and Global Spillovers in Emerging Economies April 2012, Box 2
Too Good to Be True? Fiscal Developments in Emerging Economies September 2011, Chapter 4
Determinants of Domestic Bond Yields in Emerging Economies September 2011, Box 4

VII. Employment
Income Stabilization before and during the COVID-19 Pandemic across EU Countries: October 2022,
A Microsimulation Approach Online Annex 1.2
The Direct Labor Impact of Public Investment October 2020,
Online Annex 2.4
Colombia: Labor Tax Reform and the Shift from Informal to Formal Employment April 2017, Box 2.2
Can Fiscal Policies Do More for Jobs? October 2014, Chapter 2
Methodology for Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Consolidation on Employment October 2014, Appendix 1
Do Old Workers Crowd Out the Youth? October 2014, Box 2.2
Fiscal Policies to Address Weak Employment October 2012, Appendix 2

VIII. Financial Sector

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Designing Government Support to Firms during a Crisis October 2022, Box 1.2
State-Owned Banks April 2020, Box 3.2
The Fiscal Implications of International Bond Issuance by Low-Income Developing Countries October 2014, Box 1.2
Nonresident Holdings of Emerging Market Economy Debt April 2014, Box 1.2
A One-Off Capital Levy? October 2013, Box 6
Bond Yields and Stability of the Investor Base April 2013, Box 3
Long-Run and Short-Run Determinants of Sovereign Bond Yields in Advanced Economies October 2012, Box 3
Financial Sector Support October 2012, Box 4
Reassuring Markets about Fiscal Sustainability in the Euro Area September 2011, Chapter 2
Determinants of Domestic Bond Yields in Emerging Economies September 2011, Box 4

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Financial Sector Support and Recovery to Date September 2011, Box 7

Financial Sector Support and Recovery to Date April 2011, Box 1.1
Sovereign Financing and Government Debt Markets November 2010, Chapter 2
Market Concerns about Economies and Default Risks November 2010, Box 2.1
Advanced Economies: Financial Market Spillovers among Sovereigns November 2010, Box 2.2
Are Sovereign Spreads Linked to Fundamentals? November 2010, Appendix 2
Measures to Finance the Cost of Financial Sector Support May 2010, Box 3

IX. Fiscal Outlook

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1
Climate Crossroads: Fiscal Policies in a Warming World October 2023, Chapter 1
On the Path to Policy Normalization April 2023, Chapter 1
Helping People Bounce Back October 2022, Chapter 1
Policy in an Uncertain Recovery October 2021, Chapter 1
Policies to Support People during the COVID-19 Pandemic April 2020, Chapter 1
Fiscal Policy for a Changing Global Economy April 2019, Chapter 1
Saving for a Rainy Day April 2018, Chapter 1
Recent Fiscal Developments and Outlook April 2017, Chapter 1
Navigating a Risky World October 2016, Chapter 1
Recent Fiscal Developments and Outlook April 2015, Chapter 1
Recent Fiscal Developments and Outlook October 2014, Chapter 1
Recent Fiscal Developments and Outlook April 2014, Chapter 1
Recent Fiscal Developments and the Short-Term Outlook October 2013, Chapter 1
Recent Fiscal Developments and the Short-Term Outlook April 2013, Chapter 1
The Fiscal Outlook October 2012, Chapter 1
Moving Forward October 2012, Chapter 3
Continued Fiscal Tightening Is in Store for 2012, Particularly among Advanced Economies April 2012, Chapter 1
Conclusion and Risk Assessment April 2012, Chapter 7
Addressing Fiscal Challenges to Reduce Economic Risks: Introduction September 2011, Chapter 1
Too Good to Be True? Fiscal Developments in Emerging Economies September 2011, Chapter 4
Addressing Fiscal Challenges to Reduce Economic Risks: Conclusion September 2011, Chapter 7
Risk to the Baseline September 2011, Box 2
Fiscal Developments in Oil-Producing Economies September 2011, Box 3
The Fiscal Indicators Index September 2011, Box 5
Shocks to the Baseline Fiscal Outlook April 2011, Chapter 3
Fiscal Developments and Near-Term Outlook November 2010, Chapter 1
Fiscal Adjustment Plans and Medium-Term Fiscal Outlook November 2010, Chapter 3
Assessing Fiscal Risks November 2010, Chapter 4
The Near- and Medium-Term Fiscal Outlook May 2010, Chapter 1

X. Fiscal Politics
Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1

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 Selected Topics

XI. Fiscal Policy Uncertainty

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
US Fiscal Policy Uncertainty and Bond Spreads April 2024, Box 1.1

XII. Government Debt

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1
Climate Crossroads: Fiscal Policies in a Warming World October 2023, Chapter 1
On the Path to Policy Normalization April 2023, Chapter 1
Inflation and Disinflation: What Role for Fiscal Policy? April 2023, Chapter 2
Strengthening the Credibility of Public Finances October 2021, Chapter 2
Capitalizing on Good Times April 2018
Private Debt and Its Discontents April 2018, Box 1.1
General Government Debt and Fiscal Risks in China April 2018, Box 1.4
Can Countries Sustain Higher Levels of Public Debt? April 2017, Box 1.4
Do Fiscal Rules Lower Sovereign Borrowing Costs in Countries with Weak Track Records of April 2017, Box 1.5
Fiscal Performance?
Debt: Use It Wisely October 2016, Chapter 1
Debt Data Set October 2016, Annex 1.1
Private and Public Debt and the Pace of the Recovery October 2016, Annex 1.2
Interlinkages between Public and Private Debt: Selected Summary of the Literature October 2016, Annex 1.3
Policies during Deleveraging Episodes October 2016, Annex 1.5
How Much Do Financial Markets Value Government Balance Sheets? October 2016, Box 1.5
Skeletons in the Closet? Shedding Light on Contingent Liabilities April 2016, Box 1.3
Lowflation and Debt in the Euro Area October 2014, Box 1.1
Moment of Truth: Unfunded Pension Liabilities and Public Debt Statistics April 2014, Box 1.1
Public Debt Dynamics and Fiscal Adjustment in Low-Income Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa April 2013, Box 6
Debt Ratios Are Still on the Rise, but Peaks Are within Sight April 2012, Chapter 2
High Gross Debt Levels May Overstate Challenges in the Short Run . . . April 2012, Chapter 4
. . . But Long-Run Debt-Related Challenges Remain Large April 2012, Chapter 5
The Legacy of the Crisis: How Long Will It Take to Lower Public Debt? September 2011, Chapter 5
Factors Underlying the Debt Increase Precrisis versus End-2015 September 2011, Box 6
The Importance of Monitoring Both Gross and Net Debt September 2011, Appendix 3
Stock-Flow Adjustments and Their Determinants September 2011, Appendix 4
Fiscal Deficits and Debts: Development and Outlook April 2011, Chapter 1
Sovereign Financing and Government Debt Markets April 2011, Chapter 2
Debt Dynamics and the Interest Rate–Growth Differential April 2011, Box 3.1
Sovereign Financing and Government Debt Markets November 2010, Chapter 2
Are Sovereign Spreads Linked to Fundamentals? November 2010, Appendix 2
Risks to Medium-Term Public Debt Trajectories; Methodological and Statistical Appendix November 2010, Appendix 4
Implications of Fiscal Developments for Government Debt Markets May 2010, Chapter 2
Debt Dynamics in G-20 Economies: An Update May 2010, Box 1
Gross versus Net Debt May 2010, Box 2
Fiscal Adjustment Requirements: Gross and Net Debt Targets May 2010, Appendix 2
Government Debt and Growth May 2010, Appendix 3

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XIII. Growth
Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Expanding Frontiers: Fiscal Policies for Innovation and Technology Diffusion April 2024, Chapter 2
IDEAS to Respond to Weaker Growth April 2020, Chapter 2
Factors Underlying Low Growth and Low Interest Rates April 2020, Box 2.1
Fiscal Policy for a Changing Global Economy April 2019, Chapter 1
China: How Can Fiscal Policy Support Economic Activity and Rebalancing? April 2019, Box 1.2
Tackling Inequality October 2017, Chapter 1
A Greater Role for Fiscal Policy April 2017, Chapter 1
Upgrading the Tax System to Boost Productivity April 2017, Chapter 2
Making Growth More Inclusive in China April 2017, Box 1.3
Taxation and Growth: Details Matter October 2013, Box 4
Debt Dynamics and the Interest Rate–Growth Differential April 2011, Box 3.1
Interest Rate–Growth Differential November 2010, Appendix 1
Government Debt and Growth May 2010, Appendix 3

XIV. Inflation
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1
On the Path to Policy Normalization April 2023, Chapter 1
Inflation and Disinflation: What Role for Fiscal Policy? April 2023, Chapter 2
Fiscal Policy from Pandemic to War April 2022, Chapter 1
Inflation and Fiscal Nexus: Empirical Findings April 2022, Online Annex 1.3

XV. Innovation, Entrepreneurship, Research, Development, and Investment

Expanding Frontiers: Fiscal Policies for Innovation and Technology Diffusion April 2024, Chapter 2
Climate Crossroads: Fiscal Policies in a Warming World October 2023, Chapter 1
Building a Resilient Future October 2022, Box 1.1
Public Investment for the Recovery October 2020, Chapter 2
Maintaining Quality When Scaling Up Public Investment October 2020,
Online Annex 2.3
How Green Is the Fiscal Response to the COVID-19 Crisis? October 2020, Box 1.2
Estimating Public Investment Needs for Climate Change Adaptation October 2020, Box 2.1
The Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment: A Model-Based Analysis April 2020, Online Annex 2.1
Digital Government April 2018, Chapter 2
The Role of Patents for Innovation October 2016, Box 2.1
Fiscal Policy and Green Innovation October 2016, Box 2.2
Does Preferential Tax Treatment of Income from Intellectual Property Promote Innovation? October 2016, Box 2.3
Innovation in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) October 2016, Box 2.4
Programs for Young Innovators and Start-Ups October 2016, Box 2.5
Fiscal Policy, Research and Development, and Total Factor Productivity Growth October 2016, Annex 2.1
Corrective Fiscal Incentives for Research and Development October 2016, Annex 2.2
Taxation and Entrepreneurship October 2016, Annex 2.4
Fiscal Policies for Innovation and Growth April 2016, Chapter 2

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 Selected Topics

XVI. Interest Rates

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1
Inflation and Disinflation: What Role for Fiscal Policy? April 2023, Chapter 2
Inflation and Fiscal Nexus: Empirical Findings April 2022, Online Annex 1.3
The Weakened Relation between Sovereign Spreads and Debt October 2021,
Online Annex 2.2
Fiscal Credibility Indicators Using Private Forecasts October 2021,
Online Annex 2.4
The Dog That Didn’t Bark (So Far): Low Interest Rates in the United States and Japan September 2011, Chapter 3
Debt Dynamics and the Interest Rate–Growth Differential April 2011, Box 3.1
Interest Rate–Growth Differential November 2010, Appendix 1

XVII. Low-Income Countries

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1
Building Tax Capacity in Low-Income and Emerging Market Economies April 2024, Box 1.2
Expanding Frontiers: Fiscal Policies for Innovation and Technology Diffusion April 2024, Chapter 2
Improving Tax Capacity in Emerging Market and Developing Economies April 2023, Box 1.1
The Long-Run Payoff of Tax Administration Reforms April 2023, Online Annex 1.1
Inflation and Disinflation: What Role for Fiscal Policy? April 2023, Chapter 2
Fiscal Developments in Countries Participating in the Debt Suspension Initiative October 2021, Box 1.2
Digital Government April 2018, Chapter 2
Digitalization and Property Taxation in Developing Economies April 2018, Box 2.2
Digitalizing Government Payments in Developing Economies April 2018, Box 2.3
The Digitalization of Public Finances: Country Case Studies April 2018, Annex 2.1
The Fiscal Implications of Slowing Global Trade for Emerging Market and Developing Economies April 2016, Box 1.1
The Fiscal Implications of International Bond Issuance by Low-Income Developing Countries October 2014, Box 1.2
Confronting Trade-Offs: Accommodating Spending Pressures in Low-Income Countries September 2011, Chapter 6
Global Fuel and Food Price Shocks and Fiscal Performance in Low-Income Countries September 2011, Box 8

XVIII. Policy and Reform

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1
Expanding Frontiers: Fiscal Policies for Innovation and Technology Diffusion April 2024, Chapter 2
Climate Crossroads: Fiscal Policies in a Warming World October 2023, Chapter 1
Inflation and Disinflation: What Role for Fiscal Policy? April 2023, Chapter 2
Helping People Bounce Back October 2022, Chapter 1
Coordinating Taxes across Borders April 2022, Chapter 2
The Need for Timely and Accurate Beneficial-Ownership Information April 2022, Box 2.1
Estimating the Revenue Impact of Pillar 1 and 2 April 2022, Online Annex 2.1
Emissions Equivalence of Other Mitigation Approaches to Carbon Pricing April 2022, Online Annex 2.5
Fiscal Policies to Address the COVID-19 Pandemic October 2020, Chapter 1

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IDEAS to Respond to Weaker Growth April 2020, Chapter 2

Capitalizing on Good Times April 2018
Tackling Inequality October 2017, Chapter 1
Upgrading the Tax System to Boost Productivity April 2017, Chapter 2
What Are the Budgetary Costs and Gains of Structural Reforms? April 2017, Box 1.2
Do Fiscal Rules Lower Sovereign Borrowing Costs in Countries with Weak Track Records of April 2017, Box 1.5
Fiscal Performance?
Debt: Use It Wisely October 2016, Chapter 1
Policies during Deleveraging Episodes October 2016, Annex 1.5
Benefits of Targeted Fiscal Interventions at Times of Private Deleveraging October 2016, Box 1.4
An Active, Supportive Role for Fiscal Policy April 2015, Chapter 1
Can Fiscal Policy Stabilize Output? April 2015, Chapter 2
Public Expenditure Reform: Making Difficult Choices April 2014, Chapter 2
Expenditure Rules: Effective Tools for Sound Fiscal Policy April 2014, Appendix 1
The Future of the State: Testing the Wagner and Baumol Hypotheses April 2014, Box 2.1
Fiscal Reforms to Unlock Economic Potential in the Arab Countries in Transition October 2013, Box 2
Tricks of the Trade October 2013, Box 5
How Can Fiscal Councils Strengthen Fiscal Performance? April 2013, Box 1
Commonly Used Definitions of the Fiscal Balance October 2012, Box 1
The “Two-Pack”: Further Reforms to Fiscal Governance in the Euro Area October 2012, Box 6
Anchoring Medium-Term Fiscal Credibility: The Second Generation of Fiscal Rules April 2012, Chapter 6
Measuring Fiscal Space: A Critical Review of Existing Methodologies April 2012, Box 1
The “Fiscal Compact”: Reforming EU Fiscal Governance April 2012, Box 5
Assessing the Cyclicality of Subnational Government Policies April 2012, Box A3.2
“Fiscal Devaluation”: What Is It—and Does It Work? September 2011, Appendix 1
Fiscal Aspects of EU Economic Governance Reforms April 2011, Box 4.1
Fiscal Transparency under Pressure April 2011, Appendix 2
The European Union: Reforming Fiscal Governance November 2010, Box 3.2
Fiscal Rules—Recent Developments May 2010, Box 7

XIX. Poverty and Inequality

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Inflation and Disinflation: What Role for Fiscal Policy? April 2023, Chapter 2
Fiscal Policy from Pandemic to War April 2022, Chapter 1
Social Protection and Poverty During the Pandemic April 2022, Box 1.1
Poverty Projections using Growth Forecasts April 2022, Online Annex 1.1
Analysis of Poverty, Social Safety Nets, and Informality April 2022, Online Annex 1.2
Long-Term Distributional Impact of the American Families Plan October 2021, Box 1;
Online Annex 1.2
Persistent Consequences of Wealth Inequality for the Next Generation’s Income: April 2021, Box 2.1
The Case of Norway
Public Preferences for Progressive Taxation in the Post–COVID-19 World April 2021, Box 2.2
How Will the COVID-19 Pandemic Affect Poverty and Inequality? October 2020,
Online Annex 1.1
Tackling Inequality October 2017, Chapter 1

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 Selected Topics

Global Inequality Today and in 2035 October 2017, Box 1.1

Equally Distributed Equivalent Level of Income as a Measure of Social Welfare October 2017, Box 1.2
Bolivia: Inequality Decline during a Commodity Boom October 2017, Box 1.3
Inequality Dimensions: Wealth, Opportunities, and Gender October 2017, Annex 1.2

XX. Private Debt

Private Debt and Public Sector Risk October 2020, Box 1.1
Private Debt and Its Discontents April 2018, Box 1.1
Debt: Use It Wisely October 2016, Chapter 1
Debt Data Set October 2016, Annex 1.1
Private and Public Debt and the Pace of Recovery October 2016, Annex 1.2
Interlinkages between Public and Private Debt: Selected Summary of the Literature October 2016, Annex 1.3
Private Deleveraging and the Role of Fiscal Policy October 2016, Annex 1.4
Policies during Deleveraging Episodes October 2016, Annex 1.5
Benefits of Targeted Fiscal Intervention during Times of Private Deleveraging October 2016, Box 1.4

XXI. Privatization and Public Enterprises

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Experience with Privatization April 2020, Box 3.1
General Government Nonfinancial Assets: What Do We Know? October 2012, Box 7
Government Shares in Publicly Listed Companies April 2012, Box 3
United States: Government-Sponsored Enterprises and Contingent Liabilities September 2011, Box 1
Adjusting Public Capital Stock for Investment Inefficiency September 2011, Box 9
Insights for Privatization Plans from Previous Large Episodes September 2011, Appendix 2

XXII. Revenue
Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Building Tax Capacity in Low-Income and Emerging Market Economies April 2024, Box 1.2
Improving Tax Capacity in Emerging Market and Developing Economies April 2023, Box 1.1
The Long-Run Payoff of Tax Administration Reforms April 2023, Online Annex 1.1
Inflation and Disinflation: What Role for Fiscal Policy? April 2023, Chapter 2
Coordinating Taxes across Borders April 2022, Chapter 2
Estimating the Revenue Impact of Pillar 1 and 2 April 2022, Online Annex 2.1
Corporate Tax Rate Strategic Reaction April 2022, Online Annex 2.2
Survey of International Coordination and Tax Administration April 2022, Online Annex 2.3
Revenue Implications of Cross-Border Remote Work April 2022, Online Annex 2.4
Emissions Equivalence of Other Mitigation Approaches to Carbon Pricing April 2022, Online Annex 2.5
Digital Government April 2018, Chapter 2
Digitalization Advances in Revenue Administration in South Africa and Estonia April 2018, Box 2.1
Digitalization and Property Taxation in Developing Economies April 2018, Box 2.2
Small Business Taxation and the P2P Economy April 2018, Box 2.5
The Digitalization of Public Finances: Country Case Studies April 2018, Annex 2.1
Estimating the Impact of Digitalization on Tax Evasion from Cross-Border Fraud April 2018, Annex 2.2

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FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Estimating the Distribution of Tax Revenue Collection from Offshore Income and April 2018, Annex 2.3
Wealth Following Improved Cross-Country Information Exchange
Upgrading the Tax System to Boost Productivity April 2017, Chapter 2
Past, Present, and Future Patterns in Revenues April 2015, Box 1.1
Assessing Potential Revenue: Two Approaches October 2013, Appendix 2
Increasing Revenue from Real Property Taxes October 2013, Appendix 3
Past Episodes of Sustained Fiscal Revenue Increases May 2010, Box 6

XXIII. Social Expenditures

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1
Brazil’s Emergency Cash Transfer Program October 2022,
Online Annex 1.3
Fiscal Policy from Pandemic to War April 2022, Chapter 1
Measures in Response to High Energy and Food Prices April 2022, Box 1.2
Smart Strategies to Contain the COVID-19 Pandemic October 2020,
Online Annex 1.2
From Lockdown to Recovery: Spending Measures to Support Livelihoods during the October 2020,
COVID-19 Crisis Online Annex 1.3
Understanding the Implications of Different Types of Fiscal Measures for Public Finances April 2020, Box 1.1
IDEAS to Respond to Weaker Growth April 2020, Chapter 2
State-Owned Enterprises: The Other Government April 2020, Chapter 3
Digital Government April 2018, Chapter 2
Tackling Inequality October 2017, Chapter 1
The Fiscal Response to the Refugee Influx in Europe April 2016, Box 1.2
The Pressure of Age-Related Spending on Public Debt in Advanced Economies April 2015, Box 1.3
Targeted Employer Social Security Contribution Cuts: Lessons from Experiences in October 2014, Box 2.1
Advanced Economies
Public Expenditure Reform: Making Difficult Choices April 2014, Chapter 2
Moment of Truth: Unfunded Pension Liabilities and Public Debt Statistics April 2014, Box 1.1
Structural Measures and Social Dialogue April 2014, Box 2.2
Health System Inefficiencies April 2014, Box 2.3
Recent Developments in Public Health Spending and Outlook for the Future October 2013, Appendix 1
Confronting Trade-Offs: Accommodating Spending Pressures in Low-Income Countries September 2011, Chapter 6
Potential Reform Strategies to Contain the Growth of Public Health Spending April 2011, Box A1.1
The US National Commission Report April 2011, Box A5.1
Tackling the Challenge of Health Care Reform in Advanced Economies April 2011, Appendix 1
Selected Spending and Tax Issues November 2010, Chapter 5
Advanced Economies: The Outlook for Public Health Spending November 2010, Box 3.1
Increasing Social Expenditures and Household Consumption in China May 2010, Box 4
Health Care Reforms in the United States May 2010, Box 5

XXIV. Stabilization
Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Inflation and Disinflation: What Role for Fiscal Policy? April 2023, Chapter 2

82 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 Selected Topics

Income Stabilization before and during the COVID-19 Pandemic across EU Countries: October 2022,
A Microsimulation Approach Online Annex 1.2
Designing Fiscal Tools to Build Resilience: A DSGE-Based Analysis October 2022,
Online Annex 1.4
Policy Options to Support the Economic Recovery October 2020,
Online Annex 1.5
IDEAS to Respond to Weaker Growth April 2020, Chapter 2
Can Fiscal Policy Stabilize Output? April 2015, Chapter 2
Fiscal Stabilization under Alternative Estimates of the Output Gap April 2015, Box 2.1
Boosting the Effectiveness of Automatic Stabilizers April 2015, Box 2.2

XXV. Stimulus
Determining the Size of Fiscal Stimulus for Sustained Recovery October 2020,
Online Annex 1.4
Public Investment Fiscal Multiplier and Macroeconomic Uncertainty October 2020,
Online Annex 2.5
The G-20 Economies: Crisis-Related Discretionary Fiscal Stimulus November 2010, Box 1.1
Update on Crisis-Related Discretionary Fiscal Stimulus in G-20 Economies May 2010, Appendix 1

XXVI. Subsidies
Fiscal Policy in the Great Election Year April 2024, Chapter 1
Expanding Frontiers: Fiscal Policies for Innovation and Technology Diffusion April 2024, Chapter 2
Climate Crossroads: Fiscal Policies in a Warming World October 2023, Chapter 1
Externalities from Energy Pricing Subsidies October 2022,
Online Annex 1.5
Fiscal Policy from Pandemic to War April 2022, Chapter 1
Measures in Response to High Energy and Food Prices April 2022, Box 1.2
Digital Government April 2018, Chapter 2
The Digitalization of Public Finances: Country Case Studies April 2018, Annex 2.1
Adopting a Universal Basic Income to Support Subsidy Reform in India October 2017, Box 1.6
Reforming Energy Subsidies April 2015, Box 1.2
Reforming Petroleum Subsidies April 2010, Appendix 5

XXVII. Sustainability and Risk Management

Putting a Lid on Public Debt October 2024, Chapter 1
Climate Crossroads: Fiscal Policies in a Warming World October 2023, Chapter 1
Toward Green Public Finance Management April 2022, Box 1.3
Media Coverage of Suspension of Fiscal Rules October 2021, Box 2.2
Assessing Unexpected Increases in Debt October 2021,
Online Annex 2.3
Investing in Resilience October 2020,
Online Annex 2.6
Estimating the Adaptation Costs of Investing in the Resilience of Physical Assets October 2020,
Online Annex 2.7
State-Owned Enterprises: The Other Government April 2020, Chapter 3

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 83

FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

Can Countries Sustain Higher Levels of Public Debt? April 2017, Box 1.4
Developing a Fiscal Risk Management Framework April 2016, Box 1.4
Reassuring Markets about Fiscal Sustainability in the Euro Area September 2011, Chapter 2
Assessing and Mitigating Fiscal Sustainability Risks April 2011, Chapter 4
Assessing Fiscal Sustainability Risks: Deriving a Fiscal Sustainability Risk Map April 2011, Appendix 3

XXVIII. Taxation
Building Tax Capacity in Low-Income and Emerging Market Economies April 2024, Box 1.2
Expanding Frontiers: Fiscal Policies for Innovation and Technology Diffusion April 2024, Chapter 2
Improving Tax Capacity in Emerging Market and Developing Economies April 2023, Box 1.1
The Long-Run Payoff of Tax Administration Reforms April 2023, Online Annex 1.1
Coordinating Taxes across Borders April 2022, Chapter 2
Estimating the Revenue Impact of Pillar 1 and 2 April 2022, Online Annex 2.1
Corporate Tax Rate Strategic Reaction April 2022, Online Annex 2.2
Survey of International Coordination and Tax Administration April 2022, Online Annex 2.3
Revenue Implications of Cross-Border Remote Work April 2022, Online Annex 2.4
Emissions Equivalence of Other Mitigation Approaches to Carbon Pricing April 2022, Online Annex 2.5
Persistent Consequences of Wealth Inequality for the Next Generation’s Income: April 2021, Box 2.1
The Case of Norway
Public Preferences for Progressive Taxation in the Post–COVID-19 World April 2021, Box 2.2
Tax Policy and Automatic Stabilizers April 2020, Box 2.2
Curbing Corruption April 2019, Chapter 2
Avoiding International Tax Wars April 2019, Box 1.3
Digital Government April 2018, Chapter 2
The Distributional Effects of Income Tax Cuts in the United States April 2018, Box 1.2
International Tax Policy Implications from US Corporate Tax Reform April 2018, Box 1.3
Digitalization Advances in Revenue Administration in South Africa and Estonia April 2018, Box 2.1
Digitalization and Property Taxation in Developing Economies April 2018, Box 2.2
Small Business Taxation and the P2P Economy April 2018, Box 2.5
The Digitalization of Public Finances: Country Case Studies April 2018, Annex 2.1
Estimating the Impact of Digitalization on Tax Evasion from Cross-Border Fraud April 2018, Annex 2.2
Estimating the Distribution of Tax Revenue Collection from Offshore Income and April 2018, Annex 2.3
Wealth Following Improved Cross-Country Information Exchange
Tackling Inequality October 2017, Chapter 1
Measuring Tax Progressivity October 2017, Box 1.4
Taxing Wealth and Wealth Transfers October 2017, Box 1.5
Upgrading the Tax System to Boost Productivity April 2017, Chapter 2
The Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax: A Primer April 2017, Box 1.1
What Is the Effective Marginal Tax Rate? April 2017, Box 2.1
Colombia: Labor Tax Reform and the Shift from Informal to Formal Employment April 2017, Box 2.2
Mozambique: Differential Tax Treatment across Firms April 2017, Box 2.3
Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment October 2016, Annex 2.3
Taxation and Entrepreneurship October 2016, Annex 2.4

84 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

 Selected Topics

Taxing Our Way out of—or into?—Trouble October 2013, Chapter 2

Learning from the Crisis? Taxation and Financial Stability October 2013, Box 3
Taxation and Growth: Details Matter October 2013, Box 4
A One-Off Capital Levy? October 2013, Box 6
Increasing Revenue from Real Property Taxes October 2013, Appendix 3
Do Pensioners Get Special Treatment on Taxes? October 2012, Box 5
Containing Tax Expenditures April 2011, Appendix 5
Selected Spending and Tax Issues November 2010, Chapter 5

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 85

IMF EXECUTIVE BOARD DISCUSSION OF THE OUTLOOK,
OCTOBER 2024

The following remarks were made by the Chair at the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion of the
Fiscal Monitor, Global Financial Stability Report, and World Economic Outlook on October 8, 2024.

E
xecutive Directors broadly agreed with staff ’s investment and growth, especially in emerging market
assessment of the global economic outlook, and developing economies heavily reliant on external
risks, and policy priorities. They welcomed financing. Directors also noted still-acute pressures on
the continued growth resilience of the global commercial real estate sectors and ongoing property
economy in the face of recurring shocks. Directors sector adjustments in some countries. Some Directors
highlighted that monetary policy has managed to bring highlighted upside risks to the outlook, including
about disinflation with so‑far limited cost to output a stronger recovery in investment in advanced
and employment, increasing the likelihood of a smooth economies, better performance in some emerging
landing. They noted, however, that the recovery market economies, and economic benefits from
remains uneven and that growth, while steady, remains artificial intelligence.
underwhelming, reflecting weak productivity growth. Directors called on central banks to carefully
They noted that mediocre medium‑term growth and calibrate monetary policy to restore price stability,
rising debt trajectories increase the risk that the global avoiding a tighter-than-necessary stance that could
economy will become entrenched in a low-growth, weaken growth and employment. They emphasized
high-debt environment. Against this backdrop, they the importance of remaining data dependent and
agreed that, as monetary policy becomes less restrictive, clearly communicating policy decisions. Directors
a renewed emphasis on gradual and sustained fiscal stressed that, in economies where core inflation persists
consolidation, coupled with ambitious structural at above-target levels, policy rates should remain in
reforms, is needed, with due regard for country‑specific restrictive territory until underlying inflation shows
conditions. clear signs of moving toward target. They agreed that
While most Directors agreed that risks to the moving to a more neutral stance is appropriate in
outlook are now tilted to the downside, a number economies where inflation is unambiguously abating,
of Directors also cautioned against overstating the long-term inflation expectations remain anchored, and
deterioration in the balance of risks. Directors output gaps are closing. Given elevated economic and
noted, in particular, risks from potentially more policy uncertainty, Directors called on central banks
persistent underlying inflation, increased geopolitical to stand ready to mitigate the potential disruptive
conflicts and tensions in different regions, and the impacts of foreign exchange volatility and capital
intensification of protectionist policies that could flows, including by leveraging, where appropriate,
weigh down on medium-term growth. Directors the country-specific guidance provided by the IMF’s
noted that while the monetary easing underway has Integrated Policy Framework.
helped keep financial conditions accommodative and Directors welcomed that the global banking sector
near-term financial stability risks at bay, this may in has remained resilient and emphasized that further
turn facilitate the buildup of financial vulnerabilities. progress on adopting and implementing frameworks for
They stressed that the widening disconnect between recovery and resolution is critical for addressing weak
subdued financial market volatility, relative to elevated or failing banks. They concurred that full, timely, and
economic and geopolitical uncertainty, increases the consistent implementation of international standards,
chances of sharp disorderly repricing. Further volatility including Basel III, remains important to enhance
surges could impair financial stability as well as prudential frameworks. Directors stressed the need

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 87

FISCAL MONITOR: Putting a Lid on Public Debt

to improve non-bank financial institutions’ liquidity Directors stressed the importance of advancing
preparedness, implement the Financial Stability Board’s structural reforms to boost growth and accelerate
agreed-upon standards, close data gaps, and enhance the green transition, noting the need to enhance the
stress testing for non-banks to reduce systemic risks. social acceptability of these reforms through enhanced
Directors generally called for sustained, gradual, communication and trust-building mechanisms.
and carefully designed fiscal adjustments amid They emphasized that targeted reforms are needed
elevated public debt and associated risks. They noted to boost productivity, enhance competition, improve
that larger adjustments than currently envisaged human capital, and increase labor force participation.
in many countries are needed to stabilize debt Directors reiterated the need to advance with climate
and build necessary buffers against adverse shocks. mitigation and adaptation reforms. In this context,
Directors stressed that the pace of adjustment some Directors emphasized the need to strengthen
should be calibrated to country-specific economic efforts to increase climate finance for adaptation,
conditions, should ensure continuous support to especially for vulnerable countries exposed to
the most vulnerable and protect public investment, significant climate risks.
and should be well communicated and anchored in Directors underscored that stronger multilateral
credible medium-term frameworks. They stressed cooperation is essential to facilitate debt restructuring
that strengthening fiscal governance should be a processes, mitigate risks from geoeconomic
priority and would help reduce the debt buildup from fragmentation, and accelerate the green transition in a
contingent liabilities and arrears. manner consistent with World Trade Organization rules.

88 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

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Putting a Lid on Public Debt

FISCAL MONITOR OCTOBER 2024