CHAPTER- XXX

GOO & EE V X l_ -
 GOD AND EVIL

The problem of evil is one of the central issues in

philosophy of religion. Except few, almost all the

religions assume the existence of God. It is the most

fundamental presupposition in all theological and

religious activities. Though the concept of God is

differently conceived in different religions, there is

absolute agreement in so far as God is invariably

understood as the omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient,

self-existent and benevolent being. God is infinite and

omnipotent and the supreme benefactor of the creation.

The problem of evil poses a veritable challenge to the

existence of an omnipotent and benevolent God.

"Omnipotence* and "benevolence* are constitutive of the

concept of God. It is argued that the omnipotence and

benevolence of God are not compatible with the presence

of evil. Since God is benevolent, he would not wish evil

to be there. Since he is omnipotent he could prevent evil

from being there. As the evil does exist, either he is

not benevolent or he is not omnipotent. Evil is a fact of

life. The depth and extent of human suffering, natural

and man made, do unmistakably point to the reality of

evil. For those who believe that there is such a God and

that there is evil which he could overcome, if he wanted

to, the problem of evil persists as unsolved riddle and

paradox.
 The problem of evil is given in form of a dilemma:

God either wishes to take away evil and he is unable, or

he is able but unwilling, or he is neither willing nor

able or he is both willing and able. If he is willing and

unable, he would cease to be omnipotent because

"omnipotence* has the minimal suggestion that there would

be nothing impassible for the omnipotent being to do or

achieve. God's failure to materialise his wish would

therefore, be incompatible with his omnipotence. If he is

able and not-willing it would be equally at variance with

his benevolence. If he is neither willing nor able, he

will be both malevolent and limited. If he is both

willing and able then, why does evil exist ? Evil

testifies to the imperfection of the creator. In other

words, if God is perfect how could the creation be

imperfect? Logic of the argument rests on the assumption

that the cause must be as imperfect as the effect.

In theological discourse it is axiomatic that God

is perfect. This makes him immune to any kind of

imperfection. He is the repository of all the good and

sublime qualities. Evidently, God is not good, as one

among the other good things or creatures. It is rather,

that he is goodness as such. The concept of good derives

it's meaning from God. Thus the goodness of God is

constitutive of the very notion of "good", which figures

 64

in the domain of moral-valuation. Therefore, it has been

pertinently said that God is amoral in as much as he is

beyond good and evil. When it is said that "Mr. * X* is

good", such a pronouncement is norm-specific because in

saying so the conduct of Mr. X is adjudged against

standard of goodness which the person tacitly, assumes.

But, the proposition that 'God is good' does not owe it's

justification to any moral standard. Rather, different

moral standards get their justification by being in

conformity with the goodness of God. So, despite the

grammatical similarity, the statements, 'Hr. 'X' is good"

and 'God is good’ belong to different logical categories.

The goodness of Mr. X presupposes a moral standard,

whereas the goodness of God constitutes the basis of

different forms of goodness. An action is good if it is

in conformity with the will of God. Anything that is at

variance with the natural will of God is evil. Seen from

this perspective the conduct of Mr. X, is good,

retrospectively, whereas the goodness of God is

prospective. Goodness of Mr. X is axiological or

normative, whereas the goodness of God is ontological.

The dilemma pertaining to the phenomenon of evil is

that God being all powerful can cause everything that he

desires. The onus of the explanation consists in showing

how exi'l can co-exist with the benevolence and

 63

omnipotence of God. The paradox is lucidly stated by

[Link] ,

The existence of evil in the world

must at all times be the greatest of
all problems which the mind
encounters when it reflects on God
and His relation to the world. If He
is indeed, all-good and all-powerful,
how has evil any place in the world
which he has made? Whence came it?
Why did he allow it to arise? If all
powerful why does He not deliver us
from the burden? Alike in the
physical and moral order creation
seems so grievously marred that we
find it hard to understand how it can
derive its entirety from God. 1

It is worthwhile to examine the basic

presupposition of problem of evil. It assumes that evil

is a fact of life. If evil did not exist, there would be

no reason to call the benevolence and weakness of God

into question. Evil committed by the individual is termed

as sin in theological plain and evil wrought by nature is
termed as physical evil. Sin is understood as the
transgression of moral law. It means that there are

1. G.H. Joyce, Principles of theology, See Brody Baruch.

A, (ed)Readings in the Philosophy of Religion : An
Analytic approach Ch-xvii, Prentice Hall, Inc : Engelwood
Cliffs,N.J, 1974, P.34
 66

certain objective principles or laws which transcend the

contingencies of space and time. Evil can be brought

about by super-human creatures, human, sub-human

creatures and nature. If Adam eats the forbidden fruit he

commits an act of disobedience of the will of God and has

to expiate for his sin because it was injuncted by God,

'Thou shalt not eat the forbidden fruit’.

Human beings have the capacity to cogitate on the

pros and cons of an action and make choices so as to act

in consonance with the norms or act contrary to them. But

the phenomenon is different in respect of the behaviour

of the non-human creatures, where free~choice is

conspicuous by it's absence. The behaviour of sub-human

species are conditioned instinctively whereas in nature,

everything is determined by the inexorable causal laws.

Thus, the moral evil committed by men are axiological or

deontological whereas, suffering or evil caused by the

subhuman or nature are not so. A.L. Herman observes that

Thus all the moral rules, and all the moral

cunning and moral persuasion imaginable, won't
prevent a squirrel from eating the forbidden
fruit, nor prevent a wind from knocking it from
its sacred, lofty preach. Consequently, while
the sub-human creatures and nature are capable
 67

of causing suffering, they are incapable of

doing deontologi cal evil.*5

In this sense, virtue and sin can be meaningfully

predicated only of human beings. The evils caused by

superhuman agents refer to the phenomena, caused by God

or supernatural agencies beyond human control. Obviously,

the evils caused by superhuman agencies fall in the

theological domain, whereas evil, in the sense of

transgression of moral tenet, falls in the moral domain.

Some scholars argue that the problem of human evil does

have a distinct theological dimension. If it be

considered that God is the creator of the universe and

the ultimate arbiter of all that takes place in the human

and non-human universe, then the pertinent question is :

why does an omnipotent God permit the lesser mortals to

commit sin ? For the same reason, it can be asked s why

does not God prevent nature to wreak havoc, causing

serious harm to the innocent and the righteous. Judged by

non-moral parameters, many of the events in nature bear

testimony to the fact of disharmony rather than harmony.

Much of the man-made disasters go to justify the inherent

bestiality in men, rather than their innate goodness or

divine ancestry. The apparent incomprehensibility of such

A.L. Herman, The Problem of Evil And Indian Thought,

Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, Pvt. Ltd.
Delhi,1993, Chap-S, P.91
 68

phenomena make the problem of et'ii more challenging. The

universe appears to be irrational, blind. Edward H.

Madden and Peter H. Hare highlight this.

unbearable pa i n and suffering

caused either by natural events or
the acts of other men, character
defects , immoral acts, physical and
mental deformity the prosperity of
rogues, and the failure of honest
men .3

The physical evils occur independently of human will

and actions. They stem from the very nature and

constitution of reality. Such evils include not only the

aberration of nature but also those, caused by non-human

agents such as flies, beasts etc. The human beings

discover themselves, as being thrown into a surrounding,

vulnerable not only to the vagaries of nature, such as

earthquakes, storms, pestilence, draught, famine but also

the diseases, caused and propagated by pests, flies,

bacteria etc. If excess rain causes deluge submerging the

hopes of the toiling mass, lack of rain forces them to

starve, beg and die. If pestilence kills people

wholesale, the nature-made aberrations such as, insanity

and retardation torment them in retail. The natural

3. Madden, Edward H. and Hare, Peter H., Evil and the

Concept of God, Springfield, Illinois: Charles C.
Thomas, 1968, Page-5
 69

calamities such as the violent earthquakes, volcanic

eruptions, droughts and famines shake the moral fabric of

the humans to its very foundation. It is a place where

the extremities abound. If people perish in the freezing

cold some where and else where, people burn in the

scorching heat of the desert. If God is conceived as

benevolent and infinitely powerful, how could he wish his

creatures to be subject to such extremities. It is not so

mu c h the harmony and symmetry of the universe that

fascinates one to believe in God, as the torment,

destruction and horrors, wrought by nature, which leave

one appalled and confounded and make one doubt the

existence of such a creator. Hence, the very strength of

theism depends on the extent to which one reconciles the

fact of evil with the existence of an infinitely powerful

and a loving God.

There is a sense in which moral evil is different

from physical evil* The former refers to the acts of

gross selfishness, envy, greed, deceit, cruelty,

callousness, cowardice and the large scale such as wars,

genocides, persecutions and atrocities etc. The physical

evils on the other hand, are caused by natural forces

such as earthquake, pestilence, famine etc. The natural

evils are the result of the operation of causal laws,

whereas moral evils, are the consequence of misuse of

 70

human free-will. Dilating the distinction Cornman and

Lehrer observe that,

Moral evil consists of all the evil

in the world which is the causal
result of those morally responsible
agents who exist as part of the
world. Natural evil includes all the
other evil that there may be...
immense suffering resulting from such
natural disasters as earthquakes,
floods, draughts, hurricanes

The existence of a benevolent and omnipotent God is

called into question not only with regard to the

existence of physical evil but also with the moral evil.

Human beings despite their pretensions to free-will and

choice, are integral part of the reality of which God is

the creator. The decree of Providence overrides anything

else. If this is conceded, then God would cease to be

omnipotent. Freedom of the individual cannot be so great

as to upset the design of God. On the other hand, if it

is conceived that the human mischiefs causing moral evils

are compatible with the will of God then God cannot be

said to be really benevolent. How can a God who is

4. Cornman, .lames [Link] Keith, Lehrer, Philosophical

Problems arid Arguments: An Introduction, The
Macmillan Company, New York, 1968, P-341
 71

indifferent to the omissions and commissions of this

creation be said to be benevolent ?

Man, acclaimed as the choicest creation of God,

despite being endowed with all the virtues and excellence

of head and heart, ironically falls into the abysmal

depths of immorality and evil. Selfishness, savagery,

greed, exploitation, violence and atrocities by men,

makes one wonder how and why God, the cosmic father,

could create such species who could exceed all other

creatures in perpetrating evil. If an animal is cruel it

is cruel in the very natural and simplistic way. The

behaviour pattern of a mad elephant, an angry tigress or

an avenging snake is predictable. There is hardly any

innovation or novelty in the ways of animal-cruelty.

Alas, to the human ways! One wonders at the creative and

ingenious ways in which human cruelty far exceeds those

of animals in respect of their nature, intensity and

magnitude.

Here is a case which depicts the height of crudeness

and cruelty. In certain state of India, during a spate of

communal violence, people of a particular community

attacked the houses of the other community. Especially,

the women and children were victims of the communal

frenzy. The small children are Nrested from their mothers

 72

and thrown to the bonfire, to be toasted alive. The women

are denuded and made to run in the street with the

burning tyres on their necks. Another instance s Here is

a girl, who deserted by her beloved, takes to calculated

savagery in getting her beloved killed by the

mercenaries, collects the flesh of him, preserves it in a

deep freeze and eats them bit by bit everyday, for months

together. Eiesides, arson, kidnapping, premeditated

genocides have become the very order of the day, such

that unless an event is of very great magnitude, it is

ignored as a commonplace affair and does not deserve a

place in the newspaper. Such moral evils stem from man's

imperfection and result from human nature. Having

conceded to the fact that man is the choicest creation of

God, the omnipotent and benevolent progenitor of

everything actual and possible, one wonders as to how

could such an author give birth to creatures, who instead

of exhibiting the height of virtues do stoop so low as to

be more beastly than the beasts.

The phenomena of physical and moral evil stand as

enigma for the theist. Neither theist can, without

oddity, revise the concept of God as a being, who is

either not-good or not-omnipotent? nor can he wish away

the existence of evil. Theists have attempted several

solutions. These attempts have taken two distinct forms

 73

i.e., either they show that the existence of evil is

compatible with the goodness of God or that the evil does

not exist and the so called evil is nothing but good

misunderstood. There are also different ways in which the

former contention is justified. The idea of evil is

acknowledged with greater sincerity and seriousness by

the theist than the atheist. An ordinary act of

immorality which is brushed aside as very natural in the

framework of atheist is viewed with concern and

seriousness by the theist. Given tli’e fact of evil, the.

onus lies with the theist to make sense of the predicates

like omnipotence and benevolence which are constitutive

of the concept of God.

The man who sins thereby offends

God.... We are called on to explain
how God came to create an order of
things in which rebellion and even
final rejection have such a place.
Since a choice from among an infinite
number of possible worlds lay open to
God, how came, He to choose one in
which these occur? Is not such a
choice in flagrant opposition to the
Divine Goodness ? *■

5. Joyce, Principles of Theology, [Link], [Link]., P-

68
 74

The free-will thesis is considered to be offering a

plausible solution to the problem of moral evil. It is

argued that the fact of evil does not have any bearing on

the goodness and omnipotence of a creator God, as its

genesis is traced to the free-will of the individual.

Everything is created perfect in the state of nature.

Evil accrues when free-will is misused i.e,, when the

creature acts contrary to the will of God. Nan is free to

live either in consonance with divine ways or contrary to

it. Thus, evil is as much man's own making, as the good.

Nan is said to be free only when he has the latitude to

follow either the ways of the pleasurable or the

preferable. All that goes in the name of virtue and

excellence is made possible only when the individual

makes the righteous use of will. When one falls out from

the path of righteousness there is evil. In other words,

the will which can cause good, can also cause the evil to

be there.

All ill fortune results from the

defects or at least from the
defective expression of some finite
will

6. Bertocci Peter, Introduction to the Philosophy of

Religion, Mew York, Prentice [Link], 1951 P- 397.
 75

According to [Link]?

If men are to be good they must be

free if they are free they must be
free to do wrong and it is impossible
to separate wrong doing from
suffering.1’’

Mac Closkey holds that free-will can only lend

justification to the existence of moral evil. Both Mackie

and Joyce are of opinion that free-will of man and the

goodness of God go hand in hand. Mackie elucidates the

theological impasse in pointing out that if it is not

possible for God to endow man with free-will and at the

same time, ensure that no moral evil is committed, then

he cannot really be omnipotent. Joyce points out that

free-will need not necessarily involve the power to

choose wrong. The misuse of the gift might be due to the

circumstantial exigencies when the individual rejects

what is truly good and opts in favour of what is not-

good. Often, despite our knowledge of what is good, one

cannot but choose the not-good.

The critics object to the free-will thesis in

pointing out that if evil is the result of the misuse of

7. [Link], The Modern Predicament,, A study in the

Philosophy of Religion, Mac Millan, New York, 1955,
P-358.
 76

free-will then it does not so much disclose the

imperfection of the creatures, as that of the creator.

Since God is good and omnipotent, he could create man in

a manner such that he could never err. That is to say,

man should have been so made that he is permanently

disposed only to act rightly, thereby forestalling the

fact of eril. If this objection is given merit, human

beings would be reduced to the state of automata. If God

endows man with free-will and at the same time constrains

him in a manner so that he is made to employ the will

only in a particular way i.e., the righteous way, then

the [Link]-will would be mere myth. That would

undermine the dignity of man as a moral being. Hence, it

is urged that it is better that man is free, with the

possibility of doing both good and evil than to have the

free-will by apology. In the absence of alternatives like

good and Bad.. the very concept of choice becomes

misnomer. Alvin Plantinga observes;

A world containing creatures who

freely perform both good and evil
actions and do more good than evil is
more valuable than a world containing
quasi-automata who always do what is
right because they are unable to do
otherwise. Now God can create free
creatures, determine them to do only
what is right; for if he does so
 77

then, they do not do what is right

freely. To create creatures capable
of moral good, therefore, he must
create creatures capable of moral
evil; but he cannot create the
possibility of moral evil and at the
same time prohibit its actuality.®

The proponents of the free-will thesis contend that

the perceived ei'ils which accrue to the human beings do

not militate against the existence of God as a benevolent

and omnipotent being, because evil is solely man's own

making. Man being the best of God's creation is endowed

with all the qualities of head and heart. What

distinguishes man from other living species is thfe

capacity to exercise will. Animal existence is more

physical than psychic, whereas the human existence is

more psychic than physical. Though in some evolved

animals one discovers the signs of intelligence, they are

invariably overpowered by the instinctive drives. For

example, a cow shows protective affection for her calf

like a human mother but when she is hungry she snatches

away the food from the baby. In animals, manifestation of

the subtle emotions and intelligence get eclipsed by the

instinctive urges. But the phenomenon is different in

8. Alvin Plantiga, The Free Will Defence, in Readings

in the Philosophy of Religion, An Analytic Approach,
Baruah A. Brody, Prentice Hall, Inc, Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1974, P-187.
 78

respect of human species. A human mother may prefer to

die by sharing a morsel of food with her famished child.

This goes to show that if a human being so desires, he or

she can overcome the instinctive propulsions, and act in

a manner that is characteristically human. But it is

significant that the human will can also be used for

achieving nefarious ends. When the individual takes to

the ways of evil he may prove to be more monstrous than

the beasts. The free-will thesis indicates that it is the

human agent who is to be held solely responsible for the

phenomenon of evil.

The free-will hypothesis tends to assume that free­

will and determinism are mutually incompatible. To

maintain that one acts freely is not necessarily to say

that it is not determined by causal factors. That one is

free, simply means that one could act otherwise. That one

chooses to act in a particular way, can be accounted for,

by appeal to factors other than the individual. So, there

is no oddity in saying that God creates conditions so

that the man chooses, only the right. One freely chooses

'X" because of the factors A, B, C, where /l, B, C refer

to the determining antecedents which have led the

individual to act in a particular way. Flew and Mackie

are the champions of this view. According to Flew ;

 79

... to say that a person could have

helped doing something is not to say
that what he did was in principle
unpredictable nor that there were no
causes anywhere which determined that
he would as a matter of fact act in
this way. It is to say that if he had
chosen to do otherwise he would have
been able to do so, that there were
alternatives, within the capacities
of one of his physical strength, of
his inter action, of his knowledge,
open to a person in his situation.
... there is no contradiction
involved in saying that a particular
action or choice was, both free, and
could have been helped, and so on,
and predictable, or even foreknown,
and explicable in terms of caused
causes.
.... if it is really logically
possible for an action to be both
freely chosen and yet fully
determined by causes, then the
keystone argument of the free will
defence, that there is contradiction
in speaking of God so arranging the
laws of nature that all men always as
a matter of fact freely choose to do
the right, cannot hold.*’'

9. Flew & Macintyre, (Ed) Divine Omnipotence and Human

Freedom, in Wew essays in Philosophical Theology,
London, 1995, PP.150-153.
 80

According to Mackie,

... if God has made men such that in

their free choices they sometimes
prefer what is good and sometimes
what is evil, why could he not have
made men such that they always freely
choose the good? If there is no
logical impossibility in a man's
freely choosing the good on one, or
on several occasions, there cannot be
a logical impossibility in his freely
choosing the good on every occasion.
God was not, then, faced with a
choice between making innocent
automata and making beings who, in
acting freely, would sometimes go
wrong; there was open to him the
obviously better possibility of
making beings who would act freely
but always go right. Clearly, his
failure to avail himself of this
possibility is inconsistent with his
being both omnipotent and wholly
good. =

The problem of evil becomes all the more perplexing

when one considers the phenomena of gratuitous that

i.e., accidental happenings. Mr. X gets into the fateful

train and it is derailed killing him and many other at

the same time. One may ask why so many other innocent

•10. Ibid, P-17

 81

people die at the same time ? A flash flood carries away

the whole village and hundreds of people die en mass., the

virtuous and the sinners., the innocent children., women.

Those who have faith in God as well as the non-believers

court the same fate., at the same time. Thousands of

people get engulfed in a conflagration in a place of

worship and hundreds of them die in the stampede. How to

account For such inscrutable phenomena ? How to

understand the uncalled for suffering of the innocent and

the virtuous ? The problem becomes still more enigmatic

when one finds that people committed to the ways of

virtue and righteousness are subject to untold suffering,

when those who are given to the evil ways flourish.

The facts of uncalled-for suffering is explained in

supposing that, either they are modes of divine

punishment for the wrongs, already committed or they are

summoned by God, for which they shall be compensated by

God in the heavenly state. The advocates of Karma

doctrine, on the other hand, submit that though such

phenomena have no explanation in this life, they can be

understood with reference to the actions of the past.

Such phenomena presuppose the thesis of rebirth. Because

of certain grave blunders in the past one has to undergo

the dreadful consequences in the present. Though to a

finite mind- who sees only the present span of life right
 82

from the physical birth of the individual- the phenomena

of uncalled suffering defy rational explanation, such

events owe their explanation to certain actions in the

past lives which the individual does not remember.

According to the critics this solution shifts our

attention to the another phenomenon i.e.,rebirth. What is

the evidence or reason to postulate the thesis of rebirth

which is purported to explain otherwise unexplainable

phenomena in this life ?

According to Christian theology, Adam and Eve were

created perfect and were asked to follow the divine

instruction. The wilful disobedience of God's will was

responsible for their fall from the state of pristine

beauty. The critics have also sought to repudiate the

free-wili thesis in pointing out that if man is born

perfect how could he choose the way of evil rather than

good. It surely testifies to his inherent imperfection

which, in turn, is indicative of imperfection of the

creator. In Biblical framework one fails to understand

why all human beings are treated as being infected with

the original sin. How can the whole human race be made

responsible for what was committed by the first man and

woman. Secondly, the nature of punishment seems to be

completely disproportionate with the original sin. If one

takes stock of the magnitude of suffering, one fails to

 83

understand how can a benevolent God punish his children

so severely for an action like eating the fruit of the

forbidden tree. The scholars on Biblical theodicy argue

that God's purpose is to lead us from mere biological

existence (Bios) to the evolved state of spiritual

existence (Zoa). Life as Bios, is a state of natural

existence formed through long process of evolution,

resulting in the emergence of the Homosapiens. In the

state of nature, life affords opportunities whereby man

becomes an active participant in the evolutionary

process. He is not only aware of his goal but is also

capable of moving consciously towards the goal. Evil

occurs when man instead of travelling towards the supreme

goal, turns his back and moves in the reverse direction.

Human beings are not to be classed along with animals

whose lives are conditioned by circumstances and

instinctive urges. Free-will is the distinctive

possession of human species. Freedom is genuine as long

as one is free to do good as well as evil. The world in

which we live in, provides the environment in which we

exercise our choices rightly or wrongly. The quintessence

of the free-will thesis is that the world is an

opportunity of soul-making. Though man is the most

evolved created beings he has still to go a long way to

be Godlike or attain Godhood. Free-wiii is an instrument

by which one keeps oneself engaged in the struggle for

 84

perfection. Use and misuse of free-will followed by

experience of good and evil are part of the moral sag a.

In the process of evolution the soul progresses

towards the goal, in spite of repeated hazards and

failures. The natural order, therefore, furnishes a

backdrop for the evolution of lower to the higher. Such

view can be labelled as teleological. .It is based on the

vision that every action good or bad, takes one towards

the supreme goal. Good action takes one a step ahead

towards the goal but the suffering that one undergoes on

account of doing evil, does serve as a reminder and a

positive impetus, to move on the path of righteousness.

Thus, God's purpose to take the individual unto him is

not least frustrated. Therefore, the goodness and

omnipotence of God is not in question on account of the

presence of e»'il. 'Attainment of the highest state',

gives meaning to all suffering and evil. The creation of

inorganic, organic life and later creation of man is not

the end of the whole process. Man emerges in course of

evolution and finds himself as one who possesses the

ability for self-direction, by which one can exist in

conscious fellowship of God. He moves not by divine

determination but by uncompelled response and willing

participation. The perfection is attained by exercising

the divine gift i.e., free~wiII.

 83

The foregoing discussions go to show that some

degree of suffering is necessary for the progress of

soul. Therefore, the world inhabited by free agents

witnesses good as well as evil. The critic would again

argue that if God is omnipotent, could he not create a

world in which moral perfection is achieved without such

dreadful phenomena as earthquake, famines etc. It is

further pointed out that if God is really benevolent and

omnipotent, could he not make human agents in a manner so

that they not only have free-will but make only the

righteous use of it and achieve perfection without taking

recourse to evil. The advocates of free-will thesis come

out with the rejoinder that it is better to achieve

goodness by virtue of exercise of free-will than, to have

it conferred by the sheer will of God.

To receive our final beatitude as the

fruit of our labours and as the
recompense of a hard-won victory, is
an incomparably higher destiny than
to receive it without any effort on
our part. And since God in this
wisdom has seen fit to give us such a
lot as this, it was inevitable that
man should have the power to choose
wrong. We could not be called to
merit the reward due to victory
 86

without being exposed to the

possibility of defeat.1

There are others who argue that even if evil is said

to be the handiwork of God, it is not contrary to the

nature of God. Evil has its significant place in the

moral universe in so far as it is necessary for the

existence of good. In a world where no evil exists it is

difficult to say what 'good’ would mean. Good and evil

give meaning to each other and therefore are logically

inalienable. Augustine points out,

...there can be no evil where there

is no good....Nothing Evil exists in
itself, but only as an Evil aspect of
some actual entity..... , therefore,
have there source in the good, and
unless they are parasitic on
something good, they are not anything
at all.'181

In same breath William James writes,

First of all, it appears that such

words can have no application or
rel-evancy in a world in which no

11. Joyce, Principles of Natural Theology, [Link].

[Link]., P--103

12. Augustine, Enchiridion, Chap-4, see [Link], The

Problem of Evil And Indian Thought, Motilal
Banarasidass Publishers, Delhi, 1993. PP.13-14
 87

sentiment life exists.. Imagine an

absolutely material world containing
only physical and chemical facts, and
existing from eternity without a God,
without even an interest spectator
would there be any sense in saying of
that world that one of it’s states is
better than another?'153

In refuting this, critics point out if there could

not be ’good* without 'evil', one may persist to ask; why

so much of evil ? Should not the quantum of evil be

proportionate to the quantum of good ? Even if good and

evil are logically bound up as correlates it would be

absurd to suppose that if God willed so, he was not

capable of summoning lesser evil. The necessary solution

seeks to justify the most outrageous acts of violence and

uncalled for suffering. If virtue is the outcome of

struggle against suffering, evil becomes more meaningful

than good. Evil is seen as God-sent. Suffering is

encountered with fortitude when it is believed that it is

meant for the purification of soul and prepares the

individual for living an austere and Godly life.

In refuting this, critics argue that if virtue is

the outcome of struggle against evil then there is a

13. James William, The Mill to Believe arid Other Essays

iri Popular Philosophy., Dover Publ ications , Inc , New
York, 1956, P-189
 88

sense in which the existence of evil is a pre—requisite

for good. It is unsound to claim that goodness does not

have the positive content in so far as it only means the

absence of evil. To be virtuous is to be in a state which

is free from vices and evil. As far as God wants the

creatures to wade through the path of evil in order to

attain goodness, he is not benevolent and in so far as he

fails to provide a straight way unto the goodness,

without there being evil on the way, he is not

omnipotent.

[Link] Closkey observes;

To put severe temptation in the way

of the many, knowing that many and
perhaps even most will succumb to the
temptation, for the sake of the
higher virtue of the few, would be
blatant immoralities and it would be
immoral whether or temptation
possessed free will.1*

The attempted solutions to reconcile the fact of

physical evil with the existence of a benevolent and

omnipotent God are very many. The Aesthetic solution

'14. H. J .Mccloskey, God & Evil, in Readings in the

Philosophy of Religion? An analytic Approach ,<Ed)
by E-iaruch A. Brody, op. cit P-184
 89

suggests that the whole is good and the perceived are

only true of parts. Augustine, Leibnitz, Royce subscribe

to the view that, that which is deemed as evil from the

finite perspective,, does eventually promote the good of

the whole. All the finite life is a struggle with evil.

Yet from the ultimate point of view the whole is good.

The aesthetic solution is illustrated by the analogy of

painting. A painting appears so beautiful because of the

darker and lighter shades. When considered as the part of

the whole, they appear to be incongruous but they

ultimately contribute to the total effect of the

aesthetic relish. So, it is argued that the presence of

evil in the parts, heighten the good in the whole. Good

and evil are mutual contraries. But when considered from

a holistic perspective there appears to be no evil.

Rather the so called evil become the catalytic means for

the ultimate good.

This argument in a nutshell means that the universe

is better with evil than it were without evil. Here, evil

is seen as a means to greater good. If the argument is

stressed to its logical extreme it would mean that evil

in the long run, enhances the total good. This applies

equally well to good. So, one can say that the good by

contrast, also contributes to the totality of evil. If

this is accepted then the so called ei'ii will cease to be

 90

evil and good will cease1to be good. If good and evil

have their legitimate place in the whole then any attempt

to reduce or eliminate evil, would be detrimental to the

grand design of God. If good and ei'ii are taken to be the

positive notes in divine symphony then to remove evil

shall amount to defeating the very design of God.

Elucidating this Joyce observes;

Pain is the great stimulant to

action. ... Further more, were it not
for these trials, man would think
little enough of a future existence,
and of the need of striving after his
last end. He would be perfectly
content with his existence, arid would
seek little of any higher good. These
considerations here briefly advanced
suffice at least to should how
important is the office filled by
pain in human life and with what
little reason it is asserted that the
existence of so much suffering is
irreconcilable with the wisdom of the
creator'1®

It is claimed that evil is the inevitable

consequences of the best possible world. According to

Tennant all things work together, for the good. Here the

15. Joyce, Principles of Theology, [Link]. [Link],, P-

152
 91

term ’all' does not mean each and everything but the sum

of all things taken together. Evil is either punitive or

purgatorial. In other words, exil comes either as the

result of some omissions or commissions or as a factor

necessary for getting rid of the existing evil. Suffering

is necessary for the moral evolution of the individual.

This is also termed as the instrumentalist view of evil.

[Link] objects to this view on the ground that the

facts of nature show that nature is cruel, callous to

human predicament and serve no moral purpose.

Mill's objection appears to be beside the point

because the theist claims that the perceived cruelties or

negativities in nature are conducive to the cultivation

of moral excellence in the long run. One has to endure

suffering today, so that the good will come tomorrow. It

is called as the 'wait and see' argument. Now the

question is that what is it that can promise that

tomorrow shall be better ? The scriptures instill faith

in the ultirnacy of order and the triumph of good in the

long run. In fact, in this argument it .is assumed that

God is all good. This begs the question again. It is

objected that aesthetic solution can hardly explain the

extraordinary suffering of an innocent babe. Besides, it

is difficult to see the whole. Therefore, it is not

humanly possible to perceive how or whether good accrues

from the whole.

The Discipline solution suggests that the evi1 is

necessary for disciplining the individual and his

character. Suffering is justifiable because of it's

salutary effect on man.

... to realise that one's creation

that necessities one's suffering,
that suffering is one of the greatest
of God's gift, it almost to reach a
mystical solution of the problem of
evil ...'’o

Evil is a blessing in disguise. That which is evil

considered from a finite perspective, turns out to be

good in the long run. The virtues like courage,

equanimity are cultivated only in the adverse

circumstances of pain, and suffering. Under this

interpretation, pain is said to have positive role in

moulding man's life for a better and nobler, states of

existence. When suffering is encountered as the gift of

the divine and is considered as means of ennobling the

self, one finds pleasure in the suffering. The proponents

16. [Link], Principis Ethics, Cambridge University

Press, Great Britain, 1959, P--216.
 93

of the view hold that good loses it’s significance unless

it is juxtaposed with ey.z'2. As light is not meaningful

without darkness, suffering is not meaningful without

pleasure, good has no meaning without ei'il.

Hypothetically, a life where there is only pleasure i.e.,

one which is not punctuated with suffering, would be

monotonous because one would not then understand the

value of pleasure. It is separation that lends flavour to

union. The polarities must co-exist so that one gives

meaning to the another. Hence, good and evil being the

polar opposites, one ceases to be significant without the

othe r.

The critics argue that this cannot serve as the

rationale behind suffering of animals and the innocent

babes. The incapacity of animals to learn from suffering

and to mould their life is as evident as the inability of

the innocent children to get lesson from suffering.

Besides, the problem of evil runs counter to the karmic

doctrine that suffering is the resultant of the misdeeds

in the past. This also cannot explain why the evil caused

by natural calamities sometimes leads to total

annihilation where there is hardly any scope for self-

discipline or perfection.
 94

The above argument is not sound on another score. Is

it a fact that a person who has never experienced the

pleasure of health (one who is permanently sick) cannot

feel pain even if he is injured ? There are degrees of

happiness and suffering. If life is replete with

pleasures one can contrast the pleasures of lesser

magnitude with the pleasures of greater magnitude. If it

is admitted that pleasure cannot be made meaningful

without pain, it would reflect the limitation of God.

Because had he so desired he could create a world, which

is completely devoid of pain.

There are others who justify the existence of

physical evils as modes of divine punishment. The

wrought by nature in form of earthquake, flood, famine

etc. are instances of divine intervention to punish man

for the sins and are indicative of the ways of meting out

justice. The obvious objection to this argument rests on

the perception that even if one accepts natural evil as

retribution of human sins, one fails to understand why

punishment is not evenly distributed. The problem is more

mystified when one looks at the wholesale destruction by

an earthquake or a distress of this kind which kills old

and the young, virtuous and the sinners in the same sweep

and in the same? way.

 95

Another corollary of the above argument is that the

physical evils serve as expedient in promoting the moral

good of mankind. The physical evils of great magnitude

make the individuals realise the smallness of man and the

greatness of God. The feeling of insignificance makes one

humble. It fills one's heart and mind with reverence for

nature and the author of nature i.e., God. The individual

realises the futility of ego or arrogance. But this view

is objected on the ground that it is both factually

untrue and logically unsound. It is factually untrue

because the nature-made calamities, instead of instilling

faith shakes the conviction of the individual to it’s

very foundation. One begins to wonder how is it that God

being so merciful, could be so cruel ? Is there really

any purpose behind creation ? Is this world a result of

design or outcome of certain laws which know no rhyme and

reason. It is logically unsound because it is not

consistent on the part of a benevolent and omnipotent God

to be unable to bring about goodness without the

instrumentality of evil. If the physical evils are sent

by God in order to bring about moral perfection then, it

is no better than a bad bargain and it speaks eloquently

of the imperfection of God.

There are others who hold that the perceived evil is

only an illusion. This was advocated by Spinoza, Hegel,

 96

Green and others. Spinoza observes that all things are

necessarily what they are and that in nature there is no

good and no evil. This cannot be literally interpreted

because the fact of ev'il is too conspicuous to be

explained away. The same idea is mooted by those who

claim that evil is nothing but 'good' misunderstood. The

view that evil is the privation of good also bears

affinity to the solution. To say that evil is non­

existent is to redefine the concept of evil which

obviously, contradicts the cornmonsense view of evil. Me

Taggart remarks that if e^ii is taken as illusion, then

that itself is an illusion.

Augustine is of opinion that evil is the privation

of that which is essentially good. According to him evil

is not a substance as much as a good is. It is only

absence of good in as much as disease is absence of

health. This view of Augustine is distinct from Hindu

doctrine that evil is an illusion. According to Augustine

evil is substantial reality whereas for the latter evil

is an illusion.

There are others who seek to dissolve the problem of

evil by interpreting the language about God as merely

metaphorical. This is termed as met a pho r--so lu t i on . If

theological language is to be literally interpreted, then

 97

the fact of evil appears to be irreconcilable with the

existence of God, Since God is beyond mind, he can not be

described by the concepts of categories of human mind.

The only language that can be taken recourse to, in

describing God is the language of metaphors and symbols,

it offers an anti-intellectual perspective for

understanding the theological discourse. According to

this, the metaphors used in describing God are

inexplicable. It urges one to view all talks and

discussion as retreat into silence. This view, evidently

offends commonsense. [Link] directs his polemics

against the metaphor solution in arguing that if the

goodness and benevolence are the essential

characteristics of God then the fact of evil is not

reconcilable with the supposition of God's existence.

[Link] states that,

The infliction of physical suffering

the permission of moral Evil, the
adversity of the Good, the prosperity
of the wicked, the crimes of the
guilty involving the misery of the
innocent, the tardy appearance and
partial distribution of moral and
religious knowledge in the world
these are facts which no doubt are
reconcilable we know not how , with
the infinite Goodness of god, but
which certainly are not to be
 98

explained on the supposition that

it’s sole and sufficient type
goodness of man. 't7'

The metaphor solution pushed to it’s logical extreme

takes the form of mystery solution. The advocates of

mystery solution hold that evil is a mystery which eludes

the comprehension of human mind. It is the very

foundation of moral life. The pursuit of moral life

presupposes reality of free-MilJt and exercise of

rationality. If ways of God are beyond reason, there is

no room for moral de1ibe ration.

It is also held that God is not unlimited in power.

The Universe is not his creation, but he is able to

influence it. God acts by persuasion and lure and God's

power to influence the course of nature is determined by

the structure of reality. God has not created the world

out of nothing. The universe is a process of which God is

an integral part. The ultimate principles of nature are

not created by the Divine. They are embedded in the very

processes of nature. In the Iranean theodicy, man is born

imperfect and seeks to be perfect himself by the right

use of freedom but man is created with a God-ward bias.

17. [Link], An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s

Philosophy, Longmans, Green & Co, London, 1889, P~
126
 99

The ultimate reality is creative. Creativity is inherent

in the process of actuality. Every finite entity is

endowed with creative potentiality. The present is not

completely determined by the past. It is partly

determined by the pas,t and partly determines the future.

This shows that the present has the creative power to

mould the future. Therefore, to be actual is to be

c reative .

.Even if it is conceded that suffering results from

good it cannot serve as morally sufficient reason for an

omnipotent being to allow suffering to be there.

Sometimes, the human agents are excused for allowing the

suffering either because they lack the knowledge or power

to prevent them. But if God is said to have unlimited

power there is no reason why suffering should there be at

all. According to Mill, the empirical evidence indicate

that, God is not omnipotent. If God’s power is restricted

then, evils in the world become necessary consequences of

creation. This solution questions the very assumption in

the problem of evil, i.e., God is omnipotent. Mill's view

has twofold implications namely, God is limited by the

equally powerful deity who is malevolent or that God's

power is limited by the material out of which the world

is made. According to Mill God is limited in power and

 100

perhaps in intelligence too. The evil in the world is the

result of his limitation.

He adduces arguments in support of his contention.

The first is based on the nation of contrivance,, By

contrivance he means a kind of device or mechanism. For

example, if one wished to lift a thousand kilo weight, it

is evidently beyond the physical capability of a human

being. To lift it therefore, one has to take recourse to

the leaver technique. The cranes are used to lift heavy

weights. Such contrivances no doubt are unmistakable

proofs of human intelligence. But at the same time they

point to the limitation of human ability. If the evil is

said to have been God-sent and thought as mere

contrivances to nurture good in the individuals, it bears

stamp of divine intelligence. Simultaneously, it also

bears evidence of God’s limitations because God could not

perhaps nurture good, without summoning evil. The second

proof of limitation of God’s power is indicated by our

scanty knowledge of God. The inadequate knowledge which

we the human beings have, do not so much testify to the

limitation of ours as that of a creator God. An

omnipotent God could have given us a complete knowledge

of his ways, which would deter us from pursuing the path

of evil. By looking at what happens in the world it

cannot be rationally supposed that the contrivances found

 101

in the natural process are the best possible expressions

of divine creativity. If the world is conceived as an

artifice constructed by God, it is to be admitted that it

contains certain inherent defects which the creator could

not foresee but were discovered subsequently. According

to Mil, if God is thought not to be omnipotent or wholly

benevolent, the problem of evil shall cease to be there.

Of course, there are evidence in favour of God's

benevolence but there can be no conclusive evidence to

show that God is infinitely benevolent.

Anything that integrates or promotes harmony is

good and anything which creates discord or disharmony, is

an evil. The process of evolution has the tendency to

maximise harmony and minimise disharmony. In the ladder

of evolution the lesser order is followed by greater

order. Hence, evolution is from greater evil to lesser

evil, from lesser good to greater good. The quantum of

good that have been there far outweigh the evil that were

there. The good could not have come about without the

actuality and possibility of evil. This alternative,

obviously, reconciles the fact of evil with the

omnipotence of God.

Man, together with all created beings and things

are part of reality, which is of the nature of grand

 102

order. The orde r is immanent in. the very nature of

things. The order is inviolable and irrevocable. In the

process of evolution everything has a tendency to achieve

[Link]. In theistic frameworks, highest order or

perfection is differently delineated as God, Yoga,

Liberation, Salvation etc. Man, having been endowed with

free-will, has the capacity either to accelerate the God-

ward journey or to move away from the goal, whereas in

the state of nature . everything is determined by the

order. In this sense, we could attach no sense to natural

evil. The concept of evil is significant . only, in human

context. The phenomenon of child suffering can be

explained by the thesis of Karmic Law. The past, present

and future of an individual form a causal nexus. The

suffering of the infant can be explained as the

inevitable consequence of one’s misdeeds in the past

which one neither remembers nor perceives. The Karmic-law

that every action has certain inevitable reaction, is

part of the cosmic order. The Causal-law and the Karmic-

law are the different expressions of the Cosmic Order.