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Insights on Procurement Auctions

The document titled 'Three Essays on Procurement Auctions' by Tejpal Singh Sandhu discusses various theoretical frameworks and empirical studies related to auction mechanisms. It references significant works in the field, including those by Vickrey, Wilson, and Milgrom, among others. The essays aim to explore the dynamics of competitive bidding and the implications of information asymmetry in procurement auctions.

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Tejpal Singh Sandhu
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8 views3 pages

Insights on Procurement Auctions

The document titled 'Three Essays on Procurement Auctions' by Tejpal Singh Sandhu discusses various theoretical frameworks and empirical studies related to auction mechanisms. It references significant works in the field, including those by Vickrey, Wilson, and Milgrom, among others. The essays aim to explore the dynamics of competitive bidding and the implications of information asymmetry in procurement auctions.

Uploaded by

Tejpal Singh Sandhu
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Three Essays on Procurement Auctions

Tejpal Singh Sandhu


[Link]@[Link]
September 17, 2023

1
Contents
1 intro 3

2
1 intro
(Wilson, 1967), (Wilson, 1969), (Vickrey, 1961), (Laffont, 1997), (Milgrom
and Weber, 1982), (Hong and Shum, 2003), (Goeree and Offerman, 2003),
(Athey and Levin, 2001), (Meenakshi and Banerji, 2005),

References
Athey, S. and J. Levin (2001). Information and competition in us forest
service timber auctions. Journal of Political economy 109 (2), 375–417.

Goeree, J. K. and T. Offerman (2003). Competitive bidding in auctions with


private and common values. The Economic Journal 113 (489), 598–613.

Hong, H. and M. Shum (2003). Econometric models of asymmetric ascending


auctions. Journal of Econometrics 112 (2), 327–358.

Laffont, J.-J. (1997). Game theory and empirical economics: The case of
auction data. European Economic Review 41 (1), 1–35.

Meenakshi, J. and A. Banerji (2005). The unsupportable support price: an


analysis of collusion and government intervention in paddy auction markets
in north india. Journal of Development Economics 76 (2), 377–403.

Milgrom, P. R. and R. J. Weber (1982). A theory of auctions and competitive


bidding. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1089–1122.

Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed


tenders. The Journal of finance 16 (1), 8–37.

Wilson, R. B. (1967). Competitive bidding with asymmetric information.


Management Science 13 (11), 816–820.

Wilson, R. B. (1969). Communications to the editor—competitive bidding


with disparate information. Management science 15 (7), 446–452.

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