Biosafety Training Modules Soft
Biosafety Training Modules Soft
Topics:
01 Definition
02 Risk Factors
03 Routes of Exposure
Definition
Laboratory-associated infection/
Laboratory Acquired Infection
- Any infection acquired or reasonably
assumed as a result of exposure to a
biological agent in the course of
laboratory-related activities.
Risk factors associated with LAI Common Agents of LAI
Laboratory Incidents ● Bacteria (Brucella species,
● Lack of training and supervision Francisella tularensis,
● Faculty, poorly maintained Mycobacterium tuberculosis)
equipment ● Parasites (Trypanosoma cruzi,
● Improper risk assessment and Toxoplasma gondii, Plasmodium
controls spp.)
● Performance Pressures ● Genetically Modified Organisms
● Volume of work and time constraints (Recombinant Vaccinia Virus in
● Improper or not following SOPs vaccine and therapeutic studies)
● Virus (SARS-CoV, buffalopox,
hantavirus, Cytomegalovirus,
Herpes virus, Zika virus)
Reality of LAI Documentation
➔ Much information is obtained from
anecdotal cases. However, such reports
do not always signify possible failure of
biosafety procedures or unintended
accidents
➔ While accidental parenteral inoculation
of infectious materials appears to be one
of the leading cases of LAIs, most LAIs
appear to occur even with the best
safety precautions in place.
➔ Adherence to the guidelines by
regulatory agencies decreases the risk
of occupational exposures to infectious
agents.
Routes of exposure
01. Inhalation (most common)
02. Ingestion
03. Percutaneous inoculation
04. Direct contact
Module 1.3 of Biosafety
International and Local Policies,
Guidelines, and Standards
Topics:
01 International Guidelines and
Standards
02 Local Guidelines and Standards
Compliance
Administrative controls and effective
biosafety program management in place
● Good Microbiological Practices and
Procedures
● Good communication of hazards, risk
and risk control measures
● Appropriate training
● Clear SOP
● Established safety culture
Elimination
Eliminate the hazards
● Use of inactivated biological agent
● Use harmless surrogate
Isolation
Isolate the hazard
● Elimination and reduction might not be
possible, particularly in clinical setting
● Isolate biological agent(s) using
primary containment device
Module 2.2 of Risk Assessment - Isolates or culture
Biohazards and Biorisk
Biological Agent
Hazard - Any microorganism including those
Adapted from OHSAS 18001-2007 which have been genetically modified,
- An object, situation or act that has the toxins or biological substances which
potential to cause adverse effects when may be able to provoke any infection,
an organism, system or population is allergy or toxicity in humans, animals or
exposed to it. plants.
● Physical situation
e.g., fire or explosion Biohazardous Agent
● Activity - Influenza Virus
e.g., pipetting - SARS Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)
● External Condition - Ebola Virus
e.g., weather, individual who could - It can be transmitted via different routes
steal and/or misuse materials or (direct or indirect contact) and can be
information found in different settings
● Material Risk Group Classification (unknown risk
e.g., biological agent or toxin, factor)
chemical, radiological material and - Pathogenicity
asphyxiating gases such as - Transmission
nitrogen - Host Range
- Population
Hazard has the potential for causing ● Immunity
harm ● Density
CEN Workshop Agreement 16393 ● Movement of host
- Regardless of what the cause might be - Vector
- Standard of environmental hygiene
Biohazards - Local availability of effective preventive
Adapted from ISO/IEC Guide 51-1999 measures
- An object or situation that has the ● Sanitary Precaution
potential to cause adverse effects when ● Control of animal
an organism, system or population is reservoirs/animal vectors
exposed to it. ● Movement of people and animals
- Note: Potential source of harm ● Importation of potentially infected
caused by biological agents or animals or animal products
toxins ● Prophylaxis by vaccination or
antiserum
Biological Material
- Tissue samples from animal and
humans
● Blood and
● Other body fluid
● Proteins, genetic materials, toxins
and other organic compounds
including toxins or biologic
products
Four Risk Groups Classifications “Risk Group is not sufficient for a Risk
Assessment”
Risk Group 1
● Individual: Low Risk
● Community: Low - A combination of the likelihood of an
● A microorganism that is unlikely to incident and the severity of the harm if
cause human disease or animal that incident were to occur.
disease Likelihood
● e.g., Non pathogenic [Link], S. - The probability of incident
cerevisiae occurring
Consequence
Risk Group 2 - The severity of harm
● Individual: Moderate
● Community: Low
● A pathogen that can cause human or
animal disease but is unlikely to be a
serious hazard to laboratory workers,
the community, livestock or the
environment
● e.g., Influenza (H1N1, H3), Measles,
Enterovirus, Dengue Virus Biorisk
- A combination of the probability of
Risk Group 3 (lethal) occurrence of harm and the severity of
● Individual: High that harm where the source of harm is
● Community: Low a biological agent or toxin.
● A pathogen that usually causes serious - Note: The source of harm may be an
human or animal disease but does not unintentional exposure, accidental
ordinarily spread from one infected release or loss, theft, misuse,
individual to another. Effective diversion, unauthorized access, or
treatment and preventive measures are intentional unauthorized release.
available
● e.g., Avian Influenza (H5, H7), Novel
Influenza, MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV
Topics:
01 Risk Assessment
02 Risk Characteristics
03 Risk Evaluation
04 Risk Control Measures
05 Risk Communication
Risk Assessment
- A systematic process of gathering
information and evaluating the
likelihood and consequences of Likelihood of an exposure and/or release
exposure to or release of workplace Likelihood of an exposure or release
hazard(s) and determining the occurring during the proposed laboratory
appropriate risk control measures to work
reduce the risk to an acceptable risk. Rare: Almost impossible to occur
Unlikely: Not very possible to occur
Biorisk Assessment Possible: Might occur
Adapted from OHSAS 18001-2007 Likely: Very possible to occur
- Process of evaluating the biorisk(s) Almost Certain: Highly possible to
arising from a biohazard(s), taking occur
into account the adequacy of any
existing controls, and deciding whether Consequences of an exposure and/or
or not the biorisk(s) is acceptable. release
Severity of the consequences of an
Why conduct a biological risk assessment? exposure/release
- To define preventive measures that Negligible: Trivial incident or near miss
are adapted to the nature and level of Minor: Incident with self-limiting
risk consequences
- For the sound allocation of Moderate: Incident that requires
resources to preventive measures medical treatment and/or has
- Basic legal requirement in countries insignificant environmental
that have biosafety regulations consequences
Major: Incident with potential lost time
Basic Steps in Risk Assessment due to infection but non-permanent
● Hazard/ Risk Identification (Hazard, consequence and/or limited
Situation, Risk) environmental impact
● Risk Characterization Severe: Potential fatality or serious
● Risk Evaluation illness with permanent disability and/or
serious environmental impact.
Risk Characterization
- An Isoquant is used in the risk
characterization
Risk Matrix
Risk Evaluation
● The goal of a risk evaluation is to
determine whether the assessed risk is
acceptable, or whether further targeted
control measures should be
implemented to prevent or reduce the
risks within a tolerance level.
Things to Consider:
1. Environment
2. Nature of the situation
Risk Communication
● An interactive and systematic process
to exchange information and opinion on
risk(s) that inclusively engages all
relevant personnel of various
categories as well as community
leaders and officials where appropriate
Module 2.4 of Risk Assessment ● Emerging infectious disease
WHO Risk Assessment Framework ● Re-emerging infection with agents that
developed multiple antibiotic resistance
Topics: increased risk resulted from:
00 WHO Risk Assessment Framework - No effective treatment
01 Gather Information - Absence of data/ information
02 Evaluate Risk needed for risk assessment
03 Develop Risk Control Measures
04 Select/Implement Risk Control Measures Laboratory Procedures Hazard
05 Review Risk and Control Measures ● Aerosols
Pipetting, vortexing, blending,
WHO Risk Assessment Framework pouring
● Parenteral Hazard
Needlestick, cut from sharp object
and surfaces
Bite/scratch from experimental
animals/insects
● Direct skin (intact/ non-intact
mucous membrane)
Spills, splashes
Touch on contaminated surfaces
● Ingestion
Mouth pipetting
Gathering Information
Factors to consider
● Pathogenic characteristics of the
● Potential for generation of aerosols
biological agents
- Pipetting, centrifugation,
● Type of laboratory work and/or
homogenizing, pouring, sonicating,
procedures
blending, vortexing
● Type(s) of equipment
● Potential for parenteral inoculation
● Type of laboratory facility
- Needlesticks, cuts from sharp
● Human factors exist
object and surfaces
● Other factors (legal, cultural, social,
- Bite/scratches from insects or
economic)
animal
● Contamination of skin, non-intact
Pathogenic Characteristics of the
skin, or mucous membrane
Biological Agents
- Splashes, splatter
● Infectious Dose
- Touching of contaminated surfaces
● Route of Exposure
● Potential for ingestion
● Quantity, concentration
- Mouth pipetting, splashes of
● Virulence, pathogenicity
material to mouth
● Communicability
- Contaminated articles or fingers in
● Morbidity/Mortality
mouth
● Environmental stability
- Consumption of food and drinks in
● Availability of vaccine or treatment
laboratory
● Susceptible population
● Gene products effects
● Origin of agents/endemicity
● Quantity - Public Health/ Surveillance
- Volume, concentration, titer, Laboratory
infectious dose ● Biosafety Level
● Work proposed - BSL 1
- In vitro/ In vivo - BSL 2
- Aerosol Challenge - BSL 3
- Environmental disease - BSL 4
- Recombinant activities
- Scale up and large scale activities Human Factors Exist
Factors influencing performance and
compliance
● Mental Health
● Stress, fatigue
● Skill
● Training, behavior, attitude
Other factors
● Legal
● Cultural
● Social
● Economic
Type(s) of Equipment
● Ventilated Enclosures
- Biosafety Cabinets (BSC Class
1,2,3)
- Laminar flow hood (horizontal,
vertical)
- Chemical fume hood
● Equipments that generate infectious
aerosols
- Centrifuge
- Vortex mixers
- Sonicators
- Pipette
Key Messages
- Training and evaluation of competency
are key to achieving high levels of
biosafety
- Laboratory professionals must receive
information, resources, and training, and
must be given sufficient time to build
good habits that make them risk
conscious and attentive to safety
practices
Module 3.3 of Core Requirements ● Facilities for storing food and drink,
Facility Design personal items and outwear should be
provided outside the lab
Topics: ● Facilities for eating and drinking must
01 Laboratory areas be provided outside the laboratory
02 Facility Design Features ● First-aid facilities must be readily
03 Philippine Regulations accessible and suitably
equipped/stocked
Laboratory Areas ● Appropriate methods for
⮚ Pre-analytic – usually composed of decontamination of waste must be
departments involved in specimen available in proximity to the laboratory
receiving and preparation (reception ● Waste management must be
and extraction areas) considered in the design
⮚ Analytic – where testing and ● There must be a reliable and adequate
experimental procedures are being electricity supply and lighting to permit
performed safe exit
⮚ Post-analytic – houses the ● Emergency situations must be
decontamination, storing, and archives considered in the design. Fire security
and flood risk must be considered.
Facility Design Features
● Ample space must be provided for the Philippine Regulations
safe conduct of laboratory work and for AO 2021-0037: Philippine Regulations
cleaning and maintenance.
● Provision of designated hand-washing ANNEX A: LICENSING STANDARDS FOR
basins operated by hands-free CLINICAL LABORATORY
mechanism I. PHYSICAL PLANT
● Laboratory must be a restricted-access A. Conform to all applicable local and
area (addresses biosafety and national regulations for
biosecurity concerns) constructions, renovation,
● Doors must be appropriately labelled maintenance and repair of CL.
with the international biohazard warning B. Conform to the required space for
symbols the conduct of its activities.
● Laboratory walls, floors and furniture C. There must be well-ventilated,
must be smooth, easy to clean, lighted, clean, safe and functional
impermeable to liquids areas based on the services
● Laboratory bench tops must be provided.
impervious to water and resistant to D. A program of proper maintenance
disinfectants, acids, alkalis, organic and monitoring of physical plans
solvents and moderate heat. and facilities.
● Laboratory furniture must be fit for E. Policy guidelines on laboratory
purpose biosafety and biosecurity
● Laboratory lighting (illumination) must F. There shall be an area for
be adequate for all activities confirmatory testing for Rapid HIV
● Laboratory ventilation where provided Diagnostic Algorithm and G6PD
should ensure airflows do not
compromise safe working ANNEX D1: PLANNING AND DESIGN
● Laboratory storage space must be GUIDELINES FOR GENERAL CLINICAL
adequate to hold supplied for LABORATORIES
immediate use I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Location
2. Privacy
3. Conformance with Building Laws
4. Ventilation
5. Spaces Required
6. Functional and Planning
Considerations
Module 3.4 of Core Requirements a. Primary receptacle – tube or a vial
Specimen Receipt, Storage, Packaging with leak-proof seal and labelled with
and Transport permanent marker
b. Secondary packaging –
Topics: water-resistant polyethylene box that
01 Specimen Receipt protects the primary receptacle
02 Specimen Storage c. Outer Container – a box that protects
03 Specimen Packaging the secondary packaging
04 Specimen Transport
Specimen Receipt
Specimen received by the laboratory
must be accompanied by sufficient
information:
⮚ Proper identification
⮚ Date and time of collection
⮚ Referring facility
⮚ Tests and/or procedures requested
In case of suspected breach, perform
the following:
⮚ Do not touch the package
⮚ Inform the consignor/sender of the
package about the incident
⮚ Document in the event log of this Specimen Transport
breach and do not process until Transport can occur:
further notice ⮚ Within facility
*Specimens must be thoroughly checked ⮚ Within national borders (e.g. NEQAS)
upon receipt: intact and correctly packed ⮚ Internationally
3. Exemptions
Classification
Infectious substances are divided into the
following:
1. Category A (UN 2814 (affects both
human and animal), UN 2900
(substances affecting animals only)
– capable of causing permanent
disability, fatal diseases in humans
and/or animals
- The ff. are the Categories of
Module 3.5 of Core Requirements Decontamination:
Biological Waste Management and ● Chemical
Decontamination ❖ Gas/Vapour
- Formaldehyde
Topics: - Hydrogen peroxide
01 Introduction - Chlorine dioxide
02 Methods of Decontamination ❖ Liquid
03 Waste Management - Phenols
- Peroxide
Biowaste Management and - Hypochlorites
Decontamination - Chlorine dioxide
- Any surface or material known to or - Peracetic acid
potentially be contaminated by - Formaldehyde
biological agents during laboratory - Glutaraldehyde
operations must be correctly managed - Quaternary
to control biological risks. ammonium
- Identification and segregation of compounds
contaminated materials be adopted - Alcohols
before decontamination and/or disposal ● Physical
❖ Heat
** Please observe the maximum capacity - Autoclave
of the biowaste containers, usually ¾ full - Incineration
per container volume. - Hot air oven
** Spill kits which are specialized kits - Boiling
designed to handle and clean up biological
spills, such as blood, bodily fluids or
Cleaning and Hand Hygiene
potentially infectious materials must be part
of the basic decontamination protocol. Cleaning removes:
- Dirt and organic matter from an item
Methods of Decontamination that would inactivate chemical
Cleaning and Hand Hygiene disinfectants
Chemical Disinfection - A high proportion of biological agents,
Gaseous Disinfection making subsequent chemical
Heart Disinfection disinfection more effective.
Sterilization Two types of laboratory Hand Hygiene:
Biological and chemical indicators** a. Alcohol-based hand rub:
- 60-96% concentration
Decontamination - Should only be used with visibly
- Reduction of viable biological agents or clean hands
other hazardous materials on a surface b. Handwashing:
or object(s) to a predefined level by - 20 seconds with soap and running
chemical and/or physical means. water
- The ff. are the levels of contamination:
★ Sterilization - Elimination or Chemical Disinfection
destruction of all viable biological - Preferred for decontamination of
agents and spores laboratory surfaces
★ Disinfection - Elimination of Chemical Disinfectants
viable biological agents ➔ Chlorine compounds
★ Cleaning - Reduction of viable ● 1:10 dilution (1 part sodium
biological agents hypochlorite and 9 parts of water)
● 15-20 minutes contact time
● Sodium hypochlorite (household ➔ Moist Heat
bleach = most common), Calcium ● Autoclaving
hypochlorite, Sodium - Saturated steam under
dichloroisocyanurate, Chloramine, pressure
Chlorine dioxide - Most effective and reliable
➔ Phenols means of decontaminating or
● Greater stability than sodium sterilizing laboratory materials
hypochlorite, used at a and wastes.
concentration of at least 5% in ● Boiling
water
● Phenol Sterilization
➔ Peroxides - Used when a complete elimination of
● Widely used microbiocidal agents any biological agent, including spores
● Hydrogen peroxide, Peracetic acid and prions, is necessary (e.g. for
➔ Aldehydes medical items and infectious waste)
● Commonly used for fumigation - Achieved using several
● Formaldehyde, Glutaraldehyde decontamination methods:
➔ Quaternary ammonium compounds ➢ Autoclaving
● Effective against bacteria in ➢ Chemical disinfectants and
non-spore forms and enveloped gaseous disinfection combined with
(lipid-containing) viruses. a strict SOP, and irradiation.
➔ Alcohols
● Commonly used at 70% Waste Management and
concentration (Anywhere between Decontamination of Waste Products
60% and 90% can be effective Consideration for waste management
depending on the alcohol used) Decontamination of liquid waste
● Ethanol, Propanol/Isopropanol Decontamination of solid waste
Methods of inactivation
Gaseous Disinfection
Gaseous Disinfectant Examples of waste generated in
- Also known as fumigants laboratories:
- Widely used to:
➢ Decontaminate the laboratory
space (e.g. widespread
contamination, difficult to access
areas)
➢ Disinfect equipment out of a
contaminated area and/or prior
repair or maintenance
- Hydrogen peroxide, Chlorine dioxide,
Formaldehyde (all are most common)
Waste Management Considerations
Heat Disinfection - Facilities and decontamination methods
Heat available
➔ Dry Heat - Type and volume of waste (objects,
● Incineration materials, liquids)
- Disposal of animal carcasses, - Method of decontamination
and other anatomical wastes - Segregation categories
without prior disinfection (uncontaminated, contaminated,
● Hot air oven sharps, glass)
- non-corrosive but longer - Packaging, labelling and transport
- Presence of radioactive material - Third party certified biowaste
separate protocol for disposal management service providers is an
- Presence of chemicals, and option for laboratory wastes.
- Recycling and reuse requirements - The storage area of contaminated and
disinfected wastes must be free from
Methods of Waste Decontamination pests, rodents and fly infestations.
Liquid Wastes
- Sewer System
- Chemical Disinfectants (rarely
preferred)
- Autoclaving
Solid Wastes
- Autoclaving (preferred)
- Incineration (preferred)
- Alkaline Digestion
- Rendering
Key Messages
- Disinfection, sterilization and waste
management are key to safe handling
of biological agents.
- Specific decontamination requirements
will depend on the type of laboratory
activity or procedure and the nature of
the biological agents being handled.
- Laboratories should determine
appropriate waste management
strategies based on the outcomes of
the risk assessment, and that are
applicable to local needs and
conditions.
Module 3.6 of Core Requirements Types of PPE
Personal Protective Equipment PPE: Core Requirements
- Laboratory gown/coat
Topics: - Face shield
01 Introduction - Gloves
02 Types of PPE - Closed Footwear
- Goggles
Introduction to PPE - Footwear with shoe cover
Review of Risk Reduction Strategies
Laboratory Gown
Purpose: Protect the body/skin and scrub
suit against contamination from biological
materials.
- Made of different materials
- Fluid resistant
- Cuffed sleeves
- Solid front / tied at the back
- Disposable (gown) / reusable (coat)
Footwear
Purpose: Reduces likelihood of injury from
falling objects, minimizes slips and trips and
exposure to infectious materials, hazardous
liquid
- Enclosed footwear with NO heels or
LOW heels
- Easy to clean or disinfect
Personal Protective Equipment - Reusable or disposable
- Equipment and/or clothing worn by
personnel to provide a barrier against Examination Gloves
biological agents, thereby minimizing Purpose: Protect hands from contamination
the likelihood of exposure. - Disposable, non-sterile, powder-free
- Different types depending on the nature
Important Considerations for PPE of work or handling process
Selection - Nitrile (preferable), latex,
➔ Characteristics of the biological agent polychloroprene or PVC
being handled
➔ Volumes and concentrations of the Goggles/Face Shield (Eye Protection)
biological agent Purpose: Protect the eyes, nose, or mouth
➔ Presence of additional hazards (e.g., from splashes of infectious materials or
extreme temperatures, chemical or toxins, impacting objects or artificial
radiological hazards) ultraviolet radiation
➔ Type of work being carried out - Eye protection devices can be re-used
➔ Other risk control measures being but must be cleaned each time after
used, such as a biological safety use.
cabinet (BSC) - If splashed, devices must be
➔ Other PPE being worn decontaminated with an appropriate
➔ Individual needs of the laboratory disinfectant
personnel, and
➔ Availability of national regulations and
organizational requirements
PPE: Heightened Control Measures Respirator Fit Testing
PPE Core Requirements + Respiratory - The only accepted way to determine if
Protection the respirator fits properly.
- Surgical Mask - Used to assess whether the respirator
- Fit-Tested NIOSH-approved assigned to a person forms an
Respirators adequate seal around their face.
- Coveralls - Periodic testing is needed to ensure the
- Apron fit continues to be acceptable
- Fit testing is required for tight-fitting
Apron facepiece respirators.
Purpose: Additional hazard-specific splash
protection may be required for certain Head Protectors/Covers
procedures: Purpose: Protect the hair and scalp from
- Removal of specimens from liquid contamination (for certain activities)
nitrogen - Hair that is long enough to be tied back
- Handling liquid chemicals and large should be tied back before entering the
liquid volumes laboratory.
- Autopsies - Need for and selection of head
protection should be based on a risk
Coverall assessment
Purpose: Coveralls cover the whole body
and are generally worn on top of scrubs or Key Messages
personal clothes - Any PPE used in the laboratory must
- May be disposable or reused if properly be correctly fitted.
decontaminated - Personnel must be given adequate
- Decontamination procedures for re-use training in order to ensure it is used
must be validated and approved properly and effectively.
- Care must be taken while removing - Incorrect use of PPE will not give the
coveralls protection they are designed to provide.
Surgical Mask
- Disposable, fluid resistant ear loop
- Good breathability
- Internal and external faces should be
clearly identified
- 98% droplet filtration
- 3-ply pleated
- Must be disposed properly
- It is not an example of a respirator but it
is intended to protect patients and the
environment from infectious agents
from the person wearing the mask.
Topics:
01 Safe use of laboratory equipment
02 Essential Laboratory Equipment:
Autoclave
03 Essential Laboratory Equipment:
Biosafety Cabinet
Classes of BSCs
Inward flow of air; HEPA filter
a. Class I
b. Class II
c. Class III
Class I
- Open-fronted enclosures
- Provide personnel and environmental
protection, but do not offer product
protection.
Module 3.8 of Biosafety ➢ Minimize loss of life, limb and
Emergency/Incident Response property (in decreasing order)
Topics: Alerting
01 Introduction - An institution’s incident response plan,
02 Incident Response System as developed by management, should
03 Spill Response address procedures for alerting
appropriate personnel in the event of
Introduction to Emergency/Incident an emergency/incident.
Response - The process of identifying an
Introduction emergency/incident in real-time or
- An emergency/incident is a sudden or after it occurred and using all
unexpected event that requires information to generate response.
immediate attention to prevent harm or - Can either be through sound and/or
damage. visual communication
- Emergency/incident response refers - Primarily directed at:
to the set of procedures set in place to ➢ Emergency responders
address and mitigate incidents or ➢ Possible victims
accidents involving biological materials,
pathogens or toxins. Assessment
- Types of emergencies in the lab: - Evaluation of the type and severity of
● Chemical incidents an emergency/ incident, to determine
● Fire electrical breakdown the most appropriate response
● Pest infestation - Predetermined during planning
● Flooding - Must be immediate: an emergency is
● Personal health issues of happening
personnel - Must be initially performed by someone
on the scene
Incident Response System
Assessment Factors:
➔ Type of emergency/incident
➔ Nature of materials involved
➔ Geographical/spatial coverage
➔ Number of affected personnel
➔ Medical background of affected
personnel
➔ Risk of contamination
Planning and Preparation ➔ Need for external assistance
- “Pre-”
- Have a contingency plan with specific Alerting and Assessment
SOPs - Both provide information as to the
➢ Based on applicable laws, expert existence and nature of the emergency
advice and adapted to local /incident
settings.
➢ Involves stakeholders with their Mobilization
roles, actions to be taken and details - Process of activating personnel and
about resources must be identified. deploying equipment to respond
➢ Output = a standard document directly to an incident or emergency to
➢ Must be reviewed and clarified expedite its resolution.
- Some incidents are self-resolving and
may not require a specific response.
- May require inter-agency cooperation - Sharps disposal container
depending on scale, capability or law. - Plastic container bin
2. PPE
External Responders - 2 goggles, 2 face shields
- Large-scaled or difficult emergencies - 4 pairs of gloves
may require assistance from external - 2 surgical face mask and 2
agencies (fire, earthquake, flood, major n95
spills). - 2 pairs of vinyl rubber shoe
- Depending on the laws of the covers
jurisdiction where the institution is - 2 disposable gowns and 2
located, some emergencies/ incidents coveralls
that the institution cannot respond to. 3. Absorbent materials
- Engagement with the police, fire - towel
brigades and emergency medical - paper towels
services are vital for an effective 4. Clean up tools and materials
incident response. - forceps and tongs
- small disposable broom with
Incident Management dustpan and wiper
- autoclavable biohazard
waste bags
- disinfectant (sodium
hypochlorite)
- a bottle with water
- 70% alcohol
- spill kit checklist
- biological spill response SOP
- ‘Do not enter’ signage
Drills
➢ Earthquake Drill Note: Initiate clean-up as soon as possible;
➢ Fire Drill Evacuate the laboratory if necessary; Wait
➢ Major Spill Drill 30 minutes before re-entry; Work in buddy
system.
Spill Response
Biological Spill Response
- A process of mitigating a biological spill
which may release hazardous materials
to the environment.
- “Post-”
International Standards
OHSAS (Occupational Health and
Safety Management System) 18001
- One of the International Standard for
Occupational Health and Safety
Management Systems
ISO 45001
- International standard for
occupational health and safety,
- Issued to protect employees and
visitors from work-related accidents
and diseases.
- Away from traffic patterns, doors, fans, - 40 inches (1020 mm) of open space in
ventilation registers, fume hoods and front of the BSC
any other air-handling device that could - 60 inches (1520 mm) from opposing
disrupt its airflow patterns walls, bench tops and areas of
- Located at the wall farthest from and occasional traffic
facing the entry door (If not possible: - 100 inches (2540 mm) between two
place on the side wall perpendicular to BSCs facing each other
the hinge side of the door)
- More frequent recertification should be
considered for particularly hazardous or
critical applications or workloads (e.g.,
every 6 months depending on high
workload, local risk assessment, and
institutional policy)
Emergency Response
Emergency/Incident Response
- An emergency or incident response
plan, that includes sourcing of
post-exposure prophylaxis and
therapeutics that may be necessary.
- Emergency response procedures
should include in spill management, the
use of emergency equipment such as
the emergency shower, and emergency
bypass buttons.
- Spill kits are specialized kits to ensure
safe and effective cleanup, including
PPE, absorbent materials to soak the
biological spill, disinfectants or
sanitizers. Special training on this must
Maintenance and Testing be part of preparedness response.
Recommended recertification of BSCs - All staff should be aware and trained in
- At the time of installation and at least the facility’s alarm system
annually thereafter - A 24-hour CCTV recording that is
- Whenever HEPA filters are changed regularly monitored by an authorized
- Maintenance repairs are made to personnel.
internal parts - Should be reviewed periodically
- Cabinet is relocated
Module 4.2 Two Models for Maximum Containment
Maximum Containment Measures Laboratory
a. Suit Laboratory
Topics: - Operators work in a
01 Operational working practices and positive-pressure encapsulating
procedures suits in open-fronted BSCs, also in
02 Personnel Competence and Training a negative-pressure laboratory.
03 Facility Design - Anterooms where positive
04 Decontamination and Waste pressure suits are stored, donned,
Management doffed, and maintained
05 Personal Protective Equipment - Pressure gauges to monitor
06 Laboratory Equipment negative pressure in the rooms
07 Emergency Response and positive pressure within the
suit
Operational Working Practices and - Shower room before exiting the
Procedures laboratory
Topics:
01 Definition of Biosecurity
02 Bioterrorism of Events
03 Local and International Legislations
04 The Biosecurity Assessment Team
05 Biosecurity of Events in the Philippines
Definition of Biosecurity
- Protection, control and accountability for
valuable biological materials within Category: Biological Material
laboratories, in order to prevent their ● RG1
unauthorized access, loss, theft, misuse, Components/Individual:
diversion or intentional release. - Bacillus subtilis
- Note: Hazard is for BIOSAFETY - Bacillus licheniformis
ISSUES while Threat is for - Adeno-associated virus
BIOSECURITY ISSUES ● RG2
Components/Individual:
- Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae
- Hepatitis D Virus
- Sporothrix schenckii
International Legislations
- IAP Statement of Biosecurity -
addresses the 5 fundamental issues in
biosciences
- 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention
- United Nation Security Council
Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540)
- The Danish Biosecurity Law 2008
- United States Government Policy for
Oversight for Life Sciences Dual use
Research of Concern
- United States Government Policy for
Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences
Dual Use Research of Concern
- Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
Module 5.2 of Biosecurity ● Management
Components of Biosecurity ➢ Biorisk management system
➢ Biorisk policy and procedures
Topics: ➢ Biorisk/biosecurity budget and
01 Pillars of Good Biosecurity Management resources
02 Components of Biosecurity ➢ Reporting to management
03 Biosecurity needs and challenges in the ● Physical Security
Philippines ➢ Access control
➢ Monitoring (e.g., cameras,
Pillars of Good Biosecurity Management resources)
● Awareness ➢ Building management security
➢ General biosecurity awareness ➢ Security culture in organisation
among management and
employees Components of Biosecurity
➢ Biosecurity risk and responsibility ● Inventory Control
awareness ● Information Control
➢ Biosecurity response awareness ● Personnel Control
➢ Awareness concerning biosecurity ● Physical Security Control
procedures ● Transport Control
● Personnel Reliability ● Emergency and Incident Response
➢ Personnel screening ● Dual Use Research of Concern
➢ Authorisation of personnel ● Emerging Biotechnology
➢ Confidentiality measures
➢ Integrity program (reporting 1. Physical Security
suspicious behaviour) ➢ Detection
● Transport Security ➢ Delay Response
➢ Transport rules, regulation and laws ➢ Access Control
➢ Transport procedures, chain of - Graded Protection
custody, compliance ● Concentric rings of increasing
➢ Transport risk analyses security spanning from outside
➢ Screening of transportation to inside the facility
companies ● Different areas of a facility will
● Information Security have different levels of security
➢ Guidelines for confidential based on risk.
information 2. Personnel Management
➢ Assess dual use aspects of
research and knowledge
➢ Information and knowledge security
● Accountability for Materials
➢ Secure storage of biological
hazards
➢ Inventories, verification of stocks 3. Material Control
➢ Internal transport ➢ Inventory
➢ Access to materials ➢ Checklist
● Response ➢ Markings
➢ Emergency and crisis response ➢ Access
➢ Procedures and responsibility - To prevent theft in inventory.
during incidents 4. Transport Security
➢ Communication and information - Relies on chain of custody principles
during incidents and user agreements
➢ Incident training and evaluation - e.g., Triple Packaging System
- Packaging, shipping and transport of ➢ Promote life sciences research
specimens must comply with the while protecting public health and
local and international requirements national security
for transportation of infectious ➢ Minimizing the potential threats
substances. posed by biological pathogens and
● For local and transport, patient the potential misuse of information,
sample must be shipped products, or technologies derived
following the basic triple from such research
packaging system 8. Dual Use Research of Concern
● For air shipments, sample from ➢ Pathogen or toxin, knowledge, or
confirmed and/or suspected equipment
patient must be shipped as ➢ Used for illegitimate scientific
Category B: UN Number and applications (e.g., commercial,
Proper Shipping Name: e.g., medical, or research purposes),
UN 3373, “Biological ➢ Intentionally misused as a biological
Substance, Category B” weapon to cause harm (e.g.,
● For air shipments of COVID-19 bioterrorism).
viral culture or isolates must be
shipped as Category A: Un Biosecurity needs and challenges in the
Number and Proper Shipping Philippines
Name: e.g., UN 2814,
“Infectious substance, 5 Fundamental Biosecurity Issues and
affecting humans” Challenges (According to IAP)
5. Information Security ● Awareness
➢ Data Breach ● Safety and Security
➢ Data Privacy ● Education and Information
➢ Information/ Data Inventory ● Accountability
➢ Retention Period ● Oversight
6. Emergency/Incident Response Plan
➢ Natural disasters Biosecurity Needs in the Philippines
➢ Man-made disasters (e.g., - Reforms in biosecurity policies
accidental release of SARS virus - Effective trainings and workshops
2003, use of anthrax spores in - Awareness-level trainings to
bioterrorism) policymakers
➢ Contingency Plan - Expanding the concepts of biosafety
➢ Incident Response Plan and biosecurity in National Biosafety
➢ Drills, training, updating Framework 514
7. Emerging Biotechnology - Incorporate the four pillars of disaster
➢ Scientific, ethical, and social risk reduction and management in the
implications of certain context of biohazards
biotechnologies development ➔ Prevention and mitigation
➢ Integration of those technologies ➔ Preparedness
into scientific and clinical practice. ➔ Response
➢ Clustered Regularly Interspaced ➔ Rehabilitation and recovery
Short-Palindromic Repeats - Multidisciplinary approach and linkage
(CRISPR) among agencies and other concerned
- Emerging biotechnology entities
(allows sciences make precise
changes in an agents DNA)
Module 5.3 of Biosecurity ➢ Review and Continual
Biosecurity Risk Assessment Improvement
4. Consequence
● Determine physical and
psychological impact to Public
Health, Animal Health, and the
3. Likelihood Organization
● Identification of Deliberate ● Effectiveness and Vulnerability of
Biosecurity Events Mitigation Measures using the
● Determine Adversary Motive (like following criteria:
an employee telling others that ●
he/she will free the research
animals). Adversary means they
are capable
● Means and Capability
Biosecurity risk assessment is used to identify and evaluate risks associated with the exposure and release of biological agents. It involves preparation, development of an asset inventory, assessment of the likelihood and consequences of biosecurity events, risk analysis, and determining risk tolerance. This process helps in crafting biosecurity plans that mitigate identified risks and enable monitoring and continuous improvement to protect public health and security from potential misuse or accidental release of hazardous agents .
Training is crucial in ensuring personnel understand and manage biorisks effectively. It includes competency in specific protocols, biorisk management, equipment safety, emergency response, and biosecurity ethics. Regular scenario-based training and operational updates ensure staff are prepared for incidents and can work proficiently with biohazard containment measures. This comprehensive approach is essential for maintaining high biosafety standards and minimizing human error .
Laboratory facility design should include separation from common areas, controlled access through airlocks or interlocked doors, incorporation of primary containment devices like BSCs, and systems ensuring negative pressure to contain pathogens. It also involves safe anteroom setups, effective waste decontamination protocols like double-door autoclaves, and meticulous arrangement to prevent cross-contamination. These designs enhance biosecurity by maintaining controlled environments that minimize pathogen exposure and release risks .
Data security plays a critical role in biosecurity by protecting sensitive information related to biological agents and research protocols from unauthorized access or misuse. Effective management includes implementing robust access controls, encrypting sensitive data, and conducting regular security audits. Adhering to data privacy regulations and protocols ensures that information remains secure, preventing potential misuse that could compromise biosecurity .
Risk control measures, including physical controls, operational procedures, and training, aim to reduce biorisks to acceptable levels. Effective risk communication ensures that all relevant stakeholders are informed about risks and the measures in place. This communication involves exchange of information and opinions among personnel, fostering informed decision-making and compliance with safety protocols. Together, these strategies synergize to create a culture of safety, where risks are systematically managed and communicated transparently .
Key biosecurity challenges in the Philippines include low awareness, inadequate safety and security measures, insufficient training and oversight, and the need for policy reforms. Recommended strategies involve increasing awareness through training programs for policymakers, expanding biosafety frameworks, and adopting a multidisciplinary approach for integrating biosecurity into various sectors. These initiatives aim to strengthen national capacity to manage biosecurity threats effectively .
GMPPs contribute to risk reduction by implementing standard operating procedures and practices that ensure safe handling and containment of biological agents. These include prohibiting food in labs, enforcing handwashing, maintaining clean work areas, properly labeling biological materials, and safely using equipment. Such practices minimize contamination and inadvertent release of agents by ensuring work is conducted methodically, with appropriate safety measures like PPE and proper waste management .
A comprehensive emergency response plan enhances laboratory safety by outlining specific procedures for addressing biological incidents, including spill containment, exposure management, and equipment use. Training staff on emergency protocols and regularly conducting drills ensure preparedness and quick, coordinated responses to mitigate incidents. Moreover, maintaining emergency supplies and equipment like spill kits and having alarm systems in place further strengthen preparedness and response capabilities .
The triple packaging system ensures safe transport of infectious substances by using three layers of containment. The innermost layer securely contains the substance, the second layer provides leak-proof support, and the outermost layer serves as a robust protective cover. This system complies with international transport regulations and minimizes the risk of release or contamination during transportation .
Primary factors influencing the likelihood of a biohazard incident include laboratory activities such as aerosolization and the use of sharps, low competency of personnel, high stability of biological agents in the environment, low infectious doses, high communicability, high morbidity/mortality of agents, limited availability of effective prophylaxis or treatments, and large susceptible populations. These factors interplay by increasing the chance of incidents when combined; for example, low competency of personnel handling highly communicable agents can significantly raise the risk of exposure and infection .