G.R. No.
142527 March 1, 2001
ARSENIO ALVAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LA RAINNE ABAD-SARMIENTO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Doña Aurora, Quezon City. He
received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585
votes. Private respondent filed an election protest claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading and
misappreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. After petitioner answered and
the issues were joined, the Metropolitan Trial Court ordered the reopening and recounting of
the ballots in ten contested precincts. It subsequently rendered its decision that private
respondent won the election. She garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes after
the recount.
On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that private respondent won over
petitioner. Private respondent, meanwhile, filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal
which petitioner opposed. Both petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and private
respondent's Motion for Execution pending appeal were submitted for resolution. The
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the
Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC did not preferentially dispose of the case.
Whether COMELEC prematurely acted on the Motion for Execution pending appeal
Whether COMELEC misinterpreted the Constitutional provision that "decisions, final orders,
or rulings of the Commission on Election contests involving municipal and barangay officials
shall be final, executory and not appealable".
HELD:
1. NO. The records show that petitioner contested the results of ten (10) election
precincts involving scrutiny of affirmation, reversal, validity, invalidity, legibility,
misspelling, authenticity, and other irregularities in these ballots. The COMELEC has
numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical. Considering further
the tribunal's manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural
requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines might
induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of
material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since
a very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the
electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases.
Petitioner misreads the provision in Section 258 of the Omnibus Election Code. It will
be noted that the "preferential disposition" applies to cases before the courts and not
those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily show.
2. NO. We note that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner
had a motion for reconsideration before the Second Division. This pending motion for
reconsideration suspended the execution of the resolution of the Second Division.
Appropriately then, the division must act on the motion for reconsideration. Thus,
when the Second Division resolved both petitioner's motion for reconsideration and
private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal, it did so in the exercise of
its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The requisites for the grant of execution pending
appeal are: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for the execution pending appeal;
and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. In our view, these three
requisites were present. In its motion for execution, private respondent cites that
their case had been pending for almost three years and the remaining portion of the
contested term was just two more years. In a number of similar cases and for the
same good reasons, we upheld the COMELEC's decision to grant execution pending
appeal in the best interest of the electorate. Correspondingly, we do not find that the
COMELEC abused its discretion when it allowed the execution pending appeal.
3. NO. Election cases pertaining to barangay elections may be appealed by way of a
special civil action for certiorari. But this recourse is available only when the
COMELEC's factual determinations are marred by grave abuse of discretion. We find
no such abuse in the instant case. From the pleadings and the records, we observed
that the lower court and the COMELEC meticulously pored over the ballots reviewed.
Because of its fact-finding facilities and its knowledge derived from actual
experience, the COMELEC is in a peculiarly advantageous position to evaluate,
appreciate and decide on factual questions before it. Here, we find no basis for the
allegation that abuse of discretion or arbitrariness marred the factual findings of the
COMELEC. As previously held, factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own
assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive on this Court, more so
in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law in
the questioned resolutions. Unless any of these causes are clearly substantiated, the
Court will not interfere with the COMELEC's findings of fact.