+“Nonproliferation needs to become efficient, effective and
non-discriminatory. There is a need for trust, transparency
and institutional reforms,”
Noam Chomsky
IAEA
Headquarters: Vienna, Austria
Head: Rafael Grossi
Founded: July 29, 1957
Membership: 171 Member States
The IAEA is an international organisation that seeks to
promote peaceful use of nuclear energy and inhibit its use
for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons.
With its headquarters in Vienna, the agency reports to the
United Nations’ General Assembly and Security Council.
Pakistan elected IAEA board member, Sept 21 2018 again
IAEA elects 11 new members of the BoG every year for two-
year term. And this year, Pakistan was among those
countries which were elected new board members.
Pakistan has been elected 19 times to the BoG in the past
which is recognition of the country’s long-standing
commitment to the aims and objectives of the IAEA in
promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its positive
contribution to formulation of the policies and programmes
of the agency.
Latest on IAEA
Pakistan seeks support of IAEA to boost its N-power
Programme (Feb 2020)
IAEA’s streamlined support for Pakistan aimed to expand the
nuclear power generating capacity more than six-fold over
the next decade, from 1430MW to 8800MW was discussed
by regulators, operators and representatives of
organisations involved in Pakistan’s nuclear power
programme who gathered at IAEA’s headquarters in Vienna
recently.
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which
entered into force in March 1970, seeks to inhibit the spread of nuclear
weapons. Its 190 (191 with North Korea*) states-parties are classified in two
categories: nuclear-weapon states (NWS)—consisting of the United States,
Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom—and non-nuclear-weapon
states (NNWS). Under the treaty, the five NWS commit to pursue general and
complete disarmament, while the NNWS agree to forgo developing or
acquiring nuclear weapons.?
With its near-universal membership, the NPT has the widest adherence of any
arms control agreement, with only South Sudan, India, Israel, and Pakistan
remaining outside the treaty. In order to accede to the treaty, these states
must do so as NNWS, since the treaty restricts NWS status to nations that
"manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
device prior to 1 January 1967." For India, Israel, and Pakistan, all known to
possess or suspected of having nuclear weapons, joining the treaty as NNWS
would require that they dismantle their nuclear weapons and place their
nuclear materials under international safeguards. South Africa followed this
path to accession in 1991.
AFTER the 1974 Indian nuclear test, according to his
famous autobiography 'My Country My Life', Indian
BJP leader L. K. Advani equated the significance of this
event with that of the Indian Army entering
triumphantly into the streets of Dhaka in December
1971.
The euphoria was not limited to the right-wing leaders in
India. The director of nuclear policy at the prestigious
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington
D.C., George Perkovich quotes the suave left-leaning Indian
former prime minister I.K. Gujral, in his award-winning book
'India's Nuclear Bomb', that the entry within the UN
Security Council is possible only for those with either
economic wealth or nuclear weapons. Hence, for India,
building and detonating nuclear weapon was a short cut to
great power status.
On the international, legal and diplomatic fronts, from the
very outset, the nuclear disarmament commitment of the five
states, recognised as the only nuclear weapon states under
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was questionable at best. The
common intention of the permanent members of the UN
Security Council was to confine the scope of NPT to limiting
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and its related
technology. In plain words, no other states should build
nuclear weapons in future.
However, their acceptance of indefinite vertical proliferation
obligations and nuclear disarmament was a reluctant
arrangement and the 1995 NPT review conference almost
gave up on its cause of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear
weapon states, by indefinitely extending NPT. This
drastically eroded whatever leverage the non-nuclear
weapon states might have had over the nuclear weapon
states to progress towards general and comprehensive
nuclear disarmament. In 1995, NPT ceased to be a tool for
nuclear disarmament and conferred upon the five nuclear
powers not only a legitimate but also an indefinite nuclear
power status, imposing no specific timeframe whatsoever
within which to eliminate their nuclear weapons.
According to the International Court of Justice's unanimous
opinion issued in 1996, the Article VI of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) goes beyond the mere obligation
of conducting the negotiations in good faith but also to
conclude the negotiations. In fact, initially Germany, Italy,
Japan and Switzerland insisted that the nuclear weapon
states should disarm before rendering their own non-nuclear
weapon status, but in the end they also gave up their
insistence. Most probably, the US presence of extended
nuclear deterrence over Western Europe and Japan might
have something to do with it.
In terms of elimination of nuclear weapons by nuclear states,
the NPT has completely failed as all the five nuclear weapon
states have continued to develop and improve their nuclear
weapons. One must rest assured that the recent bilateral
New START Treaty between the US and Russia is not
motivated by a sudden inspiration by Article VI of the NPT,
nor any mysterious desire has overtaken the either side to
eliminate their nuclear weapons. This bilateral arrangement,
which is yet to be ratified by the US Congress, primarily
aims at more effective and efficient management of their
ever evolving nuclear arsenals rather than their complete
elimination. This discriminatory approach has not only
weakened the international nuclear non-proliferation efforts
but has also encouraged states aspiring to acquire nuclear
weapons, considering it as the ultimate tool to achieve big
power status.
Three years after the eventful 1995 NPT Review Conference,
in order to rectify the gaping strategic imbalance within
South Asia and to pacify BJP leadership's belligerent threats
to retake Azad Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan, the
second series of Indian 1998 nuclear tests, left Pakistan with
no option but to respond in kind.
Why the NPT needs a makeover
These questions necessitate a holistic analytical review of
the Treaty. First — a preliminary study of NPT Articles I, IV
and VI reveals that fundamental problems exist in its
structure. Under the NPT, five countries are recognized as
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS — P5) while the rest of the
treaty’s signatories are regarded as non-nuclear weapon
states (NNWS). As a logical corollary, these NNWS are
barred from acquiring nuclear weapons. Such conspicuous
discrimination has led to arguments that the NPT is
primarily focused on preserving the interests of P5 states.
Second — despite a strong emphasis and an emphatic
promise to rid the world of nuclear weapons (as prescribed
in Article VI) no progress is visible on disarmament by NWS.
This is despite the fact that during the NPT extension
conference, 1995, members had shown a great
determination to implement the Treaty in its entirety
Third — the multilateral negotiations on nuclear export
control (to oversee trade of the dual use technologies and
determine their end usage) resulted, in the 1970s, in the
Zannger Committee and Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) —
an arrangement which was created against the background
of the Indian nuclear explosions in 1974. Through these,
which I call ‘short-circuited’ methods, the right to peaceful
uses of nuclear technology, a highly significant pillar of the
NPT, was drawn out of the formal mechanism. For its part,
the NSG holds no legal legitimacy and formal structure when
you compare it with the institutional stature of the IAEA.
Fourthly — there is a problem with the non-universal status
of the NPT and its inability to remain sustainable on the
ground. From the outset states adhered to a greater or
lesser extent to the terms of the NPT, but India (which
detonated devices first in 1974 and later in 1998) Israel
(which maintains a policy of opacity since 1968) and
Pakistan (which exploded devices in response to the Indian
tests in 1998) have never joined the NPT. North Korea
withdrew in 2003 thus testing the treaty article IV and X.
The existence of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is
rooted in its security compulsions. Indian testing of nuclear
devices changed the politico-strategic canvas of the region
— thinning Pakistan’s options to remain a covert nuclear
state — and forcing Pakistan to go nuclear. In 1974, Pakistan
had proposed to establish a nuclear weapons free zone
(NWFZ) in South Asia; in 1978 it proposed to India a joint
Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and
manufacture of nuclear weapons and in the same year also
proposed mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of
nuclear facilities, simultaneous adherence to the NPT by
India and Pakistan and also simultaneous acceptance of full-
scope IAEA safeguards. However, all these initiatives were
rejected by India.
During the 1990s, a missile race and Indian nuclear
explosions forced Pakistan to change its ‘cautious and
restrained’ policy into one of weaponisation. Pakistan’s
policy in pursuit of a NWFZ in South Asia was thwarted
when the regional security architecture changed in 1998.
Since then Pakistan considers its nukes as a national
security life-line and strategic assets. The introduction of
new technologies such as low-yield weapons into its
inventory is thus meant for reinforcing its full spectrum
deterrence capability and to respond to the Indian military’s
operational concepts, such as the Cold Start doctrine. This
does not necessarily imply, explicitly or implicitly, that
Pakistan promotes limited or sub-conventional war in this
region.
The fact that Pakistan went nuclear and is not a party to the
NPT does not mean that it is opposed to global non-
proliferation norms. In pursuit of this policy, Pakistan has
instituted an elaborate home-grown solution, which by any
international standard is exceptionally strong to safeguard
its national assets. In parallel, it closely follows international
standards and fulfills global commitments.
In the subsequent period, following the infamous Dr A Q
Khan revelations, Pakistan-US partnership helped dispel the
misunderstandings, increased ‘strategic trust’ and
transparency, and opened discussion forums for future
relations. The UNSC resolution 1540 created a new norm
and Pakistan as a non-NPT state operates under the rules
established by the resolution. After the implementation of
the act on export control in 2004, Pakistan instituted
international standards adopted by the NSG, Missile
Technology Control regime (MTCR) and the Austria Group
(AG). More so, Pakistan is a member to the IAEA, adheres to
its code of conduct, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism, CSI, and Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB). With
all these measures in place, there has been no reported case
of proliferation since 2004.
The NPT review conference outcomes 2015 have proven that
the NPT is widely regarded as a system in distress;
nevertheless, we should continue working on reducing the
structural flaws of the NPT and to bridge the gaps and
distances between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states,
along with working towards the universalisation of this
treaty. There is an urgent need to revive the non-
proliferation regime and enhance the non NPT states in the
full spectrum of non-proliferation and disarmament
standards and obligations instead of breaking the designed
structure of the NPT for making allowances of non-
signatories to seek benefits of signatories.
November 28, 1972: President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
inaugurates the first unit of the Karachi nuclear
plant
In parallel, the use of nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes has become ever more relevant in an energy-
hungry world. Despite the Fukushima Daiichi incident,
nuclear energy deployment continues to grow and is
expected to increase exponentially in the coming decades.
The factors contributing to this growing interest in nuclear
power are: energy security — the need to handle increasing
global demand and maintain a sustained energy supply;
mitigating effects of climate change by curbing greenhouse
gases, along with other factors that go beyond the supply of
electricity. Nuclear energy offers a greater capacity factor,
lesser cost and environmentally safer source than most other
alternatives. Nuclear power, as a stable base-load source of
electricity in an era of ever increasing global energy
demands, complements other energy sources including
renewables.
As a non-NPT state, India is keen to join the NSG to achieve
global support for its civil nuclear deals. Thus, the NSG is
under pressure to expand membership outside its defined
criteria.
Obviously India, a non-NPT nuclear state, has not placed its
facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards and, thus, it is
not entitled to the benefits of the NSG membership
It is subject to the NSG rules that forbid nuclear cooperation
with states that have unsafeguarded facilities and are not
party states to the NPT. Besides, India has not signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has not
addressed the moratorium on the Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty. Without addressing these concerns, expansion in the
Group’s membership to accommodate India’s interests on
political grounds would damage the efficacy, spirit and
structure of the treaty.
During President Obama’s recent visit to India, both the
countries under the Indo-US nuclear deal have been able to
address the nuclear liability issue, which has opened the
pathways for India for its civil-nuclear deals. Obama and
Modi, under the US-India Defense Technology and Trade
Initiative (DTTI), laid down a joint military-industrial base for
co-production, co-development and partnership between the
two countries and agreed to treat each other as close
partners. These agreements indeed are aimed at by-passing
the non-proliferation norms thereby making our regional
politics much more complicated. Through such coupling with
India, the US is making the notion of ‘selective bonding’more
pronounced and in all probability this would set an
additional discriminatory and dangerous precedent.
As a result of its own geopolitical and national security
imperatives, Pakistan has proposed to create a criteria base
approach, thus demanding revision in the structure of the
NSG to align new aspirants to meet the current demands.
Such a proposition, pragmatic in nature and consistent with
time-sensitive strategic urgency, is paramount for Pakistan
as it aspires to institute two additional nuclear power plants
to generate 40,000 MW by 2050 to make up for the crippling
power deficiency that plagues it.