Abstract:

Developing countries like India are under international pressure to sign a legally binding
emissions treaty to avert catastrophic climatic change. Developing countries, however,
have argued that any international agreement must be based on historic and per capita
carbon emissions, with developed countries responsible for reducing their emissions
first and funding mitigation and adaptation in other countries.

Introduction:

India is one of the world’s most vulnerable countries to climate change (Cruz et al.
2007; INCCA 2010). About half of its population is dependent on agriculture or other
climate sensitive sectors (Bureau of Labour Statistics 2010), and about 76 % of the
population lives on less than $2 a day (World Bank 2008).

India, however, is now the world’s third largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter,
having tripled its carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion alone between
1990 and 2011 and its emissions are predicted to increase by almost 2.5 times
between 2008 and 2035 (IEA 2013).

Citing the rising national emissions of developing countries like India, developed
countries like the United States have refused to sign a legally binding treaty to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions (National Academies 2010). Developing
countries, however, have refused to commit to binding emissions reductions based
on arguments of equity, low per-capita emissions and the historical responsibility
of developed countries to reduce their emissions first. For example, the per capita
emission of India, with 17 % of world’s population, is 1 ton of CO2 emissions in
2013, whereas in the United States, with less than 5 % of the world’s population,
per capita emissions are 17 t CO2 (IEA 2013). These three di erent frames for
carbon emissions—national, per capita, and historical—lead to di erent
conclusions about responsibility for climate change that have contributed to the
impasse in negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Dubash and Rajamani 2010).

A brief history of climate change discourses in India :

Climate change emerged as an issue for Indian policy-makers in the late 1980s, a
decade which included the formation of the IPCC in 1988, at a time when the Indian
government was beginning to transition to a market oriented economy to
accelerate growth and reduce poverty. Several scholars argue that the initial Indian
government positions on climate change were largely e orts to protect its
domestic development and sovereignty in an increasingly unipolar world (e.g.
Biermann 2001; Jakobsen 1998; Rajan 1997; Kandlikar and Sagar 1999).

Agarwal and Narain reframed the climate change issue as “environmental

colonialism” making a distinction between “luxury” and “survival” emissions, and
arguing that climate change has been primarily caused by the “historic” emissions
of greenhouse gases by developed countries, not contemporary annual emissions.

, India took a number of domestic measures and played an important role in

international meetings on global environmental problems, including the formation
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Dasgupta 2011;
Rajan 1997; Sengupta 2011).

On the domestic front, although not addressing climate change directly, the Indian
government passed domestic legislation for energy conservation and increased
use of renewable energy, for example by setting up the Indian Renewable Energy
Development Authority Climatic Change (2014) 123:107–119 109 (IREDA), legislation
of 2003 Electricity Act, and finally the “coal cess”—a form of carbon tax at the rate
of Rs 50 (approx. 1$) per ton on domestic and imported coal—to fund renewable
energy sources (MOEF 2010). The Indian government, however, continues to argue
that di erentiation between developed and developing countries should remain a
key principle of any new international agreement, and the right for “development”
carbon space (e.g. NAPCC 2008)

International aspirations:
As mentioned, several scholars have argued that climate change policy in India has
been closely tied to its post cold war foreign policy agenda, resulting in India’s
initial do-nothing, protectionist position on climate change (Dubash 2011a; Rajan
1997; Sengupta 2011).

According to Minister Jairam Ramesh, India’s stand of no emission reductions was

not only “disfavored by the developed countries, small island states and vulnerable
countries” but may also hinder “India's aspirations for permanent membership on
the Security Council” (Sethi 2009, para. 7). India is increasingly facing criticism,
and isolation, from its traditional developing and underdeveloped partner
countries, such as the group of Least Developed Countries (LDC’s) who, according
to one interviewed scientist, see “the India growth story, the China grown story”
and India’s refusal to agree to binding emission reductions, as an impediment to a
strong legally binding international agreement on climate change.

Domestic vulnerability and domestic equity:

The Indian government recently created the Indian Network for Climate Change
Assessment, along with other climate research institutes to investigate the
impacts of climate change. For grassroots organization such as India Climate
Justice, the vulnerability frame also supports their critique and skepticism of the
larger developmental narrative that they believe perpetuates the rich-poor, and
rural–urban divide within India (Adve 2007, 2013; Adve and Engineer 2010).

Increasing recognition of India’s vulnerability to climate change, particularly

among poor and rural Indians, amidst the rising emissions of rich Indians, has led
some to reassess India’s development strategy, where the benefits of record
economic growth have not trickled down to marginalized populations (Chakravarty
and Ramana 2011). Some are beginning to apply the concepts of equity,
di erentiation and capabilities at scales other than developed vs. developing
countries, including comparisons of India with its neighbors, and internally within
India itself (e.g. Bidwai 2012; Dutt 2009; Kanitkar et al. 2009; Raghunandan 2011).

Conclusion:
The primary shift in climate change discourses in India has been from a frame that
externalized the climate change problem and solutions towards a “co-benefits”
approach, where policies aim to align climate change with domestic priorities of
poverty alleviation and economic growth. Consistent with prior studies, we find
that traditional national priorities of poverty alleviation and economic growth are
key drivers of India’s emerging climate policy narrative (Jakobsen 1998; Jasano
1993; Kandlikar and Sagar 1999). However, new concerns such as international
aspirations, increasing scientific consensus regarding the need for even developing
countries to transition to a low carbon energy system, and Indians’ vulnerability,
particularly poor Indians, are increasingly being used by NGO’s and grassroots
organizations to pressure the government to adopt more proactive climate change
policies.

At the same time, for grassroots organizations, climate change becomes a new
discursive weapon to try to reinforce and amplify their critique of Indian
government’s developmental policies.
They tend to argue that without a radical shift in the policy making process in India
for more equitable development, and a quantitative shift from the primacy of
growth as a national priority, NAPCC is less likely to help the most vulnerable parts
of India, given that the poor without access to energy provide the low per-capita
emission figure the Indian government often uses in international forums to reject
any emission reductions.
reading material 2:
Mapping ‘consistency’ in India’s climate change position: Dynamics and dilemmas
of science diplomacy:
Introduction:
At the beginning of climate negotiations in 1991, India positioned itself as a
defender of the global South and as a producer of ideas and international norms
and rules on climate change. It projected itself as a coalition builder and an
aggressive protector of its own interests during negotiations that reflected a deep
North–South divide as well as major di erences within both these groups
(Sengupta 2012)
As far as the scientific evidence on climate change is concerned, it is the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that largely dictates and drives
the major agenda for climate change debate (Chaturvedi and Doyle 2010). As the
IPCC is being led by an Indian, R. K. Pachauri, India’s position on climate change
becomes more curious. For instance, the report of the Working Group II of the
IPCC’s Fourth 123 Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2015 [Link]/en Ambio
2015, 44:592–599 DOI 10.1007/s13280-014-0609-5 Assessment Report warned in
2007 that Himalayan glaciers would disappear by 2035 (Parry 2007)

Personalities played little role until the appointment of Jairam Ramesh as Minister
of State (independent charge) for Environment and Forests in May 2009, just in time
for the Copenhagen Summit (COP15).

There is a growing consensus among scientists that climate change will impact
India in di erent ways, but there is an uncertainty on the extent and pace of it as
the models and predictions

The first section of the paper outlines the context and background of India’s
climate change position. The second section presents reasons for the change in
India’s position along with a descriptive context of climate-related political
concerns in India and the relevant history of the global climate negotiations. T

MAPPING CONSISTENCY:
s. India was able to make significant progress in the negotiations through the Group
of 77 (G-77) and China, to protect the former’s overriding developmental priorities
(Dasgupta 2011a). India’s principal objective in the entire post-UNFCCC
negotiations on climate change—from Rio right up to Copenhagen—has been to
defend the ‘di erentiated’ architecture of the climate regime that it had worked to
inscribe within international law, and to ensure that no fresh legal obligations were
placed on it (Sengupta 2012, p. 107).

The run-up to voluntary commitments:

E orts to change the basic architecture of UNFCCC started at COP-1 in 1995 when
Germany proposed that ‘more advanced’ of the developing countries also accept
mitigation commitments (ENB 1995). Another e ort was made to introduce an
article on voluntary commitments at COP-3, which was opposed by India saying
that it would create a new category of parties not established in the Convention.

The first indication of a major change in India’s position came when in the run-up to
COP-15 in Copenhagen, the then minister for environment and forests, Jairam
Ramesh, suggested to the then Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, that India should
delink itself from G-77 and take emission cuts commitments ‘‘under a new deal
without any counter-guarantee of finance and technology (Sethi 2009; Rastogi
2011).’’ The reason cited for such an action was that ‘‘It [the current stance] takes
away from India’s aspirations for permanent membership of the [United Nations]
Security Council.’’

India and China accepted voluntary commitments to reduce their emission

intensity by 25 and 45 %, respectively.

From Copenhagen to Durban:

At the Durban conference in 2011, India’s new environment

minister Jayanthi Natarajan strongly defended equity and CBDR as the centerpiece of
the climate discussion but finally signed on an agreement that makes no mention of the
two principles (

Scientists vuew:
Scientists treat climate change as a physical phenomenon that can be observed,
quantified, and measured. The solutions they prescribe are straight forward—reduce
GHG emissions and remove them from the atmosphere by protecting sinks. But how to
achieve this and who should bear the burden depends on their worldviews, beliefs,
values, and attitudes which they organize into frames. Hulme (2009) suggested six
frames for climate change—market failure, technological hazard, global injustice,
overconsumption, mostly natural, and planetary tipping point. We have added Ambio
2015, 44:592–599 595 Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2015 [Link]/en 123
development to the list because climate change is considered a development issue in
India. ‘Market failure’ refers to the negative externality when firms or individuals neglect
the potential harmful e ect of their actions on others. ‘Technological hazard’ is
considered as a risk from consequences of new technology. Climate change as ‘global
injustice’ is seen as a direct result of the economic domination by Northern interests
and transnational corporations. The ‘overconsumption’ of the few is at odds with the
finite resource base and the fragile ecology on which we depend for survival. The
‘mostly natural’ frame is attributed to climate deniers who argue that global warming
cannot be attributed to human activity. ‘

‘‘We have to frame domestic policies so that the poor do not become even poorer in the
event of India taking commitments.

t ‘‘India was under immense pressure at the Copenhagen Summit to accept

commitments so we settled for voluntary commitments, but it is not in India’s interest
to take binding commitments without getting something in return.’’

Politics of business:
He earned the sobriquet of climate sceptic (Goldenberg 2014) when he told Indian
school children in a nationwide televised interaction with them on the occasion of
Teachers’ Day on September 5 that ‘‘climate has not changed, we have changed.’’ Then
he snubbed the United Nations Climate Summit 2014 by preferring to avoid it and
instead sending his environment minister Prakash Javadekar who criticized the meeting
as an attempt to hold a parallel meeting bypassing the climate convention process
(Chauhan 2014). Javadekar told the summit that India’s energy consumption will need
to increase four times to raise its Human Development Index to the level of the
developed countries (Javadekar 2014). Indian businesses and industry want the best of
the both worlds. They are interested in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) but are
against taking any binding emission reduction commitments. The Federation of Indian
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) has warned that there would be a sharp
drop in the output of energyintensive sectors leading to overall fall in GDP growth and
the energy-intensive sectors may become less competitive globally (FICCI 2007