THE PRAETORIAN GUARD IN

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE

OF JULIO-CLAUDIAN ROME

by

Sandra J. Bingham

B. A., The University of Alberta, 1980

M. A., The University of Alberta, 1987

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

(Department of Classical, Near Eastern and Religious Studies)

We accept this thesis as conforming

/^b the required standard

THE UNTVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

August, 1997

© Sandra J. Bingham, 1997

 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced
degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it
freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive
copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my
department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or
publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written
permission.

Department of

The University of British Columbia

Vancouver, Canada

DateSkc&rrtocS \6\Vf

DE-6 (2/88)
 11

ABSTRACT

The imperial praetorian guard was an elite unit of the Roman army,

whose primary responsibility was to safeguard the emperor and his family.

Adapted from a republican institution by Augustus, it in essence formed the

personal army of the emperor. Yet, within a very short time, the praetorians

became responsible for specialized military tasks involving issues of security,

and for various administrative duties in Rome. This evolution occurred primarily

because of the close relationship between the guard and the emperor, who saw

that such a large number of soldiers in the city could be put to good use for his

own benefit, and for the advantage of the state. Not only would they assist in the

management of the capital, they also would serve as a constant reminder to the

populace of the substantial armed force that formed the basis of imperial rule.

Previous studies of the guard have concentrated on its organization and

role as the imperial bodyguard. Yet it is through an examination of the other

responsibilities of the praetorians that a more comprehensive understanding of

their position in the state can be deduced. The purpose of the present study is to

examine those aspects of the guard that are outside its basic mandate of

providing protection for the imperial household. The development of the

praetorians into a unit that carried out political espionage, fought fires in the city,

and was employed as security at the games provides insight into the nature of

the early principate, which relied on armed force to maintain its authority. The

expanded role of the guard in the Julio-CIaudian period can be viewed as the
 Ill

deliberate integration of the military into the fabric of Roman administration. By

placing soldiers who owed their allegiance only to him in key roles in the capital,

the emperor was able to consolidate his hold on power while, at the same time,

often providing much needed services that benefited the state as a whole.
 IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ii

Table of Contents iv

List of Figures vi

I. Introduction 1

Part 1: Historical Overview

II. The Guard in the Republic 9

III. Augustus 22

IV. Tiberius 37

V. Caligula and Claudius 66

VI. Nero 95

VII. Postscript 118

Part 2: The Functions of the Praetorian Guard 124

VIII. The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit

Unrest in Italy and the Empire 126

The Speculatores 135

Confinement and Executions 142

IX. The Guard in Civil Administration 176

Fires 177
Security at Games 195
Taxation 211
Construction Projects 213
Juridical Responsibility 216

X. Conclusion 223
Bibliography 235

Appendix 1 Sources for the Julio Claudian Period 257

Appendix 2 Republican Terms for the Praetorian Cohort 266

Appendix 3 The Castra Praetoria 269

Appendix 4 Confinement and Execution 276

 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Sestertius of Augustus 278

Figure 2 Denarius of Antony 278

Figure 3 Sestertius of Caligula 279

Figure 4 Aureus of Claudius 279

Figure 5 Aureus of Claudius 280

Figure 6 Sestertius of Nero 280

Figure 7 Sestertius of Nero 281

Figure 8 Denarius of Antony 281

Figure 9 Plan of the Castra Praetoria 282

 1

S. Introduction

The praetorian guard was one of the most distinctive features of imperial

rule. An elite unit of soldiers, these men were responsible for the safety of the

Roman emperor and his family, and were well rewarded for their loyalty. They

received a higher rate of pay than the rest of the army, they had better living and

working conditions because they were based in Rome, and their close

relationship with the emperor singled them out as the most privileged group

among the military. Under the republic, troops had not been allowed in the

capital, and the presence of the praetorian guard in Rome under Augustus was

one of the most striking - and visible - indications that the imperial period had

begun.

It was their proximity to the imperial administration that provided the

impetus for the development of the praetorians into much more than a

bodyguard. As early as the reign of Augustus, there was a realization that having

so many soldiers close to the capital meant they could be used in any number of

circumstances requiring large numbers of trained personnel. The evolution of the

praetorians into a unit which fought fires, provided security at the games, and

carried out political espionage can best be explained by the practicality of

making use of the troops in the city as part of the overall organization of civil

administration.
 2

The guard itself has not received much attention of late. Since the

publication of the monumental work by Marcel Durry in 1938, Les Cohortes

Praetoriennes, followed closely by Alfredo Passerini's Le Coorti Pretorie (1939),

there has been no comprehensive study of the early years of the guard. 1 Durry's

book provides a detailed overview, concentrating on the organization of the

cohorts (the command structure, arms and insignia, recruitment), and the social

aspects of the praetorian community (the duration of service, the various duties

of the soldiers and officers, their families and religion). He also includes a brief

general history of the guard, from Augustus to Constantine. There is, however,

virtually no analysis of the responsibilities which the guard had in the capital,

and such tasks as policing the games are dealt with in a portion of a single

sentence, without further examination. 2 Yet an examination of how the

praetorians came to be involved in such tasks adds much to our understanding

of the history of the guard and its development into such a significant force in

the middle and late empire. Durry's work in particular is often cited as the

definitive study of the praetorians, but new evidence has shown that some of his

1
For a review of Durry, see Syme (1939), 242-248; of Passerini, see Davis (1939), 255-56. These
reviews, although dated, nevertheless provide some idea of the shortfalls of the books, and
reinforce the need for a reassessment of the guard. Evans (1986) examined the guard in some
detail, but from the perspective of a retired soldier, and his book contains many errors and
omissions.

2
Durry (1938), 278: "Une cohorte entiere surveille regulierement theatre et cirque, afin de
reprimer les violences qui y sont frequentes . . . "
 3

assumptions are incorrect and, in fact, there are minor errors throughout the

entire work. 3

Passerini's book concentrates more on the praetorian prefects than the

cohorts, though he also briefly discusses the organization of the guard,

emphasizing certain aspects such as the conditions of service and the granting of

donatives. His view of the praetorians is that they were an outstanding military

force, but his arguments for their battle-worthiness cannot be substantiated. 4

Passerini too provides a brief history of the unit, but the entire second half of the

book is given over to a discussion of the prefects, including a list of those who

held the position from Augustus to Constantine. His work has been criticized,

however, for its lack of in-depth analysis, and is less often cited as a general

source for the guard. 5

Since the publication of Durry, there has been no further comprehensive

study of the guard, and only piecemeal examinations of various aspects of its

organization, often included in general discussions of the Roman military. 6 Most

3
For example, his text of the inscription for Vettius Valens has the soldier serving in the XVI
cohort of the vigiles when, in fact, there were only seven cohorts. He also claims that the
praetorians were involved in the younger Agrippina's murder, though they were not. Cf. Durry
(1938), 132-33; 279.

4
See the criticisms of Davis (1939), 255.

5
Davis (1939), 255 notes that Passerini does not discuss "the immense effect that the prefecture of
a man like Seianus must have had upon the conception of their [i.e. the prefects'] duties held by
his successors; nor of how much depended, because of their close contact with the emperor, upon
the personality of the prefects." Yet it is precisely this relationship between prefect and emperor
that helps to explain in part the direction that the guard took in the early part of their history.

6
See, for example, Davies (1989); Grant (1974); Campbell (1984); Keppie (1984); Webster (1985);
Le Bohec, (1994).
 4

modern scholarship on the praetorians is based on citations from Durry. General

histories of the empire usually include information on the unit, but only as the

official bodyguard of the emperor, sometimes with reference to their privileged

position in Rome. 7 Biographies of emperors also make mention of the guard,

though without much consideration of its role in the events of the reign. In the

case of the Julio-Claudian period, for example, in English alone, Barbara Levick's

books on Tiberius and Claudius, A. A. Barrett's book on Caligula, and Miriam

Griffin's book on Nero all have reason to refer to the praetorians, but it is only

rarely that there is any in-depth analysis of the role which the guard had in the

episodes that are discussed. 8 This is not surprising, since the emphasis of their

works is on the individual emperors themselves rather than on an examination

of the entire imperial system, but it is also the case that such works can continue

to perpetuate certain dated ideas about the praetorians. 9

A fresh assessment of the early history of the praetorian guard is therefore

long overdue. The genesis of the unit was in the republican period. In the middle

of the first century BC, the praetorian cohort, which had functioned solely as a

7
As in Christ (1984), or Garzetti (1974).

8
Levick (1976), (1990), passim; Barrett (1990), passim; Griffin (1984), passim. One could also
include Seager (1972), Balsdon (1934b), Ferrill (1991), Bishop (1964), and Grant (1970), among
others. Though their focus is not on individual emperors, Barrett's recent book on Agrippina
(1996) and Griffin's book on Seneca (1984) can be added to this list.

9
One such instance concerns the increase in the number of cohorts from nine to twelve, now
generally accepted to have occurred under Tiberius, but often mentioned in connection with
either Caligula or Claudius. The reason is that Durry (1938), 79, following Mommsen, placed the
reference to the increase in the lacuna in Tacitus' Annals. See, for example, Barrett (1990), 159.
 5

\
bodyguard for commanders in the field, began to change and to take on more

administrative tasks. The civil wars that erupted shortly thereafter halted this

progression, and the cohorts reverted to being primarily a military force. But

when Augustus decided to institute an armed unit for his personal use, he

brought together both aspects of the republican guard, making his imperial

praetorians function not only in a military, but also in an administrative capacity.

Throughout the Julio-Claudian period, there was an increasing reliance on these

soldiers for tasks beyond the guarding of the imperial family, though most

aspects of this expanding role did not necessarily attract much notice, since the

change happened gradually. Moreover, this progression parallels to a certain

extent the increased administrative power that the position of praetorian prefect

gained in the first century AD.

It is virtually impossible to discuss the development of the functions of the

guard without examining in some detail the men who commanded it. It was

partially due to the capabilities of its prefects that the praetorians were given the

opportunity to become involved even more fully in administrative tasks in the

city itself. Such figures as Sejanus, Macro and Burrus all had great sway with the

emperors under whom they served, and it was undoubtedly because of their

influence that the cohorts were able to be put to greater use than simply serving

as a bodyguard for the imperial family. Of course, they also could work against

the system, as was the case with the last men who held the post under the Julio-
 6

Claudians, Tigellinus and Nymphidius Sabinus. There is no comprehensive work

on this early period, however. Howe's book on the prefects from Commodus to

Diocletian deals only briefly with the history of the position and its military and

judicial functions prior to the late second century, though he does point out that

the office of prefect developed slowly over time "until a mere deputy

commander of a single, if vitally important, army unit became second only to the

emperor in authority." 10

The purpose of this thesis, then, is to re-examine the imperial praetorian

guard in its earliest period, that is, under the Julio-Claudian emperors. The origin

of the guard as well as its organization - the number of men, rate of pay, and

length of service - will be briefly discussed, along with the historical

background. Issues which are controversial, or for which new evidence has

emerged since the publication of Durry's book - for example, the increase in the

number of cohorts and the effective of each - will be examined in greater detail.

But the major focus of this work will be the development of the guard from a

predominantly military force to that of an administrative unit used for a wide

variety of tasks.

The placement of the praetorians in Rome and their close relationship

with the emperor contributed to this adaptation. Such change was driven largely

by the necessity of accommodating the requirements of the government which, at

10
Howe (19662), 11. For the history of the prefecture, see 2-32.
 7

this time, was essentially a dictatorship relying on the military for support. 11

Although their primary function was to provide protection for the emperor and

his family, from the beginning the praetorians were assigned to other duties

related to the issue of imperial security. They acted as a strategic military force

sent to deal with problems where other measures had proven ineffectual, or

where there was a need for covert activity. A division of the guard, the

speculatores, became specifically associated with clandestine action. The

praetorians were also involved with the arrest, confinement and execution of

those deemed to be a threat to the state. On the other hand, they were also part of

the routine civil administration in the capital, assisting the vigiles in fire-fighting,

and acting as security at the games and theatre. The guard was able to be

employed in these tasks precisely because it was the emperor's personal unit and

could therefore be adapted to whatever need he had of his soldiers. 12

Throughout this period, the soldiers proved to be pragmatic concerning this

relationship, carrying out whatever demands were made of them, and showing

themselves unwilling to jeopardize their privileged position. 13

11
As noted by Dio 53.11. Cf. Campbell (1994), 183: "In Dio's view the maintenance of the
privileged praetorian guard and the fact that the provinces controlled directly by Augustus
contained most of the troops, demonstrated the dichotomy between appearance and reality in
imperial politics, since real power depended on control of the army."

12
As Saddington (1990), 3496 notes "What needs stressing [about the guard] is its 'incidental use',
revealed by chance remarks in Tacitus. The emperors found it particularly useful to use small
groups of praetorians, usually under the command of centurions but also of tribunes, to carry out
routine or special missions."

13
Cf. Campbell (1984), 117, who observes that since the actions of the praetorians were guided by
gain and the desire to secure their position, they in general supported the emperor.
 8

Contemporary information about the praetorians is often restricted,

however, because it was usually not in the emperor's best interest that their

activities be publicized. As a result, they are frequently overlooked by the

sources for the period. 14 This makes the historian's job that much more difficult.

The development of a military unit belonging to the army but superior to them

in status and functioning as a separate entity answering only to the emperor, did

not lend itself to close scrutiny. In the imperial period of Rome that such a group

existed should not surprise anyone. After all, most governments whose authority

relies on intimidation by the military have had an elite force which functions in a

similar fashion. But the way in which the praetorian guard adapted to the needs

of the imperial household as the empire progressed is a topic that has not

received enough attention, and the beginnings of this change will be examined in

this work.

On the sources, see Appendix 1, "The Sources for the Julio-Claudian Period", 257-265.
 9

II. The Guard in the Republic

The imperial praetorian guard was not an invention of the first princeps,

but rather a modification of a republican institution. Prior to the institution of the

imperial period, we find several references to armed men acting as a bodyguard

for generals in the field, though it was not until the first century BC that the term

cohors praetoria was applied in the sources to this type of unit, and the attribution

was not then restricted to military applications. 1 But the basic idea remained the

same: a corps of men chosen by the commander to be his guard and often to

assist him in other capacities.

Festus records that the first praetorian cohort was formed by Scipio

Africanus: praetoria cohors est dicta, quod a praetore non discedebat. Scipio enim

Africanus primus fortissimum quemque delegit, qui ab eo in bello non discederent et

cetero munere militiae vacarent et sesquiplex stipendium acciperent.2 It is uncertain,

however, whether he is referring to Scipio Africanus Maior or Scipio Aemilianus

Africanus Numantius. 3 Livy is cited in support of Scipio Africanus Maior, who

took a bodyguard with him from Spain to Sicily in 205 BC. But the term cohors is

not used in reference to the men chosen by him to serve in this capacity: ex Us

trecentos iuvenes, florentes aetate et. virium robore insignes, inermes circa se habebat,

1
For a list of terms used and their sources, see Appendix 2, "Republican Terms for the Praetorian
Cohort", 266-268.
2
Lindsay (1965), 249.
3
For example, Passerini (1939), 9 argues for the elder Scipio whereas Mommsen (1879), 25 and
Webster (1985), 45, note 4 prefer AemilianusJDurry (1938), 71 refuses to hazard a guess.
 10

ignorantes quern ad usurn neque centuriati neque nrmati servarentur.4 Though the

purpose of this group seems to correspond well to that of the praetorian cohort

in the first century BC, the fact that they are unarmed, and the absence of any

specific reference to cohors, prevents any secure correlation to be drawn with the

text from Festus. The attribution of the innovation to Scipio Aemilianus also is

not without difficulty, for the passage describing the corps he took with him to

Spain in 134 BC makes it is clear that these troops were mounted: eTcnydyexo

KE^dxaq EK 'Pri)(j,r|<; icod (piA.o'uq Tcevxoncoaiotx;, otx; eq iXr|v KaxaAi^at; EKCXA,£I

(piXcov iA,r|v.5 The correlation between cohors and i'^r| is not clear, though

Mommsen proposed that cohors could refer to a group composed of infantry and

cavalry, and thus argued that the passages from Festus and Appian are not in

disagreement. 6 Durry, however, argues that the use of cohors indicates that the

unit described by Festus consisted of infantry from the beginning, though

cavalry soon would have been associated with them. 7 Therefore, the

explanations proposed for one or the other Scipio do not resolve the problem

since neither fits the standard definition of a praetorian cohort as an armed

infantry unit. The possibility must be admitted that Festus was in error in

4
Livy 29.1.1. Cf. also Plutarch, Fabius Maxirnus 26.2.

5
Appian, Hisp 84.

6
Mommsen (1879), 27, note 3. Mason (1974), 56 lists cohors as an equivalent for iXr\, but the
passage from Appian is the only example of this, and Mommsen is cited as the source.

7
Durry (1938), 68; cf. also Passerini (1939), 5, note 1; 22. Durry (1938), 71 further adduces the issue
of the rate of pay as given by Festus, arguing that sesquiplex better fits the stipendium of infantry
than of cavalry.
 11

attributing the innovation to Scipio Africanus, projecting back to the period of

the Punic Wars the connotation which the term had come to have by his time. 8

This type of protection for commanders was deemed necessary in the

second century BC because of the lax discipline in the armies. According to Livy,

the dictator Postumius also had troops acting as his personal guard in an earlier

period: dictator Postumius postquam cecidisse talem virum, exsules ferociter citato

agmine invehi, suos perculsos cedere animadvertit, cohorti suae, quam delectam manum

praesidii causa circa se habebat, dat signum ut quern suorum fugientem viderint pro

hoste habeant.9 This personal cohort, in fact, may be a precursor to the group that

Festus attributed to Scipio Africanus. Since the Roman army of the late republic

was a volunteer force, those in charge needed to have men they could rely on in

situations where there might have been danger to the commanders, especially

when they were not certain that they could count on the majority of their

troops. 10

8
The origin of the designation "praetorian" for the cohort forming the commander's guard also
has caused controversy. Most scholars accept that the word is related to praetor, though whether
in connection with that official as a general in the field or as the governor of a province is
uncertain. Cf. Durry (1938), 70. Mommsen (1900), 437, however, understood the word to be
closely associated with the praetorium, or general's tent, of the camp, near which a guard would
be stationed.

9
Livy 2.20.5. The date is circa 496 BC. Passerini (1939), 3, however, suggests that there had been
no need for a bodyguard early on. Disciplinewasnot a problem, he argues, since the army was
comprised of citizens fighting wars agaihs'tla common danger. Yet it is hard to reconcile this claim
with the existence of a personal guard as early as the fifth century.

10
Webster (1985), 45, note 4 suggests that Scipio Aemilianus took the bodyguard with him
because of uncertainty concerning the temperament of the army in Spain.
 12

In the late second century BC, we hear of a cohort composed of friends

and relatives of the commander rather than of soldiers, though sometimes still

functioning as a bodyguard. It is possible that this type of unit was the same as

the one that later became known as a cohors amicorum. Durry prefers to have only

one cohort, sometimes called praetoria, sometimes amicorum.11 But the

composition of the corps necessarily would dictate whether this unit was

exclusively military, and the distinction is therefore important. The group that

was assembled by Scipio Aemilianus in 134 BC fits the description of a cohors

amicorum well. 12 Only twelve years later, Gaius Gracchus is said to have had a

bodyguard composed of partisans, which also suggests a cohors amicorum.13 Such

units must have been common, for Sallust is careful to distinguish Marius' guard

in Africa in 106 as military in composition: cum turma sua quam ex fortissimis magis

quam familiarissimis paraverat.14 The cohors amicorum continues to be found

throughout the late republic, though it is clear that this unit did not always

function in a strictly military capacity. 15 The cohors amicorum continued to exist

11
Durry (1938), 72. Cf. also Passerini (1939), 28.

12
Cf. Crook (1955), 25.
13
Appian, BCiv 1.25: UTCO XCOV o\)v0E|ievcov Sopixpopouuevoq. Of course, Gracchus was a politician at
the time, and not involved in military affairs.

14
Sallust, Jugurtha 98.1. Grant (1974), 88 attributes to Marius the innovation of a "regular military
escort", but it seems clear that such a unit had existed before this time.

15
Cf. Catullus 10.10; Horace, Satires 1.7.23-25; Tibullus 1.3 and 1.7. Durry (1938), 73 lists several
other examples, but errs in thinking that, despite the absence of the term cohors praetoria in any of
the texts, these men were part of such a group. The lack of designation is indeed significant.
 13

in the imperial period arid eventually developed into the "immediate entourage

of the emperor wherever he may be." 16

By the early first century BC, when the republic began to undergo radical

changes, and there was a concomitant emphasis on the safety of the individual

rather than the security of the state, bodyguards became a necessity. Sulla, for

example, is said to have had a large group protecting him. 17 It is also at this time

that a military cohort specifically designated "praetorian" and employed as a

bodyguard is first mentioned. In 63 BC, when Petreius (the propraetor of North

Italy) was fighting against Catiline, it is recorded that he led his praetorian

cohort against the centre of the enemy, and routed them: Petreius ubi videt

Catilinam, contra ac ratus erat, magna vi tendere, cohortem praetoriam in medios hostis

inducit. . ,18 Later, when he fought against Caesar, Petreius (now Pompey's

legate) had provided arms to his slaves to supplement a band of light-armed

men which formed his bodyguard, referred to by Caesar as a praetorian cohort. 19

The use of the term cetratorum to describe these men suggests, however, that they

were not Romans but local Spanish troops, being used much as the German

bodyguard would be later in the early imperial period. Caesar also had a corps of

16
Crook (1955), 25.

17
Appian, BCiv 1.100: (puXxxicfiv zox> acb^taioq TtepieOexo KoWr\v.

18
Sallust, Catiline 60.5.
19
Caesar, BC 1.75: armat familiarti; cum hac el praetoria cohorie cetratorum barbarisque equitibus paucis,
beneficiariis suis, quos suae custodiae causa habere consuerat.. . The date is 49 BC.
 14

Spaniards as a guard, which he later dismissed. 20 Yet, even at this point, a

praetorian cohort did not have to function strictly as a bodyguard for its

commander. When Cicero was governor of Cilicia, his praetorian cohort was

engaged in a battle against a force of Parthian and Arab cavalry, though he

himself was not present. 21 It seems that the corps, which was intended to serve

as protection for the governor, could function independently of him.

It is unclear whether Caesar had a bodyguard that would have been

equivalent to a praetorian cohort. The only contemporary reference to such a

group is a passage in the Gallic Wars in which Caesar threatened to take the Xth

legion as his personal bodyguard in advancing against Ariovistus if the rest of

his troops refused to go. 22 Two chapters later, Caesar records that he used the

infantry of the Xth legion, which had been mounted, as a personal guard when

he went to meet Ariovistus, because the terms of the meeting dictated that no

infantry could accompany him and he was unwilling to trust his Gallic cavalry/

20
Suetonius, Divus Julius 86; cf. Appian, BCiv 2.109. There were others who had had similar types
of bodyguards, among them Marius, who brought with him to Rome a group of men referred to
as Bardyiae (Plutarch, Marius 43), Sertorius in Spain, who used a group of Celtiberians as a guard,
for which the Roman soldiers with him felt slighted (Appian, BCiv 1.112), and Labienus, who had
a mounted guard of Gauls and Germans in 46 BC (Caesar, BAfr 19).

21
Cicero, Ad Yam 15.4.7 The bodyguard had been stationed at Epiphanea by Cicero's
predecessor; cf. Shackleton-Bailey (1977), 447.
22
Caesar, BG 1.40: quod si praeterea nemo sequatur, tamen se cum sola decima legione iturum, de qua non
dubitaret, sibique earn praetoriam cohortem futuram .. . The incident dates to 58 BC. Cf. also Dio
38.47.2. Keppie (1984), 84 argues that Caesar had been treating this legion as a praetorian cohort
for some time, though without further comment.

23
Caesar, BG 1.42. It is interesting that the praetorian cohort was comprised of soldiers taken
directly from the legion. It is not always clear where the men who made up the bodyguards at
this time came from, but this example may provide support for them originating in the rank and
file. Cf. also Keppie (1984), 153. Military records of a later period illustrate the flexibility of such
 15

These references to the use of part of a legion as a praetorian cohort have been

interpreted as evidence that Caesar did not normally have such a unit at his

disposal. 24 But he was in Gaul as governor, and must have had a group of men

assisting him who technically would be referred to as his praetorian cohort,

though perhaps they were not used in a military sense. In fact, Appian records

that Caesar dismissed the praetorian cohorts that had been his bodyguard during

the wars. This, however, is the only specific reference for the existence of such a

group. 25 It is possible that the two thousand soldiers attending Caesar when, in

45, he visited Cicero in Puteoli may indicate that by then he did have a guard. 26

Although these praetorian cohorts were primarily military in character, on

occasion they also functioned as an administrative unit. In his speech against

Verres dating to 70 BC, Cicero makes several references to the governor's cohort.

This group encompasses his staff, members of which were used in many

different capacities. 27 The most common function seems to have been service in a

troops; men from an auxiliary unit stationed at Vindolanda were assigned to the governor, for
example, to serve as his guard in London. See Bowman (1994), 52.

24
Durry (1938), 75 notes that there is no reference in Caesar's works to a praetorian cohort despite
the extensive narrative of manoeuvres and combat.

25
Appian, BCiv 2.107. Mommsen argued for Caesar to have one praetorian cohort which Durry
(1938), 74-5 associates with the young men who followed Caesar in hopes of making their name;
cf. Caesar, BG 1.39.2. But these followers do not seem to have been organized into a formal unit.

26
Ad Att. 13.52. Cicero was at Puteoli at the time. Cf. Speidel (1994), 15 who argues that at least
some of the soldiers mentioned in the letter would have been mounted.

27
Sometimes these duties were not exactly what might have been expected. For example, Verres
was accused of sending some members of the praetorian cohorts to rob the temple of Hercules at
Agrigentum: ex domo atque ex cohorte praetoria manum fiigitivorum instructam armatamque. Cf.
Cicero, In Verrem 2.4.94.
 16

judicial capacity. 28 On one occasion, farmers from Agyrium had been brought

up on false charges by one of Verres'' henchmen, Apronius; the court which was

to adjudicate the matter was chosen ex cohorte praetoria.29 The fluidity of the term

is reflected by Cicero in these speeches, for the praetorian cohort that assisted

Verres included a wide assortment of people, and there is no overt military

association. 30 A similar type of corps also is found with Cicero's brother Quintus

when the latter was proconsul in Asia in 59 BC: quos vero out ex domesticis

convictionibus out ex necessariis apparitionibus tecum esse voluisti, qui quasi ex cohorte

praetoris appellari solent...31 In Cilicia, Cicero himself made use of his cohort

(already seen engaged in battle) in his administrative duties, as is shown in one

of his letters to Atticus. 32 It is clear that, in the case of Cicero and Verres at least,

the idea of a praetorian cohort encompassed much more than just the armed

bodyguard of a general. 33 It was this fusion of military and administrative

functions which laid the foundation for the imperial praetorian guard.

28
Cicero, InVerrem 2.2.30: cum hos sibi quaestus constituisset magnos atque uberes ex his causis quas ipse
[Verres] instituerat cum consilio, hoc est cum sua cohorte .. .; 2.2.34: haec copia quam dico iudicum
cohors, non Q. Scaevolae - qui tamen de cohorte sua dare non solebat- sed C. Verris.
29
Ibid 2.3.70.

30
On Verres' praetorian cohort, see Bartosek (1977), 158-60.

31
Cicero, Ad Q.f. 1.1.12. His use of the genitive praetoris rather than the adjective praetoria is
instructive, for it places emphasis on the association between the cohort and the governor rather
than simply designating the type of unit.

32
Ad Att. 7.2.3: eius testamentum deporto trium Ciceronem signis obsignatum cohortisque praetoriae.

33
A rather colourful use of the term occurs in the second Catilinarian oration in which Cicero
refers to Catiline's scortotv.m cohortem praetoriam; see In Cat. 2.23.
 17

After the death of Caesar in 44 BC, th« contenders who fought for power

all had bodyguards. For example, Appian reports that Decimus Brutus used a

unit of Gallic cavalry, the only troops that did not desert him on the way to meet

Marcus Brutus in Macedonia.3'' In some cases, these guards are referred to as

praetorian cohorts. Both Octavian and Antony had such a corps. Octavian is said

to have gathered almost ten thousand men to serve as his bodyguard: fjyev eq

livpiovq av8poc<;, ome tim^icnevoq ivxeX&q oine awxexayixevotx; 7tco KOCTOC i'Xaq,

aXX'foe,eq novnv xov aco\iaxoq (pi)XaKT|v. . .35 When this group showed their

unwillingness to fight against Antony, Octavian used the promise of rewards to

entice them not to abandon him. This use of inducement to ensure the loyalty of

his soldiers is reminiscent of the donatives issued to the guard by the emperor

throughout the imperial period. 36 Antony, on the other hand, had a contingent

of men chosen from the army to be his praetorian cohort - those who were best

in body and in character. 37 These men acted as his personal guard when he was

34
Appian, BCiv 3.97. The date is 43 BC.

35
Ibid 3.40; cf. also Suetonius, Augustus 10.3.

36
Donatives in the republic generally were associated with triumphs, at which time the generals
rewarded their troops with booty gained from battle. Cf. Maxfield (1986), 28.

37
Appian, BCiv 3.45: amoc, 5' eniAe^diievoq EK jtdvxcovCTxpaxrryiSaoneipav dv8pa»v dpioxcov xd xe
acbuaxa KCU XOV xporcov. Cf. also 3.50. This group is probably the "royal cohort" (onetpav
PaoiXiKf|v ouvexa^Ev d|j,(p' amov) and "private guard" (oiSripocpopouvxEq dvSpec, eSopixpopouv)
mentioned in Appian's reconstruction of Cicero's speech against Antony; cf. 3.52. See also Cicero,
Philippics 8.8.25.
 18

staying in Rome on his way to Ariminum. and are referred to as his bodyguard

by Appian. 38

Further mention of these cohorts is found in a letter dated 15 April 43 BC

sent to Cicero by Galba, one of the participants in the battle of Forum Gallorum. 39

In addition to two legions, Antony is recorded to have led out two praetorian

cohorts, one belonging to him, the other to Marcus Junius Silanus, who was

either legate or tribune under Lepidus. 40 The same number was provided by the

consul Hirtius as an additional guard for those marching from the camp to

engage Antony; of these, one belonged to Hirtius, the other to Octavian. 41 These

troops, though nominally only bodyguards, took part in the fighting. There were

losses on both sides, and Appian records that Octavian's entire cohort was

destroyed. 42

Later in 43 BC, Octavian, Antony and Lepidus, having formed the second

triumvirate, entered Rome. Each man was accompanied by a praetorian cohort

and a legion. 43 The term used of the cohort (ai)v TOUC, axpaxriYiai xd^eai)

indicates that these soldiers were closely associated with the general, rather than

38
Appian, BCiv 3.46: f\ TOO ao^axoq 9po\)p&.

39
Cicero, Ad Fam. 10.30. Cf. also Appian, BCiv 3.66-70.

40
How (19626), 526.

41
How (19626), 525.

42
Appian, BCiv 3.70.

43
Ibid 4.7. Millar (1973), 59 points out that the existence of these praetorian cohorts clearly
distinguished the triumvirs from the consuls.
 19

being a unit attached to the legibn. In 42 BO, Domitius Calvinus sought to bring

two legions and a praetorian cohort of two thousand men by sea to Octavian,

who was fighting against Brutus and Cassias in (Greece.44 They were destroyed

en route when the wind failed and they fell into enemy hands. The terminology

here is similar to that used of the units with the triumvirs, emphasizing that these

soldiers were intended for use by the general. The size of the group is important.

In the late republic, it was not uncommon for a praetorian cohort to number in

the thousands, which may have provided the precedent for the size of the

cohorts set up by Augustus.

After the victory at Philippi, soldiers who had served their time were

released by Antony and Octavian. But of these, eight thousand opted to remain

active. 45 According to Appian, this group was divided between the two leaders

and formed into praetorian cohorts: OKTCCKtaxiXicov, ovq 8er|8evxaq exi

CTTpaT£t)ea9ai cnpiaiv &7co8e^6cjx£voi 8ieiXovxo KCCI cuveXoxiaav eq cxpaTrryiSaCj

T&CJEK;.46 Durry refers to this as the "veritable naissance" of the guard. 47 It is not

clear how many cohorts were created, but it is recorded that in 36 BC Antony

had three with him when he fought against the Parthians. 48 Octavian also is said

44
Appian, BCiv 4.115.

45
Of those who were discharged, some were settled at Philippi, forming a new colony (Iulia
Victrix Philippi). Coin evidence from the reign of Augustus indicates that among the settlers were
former members of praetorian cohorts. See Keppie (1984), 121; 231 (and plate 16c); figure 1.

46
Appian, BCiv 5.3; cf. also 5.59, where the praetorian cohorts thus formed meet again.

47
Durry (1938), 76.

48
Plutarch, Antony 39.2.
 20

to have had praetorian cohorts with him in his conflict against Lucius Antonius,

who earlier had been forced to get rid of a bodyguard made up of men from M.

Antony's colonies. 49 The difference between Lucius Antonius as consul, who had

no protection, and Octavian as triumvir, who had praetorian cohorts, is an

important distinction: troops could now be "regularly stationed in Rome and

Italy", though the commander of these men was not an elected official.50

In 40 BC, riots occurred in Rome over additional taxation levied on the

citizens in order to fund a war against Sextus Pompey. Octavian tried to quell the

disorder, but was himself attacked. 51 It is of note that the group that

accompanied him to the Forum consisted of friends and attendants, not specified

as soldiers (cbv (piXoiq Kod oXijoiqvnaanidxaiq). Clearly, he did not have a

bodyguard with him at all times. Antony, who came to Octavian's rescue, also

was assailed and troops had to be called in from outside the city. It is odd that, in

this instance, the soldiers were not with their commanders, but encamped

outside the walls. Where the praetorian cohorts were is not clear.52

49
Appian, BCiv 5.24; cf. 5.19-21. The date is 41 BC.
50
Millar (1977), 61.

51
Appian, BCiv 5.68.

52
An incident recorded by Suetonius (Augustus 14) in which Octavian was attacked and nearly
killed by soldiers for expelling one of their number from the games dates to the same period, and
also illustrates Octavian's lack of protection. For another attack on Octavian, cf. Velleius
Paterculus, Histories 2.79.
 21

In the years leading up to Actium, both, men continued to make use of

praetorian cohorts. In 36 BC, Antony was in the east to fight the Parthians. As

mentioned earlier, he had with him three praetorian cohorts as well as ten

legions and cavalry. In the following year, Octavia sailed to meet Antony in

Greece, bringing with her two thousand men to serve as his personal guard. 53

The importance of the praetorian cohorts to Antony in the east is emphasized on

a coin issued by him. 54 Dio mentions that Cleopatra had Roman soldiers in her

bodyguard, and it may be that these men came from among those praetorians

who were serving as Antony's guard. 55

It is likely that the praetorian cohorts of both Antony and Octavian were

involved in the fighting at Actium in 31 BC, though our only evidence for their

participation comes from Orosius, who records that Octavian had five cohorts

with him. 56 After his victory, Octavian took over Antony's cohorts, releasing

many of these soldiers and settling them in new colonies. 57 Before long,

however, Octavian had formed the majority of the soldiers from these cohorts

into the imperial praetorian guard.

53
Plutarch, Antony 53.2; cf. also Appian, BCiv 5.53; 95 (where the number is given as one
thousand); Dio 49.33.4.
54
Sydenham (1952), 1212; see figure 2. Cf. Keppie (1984), 127; 228 (and plate 12c). This coin, with
the legend C(0)HORTIUM PRAETORIARUM, is the earliest physical evidence that we have for
the term.

55
Dio 50.5.1: oxpocxicbxaq xe 'Pcou-ai-cuc, ev %&> Sopixpopuccp exeiv.

56
Orosius 6.19.8.

57
For example, at Gunugu in Mauretania; cf. Pliny, NH 5.20.
 111. Augustus
Although it has been said that, except in name, the praetorian cohorts of

the imperial period had very little in common with those of the republic, it seems

obvious from the above survey that the events of the first century BC influenced

the way in which Octavian structured his guard. 1 As noted already, Octavian

incorporated those of Antony's soldiers who were not due for discharge into his

own troops after Actium, and it is thought that many of these men became

praetorians. How soon after 31 BC the transformation of the old republican

praetorian cohorts into the imperial praetorian guard occurred is not recorded in

our sources.

There is also no indication of the rationale behind the establishment of this

unit by Augustus. The precedent of the republican cohorts may have provided

the model, but there must have been some need that transformed what had been

basically a bodyguard in the field to the emperor's guard in the capital. It has

been pointed out t h a t " [Augustus] had no illusions about the enemies he had

made in his revolutionary career", and perhaps one need look no further than

that for an explanation. 2 It is clear from the sources that the praetorians were for

his personal use; Tacitus refers to them as the proprius miles of the princeps. 3 But,

1
Name only: Watson (1969), 16. Contra Nippel (1995), 91: "[The praetorians] evolved out of the
elite units of bodyguards that the triumviri had employed during the civil wars."
2
Campbell (1984), 112.
3
Tacitus, Annals 4.5.3.
 23

even though these soldiers functioned as ids personal army, Augustus did not

restrict the responsibilities of the unit to serving as his bodyguard. 4 The

additional duties assigned to the men were probably an attempt by the emperor

to make better use of the only sizable military force in Italy. The praetorian

cohorts of governors such as Verres, therefore, which were engaged in

administrative as well as military tasks are a better model for the imperial guard.

This modification of the praetorian cohort from the late republic was a clear

indication that the imperial period had begun. 5

The date of the formal organization of the guard is conventionally

accepted as 27 BC. This is the year in which Dio mentions the grant to the

bodyguard of double the amount of pay which the rest of the troops received:

Kcd ftocpoaniKa ye xotc, 8opu(popficot>oiv ocoxov [Link] xov |a,ia86v xou xotc,

aAAoic, axpaxixbxoac, 8i8o}aivot> yrjtpicjGfjvou 8i87tpdcjaxo, OKCCX; ccKpi|3fj xfiv cppoupav

exrj.6 The establishment of a pay rate for the praetorians set higher than that of

4
Augustus had another group that better fits the description of a bodyguard, the Germani corporis
custodes. These men replaced the Calagurritani that he had had up to the time of Actium, and they
are mentioned occasionally in the sources for the Julio-Claudian period. Augustus dismissed
them after the Varan disaster in AD 9, but they are attested again under Tiberius. They finally
were disbanded by Galba. Tacitus (Annals 15.58.2) claims that it was because of their foreign
character that the Germans were used as the personal bodyguard for the emperor, for they had
no political interest in Rome. The most comprehensive work on this group is Bellen (1981). See
also Speidel (1994), passim.

5
Nippel (1995), 91.

6
Dio 53.11.5. Durry (1938), 77 says that this act "sanctioned" the existence of the praetorian guard
because the higher rate of pay was approved by the senate. Cf. also Campbell (1984), 110. Brunt
(1950), 55, following Domaszewski, argues, however, that Dio has "misunderstood his authority"
and he postulates that Augustus doubled the "existing rate of pay of praetorian soldiers" rather
than paying them twice the rate of the legionaries.
 24

the legions is perhaps the most obvious distinction between the guard and the

rest of the army. 7 The reason for this difference in pay is obvious: the praetorians

were an elite unit, loyal only to the princeps, and the need to establish this clearly

for the rest of the army and indeed for the populace as a whole was a lesson

which Augustus had learned through the years of civil strife. It is possible that

the additional duties assigned to the guard provided further impetus for the

increase in pay, though the responsibility for the safety of the imperial family

should have been enough for the emperor to ensure that the soldiers were well

paid. 8

Evidence for the number of cohorts, and the effective of each, is provided

by Dio in his description of the forces that Augustus had at his disposal in AD 5:

01 TE aco|i,oc'co(p-6A,aK£<; |xt>pioi ovxeq Kai 8£Ka%fj Texayixevoi.9 Much discussion has

been generated by the discrepancies in the number of cohorts given by Dio and

7
The question of pay rates is a difficult one. The ratio of 5:3 has been proposed, based partly on a
passage of Dio in which the discharge amounts for the soldiers are given, the praetorians
receiving twenty thousand sesterces and the other troops twelve thousand. Cf. Dio 55.23.1; the
year is AD 5. See also Watson (1969), 97-8. Soldiers who retired before this period had received
land grants as, for example, to settle Augusta Praetoria in 24 BC. For a brief overview of the
various arguments regarding pay rates, see Wolff (1986), 52-3.

8
There is only one donative recorded under Augustus, and it is not clear whether the guard
benefitted. It occurred in 8 BC when the emperor granted money to the army on the occasion of
Gaius Caesar taking part in their exercises. Cf. Dio 55.6.4. Tacitus, however, does comment that
Augustus seduced the army with bonuses, though whether the guard were part of the largesse is
not certain. See Tacitus, Annals 1.2.1: militem donis ... pellexit. On donatives under the Julio-
Claudians, cf. Passerini (1939), 114-116; Watson (1969), 109-110; LeBohec (1994), 214-217, who
provides a chart listing all donatives granted to the army in the imperial period.

9
Dio 55.24.6. He distinguishes the praetorians from the urban cohorts, of which he lists four, each
with an effective of fifteen hundred men (oi xfjq nokEac, el;aKio%iXioi xe ovxec, Kai TETpa%fj
vevep.T|(j£voi.).
 25

that given by Tacitus, who records only nine cohorts before Vitellius. 10 In fact,

inscriptional evidence now shows that Tacitus erred in his account of the number

of cohorts in AD 23, and that there were actually twelve in the reign of Tiberius. 11

The sequential numbering of the praetorian and urban cohorts, however, may

provide proof of the original number established by Augustus, for the

praetorians used I to IX and the urban X to XII.12 It is possible that the additional

cohort mentioned in Dio's account consisted of the special branch of the

praetorians known as the speculatoresP

Where the praetorians were billeted under Augustus is not quite clear.

Tacitus reports that the soldiers were scattered throughout the city prior to AD

23: dispersas per urbem cohortis una in castra conducendo.14 Suetonius, however,

records that Augustus never kept more than three cohorts in the capital: neque

tamen umquam plures quam tres cohortes in urbe esse passus est easque sine castris,

reliquas in hiberna et aestiva circa finitima oppida dimittere assuerat.15 Since this was

10
Tacitus, Annals 4.5.3. For the Vitellian increase, see Tacitus, Histories 2.93.2.

11
See below, "Tiberius", 43.

12
Durry (1938), 78, followed by Keppie (1984), 153 suggests that the number of cohorts was set at
nine to avoid any identification with the cohorts of a legion. Passerini (1939), 47 postulates that
originally Augustus did not have any specific number of cohorts, but simply drew men as needed
from those stationed near Rome. On the consecutive numbering between the guard and the
urban cohorts, see Freis (1967), 36-37.

13
See below, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 124-175.
14
Tacitus, Annals 4.2.1.

15
Suetonius, Augustus 49; cf. also Tiberius 37.1. It is not known where those cohorts not yet
stationed in the capital were located. Both Aquileia and Ostia have been proposed as possible
sites, but the evidence is tenuous. Cf. Furneaux (1896), vol. 1, 213 (on Tacitus, Annals 1.124.1);
Durry (1938), 44-45.
 26

the first time that troops had been stationed in Rome itself, it may have been that

Augustus considered it prudent to avoid placing so many armed men there in

the early years of his reign. 16 But, as the use of the guard increased because of

the involvement of the praetorians in civil administration, and as the populace

became accustomed to the presence of the soldiers in the city, it is conceivable

that more of the cohorts would have been billeted in Rome to facilitate the

coordination of their duties. Thus the discrepancy between Tacitus and Suetonius

can be resolved. Suetonius is referring to the earliest period of Augustus' reign

when the number of cohorts in the city was restricted to three, whereas Tacitus,

whose discussion on this matter comes in his section on Sejanus, is recording the

situation immediately prior to AD 23 when the cohorts were moved into the

Castra Praetoria at the instigation of their prefect, that is, when most of the guard

was billeted throughout the city but were not yet housed all together. 17

16
Webster (1985), 45. Cf. also Campbell (1984), 111; (1994), 38 where he suggests that the absence
of a dress uniform (the cohorts on duty at the palace wore togas) was "a political ploy designed to
allay the fears of the senators who were unaccustomed to the presence of soldiers in Rome or
indeed in Italy." Grant (1974), 89 offers another explanation for the dispersion: " . . . [Augustus]
felt that the concentration of all nine cohorts in Rome would have constituted a danger rather
than a protection to his life — and would have tempted other potential leaders to seduce its
loyalty."

17
Despite the lack of specific designation for these cohorts in either author, it is clear from the
contexts that these are praetorian and not urban cohorts. The urban cohorts must have been
housed in Rome from their inception, given their responsibility for general security in the city, but
the location is unknown and it is possible that they were billeted throughout the capital. In AD 23,
however, they were assembled together with the praetorians in the Castra Praetoria.
 27

The effective of one thousand given by Dio also has been questioned. 18

But it seems clear that he would have recorded the number accurately, since he

was well acquainted with the change in the guard which took place under

Severus, namely the disbanding of the praetorians after his accession and their

replacement by soldiers from the legions. 19 Moreover, there is no evidence in

any of the sources for an increase in the strength of the individual cohorts

between Augustus and Severus. 20 A passage in Tacitus describing an increase in

the number of cohorts to sixteen under Vitellius, in which the number per cohort

is given as one thousand, is not conclusive in proving a change in the effective at

the same time. 21 Additional proof for a cohort of this number from the inception

of the guard is provided by the archaeological remains of the Castra Praetoria,

and there is no evidence that Tiberius changed the strength before building the

camp. 22 Moreover, although the praetorian cohorts associated with the late

republic varied in size, we know that units of up to two thousand men were

18
For example, Durry (1938), 86 argues for a quingenary cohort, believing that Dio had attributed
to the Augustan period the effective of the late second century AD. His use of the laterculi
praetorianorum (the register of discharges) in calculating the number is criticized by Kennedy
(1979), 276-287 and Passerini (1939), 62. Others who support cohorts of five hundred are Keppie
(1984), 153; Grant (1974), 88; Syme (1939), 243.

19
Cf. Dio 75.2.4-5; Herodian 2.14.5.
20
Among those who support milliary cohorts are Mommsen (1879), 30; Richmond (1927), 12;
Passerini (1939), 62-5; Kennedy (1979), 288; Chilver (1979), 16-17; and Campbell (1984), 162, note
6.

21
Tacitus, Histories 2.93.2: sedecim pmetoriae, quattuor urbanae cohortes scribebantur, quis singula milia
inessent. If there had been a doubling of the effective at this time, a specific reference to it in the
text might be expected. Contra Durry (1938), 82 who believes that Tacitus is emphasizing the
exceptional nature of the Vitellian innovations, both in number of cohorts and in their effective.

22
See below, Appendix 3, "The Castra Praetoria", 269-275.
 28

found. 23 An effective of one thousand men per cohort for the imperial period

would also provide greater efficiency, since the praetorians were used for such a

wide variety of tasks in the city, beyond the basic task of guarding the emperor

and his family.

Recruiting for the guard became established under Augustus. As we have

seen above, the first imperial praetorians likely were veterans from the cohorts of

both Octavian and Antony. 24 During Augustus' reign, however, it became the

practice to recruit soldiers for the guard directly on an individual basis. 25 In

general, candidates had to be of free birth and Roman citizens before entering the

service. As a result, Italians tended to dominate in the ranks until the time of

Severus. 26 In the early period, recruits were predominantly from Latium,

Etruria, Umbria, and the oldest colonies. 27 Under Tiberius, praetorians began to

be recruited from the north of Italy, and Claudius granted the right of citizenship

23
See above, "The Guard in the Republic", 17; 19.
24
See above, "The Guard in the Republic", 21.
25
Durry (1938), 240; Keppie (1984), 188.

26
Brunt (1974), 193-4; Davies (1989), 23: "Most recruits would prefer to join the branch of the
armed services in which their own qualifications would provide them with the best openings and
rewards. This is why Italians joined the Praetorian Guard." Cf. also Birley (1961), 119-122. Le
Bohec (1989), 99 notes that, at the beginning of the second century, Italians still comprised 89% of
recruits for the guard, and that by the end of the Antonines, the number had fallen only slightly.

27
Cf. Tacitus, Annals 4.5.5: Etruria ferine Umbriaque delectae out vetere Latio et coloni<i>s antiquitus
Romanis. Durry (1938), 241, note 1 believes that this passage "conserves an echo of a
communication made by the government to reassure the senate at the time of the construction of
the camp." Dio (56.23.4) records that there were Gauls and Germans serving in the guard (oi 8e
KCCI ev xro 8opi)(popiKcp azpaxev6[ievoi) who were sent away from Rome after the Varan disaster,
but the reference is probably to the Gerrnani corporis custodes and not to the praetorians.
 29

to the Anauni (an Alpine tribe) because members already were serving in the

guard. 28 There were also soldiers from Gallia Narbonensis, Spain, and

Macedonia in the cohorts, though the inscriptions which refer to these non-

Italian recruits are not securely dated. 29 The term of duty for the praetorians,

originally sixteen years, was reduced to twelve in 14 BC, then reverted to sixteen

in 5 BC.30 The length of service, in addition to the higher rate of pay and the

increased prospects for promotion due to their proximity to the emperor,

probably attracted better recruits to the praetorians, and seems to have continued

to attract Italians to the unit when they were less inclined to join the legions. 31

While the guard had the advantage of living in the capital and environs, those

who served in it still had the same restrictions as the rest of the army, in

28
Tiberius: Tacitus, Annals 4.5.5. Claudius: CIL 5.5050 (=ILS 206); see below, "Caligula and
Claudius", 86. For statistics on the recruitment of praetorians under the Julio-Claudians, cf.
Durry (1938), 239-241; Passerini (1939), 146-159 (who provides a list of inscriptions of praetorians
according to origin; these date from the first two centuries AD, but are not specifically dated). For
recruitment in general (mostly second century evidence), see Sasel (1972), 474-480; Scheidel
(1992), 281-297, especially 290.

29
It has been argued that the earliest known non-Italian recruits came from Macedonia: Gaius
Iulius Montanus (CIL 6.2767=ILS 2032) and Gaius lulius Gemellus (CIL 6.2645=ILS 2030). Cf.
Durry (1938), 79; 241; 252. He argued for the date to be Caligulan, based on the reference to the
XII praetorian cohort, but there is no further evidence. For a recruit from Gallia Narbonensis, see
CIL 6.2763. Syme (1939), 246 argues for CIL 12.1187 (=ILS 2023) to be an early inscription of a
praetorian soldier from the same area. Durry (1938), 241 quotes Pliny, NH 25.17 for evidence of a
recruit from Spain in the first century, but the origin is not clear from the context. Passerini (1939),
156-159 provides the inscriptional evidence for recruits from the provinces; in the first two
centuries AD, Macedonia, Noricum, and Spain provided the most non-Italian recruits.

30
Twelve years: Dio 54.25.6 Sixteen years: Dio 55.23.1. Legionaries served twenty years. Cf.
Durry (1938), 262. CIL 6.2489 (=ILS 2028) belongs to a soldier from the first century AD who
served in the same praetorian cohort for 18 years.

31
Campbell (1984), 10; 111. See also Birley (1961), 122. The social status of these recruits is
unknown, though Durry (1938), 251-57 argues for the guard to be composed of men of modest
birth whereas Passerini (1939), 159-69 thinks that they were from families who were better off. Cf.
also Campbell (1984), 4.
 ' 30

particular, the inability to marry while in service. The importance of military

diplomas for the praetorians may stem from this injunction, for most of these

grants were given to soldiers who came from, or retired to, places outside Italy.32

Very little is known about the guard during the principate of Augustus.

This lack of information results from the absence of a contemporary and

comprehensive source for the reign. Augustus does not refer specifically to the

guard in the autobiographical Res Gestae.33 Moreover, by the end of the first

century AD, the praetorians had become an integral part of the functioning of the

city and later events had overshadowed their beginning. How extensive their

responsibilities were under Augustus, therefore, is uncertain. 34 For example,

when the emperor went east in 22/1 BC, the city was subjected to periods of

unrest. 35 Whether the guard was used to help quell such disturbances is not

known. In addition, their presence with Augustus on this trip is not recorded,

though it is likely that soldiers went with him. 36 The ways in which the

32
Cf. Maxfield (1986), 43. Campbell (1984), 111 suggests that diplomas were a "mark of honour at
Rome." The earliest extant diploma for a praetorian dates to AD 71/2 (CIL 16.25), but it is
thought that they were issued prior to this, perhaps beginning under Claudius; cf. Levick (1990),
137. On military diplomas in general, see Eck and Wolff (1986).
33
Durry (1938), 10. Passerini (1939), 210, however, believes that Augustus included the
praetorians among those referred to as milites in his autobiography.

34
For responsibilities of individual soldiers in the cohorts, see Durry (1938), 93-128.

35
Dio 54.6.5. There were riots over the consular elections, and stabiHty was maintained only after
the appointment of Agrippa to look after affairs in Rome.

36
Millar (1977), 61 comments that soldiers accompanied the emperor on all journeys, even within
Italy. Their presence is not always recorded, however, and Campbell (1984), 113 disagrees that
"each emperor was accompanied everywhere by troops."
 31

praetorians were later employed under [Link]-Claudians - fighting fires,

providing security at the games, dealing with prisoners - probably originated

during the reign of Augustus, but there are only hints of this in the sources. For

example, Suetonius mentions that there were soldiers at the games, and that on

several occasions, troops were posted throughout the city, as after the Varan

disaster of AD 9, but there is no specific mention of the guard in these incidents. 37

The involvement of the praetorians in fire-fighting is not specifically attested for

this period, but they must have taken part in battling any major blaze, especially

before the organization of the vigiles in AD 6.38 The evidence for their being

involved in executions under Augustus is meager, but there was a precedent for

such activity. While still a triumvir, Octavian had had the praetor Quintus

Gallius removed from his presence by centurions and soldiers, tortured, and then

executed because he suspected that Gallius had been armed at one of the

tribunals. 39 The situation under this emperor, however, was substantially

different from that of those who came after him: the presence of an armed force

in the city, while not unknown, was still unusual, and the lack of information

about the movements and responsibilities of the praetorians in this reign

37
Games: Suetonius, Augustus 14; 43.3; 44.1. Guards: Dio 56.23.4; Suetonius, Augustus 23; 32.1.

38
There were eight serious fires in the reign of Augustus prior to AD 6, seven of which occurred
after the formation of the guard. Cf. Werner (1906), 46.

39
Suetonius, Augustus 27A. The previous section in Suetonius records the execution of a knight
suspected of being a spy because he had been taking notes during one of Octavian's speeches to
the soldiers and the citizens.
 3 2
• • • • - . • " • ' • .

probably can be attributed to a desire by Augustus to downplay their role in the

state.

It is impossible to reconstruct the method of command for the guard

before 2 BC when Augustus appointed the first praetorian prefects. Prior to that

time, the tribunes of the cohorts undoubtedly received their orders directly from

the emperor. 40 The reluctance to delegate responsibility for the guard to any one

individual in the early years of the reign may have resulted from a desire to

deflect criticism for having stationed troops in the city; by 2 BC, there would

have been less concern about their presence. In the beginning, the duty of the

prefects was focused on the military aspects, and the power later associated with

the office was not evident because the role of the guard had not yet been clearly

defined. 41 As the responsibilities of the praetorians expanded, it was only logical

that the position of prefect would take on additional significance as well. How

the first two men who were appointed to the position were chosen is uncertain,

and very little is known about them other than their names. 42 Quintus Ostorius

40
Brunt (1983), 59-60. He questions whether the "establishment of a permanent prefecture was
not the culmination of a process in which Augustus had from time to time delegated supreme
command to one or more of the tribunes."

41
Howe (19662), 10; 32: "The basic function of the office is indicated by the title praefectus praetorio,
prefect of the praetorium of the emperor as military commander." Cf. also Brunt (1983), 60; Eck
(1987), 278. The prefects were the only higher officials at the side of the emperor who were
armed. Cf. Millar (1977), 123. Syme (1958), 591, however, notes that the "post was military in
rank, but political in significance."

42
Dio 55.10.10: KCCI |a,evxoi Kod enapxovq T<BV 5opaxp6pcov TOTE jrponov KUIVTOV TE OoTcbpiov
Y,Kanox>Xav Kod TlovnXwv EaXomoy "Arcpov ocTteSei^ev. On the issue of patronage in the
appointment to the equestrian prefectures, see Sailer (1982), 49; Millar (1977), 64; Sherwin-White
(1939), 17.
 " 33

Scapula's career is obscure; he seems to have been, the brother of the Publius

Ostorius Scapula who was prefect of Egypt under Augustus and whose

descendants gained the consulship under Claudius. 43 It is possible that a

marriage between Publius and the daughter of Sallustius Crispus (one of

Augustus' ministers) brought the brothers to the attention of the emperor. 44

About the other prefect, Publius Salvius Aper, nothing is known. 45 The issue of

coUegiality is an important one, for Augustus clearly saw a need for the office to

be shared, most likely to facilitate the supervision of the cohorts at this time,

since they were not yet housed together in the city, though it has been argued

that "duality meant that one prefect could remain at Rome, while another was

deployed elsewhere." 46 Dio offers a practical explanation for having two

prefects: should one become "indisposed" (ercaio9r|Tai xi xcp CG)|I(XTI), the other

would still be there to provide protection for the emperor. 47 It is also instructive

that Augustus chose equestrians for this office. It has been suggested that

because Maecenas was an eques, Augustus preferred to select his praetorian

43
Cf. Wachtel (1989), 241-6; Hanson (1982), 243-253. Sherwin-White (1939), 16 erred in his
attribution of the prefecture of Egypt to Quintus, and his claim that movement from the
praetorian to the Egyptian prefecture was established with this move must be discarded.

44
Hanson (1982), 247.

45
Syme (1986), 301 suggests that he came from Brixia in Transpadane Italy, based on CIL 5.4201
(=ILS 4902), which records a Lucius Salvius Aper as a magistrate in 8 BC.

46
Brunt (1983), 60; followed by Nippel (1995), 91.

47
Dio 52.24.2.
 34

prefects from that class.48 But it is more likely that they were selected because

the praetorians functioned as the emperor's personal guard, and to have put

senators in charge of such a unit undoubtedly would create friction between

them and the princeps, and perhaps be dangerous for the emperor. 49

The reason for the transfer of command from the emperor to the prefects

is not recorded in our sources. Augustus clearly maintained overall control;

evidence is provided by the language on the diplomas issued at a later date to

the praetorians, for the prefects are not mentioned at all on these documents, and

the phrase qui in meo praetorio militaverunt clearly illustrates who was in charge. 50

There may in fact be a practical explanation for the transfer of power: the

inability of the emperor to continue to handle the day-to-day command of the

cohorts himself, especially since the praetorians were involved in so many

different activities in the capital. 51 A command structure was necessary to

coordinate these tasks, and the movement of the tribunes through the system did

48
Durry (1938), 157.
49
Cf. Brunt (1983), 60: "it might have been rather invidious for [Augustus] to choose any
particular senators for a commission so closely linked with his own person." See also Rudich
(1993), 234; Eck (1987), 279; 286; Campbell (1984), 117.

50
Campbell (1994), 38 refers to the praetorian prefects as the "deputy commanders". The
relationship between the emperor and the praetorian cohorts also is shown by the carrying of his
image on their standards, and by the princeps giving the watchword to the cohort on duty at the
palace. Cf. Passerini (1939), 208, and see below, "Tiberius", 38, note 4.
51
Syme (1986), 300, however, connects the creation of the post with the ruin of Augustus'
daughter, lulia, and the elimination of her lovers, without further comment.
 35

not allow for long-term commands to be established. 52 The great influence which

the prefects later had with the emperor is not attested this early, but the close

association between thern must have existed from the creation of the office.53

We have no idea how king Scapula and Aper remained in office. The

inclusion of a certain "Valerius Ligur" on lists of praetorian prefects under

Augustus rests on a single passage in Dio in which it is recorded that Claudius,

when granting the right of a statue and seat in the senate to his prefect Rufrius

Pollio, commented that Augustus had done the same for Valerius. 54 There is no

other evidence for this appointment and it is possible that he never held the post

at all, but that he had been granted the honours in an entirely different capacity.

No title is given to Valerius in the passage, and it is not clear from the text that

this man was praetorian prefect.55

52
The orders for the soldiers probably continued to originate from the palace, however, where it
is likely that the prefects had their headquarters. Even after the construction of the Castra
Praetoria, the center of operations for the guard must have continued to be the palace, for there is
no evidence of a headquarters building in the camp itself. See Appendix 3, "The Castra
Praetoria", 272.

53
Sailer (1982), 62: " . . . it cannot be doubted that praetorian prefects, whose very appointments
testified to the emperor's confidence in their loyalty and friendship, were among the most
influential figures in imperial circles." See also Hanson (1982), 252: ". .. the prefect of the Guard
had access to the person of the emperor. It was this proximity to power and the transfer of power
which would make the prefecture of the Guard the more important post when the equestrian
career solidified into a fixed order of office toward the end of the century."

54
Dio 60.23.2: KOCI IVOC ye \ii\ KCCIVOTO^EIV XI 86^r|, ecpr| Kod TOV Avyovoxov em Otxx^epun) xivoq
Aiyooc, TOUTO 7te7ioir|Kevai.

55
Passerini (1939), 276, following Dessau, tentatively suggests that Dio has erred in the name of
the prefect, and that it should be Varius Ligur, possibly the father of Varius Ligur mentioned in
Tacitus, Annals 4.42 and 6.30. Syme (1986), 301 adduces CIL 5.7598 (=ILS 171), a dedication by
Publius Varius Ligus to Gemellus, as further evidence for the prefect to be Varius Ligur. Cf. PIR1,
V189.
 36

Beyond this controversial piece of information, however, we have only

scant evidence about one other prefect appointed by Augustus. When the

emperor died in AD 14, Lucius Seius Strabo was the praetorian prefect who

swore the oath of allegiance to Tiberius. 56 According to a passage of Macrobius,

Strabo was a friend of Augustus, which may help to explain his appointment. 57

Nothing is known about the prefect's early career, though we do have epigraphic

evidence that he was from Volsinii.58 But there is no indication of when he

became praetorian prefect, nor whether he ever had had a colleague. It is

instructive that the "rule" about sharing the prefecture had been disregarded

even within Augustus' lifetime.59 Shortly after Tiberius became emperor,

however, Strabo was given a colleague: his son Lucius Aelius Sejanus, who was

to be instrumental in making the guard a powerful tool of the principate.

56
Tacitus, Annals 1.7.2.

57
Macrobius, Sat. 2.4.18. Strabo is said to have asked Augustus for his opinion of Cato.
58
Corbier (1983)

59
Dio's claim about the collegiality of the office as represented in the dramatic speech presented
by Maecenas to Augustus - that it is dangerous to entrust the post to one man - clearly reflects
the benefit of hindsight, since there was no precedent for such a fear at the time of the
establishment of the prefects. Cf. 52.24.1-6. In Dio's own lifetime, the example of the praetorian
prefect Plautianus (whom Dio disliked; see, for example, 76.15) perhaps provided the rationale
for such a claim.
 37

IV. Tiberius

Tiberius came to power in AD 14, on the death of Augustus. This was the

first transition of power in Rome since the fall of the republic, and care had been

taken to ensure that the new princeps would have the support of the guard.

Tacitus records that Livia had posted soldiers around the house in which

Augustus died in order to stall the announcement of the death until Tiberius had

arrived to take control. 1 Shortly thereafter, the oath of loyalty to the new

emperor was taken by the consuls, followed by Strabo, the prefect of the

praetorian guard, and Gaius Turranius, the praefectus annonae; after them came

the senate, the army and the people. 2 The order in which this occurred - the

senate after the two prefects - indicates the significance that by now was

attached to the office of praetorian prefect as head of the emperor's personal

guard. 3 After the death of Augustus, Tiberius also had given the watchword to

the praetorian cohorts, an act indicating that he was now their commander-in-

1
Tacitus, Annals 1.5.3-4
2
Tacitus, Annals 1.7.2; cf. Dio 57.3. The praefectus annonae was among the first to swear allegiance
because of the importance of the grain supply to the city. It is the absence of the urban prefect
that is interesting, for one would expect him to have been among this group, given his command
of the urban cohorts. Grant (1974), 115 suggests that there was an interval between two successive
tenures by Piso, who had been appointed in AD 13, or that the post was vacant. See also Jones
(1960), 17; 179, note 57.

3
Martin & Woodman (1989), 87. Campbell (1.984), 81 notes that there is no evidence that, on this
occasion, the emperor formally addressed the guard, as would later become the practice upon
accession.
 38

chief.4 Even though the institution had been in place for less than fifty years, the

guard had become important enough to demand careful attention from the

incoming emperor. There is no clearer indication of their importance than the

size of the legacy left to the praetorians in the will of Augustus. 5

The guard also took part in the funeral of Augustus, which is the best

documented imperial funeral for the Julio-Claudian period. 6 Their participation

helped to reinforce in the eyes of the public the special relationship between the

praetorians and the emperor. In the republican period, soldiers had been present

at the funerals of men such as Sulla and Caesar as a mark of honour to the

deceased, though we do not know the unit to which they had belonged. 7 It is not

surprising, therefore, that the guard would be present at the funeral of the first

princeps as the military component, but the fact that these were the soldiers who

had constituted Augustus' personal army and who now belonged to Tiberius

could not have escaped those who were in attendance. 8

4
Tacitus, Annals 1.7.5. It was traditionally the emperor who provided the daily watchword to the
contingent of the guard which was on duty on the Palatine. Cf. Durry, (1938), 166; Passerini
(1939), 209. For further examples, see Suetonius, Claudius 42.1; Dio 60.16.7.

5
Suetonius, Augustus 101.2; Dio 56.32.3. Watson (1969), 109 notes that Augustus left the
praetorians one thousand sesterces each "with a view to ensuring an easy succession." The urban
cohorts received half that amount, and the soldiers in the legions three hundred. Tiberius doubled
the amounts; cf. Suetonius, Tiberius 48.2; Dio 56.32.3.

6
Dio (54.28.5) says that the funeral of Augustus was conducted in the same manner as Agrippa's
had been earlier (12 BC). Cf. also Velleius Paterculus, Histories 2.124.2. For a detailed description
of the proceedings, see Toynbee (1971), 58-9.

7
For Sulla's funeral, see Appian, BCiv 1.105-6; he remarks on the fear which the soldiers caused.
Cf. also Plutarch, Sulla 38; Toynbee (1971), 55. For Caesar's funeral, see Suetonius, Julius 84; Dio
44.33-51; Toynbee (1971), 57-8.

8
For the funeral, see Dio 56.31-42; Tacitus, Annals 1.8.6; Suetonius, Augustus 99.2-100.4.
 39

It was under Tiberius that the praetorian prefecture emerged as the

dominant administrative and advisory position in the state. Sejanus was

appointed shortly after Tiberius came to power to be Strabo's colleague. 9 The

reason for this appointment is uncertain. 10 ..By AD 16, Sejanus was sole prefect.11

He would be the architect of one of the major changes to the guard in this period,

the concentration of the cohorts into a single camp, and would bring the

prefecture to a prominence in the administration of the state probably not

envisioned when Augustus created the position.

We have few details of Sejanus' activities in the years prior to AD 23, and

even less information about the guard itself. The responsibilities of the

praetorians in these years must have remained much as they had been under

Augustus, that is, policing the games, assisting in fighting fires, protection (and

often surveillance) of the imperial family, and the confinement of criminals. One

incident that is recorded concerns the narrow escape of the senator Quintus

9
Tacitus, Annals 1.7.2: Seius Strabo ... ille praetoriarum cohortium praefectus ... Meissner (1968), 4
errs in believing that Sejanus was appointed by Augustus
10
The appointment has been linked with the mutiny in Pannonia following the death of
Augustus; cf. Levick (1976), 73. For the mutiny, see Tacitus, Annals 1.17; 24-30. But, see below,
"The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 128. Sejanus had been involved in military matters
prior to this assignment. Tacitus places him in the group that accompanied Gaius Caesar to the
east in 1 BC; see Annals 4.1.2; cf. also 4.39.2. Velleius Paterculus also accompanied Gaius east, but
does not mention Sejanus in the description of events. Cf. Histories 2.101-103; Woodman (1977),
248, note 1.

11
Strabo apparently had been appointed prefect of Egypt; see Stein (1950), 24-5. The exact date of
his tenure is uncertain, but Stein believes Strabo died in office. Cf. Pliny, NH 36.197. The
appointment itself is only tentatively accepted by Levick (1976), 273, note 60, and is challenged by
Hennig (1975), 7-8, who agrees that Strabo was sent to Egypt, but on a special assignment and not
in an "official capacity." Cf. also Schwartz (1982), 192.
 40

Haterius. 12 After irritating Tiberius at a senate meeting in AD 14, he went to the

palace to apologize and "accidentally" tripped the emperor. Tacitus reports that

the guards nearly killed Ha terms, and it was only the intervention of Livia that

saved him. The quickness with which the soldiers reacted seems to indicate a

heightened sense of anxiety around the emperor in the early stages of his rule.

The willingness of the praetorians to kill a senator without orders from anyone

attests as well their zeal in protecting Tiberius at any cost.

The lack of information about Sejanus in the early part of Tiberius' reign

should not be interpreted as an indication that he was unimportant in these

years. 13 Just how powerful he was prior to AD 23 probably will never be

known. 14 He obviously had carried out his duties well, both in an administrative

and military capacity, as is shown by the fact that he received the ornamenta

praetoria in 19 or 20, the first equestrian to do so. 15 The role of praetorian prefect

was yet to be clearly defined, and it would not be surprising therefore to find

Tiberius allocating responsibilities to Sejanus much in the same way that

12
Tacitus, Annals 1.13.6.

13
Tacitus mentions the prefect only occasionally in the first three books of the Annals: 3.16.1: the
trial of Piso (though even the author is unconvinced of Sejanus' involvement); 29.4: the betrothal
of Sejanus' daughter to Claudius' son; 35.1: the appointment of his uncle Junius Blaesus as
proconsul of Africa; 66.3: the prosecution of Gaius Junius Silanus. For purposes of style, Tacitus
delayed Sejanus' characterization until Book 4. Cf. Syme (1958), 308. The prefect's first
appearance in Dio (57.19.4) is in the year AD 20.

14
Tacitus (Annals 4.7.1) does imply, however, that it was because of Sejanus' influence that the
early part of Tiberius' reign was so enlightened.
]5
Dio 57.19.7.
 41

Augustus had done with such men as Maecenas and Agrippa. 16 To those in

Rome, however, it was probably not just the reliance of the emperor on the

prefect that was alarming, it was also the lad that Sejanus was commander of the

guard that made his prominence more threatening. Unfortunately, the silence of

the sources means that our knowledge of the relationship between prefect and

emperor at this time must remain virtually unknown. 17

The prefect certainly had gained the confidence of the emperor by AD 23,

when he convinced Tiberius to allow the concentration of the praetorian guard

into a single camp just to the northeast of Rome. 18 The stationing of all of the

cohorts in a permanent base in the city was one of the most significant events in

Tiberius' reign and in the history of the guard itself. The exact date of the

establishment of the camp is uncertain, either AD 20 or 23. 19 It is possible that

construction was begun in 20, but that the final relocation of the praetorians was

not accomplished until 23. The placement of these soldiers on the outskirts of the

16
Velleius Paterculus, Histories 2.127.1 (comparing the relationships of Sejanus and Tiberius with
that of Agrippa and Augustus): raw eminentes viri non magnis adiutoribus ad gubernandam fortunam
suam usi sunt. Cf. also Syme (1958), 402; Hennig, (1975), 25; Shorter (1992), 42.

17
The ancient sources depict Tiberius as a reluctant princeps (for example, Tacitus, Annals 1.11),
which would account for the propensity of the emperor to rely on men like Sejanus. As Woodman
(1977), 245 points out, if Tiberius' hesitation is accepted, "[it] goes a long way towards explaining
the otherwise astonishingly rapid career of the distinguished eques L. Aelius Sejanus."

18
Tacitus, Annals 4.2.1; Suetonius, Tiberius 37.1. It should be noted that Suetonius does not
mention Sejanus in connection with the construction of the camp. Cf. also Dio 57.19.6.

19
AD 20: Syme (1958), 424. According to Syme, Tacitus has withheld the event until the year 23 in
order to include it in his general assessment of Sejanus at the beginning of Book 4. AD 23:
Durry (1938), 45.
 42

capital set a precedent: it was the first time that a permanent military institution

was established virtually right in the city, and no longer could the means by

which the emperor exerted his power be ignored.

Tacitus records that Sejanus brought all of the cohorts together into one
camp

ut simul imperia acciperent numeroque et robore et visu inter sefiducia

ipsis, in ceteros metus oreretur. praetendebat lascivire militem diductum; si
quid subitum ingruat, maiore auxilio pariter subveniri; et severius acturos, si
vallum statuatur procul urbis inlecebris.20

Ulterior motives have been suggested for this action, thought to be hinted at by

Tacitus' use of praetendebat to indicate the guile of the prefect. It is assumed that

he wanted to have better control over the city (including the senate) and the

emperor. 21 It could be, however, that there was indeed a problem with discipline

since the soldiers were still being billetted throughout the area, and maintaining

control may have been increasingly difficult if the number of cohorts in Rome

had gradually increased over previous years as they were brought into the city

from the environs. 22 With the principate more firmly established, the

precautions taken by Augustus to avoid the appearance of imposing an armed

guard on the city no longer were necessary, and it certainly would be safer for

20
Tacitus, Annals 4.2.1; cf. also Dio 57.19.6.

21
Durry (1938), 152; Passerini (1939), 52; Maranon (1956), 129; Meissner (1968), 5.

22
Juvenal's Satire 16 certainly suggests a tumultuous relationship between soldiers and civilians;
cf. Campbell (1984), 251; Speidel (1994), 95-96: "Maintaining discipline in the city was of the
greatest importance . . . to keep the men out of mischief always was a hard task for Roman
officers . . . soldiers were all too ready to stray from their camps and become a scourge to
civilians, in the city of Rome perhaps even more so than elsewhere . . . "
 4 3
; •

the citizens to have the cohorts housed together where their activities could be

monitored. >

The concentration of tlw guard in the camp can be viewed, therefore, as a

practical decision. In Rome prior to AD 23,.the praetorian cohorts had been

engaged in a wide variety of tasks. We have already noted their role in helping

to fight fires and to patrol the theatres. 23 Under Tiberius, the praetorians were

used as well to control protesters complaining about the high price of grain, and

they were also sent to put down a disturbance in Pollentia in northern Italy.24

The concentration of the guard in one place in Rome was probably intended to

allow it to be put to greater use in assignments of this sort, since having the

soldiers all together, close to the capital, would allow them to function much

more efficiently than when they were dispersed.

It was probably also at the time of the move to the Castra Praetoria that

the number of cohorts was increased from nine to twelve. The additional

responsibilities that had been assigned to the guard provides the rationale for

such an expansion. Having an additional three cohorts would enable the guard

to be used more efficiently throughout the city and would allow the emperor's

personal guard to be integrated even more thoroughly into the administration of

23
Augustus: Suetonius, Augustus 44.1. Tiberius: Tacitus, Annals 1.77.1; cf. also 1.54.2;
Suetonius, Tiberius 37.2. See below, "The Guard in Civil Administration", 177-211.

24
Grain riots: Tacitus, Annals 6.13.1. Pollentia: Suetonius, Tiberius 37.3; see below, "The Guard as
a Specialized Military Unit", 129-130.
 44

the city. There is no literary evidence fox this change.'Tacitus lists nine cohorts in

AD 23 in his discussion on the strength of the Roman armed forces, while Dio

mentions ten cohorts in his catalogue of troops under Augustus. 25 Until recently,

the epigraphic evidence had provided little 'information, except to show that,

prior to Vespasian, the praetorian cohorts included those numbered XI and XII.26

The assumption was that any increase would have been recorded by Tacitus.

Therefore, the creation of the new cohorts was attributed to the reign of either

Caligula or Claudius, and was thought to have been noted in the section of the

Annals which is lost.27 Inscriptional evidence was adduced in support of this

idea. 28 But no consensus was reached on the emperor responsible for the

increase.

An inscription discovered in 1976 seems to provide documentation that

the creation of two additional cohorts occurred under Tiberius. Found in Lecce

dei Marsi, it is dedicated to Aulus Virgius Marsus, who served as a tribune of the

IHIth and Xlth praetorian cohorts:

A. Virgio L. f. Marso, | prim. pil. leg. Ill Gallicae |

iterum, praef. castr. Aegy., | praef. fabr., tr. mil. in

25
Tacitus, Annals 4.5.3; Dio 55.24.6.

26
Durry (1938), 78 lists five inscriptions which mention the XI cohort and six which mention the
XII cohort. However, all of these are dated only broadly to the first century based on the style of
their lettering.

27
Durry (1938), 79. The original idea was Mommsen's.

28
CIL 5.7003 (=ILS 2701), Gaius Gavius [Link] (dating to the reign of Nero), and CIL 6. 2767
(=ILS 2032), Gaius Julius Montanus (thought by Durry [1938], 79 to date to the reign of Caligula),
both soldiers of the XII praetorian cohort. For Silvanus, see below, "Nero", 108; "The Guard in
Civil Administration",192.
 45

• I T

praet. | divi Aug. et Ti. Caesaris Aug. | cohort. XI et

IIII praetoriar., | IIII vir. quinq. delato hon | ore ab
dec. et popul. in col. Troad. | Aug. et Marru[u]io,
testamento | dedit vicalibus Anninis imagin. |
Caesarum argentias quinqiie :| et sestertia X milia |
vicales Anninis honor. | causa. 29

Marsus became a tribune of the guard under Augustus after holding a

primipilate in a legion, an advancement which was not unusual in the career of a

praetorian officer.30 He then became primuspilus for a second time. 31 After this

distinction, he moved through two senior posts, praefectus castrorum Aegypti and

praefectus fabrum, and finally returned to Rome to serve as praetorian tribune for

a second time sometime after AD 23. 32 His term of service in the capital was with

the Xlth and IHIth praetorian cohorts. The inclusion of the Xlth in connection

with either Augustus or Tiberius indicates that the increase in the number of

cohorts had to have occurred before the reign of Caligula. The use of the phrase

divi Aug(usti) means that one of the appointments had to be before AD 14.

Since Tacitus makes reference to only nine cohorts in AD 23, Letta argued

that the command of the IHIth cohort had occurred under Augustus. 33 He

29
AE (1978), #286. The inscription receives extensive discussion in Letta (1978), 3-19 and in
Dobson (1982), 242-257. Cf. also Demougin (1992), #318.
30
Dobson (1979), 199. Demougin (1992), 268 argues that he would have served first in the ranks of
the praetorians.

31
Campbell (1994), #96 notes that "this is the earliest clear example of the position of chief
centurion twice."

32
This summary of Marsus' career is based upon Dobson (1982), 248.

33
Letta (1978), 11. See also Dobson (1982), 327.
 46

believed that the reversal of the praetorian tribunates from their chronological

order resulted from an slight imprecision in the setting up of the inscription;

there are other examples of similar inversions of chronology. 34 It should be

noted, however, that another interpretation has been proposed, namely that

cohorts X and XI came into existence at the very end of the reign of Augustus

and that they were disbanded by Tiberius prior to AD 23 so as to number nine in

that year. This explanation, though maintaining the order of the tribunates in the

inscription, seems very unlikely since it would mean the discharge of two entire

cohorts after only a few years' service. 35

Letta also argues that the second tribunate, that of the Xlth cohort, would

have occurred quite soon after AD 23 since it is unlikely that the two

appointments would have been separated by an excessive amount of time.

Allowing for each tribunate to be only one year in duration, he concludes that

the gap between them had to have been at least nine years (AD 14-23), during

which time Marsus could have held his second primipilate, and been at

Alexandria Troias. 36 But it is not certain that a praetorian tribunate was held for

34
Dobson (1982), 328 cites CIL 9. 5839 (= ILS 2084) in which Gaius Oppius Bassus is recorded to
have served in the XHIth and XHIIth urban cohorts, and 9. 5840 (=ILS 2085), also belonging to
Bassus, in which the appointments are reversed.

35
AE (1978), 286. Another interpretation is offered by Demougin (1992), 270: Marsus' first
tribunate was in the Xlth urban cohort. This solution maintains the order of tribunates given in
the inscription, but the absence of the adjective urbanae is troubling, and the explanations offered
for the omission (either the designation XI would clearly indicate an urban cohort, or the
stonecutter had made an error) are not convincing.

36
Letta (1978), 11.
 47

only one year, and it is possible that the two assignments were for longer

durations. 37 The first assignment, then, to the Illlth cohort, could have begun

under Augustus, and extended to Tiberius' reign, with the second post, in the

Xlth cohort, occurring entirely under the latter emperor. Since it seems to have

been extremely rare at this period to hold more than one tribunate in the guard,

there must have been extenuating circumstances for Marsus' return, and the

logical solution seems to be that there was a need for experienced officers in the

newly formed praetorian cohorts in the early 20s AD. 38

It no longer seems likely that the increase in the number of cohorts of the

guard could be attributed to the reigns of Caligula or Claudius. For whatever

reason, Tacitus did not include the information on this change in his section on

the camp. 39 In fact, the argument from silence is unconvincing, since Tacitus

often leaves out information that we would consider important to the narrative.

Based on the evidence of the Lecce dei Marsi inscription, it may be argued that

the increase in the number of cohorts of the praetorian guard that occurred

under Tiberius was part of the reorganization brought about by Sejanus, and was

connected with the construction of the camp. Additional evidence for assigning

37
Dobson (1982), 327.

38
Ibid, 328. Dobson suggests that the two tribunates were placed together on the inscription
because Marsus wanted to "emphasize the distinction . . . of serving two emperors in the
responsible task", and the "placing of a p o s t . . . out of chronological order in a career to
emphasize some special point about it is a common practice."

39
Campbell (1994), 54 suggests that the increase in cohorts occurred after 23, but during the reign
of Tiberius.
 48

the increase to this time is offered by the archaeological remains of the Castra

Praetoria itself.40 The design of the barrack blocks, some of which were two-

storeyed, provided considerable space for housing troops as did the rooms along

the inside of the walls; the use of opus reticulatum dates these structures to the

original construction of the camp. The areas of housing connected with the walls

are unlike those of any other Roman camp of the time, and this type of

construction was not done again until much later in the empire. 41

Tacitus portrays Sejanus as using the easy access to the praetorians in the

camp in order to gain the favour of the soldiers. 42 Command of the guard, in

name at least, rested with the emperor. But, in a practical sense, the prefects were

the ones who had responsibility for the day-to-day activities of these cohorts, and

by this time, the duties must have required increasingly complex scheduling. It

was reasonable, therefore, that Sejanus should communicate with his men, and

his actions need not be seen as remarkable, and in fact, were simply part of his

responsibility for the administration of the guard. Tacitus notes moreover that

the emperor referred to the prefect as a "partner in his labours", not only in

40
See Appendix 3, "The Castra Praetoria", 269-275.

41
Cf. Lander (1984), 259-61.

42
Tacitus, Annals 4.2.2. Tacitus also adds that Sejanus chose the centurions and tribunes himself.
With respect to the post of centurion, however, this action was not unusual in the Roman army;
cf. Campbell (1984), 105. Appointment to the legionary tribunates, however, generally seems to
have been made by the emperor, though many men were probably brought to the emperor's
attention as a personal favour, and in the case of the guard, this might involve the prefect. See
Sailer (1982), 42; 158. Cf. also Millar (1977), 276; 285.
 49

private conversations, but even in the senate and with the people. 43 The other

sources also indicate that Tiberius was relying on Sejanus to an ever greater

extent. 44 The responsibilities for the prefect would have been significant because

of the number of soldiers in Rome, and the variety of tasks that the praetorians

were being used for beyond the basic protection of the imperial family. In fact,

Sejanus is described as having looked after both civil and military administration

in the capital. 45 But such influence was bound to create antagonism, and Tacitus

records that Sejanus was blamed for every crime because of his close relationship

with Tiberius and the general hostility toward the prefect by the public. 46

Sometime in AD 25, Tiberius held an exhibition of the guard. The

praetorians were drilled before the senators in an attempt to overawe them with

a military display. 47 It also reinforced for the soldiers that they had a special

43
Tacitus, Annals 4.2.2: sochim laborum non modo in sermonibus, sed apud patres et populum celebraret.

44
Dio (57.19.7) uses the terms cn4i|3o\Aoc; KOCI i>nr\pkxr[c, of the prefect in reference to his
relationship with the emperor; cf. also 58.4.3 (KCHVWVOV TCOV (ppov-ci8cov). Velleius Paterculus
(Histories 2.127.3), with whom the idea may originate, calls him the principalhim onenim adhitor in
omnia. Woodman (1977), 246-47 points out that, "such nomenclature must have had an
incalculable effect upon the senatorial order at Rome."

45
Tacitus, Annals 6.8.2: mox urbis et militiae munia simul obeuntem [Seianum].
46
Ibid, 4.11.2: sed quia Seianus facinorum omnium repertor habebatur, ex nimia caritate in eunt Caesaris
et ceterorum in utrumque odio. This animosity went so far as to include allegations that the prefect
had murdered Drusus, Tiberius' son. The source of the story was Apicata, the former wife of
Sejanus. The rumour did not even surface until 31, eight years after Drusus' death, and after the
accused himself had been executed. Cf. Dio 58.11.6. Although it is extremely unlikely that Sejanus
would have confided plans of murder to a former spouse and that such information could have
been kept secret for so long, and despite a lack of a motive, ancient authors accepted the veracity
of the accusation. See Tacitus, Annals 4.3.2-5, 8-10; Seneca, Octavia 942-44; Suetonius, Tiberius 62.1;
Dio 57.22.1-4. Evidence for a natural death for Drusus may be found in Tosephus, A] 18.146, 206.
For a survey of modern scholarship, cf. Meise (1969), 51, note 9.

47
Dio 57.24.5: EV 5' o\)v TCO TOTE 6 TipEpux; xf)v xox> SopixpopiKov yujivcccriccv xolq f>ox>X£\)xaiq, <acnt£p
dyvoouoi xf|v 8\)va|[Link] ocbicov, E7iE5ei^ev, O7tcoq KOCI Tto^ouq ocpaq KCCI [Link]'ui; iSoviec, \iaXXov
 50

relationship with the emperor, and allowed them to take pride in this connection

in a public display. At the same time/they no doubt realized that their privileged

position depended upon their continued attention to the well-being of Tiberius,

and not that of the senate.

Such displays seem to have been done at times when there was some sort

of threat to the emperor perceived; in this case, the warning was aimed primarily

at the elder Agrippina. 48 Sejanus had become alarmed over her growing

popularity, and had informed the emperor that there was a danger of civil war

unless something was done. 49 There was concern that some of the guard might

be convinced to side with Agrippina in any conflict, out of respect for her late

husband, Germanicus. 50 Now that the praetorians were concentrated in Rome,

such apprehensions had taken on additional importance since it was easier for

the soldiers to act as a cohesive unit. Whether any of them would have

abandoned the emperor for Agrippina in this instance is doubtful, but the

warning of civil strife, while probably exaggerated, may indicate that there was

otvxov (poPcoviou. He says that the purpose was to make the senators more afraid of Tiberius.
Tacitus does not mention the incident.

48
Tacitus, Annals 4.17.1; cf. Suetonius, Tiberius 54.1. See Bird (1969), 71. In the previous year, the
priests in Rome, led by the example of the pontifices, had included the names of Agrippina's sons,
Nero and Drusus, in the prayers offered at the beginning of the year for the safety of the emperor.
Tiberius was angered and attibuted the action to their mother's intercession.

49
Tacitus, Annals 4.17.3.

50
When Agrippina had returned from the east in AD 19 with Germanicus' ashes, two cohorts of
the guard had gone to meet her at Brundisium and carried the urn to Rome, perhaps not a
surprising gesture toward a man with whom several of the soldiers may have served in Germany
in AD 16. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 3.2.1.
 51

apprehension on the part of the prefect that the guard would become involved in

any dispute. It was Sejanus' duty to watch out for Tiberius' interests, which is

exactly what he did in this case.51

In AD 26, Tiberius withdrew to Capri. The reasons for his retreat from

Rome were varied, according to the sources. 52 Tacitus records that Sejanus

encouraged Tiberius' withdrawal, though the alleged motive - to have greater

power and to control access to the emperor - illustrates the bias of the author. 53

Tiberius took few companions to Capri, but he clearly had a contingent of

praetorians with him. 54 They were used for crowd control when the emperor

was dedicating temples in Campania on his way to the island. 55 Further

51
Perhaps in response to the perceived danger, there was a marked increase in treason trials
following this incident. Several people who were deemed a threat to the regime were charged
with a variety of crimes. Of these, many were supporters of Agrippina, including Gaius Silius and
his wife (Tacitus, Annals 4.18-19); Vibius Serenus (ibid, 4.28-30); Claudia Pulchra (ibid, 4.52.1);
Titius Sabinus (ibid, 4.68-70). Cf. Hennig (1975), 65-6; Bauman (1974), 116-124. No doubt
members of the guard, under orders from the prefect, would have been involved in the
apprehension and confinement of some of those who were charged, though no mention is made
of this in the sources.

52
Tiberius was sixty-seven years old and not in very good health. He was not a popular ruler and
had become impatient with the spate of rumours, and with the insults of the citizens. See, for
example, Tacitus, Annals 4.42 (Tiberius' violent reaction to the trial of Votienus Montanus). His
quarrels with both his mother and Agrippina were wearying; cf. ibid, 4.52-54; Suetonius, Tiberius
53.1-2. Suetonius (Tiberius 51.1) and Dio (57.12.6), however, cite Livia as the reason for Tiberius'
departure from Rome.

53
Tacitus, Annals 4.41.1-2; cf. also 57.1-3. The idea that it was only at the urging of the prefect that
Tiberius left Rome seems too simple. Martin and Woodman (1989), 223 point to the use of diu
meditate (in 57.1) as indicative that this decision had been contemplated for some time. Cf. also
Seager (1972), 202; Syme (1986), 169.

54
Cf. Tacitus, Annals 4.58.1; 67.1.

55
The incident at Sperlonga also dates to this period; while Tiberius was dining in a cave there, a
rock fall occurred. Tacitus reports that several of the servants were crushed, but that the emperor
was saved by Sejanus, who shielded him with his own body. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 4.59.1-2. See also
Suetonius, Tiberius 39, where there is no mention of the role of Sejanus" in this incident. What role
 52

evidence for their presence on Capri conies from a passage in Suetonius in which

members of the unit are recorded to have been punished for actions while

there. 56 It is impossible to tell how many soldiers were with him, or how much

time they spent there before being replaced by others from Rome. While on

Capri, the guard would have been involved in a wide variety of responsibilities;

for example, Tacitus records that Sejanus used them to convey imperial

correspondence. 57 Praetorians also probably reported to the prefect about events

which occurred there. 58 This activity was crucial, since Sejanus himself may not

have spent much time on Capri. 59 As sole prefect, he would need to be in Rome

to oversee matters there that concerned the guard, and in particular, to

coordinate the duties of the soldiers in the city. He also probably acted as the

the praetorians with Tiberius played in the sequence of events is impossible to determine, though
they undoubtedly were present.
56
Suetonius, Tiberius 60: militem praetorianum ob subreptum e viridiario pavonem capite puniti. in
quodam itinere lectica, qua vehebatur, vepribus impedita exploratorem viae, primarum cohortium
centurionem, stratum humi paene ad necem verberavit. The primae cohortes are assumed to be the
praetorian guard. These incidents are somewhat puzzling. It is odd that Tiberius would have
treated the soldiers so harshly given their position in protecting his person. The punishments may
be the result of some other event obscured by Suetonius or his source, but the possibility must be
admitted that these stories are simply exaggeration by the author intended to denigrate Tiberius
since neither incident is found in the other sources.

57
Tacitus, Annals 4.41.2. The use of the guard in this way meant that Sejanus had access to all
communication. But this was not so unusual, since the speculatores had been used for such
activities from the beginning; see below, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 138.
58
Cf. Dio 58.4.2, who says that Sejanus had informers on Capri. While these are described simply
as those who were around Tiberius - zovc, te rcept Tvf3epiov ovxaq OUTCOrcavuac,7tpocrT|xaipvoTO - it
is hard not to see them as guard members.
59
Our sources record three occasions when Sejanus was definitely on Capri: in 28, he crossed with
Tiberius to Campania at the request of the senate (Tacitus, Annals 4.74.2-3); in 29, embassies were
sent to him by those in Rome (Dio 58.2.8); in 30, he was sent ahead from Capri by Tiberius to take
u p his consulship (Dio 58.4.9).
 53

liaison between the emperor and those in Rome, and so his presence in the

capital was of vital importance to Tiberias. Clearly, then, the prefect took on a

greater role in the administration of the empire with Tiberius away, though it is

unclear exactly how much power he had. There is little evidence, however, that

Sejanus had the sort of control which once was attributed to him. 60 It is more

likely that he managed what had to be done in Rome, as did others of the

emperor's inner circle and in particular, the urban prefect.61

During the late 20s AD, then, Tiberius came to rely on Sejanus in Rome.

Honours were heaped upon him in recognition of his perceived status. 62 Yet, it

was the close relationship between the emperor and his prefect rather than the

notion of independent power on the part of the latter by which Sejanus had

gained such a reputation. 63 Officially he was still only the prefect and Tiberius'

representative in the capital. It is true that his control of the guard meant that

60
See, for example, Marsh (1926), 233-250.
61
Seneca (Ep. 83.14) comments that, when he withdrew to Campania, Tiberius entrusted Piso, the
urban prefect, with some sort of secret orders. Cf. Passerini (1939), 273; Syme (1986), 343.

62
Sejanus was honoured with the celebration of his birthday as a holiday and the taking of oaths
by his Fortune as well as by that of Tiberius. For a complete discussion of the significance of the
oath, see Hennig (1975), 124-131. Other distinctions included the erection of statues of the prefect,
embassies from the senate, the knights and the people to Sejanus as well as to Tiberius, and the
inclusion of Sejanus' name in wills. Cf. Dio 58.2.7-8; 4.4; 16.2; Suetonius, Tiberius 65.1. The senate
also voted altars to Clementia and Amicitia with statues of both Tiberius and Sejanus alongside
them. See Tacitus, Annals 4.74.2; cf. Platner-Ashby (1965), 21.

63
One of the more striking distinctions paid to him was the inclusion of his statue among the
standards of the legions of the army, with the exception of those in Syria; cf. Suetonius, Tiberius
48.2; Tacitus, Annals 4.2.3. The significance here is the extent to which the prefect has become
included in honours generally reserved for members of the imperial family. Because not every
legion followed this practice in honouring Sejanus, it can be assumed that there was no official
directive from either the senate or the emperor.
 54

Sejanus had considerable military authority, and the increased use of the

praetorians in the civil administration of the city would have emphasized the

potential danger that they represented because of their numbers. We have no

evidence, however, that Sejanus ever tried to intimidate the emperor with this

force, though Dio does mention that Tiberius realized the latent threat from the

praetorians. 64 The perception that Sejanus could use these soldiers for his own

purposes appears to have caused concern among those who were close to the

emperor, and allowed such fears to be exploited by others. Yet, throughout their

history, the praetorians proved to be pragmatic: the soldiers recognized who

ultimately was responsible for their well-being and, as a unit, were reluctant to

jeopardize that relationship. There is little reason to believe that they would have

acted otherwise with Sejanus.

At the beginning of AD 31, Sejanus had the honour of holding the

consulship with the emperor for five months. 65 When Tiberius stepped down in

May, however, the prefect was forced to do the same. 66 There is no doubt that

64
Dio 58.4.2.
65
Ibid, 58.4.2-4. Cf also Suetonius, Tiberius 65.1. This was remarkable, for Sejanus not only was an
equestrian, he also had not held any other political office. Associated with his appointment is an
inscription (CIL 6.10213 [= ILS 6044]) which mentions his confirmation by a public assembly in a
meeting held on the Aventine. Whether this procedure was unusual is not certain, though the
absence of any mention of this particular meeting in the sources would seem to suggest that it
was not. See Seager (1972), 127. Cf. Hennig (1975), 140-142; Demougin (1988), 433-35; Levick
(1967), 217-18; (1976), 119-120; Syme (1956), 259-260; Pani (1979), 154-55; Pekary (1966/67), 117.

66
It is unclear what status the prefect had during the period of his consulship; both Durry (1938),
364 and Passerini (1939), 277-78 believe he held the offices concurrently. It has been suggested,
however, that an interim prefect or a colleague must have been appointed; see de Visscher (1960),
248; Maranon (1956), 137; Hennig (1975), 144-55. After stepping down from the consulship,
Sejanus was invested with proconsular imperium, most likely a symbolic honour, since he must
 55

the emperor's attitude toward his prefect was changing. In October of the same

year, Tiberius decided to oust Sejanus from his post as prefect. The reasons for

his removal are shrouded in mystery, though according to Dio at least, Tiberius

was afraid that his prefect might be proclaimed emperor in his place. 67 But there

is no other evidence to confirm this fear, and the real reasons behind the action

remain a subject for speculation. It is possible that some in Rome felt that with

the commander of the guard having so much administrative control in the city, a

dangerous situation was created, especially with the emperor away from, and

the troops housed in, the capital. Whether Sejanus would ever have used the

praetorians against the emperor was not important; it was the perception that he

could have, both by Tiberius and others, that made his removal necessary.

Once Tiberius had decided to act, he resolved to move cautiously because

of the authority that Sejanus had over the praetorians, having been their

commander for fifteen years. 68 Though there is no indication that the soldiers

would have abandoned the emperor for their prefect, Tiberius probably felt that

it was not worth risking any confrontation with the guard. He therefore decided

have maintained his equestrian status in order to remain in command of the guard. See Dio
58.7.4. Cf. Bringmann (1977), 236-7.

67
Dio 58.4.1: uaGcbv o w l a m a 6 TiPepioq owe ev e^acppro TO [Link] ETtoiriaaTO, q>opr|0£i<; \ir\ Kai
ccbxoKp&Topa avxiKpix; awov amoSei^cooiv, oine fpe^rioev. EK \LEV 8T| OVV XOV npoqavovq ovbzv
eSpaae- TO TE yap 5op\)(popiKOv 7tav iaxupax; COKEICOTO. . . Dio provides the most complete account
of the fall of the prefect, since the text of Tacitus is missing for the year AD 31.

68
Bird (1969), 81: "The emperor did not know exactly what support Sejanus might count upon
from the nobiles in 31, but he did not underestimate the potential threat from the praetorians."
 56

to use deception, and secretly appointed Quintus Naevius Cordus Sutorius

Macro as praetorian prefect, sending him to Rome on the night of October 17, AD

31 with a letter for the senate in which Tiberius condemned his former prefect.69

How Macro was chosen for this task is not recorded in the sources. 70 An

inscription from Alba Fucens shows that, before becoming praetorian prefect,

Macro had been praefectus vigilum, though how long he had held the position and

when is unknown. 71 It may have been that his position as prefect of the vigiles

had allowed him to act on behalf of the emperor in judging the attitude in Rome

towards Sejanus, and to report back to Tiberius so that the plan might be

executed at the most propitious time. But his presence on Capri is difficult to

explain if Macro remained in command of the vigiles until the implementation of

the plan. 72 It is possible that he became involved with the guard when Sejanus

69
Dio 58.9.2-3.

70
It is possible that he had come to the attention of the emperor through his marriage to Ervnia
Thrasylla, the granddaughter of the astrologer Thrasyllus who was with Tiberius on Capri. See
Cramer (1954), 105-6. The marriage occurred in either AD 29 or 30.
71
AE (1957), 250:

Q. Naevius Q. f. Fab. Cordus Sutorius Macro

praefectus vigilum praefectus praetori
Ti. Caesaris Augusti testamento dedit

Cf. de Visscher (1957a), 39-49; (1957b), 169-179. In another article, de Visscher proposes that
Macro was praefectus vigilum by AD 24, though there is no direct evidence; see (1966), 766.

72
See de Visscher (1960), 248. Koestermann (1955), 364 argues that Macro was in charge of the
guard on Capri, having gained the trust of Sejamis. See also Hennig (1975), 154.
 57

became consul, though there is no mention of this in the sources. 73 Such an

appointment would explain why Sejanus did not become suspicious when Macro

was on Capri, for Macro could not have become interim prefect without Sejanus'

knowledge. But the manner of his appointment to the command of the

praetorians must remain a mystery. The emperor obviously had confidence in

Macro, though it seems surprising that he would entrust someone with such a

sensitive task whose only previous association with the regime was a satisfactory

stint as the commander of the vigiles. The fact that he continued as sole prefect

after the fall of Sejanus, however, indicates that Tiberius had no doubts about his

loyalty, or his ability to control the guard. 74

Sejanus was arrested at a senate meeting held on the morning of October

18th; at a second meeting later in the day, the senate condemned him to death. 75

The guard was not involved at all, having been confined to camp by its new

prefect as soon as Sejanus had entered the first meeting. It is instructive that the

cohort was so easily convinced to return to quarters. Despite the concern about

their loyalty as expressed in Dio, the soldiers did not disobey the orders of their

73
Hennig (1975), 153 remarks on the practical difficulty of Macro simply changing commands
overnight and argues therefore that Macro had become the substitute commander of the guard at
the beginning of Sejanus' consulship.
74
Barrett (1990), 28. Cf. Philo, Legatio Ad Gaium 6.37.
75
Dio 58.11.4. Sejanus' children were also killed; Dio (58.11.5) reports that all three children were
killed that same day, but evidence from the Fasti Ostienses (CIL 14, suppl. no. 4533, col. II, 15-17 =
Ehrenberg and Jones [1949], 42) shows that this was not the case. Cf. also Tacitus, Annals 5.9.1;
Levick (1976), 178.
 58

new commander, though many may have wondered why they were being

replaced by the vigiles.76 The ease with which this transfer occurred is puzzling.

Macro probably was known to the praetorians, but only in an adjunct capacity as

prefect of the vigiles unless he had been appointed to the guard at the time of

Sejanus' consulship. 77 That the cohorts would follow a new commander and not

question their replacement at the senate meeting, or become alarmed at their

confinement to quarters, is hard to understand. Certainly the guard understood

that it had a responsibility to carry out the will of the emperor, regardless of the

rationale, and the unquestioning attitude of the men in following Macro's orders

may be seen as another example of the discipline of the praetorians.

As a result of its confinement, the guard could not come to Sejanus'

rescue, though it is not certain that the soldiers would have attempted such an

exploit anyway. A donative promised by Tiberius no doubt initially helped to

silence any grumbling, but it was not enough. 78 Angered by the slight to their

76
Dio 58.9.3. It is not clear why the praetorians were even at this meeting. It is true that they
usually accompanied the emperor when he attended the senate, but Tiberius was not there. The
most common interpretation is that they were with Sejanus, but the exact reason for their
presence is not discernible. For views on Macro's role, see Hertnig (1975), 151-56, especially 155;
de Visscher (1966), 761-68. The choice of the vigiles clearly reflects the influence of Macro as the
former praefectus vigilum.

77
de Visscher (1966), 764-68 examines the possibility that there was a struggle between Macro
and Sejanus which dated to long before AD 31 and which was exploited by Tiberius. See also
Durry (1938), 156. Yet this view ignores the fact that Sejanus believed Macro on the morning of
October 18 when told about the contents of the letter. If there had been any dissension between
them, or rivalry between the guard and the vigiles, it is doubtful whether Sejanus would have
trusted Macro. Cf. Hennig's criticisms (1975), 153, note 77.

78
Donative: Suetonius, Tiberius 48.2; cf. Campbell (1984), 188: "Tiberius was not as lucky as
Augustus, who had avoided this kind of donative which placed imperial largess back in the
context of political strife as a reward for loyalty in time of personal danger for the commander."
 59

honour which their replacement at the meeting signified, and by the sinister

manner in which their commander had been removed, the soldiers rioted. 79 As

has already been noted, the guard as a whole was a pragmatic group. By creating

a public disturbance, the praetorians showed their anger at the implication that

they would have been disloyal to the emperor, and their disappointment over

their replacement by the vigiles at the meeting. At the same time, however, they

were not willing to risk their privileged position in the city by attacking the state

- that is the emperor - directly.

The reasons for the removal of Sejanus also remain a mystery, though the

story of his plotting against Tiberius has found much favour among modern

scholars, despite the lack of information in the sources. 80 As might be expected

79
Dio 58.12.2: Koci oi axpaxicoxai ayavaKxouvxei; oxi at>xoi xe eq xr\v xox> Eeiavov euvoiav
•OTtcoKxcoGTiaav Kai oi vuKxcxp-oXaiceq ocpcov ec, xf)v xov amoKpaxopoq 7tiaxiv 7tpoexin.Ti0T|(Tav,
k\xnpr\GEic, xe Kai apTtaydq eTtoiouvxo, KCUXCHrcavxcovxcov ev xaic; apxoui; ovxcov xo aoxi) nav £K xfjq
xot> TiPepiou evxoXfjg cpuXaxxovxcov. It is unclear how the magistrates were guarding the city. It has
been proposed that it was the vigiles who were involved in this task; see de Visscher (1957b), 174.
Cf. Seager (1972), 221 who interprets the riot as resulting from "the slur that had been cast on
their loyalty."

80
The list of references in the ancient sources to a conspiracy is brief:
Tacitus, Annals 5.8.1; 5.11.1; 6.14.1; 6.19.2; 6.47.2; possibly also 6.3; 6.8.3; 6.8.6; 6.23.2.
Suetonius, Tiberius 61.1; 75; possibly also Vitellius 2.3.
Juvenal, Satire 10.69-72.
Valerius Maximus, 9.11.4.
Seneca, De Tranquillitate Animi 11.11.
Possibly also Philo, Legatio ad Gaium 24.160.

The main source is Josephus, A] 18.181-182. He records that Antonia, Tiberius' sister-in-law, had
discovered a conspiracy against the emperor masterminded by the prefect and including most of
the senators and freedmen as well as the army. She revealed the plan in a letter covertly sent to
Tiberius. The only other mention of such a letter is an incidental reference in Dio's section on
Vespasian; cf. Dio 66.14.1. It is unclear whether, as a member of the imperial household, Antonia
had her own contingent of praetorians. If she did, it may explain how the letter was able to reach
Tiberius without the knowledge of his prefect. How Antonia became aware of such a plot is
unknown. It is possible that the source was Caligula, who had been living with her before being
summoned to Capri. Cf. Levick (1976), 174; Bauman (1992), 158. For a summary of the most
 60

of such a closely kept secret, details are lacking about the alleged conspiracy,

namely who exactly was involved and wiiom it was against. 81 That Sejanus

would plot against the emperor himself seems unlikely, since there was little for

him to gain by doing so.82 It is also difficult to accept that the prefect could have

been so easily deceived. After all, Sejanus controlled both personal access and

correspondence to Capri through the guard, and the idea that he had no advance

warning of the danger of his situation is ludicrous. Yet, it is clear that he did not

know what was to take place at the senate meeting of October 18, and that he

considered Macro a loyal colleague. 83

The career of Sejanus was distinguished by achievements that had a great

impact on the future of the praetorian guard. As prefect, he had brought about

one of the major changes in its history, namely the concentration of the cohorts in

the Castra Praetoria. 84 It is possible that, in the early years of his prefecture, he

prominent modern theories, cf. Hennig (1975), 144, note 40. The views range from Rogers (1935),
114: "Conspiracy against Tiberius and his throne by Sejanus may be accepted as historical fact",
to Bird (1969), 85: "Motivation for any plot of long standing is entirely lacking."

81
In the absence of the account of Tacitus for the event, it is virtually impossible to reconstruct the
details in any comprehensive manner, especially in light of the omission of the plot in Dio, our
most complete source for the fall of Sejanus. Even this account is often treated as suspect, for
many scholars dismiss Dio as being unreliable, arguing that he has allowed his understanding of
the overthrow of Plautianus under Severus to influence his interpretation of the Sejanus episode,
though he ought to be given more credit for being able to discern the difference. Cf. Koestermann
(1955), 351-52; Meise (1969), 79; Hennig (1975), 148.

82
Cf. Seager (1972), 215-16; Boddington (1963), 7; Syme (1958), 406; 752-54; Durry (1938), 151;
Marsh (1931), 309. Hennig (1975), 149-150 concludes after examining the sources that there is no
real evidence for a plot, being convinced in particular by the lack of any motive.

83
Cf. Hennig (1975), 150-51.
84
Durry (1938), 156: "II a ete Ie vrai fondateur du pretoire.
 61

recognized the benefits that would accrue to the state through having the

praetorians housed together in a permanent camp in Rome. Through this

accomplishment, Sejanus advanced the role of the guard in the civil

administration greatly. There can be little doubt that Tiberius trusted Sejanus and

gave him great responsibility which often went beyond the command of the

guard. Yet, throughout his career, Sejanus always acted within the constraints of

his position as prefect, undertaking to protect the interests of the emperor and of

Rome. 85 The fact that, on several occasions, his attention to these duties

inevitably involved him in the politics of the state should not be construed as

political ambition on his part. It is unlikely that he had any illusions that his

position would lead to supreme power. The office of prefect had not yet been

precisely defined, and the presence of an equestrian closely associated with the

emperor and commanding a large armed force in Rome probably added to the

resentment felt by those involved in political life, and to the suspicions which no

doubt contributed to his downfall.

Tiberius became increasingly fearful after the removal of Sejanus. He was

troubled about his safety, not venturing from Capri too often, and indeed, never

returning to Rome. 86 This, notwithstanding the fact that the guard had proven

85
This may be the point that Velleius Paterculus was making in his assessment of Sejanus. As
Woodman (1977), 251 points out, "V[elleius'] argument seems to be this. If the services of a
certain man are required for the good of the state... that man should be given the political status
appropriate to his actual (as opposed to hereditary) importance... otherwise he will not be seen
to possess the proper influence.. . and his activities on behalf of the state will run the risk of being
disregarded."

86
Levick (1976), 217; cf. Tacitus, Annals 6.15.3.
 62

itself loyal to the emperor in spite of its replacement at the senate meeting, and

so could be trusted to ensure his safety to the best of its ability. Tiberius'

insecurity is marked by two events relating to the guards that occurred shortly

after the fall of Sejanus. His reaction to a proposal by Iunius Gallio that former

members of the guard be allowed to sit in the fourteen rows at the theatre

reserved for equites illustrates the sensitivity which the emperor felt concerning

the praetorians. Tacitus reports that, after hearing of the request, the emperor

wrote to Gallio, questioning his motives and accusing him of trying to subvert

the discipline of the guard. 87 Dio explains Tiberius' response as resulting from

the fear that Gallio was trying to persuade the guard to be loyal to the state

rather than to the emperor. 88 Such a modification - making the praetorians

indebted to the senate for one of their privileges - would subtly alter the

dynamics of the relationship between the guard and the emperor, representing a

loss of authority for Tiberius. Yet, at the beginning of the reign, it was Tiberius

himself who had claimed that the soldiers, presumably including the guard

among them, had allegiance to the state, not to him. 89 By this time, however, he

had recognized the power that rested in the praetorians and knew that he had

87
Tacitus, Annals 6.3.1-2. The date is AD 32. The result of Gallio's proposal was imprisonment in
Rome after a brief exile on Lesbos.
88
Dio 58.18.3-4.

89
Dio 57.2.3: KOCI EKEISI'I ye KO|a,i|/£\XT&(a,ev6<; xiq sni xo-oxcp (ppoupav cancp wq OUK exovxi 5o9f|Vcu
EOT|YT|0CXTO, tov TE xX,£-oaa|i6v amou cuvfJKE, Kod E(pr| Kai o n oi aTpananai COK i[iol ccXAa
8r||j.6aioi eioi.
 63

used it, and could use it again, to his own advantage. Gallio's transgression

reminded him of this fact.90

The second event occurred in AD 32. Togonius Gallus proposed that

Tiberius be given an armed guard composed of twenty senators who would

accompany him into their meetings. 91 Yet, it was the responsibility of the

praetorians to accompany the emperor to any meeting of the senate should he

return to Rome. 92 The proposal, then, by Gallus seems to have been an attempt

to relieve the guard of this duty, perhaps as a means of reinforcing the position

of the senate with the emperor, or of reducing the element of intimidation of the

senate which the armed escort of soldiers represented. But it is not surprising

that Tiberius did not respond well to the suggestion. Dio records that, shortly

after this incident, the emperor did request an escort into the senate house,

consisting of Macro and several military tribunes from the guard. Since Tiberius

never intended to go to Rome again, Dio suggests that Tiberius' purpose was to

prove to each group how he felt about them, and the message could not have

90
Levick (1976), 204 notes t h a t " . . . Gallio implied that Tiberius owed his survival to the loyalty of
the Guard, and Tiberius did not like being reminded of debts of that kind." Cf. also Campbell
(1994), 184: " . . . it was wise for [senators] to avoid the politically sensitive area of the emperor's
relationship with his troops."

91
Tacitus, Annals 6.2-4; Dio 58.17.3-4. It appears that Gallus had misinterpreted a request from the
emperor to have a consul escort him and act as a guard on a trip from Capri to Rome, as recorded
by Dio (58.10.2): mq yow ou8e xf|v 686v aoqtaX&c, jroif)oao0ai Swafievoq, xov exepov xcov "brcaxcov
H£XE7tep.\|/axo. The request is mentioned again at 58.13.3 when the consul Regulus goes to Capri to
accompany Tiberius.

92
Tacitus (Annals 1.7.5) includes this escort by the guard into the senate as one of the indications
that Tiberius had taken over the principate at the death of Augustus: miles in curiam comitabatitr.
See also Dio 58.17.4.
 64

been clearer: the senators were to stay in their place, and the praetorians would

be present to remind them of that. 93 That the senate would feel some uneasiness

regarding the role of the personal army of the emperor at this time would not be

unusual; the guard had proven their allegiance to Tiberius in the Sejanus affair

and, given the uncertain relations between him and the senate, the possibility

that force could be used against some of their members was always present. Dio

even reports that this proposal by Gallus caused Tiberius to become more

suspicious of the senate and as a result, he rewarded the guard in order to ensure

their continued loyalty. 94

In the reign of Tiberius, then, the praetorian guard began to develop into a

cohesive unit. The establishment of the Castra Praetoria not only provided a

practical solution to the housing of the guard, it also enabled the cohorts to

fraternize in a large group. Such interaction would have reinforced the attitude

that they were an elite unit, responsible for the security of the emperor himself

(even at the cost of the lives of influential citizens, or of members of the imperial

family), and the well-being of the state. Their importance was clearly illustrated

after the fall of Sejanus. At that time, Tiberius was generous in his rewards for

the continued loyalty of the cohorts, even though they had never been given the

opportunity to display their allegiance to him in a practical sense, being

93
Dio 58.18.5. Cf. also Tacitus, Annals 6.15.2.

94
Dio 58.18.2: xovc, 8e Sopucpopoix; KCU ^.oyoiq KOU xpfiuaai, Kainep toe xox> Seiavou (ppovrjcravxaq
ei8cbq, exiuriaev.
 65

sequestered in the camp before the event actually occurred. But, with the

praetorians recognizing their unique status during the principate of Tiberius, the

reign of Caligula was to see the influence of the guard on political matters even

more clearly, beginning with his accession.

 66

V. Caligula and Claudius

The question of the succession was of paramount importance in Rome

during the last years of Tiberius' reign, and it is likely that the praetorians

engaged in speculation among themselves over who would be the next emperor.

No matter who succeeded Tiberius, the role of the guard in the principate was

well established, but the attitude of the soldiers would have to be considered by

any who would aspire to the position of power. The praetorians may have had a

preference, perhaps being influenced by their prefect, who was actively

supporting Caligula, Tiberius' great-nephew (and grandson by adoption). 1 The

emperor was probably all too aware as well of the popularity of Caligula with

the military in general, including the praetorians. Germanicus had been greatly

admired, and Josephus reports that the army was especially fond of his son, to

the point that they were willing to die in order that he might become emperor. 2

Macro's movements in Tiberius' last years are difficult to ascertain. It is

likely that he spent much of his time going between Rome and Capri,

coordinating the various activities of the guard. 3 This freedom of movement

would have allowed him to keep informed about events in both places, much as

1
For a complete discussion of the difficulties surrounding the various candidates for the position,
see Barrett (1990), 37-40. The actions of Macro in the latter years of the reign are often understood
in light of this allegiance to Caligula, and even Tiberius himself is said to have noted it; cf.
Tacitus, Annals 6.45.3; 46.4. See also Dio 58.28.4; Philo, Legatio ad Gaium, 33-41; also 24; in Flaccum,
11-13; Suetonius, Tiberius 55.

2
Josephus, A] 18. 210.

3
See Balsdon (1934), 20; Levick (1976), 215; Schrombges (1986), 361, note 90.
 67

Sejanus had done before him. As a result of this surveillance, when the emperor

died on the sixteenth of March AD 37 at Misenum, the arrangements for a

smooth transition of power had already been put in place. 4 The first action had

been to send directives to the governors and the legionary commanders in the

provinces, probably making use of the speculatores as the messengers, since they

were able to travel quickly and discreetly. 5 That the prefect of the guard would

be the one to send out such an announcement, and that it seems to have been

done even before Tiberius was dead (if one accepts Tacitus' chronology), shows

where the authority rested in these last days. There is no mention of the senate or

the consuls being involved in the mechanics of this transference of power,

though Tacitus does report that meetings were held with men of importance in

the emperor's entourage. 6

Within two days of Tiberius' death, Macro had returned to Rome. It is

likely that the praetorians who had been with Tiberius as well as the fleet at

Misenum had already sworn the oath to the new emperor, and one of the

prefect's first tasks in the capital would have been to inform the rest of the guard

of the change of power and ensure their loyalty. The endorsement of the new

4
Whether Tiberius' death was due to natural causes, or was facilitated by outside forces is not
clear. See Tacitus, Annals 6.50.5; Suetonius, Tiberius 73.2; Caligula 12.2; Dio 58.28.4; Philo, Legatio
ad Gaium 25. Cf. Barrett (1990), 41; Balsdon (1934), 21-22. Tacitus (Annals 6.50.4) records that
Charicles, Tiberius' doctor, informed Macro of the impending death. Barrett (1990), 41 points out
that Charicles "seems to have been acting as Macro's agent."

5
Cf. Grant (1974), 141, and below, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 138.

6
Tacitus, Annals 6.50.4.
 68

emperor by the praetorians through the swearing of the oath had become an

integral part of the accession, and the initial approval of the guard was to become

even more significant to future emperors. It clearly illustrates the importance

that the personal troops of the emperor had attained in the dangerous period of

the transition of power. 7 The reaction of the soldiers to this particular change of

emperor is not recorded, but it may be assumed that they were pleased at the

promotion of the son of Germanicus. 8

Caligula was prompt in fulfilling the bequests left to the soldiers and the

citizens, in particular, in granting the donative to the guard. 9 The amount left to

them was doubled, and this increase must be seen as a means of rewarding the

praetorians for their support. As Barrett points out " [Caligula] thus became the

first, in a sense, to acknowledge, by such a gift, his debt to the Praetorians for his

accession, and he established a precedent for his successors." 10 Dio also adds

7
Barrett (1990), 53; Balsdon (1934), 25.

8
It took almost two weeks for Caligula to travel to Rome from Misenum. According to Suetonius,
members of the guard accompanied the procession to the city, as had happened after the death of
Augustus. Cf. Tiberius 75.3; Caligula 13. The purpose of this escort was twofold: as a mark of
respect for Tiberius, and to maintain crowd control, for Caligula was greeted by great numbers of
people as he travelled along the route.
9
Dio 59.2.1. See Scramuzza (1940), 61: "Their privileged position was emphasized anew when,
after the example of Augustus, Tiberius at his death left each man 1000 sesterces. It is clear that
henceforth every Emperor would make provisions in his will for the army, especially the Guard."
10
Barrett (1990), 60. Dio (59.2.3) records the amount given to the other city troops: 500 sesterces to
the urban cohorts and 300 to the vigiles as per Tiberius' bequest. Watson (1969), 109 considers the
donative to the latter unit to be "recompense for services rendered: the vigiles had been of
considerable assistance to [Tiberius] in his action against Sejanus." They had not been singled out
for grants under the conditions of Augustus' will; cf. Dio 56.32.3.
 69

that, at the time when Caligula distributed the money, he watched the

praetorians at drill, with members of the senate in attendance. This display is

reminiscent of Tiberius' demonstration in AD 25, and should be viewed as a

message to the senate in particular, but also to everyone else in Rome, of the

power of the emperor's personal troops. It also emphasized the close relationship

between Caligula and the praetorians, and was reinforced by the issue of a

sestertius showing the emperor addressing five soldiers, with the legend

ADLOCUT(io) COH(ortium). 11 Their prominence in the administration was thus

advertised to the greater public even more emphatically.

Though we have virtually no information about the guard in the first year

of Caligula's reign, they undoubtedly continued to perform the duties already

familiar under Tiberius. Rather than the pretorians, it is Macro who attracted

attention, for within a year of coming to power, Caligula had disposed of his

prefect. At some time after the recovery from his illness in the fall of AD 37,

Caligula apparently indicated to Macro that he was to have a new position, that

of prefect of Egypt. 12 The transfer would remove Macro from the command that

had the potential to do the greatest harm to Caligula, and would isolate him

from the capital and, perhaps more importantly, from the soldiers there. 13 The

11
RIC I 2 ,110, #32; see figure 3. The absence of SC on these coins has led to the theory that they
may have been used to pay the soldiers; see Sutherland (1987), 69-70; Balsdon (1934), 34; Grant
(1974), 143. Contra Barrett (1990), 268, note 50.

12
Dio 59.10.6. This is the only mention of the appointment in the sources. Cf. Stein (1950), 28.

13
No doubt this precaution had something to do with the actions of Macro while Caligula had
been ill. It may be that, during that time, the prefect had gone beyond what Caligula thought was
 70

reason for the move is not known, but the transfer clearly would have been

viewed by Macro as a demotion. 14 Yet he did not make it to Egypt. Early in AD

38, the prefect and his wife, Ennia, committed suicide. 15 An accusation had been

made against them, though the details are unclear. 16 It is possible that he was

involved in a conspiracy, but the evidence is insufficient to draw any firm

conclusions. 17 There is no indication that the guard itself was in any way

appropriate. For example, among his responsibilities would have been what might be considered
a minor task, that of giving the watchword to the guard. Technically, though, this action would
have placed the cohorts at Macro's disposal for whatever end he chose, and it may well have been
the subsequent mistrust over the ambitions of his prefect that prompted Caligula to act.

14
Though it was not until the Flavians that a definite cursus was established for these prefectures,
the position in Rome included control of the praetorians and a place close to the emperor.
Scholars are divided on which prefecture ranked highest. Those who argue for the praetorian
prefect include Durry (1938), 140; 146; Hurley (1993), 107; Christ (1984), 71; Grant (1974), 144.
Among those who believe that it was the prefect of Egypt are Barrett (1990), 273, note 24; Ferrill
(1991), 106; Griffin (1976), 83; de Visscher (1957a), 45; (1960), 250.

15
Dio 59.10.6; Suetonius, Caligula 26.1; Philo, Legatio ad Gaium 61. The suicides of Macro and
Ennia seem to have been motivated by a desire to retain their property within the family rather
than risk it being confiscated by the state. In fact, Macro was able to bequeath enough money to
his hometown of Alba Fucens for an amphitheatre to be constructed. Cf. de Visscher (1957a), 39-
49; (1957b), 176-178; (1960), 252-3.
16
Philo (Legatio ad Gaium 52-59) records that Caligula contrived charges against the prefect
because, among other things, he was tired of being reminded of the role Macro had played in the
succession, in particular in ensuring the loyalty of the praetorians after the death of Tiberius. Cf.
Barrett (1990), 78; Meise (1969), 247, with note 15; 249; Balsdon (1934), 38-9. But such an
explanation is likely to mask something more serious and, in fact, one of the official charges
against the prefect was sexual impropriety. Cf. Dio 59.10.6 (also 58.28.4); Philo, Legatio ad Gaium
39; 61; Tacitus, Annals 6.45.5; Suetonius, Caligula 12.2. See also Barrett (1990), 79; Hurley (1993),
34; Bauman (1974), 176; Balsdon (1934), 21; Meise (1969), 250, note 28.

17
Coincidentally, two other deaths of significance occurred around the time of Macro's demise:
those of Gemellus and Caligula's father-in-law, Marcus Silanus. Cf. Dio 59.8.1; 4-6; Suetonius,
Caligula 23.3. For Gemellus, see below, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 155-56.
Whether these three deaths are connected in any way is impossible to determine, and any
understanding of the events is complicated by the problems with chronology: was the
appointment of Macro to the prefecture of Egypt before or after the deaths of Gemellus and
Silanus? If evidence had emerged of some sort of arrangement between Gemellus and Silanus
(among others), it is likely that the prefect would have been implicated, because any plan needed
the support of the guard.
 71

implicated in Macro's downfall/and there is no record of its reaction to his

removal. 18

The praetorians took part in several events in Caligula's reign. At the

funeral of Drusilla, which was said to have been modelled after that of Augustus,

members of the guard took part in a decursio.19 The involvement of the

praetorians in such a display of honour for a person other than the emperor was

unprecedented, and the participation of the emperor's personal troops

emphasized the special bond between Caligula and his sister. In AD 39, things

started to come to a head. One incident dated to this year was the crossing from

Puteoli to Bauli on an artificially constructed bridge. 20 The reason for this event

has eluded both ancient and modern scholars, though it may simply have been

an extravagant spectacle.21 According to Suetonius, a great number of

praetorians accompanied the emperor on his trip across the bridge, again

18
It is not known when a new praetorian prefect was appointed to the post, nor do we know who
it was. Despite the assertion of several scholars that it was immediately after Macro's dismissal
that the command of the guard reverted to being shared by two men, this is not supported by the
sources, for Dio (59.11.2) speaks of only one praetorian prefect at the funeral of Drusilla in AD 38:
o'{ xe Sopvxpopoi [Link] %ox> apxovxoc, a<pcov. Contra Barrett (1990), 80; Balsdon (1934), 39-40, with
note 1; Grant (1974) 144; Hurley (1993), 199. By AD 41, there were two prefects, one of whom was
Marcus Arrecinus Clemens; see Suetonius, Caligula 56.1: praefectorum praetori; Dio 59.25.8: xoiiq
raapxo-uq. Cf. also Josephus, AJ 19.37. Nothing is known about Clemens' career prior to AD 41,
though from AJ 19.45, it seems that he may have been advanced in age by that time. Hurley
(1993), 199 is in error in saying that the elder Clemens was of senatorial rank; see Passerini (1940),
148.

19
Dio 59.11.2; cf. Suetonius, Caligula 24.1-2. See also Vogel (1973), 58; Balsdon (1934), 43.

20
According to Dio, the event took place in AD 39; cf. 59.17.7-8. But as Barrett (1990), 211 points
out, it is possible that the author included it in that year for convenience.

21
Cf. Maurer (1949), 100-101; Barrett (1990), 211-212; Hurley (1993), 73-74.
 72

allowing the power of the imperial household troops to be displayed to a large

audience. 22 Dio adds that, after Caligula had praised them for their resolve, he

rewarded them with a donative. 23 Since this grant is one of only three donatives

recorded for the reign, it is likely that there was significance to the act beyond

what is apparent in the sources, though it could be that the distribution of money

to the praetorians at a very public display reinforced to others the strength of the

guard and the special relationship between the soldiers and the emperor. 24

Under Caligula, the guard continued to perform various administrative

duties, such as assisting the vigiles or providing security at the games. Because

they were involved in such tasks, however, some scholars have concluded that

the praetorians were treated poorly during Caligula's reign, and therefore

readily joined the conspiracy which took his life.25 Yet, it must be noted that

most of these duties appear to have been no more than had been asked of the

guard by previous emperors, and after the death of Caligula, there was concern

that the praetorians would be outraged at the murder, which indicates that there

22
Suetonius, Caligula 19: comitante praetorianorum agmine. See also Josephus, A] 19.5-6.

23
Cf. Barrett (1990), 211, who suggests that the praise may have been due to the soldiers'
involvement in the construction of the bridge. Speidel (1994), 21-2 argues that the entire episode
was to show "the guard's readiness for a sudden strike by the engineering feat of the bridge . . . it
proved the mettle of the Caligula's household forces . . . "

24
It is possible that the grant of the donative was connected to the removal of Macro, though
there is no evidence of this in the sources. Cf. Cramer (1954), 111.
25
For example, Levick (1990), 29: "Gaius even antagonized the officers of the Praetorian Guard,
by inflicting cruel duties and personal humiliation on them."
 73

was still loyalty among the rank and file of the guard. That several praetorian

officers felt otherwise is indisputable, but the motivation for their action is not at

all clear. It is perhaps not surprising that the exact reasons for the assassination

are not known; for the plan to succeed, those involved had to maintain a high

level of secrecy.

The imperial praetorian guard had been developed by Augustus first and

foremost for his own protection. Though the soldiers had been involved in many

other tasks since the inception of the guard, the security of the emperor still

remained their primary function, the one to which all the others were

subordinated. It is remarkable, therefore, that, just over fifty years after their

introduction, members from this unit would be responsible for the assassination

of the man that they had sworn to protect. Yet, by AD 41, the guard was so

firmly established as a vital part of the management of the state that several of its

members were willing to risk their positions to advance other political aims

through the elimination of the emperor. It should be remembered, however, that

the conspiracy was restricted for the most part to a few officers. It is possible that

the close association of these men with the emperor and with the administration

meant that they were more easily influenced by the political scene around them,

and therefore were corruptible. They also had easy access to Caligula through

their personal contact with him. But they by no means represented the attitude of

the entire force, which on the whole remained loyal to Caligula. Nevertheless,
 74

the success in carrying out the assassination brought a increased recognition by

all involved in political life in Rome that the praetorians were a powerful corps,

and a potential threat, which must be taken into account in any decision taken by

the emperor.

Dio and Suetonius record that there had been other plots against Caligula

before AD 41, but they provide few details. 26 It is clear, however, that by AD 40,

discontent against the emperor was widespread. 27 The details of the conspiracy

are obscure, but officers of the guard appear to have been involved right from

the beginning. 28 One of the major players was the praetorian tribune, Cassius

Chaerea. 29 His participation is said to have resulted principally from resentment

26
For example, Suetonius, Caligula 56.1; Dio 59.25.5b; 26.4. Although scholars generally have
accepted the idea of two separate conspiracies in 40-41, Barrett (1990), 155 argues convincingly
for the events to be part of a single plot. A crucial element in the success of any conspiracy is
timing; it is unlikely that, given the constraints of time, two plots could have been conceived and
then attempted within the few months available after Caligula's return to Rome.

27
In that year, Caligula was granted an armed escort in the senate house, and guards for his
statues; cf. Dio 59.26.3. This is the first reference to the need for guards to be placed near statues
of the emperor, and it suggests that there had been a problem with vandalism or demonstrations
centred around the images. Cf. Barrett (1990), 294, note 29. Dio (59.30.1a) also notes that, after
Caligula's assassination, "his statues and his images were dragged from their pedestals . . . " It is
possible, however, that the need for guards was connected with some problem with those seeking
asylum at the statues. For the right of asylum associated with images of the emperors, see, for
example, the advice given to Agrippina Maior to grasp the statue of Augustus when accused by
Sejanus - Tacitus, Annals 4.67.6; cf. Bauman (1974), 85-87.

28
The text of Tacitus is missing for this period, and so we are forced to rely upon Josephus and
Dio for the details. It is possible, however, that Josephus made use of the history of Cluvius
Rufus, who may have been an eyewitness to the assassination; cf. below, Appendix 1, "The
Sources for the Julio-Claudian Period", 259.

29
For his career, see Demougin (1992), #419. He had been present at the mutiny of the armies on
the Rhine in AD 14 as an officer in one of the legions, and is described by Tacitus as a courageous
young man; see Annals 1.32.5. We know nothing of his career under Tiberius. Balsdon (1934), 102-
03 is incorrect in assuming Chaerea had not received any promotions since AD 14, for his
tribunate in the guard was an advancement from his position in the legions, whatever he had
done in between.
 75

at the many personal insults to which he had been subjected by the emperor. 30

The inclusion of officers in the conspiracy suggests that the hostility against

Caligula was rooted in something which had a direct effect on them rather than

on the guard in general; it is impossible to say, however, what their

dissatisfaction with him might have been.

The plot against Caligula was successfully executed in January of AD 41. 31

The details of the assassination are obscure. 32 But it is the involvement of the

praetorians in the murder of Caligula that is significant. This was the first time

that the emperor's private guard had taken part in an overtly political action.

Although the impetus came from the officers, and the reasons which led to the

act were varied and remain unknown for the most part, it was inevitable that a

few of the rank and file of the guard would be drawn in by the conspirators who

needed their cooperation, probably in anticipation of a reward. On the other

hand, the murder of Caligula by the very soldiers who had taken an oath to

protect him signalled a transformation in the imperial attitude towards the

guard. The emperor's personal troops had played an important role at the

transition of power between Augustus and Tiberius, and between Tiberius and

Caligula by helping to ensure a smooth succession. Now, however, members

30
Josephus, AJ 19.21; Suetonius, Caligula 56.2; Dio 59.29.2; Seneca, De Cons.18.3-4; Pausanias
9.27.4.
31
For a discussion of the exact date, see Wardle (1991), 158-165.

32
Cf. below, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 159-161.
 76

from the same unit had been the primary means by which the next succession

had taken place, through an act of murder, and the assassins were men who had

been promoted by the emperor himself. Such a step demonstrated to all that the

praetorians could have a immense impact in the political arena in Rome, and sent

a message to Claudius, and to those who came after him, that the officers of the

guard in particular must be carefully chosen and closely monitored.

Shortly after the assassination of Caligula, Claudius found himself in the

praetorian camp under the protection of the entire guard. 33 The next day, the

urban cohorts and vigiles joined in swearing the oath of loyalty to the new

emperor. 34 The urban cohorts may have been convinced to accept Claudius in

the hope of receiving a sizable reward from the new emperor, since the

praetorian guard had been promised a considerable donative by him for their

loyalty. 35 The grant of a donative upon a change of emperor was not unusual,

33
The actions of the guard after the murder are vague, for the account is garbled in Josephus and
difficult to unravel. He offers two versions: that the praetorians decided at a meeting that they
must provide their own candidate for emperor if they were to safeguard their position; their
choice was Claudius. See A] 19.162-165. The second version records that the acclamation occurred
by accident when a soldier named Gratus stumbled upon Claudius hiding in the palace as
members of the guard were rampaging through it; Gratus saluted him as emperor, and along
with his comrades, escorted him back to the camp. See AJ 19.214-226; cf. also Suetonius, Claudius
10; Dio 60.1-3; Aurelius Victor, Caes 3.16. There are problems with both of these scenarios,
however, and it is more likely that Claudius himself is implicated in the transfer of power, having
prearranged with some of the conspirators (perhaps a group acting separately from Chaerea and
his colleagues) a place in the palace where he could be found. Cf. Levick (1990), 35; 38; Barrett
(1996), 72. Dio (60.1.3) may provide additional support for his involvement, for the wording of
the text suggests that the soldiers were searching for someone specific.

34
Josephus, A] 19.253; BJ 2.211-212; Suetonius, Claudius 10.4; Dio 60.1.4.
35
The amount of donative to be given by Claudius was either 15,000 sesterces (Suetonius,
Claudius 10.4 where it is, in fact, only "promised") or 20,000 sesterces (Josephus, A] 19.247 where
a donative is also "promised" to the rest of the army). Cf. Levick (1990), 32; Mortershead (1986),
50.
 77

though Suetonius records this particular instance as setting a precedent: primus

Caesarutn fidem militis etiam praemio pigneratus.36 Upon his accession, however,

Caligula had doubled the amount left to the praetorians in Tiberius' will, and it

can be argued that that was the first time a reward had been given to the guard

in exchange for its loyalty in the future. 37 Nevertheless, it is true that the

donative given by Claudius was unique in that its size was larger than any

previously bestowed, being five times the annual salary for a praetorian. 38 It has

been suggested that, rather than the purchase of loyalty, the grant was made in

lieu of any bequest from Caligula, but it seems clear that Claudius was interested

in rewarding the praetorians for their role in his succession. 39 Evidence for this

comes from two coins issued under Claudius; the first, with the legend

IMPER(ator [or -atore]) RECEPT(us [or -o]), shows the praetorian camp with a

figure holding a spear and standing in front of a standard. 40 The other coin

36
Suetonius, Claudius 10.4. Maxfield (1986), 28 remarks on Claudius' generosity to the praetorians
in particular which "emphasiz[ed] the political character of many of these gifts - bribes to ensure
and reward the loyalty of the army."

37
Barrett (1990), 175. Sutherland (1987), 76 and Durry (1938), 366 agree with the assessment of
Suetonius.
38
Campbell (1984), 166-68 points to the "violent upheavals of the republic" as precedent for such
a huge donative but suggests that the Claudian figure may have been "merely a convenient
round sum." Cf. also Balsdon (1934), 105 who comments that "the troops were in a position to
assess the value of the support that they were going to give [Claudius]."

39
Garzetti (1974), 108.
40
RIC l 2 (1984), 122, #7. See figure 4. Grant (1974), 151: "These issues are unique in Roman
imperial numismatics and military history. No other emperor, before or after Claudius, blatantly
advertised that he owed the praetorians his throne." Cf. also Sutherland (1987), 75-76; Instinsky
(1952/54), 7-8. Clay (1982), 42-43, however, argues that this figure is not a soldier as has been
accepted traditionally, but rather is a female goddess representing Fides Praetorianorum,
 78

depicts Claudius clasping hands with a soldier who has a shield and carries the

standard; the legend reads PRAETOR. RECEPT.41 They first were minted in AD

41-2, but the type was reissued throughout the first five years of Claudius' reign,

and must have been intended to reinforce the importance of the praetorians in

his rule. 42 The guard also was given one hundred sesterces per man on the

anniversary date of the accession of the new emperor. There can be little doubt

that Claudius understood the need not only to continue to show his gratitude to

the praetorians, but also to keep the message of their support for him before the

senate and the people through the continued minting of these coins. 43

One of Claudius' first acts as emperor was to execute Chaerea for his

involvement in the conspiracy. By now, he had assured himself of the support of

the guard and the execution of one of the tribunes was not likely to result in any

hostility. In fact, the attitude of the praetorians after the murder, as it had been

during crises in the past, was one of pragmatism. It is possible that, for many of

the soldiers, the change in emperor was of limited significance. As long as their

needs were looked after and they were well rewarded for their continued

illustrating the trust which Claudius had in the guard. The use of dextrarum iunctio on the other
coin reinforces this idea.
41
RIC l 2 (1984), 122, #11-12. See figure 5. Campbell (1994), 185: "They are so unusual, with their
clear emphasis on comradely spirit and mutual support of emperor and soldier, that Claudius
himself may have been directly responsible for their design. They celebrate an association
between emperor and soldiers that Augustus had been at pains to conceal."

42
Cf. Levick (1990), 39.
43
See Dio 60.12.4. Cf. Mottershead (1986), 50; Levick (1978), 95.
 79

loyalty, there was little incentive to become involved in political intrigue. On the

other hand, it certainly was in the new emperor's best interests to be rid of

Chaerea: "Claudius recognized that he owed his own elevation in no small

degree to Chaerea, but also saw the danger in the precedent of regicide." 44 The

praetorian prefect, Clemens, who had refused to participate in the conspiracy,

also disappears from the sources at this point, though it is not clear what

happened to him. 45

Throughout Claudius' reign, the guard was employed in much the same

way as under his predecessors, though often with additional emphasis on their

importance in his accession. Praetorians accompanied Claudius in the senate,

though by this time their attendance was not unusual since both Tiberius and

Caligula had had similar escorts of soldiers. 46 But, by their presence, they also

provided a constant reminder to the senators of the way in which Claudius had

come to power. 47 The guard continued to be involved in such routine tasks in

the city as the fighting of fires and providing security at the games. It is in the

44
Barrett (1990), 176.

45
Josephus mentions that Rufrius Pollio was appointed as the new praetorian prefect by Claudius
immediately after his accession, and it has been assumed that Clemens was replaced; cf. Josephus,
A] 19.267. See also Jung (1972), 385; Barrett (1990), 176. Yet, this is by no means certain, and it is
possible that Clemens was joined by Pollio in the prefecture, and that it was the other prefect who
was dismissed.

46
Suetonius, Claudius 12.1; cf. above, "Tiberius", 63, note 92.

47
By 42, Claudius was attended in the senate by the prefects as well, and in 44, Rufrius Pollio was
granted his own seat there. Cf. Dio 60.16. 3.
 80

this reign that we first hear of soldiers, under the command of their tribunes and

the prefect, taking part in beast hunts. 48 Claudius was also acutely aware of the

dangers associated with being emperor, considering how he had attained power

and the subsequent antagonism of the senate. The emperor's concern about his

own security, therefore, led to increased activity for the praetorians, as he took

measures to protect himself that seem to border on paranoia. 49 For example,

praetorians were forbidden to enter the houses of senators, possibly to suppress

any communication between the emperor's personal guard and those whom he

had good reason to mistrust. 50 When a rumour circulated that the emperor had

been assassinated, the people were furious with the guard because they thought

that the soldiers had failed to protect him. 51 Soldiers also were present during

banquets, though whether this was something new is uncertain. 52 Clearly there

was danger for Claudius, acknowledged not only by him, but also by the general

population.

48
Suetonius, Claudius 21.3: Africanas conficiente turma equitum praetorianorum, ducibus tribunis
ipsoque praefecto. Gaggero (1990), 483, note 10 argues that the prefect was Rufrius Pollio. See
below, "The Guard in Civil Administration", 206-207.

49
In AD 42, an attempt was made against Claudius by Lucius Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus
and Annius Vinicianus; cf. Suetonius, Claudius 13.2; Dio 60.15.1-16.3. Cf. Levick (1990), 60; 208,
note 19; Ehrhardt (1978), 62-3. The trial of the conspirators was held in the presence of the
praetorian prefects, according to Dio (60.16.3). See below, "The Guard in Civil Administration",
218.

50
Durry (1938), 366, interprets Suetonius, Claudius 25.1 - milites domus senatorias salutandi causa
ingredi etiam patrum decreto prohibuit - as referring specifically to the praetorians. See also
Campbell (1984), 36.

51
Suetonius, Claudius 12.3; Levick (1978), 87.

52
Suetonius, Claudius 35.1. See below, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 139.
 81

Yet, in spite of these measures, it seems that there were times when even

the security of the guard was breached. In AD 51 during a food shortage, a

crowd of people accosted Claudius in the Forum, and demanded action; he

barely escaped to the palace with the help of the praetorians. 53 It is odd that the

mob should have been able to get so near to the emperor, given the presence of

the soldiers and his own paranoia. We also hear of a certain Gnaeus Nonius who

appeared armed before Claudius at the morning reception, and of another

attempt against the emperor by an individual who had gained access to his

bedroom. 54 The success of these men in getting through to the princeps when the

guard was there to protect him, especially given the additional precautions taken

by Claudius, suggests either serious problems with security or, more likely,

complicity of guard members, though it is impossible to determine the exact

reason.

The first half of Claudius' reign provides little information on the

praetorian prefects. There was a quick succession of men in one of the two

positions in these years, which may suggest that the emperor was concerned

about the loyalty of his commanders. The man appointed upon Claudius'

accession was Rufrius Pollio. Nothing is known about this man prior to his

53
Suetonius, Claudius 18.2; Tacitus, Annals 12.43.1. Dio (60.33.10), however, dates this incident to
AD 53 and blames Agrippina for the riot, but see Barrett (1996), 121.

54
Tacitus, Annals 11.22.1; Suetonius, Claudius 13.1. These episodes could have provided the
initiative for Claudius to have visitors searched when they arrived for their morning meeting; see
Suetonius, Claudius 35.1; Dio 60.3.3.
 82

appointment. Sometime before AD 43, he had been joined in the prefecture by

Catonius Iustus, though we have no knowledge of when this occurred, or of

what had happened to his predecessor. 55 Pollio was among those who

accompanied Claudius to Britain in AD 43, no doubt as one of the emperor's

inner circle. He also may have been involved in the administration of those

guard members who were along to provide protection for the emperor. Upon his

return, Pollio was granted a triumphal statue and the right to a seat in the senate

whenever he attended with Claudius. 56 He disappears from our sources after

this and we do not know the exact date of his removal from the prefecture. 57

According to Dio's chronology, the other prefect, Iustus, fell into

disfavour with Messalina and was put to death in AD 43. 58 It has been assumed

that the departure of Pollio to Britain in that year necessitated the transfer of the

55
Iustus had been primi ordims centurio in AD 14 in Pannonia under the command of Quintus
Iunius Blaesus, but his career in the intervening period is unknown. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 1.29.2; see
Demougin (1992), #428.

56
Dio 60.23.2. He apparently was joined in this honour by Publius Graecinius Laco, the prefect of
the vigiles at the fall of Sejanus; he also had gone to Britain with Claudius, and was granted a
statue and a seat in the senate, as well as the consular ornamenta, and appointed procurator of
Gaul. Cf. Dio 58.9.4; 60.23.3.

57
It may be he who appears in the catalogue of those greeting Claudius in the Apocolocyntosis,
where two praetorian prefects are listed. One is Catonius Iustus; the other name has been restored
to Pollio. Cf. Roncali (1990), on 13.5; Ehrhardt (1978), 66; Meise (1969), 143. The difficulty with the
emendation is that the list seems to consist of those who were victims of Claudius' regime, and
there is no other evidence that Pollio belongs in that category, though Barrett (1996), 88 believes
that he was executed. Cf. also Eden (1984), 142.

58
Dio 60.18.3. Cf. Levick (1990), 56-57; Barrett (1996), 87; Dorey (1966), 150; Meise (1969), 140,
note 64; 143.
 83

command of the praetorian guard in Rome to the consul, Lucius Vitellius. 59 It

would have been very unusual, however, for a senator to have been given this

responsibility because the position had been reserved for equestrians from its

inception. Moreover, since we have evidence of Claudius' mistrust of senators, it

is unlikely that he would have entrusted his personal guard to the highest

ranking member of the senate. We know that he even took senators with him to

Britain "to be kept from mischief in Rome." 60 The burdens which fell to the

consul in the absence of the emperor would have been quite extensive without

the additional obligation of managing the guard, the majority of which would

have remained in Rome.61

But if Vitellius did not have command of the praetorians when Pollio

accompanied the emperor to Britain, there would need to be a second prefect

who remained in Rome. This man would have to be someone whom Claudius

felt he could trust and, in fact, there is a suitable candidate in Rufrius Crispinus,

who possibly was a relative of Pollio.62 Crispinus was prefect in AD 47 when he

59
Dio 60.21.2: xcp Omxe^Mco xcp AOUKUO xcp owdp^ovxi xa xe a>Aa m i xovq axpaxicbxaq
evexeipioe. Cf. also Suetonius, Vitellius 2.4: curam quoque imperii sustinuit absente [Claudio]
expeditione Britannica. See Melmoux (1988), 650; Levick (1990), 142: "In Rome Claudius entrusted
everything to Vitellius, including command of the troops, probably appointing him Prefect of the
City, even of the Guard as well."
60
Levick (1990), 142.

61
Another explanation is possible if one understands the axpaxicbxocc; in Dio as referring only to
the urban cohorts, with Vitellius then given the same jurisdiction as an urban prefect, to
command them and look after affairs in the city.

62
Tacitus, Annals 13.45.4; Dio 61.11.2. Cf. Levick (1990), 207, note 9. For Crispinus, see Demougin
(1992), #586.
 84

was sent by Claudius (at the instigation of Messalina) to arrest Valerius

Asiaticus. 63 That year has been construed to be the one in which he was made

prefect, but there is no firm evidence to support this, and it is plausible that he

had been appointed as early as AD 43, especially if he was recommended by

Pollio, who was highly regarded by the emperor. 64 Crispinus was handsomely

rewarded for his action in arresting Asiaticus, being granted the insignia praetoria

and given a million and a half sesterces. 65 Joined in the command of the guard

by Lucius Lusius Geta before 48, it was in that year that the two prefects were

involved in the downfall of Messalina. 66

The affair of Messalina and Gaius Silius emphasized the vital role of the

guard in the reign of Claudius. 67 There can be little doubt that there was some

fear among his advisors that members of the guard might be convinced to desert

to the side of Silius and Messalina. 68 As wife of the emperor, she would have

63
Tacitus, Annals 11.1.3.

64
An earlier date for Crispinus' appointment is also suggested by the enmity which Agrippina
felt towards him, for she suspected him of sympathies towards Messalina and her children, and
had him removed in AD 51 along with his colleague. See Tacitus, Annals 12.42.2; below, 90.

65
Tacitus, Annals 11.1.3; 4.3. Cf. Barrett (1996), 122 who refers to him as "playing an active role as
Messalina's hireling." Crispinus may also have been awarded the insignia consnlaria at a later
date; cf. Tacitus, Annals 16.17.2. Many scholars believe that Tacitus has erred in this passage. See,
for example, Syme (1958), 747; Rudich (1993), 298. But Griffin (1984), 68 argues that Crispinus
was so honoured, in consolation for losing the praetorian prefecture to Burrus in 51. Cf. also
Durry (1938), 176; Passerini (1939), 280.

66
Cf. Melmoux (1983), 354-55. For Geta, see Demougin (1992), #484.
67
On the question of whether there was a conspiracy, see Barrett (1996), 91-94; Meise (1969), 123-
168; Bauman (1974), 177-88.

68
Most scholars have accepted the story of the replacement of Geta by Narcissus as prefect for the
day; cf. Durry (1938), 367, with note 3; Passerini (1939), 280, who even gives Narcissus his own
 85

had a personal escort of praetorians, undoubtedly among those attendants said

to have gone with her when she visited Silius!69 There was probably

apprehension that these soldiers could have been used by her in an attempt to

subvert their colleagues, much as Agrippina was later accused of doing. 70 But, in

reality, it is extremely unlikely that any of the praetorians would have

considered deserting Claudius. 71 It was simply the perception that the guard

could be influenced by Messalina that caused concern, and that resulted in the

removal of both her and her followers. 72

entry as prefect; Barrett (1996), 77; 92; 122; 128; Levick (1990), 65; Mehl (1974), 80, who includes
Geta as an active participant in a conspiracy; Dorey (1966), 153, especially with note 7. Yet, the
only evidence for this substitution is a passage from Tacitus, in which he records a private
conversation between Claudius and his advisors. Cf. Annals 11.33: trepidabatur nihilo minus a
Caesare: quippe Getae praetorii praefecto hand satis fidebant, ad honesta sen prava iuxta levi. ergo
Narcissus adsumptis quibus idem metus, non aliam spem incolumitatis Caesari adfirmat, quam si ius
militum uno Mo die in aliquem libertorum transferred seque offert suscepturum. Since there was still
concern at this time over whether the loyalty of any of the praetorians had been compromised, it
does not seem logical for a change of command to be considered before the attitude of the guard
was known. Tacitus is concerned to stress here that the guard was given over to the command of
a freedman, for he uses the expression in aliquem libertorum transferred and only then mentions
that Narcissus offered himself for the job. It may be that the point of the sentence, therefore, is to
highlight the power to which Narcissus had risen.

69
Tacitus, Annals 11.12.3.

70
See below, "Nero", 98.

71
Sympathy for her cause might be gained through the presentation of Britannicus to the
praetorians; as an infant, he had been commended to the soldiers by Claudius. See Suetonius,
Claudius 27.2; cf. Mottershead (1986), 113. It seems that members of one of the imperial
gladiatorial schools as well as some of the vigiles were involved. Both the procurator ludi, Sulpicius
Rufus and the prefect of the vigiles, Decrius Calpurnianus, were removed after the exposure of the
affair. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 11.35.3. See also Mottershead (1987), 108; Meise (1969), 156-7.

72
For the details, see below, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 164-166.
 86

It was under Claudius that recruitment for the guard was first extended

beyond the central regions of Italy.73 For some time, there had been soldiers

from the Anauni, an Alpine community, serving as praetorians and even

reaching the rank of officer, though the tribe did not have Roman citizenship. It

is not clear how many soldiers were involved, how they had been able to obtain

such privileges, nor how long this practice had been going on. It was partly

because of the Anauni serving in his guard that Claudius decided to extend

citizenship to the tribe as a whole. The grant was detailed in an inscription which

dates to 46.74 The relevant lines of the inscription are: quod | pler[i]que ex eo genere

hominum etiam militare in praetorio \ meo dicuntur, quidam vero ordines quoque

duxisse. These men had used their usurped status to join the guard, but Claudius

viewed this in a positive manner since they had served the princeps faithfully,

and he confirmed what in principal they already had as praetorians. 75 Rather

than granting citizenship to a few, however, he chose to extend it to the tribe as a

whole. 76 The entire episode is somewhat puzzling, since it is difficult to

73
For recruitment in the guard, see above, "Augustus", 28-29.

74
CIL 5.5050. For the inscription in general, see Frezouls (1981), 238-252. Durry (1938), 241, 252
connects the extention of recruitment to the increase in the number of cohorts which he had
attributed to Claudius, but now, see above, "Tiberius", 43-48. Cf. also Levick (1978), 91;
Scramuzza (1940), 129-134.
75
One of the prerequisites to being a soldier in the guard was Roman citizenship, and the length
of time that these men had served meant that they virtually possessed it, as shown by lines 25-26
of the inscription: cum longa \ usurpatione in possessionem einsfuisse dicatur. Cf. Frezouls (1981), 249.
76
Frezouls (1981), 246-7. Scramuzza (1940), 277, note 11 notes that "the acquisition of the
franchise by irregular and surreptitious methods was an old practice", but Frezouls (1981), 244,
note 31 points out that this claim pertains to individuals, not entire communities.
 87

comprehend how these men could have gained such status without citizenship,

though the methods of record keeping for new recruits may not have been

precise. Why Claudius felt compelled to grant citizenship to the entire tribe

rather than just to those men who were members of his household troops is also

not clear. If they had served for a considerable length of time, it simply may have

been a generous gesture on the part of the emperor.

The guard appears only occasionally in the sources for the remaining

years of Claudius' principate, but there can be little doubt that the praetorians

were always visible in the city and were displayed by the emperor at every

opportunity. 77 Claudius was astute enough to realize the advantages which

could be gained from keeping his praetorians in the public eye, given the

dissatisfaction of the senate with his rule. In AD 49, shortly after Claudius had

married his niece Agrippina, a tribune of the guard was sent to ensure that Lollia

Paulina (who had been perceived as a rival by the empress) carried out the order

of suicide. 78 It is possible to see Agrippina's hand in this, and before long, she

had also begun to ensure the loyalty of the praetorian officers to her and to her

cause (namely the promotion of her son Nero) through the replacement of some

of the tribunes and centurions. The officers removed were those who had shown

77
For example, in AD 49, they were with Claudius when Mithridates was paraded before the
public; two years later, the guard was exhibited before the camp to Caratacus and the people of
Rome in what once again must have been a show of power. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 12.21; 36.10. See
Barrett (1996), 124. The same reasoning was behind the display of the guard when Tiridates came
to Rome in AD 66; cf. Dio 63.4.2-3; Suetonius, Nero 13.1.

78
Tacitus, Annals 12.22.3; cf. Dio 60.32.4.
 88

sympathy for Britannicus. The empress clearly understood the need for the

praetorians to be supportive of Nero in any struggle for the principate which

might occur after Claudius' death, and she knew that, in the past, the way this

had been accomplished was through the officers. Agrippina's methods of

replacing these men were such that her intentions could not be questioned, for

she invented reasons for the dismissal of some of the soldiers, and had others

promoted. 79 We do not have any information about the reaction of these officers

to their transfers, but it is possible that there was some ill will among those

dismissed, since discharge from the city cohorts was bound to cause bitterness. It

is also likely that the contingent of the guard that had been assigned to protect

Britannicus had already been replaced by soldiers appointed by Agrippina, for

the sources mention that he was virtually a prisoner in his isolation, and the use

of the guard to enforce such segregation is well attested. 80 These manoeuvres by

Agrippina will not have gone unnoticed by the rank and file of the praetorians.

Their attitude to such a high-level reorganization is not known, though the

replacement of officers would have had a direct effect on them.

79
Tacitus, Annals 12.41.2: simul qui centurionum tribunorumque sortem Britannia miserabantur, remoti
fictis causis et alii per speciem honoris. Cf. Barrett (1996), 118-21. The nature of this action by
Agrippina must be that she recommended to Claudius that certain officers be replaced and others
promoted, for she had no authority of her own to accomplish such changes. The promotion from
the rank of officer in the guard, especially from centurion, to the centurionate of a legion was a
common practice. See below, "The Guard in Civil Administration", 188-194.

80
Tacitus, Annals 12.26.2; cf. Dio 60.32.6. See below, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit",
150-151.
 89

In AD 50, Nero was adopted by Claudius, and the following year, a

donative was given to the troops upon his assumption of the toga virilis.81 It is

recorded that Nero also announced a decursio of the praetorians and even led

them himself, shield in hand. 82 Such a display will have served to ingratiate the

young man to the soldiers, and to promote a close bond between them. Soon

after Nero's entry into public life, Agrippina further strengthened her position

through the replacement of the two prefects by one man, Sextus Afranius

Burrus. 83 The reason which she supposedly gave to Claudius for the dismissal of

Crispinus and Geta was the need for stricter discipline for the praetorians; she

argued that this would be accomplished more easily through the command of a

single prefect. It is not clear whether there had been problems with the control of

the guard, though it is possible that Agrippina was able to use as an excuse the

demonstration over food shortages which that same year had put Claudius in

81
Tacitus, Annals 12.41.2.
82
Suetonius, Nero 7.2: indictaque decursione praetorianis scutum sua rnanu praetulit. Cf. Speidel
(1994), 27. The military decursio was the precursor of the funereal type; cf. Richard (1966), 314,
note 2. During Nero's reign, a coin was issued which illustrated the decursio scene; it may have
been to commemorate this event, though it also served to reinforce the close relationship between
the emperor and his guard. Cf. RIC I 2 ,162, #163-173; Grant (1974), 165. See figure 6.

83
Tacitus, Annals 12.42.2; Dio 60.32.6a. Geta was given the post of prefect of Egypt, a move which
had been used in the past to remove praetorian prefects from Rome. Cf. "Tiberius", 39, note 11
(Seius Strabo); above, 69-70 (Macro). He was to remain in that post until AD 54 at least, for we
have an inscription from Egypt dated to that year which refers to him; cf. ILR 1.1118 (=OG 1.664).
The inscription dates to some time after the death of Claudius. The cognomen Tezaq has been
erased. Cf. Hirschfeld (1963), 347, note 3. Geta's colleague, Crispinus, outlived Agrippina, and his
next appearance in our sources is when he is accused of involvement in the Pisonian conspiracy
in AD 65. See below, "Nero", 108.
 90

some danger in the Forum. 84 Of greater significance to Agrippina than Claudius'

security, however, the appointment of Burrus eliminated those prefects whom

she perceived as having been supportive of Messalina, and thus loyal to

Britannicus. 85 It seems clear that, with Nero now able to stand for office,

Agrippina was anticipating that the struggle between Nero and Britannicus

would not be far off, and wanted to ensure that her partisans were in the

positions from which they could provide the greatest assistance. 86

Burrus was well known to the imperial family. He was from Vasio in

Gallia Narbonensis where an inscription was set up in his honour:

Vasiens. Voc. | patrono, | Sex. Afranio Sex. f. |

Volt. Burro, | trib. mil., proc. Augus | tae, proc.
Ti. Caesar., | proc. divi Claudi, | praef. pra[e ]tori,
orna | m[enf]is consular. 87

84
Barrett (1996), 121.
85
The timing of the replacement is interesting, since both Crispinus and Geta had been able to
continue in their positions until AD 51, that is, for three years after the death of Messalina, and for
two years after Agrippina's marriage to the emperor. Levick (1990), 74 believes that there were
two other prefects appointed after the fall of Messalina and before the appointment of Burrus.
There is, however, no evidence for this idea and it is difficult to understand why a change of
prefects at that time would not have elicited a comment from our sources. Scholars often have not
fully considered the time lapse before Agrippina had the prefects dismissed; for example, Rudich
(1993) 148: "Upon Messalina's fall, [Crispinus] was dismissed under pressure from Agrippina,
who had championed Afranius Burrus... "

86
Cf. Levick (1990), 74; Sutherland (1985), 86; Faider (1929), 186. Of course, Agrippina had
already arranged that several of the tribunes and centurions would support Nero; as Barrett
(1996), 121 notes, "the change of officers at a lower level would have an effect on the rank and file
which the more remote prefect could not possibly match."

87
CIL 12.5842 (=ILS 1321). Cf. Demougin (1992), #552; Barrett (1996), 122; McDermott (1949), 230-
234. Three other inscriptions associate Burrus with this area in Gaul; cf. ibid, 233-4.
 91

Burrus had been tribunus militum as a young man, though it is not known where,

and there is no other record of military service. 88 Tacitus refers to him as egregiae

militaris famae, but this distinction could refer to the respect which the praetorians

had for him when he was their commander rather than to any experience in the

field.89 He began his civil career as procurator for Livia, and after her death, was

retained by Tiberius and Claudius. 90 The connection with the imperial

household would have brought him into contact with Agrippina, and his

appointment as praetorian prefect should be viewed in that context. 91 At some

point, Burrus also was awarded the consularia ornamenta, a detail recorded on the

inscription at Vasio, but neglected by the historians. 92 We do not know when or

88
Burrus' date of birth was probably in the last decade of the first century BC; cf. Barrett (1996),
122. For possible explanations for the lack of further military service, see Bloch (1885), 4-5; de la
Ville de Mirmont (1910), 85.

89
Annals 12.42.1. A similar term (militum fama) is used of a later praetorian prefect, Faenius Rufus,
though no military experience other than the command of the guard is known for him either. Cf.
Tacitus, Annals 14.51.3; Griffin (1976), 82, note 5. Syme (1958), 623-4 notes the possibility that
Tacitus hailed from the same region as Burrus and was "amicably disposed" towards him, hence
the exaggeration of military distinction.

90
It is possible that he also had held the same position under Caligula whose name has been
omitted from the inscription. Cf. de la Ville de Mirmont (1910), 83; McDermott (1949), 233. In
order to explain the reference in Tacitus to Burrus' military distinction, some scholars have
postulated that his posting under these emperors was as governor in a procuratorial province; cf.
Bloch (1885), 6-8; de la Ville de Mirmont (1910), 85-6. But such a position was not likely to bring
military fame since it was mostly civil in character. See Barrett (1996), 122; McDermott (1949), 232;
Waltz (1910), 244.

91
Cf. Waltz (1909), 171; Durry (1938), 368 even refers to Burrus as "Agrippina's creature."
McDermott (1949), 248-254, however, sees Burrus as a protege of Seneca.

92
This omission is unusual, since it is possible that he was the first praetorian prefect to receive
such an honour. Cf. Bloch (1885), 15; McDermott (1949), 233. But see above, note 65.
 92

why he was honoured in this way, though it is possible that his role in the

accession of Nero provided the rationale. 93

Agrippina had to wait for three years after the appointment of Burrus

before Nero came to power. Claudius died in AD 54, either of natural causes or

aided by his wife, and everything had been thoroughly prepared for the

sequence of events which followed. 94 All knowledge of the emperor's death was

kept secret, and Britannicus and his two sisters were kept isolated, no doubt

watched over by members of the guard. 95 Even the praetorians were not

informed, which is ironic given the role they were to play in the accession of the

new emperor. Such a precaution seems to indicate a lack of confidence that

everything would go smoothly despite all the careful planning. The concern may

have been that there were some among the guard who would question the

whereabouts of Britannicus as Claudius' natural son, and cause dissension

among the soldiers. Finally, however, Burrus and Nero approached the cohort

on duty at the palace and, at the command of the prefect, Nero was cheered by

93
Barrett (1996), 122; Griffin (1984), 69; McDermott (1949), 233. Bloch (1885), 16, however, argues
that the grant occurred under Claudius because he freely gave such distinctions to others.
94
On the question of murder, see Barrett (1996), 140-42. The preparations included the removal of
Narcissus from Rome, since it was believed he could have caused problems for the smooth
transfer of power. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 12.65.2-66.1; Dio 60.34.4; Barrett (1996), 139-40.

95
Tacitus, Annals 12.68.2-3. The guard was used to restrict access to the palace until the
appropriate time. These arrangements are reminiscent of those taken by Livia at the death of
Augustus; see above, "Tiberius", 37.
 93

the praetorians and then taken to their camp. 96 No mention is made in the

sources of who was responsible for these arrangements, but it is probable that

Burrus had acted in concert with Agrippina. Both Tacitus and Suetonius record

that the delay in proclaiming the new emperor was to allow Nero to take over at

the best time as calculated by astrologers, but it was probably also to guarantee

that there would be no problem with the guard at the transfer of power. 97 The

involvement of Burrus in the planning process would have ensured that the

contingent on guard at the palace was one whose commander was favourable to

Agrippina (and thus to Nero), and so it was easy to silence the few grumblings

about Britannicus heard after the reception of Nero at the palace. Yet, Tacitus

uses language that suggests that the cheers of the praetorians for the new

emperor were not spontaneous but had to be prompted by Burrus, and so the

precautions which had been taken by Agrippina may have been warranted. 98

Upon his arrival in the Castra Praetoria, Nero gave a speech in which he

promised the same size of donative which his adoptive father had given to the

soldiers. There can be little doubt that this was to ensure future loyalty and was

not a condition of Claudius' will. The entire guard immediately swore the oath to

96
Tacitus, Annals 12.68.3-69.3; cf. Josephus, A J 20.151-2; Suetonius, Claudius 45.1; Nero 8; Dio
61.3.1.

97
Cf. Barrett (1996), 142; Griffin (1984), 33; Timpe (1962), 100.
98
Tacitus, Annals 12.69.1: monente praefccto faustis vocibus exceptus [sc. Nero]. Cf. Barrett (1996), 142-
3; Bradley (1978), 63.
 94

Nero, and their choice was soon ratified by the senate." The support of the

praetorians once again had been a precondition of attaining power in Rome.

99
Cf. Martin (1991), 42; Campbell (1984), 185-6.
 95

VI. Nero

It was primarily because of the support of the guard that an accession had

occurred without challenge. Most of the rank and file probably welcomed

another descendent of Germanicus as their supreme commander. Nero himself

clearly understood the machinations which had brought him to power. 1 In the

early stages of the reign, the role of Burrus in assisting the young emperor is well

documented. 2 His primary task would have been to manage the affairs of the

guard. This responsibility took on greater significance after conflict had erupted

over the dominance of Nero between Agrippina and the two men whom Tacitus

calls the rectores imperatoriae iuventae, Seneca and Burrus himself.3 The prefect

undoubtedly felt confident that, in any confrontation between the emperor and

his mother, the loyalty of the guard for Nero would not be compromised,

although certainly there would be sympathy among the praetorians for

Agrippina. But it would be his control of the soldiers that would be instrumental

in maintaining order. Through his earlier influence under Claudius and later

1
It is recorded that, on the first day of his rule, Nero gave to the tribune of the cohort on duty at
the palace the watchword Optima Mater, an indication of his recognition of the debt to his mother.
See Suetonius, Nero 9; cf also Tacitus, Annals 13.2.3. Durry (1938), 275 is in error when he has
Agrippina give the password in place of Nero, which would have elevated her to a status above
her son, for that was one of the responsibilities of the supreme commander of the guard.

2
Tacitus (Annals 13.2.1) refers to the prefect's sternness of character and his military management
as assets which he brought to his position: Burrus militaribus curis et severitate morum. See also
13.6.3 where he is said to be experienced in many things; Dio 62.13.1-2, where Burrus' bluntness
of speech when dealing with Nero is recorded; Seneca, De dementia 2.1.2 where Burrus is called
vir egregius et tibi [Neroni] principi natus.

3
Tacitus, Annals 13.2.1.
 96

with Nero, Burrus likely had managed to place associates from his home

province of Gaul among the ranks of the praetorians, which could only help to

strengthen his command of the soldiers. 4

There is not much recorded in the sources concerning the activities of the

guard in the early part of Nero's reign. By this time, the machinery of the state

functioned for the most part without regard for who was in power, and the

administrative responsibilities which the praetorians had had in the past would

have continued under Nero. It was the obligation of the tribunes and centurions,

and their junior officers, to ensure that these duties were carried out efficiently,

and the change in emperor would have made little difference in this routine. But

it is likely that the close relationship between the emperor and his personal army

was stressed by the regime at every opportunity, probably through the agency of

Burrus, and this emphasis on the importance of the guard to Nero's rule may

have contributed to Agrippina's frustration with her diminishing role in the

reign. 5

4
The evidence for Burrus' influence in appointments admittedly is tenuous, but his close
relationship with both Claudius and Nero must have provided him with the means to suggest
men for positions, though it is impossible to say how much effect he had on gaining promotions
or transfers for his fellow countrymen. For officers from Narbonensis who may have benefitted
from Burrus' intervention on their behalf, see Demougin (1992), #505 (Maxumus, a tribune of the
II cohort under Claudius); #539 (Iulius Pollio, tribune of the IIII cohort under Nero); #546
(Tiberius Iulius Ustus, tribune of the Villi cohort under Nero). Cf. also Griffin (1976), 84-5; 251-4;
Syme (1988), 139. Barrett (1996), 241, however, notes that "there is little direct evidence that
Burrus was able to secure appointments for colleagues."

5
When Agrippina realized that she had lost her hold on her son, her response was to claim that
she would take Britannicus to the Castra Praetoria and present him to the troops as Claudius'
legitimate heir. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 13.14.3. There is no indication that the guard would have been
willing to rally to her cause and risk losing its privileged status. Not long after Agrippina made
this threat, Britannicus died; see below, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 167-168.
 97

Within a year, Nero's attitude towards his mother was made absolutely

clear when he banned Agrippina from the palace and withdrew the contingent of

guards who accompanied her: [Nero] excubiasque militares, quae ut coniugi

imperatoris dim, turn ut matri sewabantur, et Germanos nupereundem in honorem

custodes additos digredi iubet.6 The term excubias in this passage refers to the

members of the praetorians who were with Agrippina at all times, not just in the

palace but also when she went out in public. 7 As the mother of the emperor and

previously as the wife of Claudius, Agrippina had had an assigned number of

soldiers as her own bodyguard, though the exact strength is difficult to

determine. 8 As well, some members of the Germani corporis custodes recently had

been added, perhaps when Nero became emperor. Agrippina's contingent of

praetorians was surely as much for a show of status as for protection. This made

6
Tacitus, Annals 13.18.3. Cf. also Suetonius, Nero 34.1. At the same time, Nero was surrounded by
a large group of officers whenever he went to visit his mother in her new residence and,
according to Dio (61.8.4), he declared that no one except the emperor should have soldiers to
guard them. Barrett (1996), 173 sees this action as "part of a broader package, in which the
general duties of the guard were redefined", but the connection between the removal of the guard
from Agrippina and other issues - such as the removal of the guard from the games - is tenuous.

7
Contra Koestermarm (1965), vol. 3, 269 who distinguishes the guards who are exaibiae (the
palace watch) from those who are custodes (the permanent guard for attendance in public). But it
seems clear from the text that custodes refers to the German bodyguard (as in Suetonius, Caligula
55: Germanis corporis custodibus) whereas excubiae militares are the praetorians. This is the same
term as was used to indicate that Tiberius had adopted all the trappings of power after the death
of Augustus - he was attended by bodyguards (excubiae); cf. Tacitus, Annals 1.7.5. The term is
used elsewhere with reference to watches in the city itself, not just at the palace, for which the
word excubitores is more common. See, for example, Tacitus, Annals 1.17.6 where, in the section
setting out the complaints of the Pannonian legions about their service, the guard is referred to as
urbanas excubias. Cf. also Suetonius, Augustus 23.1; Claudius 10.3. For excubitores, see Suetonius,
Claudius 42.1; Nero 8.

8
It is unlikely, however, that Agrippina would have had two cohorts accompanying her, as
claimed by Durry (1938), 277.
 98

their dismissal all the more disturbing to her. 9 The removal of the praetorians

may have been intended to illustrate that the grant of a bodyguard was the

emperor's to bestow or to take away. Of course, it also ensured that Agrippina

could not continue to associate with the soldiers, and signalled that the

relationship between Nero and his mother had changed substantially. 10 The

ostensible reason for the withdrawal of the soldiers was that Agrippina had been

courting the loyalty of the praetorians (among others) considered by Nero as an

attempt at subversion. 11 But it is more likely that she was simply trying to

ingratiate herself with the soldiers, not turn them against the emperor. The

removal of the guard brought an end to this. 12 There is no record of the reaction

of the praetorians to their removal from Agrippina. Some of the soldiers

undoubtedly had sympathy for her, both as the mother of the emperor and the

daughter of Germanicus, but their allegiance was bound to remain with the man

9
The consequence for Agrippina of the deprivation of this bodyguard and of being denied
quarters in the palace was that she was shunned. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 13.19.1; Dio 61.8.6.
10
In fact, shortly after her isolation, no doubt bolstered by the obvious change which had
occurred in Agrippina's status, a charge of inciting revolution was brought against her by a
former friend, Junia Silana. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 13.19-21.

11
Tacitus, Annals 13.18.2: tribunos et centuriones comiter accipere, nomina et virtutes nobilium, qui
etiam supererant, in honore habere, quasi quaereret ducem et partes.
12
Though it is not at all clear that Agrippina was trying to convince the praetorians to be disloyal
to Nero, it has been argued recently that the grant of free grain to the praetorians should be
assigned to this year as a means of his "winning [them] over." Cf. Barrett (1996), 173. Yet there is
no compelling reason to discard the text of Tacitus (Annals 15.72.1), in which this reward is
closely connected to events after the Pisonian conspiracy in 65: quibus perpetratis Nero et contione
militum habita bina minimum milia viritim manipularibus divisit addiditque sine pretio frumentum, quo
ante ex modo annonae utebantur. The phrase quibus perpetratis refers to the executions carried out
after the disclosure of the Pisonian conspiracy, described in the previous chapter. Suetonius (Nero
10.1) also mentions the reward for the guard, but in the context of other grants made by Nero.
 99

who was ultimately responsible for their pay and benefits. Any affection for

Agrippina, then, should not be viewed as a lack of devotion for Nero.

Four years passed before Nero decided he must finally be rid of his

mother. It is unknown why Nero chose to act at this time, but Tacitus records

that the emperor was simply tired of having her around. 13 The absence of the

praetorians in the event is significant.14 From the earliest stages of the plan, it is

clear that the guard was not considered as the agent for the murder, though by

this time, executions of a political nature, including members of the imperial

family, had long been one of its functions. 15 Instead, the scheme originated with

Anicetus, the freedman in charge of the fleet at Misenum. When Nero was

young, Anicetus had been his tutor and Tacitus records that he had great hatred

for Agrippina. The fact that he had been able to attain the command of the fleet

shows that he also had ambition. 16 The use of the fleet, then, was the result of its

13
Tacitus, Annals 14.3.1: postremo, ubicumque haberetur, praegravem ratus interficere constituit. Cf.
Barrett (1996), 156. The sources record two ostensible reasons for the murder: Poppaea wished it,
and the negative reaction to the rumour of incest between mother and son. Cf. Tacitus, Annals
14.1.1; 2.1; Suetonius, Nero 28.2.
14
It is not clear what Durry (1938), 279 means when he writes: "Surtout ils [les pretoriens]
collaborent activement a l'assassinat d'Agrippine."
15
For example, see below, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 146-147.
16
The assignment of the command of the fleet at Misenum to a freedman is unique to the reigns
of Claudius and Nero in the imperial period, and is a result of the promotion of favourites to the
position; cf. Brunt (1983), 59.
 100

commander having the pivotal role in the murder, since Anicetus would want to

use men he could personally trust, and who were bound to follow his orders. 17

The details of the murder as recorded in Tacitus are well known. 18 The

initial failure of Anicetus' plan resulted in Nero summoning Burrus and Seneca

to his room. 19 He apparently feared retaliation from his mother. 20 The advisors

had no response initially; when Seneca finally asked whether guard members

could be sent, Burrus refused.21 Instead, he insisted that Anicetus finish what he

17
Barrett (1996), 184 argues that Nero was forced to rely upon the fleet because he felt that he
could not trust the praetorians while Burrus was in command. Yet Burrus continued as praetorian
prefect without incident until his death in AD 62, despite the fact that Nero could have replaced
him at any time. The use of the fleet here seems to stem rather from the involvement of its
commander as the one who devised the plan to murder Agrippina. Whatever unit Anicetus had
been commanding would have provided the manpower for the deed, though it is probably the
case that the fleet had less of an attachment to Agrippina than the guard may have had. The
sailors were never used as a security force for the emperor; cf. Brunt (1983), 59. Contra Barrett
(1996), 184. After the murder, in fact, Anicetus returned to his previous obscurity until confessing,
at Nero's command, to a false charge of adultery with Octavia in order to provide a motive for
her removal. He was exiled to Sardinia in AD 62. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 14.62.2-4; Suetonius, Nero
35.2.

18
Tacitus, Annals 14.3-9.1; see also Dio 61.12.2-14.1; Suetonius, Nero 34.
19
Whether this meeting actually took place, or how the details came to be known if it did, is not
clear. It seems that the two men were not cognizant of Anicetus' plan since they were not waiting
with the emperor for word of the outcome. They were obviously in Baiae, however, and there
must also have been guard members present. Cf. Barrett (1996), 189; 299, note 20. Dio (61.12.1)
involves Seneca in the planning of the deed, but see the criticisms of Seita (1979), 450-53.

20
Tacitus, Annals 14.7.2: turn pavore exanimis et iam iamque adfore obtestans vindictae properam, sive
servitia armaret vel militem accenderet, sive ad senatum et populum pervaderet, naiifragium et vulnus et
interfectos amicos obiciendo. If Nero had been concerned about the loyalty of his officers, however,
he had ample opportunity to replace them prior to the murder. Yet the fact that Nero was fearful
that Agrippina might try to use the soldiers against him was enough to ensure her death.

21
The prefect was adamant that the praetorians could not be involved, because their loyalty to the
imperial house and to the memory of Germanicus would not allow them to commit such a deed.
Tacitus, Annals 14.7.3-4: [Burrus] praetorianos toti Caesarian domui obstrictos memoresque Germanici
nihil adversus progeniem eins atrox ausuros [Link]. See also Dio .61.13.5. Yet if Burrus had been
ready to make use of his men, it is certain that he could have found someone among those
praetorians with the emperor at Baiae who would be willing to carry out the order to kill
 101

had started. The fleet commander was quick to agree, since he realized that such

action was politically expedient if he was to survive. He took with him two

officers of the fleet whom he could trust. The crowd which had gathered to

celebrate Agrippina's escape from drowning was dispersed by armed troops,

probably those guard members who were with Nero at Baiae, and the murder

was accomplished without difficulty.22

There is no indication in the sources of the praetorians' initial response to

the news that Agrippina was dead. If there was any discomfort among members

of the guard over the murder, the reality of the situation soon prevailed. The

official version - that Nero had escaped an assassin sent by his mother - was

accepted without hesitation. 23 The day after the murder, the guard

demonstrated its loyalty to the emperor in a display arranged by Burrus that was

designed to assuage Nero's fear.24 According to Dio, the emperor also granted

the praetorians a donative after Agrippina's death, though the author's

Agrippina. It should be remembered that we only have Tacitus' account of what the prefect was
alleged to have responded to Nero as evidence for the attitude of the praetorians.

22
Tacitus, Annals 14.8.2-5.

23
Barrett (1996), 190: "Their loyalty to Agrippina was clearly tempered by a practical realism."
The official account was repeated in a letter to the senate in which Nero also claimed that his
mother wanted to be co-ruler with him, symbolized by having the oath of allegiance sworn to her
separately, rather than being included with the imperial household. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 14.11.1:
quod consortium imperii iuraturasque infeminae verba praetorias cohortes idemque dedecus senatus et
populi speravisset.

24
Tacitus, Annals 14.10.2: atque eum auctore Burro prima centurionum tribunorumque adulatio ad spem
firmavit, prensantiuni manum gratantiumque, quod discrimen improvisum et matris facinus evasisset. As
Griffin (1976), 77 notes, "Burrus limited himself to reconciling the praetorians to the murder. . . "
McDermott (1949), 252, however, attributes this action to Seneca.
 102

explanation for it - that they might expect more crimes to be committed - is not

very plausible. 25 If a donative was given at all, it is more probable that Nero was

acknowledging the importance of the praetorians to his rule and ensuring their

continued support. 26 Both emperor and guard emerged from the circumstances

of Agrippina's death with a clear and sensible understanding about their

relationship.

The praetorians are absent from our sources for the next few years of

Nero's reign, though as we have noted with previous emperors, their various

duties would have continued without interruption. It is simply the fact that

nothing of significance occurred, at least as far as the sources were concerned,

that explains the silence.27 We do have details concerning the prefects, however.

Burrus remained in office until his death in AD 62. Although most of the ancient

sources record that he was poisoned, Tacitus admits the possibility of a natural

death. 28 To replace him, Nero chose Lucius Faenius Rufus and Gaius Ofonius

25
Dio 61.14.3: KOU xotq xe 8op"U(popoi<; dpyupiov ESCOKEV, IVCC bf\kov OTIrcoMictxovama yiveaSai
euxcovxai. There is no mention of this donative in the other sources.
26
The number of [Link] by Nero before AD 59 were not that numerous, but the claim
which was made by Nero after Agrippina's death - that she had opposed donatives to the
soldiers - is unfounded. The explanation lies rather in the dearth of occasions on which it would
have been suitable for donatives to have been given.
27
There is one incident in which they may have taken part: the control of those who were
protesting the execution of all of the urban prefect's household slaves after his murder by one
among their number. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 14.45.2. It is likely that the praetorians were used in this
instance rather than the urban cohorts. They may have reacted violently to any display of
sympathy by the crowd, since it had been their commander that had been killed. See Yavetz
(1969), 29-30; Grant (1974), 166.

28
Tacitus, Annals 14.51.1-3 (with Koestermann (1965), vol. 4,122); Suetonius, Nero 35.5; Dio
62.13.3. The reason given by Dio for the murder was the prefect's opposition to Nero divorcing
Octavia to marry Poppaea. McDermott (1949), 253, in support of the story of murder, points to
 103

Tigellinus. Rufus had been prefect of the grain supply since AD 55, an

appointment that was associated with Agrippina's successful defense in that

year. 29 He was popular with both the citizens and the praetorians, but his

promotion to the office of praetorian prefect is curious, given his previous

association with Agrippina. 30 Nero no doubt had taken the attitude of the guard

into consideration in making his choice, perhaps even soliciting the opinions of

the officers, but the reliance on Rufus may have been simply that he could act as

a moderating influence on his colleague, Tigellinus. 31 It is conceivable that, at the

time when Burrus and Seneca were losing their influence with the emperor, that

of Rufus and Tigellinus was increasing. The evidence suggests that Nero became

more reliant upon Tigellinus when he became prefect of the vigiles, probably in

the words used by Tacitus (infausta dona) when discussing the grant of Burrus' estate (as well as
that of Rubellius Plautus) to Octavia: "These properties would have been infausta only if they had
belonged to men who had suffered some unnatural misfortune."
29
Rufus was one of those rewarded after Agrippina had defended herself against a charge of
inciting Rubellius Plautus to rebellion. See below, "The Guard in Civil Administration", 218-219.
For Rufus' career, see Demougin (1992), #577. Cf. also Eck (1993), 70; Rudich (1993), 19; Griffin
(1984), 79; Koestermann (1965), vol. 3, 272.

30
Tacitus, Annals 14.51.3: prospera populi et militum fama Rufus. His popularity may have been the
result of the diligence with which he had carried out his duties when in charge of the grain
supply, if a reference to Faenian granaries (CIL 6.37796) belongs to him.

31
Tacitus, Annals 14.51.3. For Tigellinus' background, see Demougin (1993), #651. Griffin (1976),
90 points out that Nero could have become acquainted with Tigellinus during Claudius' reign
when the future prefect possibly was involved with, raising race-horses. Cf. also Barrett (1996), 86.
The suggestion has been made that Tigellinus was behind not only the death of Burrus but also
that of Annaeus Serenus, who had been prefect of the vigiles before him. See Waltz (1909), 384,
notel.
 104

AD 59, and that, after the death of Burrus, Tigellinus had even greater influence

on the emperor. 32

The appointment of two prefects at this time is very interesting, since it

had been some time since the position had been shared. 33 The decision may

betray a concern over how the appointment of Tigellinus to such a powerful post

would be received in Rome, especially by the guard, or Nero's own lack of

confidence in Tigellinus' ability to be able to control the soldiers. There certainly

was no mutual respect between the two prefects, and in fact, Tacitus reports that

Tigellinus immediately set about to undermine Rufus' position. 34 The

prominence of Tigellinus as a close companion of the emperor and his

domination of the office of prefect no doubt contributed to the alienation of

Rufus, and this disaffection must have been noticed by the officers of the guard,

if not by the rank and file. It undoubtedly helped to draw Rufus into the Pisonian

conspiracy against Nero in AD 65. 35

32
Griffin (1976), 447-8. The date of his appointment as prefect of the vigiles is uncertain. Rudich
(1993), 64 argues that it could have been "at Agrippina's request."

33
Gillis (1963), 22, note 22 errs when he refers to "the disruptive method" of appointing two
prefects rather than one. The prefecture initially had been established as a shared post by
Augustus, and Nero simply was returning to this system. Cf. Koestermann (1965), vol. 4,123 (on
Tacitus, Annals 14.51.2).

34
Tacitus, Annals 14.57.1; see also Dio 62.13.3. In the sources, we hear of Tigellinus being involved
in the persecution of Octavia (AD 62), and of an elaborate banquet held by the prefect for Nero's
enjoyment (AD 64), but there is no mention of Rufus. See Tacitus, Annals 14.60.5; 64.1; 15.37;
Suetonius, Nero 35.2; Dio 62.15.1-6.

35
Koestermann (1965), vol. 4,137 (on Tacitus, Annals 14.57.1); Henderson (1903), 261. Tacitus'
account of the event is the most comprehensive and reliable. For a summary, see Rudich (1993),
122; for criticism, see Baldwin (1967), 437-8.
 105

The involvement of the praetorians in a conspiracy against the man whom

they had sworn to protect reveals the change in attitude towards the princeps

that had been developing in the years since the death of Agrippina. As Nero's

behaviour became more eccentric, the soldiers grew less tolerant of his conduct,

and some of them were drawn to conspire against him in spite of their oaths of

loyalty. Once again, it was primarily the officers of the guard, in concert with

senators and equites, who were at the forefront.36 The plot attracted most of the

tribunes, apparently united by their personal dislike of the emperor, although

problems with pay also may have played a role in their participation. 37 The

extent of the involvement of the rank and file is not recorded in the sources but,

as had been the case with the conspiracy against Caligula, there was a need for

the participation of at least a few of the soldiers if the plan was to succeed. It is

likely that the average recruit had no animosity towards the emperor, though

some may have been influenced by the prejudices of their commanders.

36
The focus of the conspiracy was the replacement of Nero by Gaius Calpurnius Piso. The choice
of someone who was not a member of the Julio-Claudian family may indicate that the impetus
came not from those guard members who were involved but from elsewhere among the
conspirators. In fact, it is recorded that the praetorians were not happy with the selection of Piso.
Tacitus reports a rumour that the officers would replace him with Seneca soon after he had taken
power. Cf. Annals 15.65.1.

37
Hatred of Nero: Tacitus, Annals 15.67.2-3 (especially 67.2 where he quotes what Subrius Flavus
said to Nero); 68.1; see also Dio 62.24.2; Suetonius, Nero 36.2. Cf. Warmington (1969), 137.
Pay: Suetonius (Nero 32.1) notes the problem which was facing Nero: destitutus atque ita iam
exhanstus et egens ut stipendia quoque militum et commoda veteranorum protrahi ac differri necesse est. It
is of note, however, that the conspiracy did not involve any of the military outside Rome; cf.
Griffin (1984), 166.
 106

It was the inclusion of the prefect Rufus, however, that separated this

conspiracy from that against Caligula; his involvement marked the first time that

a prefect is known to have actively taken part in a plot against the emperor. As a

result, his commitment was thought to augur success, though his actions in the

affair were to prove disastrous. 38 His participation presumably indicated to

those involved that he brought with him the backing of the entire guard, though

in reality, it could not guarantee anything. 39 In the end, delays in putting the

plan into action resulted in the betrayal of the conspiracy. 40 Nero was frightened

enough to increase his guard and to post soldiers at every route into the city,

both by land and by water. 41 He clearly did not yet know how widespread the

conspiracy was among his officers, and he used them to convey messages to

those accused of complicity, apparently unaware of the guilt of the men he sent.42

38
Koestermartn (1965), vol. 4, 271 (on Tacitus, Annals 15.50.3): "The praetorian prefect Faenius
Rufus, in whom the conspirators had put their greatest hopes, proved himself later to be the
greatest failure in the affair."

39
Tacitus, Annals 15.59.1.
40
The chronology of the events is not entirely clear, but in the initial stages, everyone seemed
unwilling or unable to act, even after having gained assurances from Rufus that they had his
support. The first disclosure of the plot came from a member of the fleet at Misenum, Volusius
Proculus, who had been approached to carry out the plan because of the delays. His report to
Nero forced the hand of the conspirators, who were then betrayed by one of their freedmen. See
Tacitus, Annals 15.49.2; 50.4; 51.1-4; 54-56; 57.1-2. Cf also Dio 62.27.3.

41
It is not clear where these extra troops came from; Tacitus simply mentions that there were
Germans among them. Tacitus, Annals 15.58.1-2: volitabantque perfora, per domos, rura quoque et
proxima municipiorum pedites equitesque, permixti Germanis, quibus fidebat princeps quasi externis.
Koestermann (1965), vol. 4, 291, following Furneaux (1896), vol. 2, 394, argues that the pedites
equitesque of the passage are praetorians.

42
See below, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 171. He sent new recruits, however, to
issue the order of death to Piso, being unwilling to rely upon any of those who might be
favouring the consul; cf. Tacitus, Annals 15.59.4-5.
 107

The ability of those officers eventually implicated to escape detection for so long,

especially Faenius Rufus himself, resulted from a willingness to carry out the

emperor's order to investigate their fellow conspirators (and others accused with

them) and thus deflect attention away from themselves. 43

In the end, it was their enthusiastic interrogation that brought about the

downfall of many of the officers, for they were betrayed by those being

questioned. Among their number was Rufus himself, as well Flavus and

Sulpicius Asper. 44 Nero must have been astounded to discover how widespread

the conspiracy was among the upper ranks of the praetorians. Rudich suggests

that this may account for him using triple bonds during their trials. 45 According

to Tacitus, the soldiers met their deaths with dignity. Rufus alone is singled out

for being cowardly. 46 Not all the officers were killed, however. Four were

demoted, though their level of involvement in the plot is uncertain. 47 Among

43
It is not clear whether this interrogation included torture of their colleagues, which would cast a
more malevolent light on those officers involved. Rufus himself is depicted as taking part in
investigations carried out by Nero and Tigellinus and, in one instance, Subrius Flavus wanted to
murder the emperor during the procedure but was stopped by the prefect, who obviously still
had firm control over his men. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 15.58.3-4; Rudich (1993), 117.

44
Tacitus, Annals 15.66.1. It is interesting that it was not a member of the guard who betrayed
Rufus, but Scaevinus, whose actions were what had brought about the initial exposure of the plot.

« Rudich (1993), 119; 290.

46
Tacitus, Annals 15.67-68.1.
47
Tacitus, Annals 15.71.3. Koestermann (1965), vol. 4, 322 notes that the four who were demoted
were not listed in 50.3 as being involved in the plot. It may have been that Nero was uncertain
whom he could trust, and;preferred to remove any officers that had the least suspicion attached
to them. .:;;;: r\
 108

those who suffered for alleged complicity was Rufrius Crispinus, the former

praetorian prefect, who was exiled to Sardinia, his only crime being that Nero

hated him. 48

It is remarkable that the conspiracy failed, given the involvement of so

many high-ranking members of the guard. The evidence points to at least seven

of the twelve praetorian tribunes somehow being connected to the plot,

acknowledging that the four who were demoted were associated in some way

with those who were found guilty. 49 The entire plan seems to have collapsed

because of the unwillingness of those involved, in particular the praetorian

officers and the prefect, to take decisive action.50 For the majority of the

praetorians, however, the Pisonian conspiracy proved to be a boon. They stood

to gain no matter what the outcome. If the plot had succeeded, there can be no

doubt that the soldiers would have been enticed by a large donative to pledge

allegiance to a new emperor. On the other hand, when it failed, Nero saw to it

that they were well rewarded for not having deserted him. After the punishment

of the conspirators had been completed, he gave the praetorians a donative of

48
Tacitus, Annals 15.71 A.

49
The seven tribunes were: Pompeius (praenomen and cognomen unknown); Cornelius Martialis;
Flavius Nepos; Statius Domitius (all of whom were demoted); Gavius Silvanus; Statius Proxumus
(both of whom committed suicide); and Subrius Flavus (who was murdered). Cf. Demougin
(1992), 480. We know of only two who seem not to have been incriminated: Veianius Niger and
Gerellanus; cf. Tacitus, Annals 15.67A; 69.1.

50
Cf. Koestermann (1965), vol. 4, 322, who argues that it was the "incompetence and inactivity" of
Faenius Rufus that accounts for the failure of the conspiracy; also 311 (on Tacitus, Annals 15.66.1).
See also Rudich (1993), 118.
 109

two thousand sesterces, and granted them free grain. 51 These gifts signified his

recognition that, even though the plot had primarily involved officers who had

since been removed from their positions, he still needed to acknowledge the

loyalty of the majority of the guard in the affair, and ensure their continued

support. The grant of grain seems to have been intended not just for this one

occasion but as a permanent concession, given Tacitus' quo ante ex modo annonae

utebantur.52 It is of note that only members of the guard were given the donative,

and there is no mention in the sources of any grant to the rest of the army, nor a

congiarium for the people as a whole. 53

In addition to these grants to the soldiers, Nero also rewarded individuals

for their loyalty, among them Tigellinus. There is no information about him

during the conspiracy except after its exposure. 54 The rewards that he received

were substantial for a praetorian prefect: an honourary triumph, and statues in

51
Tacitus, Annals 15.72.1; cf. Dio 62.27.4; Suetonius, Nero 10.1. See above, note 12. A coin issued in
the years AD 66-68, depicting the emperor addressing the praetorians, indicates that their
significance to the rule was never forgotten. See figure 7.

52
It has been argued that the legions had had free grain rations from the time of Augustus, and it
was only now that the praetorians were given the same privilege. Cf. Furneaux (1896), vol. 2, 410-
11. He based his claim on Tacitus, Annals 1.17'.4. His argument is accepted by Koestermann
(1965), vol. 4, 325, and Watson (1969), 110. Contra Durry (1938), 269; Brunt (1950), 53; Bradley
(1978), 76-7. The praetorians apparently drew their rations individually, presumably in Rome,
which may have driven the price up. Cf. Roth (1994), 362, note 128; Brunt (1950), 53, note 21, who
accounts for the increased rate of pay for the guard as compensation to offset the higher cost of
purchasing food in the capital.

53
Cf. Koestermann (1965), vol. 4, 325. Griffin (1984), 168 refers to Nero "buying the loyalty of the
Guard."

54
For example, Tacitus, Annals 15.58.3 where Tigellinus is one of those involved in the
interrogation of alleged conspirators. See also Dio 62.28.4 where he is reported to have taken
bribes to save lives.
 110

the palace and the forum. 55 Such excessive honours must indicate a significant

role in the detection of the plot, something which the sources have omitted to

report. Also honoured at this time was Gaius Nymphidius Sabinus, who was

awarded an honourary consulship. He was also chosen to be Tigellinus' new

colleague. Tacitus provides some information about Sabinus at this point, his first

appearance in the Annals.56 Nothing is known about his early career, nor about

his role in the exposure of the conspiracy. 57 It must have been significant, given

his reward: " . . . the merit of C. Nymphidius Sabinus in the outcome of the affair

remains unclear . . . in light of [his] low social origin the prize of consular

decorations bestowed upon him certainly seems exorbitant, so that, judging by

what our sources unanimously say concerning his character and behaviour, the

job he performed must have been nothing short of dirty." 58 A lacuna in the text

of Tacitus has resulted in the omission of any record of Sabinus' appointment as

praetorian prefect, but it is possible that he previously had been associated in

some way with the cohorts in the city. He obviously was involved in the

aftermath of the plot in a manner which had attracted the attention of the

55
Tacitus, Annals 15.72.1; cf. also Suetonius, Nero 15.2; Dio 62.27.4. According to Suetonius (Otho
1.3), it was a very rare honour for a statue on the Palatine to be granted to an individual outside
the imperial family. The last praetorian prefect to have been granted an honourary statue was
Sejanus; cf. below, "The Guard in Civil Administration", 183.

56
Tacitus, Annals 15.72.2.

57
Koestermann (1965), vol. 4, 327 argues for Sabinus earlier to have been in Pannonia, based on a
rather fragmentary inscription (CIL 3.4264 = ILS1322). See also Syme (1939), 247; Chilver (1979),
50; Demougin (1992), #640.

ss Rudich (1993), 130.

 Ill

emperor. Yet Sabinus was to prove a major element in the eventual downfall of

Nero.

Throughout the rest of the reign, the guard continued to perform the same

duties as it had before, though these tasks sometimes went beyond what had

become routine. 59 For example, in addition to acting as security at the games and

theatre, the praetorians now provided encouragement to Nero when he was

performing on stage. 60 The guard also continued to be employed in the

surveillance and execution of those who were determined to be a threat. 61 Even

after the exposure of the Pisonian conspiracy, praetorians were still trusted to

carry out such duties. 62 The role of the prefects in these cases is often not

recorded, and it is difficult to know the level of their participation, though we are

told that Tigellinus was involved in at least one instance, that of Petronius. 63

59
A good illustration is provided by the role that the praetorians played in the intimidation of
senators attending the meeting at which Nero wished to secure the condemnation of Thrasea
Paetus; cf. Tacitus, Annals 16.27.1. Intimidation was also the objective for the display of the guard
put on when Tiridates entered Rome in AD 66; cf. Dio 63.4.2-3; see also Suetonius, Nero 13.1. It is
unlikely that the soldiers were there only as a police force, as claimed by Bradley (1978), 90.

60
See below, "The Guard in Civil Administration", 199-200. In AD 55, Nero had experimented
with removing the guard from the games, but it was not long before they were back; cf. Tacitus,
Annals 13.24.1; 25.1.
61
See below, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 173.

62
The guard was probably used for the arrest and execution of many of those involved in the
Vinician conspiracy of AD 66. Cf. Suetonius, Nero 36.1. As Bradley (1978), 220-1 notes, this
passage is the only literary evidence for the conspiracy, though there is an entry in the Acta
Fratrum Arvalium (= Smallwood [1967], 26), part of which reads ob detecta nefariorum consilia; cf.
also Griffin (1984), 177-179. Further evidence for the discovery of a plot may come from coins
issued at this time which bear the same legend (JUPPITER CUSTOS) as those struck after the
exposure of the Pisonian conspiracy, when they were used for the donative paid to the guard. Cf.
Zehnacker (1987), 333.

63
Tacitus, Annals 16.18.3.
 112

Late in AD 66, Nero went to Greece. It is riot known how many members

of the guard went with him, but among their number was Tigellinus. The

emperor left one of his freedmen, Helius, in charge in Rome. Nymphidius

Sabinus also remained behind, in command of the greater part of the praetorians

who stayed in the city.64 But all was not well in Rome with the emperor away,

and Nero finally was convinced to return because of fears that another

conspiracy was being planned against him. It is noteworthy that this warning

came from Helius and not from Sabinus. Though the division of responsibility in

Rome is not clear in the sources, it is obvious from later events that Sabinus had

military control of the capital. 65 After all, he was the sole prefect in Rome with

command over the majority of the guard, and there was virtually no one who

could challenge him with the emperor away. Nero reluctantly returned to the

capital, making a grand entry and accompanied by members of the guard. 66

Such a extravagant display was intended, no doubt, to remind those in Rome

that he was still in control, and that he still had the support of the praetorians

behind him. Within a short time, however, Nero found himself facing a revolt by

the governor of Gaul, Gaius Julius Vindex, and then came the rumour that

64
Dio 63.12.1. It is not clear exactly what position Helius held, but it appears he had more power
in Rome than the consuls or urban prefect. That he had been given the power of death over those
in the city as Dio records is in all probability an exaggeration.

6
5 Rudich (1993), 234.

66
Dio 63.20.4.
 113

Servius Sulpicius Galba, the governor of Spain, had been acclaimed as emperor

by his troops. Completely overwhelmed by these events, Nero turned to his

guard for support. But Sabinus had already undermined the relationship

between the soldiers and the emperor while the latter was in Greece to such a

degree that it was relatively easy to convince the praetorians to abandon Nero. 67

This marks the first time that the rank and file of the guard as a whole had

forsworn their oaths and deserted an emperor, but it appears to have been made

possible only because Nero's authority had been substantially diminished while

he was absent. By the time that the emperor returned, it is clear that the guard

had become extremely dissatisfied with him, and that he needed to reassert his

authority over them. If he had done so when he had first come back, he

undoubtedly could have regained control in Rome, since the praetorians had in

the past chosen to support the status quo rather than risk their privileged

position. After all, Galba was still in his province, and largely an unknown

quantity for those troops in the city. All they had were the reassurances of

Sabinus. But Nero was either unwilling or unable to negotiate with his

household troops and, as a result, they were left with only the word of their

67
There is scant mention in our sources of Tigellinus after Nero's return from Greece. We have no
knowledge of the role he played (if any) in the events which brought about the fall of the
emperor. His influence with the guard in the latter part of the reign was overshadowed by that of
Sabinus; the ease with which this happened can be explained by Tigellinus' absence from Rome
when he accompanied Nero to Greece. Despite calls for retribution against him while Galba was
emperor, Tigellinus was only put to death by Otho after continued demands for his execution. Cf.
Plutarch, Galba 17; Otho 2.1-2; Suetonius, Galba 15,2; Dio 63.3.3.
 114

prefect that the emperor had deserted them rather than the reverse, which made

their decision much easier.68

Nero now made plans to flee from Rome, and sent men to prepare the

fleet at Ostia. Escape by sea offered the only hope, given his uncertainty about

the loyalty of the legions in the north, and it is possible that he hoped to reach

Egypt where he could conceivably mount a counterattack against Galba. The

decision to go to the fleet, therefore, should not be seen as a preference for this

unit over any other, but as the only practical solution. Nero tried in vain to

convince tribunes and centurions of the guard to accompany him. 69 Later that

same night, he awoke to find that the cohort usually in attendance at the palace

had deserted him, and so he decided to make his way out of the city.70 In his

flight, he passed by the Castra Praetoria and reportedly overheard the shouts of

the guard acclaiming Galba as emperor in his place. 71 Had Nero made an

68
To facilitate the defection, Sabinus also promised the guard a large donative (in Galba's name)
if they would acknowledge Galba as emperor. See Plutarch, Galba 2.2; cf. Suetonius, Galba 16.1;
Tacitus, Histories 1.5.1; Josephus, 8/ 4.492-3. The amount of this grant is recorded to have been
7500 denarii per praetorian, double that given by Claudius and Nero at their accessions. The large
donative may have been offered not only to expedite the declaration of the praetorians for Galba,
but also to assuage any guilt that they may have felt at betraying Nero. Cf. Daly (1975), 86, note
50.

69
Suetonius, Nero 47.1. Bradley (1978), 273 notes that "appeal to the lower ranking officers implies
that the praefecti had already broken their allegiance to Nero."

70
Dio 63.27.2-3; Suetonius, Nero 47.3. Although Dio records that it was the senate who withdrew
the guard from Nero, this would be most unusual since they had no authority to do so. The
epitomators are not clear at this point about the chronology of events but the cooperation between
the senate and the guard would be unprecedented and, given the subsequent influence of the
prefect Sabinus, seems highly unlikely.

71
Suetonius, Nero 48.2; cf. Plutarch, Galba 72.
 115

appearance at the camp at this time, he could have saved his empire and his life,

since the praetorians undoubtedly would have wavered had they been

confronted by the man to whom they had sworn allegiance. 72 But once the

soldiers had declared for Galba, it was a simple matter for the senate to ratify the

decision, and for Nero to be declared a public enemy. 73 There is a rather

poignant story in Suetonius that, on the way out of Rome, Nero received one last

salute from a retired praetorian who recognized him when his face was exposed

for a brief moment. 74 No member of the guard attended his death, except for a

centurion who came in as if to help him, but was too late. 75

The desertion of Nero by the praetorians was facilitated in the end by the

influence which Sabinus had with his men, and by the promise of a substantial

donative. It is clear that the prefect had used the opportunity while Nero was in

Greece to ingratiate himself with the soldiers. Committed to the cause, he was

instrumental in convincing the praetorians to abandon the emperor, and it is this

resolution that constitutes the major difference between the final betrayal of Nero

by the guard and the previous incidents with Agrippina and Piso. The ease with

which the betrayal was accomplished indicates the guard's level of annoyance

72
Griffin (1984), 186. She blames Nero's cowardice for his demise. Cf. also the remark in Tacitus
(Histories 1.89.2) that Nero was driven out more by messages and rumours than by arms.
73
Cf. Furneaux (1896), vol. 2,483; Griffin (1984), 185; Brunt (1959), 542.

74
Suetonius, Nero 48.2; cf. also Dio 63.28.1.
75
Suetonius, Nero 49.4. Cf. also Dio 63.29.1.
 116

with Nero, as well as the thoroughness of the undermining of the emperor's

position by Sabinus. 76 It was only later when they realized that the donative

would not be paid that the praetorians seem to have become aware of the way in

which they had been deceived. 77 But, as long as Galba was not in Rome, Sabinus

clearly was in charge in the city, with the senate accepting and even encouraging

his position, and the guard being devoted to him. 78 When Sabinus received

word that Galba had appointed Cornelius Laco to be prefect, however, his

response was to attempt to subvert the new emperor's authority. 79 He first tried

to force Galba to return to Rome by reporting chaos in the capital and elsewhere,

but to no avail. 80 Therefore, he tried a different approach. He convinced some of

his followers that he should be proclaimed emperor in the Castra Praetoria

without delay, declaring that he was the illegitimate son of Caligula and

76 Warmington (1969), 162 remarks that "[Sabinus'] role seems to have been underestimated in the
sources, as if it was undesirable to admit the importance played in the fall of Nero by such a
deplorable person, who was subsequently disloyal to Galba as well." Cf. also Rudich (1993), 235.

77
Tacitus, Histories 1.5.1; Suetonius, Galba 16.1; Dio 64.3.3; Plutarch, Galba 2.3; 18.2. Although the
guard probably did not anticipate the huge amount promised by the prefect, the expectation
would have been that some payment would be forthcoming.

78
Plutarch, Galba 8.1-5. Rudich (1993), 236 calls Sabinus the "virtual dictator of the city."
79
Suetonius, Galba 14.2; Plutarch, Galba 13.1-2. Syme (1988), 115 refers to Laco as "a mere legal
officer attached to the governor", making for a most unusual appointment to prefect, given his
lack of experience. It is not entirely clear from the sources whether Laco was to be sole prefect or
to share in the command with Sabinus; it is of note that the new appointee remained sole prefect
after Sabinus' death.

80
Plutarch, Galba 13.3. It certainly would not have helped his case for Sabinus to point to unrest in
the city, since he himself ultimately seems to have been responsible for the military in Rome.
 117

therefore had the right to rule. 81 The fact that his claim was based on an affinity

with the Julio-Claudians emphasizes the influence that the imperial house still

held in this struggle for power. The plan was foiled, however, by one of the

tribunes, Antonius Honoratus, who made an impassioned plea to his cohort not

to abandon Galba.82 His soldiers in turn convinced their fellow praetorians to

join them. When Sabinus arrived at the camp intending to persuade them of his

cause, he found that the guard had reasserted its support for Galba, and despite

an attempt to maintain solidarity with his men, he was murdered. 83

81
Plutarch, Galba 9. Rudich (1993), 235 offers the theory that, with such notable persons as the
consul-designate Cingonius Varro supporting him, Sabinus was being used to get rid of Galba,
only to be removed himself later. Cf. also Manfre (1941), 118-120.

82
Greenhalgh (1975), 21 refers to Honoratus as a "secret agent", but there is no evidence to
suggest that the tribune had been working covertly on behalf of Galba.

83
Plutarch, Galba 13.4-14.6; Suetonius, Galba 11.1 where there is also a reference to a plot against
the new emperor involving Sabinus, Fonteius Capito (legate of Lower Germany) and Clodius
Macer (legate of III Augusta in Africa); this is most likely an conflation of individual actions
against Galba.
 118

VII. Postscript
The involvement of the guard in the events of the so-called "year of the

four emperors" was significant, though overshadowed by the role played by the

legions. The choice of Galba as emperor had been decided by the troops in the

field, but any ruler needed the support of the praetorians as well. After all, they

had become so integrated into the civil administration of the capital and the

workings of the principate that to neglect them would bring about massive

discord. The new emperor, however, did not seem to recognize their importance.

The bitterness of the guard at being denied the donative promised by Sabinus,

coupled with Galba's cruel treatment of the soldiers on the march to Rome and

the dismissal of several officers from the city cohorts, resulted in much

disaffection among the soldiers. 1 As Murison notes, " [Galba's] behaviour

towards the Praetorians was utterly foolish: given the situation in 68-69, he was

in no position to insist on discipline and at the same time to refuse to pay the

promised donative." 2

It was because of these problems that Marcus Salvius Otho, former

governor of Lusitania and now one of Galba's confidants in Rome, was able to

1
Donative: Tacitus, Histories 1.5; Plutarch, Galba 18.2. March to Rome: Dio 64.3.1-2; cf. Plutarch,
Galba 15.3-4. Dismissal: Tacitus, Histories 1.20. Tacitus points out that these dismissals were
greeted with suspicion since the remaining officers felt insecure about their positions as well.
Lucius Antonius Naso, who had a remarkable career under Nero, was one of those who was let
go; see below, "The Guard in Civil Administration", 225-26.

2
Murison (1993), 60.
 119

ingratiate himself with the praetorians, in particular, with the officers.3 After

being overlooked as Galba's designated successor in January of AD 69, Otho

used his influence with the guard to convince them to switch allegiance to

himself.4 Two members of the guard were bribed to spread dissent among the

ranks about Galba's inability to rule, and to persuade the praetorians to support

Otho. They met with little difficulty. Any disgrace that had been attached to the

forswearing of their oaths had been eradicated. The guard now recognized that it

indeed had a choice. On the appointed day, though the cohort guarding the

palace remained loyal for the most part, Galba was unable to defend himself

adequately against the praetorians and assorted legionaries that attacked him,

and he was murdered in the Forum. 5 His praetorian prefect, Laco, was also

killed. 6 In the end, it was Galba's inability or unwillingness to accept that he

needed the support of the troops in the city, and that a donative, even of a small

sum, had to be paid to the praetorians in order to establish this trust, which

helped to bring him down.

The role that the guard had played in assuring Otho's succession

demanded recognition, and Tacitus records that the new emperor acquiesced to

3
Tacitus, Histories 1.23-24. His courting of the guard began with the group of praetorians sent to
escort Galba from Spain and continued once he was in Rome.

4
Tacitus, Histories 1.25-28.

5
Cohort at the palace: Tacitus, Histories 1.29; 38. Galba's death: Tacitus, Histories 1.40-41.

6
Tacitus, Histories 1.46.
 120

the requests of the soldiers, including the right to appoint their own prefects, the

first time the choice had been granted to them. 7 The men selected were Licinius

Proculus and Plotius Firmus. 8 By allowing the guard this right, Otho

presumably thought that he would provide a safeguard for himself, for the

soldiers ought to be well disposed toward the commanders they had chosen,

who, in turn, would answer to him. It also was under Otho that the praetorians

saw active service in the field for the first time since the reign of Tiberius. 9 They

were sent to block the advance of the forces sent by Aulus Vitellius, the former

governor of Lower Germany, who in early January had been proclaimed

emperor by his troops. In the weeks that followed, the praetorians proved

themselves capable of battle; service in the city had not blunted their field skills.

Even after the defeat of most of Otho's forces, he continued to be encouraged by

his praetorians to keep up the fight, not only because their position would be

threatened by his loss, but also through affection for their emperor. 10 After his

7
Ibid.
8
Firmus earlier had been appointed prefect of the vigiles by Galba. Cf. Tacitus, Histories 1.46.1;
Demougin (1993), #660. For Proculus, see Demougin (1993), #666. The praetorians also were
allowed to choose the urban prefect; their preference was Flavius Sabinus, who had held the same
position under Nero.

9
Tacitus, Histories 1.87.1; 1.89.2. They had last fought with Germanicus in AD 16, though the
mock exercises held by Caligula in Germany had also involved the guard; cf. Suetonius, Caligula
45.1.

10
Tacitus, Histories 2.46.
 121

suicide, in fact, his funeral was held by those members of the guard who had

remained loyal.11

Vitellius understandably was distrustful of the praetorians who had

fought for Otho (and who were mainly the same men who had served under

Nero and Galba) and decided to start afresh. The guard was cashiered and

sixteen new cohorts were created, mainly from the legions. 12 By early August,

however, the new emperor had been made aware of the proclamation of

Vespasian in the east, and the praetorians again took part in the subsequent

battles which ensued between the opposing parties. The Flavians had managed

to locate several members of the guard who had been released by Vitellius and

enlisted them with the promise of readmittance to the ranks of the praetorians in

return for their assistance. By the middle of December, the capital itself had been

attacked, with some of the heaviest fighting occurring in the area of the Castra

Praetoria between those who were the former praetorians of Galba and Otho,

now fighting for the Flavians, and those who had taken their position, fighting

for Vitellius. As happened elsewhere in Italy, the Vitellian forces were defeated,

though not without a strong fight.

11
Ibid 2.49.

12
Tacitus, Histories 2.67.1. As Wellesley (1975), 106 notes, " . . . by this measure Vitellius bound to
himself a large body of totally devoted and desperate men who could be relied on to fight to the
last for their emperor and their privileges."
 122

When Vespasian came to power, the number of praetorian cohorts was

reduced back to nine, but he did not dismiss all the men as Vitellius had done. 13

Instead, the new emperor appointed his son to be sole prefect. This was the first

time that the relationship between emperor and prefect had been strengthened

through kinship, and it acknowledged the importance that the prefecture, and by

extension the praetorians themselves, had in supporting the administration and

keeping the emperor in power. Titus also was a military man, unlike the

previous prefects, and would bring to the position the discipline and skill which

was needed to manage a guard disheartened by recent events. Vespasian knew

that Titus would be able to control the guard, and had no doubts about his

loyalty. The upheavals of the previous year had not gone without notice by

Nero's former general.

The importance of the guard to the imperial household, and to the civil

administration of Rome, continued to manifest itself throughout the rest of its

history. The organization of the praetorians remained much as it had been under

the Julio-Claudians, until the dismissal of the entire unit by Severus in AD 193,

and its replacement by men from the legions. 14 Their responsibilities also must

have continued as before, especially the role of providing assistance in the civil

administration of the city. By the early part of the second century AD, the career

13
The number of cohorts is based on CIL 16.21 (ILS1993). Cf. Durry (1938), 80.
14
Cf. Dio 75.1-2; Herodian 2.14.5. The number of cohorts was set at ten in the reign of Domitian;
see Durry (1938), 80.
 123

of the praetorian had become regularized within the military system, and guard

members are found in the field, fighting alongside the emperor. 15 But, after its

experiences under the Julio-Claudians, the guard also was aware that they could

have an impact on the political fortunes of the emperor, though this ability was

not truly appreciated until the auctioning of the empire in AD 193.16 Of course, it

was partly because of the dishonor of the auction that they were dismissed by

Severus, and their replacements chosen from the northern legions. This change

dramatically altered the composition of the guard, for no longer were Italians to

dominate the ranks. Yet, it was only a century later, after Constantine's accession

in AD 312, that the guard was disbanded permanently. The history of the

praetorians had come to an end.

15
Durry (1938), 379.

16
For the details, see Birley (1988).. 94-96; Durry (1938), 382-83.
 124

Part 2: The Functions of the Praetorian Guard

The praetorian guard was used for many purposes other than simply

guarding the emperor. These responsibilities fall into two broad categories:

special military assignments, and civil administrative tasks. The duties evolved

from the primary function of the praetorians as the imperial bodyguard and

from the close relationship between the emperor and the guard; they were

influenced as well by the way that the praetorian cohort had been employed in

the late republic. As the presence of soldiers became more acceptable in Rome,

the guard was able to be used in circumstances where previously there had been

no organized response, or to supplement other services that did exist. It must be

remembered that the imperial praetorian guard came into being in the early

stages of the empire, and there was no formal plan in place to dictate how the

body should develop and change as the principate evolved. By the end of the

Julio-Claudian period, the guard had become entrenched in diverse aspects of

the administration, and the role that it was to play in subsequent reigns had

already been foreshadowed in their actions under the early emperors.

It is clear that the praetorians were not a static group throughout their

early history. Nor is it the case, however, that the evolution of the unit was

inherent in its character. The development of the guard from a group whose

primary purpose was to oversee the protection of the emperor and his family

into a force that had various functions in the state, some of which might be
 125

considered objectionable, was a response to the requirements of a

metamorphosing imperial system. The fact that the praetorians changed from

what was essentially a benign unit to one that, only fifty years into their

existence, was willing to murder the man whom they had sworn to protect, has

more to do with the nature of the Roman state in the early first century AD than

with the guard itself. It was in response to the political events of the times that

the soldiers became drawn into intrigue, and on occasion were driven to

forswear their oaths. The broadening scope of their duties not only provided

them with additional responsibilities but also inserted them into the

administration of the city in a way that made them visible and liable to be

influenced.

An important consideration in the assignment of the guard to the sort of

tasks discussed in the following pages was the need to keep such a large force in

Rome occupied. This challenge became even more significant with the increase in

the number of cohorts to twelve under Tiberius in AD 23. It is possible that the

use of the praetorians in such a wide variety of duties was the most practical

means to keep the soldiers occupied and not sitting idle in their camp. Not only

was the guard kept busy but the citizens also benefitted from the more efficient

administration of the city.

 126

VIII. The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit

Unrest in Italy and the Empire

The use of the guard to protect the emperor and his family has been well

documented, and is discussed in some detail above. Not only was there a

permanent watch of praetorians at the palace, but they also accompanied the

emperor whenever he travelled, either in Italy or abroad. There were also

contingents of the guard assigned to members of the imperial family, though

how many men this involved, and exactly who of the household were granted

such a privilege, is not clear from the sources. The honour was given at the

discretion of the emperor, as the case with Agrippina under Nero shows, but

specific mention of the presence of the praetorians in such instances is infrequent.

In the rare cases where the praetorians accompanied members of the

family other than the emperor in military operations, however, we are provided

with some details. Under the Julio-Claudians, there are only two examples, both

of which date to the early years of Tiberius' reign: the guard went with Drusus to

Pannonia in AD 14 to quell a rebellion, and soldiers accompanied Germanicus to

Germany in AD 16.1 In both incidents, two cohorts of the guard were sent. 2 The

1
Drusus: Tacitus, Annals 1.24.2; cf. Dio 57.4.3-4. For details of the chronology of the revolt, see
Levick (1976), 72-3; Seager (1972), 60-1; Schmitt (1958), 378-383. Germanicus: Tacitus, Annals
2.16.3; 20.3. We know very little about the role of the guard in this expedition, other than that
praetorians along with selected guard cavalry provided protection for Germanicus in battle.

2
Durry (1938), 277 used these examples to argue that the usual number of cohorts accompanying
members of the imperial family was two, but the number of men that would involve seems
excessive, even if the effective of 500 as proposed by Durry is accepted. The fact that these are
military operations dictated the presence of such a large contingent.
 127

purpose of sending elite troops with Drusus was twofold: to provide protection

for him and as a show of status, though there can be little doubt that the soldiers

were also to keep an eye on his conduct with the legions. It is ironic that

praetorians were sent north with Drusus, for one of the complaints of the army

was the preferred status given to the cohorts from Rome, and Tacitus records

that members of the guard were harassed by their legionary counterparts in

hopes of provoking a confrontation. 3 It may have been an acknowledgment of

the potential for just such a dangerous conflict that led to the sending of the

praetorians as a guard for Drusus in the first place. The gravity of the situation

also may explain the presence of Sejanus. There is no reason for him to have

accompanied Drusus as commander of the cohorts, for that responsibility would

have been handled by the tribunes, but Tiberius may have sent the prefect of the

guard along to provide additional support by a high-ranking officer, and to

show how seriously he himself was taking the matter. 4 According to Tacitus,

Sejanus was to be Drusus' advisor (rector iuveni), which may have meant that he

had explicit instructions from the emperor on what was to be conceded to the

rebellious legions, especially in light of the fact that Drusus himself apparently

3
Complaints: Tacitus, Annals 1.17. The main complaint was the length of service and rate of pay of
the legionaries in comparison with the guard. Harassment: Ibid, 1.27.1.

4
Levick (1976), 73 argues that Sejanus was needed to command the troops because of a delay in
Drusus leaving Rome, but it is difficult to understand why the absence of Drusus made the
presence of Sejanus imperative. The cohorts could have gone on ahead without Drusus, with the
tribunes in charge of their men. Tacitus (Annals 1.24.2) does not associate Sejanus' appointment
specifically with the mutiny.
 128

had not been given definite instructions. 5 It is possible that Tiberius had doubts

about Drusus' ability to handle the problem; after all, he had not been involved

in military matters prior to this assignment. 6 The prefect's presence, then, can be

explained by the need to have someone with experience accompany a

commander whose appointment resulted more from his status as the son of the

emperor than his skill as a negotiator. Yet, Sejanus is not mentioned again in the

account of the events of the mutiny and it is not clear exactly what role he

eventually played. 7 The two cohorts of the guard that were sent had been

strengthened beyond their regular effective and were reinforced by both

praetorian cavalry and German bodyguards. These precautions proved to be

necessary, for the mutineers among the legions in Pannonia were intent on

making trouble and it was only an eclipse of the moon that prevented a

confrontation. 8 As punishment, Drusus had the ringleaders of the mutiny

executed, some by praetorians. 9

5
Tacitus, Annals 1.24.1: nullis satis certis mandatis. It may have been that this arrangement
contributed to the later animosity between Drusus and Sejanus. Cf. Meise (1969), 70. Contra
Levick (1976), 159. Hennig (1975), 19 thinks that Tacitus has overestimated the role of Sejanus,
given Drusus' status and his age.

6
Levick (1976), 158 comments that "the trip to Pannonia in AD 14 is the first attested service
abroad [for Drusus], and that was made without any grant of official powers."
7
Velleius Paterculus (Histories 2.125.5) names Quintus Iunius Blaesus, the legate of Pannonia, as
the main advisor to the group from Rome. A further explanation for Sejanus' presence may lie,
therefore, in the relationship between the legate and himself, for the prefect was Blaesus' nephew.

8
For example, the guard came to the rescue of Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus who had been accosted
by soldiers as he was leaving the camp; cf. Tacitus, Annals 1.27.2. Furneaux (1896), vol. 1, 215
argues that the praetorians were kept outside the camp except for a small contingent with
Drusus, but their arrival to rescue Lentulus seems to suggest that they are within the walls.

9
Tacitus, Annals 1.30.1.
 129

There were also occasions when the praetorians were used to quell

disturbances without any member of the imperial family present. The reason for

their involvement can be found in the character of the unit itself. Their presence

on such missions can be viewed as representing the direct intervention of the

princeps in Rome. Under the Julio-Claudians, there are three incidents when the

praetorians were sent to areas in Italy to handle problems, and in each, the

involvement of the guard was dictated by the failure of others to find a solution.

Sometime during the reign of Tiberius, praetorians intervened in an

incident in the town of Pollentia in northern Italy. The citizens there were

unwilling to allow the body of a chief centurion to be removed from the forum

until the heirs promised to provide gladiatorial games. 10 Tiberius sent two

cohorts, one from the city, another from the area of the Cottian Alps to suppress

the demonstration. 11 Although it is not stated expressly that the cohort from the

city was praetorian, it most likely was the guard that was involved rather than

the urban cohorts. 12 The praetorians would be better prepared to handle such

incidents, given their training as a military unit. Suetonius adds that the entire

10
Suetonius, Tiberius 37.3.

11
Since 14 BC, the area of the Alps near Segusio had been ruled by Cottius, a local chieftain.
Augustus had provided a contingent of Roman troops, stationed at Segusio, for his use. It is
probably these soldiers which are meant.
12
Nippel (1995), 91. Seager (1972), 138, however, argues for it to be an urban cohort; cf. also
Gaggero (1990), 360, note 5. Under the Julio-Claudians, however, there is no evidence of the
urban cohorts being sent from the city to handle problems elsewhere.
 130

undertaking was done secretly and it was only at the last moment that the real

reason for the presence of the soldiers was revealed to the citizens. 13 The need

for concealment may also help to explain why it was the guard that was sent. The

mobilization of the praetorians in a concerted action together with troops sent

from the north indicates that the incident eliciting such a response must have

represented a much greater threat than is revealed in our sources. 14

Under Tiberius the guard was also called upon to prevent a slave

insurrection led by one of its veterans, Titus Curtilius. 15 In AD 24, this former

guardsman was holding secret meetings in Brundisium and the surrounding

area, and issuing pamphlets to incite the slaves there to revolt. The initial

response against the rebellion came from a quaestor in the area, Cutius Lupus,

who made use of the crews from patrol ships which happened to have docked

there, but this effort was not enough. Tiberius quickly dispatched a tribune of the

guard, Staius, with a force of praetorians, to capture Curtilius and bring him to

Rome. 16 Tacitus adds that there was great fear in the capital because of the large

number of slaves there, and this may explain why the emperor's personal guard

13
dissimulata itineris causa detectis repente armis concinentibusque signis per diversas portas in oppidum
immisit.
14
The penalty imposed on the town was severe: many of the citizens and local officials were
sentenced to life imprisonment. This action also suggests that the problem was more significant
than our sources have recorded.

15
Tacitus, Annals 4.27.1-2. Tacitus calls him Curtisius, but see Koestermann (1965), vol. 2,102.

16
The number of men sent is not specified; the text is Staius tribunus cum valida manu.
 131

was sent: the citizens could be reassured that everything possible was being

done. It may also be the case that the praetorians were familiar with the man

who was leading the revolt. Curtilius, in fact, was quickly apprehended, and

without difficulty, suggesting that he was known to his captors. Once returned to

Rome, it is possible that he was executed publicly in an effort to avoid any

disturbance by the slave population. 17 We are not told anything about what

happened to those who had fallen in with him. Curtilius probably had retired to

the area, involving himself in local issues that affected the slaves who worked the

fields.18 The direct involvement of the emperor, however, illustrated the

seriousness with which this particular incident was viewed by Tiberius.

One other case is known in which the guard was sent to enforce order in a

city in Italy. It occurred in AD 58 during the reign of Nero. 19 The citizens of

Puteoli were upset over embezzlement by local officials. The council was

complaining about public disorder. 20 The controversies escalated to rioting. The

senate appointed Gaius Cassius Longinus to settle the matter, but when the

citizens could not tolerate his severity, he asked to be relieved of the

17
A public execution would explain why Curtilius was taken to Rome. Koestermann (1965), vol.
2,103 assumes that the death was very excruciating, but there is no evidence for this in the
source. It is possible that an inscription which calls Tiberius the conservator patriae may refer to
this incident; cf. Marangio (1992), 93-98.

18
On the retirement of praetorians both in Italy and in the provinces, see Durry (1938), 301-3.

19
Although Durry (1938), 279; 369 cites the attempted break-out of the gladiators at Praeneste in
AD 64 together with this incident as examples involving the praetorians, it is not clear from the
text that the guards in the Praeneste situation were from the city cohorts.

20
Tacitus, Annals 13.48.
 132

responsibility. 21 It was given instead to the brothers Publius Sulpicius Scribonius

Proculus and Sulpicius Scribonius Rufus.22 They were provided with a

praetorian cohort, the first and only time under the Julio-Claudians that a

contingent of the guard was given over to the command of men of consular rank.

Tacitus records that the situation was brought under control because the citizens

of Puteoli were afraid of the soldiers; this fear no doubt resulted from the

executions which the commanders ordered. 23 By sending his own guard, Nero

also was showing that he took a personal interest in the matter. 24 It was at the

request of Cassius that the Scribonii were sent, and the addition of a cohort of

praetorians may have been necessary if it had been decided beforehand that

executions would take place, since that was one of the responsibilities of the

guard.

There is only one example under the Julio-Claudians of the praetorians

being used to suppress unrest outside Italy. The incident dates to circa AD 2,

21
For a brief analysis of Cassius' role and his possible reasons for withdrawing from the affair, see
Bauman (1989), 90-92. Cf. also D'Arms (1975), 155-166.
22
These men previously had been legates in the Germanies; they were later called to Greece by
Nero (perhaps in connection with the Vinician conspiracy) and were killed. Cf. Dio 63.17.2;
Tacitus, Histories 4.41.3.
23
Tacitus, Annals 13.48:. . . cohorte praetoria, cuius tcrrore et paucorum supplicio rediit oppidanis
concordia. As D'Arms (1975), 157 points out, "however harsh and intolerable the remedium of
Cassius Longinus, that of his chosen successors, the Sulpicii Scribonii, was appreciably worse,
involving a cohort of the praetorian guard, which brought with it armed conflict, terror and
punishment."

24
Nero may have been concerned that riots in the city would cause disruption elsewhere in Italy.
Puteoli had a harbour that was the hub for Rome's eastern imports and exports and was also a
resort area. Disorder in the city could have devastated either of these enterprises.
 133

when a tribune was sent to North Africa to halt an incursion from the interior. 25

The report in Dio is incomplete, and it is difficult to say with certainty where the

guard was sent, but Cyrenaica has been suggested since it fits the description

given in the passage: it was governed by a senator and was not garrisoned. 26 It

seems from Dio's text that help had already been sent from Egypt to stop the

aggressors, but without success.27 Whatever the nature of the problem, it was

pressing enough to force Augustus to take a personal interest, and send a senior

officer from Rome who could act directly on the authority of the emperor. In fact,

the tribune, presumably with at least one cohort, managed to turn back the

attack. Dio adds that there was no senator governing in the area for a long period

afterwards which may imply that the tribune remained there until the threat was

eliminated completely. 28

25
Dio 55.10a.1: exepoix; EK zf\q AiytmTO'D EjrioxpaxEixjavxaq acpunv aTiEcbaavxo, ou Ttpoxspov TE
EVESOCTOCV Ttpiv xiXiap%6v xiva EK xot> SoptxpopiKcro E7t' auxoix; 7iE|a.(p0fjvai. KCCI EKEivoq 8' EV XP0V(P
xaq KaxaSpo^aq ounwv £7iEaxEV, QOXE ETU noXvi |rr|8£va POUXEOTTIV XCBV XCCUXTI KOXECOV dp^av.

26
Cf. Scott-Kilver (1987), 291: "In the context the cities mentioned must be those of Cyrene, since
only Cyrene and modern Tunisia (termed 'Africa' by the Romans) were normally governed by
senators, and 'Africa', being an armed province, had no need of help from Egypt, whereas Cyrene
had no regular garrison." See also Brunt (1983), 56. Cyrenaica had become a Roman province in
74 BC; Crete was combined with it in 67 BC. There had been problems in the area previously, and
in fact, the Marmaridae had attacked the area as recently as 19 BC. Their revolt had been quashed *. .
by Publius Sulpicius Quirinus, legate of Syria at the time; cf. Florus 2.31.
27
The text is corrupt, but the phrase is EXEpouq EK xfjq Aiy\)7txot) EniaxpaxEUoavxai; aqnaiv
arcEcboavxo. The III Cyrenaica was stationed in Egypt at this time.

28
There is documentation that, perhaps from the reign of Augustus and certainly from that of
Tiberius, an auxiliary cohort, later known as cohors I Lusitanorum Cyrenaica, was stationed in
Cyrene. It is tempting to see its assignment to this area as a result of the disturbance of AD 2. For
the evidence that this cohort was stationed there, cf. Reynolds in Ward Perkins and Ballance
(1958), 160-61.
 134

There is one other occasion when the guard was sent overseas, not to quell

any disturbance, but for reconnaissance. Under Nero, the praetorians undertook

a peaceful expedition to Africa. The purpose of this journey was ostensibly to

find the source of the Nile, but no doubt it was for military surveillance as well. It

was not the first time that the area had been explored; under Augustus, the army

had reached Nabata. 29 But this time, the soldiers went further, reaching Meroe. 30

The expedition has been dated to sometime between AD 61 and 63. 31 Although

Seneca mentions it only as a scientific project, the elder Pliny records that Nero

had sent a tribune accompanied by soldiers from the guard as an exploratory

party because he intended to invade Ethiopia. 32 The size of the contingent is

unknown, but a map of the area was made, implying that military surveyors and

cartographers were among those who went. Seneca records that he had obtained

information from two centurions, which may provide some idea of the numbers:

if the soldiers were functioning as scouts as well as surveyors mapping the area,

the numbers would have been kept to a minimum so as not to attract undue

29
Augustus, Res Gestae 27; Strabo, Geography 17.1.54; Pliny, NH 6.181. The date was 25-22 BC. The
expedition was a punitive attack against the Ethiopians; it was led by Gaius Petronius, prefect of
Egypt.

30
Seneca, NQ 6.8.3-4; Pliny, NH 6.181-186; 12.19.

31
Desanges (1978), 325. The detailed description of the Nile in Lucan (BC 10.194-332, written in
AD 62/3) provides support for this date.

32
NH 6.181: missi ab [Nerone] milites praetoriani cum tribnno ad explorandum, inter reliqua bella et
Aethiopicum cogitanti. Cf. also Dio 63.8.1 who records that Nero had sent spies (KcaaoKOTrouq) to
Ethiopia in anticipation of an invasion, but later abandoned the idea because of its difficulty.
 135

attention. 33 It seems inconceivable, however, that the praetorians would have

been sent if there had been no military intent. 34

The Speculatores

Exploits such as the investigation of the Nile region often were assigned to

members of the guard known as the speculatores. These soldiers were employed

in tasks which were of a sensitive nature, that is, those involving issues of

security or a need for covert activity. 35 As a result, information about this group

is scarce in the sources. In the period of the republic, speculatores were members

of the army engaged primarily in reconnoitering, and in fact, Antony had a

cohort of speculatores, which he commemorated on his coinage. 36 These men may

33
Contra Desanges (1978), 324, note 88 who argues for at least five centurions to have
accompanied the tribune.
34
Contra Sherk (1974), 541 who argues, based on the evidence of the map, that the purpose was
"basically scientific in nature." Durry (1938), 280 also sees the expedition as a geographical
mission "to bring Italian civilization to savage regions." Cf. also Griffin (1984), 229.

35
The institution of a formal secret police force, known as the frumentarii, came about late in the
first century AD, or early in the second century. Their primary duties were spying, and soon
executions, but they also were employed as couriers, tax collectors, and policemen. Cf. Sinnigen
(1961), 65-73; Austin and Rankov (1995), passim. The speculatores continued to exist after the
introduction of the frumentarii.
36
Republic: Durry (1938), 108; Passerini (1939), 70. See, for example, Caesar BAfr 37.1 in which he
ordered his speculatores to be ready to assist him, but the rest of his legions were not informed of
his plans. Durry also argued that the unit of 300 soldiers with each of the triumvirs at their
meeting at Bologne were speculatores. Antony: The legend reads CHORTIS
SPECULATORUM. The coin was issued in 32/31 BC (just prior to Actium); cf. Passerini (1939),
71; Sydenham (1952), # 1214. See figure 8. Taken with the other coin minted at the same time but
with the legend CHORTIUM PRAETORIARUM (cf. figure 2), it seems clear that these were two
separate units.
 136

have acted as his bodyguard in addition to being his scouts or spies. 37 The

imperial unit undoubtedly was adapted from this republican prototype early in

the reign of Augustus. 38 Although the evidence is scant, it is probable that, for

most of the first century AD at least, the speculatores associated with the

praetorians formed a unit of their own, but technically were considered part of

the guard. 39 Evidence for this may come from a passage in Tacitus' Histories, for

it was the tesserarius speculatorum, joined by the optio, who were first approached

by Otho to win over the guard in his campaign for emperor. 40 By the end of the

first century AD, however, the speculatores had been distributed throughout the

praetorian cohorts. This may have happened in the reign of Vitellius; since the

speculatores had been responsible for the accession of Otho and had fought in the

field with him, their continued existence as a separate unit might have been

37
Speidel (1994), 33: "The name of the speculatores betrays their origin: reconnaissance was so
essential to Roman field marshals, and so risky, that their reconnoitering force became their
bodyguard." Each legion in the imperial period also had ten speculatores, who were assigned to
the staff of the governor, and functioned as couriers, bodyguards, and often as executioners. See,
for example, Seneca, De Ira 1.18.4 in which a centurion is in charge of the execution of a soldier,
but it is the speculator who is about to perform the act. Cf. also Le Bohec (1994), 51; Webster
(1985), 263.

38
Durry (1938), 108. Sinnigen (1961), 66 remarks on the first emperors making use of officers of
the guard to "act as plain-clothes men and to arrest those accused of treason" but without specific
reference to the speculatores. Inscriptions of speculatores Caesaris which date to the early part of the
first century AD have been discovered. Cf. CIL 6.1921a (=ILS 2014); CIL 3.4843 (=ILS 2015). The
use of the phrase speculator Caesaris or Augusti in these inscriptions is found only in the early part
of the first century AD. At some time after AD 23, they are simply referred to as speculatores. Cf.
Speidel (1994), 34.
39
It is possible that Dio's count of ten cohorts may have included the speculatores as a separate
unit. Cf. above, "Augustus", 25-26.
40
Tacitus, Histories 1.25.1. The tesserarius was the officer who conveyed the watchword to the rest
of the cohort. Cf. Hurley (1993), 163.
 137

deemed undesirable. 41 The close relationship between emperor and speculatores

existed from the creation of the unit. Suetonius records how Augustus

entertained a former speculator at whose home he had often stayed. 42 Their

significance is shown by one of the earliest extant military diplomata in which

members of the unit are singled out, and placed first, in the list of those

honoured by the document. 43

It is not certain how many men comprised this unit. By the middle of the

first century, the speculatores were commanded by a soldier known as a

trecenarius.44 This title has led to the conjecture that the unit comprised 300 men,

41
Accession: Tacitus, Histories 1.27. Fighting: Tacitus, Histories 2.11. Speidel (1994), 34 argues
that their inclusion in this passage indicates that the strength of the unit had to be sufficient to
make a difference in the field. But it is more likely that because the speculatores did not usually
take part in battle, they were specified in the list.

42
Suetonius, Augustus 74: ipse [Augustus] scribit, invitasse se quondam, in cuius villa maneret, qui
speculator SUMS olim fuisset. Durry (1938), 108 believes that the cohort to which this soldier
belonged was one which was contemporary with that of Antony's.

43
CIL 16.21 (=ILS 1993), dating to AD 76. The relevant lines are:

nomina speculatorum, qui in praetorio meo militaverunt, item militum,

qui in cohortibus novem praetoriis et quattuor urbanis, subieci

"I have appended the names of the speculatores who served in my guard,
and also of those soldiers who were members of the nine praetorian and
four urban cohorts"

The wording of the diploma need not mean, as Speidel (1994), 35 argues, that the speculatores
were still a separate unit at this time. The fact that they are mentioned separately from the
praetorian cohorts may be the way that their importance is emphasized.

44
This position was equivalent to the primus pilus of the legion, that is, it was the senior post
among centurions of the guard. After serving as trecenarius, the officer generally proceeded to a
legionary centurionate. Cf. Breeze (1974b), 12; Dobson and Breeze (1969), 119; Le Bohec (1994), 21.
 138

but such a number is not corroborated by other evidence. 45 For most of the Julio-

Claudian period, in fact, the commander was known simply as the centurio

speculatorum.46 There is also controversy over whether all of these soldiers were

mounted. 47 Many of them certainly were, since one of their main responsibilities

was to courier imperial correspondence. In fact, it was probably members of this

unit that Sejanus utilized to carry correspondence between Rome and Capri, and

no doubt the same group was used by Macro to convey the information about

Tiberius' death to the provincial governors. 48 In the latter instance, sending the

speculatores allowed reports of the reaction of those to whom he had sent his

messages to be brought back to Macro. But since this cohort of the guard also

45
The idea originated with Domaszewski; cf. Passerini (1939), 70, note 6. It is important to note,
however, that three hundred is roughly the same number of speculatores that were found in the
legions under Augustus (each legion supplied ten speculatores to the staff of the governor), and so
the conjecture may have been an attempt to harmonize these numbers.

46
Cf. Passerini (1939), 70. The title seems to continue even after the use of trecenarius came into
vogue in the reign of Nero. For an example of a career which included the post of centurio
speculatorum, see that of Marcus Vettius Valens, below, "The Guard in Civil Administration", 192-
94.

47
Cf. Passerini (1939), 71-72; Durry (1938), 110; Speidel (1994), 33-34; Grant (1974), 91. There is
much confusion about the overlap between the speculatores and the Germani corporis custodes,
many of whom were mounted. As part of the guard, however, the speculatores had greater
possibility for advancement and were considered an integral part of the military. Speidel (1994),
35 argues that the duplication of responsibilities between the two groups resulted from the
unwillingness of the emperors to use foreigners against citizens in the street, but the speculatores
were certainly used for much more than just crowd control.

48
Couriers: Suetonius, Caligula 44.2: magnificas Romam litteras misit, monitis speculatoribus, ut
vehiculo ad Forum usque et curiam pertenderent nee nisi in aede Martis acfrequente senatu consulibus
traderent. Cf. Hurley (1993), 163. Macro: Grant (1974), 141.
 139

had to function as the bodyguard of the emperor, they could not always be

mounted, depending on how the emperor was moving about. 49

One of the most important tasks of the speculatores was spying, which

possibly derived from their ability to travel about freely as couriers in the name

of the emperor. The sources do not provide many examples of this activity,

which is not surprising given its nature. 50 In one of the few specific references

we have, Suetonius reports that they accompanied Claudius to banquets: neque

convivia inire ausus est nisi ut speculatores cum lanceis circumstarent militesque vice

ministrorum fungerentur.51 It seems clear from the text that the speculatores were

there simply to observe, that is to spy on the dinner guests, with other members

of the guard present to wait on the emperor. Despite the dearth of evidence in

the sources, the unit must have been used constantly for spying, and it is

probable, for example, that the surveillance carried out under Tiberius to spy on

the activities of Agrippina Maior and her two sons, or by Nero on Lucius

Antistius Vetus fell to them. 52

49
Grant (1974), 91 argues that the first priority of the speculatores was to "save the Imperator from
assassination" which would be logical, given that they were part of the praetorian guard. They
carried lances to aid in crowd control; cf. Speidel (1994), 33.

50
Rudich (1993), 135: "Intuition and common sense . . . point to the inevitability, under tyrannical
rule, of some kind of a special repressive and investigative machinery. A few scattered hints in
our sources do, indeed, imply the operation of a certain network of secret agents in the early
Empire . . . " See Dio 52.37.2, who comments on the need for spies in a system such as the one
which Augustus has implemented; Grant (1974), 91.

51
Suetonius, Claudius 35.1. Cf. also Dio 60.3.3.

Agrippina: Tacitus, Annals 4.67.4. Vetus: Tacitus, Annals 16.10.2.

 140

One place where the specidatores undoubtedly were used as spies was at

the games. Tacitus notes that, under Nero, there were men in attendance to

record who was at the events and what their expressions betrayed about the

performance; it is most likely that these men would be speculatores, though they

are not named in the text.53 The presence of so many people in one place at such

spectacles was a constant concern to the emperors, and it was only logical that

soldiers from the emperor's personal guard be assigned to the task of collecting

information on what was being said to whom at such performances. There is a

passage from Epictetus which illustrates the sort of role these men may have

played: "A soldier dressed as a civilian sits down next to you and starts to

denounce the emperor. Then, because you have a kind of pledge from him of his

good faith since he began the abuse, you yourself say what you think, and are

immediately carted off to prison." 54 Since the praetorians were employed as

security at the games, the specific use of the speculatores at these events may have

resulted from their belonging to the guard. 55

53
Tacitus, Annals 16.5.2: quippe gravior inerat metiis, si spectaculo defuissent, multis palam et pluribus
occultis, ut nomina ac vultus, alacritatem tristitiamque coeuntium scrutarentur...

54
Epictetus, Discourses 4.13.5. The text dates to the early second century AD. Campbell (1994), 191
points to the similar case of Votienus Montanus in the reign of Tiberius; cf. Tacitus, Annals 4.42.2.
Grant (1970), 212 attributes the increased use of the "intelligence service" under Nero to the
machinations of Tigellinus. Philostratus (Life ofApollonius 4.43) records that the same prefect used
"all the eyes with which the government sees" to watch Apollonius; it is hard not to interpret this
as referring to the speculatores.
55
Rudich (1993), 135, comments on the difficulty in determining which official was "in charge of
supervising such clandestine government activities as the collection of information relevant to the
enhancement of imperial security." Given the fact that such a task seems to have fallen primarily
to the speculatores, and that they were a unit of the guard, it is clear that the praetorian prefect had
ultimate responsibility for such activity.
 141

The speculatores were a special unit under the Julio-Claudians, and their

responsibilities revolved very closely around the emperor, more so, in fact, than

the other cohorts of the praetorian guard. It is therefore no wonder that it was

these soldiers who often were entrusted to be the emperor's executioners. 56 Since

such deeds needed to be accomplished quickly and quietly, the unit associated

with clandestine activity was used. It is also reasonable to assign to them the

various instances of political executions carried out under the Julio-Claudians. It

has been pointed out that the speculatores of the legions were "concerned with the

custody of prisoners and the execution of the condemned." 57 There is no reason

to think that the speculatores associated with the guard would not have carried

out similar tasks, but at the behest of the emperor himself. An examination of

such incidents of confinement and executions under the Julio-Claudians reveals

that the praetorians were involved in many of these cases, though it is impossible

to say with any certainty which specific unit of the guard was assigned to the

task.

56
One of the offices which ranked below that of the speculator in the guard was the a quaestionibus
praetorio praefecti. This post seems to have been equivalent to the questionarius of the legion, a
position which has been interpreted to be a torturer. Cf. Durry (1938), 112; Le Bohec (1994), 56;
CIL 6.2755 (=ILS 2145).

57
Jones (1960), 161, citing Seneca, Dc Ben. 3.25 and De Ira 1.18.4.
 142

Confinement and Executions

In the republic, the responsibility for arrest and confinement in Rome

rested with the tresviri capitales who were members of the vigintisexviri, a group

of minor magistrates in Rome. Cicero records that their particular duties

included the imprisonment of criminals and the application of capital

punishment. 58 It is uncertain whether these magistrates "exercised a summary

criminal jurisdiction over slaves and humble citizens"; in the cases where the

tresviri capitales made arrests, it is possible that they were acting on the authority

of the senate. 59 The tresviri capitales also seem to have been in charge of the

prisons in Rome, and therefore supervised any executions which occurred there,

though they did not carry out the task themselves, leaving that to the carnifex, "a

man so polluted that he was not supposed to enter the Forum or to live within

the pomerium."60

In the imperial period, it became the responsibility of the urban cohorts,

under the direction of the urban prefect, to look after public order. 61 This unit

had been established by Augustus, who realized the need to have such a force on

58
Cicero, De Legibus 3.3.6. Robinson (1992), 175 notes that these magistrates "were normally
young men hopeful of a senatorial career, for which this was the first step on the civilian ladder."

59
Nippel (1984), 21; (1995), 22-26. Christ (1984), 123 offers a slightly different interpretation,
arguing that the tresviri had greater power in policing and in the carrying out of sentences.

60
Robinson (1992), 179, citing Cicero, Pro Rab. 5.15. The death penalty was imposed for various
crimes, ranging from poisoning to incendiarism; see Christ (1984), 123.

61
The office of the tresviri capitales continued to exist, however, and there are occasional
references to them in the literature. For example, Tacitus, Agricola 2.
 143

patrol in the city, given the size of the population. 62 "Granting the city prefect

command over three separate cohorts was probably not just a political gesture

towards the Senate and the nobility, but an effort to supply the magistrates

responsible for the security of the city . . . with effective means of control ready at

hand, especially when the emperor was not present." 63 There are many

examples of citizens being arrested, imprisoned and executed, but often without

reference to the persons carrying out these acts. One might cite, among other

examples, the case of Considius Proculus, who in AD 33 was arrested while

celebrating his birthday, charged with treason, condemned in the senate, and

immediately executed. 64 This incident illustrates the nature of the problem in

discussing these cases: we do not know the specific charges, nor do we know

where Proculus was held, or by whom he was executed, though the employment

of a public executioner, presumably in the prison itself, is known from other

cases.65 The responsibility of arrest in general belonged to members of the urban

62
The exact date of the creation of the urban cohorts is unknown, but it most likely occurred at
the time when the praetorians were organized in a formal way as the bodyguard of the emperor.
Cf. Suetonius, Augustus 49.1. For the date, see Freis (1967), 4-5; Passerini (1939), 44-45; Cadoux
(1959), 156.

63
Nippel (1995), 92. The specific nature of the duties of the urban cohorts under the Julio-
Claudians is not well documented; cf. Freis (1967), 44; Homo (1956), 167; Nippel (1995), 94-95.
The urban prefect was chosen from among the ranks of the senators, the only prefecture that was
not equestrian. It is not known for certain when the first urban prefect was appointed; Vitucci
(1956), 113-15 provides a list of prefects for the Julio-Claudian period, beginning with Messalla
Corvinus in 26 BC.

64
Tacitus, Annals 6.18.1.
65
For example, the execution of the children of Sejanus after the fall of their father (AD 33) (Dio
58.11.5); the case of Vibulenus Agrippa who took poison in the senate house and was carted off to
prison to be executed (AD 36) (Tacitus, Annals 6.40.1); or the incident involving Sextus
 144

cohorts since they were in charge of ensuring the security of the city as a whole. 66

But we have no specific examples of such activity in our sources, unless the

incident involving Julius Celsus falls into this category. 67

Sometimes we are given information about those who were involved in

cases of confinement or execution. For example, Asinius Gallus was arrested by a

praetor in AD 30 and led off to what he assumed would be his execution;

however, he remained under house arrest, the responsibility of the consuls and

praetors, until he died in AD 33. 68 Junius Gallio, who had been exiled by

Tiberius for allegedly attempting to subvert the guard, was returned to Rome

and kept under house arrest in the custody of the magistrates. 69 Plass refers to

this type of confinement as "a more calculatedly sinister limbo between life and

death." 70 In the cases of Gaius Fufius Geminus (under Tiberius) and Thrasea

Paconianus who was strangled in prison because he had composed verses critical of the emperor
while there (AD 35) (Tacitus, Annals 6.39).
66
In cases which required a high degree of security, or which involved members of the nobility,
the guard was used instead of the urban cohorts.
67
Tacitus, Annals 6.9.2-4; cf. Levick (1976), 203. In AD 32, five senators were charged with treason
and Celsus, a tribune from the urban cohorts, acted as one of the informers and secured the
release of two of the accused. It is possible he had acted as the arresting officer, and had gained
information which exonerated the men. Celsus himself was charged with conspiracy the next
year, and committed suicide while in custody; cf. Tacitus, Annals 6.14.1. Marsh (1931), 204 errs in
referring to Celsus as a member of the praetorians.

68
Tacitus, Annals 6.23.1; Dio 58.3.4-6. Cf. Hennig (1975), 103-6. Dio comments on the harshness of
Gallus' treatment; this is questioned by Marsh (1931), 276 who points to the lack of corroboration
in Tacitus. It is possible that Gallus died of enforced starvation; cf. Seager (1972), 233.

69
Dio 58.18.4; cf. Tacitus, Annals 6.3.3. See also the case of Titius Sabinus who was held in prison
and then executed (AD 28): Tacitus, Annals 4.68-70; Pliny, NH 8.145; Dio 58.1.1b-3.

70
Plass (1995), 173. Since prisons generally were not used for long-term incarceration at this time,
the phrase in Dio (eq (p-uXaicr|v tote, ap%ox>aiv) has been interpreted to indicate house arrest. Cf.
 145

Paetus (under Nero), quaestors were sent to inform them of their impending

deaths. 71 And, in AD 16, Publius Marcius was executed extra portam Esquilinam,

cum classicum canere iussissent, more prisco; the sounding of the trumpet probably

indicated a public execution. 72 But more often the incidents simply are recorded

without further comment.

Sometimes, however, we have evidence of the involvement of the

praetorian guard in these cases. There is a precedent for the use of the military in

arrest, interrogation, and execution that dates to the period of the triumvirate of

Octavian. Suetonius records an incident in which the praetor Quintus Gallius,

suspected to be carrying a sword as he paid his respects to Octavian, was

removed by centurions and soldiers, tortured and then executed. 73 By the reign

of Tiberius, praetorians were being used for surveillance of those who had been

banished, for interrogation and torture of prisoners, and in particular, for

Dio 59.6.2, for the case of Pomponius Secundus, who had been jailed for seven years and treated
poorly; the phrase used is EV %& oiKfiuaai. He was released by Caligula.

71
Geminus: Dio 58.4.5-6. Thrasea: Tacitus, Annals 16.32.1. Given Nero's excessive arrangements
for security at the senate meeting where Thraea was convicted, the use of a quaestor may result
from the emperor's desire to maintain the fiction of a legal proceeding which had included a trial
in the senate, though the absence of the guard is unusual. For Thrasea's trial, see Bauman (1974),
153-57.

72
Tacitus, Annals 2.32.3; Furneaux (1896), vol. 1,322. This particular execution may be included
by Tacitus because it followed the "ancient custom"; cf. Suetonius, Claudius 25 for executions in
the same location. In other cases, the act took place in the prison (for example, Clutorius Priscus;
cf. Tacitus, Annals 3.51.1) or the accused was thrown from the Tarpeian Rock (for example, Sextus
Marius; cf. ibid, 6.19.1).

73
Suetonius, Augustus 27A. Gaggero (1990), 237, note 9 dates this episode to 43-42 BC.
 146

executions. 74 It should be noted that, in general, we are dealing only with the

upper classes of Roman society, and almost all of the examples are political in

nature. 75 Yavetz comments on the use of the guard to quell "the unruly

behaviour of the plebs ... the dispatch of a praetorian cohort, several executions

- and order would once more be restored." 76 But this is a unique situation for

the guard. It occurred in AD 58, at Puteoli, with the praetorians being under the

command of the brothers Scribonii and should not be used as proof of the

praetorians' involvement in executions of the lower classes.

After the death of Augustus in AD 14, the first act of the new regime

recorded in the sources is the execution of Agrippa Postumus, with a member of

the guard as agent. 77 Agrippa had been banished to the island of Planasia by

Augustus with soldiers from the ranks of the praetorians guarding him, no doubt

so that the emperor could be kept informed about his activities. 78 On the

accession of Tiberius, a centurion killed Agrippa. This is the earliest example in

74
As, for example, in the case of the mutineers in Pannonia where those members of the guard
who were with Drusus executed the ringleaders; cf. Tacitus, Annals 1.30.1. See above, 128.

75
Examples involving the lower classes are few; for example, cf. Seneca (De Tranq. 14.7) in which
some of those being led off to execution by a centurion (from the prison of the Castra Praetoria?)
may have been members of the lower classes, but it is impossible to tell. It is also in Seneca (De
dementia 2.1.2) that we hear of Burrus being involved in the execution of two latrones of unknown
origin, presumably not doing the act himself, but delegating it to his officers. Soldiers were used,
however, to execute those who protested at the games about tax increases under Caligula; cf.
Josephus, A] 19.24-26; Dio 59.28.11.

76
Yavetz (1969), 12; cf. Tacitus, Annals 13.48.3.

77
Tacitus, Annals 1.6.1; Suetonius, Tiberius 22.

Suetonius, Augustus 65A.

 147

the sources of such a high profile execution carried out by a praetorian officer,

though it is likely that others had occurred in the previous regime. Tacitus notes

that the man found the task difficult, though he was of firm resolve. 79 Although

the soldiers had sworn an oath to ensure the security of the imperial family as

well as that of the emperor, this incident clearly illustrates the pragmatism of the

guard. The praetorians, and especially the officers, acknowledged that

sometimes there would be a conflict between their oath and the demands of the

emperor. Therefore, when a direct order was issued from the princeps which

contravened this oath, the choice was simple: the man who was their

commander-in-chief must be obeyed. 80 It is not certain in this instance where the

order originated; when the centurion reported to the new emperor that he had

carried out his command, Tiberius appeared not to know what he meant. Tacitus

adds, however, that the instructions had been relayed by Gaius Sallustius

Crispus, a friend of Tiberius, to a tribune of the guard, who presumably then had

passed along the command to his subordinate. 81 It is possible that Augustus had

left orders that Agrippa be executed upon his death, and the letter then would

79
Tacitus, Annals 1.6.1: quamvis firmatus animo centurio aegre confecit. This statement seems to
negate the possibility of independent action on the part of the centurion as presented by Dio
(57.3.6). See also Suetonius, Tiberius 22 where it is reported incorrectly that it was a tribune who
murdered him.

80
On the type of oath sworn by the army, cf. Campbell (1984), 26-8; Hennig (1975), 127-8; Brunt
and Moore (1967), 67-68.

81
Tacitus, Annals 1.6.3. Cf. Rogers (1935), 2. For Crispus, see Crook (1955), 34; Kehoe (1984/5),
247-254. He had been a confidant of Augustus as well.
 148

have relayed the news that the emperor had died. 82 Because of the fear of

retaliation, Crispus is said to have warned Livia that certain things were best left

undisclosed, among which were duties performed by the military. The need for

such secrecy in many executions no doubt provided the rationale for using

praetorians, and in particular, the speculatores.83

Under Tiberius, members of the guard also kept an eye on those whom

the emperor deemed a threat or who were waiting to be tried; in some cases, this

resulted in the suicide of the accused. In AD 16, Marcus Scribonius Libo Drusus

was charged with conspiracy. He was granted an adjournment during his trial

and allowed to return to his house, accompanied by soldiers. 84 Tacitus describes

the guard as disturbing the dinner-party which Libo had decided to give as his

final act: strepebant etiam in vestibulo, utaudiri, ut aspici possent, cum Libo ipsis . . .

epulis excruciatus. It seems clear that the intention here was to coerce Libo to kill

82
Cf. Seager (1972), 48-50, who notes that "neither Sallustius nor Livia had the power to give
orders to the centurion of the praetorian guard who actually carried out the execution; with
Augustus dead, Tiberius alone had the right." Cf. also Levick (1976), 151; Lewis (1970), 165-184.
For a discussion of the various interpretations, see Marsh (1931), 278.

83
Secrecy is evident as well in the case of Clemens, one of Agrippa Postumus' slaves, who
pretended to be his master. He was brought to Rome by Crispus and executed in a secluded part
of the palace, probably by a praetorian, given the location and clandestine nature of the murder.
Cf. Tacitus, Annals 2.40.2; Rogers (1935), 21-2; Seager (1972), 93; Kehoe (1984/85), 248-51. Guard
members were sent as well to ensure the death of Sempronius Gracchus in the same year. He had
been exiled by Augustus, and when Tiberius became emperor, soldiers were sent to kill him. Cf.
Tacitus, Annals 1.53.3-5.

84
Tacitus, Annals 2.31.1; cf. also Seneca, Ep. 70.10; Suetonius, Tiberius 25.1; 3; Dio 57.15.4-5;
Velleius Paterculus, Histories 2.129.2; 130.3. For the charges, see Bauman (1974), 60-1; Marsh
(1931), 58-60; Seager (1972), 89-92.
 149

himself once he realized that there was no hope of escaping conviction. 85

Another case of confinement involving the praetorians is that of Gnaeus

Calpurnius Piso in AD 20. After his trial, he was sent home under guard,

specifically a praetorian tribune, though Tacitus says that it was not clear

whether this soldier was there to ensure Piso's safety or his death. 86 Piso killed

himself after being rejected by both the senate and Tiberius, but constant

surveillance by an officer of the guard no doubt would have added to his

desperation, and in fact, there was a rumour that he had been murdered. 87

Enforced suicides such as these have been seen as constituting "hybrid self-

execution which, conveniently for the emperor, could be thought of as both

criminal-free and victimless." 88 The praetorians persuaded the accused through

intimidation to perform an action which would exonerate the emperor from the

85
Cf. Koestermann (1965), vol. 1, 306; Furneaux (1896), vol. 1, 320. Rogers (1935), 18, note 58
comments that "Seneca makes the suicide premeditated; it is not clear in Tacitus whether the
suicide was the result of deliberation or sudden terror of anticipated execution."

86
Tacitus, Annals 3.14.5; cf. Koestermann (1965), vol. 1, 443-5; Durry (1938), 278. Yavetz (1969), 28
points to the violent reaction of the people in Rome over the death of Germanicus, in particular,
their anger with Piso whom they believed to be guilty. It may have been such demonstrations that
prompted the use of the guard.

87
Tacitus, Annals 3.16.1.

88
Plass (1995), 93. There has been much debate over the value of suicide before conviction as a
method of allowing those who survive to escape further punishment and in assuring that the
victim's will was honoured. See Tacitus, Annals 6.29; Dio 58.15.2-4. The argument in favour of
such an interpretation is made, for example, by de Visscher (1957b), 176-9 and Plass (1995), 104;
that against by Rogers (1952), 282. For suicide in the Roman world, see Grise (1982).
 150

murder of a prominent citizen, and allow the emperor as well to claim that he

would have interceded on behalf of the defendant if he had been found guilty. 89

The imperial family also endured guarded confinement under Tiberius.

Praetorians were used to provide information to Sejanus about the actions of

Agrippina and Nero Caesar. 90 After their trial in AD 29, both were exiled;

Suetonius records that, whenever they were moved after this, they were bound

and kept under heavy guard to prevent anyone making contact with them. 91

Agrippina was banished to Pandateria where she was kept under close guard.

She is said to have lost the use of an eye as a result of a beating by the centurion

who was in charge of her, and was force-fed to prevent suicide by starvation. 92

Nero was sent to Pontia, no doubt accompanied by members of the guard. 93

Suetonius includes the rumour that an executioner was sent to him in exile, the

appearance of whom led him to kill himself. Again, there is the idea that the

89
As in Libo's case; see Tacitus, Annals 2.31.3.

90
Tacitus, Annals 4.67.4: quis additus miles nimtios introitus, aperta secreta velut in annales referebat.
Cf. Barrett (1996), 36-7; Martin and Woodman (1989), 246. The result was charges against
Agrippina and her sons. They were undoubtedly confined under house arrest, with praetorians to
guard them; cf. Barrett (1996), 36-37. For the background to the situation between Tiberius and
Agrippina, see Bauman (1992), 138-56.

91
Suetonius, Tiberius 64; cf. Pliny, NH 8.145; Philo, in Flaccum 3.9.
92
Suetonius, Tiberius 53.2; see Seager (1972), 211. Agrippina died, still in exile, in AD 33; cf.
Tacitus, Annals 6.25.3.
93
Suetonius, Tiberius 54.2.
 151

arrival of this figure was enough to ensure the suicide, whether or not that was

the intention. 94

Nero's brother Drusus also suffered. He was imprisoned on the Palatine

after being declared a public enemy. 95 Given the location, supervision by

soldiers would be likely. In AD 33, he died, starved to death according to the

sources. 96 Tacitus adds that Drusus was beaten by a centurion named Attius

who also recorded his final words and announced them to the senate. 97 Both

Nero and Drusus had been under surveillance before and after their arrests; spies

had reported every look and every saying that each man had made. 98 It seems

from the text (adpositi custodes) that the task was carried out by the praetorians

who were in attendance as the personal guard for the young princes. 99

Ironically, the unit originally intended as an honour and for protection turned

out in these instances to be an instrument of destruction. 100

94
Plass (1995), 114. Marsh (1931), 194 blames Sejanus, acting through Nero's guard, for the death.

95
Dio 58.3.8; Suetonius, Tiberius 54.2. The brevity of the account in Dio leaves much unanswered,
though he does mention the involvement of Sejanus in ensuring that a charge was laid once
Drusus arrived in Rome.
96
Tacitus, Annals 6.23.2; Suetonius, Tiberius 54.2. Cf. Seager (1972), 231-2; Barrett (1996), 47-48.

97
Tacitus, Annals 6.24.2.

98
Tacitus, Annals 4.60.1; 6.24.1. Agrippina also was watched; ibid, 4.67.4.
99
Koestermann (1965), vol. 2, 200 notes that those who had informed on Agrippina came from the
ranks of the praetorians but it is not discernable from the text whether they had been assigned as
a "military guard of honour." Yet, based on the analogy of Nero and Drusus, the soldiers fulfilled
two functions: protection and spying.

100 One might also add to this list the two lulias, daughter and grand-daughter of Augustus, who
had been banished by him and died in the reign of Tiberius. Cf. Velleius Paterculus, Histories
 The guard's responsibility for supervision extended beyond surveillance

of individuals. In the case of Aemilia Lepida, tried in AD 20, her slaves had been

kept in prison watched over by the praetorians (militari custodia) until they were

handed over to the consuls for interrogation. 101 Where they were held is not

entirely clear. There was a prison in the Castra Praetoria, but it is doubtful

whether the camp had been completed by this date. 102 A prison under the

control of the guard must have existed prior to the construction of the Castra

Praetoria, perhaps in close proximity to the site of the camp, but there is no

evidence for it in the archaeological record. 103 Levick comments on the increase

in the number of imprisonments under Tiberius, "due partly to the introduction

of an effective death penalty, which meant that the accused person had to be

prevented from escaping both before and after the verdict." 104 It is to be

expected that the guard would be involved in many cases, in particular when the

accused were held in the prison of the Castra Praetoria. Other, more furtive

demands made of the praetorians - for example, surveillance before arrest -

2.100.5; Suetonius, Augustus 65; Tacitus, Annals 4.71.4; Dio 55.10.14; 55.1; 57.18.1a; Seager (1972),
50; Barrett (1996), 19-20.
101
Tacitus, Annals 3.22.3. See also Bauman (1972), 173-76.

102
Koestermann (1965), vol. 2,458, however, notes that "the slaves of Lepida . . . had been in
military custody in the praetorian barracks . . . "

103 xhe main prison in Rome was the Career on the slopes of the Capitoline, but other prisons are
known by the beginning of the second century; cf. Juvenal 3.312-14; Robinson (1992), 194-5.
Prisons generally were used only for holding defendants or persons who were to be executed,
and were not intended for long-term incarceration; cf. Millar (1984), 131.

104
Levick (1972), 188; cf. also 284, note 58 for a list of those held under Tiberius.
 153

would not be recorded in the sources but must have occurred when the situation

warranted increased security. 105 This being the case, the fall of Sejanus is of

interest because of the absence of the praetorians in any capacity. Sejanus was

arrested in the senate by the prefect of the vigiles, and escorted to prison by him

and by one of the consuls plus the other magistrates who were present. 106 Later

that same day he was executed. 107 It is possible that the prefect's executioner was

a member of the guard, though it is recorded that his children were killed by a

public executioner, and it is unlikely that Macro would have entrusted that task

to a praetorian officer who might be unwilling to carry it out. 108

The emergence of the treason trials under Tiberius, and his paranoia about

security, which increased over the years and in particular after the fall of Sejanus,

resulted in the deaths of many prominent Romans. 109 Suetonius remarks on the

emperor's cruelty to his victims, detailing executions at the rate of twenty a day;

105
As, for example, in the case of Rubrius Fabatus, who in AD 33 had tried to escape to Parthia
and was brought back to Rome by a centurion; Tacitus (Annals 6.14.2) records that there were
guards watching him (custodes additi), which seems to suggest that he had been under
surveillance by praetorians as he headed east. This is the same expression used of those who were
spying on Nero Caesar and Agrippina; cf. above, note 90. It is possible that assignments such as
these often fell to the speadatores.

106
Dio 58.10.5-8.

107 j h i s action directly contravened the ten-day waiting period between conviction and execution
enacted by Tiberius in 21; cf. Tacitus, Annals 3.51.1; Levick (1976), 288, note 107; Bauman (1989),
82.

108
Dio 58.11.5. The term used is 6 ST^IOC; which is found, however, in Josephus in reference to
members of the guard; see below, 159.

109
Seneca (De Ben. 3.26) comments that the treason trials under Tiberius resulted in more deaths
than in the civil war. On treason trials in this period, see Bauman (1974), passim; Rogers (1935),
passim, especially 190-96; Levick (1976), 184-5; Griffin (1995), 49-57.
 154

he adds that there was an area on Capri still pointed to in his time where victims

had been put to death after torture. 110 Whether the exact nature of the tortures or

the number of victims can be believed, it is probable that in many of these

interrogations and executions, members of the guard would have been involved,

and in the case of Capri, specifically those who were in attendance on the

emperor.

The transition of power to Caligula apparently brought about a decline in

the incidences of confinement and executions. At the beginning of the reign,

Macro was involved in the case of Herod Agrippa, who had been imprisoned in

AD 36 for seditious speech. Josephus records that the prefect was ordered by

Tiberius to arrest Agrippa and haul him to jail.111 It seems that he was taken to

the prison in the Castra Praetoria, for there was a soldier in charge, soldiers were

guarding the prisoners, and Agrippa is said to have been chained to a

centurion. 112 It was Macro who granted permission for leniency toward the

prisoner at the request of Antonia; this is not surprising since the prefect would

110
Suetonius, Tiberius 61.2-62.3. Suetonius also comments here on Tiberius' cruel treatment of
those being held in prisons. Seager (1972), 232-3 connects the figure of 20 executions per day with
the command dating to the summer of AD 33 to dispose of adherents of Sejanus who were still in
prison; cf. Tacitus, Annals 6.19.
111
Josephus, AJ 18.196-204. Durry (1938), 172 used this passage to argue that the praetorian
prefects were put in charge of high-profile prisoners, but it is more likely that their responsibility
extended only to those prisoners kept in the prison of the praetorian camp.

112
Josephus (AJ 18.235) also records that when Agrippa was released, it was from the camp where
he had been held, further evidence that his place of confinement was the Castra Praetoria. During
the reign of Claudius, it is likely that Mithridates received the same sort of treatment. Tacitus
(Annals 12.21) records that he was handed over to guards (custodes) in the city. Given the status of
the prisoner, it would be logical for these men to have come from the ranks of the praetorians.
 155

have had control over what went on in the prison. 113 The concessions given to

Agrippa apparently included freedom to go to the baths, for he was on his way

there when the news of Tiberius' death was brought to him. Later that same day,

the centurion who was in charge of Agrippa's guards invited his prisoner to dine

with him. 114 Yet, when Agrippa was released to house arrest after Caligula came

to power, the instructions for this move were contained in a letter that was

brought to the urban prefect, Lucius Calpurnius Piso. It appears that, as long as

Agrippa was housed in the Castra Praetoria, he was in the charge of Macro, but

the judicial responsibility continued to rest with the urban prefect.115

In the short reign of Caligula, there are only a few examples of the guard

being used as executioners. One of the reasons for this is the absence of treason

trials in the early part of the reign. 116 Perhaps the most notorious incident

concerned Tiberius Gemellus, who had been named co-heir with Caligula, but

within a year of Caligula coming to power, had been killed. It is recorded that a

113
It may have been through the influence of Caligula that these concessions were granted; cf.
Schwartz (1990), 55.
114
Josephus, A] 18.228-233.

115
Durry (1938), 172; cf. also Nippel (1995), 95; Howe (19662), 16, note 19: "There is, no doubt,
some validity in the theory that the custom of sending prisoners to Rome and keeping them
militari cnstodia would bring them under the control of the praetorian prefect, who would thus
acquire a summary jurisdiction in criminal trials."

116
Cf. Barrett (1990), 64-5. They were reintroduced in AD 39; cf. Dio 59.16.8; 18.1-4; 23.8;
Suetonius, Caligula 26.3. It is impossible to determine the level of involvement of the guard in
these imprisonments and deaths, but given the nature of the incidents, it is likely that the
praetorians would have had a role in many of them.
tribune of the guard was sent to ensure his death. 117 It has been argued that,

because Gemellus was a member of the imperial family, it was necessary for him

to kill himself, since "it was nefas for anyone who had taken the oath to the

emperor to harm him." 118 But there is no evidence that any officer of the

praetorians refused to forswear his oath when ordered to kill a member of the

imperial family. As we have seen, there seems to have been no hesitation in the

execution of Agrippa Postumus in AD 14 and, in the decades to follow, soldiers

will carry out their orders against the emperor's relatives without question. In

fact, Philo records that the tribune assigned to ensure Gemellus' death had to

help him because he did not know how to kill himself with the sword he was

given, which is tantamount to participating in the actual death. 119 The presence

of the tribune from the emperor's personal guard coupled with the absence of

any announcement to the senate of Gemellus' death, suggests it was intended

that the incident would be kept quiet. 120

There are scattered references in the sources to instances during the reign

of Caligula when the guard may have taken part in confinement and execution,

117
Suetonius, Caligula 23.3; Philo, Legatio ad Gaium 30-31. Cf. Barrett (1990), 75-6. Balsdon (1934),
37 notes the parallel with Agrippa Postumus' murder.
118
Hurley (1993), 95. Cf. the words of Philo: cbq OUK amoKpccTopcov ctTioyovouqrcpoc,exepcov
avaipetaBai.

119
Grant (1974), 144 refers to "the professional etiquette of the military executioners", in this case,
that they could assist, but not do. Plass (1995), 94 points out that such action on the part of the
person sent to ensure death blurs the distinction between execution and suicide.

120
Dio 59.8.2.
 157

but it is often difficult to be certain whether those involved are praetorians. One

instance where a praetorian officer certainly did act as the agent was the

execution of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus on Caligula's journey to Germany in AD

39. The emperor, accompanied by praetorians, went north apparently to

suppress an emerging conspiracy involving Lepidus and Cornelius Lentulus

Gaetulicus. 121 It is impossible to determine the sequence of events which

resulted in the deaths of the two alleged conspirators. We have few details about

the elimination of Gaetulicus; it is reasonable that the guard was involved, in

particular that the speculatores were used. 122 Their service in this case would have

allowed the removal of Gaetulicus without attracting undue attention. Seneca

records that Lepidus was killed by a tribune named Dexter, undoubtedly an

officer of the praetorians, perhaps the commander of the soldiers who were

accompanying the emperor. 123 The use of the guard in these instances, then, was

dictated by the high profile of the alleged conspirators, and the danger which

they posed, given their military support; their elimination needed to be carried

out quickly and quietly. 124

121
On the conspiracy, see Barrett (1990), 101-113. Cf. Suetonius, Vespasian 2.3; Dio 59.22.6-7. See
also Simpson (1980), 347-366. Suetonius (Caligula 43) reports that the journey was made so
quickly that the praetorians, against tradition, were forced to put their standards on their pack
animals. The reason for this action is not given, though it has been suggested that the weight of
the standards was slowing down the march. Cf. Hurley (1993), 160. On the speed of Caligula's
journey, see Balsdon (1934), 17.

122
Cf. Barrett (1990), 105 who postulates that Gaetulicus was eliminated in Germany by "agents".

123
Seneca, Ep. 4.7. Cf. Barrett (1990), 107.
124
The grant of a donative after the death of Lepidus probably was made only to the praetorians
with Caligula, if in fact the deed was done before reaching the army on the Rhine. Cf. Dio 59.22.7.
 158

The guard was also involved in the case of Gaius Calpurnius Piso who

was banished in AD 40. Dio records that he was allowed to take ten slaves with

him, and when he asked for permission to take more, was told that he would

have an equal number of soldiers. 125 It is also likely that members of the guard

were with Agrippina Minor and Julia Livilla while they were in exile, given the

previous examples of Agrippina Maior, Nero Caesar, and Agrippa Postumus,

though there is no mention of soldiers in the sources. 126

Caligula himself is recorded to have delighted in observing the torture

and executions of prisoners during lunch or celebrations. 127 Although such

extreme measures were usually reserved for slaves, it had become the practice to

torture those who had been accused of treason, and it is possible that the guard

was involved in these cases. Suetonius adds that Caligula had a soldier who was

a master at decapitation (miles decollandi artifex) execute those who were brought

from the prison. Other incidents where praetorians may have played a role

include the beating of the quaestor Betilienus Bassus during which the emperor

is said to have spread clothing on the ground so that the soldiers could get a

125
Dio 59.8.8. He is incorrect on his daring of the incident; see Barrett (1990), 77.

126
Dio 59.22.8. On the banishment, cf. Barrett (1996), 69-70.
127
Suetonius, Caligula 32.1; cf. also Seneca, Dial. 5.18.3-4 where Caligula is described as walking in
the gardens of Agrippina as he watched the murders.
better footing, and the executions of men whose fathers were forced to attend or

vice versa. 128

The assassination of Caligula, in which officers of the guard played a

major role in the death of the emperor, differs from the other examples in that

the praetorians acted of their own volition. During the planning of the deed, the

praetorian tribune Chaerea voiced complaints about the use of the guard as

torturer and executioner: TOVC, \)7tr|K6o"D<; 8iaKovovp:e6a, Sopwpopoi Kai 8r||iioi

KaGeaxriKOTeq ccvri axpaxicoxrov . . . (j.iaiv6([Link] x& KOCG' fmepav ocfycm ©(paynq

Kai Pao&voi) xfj<; eKeivtov.129 Chaerea became one of the leaders in the

conspiracy. 130 It also included three other tribunes of the guard: Cornelius

Sabinus; a certain Papinius who is not otherwise known; and Iulius Lupus, who

was related to the praetorian prefect, Clemens. 131 The extent to which the plot

128
Bassus: Suetonius, Caligula 26.3. Executions: Suetonius, Caligula 27A; cf. also Dio 59.25.5b-7;
Seneca, Dial. 5.18.3; 4.33.3-6. For elucidation of these incidents, see Barrett (1990), 156-158. For a
similar incident during the reign of Augustus, cf. Suetonius, Augustus 13.2.

129
Josephus, A] 19.34; 42. The comment was directed to the praetorian prefect Clemens, and to
Papinius, a fellow tribune.

130
A story in Josephus seems to indicate that Chaerea was involved from the early stages of the
conspiracy, for he was called upon to torture Quintilia, a woman closely associated with a fellow
conspirator. Cf. Josephus, A] 19.35-6; also briefly mentioned in Dio 59.26.4, and referred to, but
without names, in Suetonius, Caligula 16.4. The torture took place in the palace, very near the
emperor's quarters; cf. Wiseman (1991), 51. It is easy to imagine that being forced to undertake
this action only added to Chaerea's anger; see Wiseman (1992), 1.

131
Cf. Demougin (1992), #420 (Sabinus); #421 (Lupus); #423 (Papinius). In addition, Clemens
himself was approached by the conspirators, though he did not agree to participate directly,
ostensibly because of his age; it is not known whether the other prefect had knowledge of the
plot, but since the sources do not even record his name, if he was privy to it, he must have had an
insignificant role. Wiseman (1991), 52; 69 suggests that Arruntius Stella was the other prefect
based on A] 19.148, but this is by no means certain. Cf. also Suetonius, Caligula 56.1; Dio 59.29.1.
 160

spread among the rank and file is not certain, but its success shows that there

were praetorians who could be trusted to assist their commanders and to

forswear their oaths, perhaps through the promise of accelerated promotion in

the guard or a substantial donative.

Caligula was killed in AD 41 at the games on the Palatine. 132 Chaerea

approached Caligula as he left the theatre, and asked him for the day's

watchword. He attacked after receiving the reply. 133 There was no one to come

to the emperor's aid except his litter-bearers, who were ineffective. During the

actual assassination, most of the praetorians on duty that day on the Palatine

(whether as protection for the emperor or as security for the games being held

there) must have remained in the theatre, unaware of what was happening. That

they did not attempt to get to the emperor or try to follow the assassins can

probably be attributed to the efforts of the ex-consul Valerius Asiaticus, who

seems to have been given the role of calming those in the theatre. 134 In fact, it

132
The choice of the place and time apparently was dictated by Caligula's intention to sail to
Alexandria after the games; cf. Josephus AJ 19.80-83. See also Barrett (1990), 162-63, who points
out that the crowd at the games would make it more difficult for the guard to protect Caligula
when he was attacked. A further consideration had to be the ability of the conspirators to isolate
Caligula from the rest of the praetorians and from the German bodyguard, both of which were
supposed to protect him. This was made possible by the fact that Chaerea had to get the
watchword from the emperor at the change of the guard; see Josephus, AJ 19.99; Suetonius,
Caligula 58.

133
In the version given by Suetonius (Caligula 58.2), it is Sabinus who asks for the watchword. It is
possible that the change of the watch on the Palatine was to take place with the cohorts of
Chaerea and Sabinus, which would have ensured that both of them would be close to the
emperor. Hurley (1993), 198, note 113 remarks that Aquila, who landed the blow which killed
Caligula, must have been a praetorian; if so, it is not known what rank he held.

134
Cf. Dio 59.30.2: enei 5e TO Sop-ocpopucov exapaxxexo m i 5ia6eovxec, E7fuv6dvovxo xiq Taiov
eatpa^ev, OuaXepioq 'ACUXTIKOC; avfip vmaxe'UKGx; Ga-u^aaxov 8ri xiva xpomov ocoxout; f|aux a o e v -
For Asiaticus' possible involvement in the conspiracy, see Barrett (1990), 162.
 161

was the German bodyguard who first realized what had happened and who

began to exact revenge. 135 They indiscriminately murdered anyone they

happened upon and it was only with difficulty that they were prevented from

wholesale slaughter by the supplication of the crowd still in the theatre and the

admonitions of Arruntius Stella, though the number of praetorians present must

have had an impact as well.136

Members of the guard were involved not only in the murder of the

emperor, contravening the oath which they had sworn to him, but also in the

elimination of his family. One of the praetorian tribunes, Lupus, was sent

immediately to kill Caesonia and her child. 137 He showed no hesitation in

performing this task, according to Josephus, though technically they should have

been protected by the same oath sworn to Caligula. After his accession, Claudius

had both Chaerea and Lupus put to death. 138 It has been suggested that the

135
Exactly where the Germans were at the time of the assassination is not clear. Although they
should have been in close proximity to Caligula, it appears from Josephus' account that they had
not exited the theatre with the emperor. Those guard members involved in the conspiracy may
have played a role in keeping the Germani corporis custodes separated from Caligula.

136
Josephus, A] 19.119-126; 138-142; 148-152. Josephus describes the Germans as loyal to Caligula,
partly because of the emperor's grants of money to them, and so bent on revenge. But see also
chapter 215, where the Germans are described as having acted as they did because of their own
savagery rather than out of any concern for public welfare. On the character of the German
bodyguard, see Bellen (1981), 84-85.

137
The choice of Lupus for such a task was to implicate his relative Clemens, according to
Josephus (A/19.191); cf. Levick (1991), 37-8. Suetonius (Caligula 59) calls him a centurion of the
guard. Balsdon (1934), 105 mistakenly attributes the murders of Caesonia and the child to the
senate.

138
Josephus, A] 19.269; cf. Dio 60.3.4, Suetonius, Claudius 11.1, where a further reason for the
execution of Chaerea is given, namely that he had advocated the murder of Claudius.
 162

charge against them must have been the murder of Caesonia and Drusilla:

"Killing Gaius was justifiable tyrannicide . . . . but going after the rest of the

family (which included Claudius of course) was n o t . . . " 139 Yet, Claudius must

have viewed with trepidation the officers' contravention of their oath to protect

the emperor, and the death of Chaerea in particular can be justified on the

grounds that the new emperor wanted to let the guard know that he was not

going to be next.140 The executions were carried out by a man who seems to have

been experienced in such things, for Chaerea is said to have been killed with the

first blow. 141 It is interesting that this task was carried out by a "soldier" (xov

CTpocuojTriv) who is not recorded to have been an officer, one of the few specific

examples we have in the sources of an ordinary guardsman performing this

duty. According to Josephus, the executions took place in public.

Suetonius records that Claudius, during his reign, killed thirty-five

senators and over 300 knights. 142 The reasons for the elevated numbers are

twofold: the re-introduction of treason trials and Claudius' own paranoia which

139
Hurley (1993), 214.
140
Cf. Levick (1990), 35.
141
Josephus, A] 19.268-270; Dio 60.3.4; Suetonius, Claudius 11.1.

142
Suetonius, Claudius 29.2. Cf. also Dio 60.13 in which it is recorded that the number of public
executions was so great that a statue of Augustus had to be removed from the area. The figure
given in the Apocolocyntosis (14.2) for the number of equites is 221; Mottershead (1986), 120
comments that "the figures are remarkable and reveal that relations between Emperor and both
senators and equites were strained." Cf. also Barrett (1996), 73; 104-5. For the references to
executions in the Apocolocyntosis, see Baldwin (1964), 39-48.
 163

was preyed on by those around him. 143 Though the total may be disputed, the

evidence is overwhelming that there was a large number of deaths under this

emperor, and the praetorians probably took part in most of them. For example,

there is a case in Suetonius where a centurion reported to Claudius the death of

an ex-consul; the emperor denied ever giving the order, but is said to have

approved of the action because the soldiers had been vigilant in avenging him

without instructions. 144

The incident involving Decimus Valerius Asiaticus in AD 47 illustrates the

fear that Claudius felt. Charged with adultery and tampering with the army, he

was arrested by the prefect of the guard, Rufrius Crispinus, who was

accompanied by soldiers under heavy arms, as Tacitus puts it (tamquam

opprimendo bello).u5 Asiaticus was returned in chains from Baiae to Rome and

dealt with intra cubiculum. It is obvious from the way in which he was handled

that Claudius took seriously the threat this man represented. Yet, according to

Dio, Asiaticus almost escaped death, and would have done so had it not been for

143
Cf. McAlindon (1956), 114: " . . . many condemnations, attributed to a multitude of causes,
appear, when seen in their context, to have been at least understandable precautions and
sometimes justifiable measures against treason, committed or contemplated." For example, there
were many executions after the exposure of the conspiracy of Annius Vinicianus in AD 42; cf. Dio
60.15.6-16.3. Grant (1974), 154 suggests that there were at least six conspiracies planned during
Claudius' reign.
144
Suetonius, Claudius 29.2. See also Dio 60.14.2. The role of Claudius' freedman, Narcissus, in
many of these deaths should not be overlooked. Cf. Seneca, Apocolocyntosis 13A where there is a
list of those Narcissus had ordered executed. See also Baldwin (1964), 44.

145
Tacitus, Annals 11.1.3. For further details, see Levick (1990), 61-64 (who refers to Asiaticus as
"an active and athletic culprit" in an attempt to explain the excessive measures taken to arrest
him); Scramuzza (1940), 93-97; Bauman (1974), 202-3.
 164

Messalina. Acting through Lucius Vitellius, a member of the consilium which was

hearing the charges, she remained insistent on his conviction. 146 Crispinus was

rewarded well, being given one and a half million sesterces and an honourary

praetorship, excessive compensation for an arrest. 147

The praetorians were called upon to act again in the affair with Messalina

and Gaius Silius in AD 48.148 After their "marriage" became known, Claudius,

assisted by his inner circle, took quick action and members of the guard were

dispatched to arrest those who had been in attendance. 149 The emperor himself

was conveyed to the Castra Praetoria to reaffirm the loyalty of the praetorians. 150

They called out for retribution. By this time, several of those who had been

present at the party had been brought to the camp by centurions of the guard.

They were tried there by the soldiers (parata condone militum . . . continuus dehinc

cohortium clamor nomina reorum et poenas flagitantium) and executed, including

146
Dio 61.29.5-6. Whether the soldier who appeared to testify against Asiaticus was a member of
the praetorians is not clear.

147
Tacitus, Annals 11.4.3. Rudich (1993), 148 refers to Crispinus as "active in the prosecution of
Valerius Asiaticus", but there is no evidence that the prefect actually took part in the proceedings.

148
Tacitus, Annals 11.31-38; Suetonius, Claudius 26.2; 36.1; Dio 61.31.5. For analysis of the incident,
see Levick (1990), 64-67; Bauman (1974), 177-88.

149
Tacitus, Annals 11.32.1. Meise (1969), 161 postulates that there was a list of names of those who
had attended the celebration which facilitated the quick arrests. Koestermann (1965), vol. 3,102
argues that the soldiers in the camp had no knowledge of the affair, but this seems unlikely given
the role of the praetorians in the apprehension of those involved.

150
Tacitus, Annals 11.31.1. Bauman (1974), 180: "[The] view of the marriage as an act of
usurpation is also implicit in the advice given to Claudius by his consilium, to go to the praetorian
cohorts and ensure his safety before worrying about revenge." He later refers to the gathering of
the troops as a "prearranged mass meeting", but it is possible that the cohorts responded of their
own volition once word had got out.
 165

Silius.151 By allowing the soldiers to have a say in the fate of those charged, the

emperor provided them with the opportunity to reassert their loyalty.

The next step was the removal of Messalina. Tacitus records that

Narcissus sent members of the guard - centurions and a tribune - to kill her. 152

The order had come from the emperor himself, Narcissus said, and there is little

reason to doubt the veracity of his claim.153 Although Messalina tried to kill

herself when she knew that there was no hope, she could not do it, and the

tribune was forced to provide the final blow. It is reported that a former slave,

Euodus, was sent along to make certain that the order was carried out. 154 This

may indicate the uncertainty felt by Tigellinus over whether a praetorian officer

would be willing to violate his oath of loyalty to the imperial family.155 But there

was no need for concern; like those soldiers who had killed Caesonia and

151
Tacitus, Annals 11.35.2. For the legal aspects of these "trials", see Bauman (1974), 186-7. He
points to the shortness of time in allowing for fourteen cases to have been heard and so assumes
that there were "summary proceedings". Dio (60.31.5) records that several people were arrested
and tortured while Claudius was on his way back to Rome, but again, the restraints of time
preclude such action.

152
Tacitus, Annals 11.37.2-3. Koestermann (1965), vol. 3,105 notes that these officers were
members of the palace watch, but since the other events had taken place in the camp, this is not
absolutely certain.

153
Nearly all the sources are in agreement on this aspect of the death of Messalina; cf. Suetonius,
Claudius 26.2; Dio 60.31.5; Josephus A] 20.149; 8/ 249. Tacitus (Annals 11.37.1-2) insinuates that
Narcissus gave the command, though the freedman attributed the command to Claudius (ita
imperatorem iubere). Cf. also Bauman (1974), 185. Contra Oost (1958), 119.

154
The words used of Euodus by Tacitus (Annals 11.37.2) are custos et exactor, the same as were
used in 3.14.5 to describe the guard placed on Piso, which may add to the speculation that, in that
case, the soldier was there simply as a guard.
155
Or, it may indicate uncertainty over whether a guard member would obey an order coming
from a freedman rather than from his commander.
 166

Agrippa Postumus earlier, once the order had been given, the tribune did not

hesitate to obey. 156 After Messalina's death, the senate honoured Narcissus with

the insignia quaestoria, presumably for his role in the exposure of the affair.157

There is no record of the reaction of the guard to the murder of the empress, but

given the attitude of the praetorians to the trials in the camp, it is likely that they

had little sympathy for her fate, if any.

Nero came to power in AD 54. In Tacitus' narrative, the first death

recorded was that of Marcus Junius Silanus, governor of Asia. Interestingly, the

guard was not involved in his death. He reputedly was killed instead by the

procurator, Publius Celer, and a freedman, Helius. Tacitus refers to these men as

reifamiliari principis in Asia.158 The reason why praetorians were not sent to carry

out this execution was that the order apparently came from Agrippina, and Nero

had not been told about her plans. 159 She also at this time was able to dispose of

Narcissus, who had been placed in custody before the transition of power,

156
Tacitus records that in the previous years there had been many executions ordered by
Messalina herself. It is unknown whether the guard had been involved in these deaths. Cf. Annals
11.28.2: multasque mortes iussu Messalinae patratas. Among her victims was Julia Livilla, daughter
of Germanicus, who had been exiled to Pandateria and by the end of AD 41, had been killed,
possibly by a member of the guard. Cf. Dio 60.8.5; 18.4; Tacitus, Annals 13.32.5; Suetonius,
Claudius 29.1; Levick (1990), 56.

157
Tacitus, Annals 11.38.4. Messalina suffered damnatio memoriae; cf. Meise (1969), 161.
158
Tacitus, Annals 13.1.1-3; cf. Dio 61.6.4-5.

159 if Nero was not aware of the order, this episode may provide additional support for the
argument against Agrippina's influence with the praetorians at this time, since she chose not to
use them for what was an important execution. Bauman (1992), 191 argues that Agrippina could
act unilaterally because she had shared authority over imperial procurators (based on Smallwood
[1967], 264). Pliny (NH 7.58), however, attributes the death to Nero; cf. Baldwin (1967), 427;
Barrett (1996), 153-55.
 167

perhaps under the watchful eyes of the praetorians. He killed himself when

threatened with execution, which leads to the speculation that, as in other cases,

a soldier may have been sent to enforce his suicide. 160 Nero, who apparently

knew nothing of the order, is recorded to have been upset by the freedman's

death.

The sources indicate that the guidance of Burrus and Seneca prevented

more deaths. Yet, they could not stop them all.161 In AD 55, Britannicus died,

apparently murdered, though the evidence is controversial. 162 According to

Tacitus, the agent was the infamous poisoner Locusta, who had been imprisoned

under Claudius. A praetorian tribune named Iulius Pollio had been assigned to

watch over her, and it was to him that the arrangements were entrusted. 163 She

may have been kept in the prison of the Castra Praetoria, given the status of the

officer who was guarding her. Pollio is not mentioned in connection with this

160
Tacitus, Annals 13.1.3; Dio 60.34.4-5. Cf. Faider (1929), 192.

161
Pliny (Ep. 5.5.3) notes that Gaius Fannius was writing a history of people put to death or
banished by Nero, and that the unfinished work already amounted to three volumes. It is
interesting that the most notorious murder of Nero's reign, that of his mother, did not involve the
guard. In AD 59, when Nero decided to get rid of her, Anicetus, commander of the fleet at
Misenum, provided the plan and undertook to carry it out. For details, see above, "Nero", 99-100.

162
The claim of murder is disputed. But, cf. Rogers (1955), 199; Griffin (1984), 73-4; Bauman
(1974), 211. Barrett (1996), 172 notes that it was the perception that Nero had murdered
Britannicus that was important, not whether the charge was true.

163
Tacitus, Annals 13.15.3-16.1. It is possible that Pollio was from Narbonensis and an
acquaintance of Burrus. Cf. Demougin (1992), #539. He also was associated with another
praetorian tribune from the same area in an inscription from Annecy; cf. CIL 12.2545. Barrett
(1996), 121 suggests Agrippina's involvement in Pollio's appointment. For the death of
Britannicus, see also Suetonius, Nero 33.2-3, Titus 2; Dio 61.7.4; Josephus, A] 20.153. Cf. Barrett
(1996), 170-72; Bradley (1978), 197-99.
event in any of the other sources. The reason for the involvement of the tribune,

if we accept Tacitus' version of the death, was a need for secrecy.164 Who better

to ensure that such a task was carried out quickly and quietly than an officer of

the guard? Whether the incident occurred as recorded in Tacitus is not as

important here as the purported role of the tribune; that such a responsibility

would be attributed to an officer of the guard indicates that the involvement of

praetorians in such deeds was an appropriate presumption. The official version -

that Britannicus succumbed to a natural death - seems to have been widely

accepted, if not completely believed. 165 There is no record of any response from

the praetorians to this incident, but the absence of any donative to them after

such a high profile death suggests that they accepted the official explanation.

Pollio himself was promoted soon thereafter to the post of procurator of

Sardinia; this "removed him per speciem honoris from the city where he might

spread rumours among the guard or serve as a living reproach to the

Emperor." 166 It seems clear that his motivation for taking part in such a deed

was personal gain, as had been the case for many officers in the past.

164
Tacitus, Annals 13.18.1. Cf. Griffin (1976), 135. Clearly Nero did not want to risk any display of
support for Britannicus coming from either the ranks of the guard or elsewhere.

165
Cf. AE (1959), 224, from Amissus in Pontus, honouring Nero, Poppaea, and Britannicus, and
dating to AD 63:

[NJepcova KkxuSiov Kaiaapa IEPCCGTOV

[Link], ZEpaoxf)v rio7t7taiav, Tipepiov
KtaxuSiov BpetavviKov, 6 5fj)[Link] 8m xfjq
erciue^eiac, AO-OKIOU Eiowioi) noxeuov
m i T6V ouvapxovxrav

166
Griffin (1976), 88. Two inscriptions (CIL 10.7952 and 10.7863) from Sardinia record his tenure
in the guard and in the urban cohorts.
 169

In the year AD 62, there are several instances where the guard was used to

arrest or execute those who were deemed a risk to the emperor. 167 The role of

Tigellinus, by this time praetorian prefect, should not be overlooked in these

cases. For example, he worked on Nero's fears of Rubellius Plautus to dispose of

him, at this time in exile in Asia.168 Soldiers were sent to kill him; it is claimed

that there were sixty, a rather large number for such an undertaking. 169 Despite

being warned in advance by one of his former slaves, Plautus refused to flee or to

fight, and was killed by a centurion. It is recorded that a eunuch went along to

observe the execution, which marks the second time that someone not associated

with the military was in attendance to make sure that the job was done correctly,

and it is suggestive of Tigellinus' lack of trust in the soldiers who had been sent.

One other incident in AD 62 should be noted. In the case of Octavia,

Nero's former wife, the instigator of her downfall was not Tigellinus but

Poppaea Sabina, the emperor's new wife. She first had Octavia's slaves tortured,

167
Griffin (1984), 84 refers to ". . . the re-emergence of maiestas charges and the use of murder as a
security measure, applied not merely to members of the imperial family but to possible rivals to
the throne."

168 Tacitus, Annals 14.58.2-59.2. Cf. Rudich (1993), 68-9. Plautus had been named in connection
with the alleged conspiracy of Agrippina in AD 55, and exiled in 59; cf. Tacitus, Annals 13.20.1;
14.22. Connected with this execution in Tacitus is that of Faustus Cornelius Sulla Felix, in exile in
Gaul, who was murdered at dinner by assassins, probably soldiers (speculatores?) since the order
came from Tigellinus; cf. Tacitus, Annals 14.57.4; Rudich (1993), 67-8.

169
Tacitus, Annals 14.58.4. Tacitus later (59.2) refers to these soldiers as a maniple, which usually
consisted of two centuries. It is obvious that there is some confusion over the exact number,
though it seems to be rather large.
 170

under the direction of Tigellinus. 170 Koestermann argues that by using the

prefect, Nero intended to give the impression of legality for this action, though

there was no basis for the interrogation. 171 Even though no incriminating

information was forthcoming, Octavia was banished to Campania and placed

under military guard. 172 Before long, she had been moved to Pandateria and,

within a few days, the command came for her death. 173 She was bound and

killed; although it is not recorded in Tacitus who performed the deed, it likely

was a soldier of her guard.

The Pisonian conspiracy of AD 65 provides several examples of the

praetorians being involved in arrests and executions, often of their own

colleagues. The details of the plot have been discussed elsewhere. 174 Tigellinus

appears in the role of torturer, with his first victim being Epicharis, who earlier

170
Tacitus, Annals 14.60.3; cf. Dio 62.13.4. See Griffin (1984), 111-2.

171
Koestermann (1965), vol. 4,146. It should be recalled that Macro also had taken a personal
interest in interrogations; see below, "The Guard in Civil Administration", 216-217.
172
Tacitus, Annals 14.60.5. Though it is not specified, this guard no doubt consisted of praetorians;
cf. Rudich (1993), 69-74.
173
Tacitus, Annals 14.64.1; cf. also Suetonius, Nero 35.2. Her exile before execution was necessary
because of public opinion in Rome. Tacitus records that troops (probably the praetorian cohort
which was on duty on the Palatine; cf. Koestermann [1965], vol. 4,148) were used to disperse a
crowd which had rioted and broken into the palace when they thought that Octavia had been
restored to her previous position; cf. 14.61.1. See also Plass (1995), 98; Yavetz (1969), 15.

174
See above, "Nero", 105-109. One may assume that a similar reaction followed the Vinician
conspiracy in the next year, though there is little information in the sources; cf. Suetonius, Nero
36.2; Griffin (1984), 177-179. The murder of Corbulo and the Scribonii brothers that year also may
be connected with this conspiracy. These men were summoned to Greece while the emperor was
there, and executed. It is possible that the murders were carried out by the praetorians under the
direction of Tigellinus. Cf. Dio 62.17.2-6; Bradley (1978), 221.
 171

had been arrested under suspicion of being involved in a conspiracy. Other

arrests followed, and the entire plan was revealed by two conspirators when

they were faced with torture. 175 Tacitus records that the interrogation by Nero

and TigeUinus was brutal (saevas percunctationes) and was supplemented by fierce

attacks by Faenius Rufus, the prefect who himself was involved in the plot.176

When executions were ordered of those implicated, it was guard members who

were sent to carry out the command and, in the case of Piso himself, Nero trusted

only new recruits to kill him, fearing that soldiers of long service might have

declared for Piso already. 177 The consul Plautius Lateranus was killed by a

tribune of the guard, Statius Proxumus; though his executioner was a fellow

conspirator, Lateranus did not betray him. 178 The consul-designate, Marcus

Iulius Vestinus Atticus, was given the order to kill himself by another tribune,

Gerellanus, who took an entire cohort with him because of the threat that Nero

perceived from Vestinus. 179 Tacitus describes Nero's amusement at the thought

175
The two were Flavius Scaevinus and Antonius Natalis. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 15.56.1.

176
Tacitus, Annals 15.58.3. The inquiries took place intra cubiculum, but the proceedings later were
made public; ibid, 73.1.

177
Tacitus, Annals 15.59.4-5.
178
Tacitus, Annals 15.60.1. Proxumus was pardoned by Nero but committed suicide.

179
Tacitus, Annals 15.68.2-69.3. Nero's fear came from the personal guard which accompanied
Atticus. Cf. Rudich (1993), 121. Whether, in fact, an entire cohort was sent or the term simply
indicates a very large number of soldiers is uncertain.
 172

of Vestinus' dinner companions surrounded by praetorians and not knowing

what fate awaited them. 180

Of the conspirators who belonged to the praetorians, the tribune Subrius

Flavus was executed by one of his colleagues, Veianius Niger. Tacitus records

that Niger boasted to Nero of his brutality in carrying out the execution. 181

Faenius Rufus was betrayed while interrogating Scaevinus (one of those who

first had revealed the plot), and arrested by a soldier named Cassius, but details

of the prefect's fate are not provided in the sources. 182 Seneca also fell in the

aftermath of the conspiracy, though whether he was personally involved is

difficult to ascertain. 183 The initial interrogation was conducted by a tribune of

the guard, Gavius Silvanus, who was among the conspirators, but the order to

die was brought to Seneca by a centurion, for Silvanus could not bring himself to

play the role of executioner. 184 Seneca's wife, Pompeia Paullina, intended to die

with him, but was stopped by the soldiers who were still in the house. Clearly,

Nero wanted to be kept informed of the events as they unfolded at the villa, and

180
One is reminded of the circumstances of Libo in AD 16; see above, 148.

181
Tacitus, Annals 15.67A; cf. Koestermann (1965), vol. 4, 314. A centurion named Sulpicius Asper
also was executed, but it is not recorded who his executioner was; cf. 68.1. For discussion of
Subrius Flavus and Sulpicius Asper, see Rudich (1993), 112-14.

182
Tacitus, Annals 15.66.1-2. Tacitus remarks only that he did not go to his death bravely; cf. 68.1.

183
For discussion, see Rudich (1993), 106-112.
184
Tacitus, Annals 15.60.4-61.4; cf. Dio 62.25.1-2 where the soldiers in attendance have to help
Seneca commit suicide. Silvanus later was acquitted of any wrongdoing by Nero, but committed
suicide; cf. Tacitus, Annals 15.71.2; Koestermann (1965), vol. 4, 300-301.
 173

members of the guard were there to courier information to the palace, and to

relay Nero's orders. 185

The remaining period of Nero's reign saw the guard involved in many

other cases of surveillance and execution. 186 In AD 65, Lucius Iunius Silanus

Torquatus was expelled from Rome under suspicion of conspiracy and confined

in Bari where a centurion soon arrived to kill him. 187 Unlike other cases where

the arrival of a soldier was enough to drive the accused to suicide, this time

Silanus forced the soldier to do what he had been sent for. He put up a fight, but

finally, having been subdued by the praetorians, was killed by the centurion.

Tacitus adds that Silanus died as if in battle, wounded in the front. Others did

not put up such a struggle. In AD 66, Marcus Ostorius Scapula was executed by a

centurion of the guard when he was at his villa on the Ligurian border. 188 Nero

took special care with the destruction of Ostorius for he was a renowned military

man. Tacitus records the speed with which the action occurred, but nothing

about the size of the force that was sent. Ostorius died without a fight, however.

When he realized there was no escape, he killed himself.

185
Rudich (1993), 112. It is likely that these soldiers were speculators; how many of them would
have knowledge of the conspiracy is not known.
186
To the examples which follow should be added Rufrius Crispinus who was brought the order
to die, most likely by an officer of the guard given his previous office as prefect (Tacitus, Annals
16.17.1-2); and Petronius who was arrested at Cumae and kept under house arrest, where he soon
killed himself (Tacitus, Annals 16.18-19; for the role of Tigellinus in this case, see Rudich [1993],
156-7).
187
Tacitus, Annals 16.9.1-2; cf. Rudich (1993), 139-140.

188
Tacitus, Annals 16.15.1; cf. Rudich (1993), 146.
 Throughout the Julio-Claudian period, then, there is evidence for

members of the guard arresting and confining Roman citizens, both in their own

homes and in the prison of the Castra Praetoria. The surviving information about

arrests and imprisonment of the lower classes is scarce, but the responsibility

probably fell to the urban cohorts, since the job of policing the city belonged to

them. Praetorian officers appear to have participated in detention and

imprisonment only in political cases which involved the nobility, and especially

those who had any connection with the imperial family. It was partly for

purposes of intimidation that these men were used, for the arrival of a soldier

from the guard indicated to the accused that his fate was sealed, and often

provided the catalyst for the victim's suicide.

The use of praetorians as executioners is consistent from Augustus

through to Nero. 189 Although arrests and confinement may be viewed as an

extension of the responsibility to ensure the safety of the emperor, the

employment of members of the guard as executioners is not as easy to explain.

Tiberius seems to have sent soldiers to ensure the suicides of those who had been

charged under the treason law, but by the time of Nero, we find examples of

people being forced to suicide or killed by the officer who had been sent by the

189
It should be noted again that many of the cases in which prominent people were executed
make no mention of the executioner, but in at least some of these, the guard would have been
involved. See Appendix 4, "Confinement and Executions", 276-277.
princeps without sufficient reason for the death penalty to have been ordered. 190

The praetorians were compelled to carry out the wishes of the emperor, even if

that should extend to killing members of the Roman nobility (including, on

occasion, members of the imperial family). The job needed to be done quickly

and efficiently and with a minimum of fuss, and the guard was at hand to do

what was ordered without question and with little or no concern over the

correctness, or legality, of its actions. 191 But there is no obvious pattern to the

executions committed by praetorian officers, though they do increase in

frequency throughout the Julio-Claudian period, and it is not surprising to find

the guard involved in executions after conspiracies in particular. 192

190
Durry (1938), 279 argues that Nero was the one who "lowered the praetorians to the rank of
police and even executioners", but from the examples given, it seems that they had been used in
this way from very early in their history.

191
It should be remembered that many of these tasks, in particular the more sensitive cases,
probably were assigned to the speculatores.
192
1 disagree with Millar (1977), 63, who comments on the difficulty in ascertaining which unit
those soldiers functioning as executioners belonged to. It is the guard which is closest to the
emperor and to which such a sensitive responsibility would be given. Cf. Nippel (1995), 93.
 176

IX. The Guard in Civil Administration

The praetorians were involved in another area which was not directly

related to serving as the emperor's bodyguard, and constituted what might be

termed civil administration, such things as helping to fight fires, looking after

public security at games and the theatre, tax collection, and construction projects.

These responsibilities were similar to those of praetorian cohorts of provincial

governors in the late republic, and probably were adapted from the

administrative role of the soldiers at that time. 1 The period of civil war caused

this aspect of the republican praetorian cohorts to be neglected in favour of their

military function, but it should be remembered that in the first century BC, the

direction which the employment of these cohorts seemed to be taking was

towards increased involvement in administrative duties.

The praetorians seem to have been involved in such tasks as fire fighting

or patrolling the games from very early on in their history. It is likely that

Augustus soon realized that the employment of his personal guard in this way

could be turned to his advantage. The presence of the soldiers at fires or the

games was indicative that the emperor was taking a personal interest in these

events, even if he himself was not there.

1
See above, "The Guard in the Republic", 15-17.
 177

Fires

The problem of fires in the ancient city of Rome had vexed its citizens for

centuries. Under the republic, there was no formal system of fire fighting in place

despite the fact that conflagration was such a common occurrence. 2 It is recorded

in Plutarch that in the first century BC Crassus formed his own contingent of

slaves and purchased buildings which were on fire or near the scene of a fire;

there is, however, no mention of this group actually fighting the blazes. 3

In 22 BC, after a particularly devastating inferno, Augustus instituted a

corps of six hundred slaves who were given the responsibility of extinguishing

fires and who were under the authority of the aediles. In 19 BC, they were

ordered not only to put out the fires but also to prevent their outbreak. 4 As

Nippel points out, the organization of such a corps may have been "a reaction to

the activities of the ambitious aedile Egnatius Rufus, who had achieved

particular popularity by employing a privately recruited fire-fighting squad." 5

In 7 BC, after the city had been divided into fourteen regions, the command was

transferred to the vicomagistri - four magistrates in each of the wards in Rome -

2
See, for example, Johnstone (1992), 41- 57; Canter (1931-32), 270-88.

3
Plutarch, Crassus 2.

4
Dio 54.2; 53.24.4-5.
5
Nippel (1995), 96; cf. also Yavetz (1969), 96. Daugherty (1992), 229 notes that "once it had
become obvious that the security of Rome and the security of the Princeps were synonymous,
action was swift."
 178

but their fire duties were secondary to their main responsibility, which was the

maintenance of cults, particularly those of the emperor. 6

It was only in AD 6, after another fire had devastated many areas of the

city, that Augustus finally incorporated the vigiles, a corps composed of

freedmen, as a permanent and active fire-fighting force.7 The decision not to use

freeborn men in this unit apparently was an effort to distinguish the vigiles as a

non-military group. As Watson points out, "It is true that they were organized

on a paramilitary basis but that they were regarded as milites . . . seems

unlikely." 8 The vigiles were divided into seven cohorts, each commanded by a

tribune, with seven centuries per cohort. Overall control was assigned to a

praefectus vigilum, chosen from the equestrian order. 9 The number of cohorts was

dictated by the divisions of the city; every cohort of vigiles was responsible for

two of fourteen regions, with each region having its own watch-house or

excubitorium, "depots for equipment and shelters for men out on patrol or

6
Dio 55.8.6.
7
Dio 55.26.4; Suetonius, Augustus 25.2; 30.1; Strabo 5.3.7; Appian, BCiv 5.132 (who has the
incorrect date for the formation). Johnstone (1992), 56 sees the actions of Augustus as political:
"[Augustus'] attempts to control fires are best understood not as technical or bureaucratic
reforms, but as an aspect of political power." Cf. also Durry (1938), 18.

8
Watson (1967), 413. Cf. also Homo (1951), 178. The claim by Robinson (1992), 185 and note 85
that the vigiles twice were sent by Augustus to fight in battle is a misunderstanding of Suetonius,
Augustus 25.
9
Daugherty (1992), 230 remarks on the scarcity of information about these prefects: "for the entire
three centuries of the existence of the cohortes we know the names of 43 prefects, only seven of
whom are ever mentioned by historians, and then for reasons other than firefighting."
 179

fighting fires." 10 The total number of vigiles initially seems to have been around

4000, a considerable increase over the earlier contingent of slaves. 11 The large

number attests to the difficulty of controlling fire in Rome. 12 Such an exigency

also accounts for the continued involvement of the guard even after the creation

of a specific unit to look after controlling blazes in the city.

Scholarly conjecture about the duties of the vigiles has them engaged not

only in fighting fires but also in policing the city at night. 13 But the evidence

does not support this hypothesis, and it seems more likely that the night patrols

were used for fire prevention rather than for maintaining order. 14 "In an

overcrowded city with a low technological standard of fire-fighting (which

precluded the effective use of water) [the vigiles] would have been busy enough

with their tasks as a fire brigade. . ."15 The technology available for combatting

i° Rainbird (1986), 148. Cf. Dio 57.19.6.

11
For an estimation of the strength of the vigiles, see Rainbird (1986), 150-151. The number of men
per cohort is not clear, but was either 560 or 1000. The difficulty in estimating their number comes
from the late date of most of the evidence. By the third century, the vigiles numbered 7000 and
much of our information - especially from inscriptions - comes from that period.

12
Estimates put the number of fires in Rome at up to one hundred per day, with twenty of those
being large and two serious; cf. Robinson (1992), 108 (citing Rainbird's 1976 unpublished
dissertation). See Juvenal 3.197-202 on the dangers of fire in the crowded areas of the city. Cf. also
Ramage (1983), 74-79.
13
Daugherty (1992), 231 and 238; Homo (1951), 176; Canter (1931-32), 287; Johnstone (1992), 61:
"Augustus deployed the vigiles not just to fight fires, not just to patrol the dark nighttime streets,
and not just to suppress riots, but to do all of these."

14
Rainbird (1986), 151; cf. also Robinson (1992), 107. One might point to the appearance of the
vigiles at Trimalchio's party: drawn by the noise, they broke down the door, not because of the
disruption, but because they thought the house was on fire. Cf. Petronius, Satyricon 78.7.

15
Nippel (1995), 96-7.
 180

conflagrations was limited and therefore a quick response was greatly

advantageous to fighting any blaze. As well, since the rate of pay for the vigiles

has been estimated to be less than half the annual amount of that of the urban

cohorts (150 to 375 denarii), it is unlikely that they would have had similar

responsibilities. 16 It was the function of the urban cohorts to see to the safety of

the city, and inevitably there would have been some overlap of duties as both

groups patrolled the streets. While at times this would mean the vigiles rendering

assistance to the urban cohorts, it by no means negates the necessity for the latter

to be out at night as well, since the hazards of the night in Rome were

considerable. Nero provides evidence for this when, disguised, he went

wandering through the city causing disruption and himself came under attack.

He always ensured that he had members of the praetorian guard with him after

this incident. 17 As Rainbird points out, "We do not need to seek an explanation

for the large number of vigiles in anything other than firefighting. Even if they

did have minor policing duties, their firefighting duties had to take priority as

fire develops quickly. Their method of patrolling would probably appear police-

like to the modern reader." 18

16
For rates of pay, see Watson (1967), 414-15; Le Bohec (1994), 212. Although the exact numbers
are controversial, the different estimates are all in agreement that the vigiles received much less
than the urban cohorts.
17
Suetonius, Nero 26.1-2; Tacitus, Annals 13.25.1-3.

18
Rainbird (1986), 151.
 181

Elsewhere in the empire, soldiers often were used to assist the local

population in the control of fires.19 Despite the existence of the vigiles, this also

was true in Italy where there are several examples of the praetorian guard being

called upon to assist at conflagrations. Under Augustus, we know that

praetorians were fighting blazes at Ostia; there is an inscription set up by the

citizens there which honours a soldier of the guard who had died in such

circumstances:

u | .. militi cohor. VI pr., | Ostienses locum

sepult. | dederunt | publicoque funere efferen. |
decrerunt | quod in incendio | restinguendo interit. 20

This inscription provides evidence that soldiers had been sent from Rome to aid

in the suppression of the fire, perhaps to assist the vigiles.21 Durry, however,

proposes the possibility that the sixth praetorian cohort may have been stationed

in Ostia prior to being united with the other cohorts in Rome, though the

evidence is tenuous. 22 On at least one other occasion we know that cohorts were

19
Rainbird (1986), 153, note 13: "In general terms, soldiers should have been more effective than
collegia because they were available full-time, they should have been better disciplined, they were
available in larger numbers, and they were trained in the military use of and protection against
fire." For an example of the army coming to the aid of civilians in a fire, see Safrai (1967), 226.

20
CIL 14.4494 (=ILS 9494).

21
Durry (1938), 16 comments on the use of the vigiles in Ostia but without further discussion. It
makes sense that only some of the vigiles were sent to Ostia and their number supplemented with
other soldiers, since it would have been unwise to leave Rome completely unprotected.

22
Durry (1938), 44; cf. also Rainbird (1986), 157; Baillie Reynolds (1926), 110-1. There are four
inscriptions which mention the sixth praetorian cohort in association with Ostia (CIL 14.215; 223;
4494; 4495) but 4494 is the only inscription securely dated to the period of Augustus. The ancient
sources are divided on the issue of the billetting of the guard in and around Rome under
Augustus; see Tacitus, Annals 4.2.1 (all nine cohorts in the city itself) and Suetonius, Augustus 49;
Tiberius 37.1 (three cohorts in the city and the others scattered in the environs). See above,
"Augustus", 25-26.
 182

sent to Ostia from Rome when the emperor, this time Tiberius, saw a red glow in

the sky. 23 It was, in fact, fear of fire in Ostia, and no doubt as well the

inefficiency of sending men from Rome to the port, which finally prompted

Claudius to establish a force, probably a cohort of vigiles, there permanently for

the purpose of preventing outbreaks: Puteolis et Ostiae singulas cohortes ad arcendos

incendiorum casus collocavit.24

In Rome itself, the guard was involved in fighting most of the major fires

which occurred during the reign of the Julio-Claudians. 25 Suetonius records that,

in the reign of Tiberius, Livia was present at a fire which was near the Temple of

Vesta, encouraging both the citizens and the soldiers (populum et milites) to work

harder in their efforts. She apparently had done the same sort of thing under

Augustus. 26 Milites here must refer to a force other than the vigiles, who were

generally not considered soldiers, and it is likely that the praetorians are meant,

23
Seneca, Quaest. Nat. 1.15: sub Tiberio Caesare cohortes in auxilium Ostiensis coloniae cucurrerunt
tamquam conflagrantis . . . It is not clear whether these men were from the guard or the vigiles, or
maybe a combination of the two.

24
Suetonius, Claudius 25.2. The type of cohort is not identified, but Murison (1993), 128, note 32,
and Daugherty (1992), 231 both argue for detachments of vigiles. Contra Durry (1938), 12, note 6
who suggests it was an urban cohort. Rainbird (1986), 157, in agreement with Durry, notes that it
was removed by Otho (cf. Tacitus, Histories 1.80-82), and suggests that it may have been under
Vespasian that the cohort returned, though there is a gap in the evidence until the time of
Domitian. It should be noted, however, that in none of the ancient texts is the type of cohort ever
specified and, in fact, Grant (1974), 156 refers to it as a "naval detachment."

25 Werner (1906), 46 records 11 serious fires between AD 6 and 68. Many of these would have
involved the praetorians, though the soldiers are not always mentioned, as in the fire of AD 27
which gutted the Caelian Hill. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 4.64.1; Velleius Paterculus, Histories 2.130.2.

26
Suetonius, Tiberius 50.3.
 183

in particular those who would have been Livia's regular escort in the city.27

According to Dio, Drusus, the son of Tiberius, also was accompanied by

praetorians when he went to give aid at a blaze in AD 15, though the report of

his assistance is very uncomplimentary: VOKT6<; en7tpr|CT9eiai TICIV e7riKot>pfjaou

ixexa xcov Soptxpopcov dvayKaaeeit;.28 The aid of the praetorians is not commented

on, but it is probable that they took part in the fire-fighting process, rather than

simply acting as protection for the emperor's son. The guard must have been

present at the fire of AD 22 during which the Theatre of Pompey was destroyed.

Tacitus records that, after the prefect had been praised by the emperor, the

senate granted Sejanus a statue in the theatre in recognition of his actions in

containing the flames.29 This distinction was not favourably received. 30 Velleius

Paterculus, in his brief account of the fire, does not mention Sejanus at all, which

may indicate that the later sources have misinterpreted the gesture of the statue

27
Although Dio on one occasion (62.17.1) refers to the vigiles as oxpatiraxai, the fact that he
includes a parenthetical comment in which he distinguishes the other axpaxi&xai from the
vuKTO<pt>[Link]£<; indicates that there was some ambiguity even in antiquity about the "military"
nature of the unit.

28 Dio 57.14.10.

29
Tacitus, Annals 3.72.3; cf. Dio 57.21.3 who remarks that this recognition was unusual, since
Tiberius previously had honoured other men with statues only after their deaths. Levick (1976),
note 63 comments on the praise for Sejanus as perhaps being "an implied criticism of Drusus'
conduct at a fire", in reference to the blaze of AD 15.

30
Seneca (Cons, ad Marc. 22.4) records the reaction of Cremutius Cordus to the statue: exclamavit
Cordus tunc vere theatrum perire.
 184

as evidence of the growing power of the prefect rather than as an honour for his

role in helping to contain the fire.31

Sometimes even the emperors are recorded as being present at the fires. It

is recorded that Tiberius gave aid to fire victims, and early in his reign, Caligula

is said to have helped extinguish a blaze and to have been aided in this by

soldiers (\IETO. TCOV CTpocTicoTcov).32 These are probably the praetorians, given their

presence at earlier fires, in attendance not merely as protection for the emperor

but rather to take an active role in fighting the flames. A group of soldiers (turba

militum) also accompanied Claudius to a fire at which he stayed for two days. 33

Mottershead includes in this crowd "detachments of Vigiles, Urban Cohorts and

possibly Praetorian Cohorts .. ."34 He argues that the urban cohorts would have

been necessary to maintain order, and that the praetorians were present simply

to guard the emperor. Yet it is more likely, since the fire raged for two days, that

as many cohorts as were available in Rome would have participated in

31
Velleius Paterculus, Histories 2.130.1. It could also be the case that the presence of the
praetorians and their prefect at fires was so accepted by this time that no mention need be made
of them.

32
Tiberius: Dio 57.16.2; Tacitus, Annals 6.45. Caligula: Dio 59.9.4; cf. Durry (1938), 278.

33
Suetonius, Claudius 18.1; cf. Dio 60.33.12. Agrippina was with Claudius; cf. Barrett (1996), 130.
Levick (1990), 112 argues that Claudius had learned from Sejanus the "political capital" which
could be gained by personal attention to the fighting of fires, but it seems more likely that he was
just following the tradition set by his predecessors.

34
Mottershead (1986), 73.
 185

combatting it, especially since Claudius is said to have paid as well for the

services of the plebs to fight the blaze. 35

In the accounts of the great fire of AD 64, the role of the praetorians is not

clearly defined. Given their participation in those fires noted so far, however,

they must have been present at such a disaster. The sheer size of the blaze, it

seems, should have made their assistance necessary: "Though Rome was

regularly subject to fires as a consequence of overcrowding, timber construction,

and inadequate fire-fighting apparatus, there was nothing routine about this

blaze. It broke out in the early hours of 19 July and lasted for six days, only to be

renewed for a further three days: it effectively levelled three of the fourteen

regions . . . leaving only four untouched." 36 Yet, there is virtually nothing

recorded in the sources about the attempts made to fight the fire. A reference in

Dio, however, does hint at a somewhat malevolent involvement of "soldiers":

Kai noXXoi (iev OIKOI epr||ioi xou PoriGfiaovxoc, ocpioiv anfoXovzo, noXXoi 8E Kai vn

amcov xcov £7UKOt>poi)vxa)vrcpocKaxercpTiaGriaavoi yap axpaxuoxai, oi XE aAAoi

Kai oi voKxocpvXaKeq, npbq xaq aprcayaq acpopdWxEi; ot>x ooov ov Kaxea(3evvooav

xiva aAAa Kai rcpoae^EKaiov.37 It is impossible to determine who exactly is

meant by oi cxpaxiwxai, though the parenthesis, oi XE aMoi Kai oi

35
Cf. Canter (1931-32), 275 who refers to the inability of the "regular firemen" to manage the fire.

36
Griffin (1984), 129. Robinson (1992), 108 notes that the fire "seems to have created a fire-storm",
and quotes Rainbird that the odds of such a conflagration were one in eleven million.

37
Dio 62.17.1. Cf. also Suetonius, Nero 38.1; Tacitus, Annals 15.38.7: nee quisquam defendere audebat,
crebris multorum minis restingnere prohibentium, et quia alii palam faces iaciebant atque esse sibi
auctorem vociferabantur.
 186

vvKToyvXaKEq, must indicate members of the guard in addition to the vigiles. But

whether the purpose of these soldiers was as sinister as traditionally had been

thought has recently been questioned. From the report of the event in Tacitus, it

is clear that someone was trying to combat the fire: incendium .. .anteiit remedia.38

Daugherty has suggested that what the soldiers were doing was creating a

firebreak to stop the spread of the blaze: "The accounts of Dio, Tacitus, and

Suetonius reflect active efforts at fire suppression by one of the few effective

methods open to firefighters of the day: containment by demolition or

backfire." 39 The fact that the "counter-fires" were started on Tigellinus' property

is presented as additional evidence for this idea; as former commander of the

vigiles, the praetorian prefect would have had experience of how to handle

problem fires.40 The efforts of the vigiles and the guard (and probably also of the

urban cohorts) to fight the fire, then, has been misrepresented by anti-Neronian

sources which portrayed the emperor as the cause of the disaster. 41 The rumour

that Nero had set the fire himself emerged in that same year, and is recorded by

38
Tacitus, Annals 15.38.3.

39
Daugherty (1992), 233; cf. also 234. Robinson (1992), 109 notes that "even nowadays demolition
to create a fire-break is the only effective method of quelling a really serious fire."

40
Counter-fires: Tacitus, Annals 15.40.2. Daugherty argues that Tigellinus was in charge of the fire-
fighting process in the absence of the prefect of the vigiles, the office being vacant or held by an
inexperienced commander, but offers no further evidence. His assumption that many of the
officers of the vigiles would have moved to the guard with Tigellinus, leaving the unit without
many knowledgeable commanders, is not defensible, since such a move would go against the
usual method of promotion through the ranks of the Rome cohorts.

41
Daugherty (1992), 233: "Historical accounts which were following this anti-Neronian line
clearly skewed their versions of the fire to reflect as badly as possible on the emperor and any of
the efforts he took to deal with the fire and its aftermath."
 187

the elder Pliny, Suetonius and Tacitus, among others. 42 Thus, what seems at first

to be inhibition of the fire-fighting process - preventing people from trying to

save their property and setting new fires in the area - in fact may have been the

only remedy available to fight such a large blaze. After the conflagration had

finally been extinguished, it is recorded that Nero made an effort to ensure that

another fire of these proportions would not occur.43

Johnstone notes that "the Romans left no comprehensive record of fires in

their city. Our knowledge of them must be culled from incidental references in

literature and, most especially, brief citations in histories . .. fires which

concerned powerful men, consumed public buildings, or impinged on the state

were most likely to be reported." 44 It is not surprising, then, that the examples of

blazes under the Julio-Claudians which are recorded in the sources are only

those of the greatest significance. The presence of the praetorian guard at many

of these fires, however, does not seem fundamentally to be related to the task of

protecting the emperor, and therefore, an additional reason for their attendance

must be sought. It is true that, by early in the second century AD, a career

pattern had been established for the cohorts in Rome, and promotion, at least at

42
Pliny, NH 17.5; Tacitus, Annals 15.38.1; Suetonius, Nero 38.1. Cf. also Statius, Silvae 2.7.60-61;
Octavia, 831-33; Dio 62.16.1-2.
43
Tacitus, Annals 15.43. On the social and economic impact of the fire, see Newbold (1974), 858-
69.

44
Johnstone (1992), 52-3.
 188

the level of centurion and tribune, generally meant moving from the vigiles to the

urban cohorts to the guard. 45 It is possible that this cursus could have provided

some of the praetorians with experience in fire-fighting techniques, and may help

to explain their participation alongside the vigiles. It should be noted, however,

that the evidence from inscriptions for the average soldier is rather scarce.46 An

example of what was to become a typical career for an officer in the first half of

the second century is that of Gaius Arrius Clemens:

C. Arrio C. f. Corn. | Clementi militi coh. IX | pr.,

equiti coh. eiusdem, donis | dona to ab imp.
Traiano | torquibus armillis phaleris | ob bellum
Dacicum, singulari | pr[fl]efectorum pr., tesserario,
op | tioni, fisci curatori, cornicul. | tribuni, evocato
Aug., (centurioni) coh. I vigil., (centurioni) | statorum,
(centurioni) coh. XIIII urb., (centurioni) coh. VII pr., |
trecenario, donis dona to ab. imp. | Hadriano hasta pura
corona aurea, | (centurioni) leg. Ill Aug., primipilari,
Ilviro quin | quennali, patrono municipi, | curatori rei
publicae, | decur. et Aug. V[J vir.] municipes Matil. 47

45
See Dobson and Breeze (1969), 107. It is not clear how long each post was held. Though Dobson
(1974), 418 had suggested that one year was the norm, he later (1982), 327 argued that, before
Claudius, men could have served for longer. It is more likely that promotions were flexible. Cf.
Devijver (1970), 79.

46
On the promotion of men below the rank of the centurionate to junior offices in the cohorts in
Rome, see Breeze (1974a), 436-441. It appears from inscriptions that each unit followed a similar
pattern in these promotions, but there is little evidence for movement from one unit to the other
at this level until after the Julio-Claudian period. See, for example, CIL 6.2558 (=ILS 2036), dating
to AD 69.

47
CIL 11.5646 (=ILS 2081). Translated in Campbell (1994), #91 who notes that this career is "fairly
typical of the more elaborate second century pattern of promotion to the centurionate from the
guard. . . " Other examples include Lucius Velius Prudens (CIL 11.7093a=ILS 2081), Lucius
Arbustius Valentinus (CIL 14.4007), Marcus Bassaeus Rufus (CIL 6.1599=ILS 1326), Tiberius
Claudius Secundums (CIL 5.867=ILS 1339), and Quintus Petronius Modesrus (CIL 5.534=ILS
1379).
 189

Clemens began his career as a soldier in the ninth praetorian cohort, moving to

the cavalry of the same unit, and after decoration for service in the Dacian War,

progressed through several junior posts. After reaching the status of an evocatus,

he proceeded to the centurionates, first of the vigiles, then of the statores

(imperial messengers), next of the urban cohorts, and finally of the praetorian

guard, the usual progression for soldiers who began their service in Rome. 48 The

stint in the Rome centurionates often preceded a move to a legion as centurion, a

pattern which Clemens followed; he even managed to reach the primipilate,

though he advanced no further. 49

For the first century AD, however, the evidence is too incomplete to be

able to state with any conviction that the same career pattern was followed. As

Dobson and Breeze point out, "in epigraphic terms career records of the guard

come in a sudden burst under Trajan and Hadrian after a few scattered examples

in the first century." 50 We do know of men who moved from the vigiles to the

guard, but these inevitably are officers and not common soldiers. This inequity

48
Dobson and Breeze (1969), 100-117. In the imperial period, evocati referred to soldiers who
stayed on after the completion of their service, or who were invited to remain, and did so
willingly (in the republic, the term generally referred to those who were forced to do further
service).
49
For discussion of such careers, see Birley (1961), 118-122. Dobson and Breeze (1969), 101-2 note
that the progression for an evocatus of the guard was never from the legionary centurionates to
the Rome centurionates; only men directly commissioned to the position of centurion in the
legions were promoted in this way, and even then, seem never to have served as centurion in the
vigiles. It is possible that Claudius regularized the career pattern; cf. Demougin (1988), 742, with
note 240.

50
Dobson and Breeze (1969), 115. Although they are focussing on the centurionate, the same
seems to hold true for other ranks as well. For the tribunates of the guard, see Dobson (1974), 418.
 190

could be a result of the continued use of freedmen in the vigiles in the first

century, whereas the officers came from the Rome cohorts or the legions. 51 The

following are examples of three careers from the first century:

L. Tatinio. | L. f. Vol. Cnoso | militi cohortis IIII

pr. | singulari et benef. trib. j optioni benef. pr. pr.
evoc. | Aug. donis donato tor | quibus armillis phaler. |
corona aurea [ab imp. Do \ mitiano Caes. Aug. Germ.] |
(centurioni) cohor. IV vigil, (centurioni) stat. |
(centurioni) cohor. XI urbanae | veterani qui sub eo
in vigilib. | militaver. et honesta mis | sione missi sunt. 52

Lucius Tatinius Cnosos began his career as a soldier of the fourth praetorian

cohort and then progressed through the usual sequence of junior posts before

reaching the stage of evocatus. His service in Rome included only the

centurionates of the vigiles, the statores, and the urban cohorts, though one can

assume that the next step would have been the centurionate in the praetorian

guard. 53 The inscription was set up by those who had served under Cnosos in

the vigiles, a tribute to the command which he had held.

The second example is Lucius Antonius Naso:

[L.] Antonio M. f. Fab. Nasoni | [(centurioni) le ]g.

Ill Cyrenaicae | [(centurioni) le ]g. XIII Geminae, |

51
Durry (1938), 18. The lex Visellia of AD 24 granted citizenship to those who had served in the
vigiles for six years (later reduced to three years) and, after becoming citizens, they could advance
through the ranks to the other Rome cohorts. Cf. Homo (1951), 182. de Visscher (1966), 764-66
argues that Macro was instrumental in gettiang this law enacted.

52
AE 1933, 87. Cf. Breeze (1974a), 436

53
In between the assignment as centurion of the vigiles and that of the urban cohorts, Cnosos held
the centurionate of [Link], which is a very obscure post. The statores were imperial
* messengers. ..i;^ ; :::
 191

[honorat]o albata decursione ab imp., | [praef.] civitatis

Colophianorum, | [primo] pilo leg. XIII Gem., | trib.
leg. I Italic, | [trib. coh.] Till vigilum, | trib. coh.
XV urban | [trib. coh. ] XI urban., | trib. coh. IX prae[f. |
donate] ab imperator[e Nerone co]ron. [valla]h, corona
au[raz] | vexillis [duob]us, ha[stis puris] du[fl]bus |
[primo pilo bis le]g. XIV Gem., | [trib. coh.] I praet., |
et pra[ep]osito supra | [vetew]nos Romae m[o]rantium
[pluriu]m exercituum, | proc. Aug. [Po]nto et B[ithyni]ae.M

Naso, who had a very distinguished career, began as a centurion in the legions

and reached the primipilate before becoming tribune of the I Italica.55 He then

was promoted to the tribunates of the Rome cohorts, beginning with the vigiles.

His successive posts in the urban cohorts (that of the XV urban in Puteoli) were a

rare occurrence, perhaps explained by the turbulent events of AD 68. The

repetition of the praetorian tribunate after being primus pilus for a second time

also is explained by the strange events of AD 69, when Naso fell in and out of

favour as the emperors changed. His assignment as commander of the veterans

in Rome was unusual as well, but resulted from the civil wars of AD 69 and

shows the great confidence which Vespasian had in him. 56

The third example is provided by Gaius Gavius Silvanus:

54
CIL 3.14387 (=ILS 9199); Pflaum (1960), #36; Demougin (1992), #703. Translated by Campbell
(1994), #95.
55
Demougin (1992), 598 points out that this promotion was surprising since the office of legionary
tribune had been reserved for those of equestrian status from the time of the reforms of Claudius.
The appointment of Naso to this post perhaps was made necessary because the I Italica was a
new legion created by Nero and it needed officers.

56
Pflauni(1960), 86iplaces this responsibility at the same time as the office of tribune of the
praetorian guard, and records a suggestion by Birley that these veterans were to be settled in
Reate. Cf. also Demougin (1992), 599.
 192

C. Gavio L. f. | Stel. Silvano, | [p]rimipilari

leg. VIII Aug., | [f]ribuno coh. II vigilum, |
[f]ribuno coh. XIII urban., | [£]ribuno coh. XII
praetor., | [d]onis donato a divo Claud. | bello
Britannico | [fo]rquibus> armillis, phaleris, | corona
aurea, | [p]atrono colon., | d. [d.]57

Silvanus, who had reached the status of primus pilus in the legions, was

promoted to the tribunate of the vigiles and then moved through the urban

cohorts to the praetorian tribunate. 58 It is thought that he was a centurion of the

guard when he accompanied Claudius to Britain, but his earlier career is omitted

from the inscription, although the decoration by the emperor is included. 59

Silvanus later was involved in the Pisonian conspiracy against Nero, and

committed suicide. 60

One of the best known careers from the Julio-Claudian period is that of

Marcus Vettius Valens:

M. Vettio M. f. Ani. | Valenti | mil. coh. VIII pr.,

benef. praef. pr., | donis donato bello Britan. |
torquibus, armillis, phaleris, | evoc. Aug., corona
aurea donat., | (centurioni) coh. VI vig., (centurioni)
stat., (centurioni) coh. XVI urb., (centurioni) coh. |
II pr., exercitatori equit. speculatorum, princip. |
praetori leg. XIII Gem., ex tree. [p. p.] leg. VI | Victr.,
donis donato ob res prosper. | gest. contra Astures
torq. phaler. arm., | trib. coh. V vig., trib. coh. XII

57
CIL 5.7003 (=ILS 2701); cf. Demougin (1992), # 574.

58
On the question of the location of the XIII urban cohort, see Berard (1988), 174-5.
59
Demougin (1992), 477. The argument in favour of the centurionate is based on Silvanus
attaining the primipilate of the VIII Augusta.

60
Tacitus, Annals 15.50; 60-61; 71.
 193

urb., trib. coh. |. Ill pr., [p. p. If] leg. XIIII Gem. Mart.
Victr., | proc. imp. [Neroni] Caes. Aug. prov. Lusitan., |
patron, coloniae, speculator. X h. c , | L. Luccio Telesino
C. Suetonio Paulino cos.61

Valens clearly had an unusual and illustrious career, for he went from the ranks

of the guard under Tiberius to hold an imperial procuratorship under Nero. 62

He was decorated by Claudius for his service in Britain as beneficiarius to the

praetorian prefect Rufrius Pollio, and was awarded a corona aurea after reaching

the status of evocatus.63 He then held centurionates in Rome, moving from the

vigiles to the statores, the urban and praetorian cohorts, after which he held the

position of drillmaster (exercitator equit [um]) of the speculatores. The assignment

as trecenarius, which preceded his stint as primus pilus of the VI Victrix in Spain,

indicates his tenure as the centurion in charge of the speculatores of the guard. 64

After receiving equestrian status, he came back to Rome to hold successive

tribunates and then held the primipilate for a second time. Finally, he became

61
CIL 11.395 (=ILS 2648); Pflaum, #32; Demougin (1992), #588. Translated by Campbell (1994), #
90. Cf. also Syme (1958), 183, note 4. Barrett (1996), 119-120, like Durry (1938), 132-33, is incorrect
in his attribution of Valens' centurionate to the XVI vigiles. Durry also omits the tribunates of the
vigiles and the urban cohorts, without comment.
62
Syme (1939), 244 notes that Valens may have been related to Claudius' doctor, Vettius Valens,
which could account for his prominence at court.
63
Durry (1938), 133. Demougin (1992), 488, note 2 suggests that this honour may have been given
in AD 48 for service to Claudius during the Messalina affair.
64
On the speculatores, see above, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 135-141. The
appointment as primus pilus was conjectured by Mommsen and followed by Pflaum and
Demougin, among others. But cf. Picard and Le Bonniec (1937), 119-121 for a different
interpretation of the lacuna (reading princeps praetorii); they also suggest that the position held in
the XIIII legion was tribune, not primuspilus bis.
 194

procurator for Nero in Lusitania. Such a career is unusual, however, for the

cumulation of offices plus the further promotion after reaching the primipilate

for the second time are rare events. 65

Given the paucity of information on the movement of soldiers from the

vigiles to the praetorians in the first century, then, it is impossible to determine

whether members of the guard were employed to fight fires at this time because

they had previous experience as vigiles. Another explanation for the use of

praetorians to combat blazes in Rome and the surrounding area is that of

practicality: the guard was present in the city in large numbers, and was

personally employed by the emperor. Since he was seen as responsible for the

welfare of the state, it is perhaps not all that surprising that his private

bodyguard would be called upon to assist when the city was threatened. The

vigiles, though numerous, no doubt required assistance, especially at larger

blazes, and since it is these which we find recorded in the ancient sources, it is no

accident that the praetorians (and probably also often the urban cohorts) are

present as well. 66 Johnstone, remarking on the presence of the praetorians at

three of these fires under the Julio-Claudians, concludes that "fire fighting . . .

65
Valens is the first soldier from the ranks of the guard to achieve such a promotion for whom we
have evidence. Cf. Demougin (1992), 487; Birley (1961), 118; Syme (1958), 183, note 4. Durry
(1938), 134, however, calls this career "typical".
66
One might adduce a modern parallel in this context, for even today at fires which threaten a
large area, and especially those which threaten residential communities, the army is occasionally
brought in to supplement those fire-fighters employed by the state.
 195

was not so specialized that other troops could not do it effectively... any might

fight fires, all asserted the emperor's substantial presence." 67

Security at the Games

Spectacles were of major importance to the ancient Romans. Under the

empire, these events included the theatre, the arena, and the circus; the latter two

were venues for gladiatorial combat and beast hunts and, in the case of the

circus, horse-racing. During the period of the Julio-Claudians, the number of

days on which spectacles were held averaged roughly 90; they steadily increased

throughout the imperial period. 68 With the population of Rome at this time

estimated to be close to one million, the need for security at such events was

considerable. 69 Yet the question of who was responsible for maintaining order at

these venues is a difficult one to answer. It is often impossible to identify the

units of soldiers who performed this service because of the imprecision of the

terms used in the sources. 70 But milites to Roman ears undoubtedly would have

been interpreted as designating the most visible and concentrated force in Rome,

namely the praetorians. Certainly, by the second century, the urban prefect was

in charge of the security at the games and this has been interpreted to mean that

67
Johnstone (1992), 60-1.

68
Balsdon (1969), 248; Olivova (1984), 174.

69
Population estimate: Freis (1967), 41; Robinson (1992), 8.

70
Millar (1977), 63.
 196

he used the urban cohorts for this purpose, since they were under his command.

It is not clear, however, whether they also were engaged in this way under the

earlier emperors. 71 Upon examination of the evidence for the first half of the first

century, it would seem that there is another, more plausible, possibility. Under

the Julio-Claudians, the praetorians are described as being present at the

spectacles, both the theatre and the games, for the purpose of policing. 72 By the

end of the first century, there was a detachment of soldiers that maintained order

at the Colosseum, so it is not surprising to find the praetorians used in a similar

way much earlier, not only at the games but also at the theatre. 73

We know that soldiers attended the games as spectators, and that on at

least one occasion, their presence almost proved fatal to the future emperor

Augustus. In 41 BC, he ordered a soldier to be removed from the games for

sitting in the rows of seating reserved for equites. When a rumour started that the

man had been tortured and killed, Suetonius records that an indignant mob of

soldiers attacked Octavian, and he was only saved by the reappearance of the

71
Cadoux (1959), 158, however, asserts that this responsibility belonged to the urban prefect
"from the beginning" and provides Ulpian, Digest 1,12,1,12 as evidence. Cf. Freis (1967), 44-45;
Wiedemann (1992), 176; Robinson (1992), 197-8; Balsdon (1934), 266. Yet one cannot use third
century evidence to illustrate practices in the first century.

72
Many commentators accept the presence of the guard without further comment: cf. Durry
(1938), 278; Koestermann (1965), vol. 1, 249, who notes only that a unit of praetorians was at the
games to rein in the crowd; Grant (1974), 15: "It had long been customary [by the time of Nero]
for a cohort to maintain order at the games."; Garnsey and Sailer (1987), 158: "To prevent vocal
protest from developing into a riot, the presence of a praetorian cohort became a regular function
of public spectacles."

73
Colosseum: Scobie (1988), 219.
 197

soldier who had been evicted. 74 Augustus later decided to separate the soldiers

from the general populace at these events: militem secrevit a populo.75 It is not

clear from this passage whether the partition refers to the seating arrangements

for the audience (i.e. soldiers seated apart from the rest of the crowd) or, given

the use of the praetorians as security, to a physical boundary between the

spectators and those there to maintain order. It has been argued that the troops

referred to by Suetonius must be off-duty soldiers, since any guard present

should have had a particular area in which it was stationed. 76 In fact, the

evidence seems to suggest that the close proximity between the security force

and the audience had resulted in some confrontation, and that it was only after

Augustus had ordered the separation of the two that the guard had its own

station. As Campbell points out, "hostile relations between plebs and soldiers

were exacerbated by the fights and disturbances at games and chariot races

where soldiers were detailed to keep order." 77

One might add the theatre to this list, for it was a place where violent

activity often broke out, and the presence of soldiers could have provoked

74
Suetonius, Augustus 14.

75
Suetonius, Augustus 44.1. Gaggero (1990), 263, note 2 refers to these as praetorian cohorts. A
suggestion by Rich (1991), 194 that the troops were first stationed at the games in AD 15 "in
response to the disturbances of the previous year" overlooks the fact that there would have been
a need for some sort of policing much earlier; since the emperor presided over these events, he
could not risk confrontation and disruption occurring there.

76
Rawson (1987), 99; cf. also Scobie (1988), 204.

77
Campbell (1994), 171.
 198

additional incidents. Valerius Maximus referred to the theatre as a "military

camp in the city" (urbana castra), indicating that the presence of soldiers was

highly visible.78 In fact, in AD 15, there was an increase in violence in the theatre.

On one particular occasion, members of the audience were killed as well as

praetorians and a centurion. 79 Tacitus adds that a tribune of the guard was

injured while trying to maintain order and stop any attacks against the

magistrates who were present. It is clear that praetorians were there to take part

in the policing at the theatre. Balsdon argues that they were used in this instance

because "the City Prefecture, with command of the urban cohorts, was not yet

established." 80 Yet we know from Tacitus that Lucius Calpurnius Piso had been

appointed as urban prefect by AD 14 at least, and probably a year earlier, and

therefore the option of using the urban cohorts clearly was available. 81 The

praetorians were involved here simply because, in this period, security at the

games was one of their administrative duties.

Probably the most well known association of the guard with the games is

the occasion on which Caligula was murdered. 82 Praetorians were in attendance,

78
Valerius Maximus 2.4.1: proximus a militaribus institutis ad urbana castra, id est theatra . . .

79
Tacitus, Annals 1.77.1; see also Suetonius, Tiberius 37.2. Cf. Cameron (1976), 223.

80
Balsdon (1969), 418, note 117.

81
Tacitus, Annals 6.11.3 where the death of Piso is noted, along with the observation that he had
gained approval for his conduct as urban prefect viginti per annos. The passage falls under the
entries for the year AD 32. Suetonius (Tiberius 42.1), however, records that Piso was given his post
by Tiberius. Vitucci (1956), 113 has him appointed in AD 13.
82
See above, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 159-62.
 199

but it is not clear from the sources whether they were there only as protection for

the emperor, or for security in the theatre as well. The issue is complicated by the

fact that the event took place on the Palatine where there would have been a

cohort on duty anyway. The most important aspect of this incident for our

purposes, however, is the absence of the urban cohorts at the time of the murder.

If it had been their duty to be on watch at games such as these, then one would

expect some mention of them in the aftermath of the assassination. Instead, all

we are told is that the German bodyguard reacted with anger, indiscriminately

slaughtering several senators and threatening the crowd until they were calmed

down. 83 It is not clear how many cohorts were in the vicinity; Chaerea was there

with his men as part of the change of the watch on the Palatine, but it is likely

that there were additional units patrolling the area, given the large number of

people in attendance. 84 The apparent absence of the urban cohorts, however,

provides some of the strongest proof that it was the responsibility of the guard to

police the games, at least in the first half of the first century.

Under Nero, we hear of the praetorians attending theatrical performances

of the emperor. In AD 59, a cohort of the guard along with centurions, tribunes

83
Josephus, A] 19.119-126; 138-142. It should be noted, however, that the account in Josephus is
rather incoherent, and it is difficult to ascertain the exact chronology of events. Hurley (1993), 212
interprets the passage at 119-122 as indicating that the Germans had come "rushing out of their
station on the Palatine." But it makes more sense that they were in the theatre at the time of the
assassination, having accompanied the emperor there.

84
Josephus (A] 19.76) notes that the crowd was sizeable: noXX&v nvipiaScov av8pco7tcov. He also (A}
19.91) describes Chaerea as taking his place among the tribunes, close to Caligula, which suggests
that there were other cohorts in attendance besides that of Chaerea.
 200

and their prefect were present at Nero's stage debut at the "youth games" in

Rome. 85 It is difficult to tell from the text whether these soldiers were there as

the personal bodyguard for the emperor, as security to maintain order during the

entertainment, as part of the audience, or perhaps, all of these. Dio's description

supports the idea of the praetorians policing the audience, since they are said to

be standing around while the rest of the people were seated. 86

At Nero's public debut in Naples in AD 64, there also were soldiers

present, though again it is not entirely clear from our source whether they were

there as security or as spectators. 87 Koestermann argues that they are members

of the praetorians who normally accompanied Nero as his bodyguard, but the

text seems to single out their presence. 88 Tacitus divides those who were there

out of respect for Nero (per honorem) or for some useful function (varios usus), and

then adds that even troops (etiam militum manipuli) were in attendance. It seems

possible that the soldiers were there in an official capacity as security for the

games (counted among those who were in attendance for a practical purpose),

and that there was a great number of them. The fact that Tacitus highlighted the

85
Tacitus, Annals 14.15.4-5; Dio 61.20.2.

86
Dio 61.20.2: noXX&v uev axpaxicoxcov TtapeaxTiKOxcov, rcavxoq 8e xou Sipou, ooov ai eSpou
EX<bpT|oav, KaGrpevoi).

87
Tacitus, Annals 15.33.3: ergo contractum oppidanorum valgus, et quos e proximis coloniis et municipiis
eius reifama civerat, quique Caesarem per honorem aid varios usus sectantur, etiam militum manipuli,
theatrum Neapolitanorurn complent.

88
Koestermann (1965), vol. 4, 224.
 201

presence of the soldiers must be of significance and could have resulted from the

fact that the forces were so great as to be noteworthy. 89 After all, Nero was

intending to leave for Greece after his debut, and so probably had a greater

number of praetorians with him than would be usual.

It was also around this time that Nero created the Augustiani, who served

as official supporters for him whenever he performed. 90 Bradley has concluded

that "according to the literary record the functions of the Augustiani were to

serve as cheerleaders for Nero's performances and to act as an imperial

bodyguard." 91 But his evidence for these men acting as a guard rests on a single

passage in Dio, which refers to "equites who formed a bodyguard for Nero". 92

But Bradley may have misinterpreted Dio, for the context indicates that these oi

i7t7t£ic; oi cco(j,ocTO(ptiA,aK£<; Tot> Nepoovoc, are engaged in beast hunts. We know that

the cavalry of the praetorian guard had previously taken part in venationes under

Claudius, and it was probably this group to whom Dio is referring. 93 The

89
The use of manipuli in connection with the guard is also found in Tacitus, Annals 12.56.2, where
it indicates a large number of praetorians employed as protection by Claudius at his naumachia.
See below, 208.
90
The Augustiani were either knights or soldiers. See Tacitus, Annals 14.15.5 (equites Romani); Dio
61.20.3-4 (axpaxicbxccc,); Suetonius, Nero 20.3. Cf. Bradley (1978), 127-8. There had been
professional applause leaders in the theatre prior to this time; see, for example, Tacitus, Annals
1.16.3.

91
Bradley (1978), 127.
92
Dio 61.9.1: ev 8e xvvv 0ea dvSpeq Tatipoix; and Ircrccov, ai)U7iapa6eovxe<; ocpioi, Kocxeaxpecpov,
le-cpctKOCTiat; xe apKxcuq KOU xpuxKooiovx; ^eovxaq oi innziq oi arauaxocptAaKec; xov Nepcovoq
KOixTiKOvxiaav...

93
Suetonius, Claudius 21.3.
 202

Augustiani, then, were not intended to be anything more than leaders of the

applause for the emperor, whereas the functions of security, both to guard the

princeps and to maintain order during these events, were fulfilled by the

praetorians.

At the Neronia of AD 65, the praetorians clearly are seen to be acting as a

policing body. Members of the guard patrolled the seats, ensuring the

enthusiasm of the crowd, and punishing those who were seen to be disrupting

the applause. 94 Monitoring the eagerness of the audience was out of the ordinary

for the guard, although protecting against disruptions during performances was

one of its responsibilities. Evidence for this comes from a passage in Suetonius in

which it is recorded that a centurion was used to discipline a knight who had

interrupted a favourite actor.95 During the Neronia, the soldiers also seconded

the request of the audience that Nero sing, and their prefects, followed by

tribunes, carried his lyre for him. 96

94
Tacitus, Annals 16.5.1: turbarent gnaws ac saepe a militibus verberarentur, qui per cuneos stabant, ne
quod temporis momentum impari clamore aut silentio segni praeteriret. Koestermann (1965), vol. 4, 343
suggests that the gnaws (sc. plaudendi) refers to the Augustiani. It is interesting that Robinson
(1992), 198 agrees that the soldiers of this passage are most likely members of the bodyguard and
not of the urban cohorts, though she argues that security at the games was provided by the urban
cohorts as a rule, and provides no reason for the change in this particular instance.

95
Suetonius, Caligula 55.1. Praetors also had the power to remove members of the audience who
were unruly; cf. Tacitus, Annals 1.77.4.

96
Suetonius, New 21.1: sed adiuvante vulgi preces etiam statione militum, quae tunc excubabat,
repraesentaturum se pollicitus est libens. The statio militum most likely refers to praetorians since
statio indicates a guard (cf. Watson [1969], 73; Suetonius, Augustus 32.1), and the urban cohorts
generally are not described as such. Cf. Bradley (1978), 132. He identifies the tribunes as
belonging to the Augustiani or the urban cohorts, but the involvement of the prefects and the
soldiers makes it more likely that these commanders are praetorians.
 203

One of the main reasons for Nero's trip to Greece was to participate in the

contests, and it is not surprising to find the guard acting as security at such

performances, since soldiers would have been in attendance as protection for the

emperor. It is recorded that, during the tour, no one was allowed to leave the

theatre while Nero was performing, and therefore it might be assumed that the

praetorians were the ones who would have enforced such a rule. 97 As well, at

one of these events, when a young recruit saw Nero in chains on the stage, he

rushed forward to help him, misinterpreting his plight. 98 Dio even records that

the praetorians received money to attend these performances. 99 Clearly,

members of the guard were in attendance as a means of providing protection for

the emperor, but also to quell any disruptions which might arise among the

crowd.

It was also in the reign of Nero that an experiment was tried in which the

troops normally on duty at the theatre were dismissed. Tacitus records that the

cohort was removed at the end of AD 55 to allow for a greater pretense of

freedom for the audience, and to stop the corruption of those soldiers who were

97
Suetonius, Nero 23.2. But we know from Suetonius (Vespasian 4.4) that Vespasian left the theatre
on several occasions, offending Nero (cf. also Tacitus, Annals 16.5.3; Dio 66.11.2). It is possible,
however, that most members of the audience were forced to stay.
98
Suetonius, New 21.3; cf. Dio 63.10.2.
99
Dio 63.10.3. It is possible, however, that oi oxpaxicbxai in 10.1 refers not to the guard but to the
Augnstiani who are also referred to in this way in 8.4.
 204

on duty at the events. 100 The second reason is the more interesting, since it

suggests that those members of the guard who were in attendance were being

distracted by the atmosphere at these events and therefore were not performing

their duty. Nero also may have been uneasy about the interaction between the

praetorians and the rest of the crowd. It was noted above that Augustus had

separated the soldiers and the people, and perhaps the possibility of sedition was

a constant cause for concern. But the removal of the soldiers did not last. By the

following year, because of fights between factions supporting different actors,

the cohort was back again. 101

Problems with actors were a major concern throughout the Julio-Claudian

period. 102 In AD 14, at the inaugural games in memory of Augustus, there had

been disturbances because of disputes between actors. 103 Augustus himself had

shown greater leniency towards them but Tiberius imposed further restrictions

in AD 15, and it is possible that conflict resulted from the decrease in pay which

ioo Tacitus, Annals 13.24.1-2: quo maior species libertatis esset, utque miles theatrali licentiae non
permixtus incorruptior ageret; cf. also Dio 61.8.3. Freis (1967), 45, followed by Robinson (1992), 197
understands the soldiers on duty to belong to an urban cohort, but from the Latin (statio cohortis),
it is more likely the praetorians who are meant. On statio, see above, note 96. Most commentators
also understand the statio to be that of the praetorian guard. See, for example Koestermann
(1965), vol. 3, 280; Cameron (1976), 224; Rudich (1993), 21.

101
Tacitus, Annals 13.25.4.
102
Cameron (1976), 225 notes that the theatre was notorious for "rowdyism", whereas events at
the circus did not promote "regular and violent brawls."

103
Tacitus, Annals 1.54.2.
 205

Tiberius had implemented. 104 Later on, however, there were periods when actors

were banished completely from Rome because of disruptive incidents. 105 An

examination of the terms used by Suetonius in connection with actors concludes

that "he frequently associates theatres and actors with the absence of order"; it

may have been this propensity for violence at the theatre which necessitated

stricter security measures there. 106

One of the main concerns for the emperors at these events was the

opposition of the audience to their policies. The gathering of such a large crowd

provided a means of communication between the ruler and the people, and

allowed him to display the power of his empire. 107 But it also enabled the people

to demonstrate against the emperor and his actions or to make requests of him,

and in a more open manner than might otherwise have been possible. 108 The

princeps could not afford to ignore such groups. 109 On several occasions, there

104
Augustus: Suetonius, Augustus 45.3; Tacitus, Annals 1.77.3. Tiberius: Tacitus, Annals 1.77A; cf.
Suetonius, Tiberius 34.1. See also Robinson (1992), 203.
105
See, for example, Tacitus, Annals 4.14.3; Suetonius, Tiberius 37.2; Dio 57.21.3 (under Tiberius,
recalled by Caligula; cf. Dio 59.2.5); Suetonius, Nero 16.2 (under Nero, though they had been
recalled by 60; cf. Tacitus, Annals 14.21.4).
106
Wistrand (1992), 35. Cf. also Cameron (1976), 223-24. For Tacitus' pejorative descriptions of the
theatre in his Neronian books, see Aubrion (1990), 199-200. On Dio's view of the games (". . . in
writing of the games he sees them more as a political institution rather than as a social
phenomenon"), see Newbold (1975), 589-604.

107
Wistrand (1992), 65; see also Yavetz (1969), 22-24; Hopkins (1983), 15.

108
Yavetz (1969), 21; Nippel (1995), 87. Cf. also Tengstrom (1977), 47-49.

109
Yavetz (1969), 132. Cf. also Cameron (1976), 162; Wiedemann (1992), 168-9; 175. Tiberius in fact
did stay away from the games, but whether simply out of distaste for the entertainment, or to
avoid displays of negative sentiment is impossible to say. See Yavetz (1969), 23; Tengstrom (1977),
49; Veyne (1990), 399-401.
 206

were protests over various issues, for example, concerning the high price of grain

under Tiberius and an increase in taxes under Caligula. 110 Tiberius is said to

have chastised the magistrates for not restraining those causing the disturbances

in the theatre through the use of the authority of the state; whether the

application of publica auctoritas would have included bringing in the soldiers is

not known. 111 It is conceivable that one of the main reasons for the presence of

soldiers at events like gladiatorial contests or the theatre was to restrict any

dissension to peaceful displays and to stop matters from getting out of hand. 112

We also hear of the personal involvement of the praetorians in the games

under Claudius, an apparently new development in their history. Members of

the guard, including tribunes and their prefect, took part in beast hunts. 113 The

reason for their participation is not given in the sources, though such a display of

military prowess provided yet another demonstration of the power of the

imperial bodyguard, and at the same time, furnished an opportunity for

110
Grain riots: Tacitus, Annals 6.13.1. Demonstrations against the price of grain in AD 19 also
probably occurred at either the theatre or the games. Cf. Tacitus, Annals 2.87; Cameron (1976),
164. Taxes: Josephus, AJ 19.24-26 (soldiers not specified, but undoubtedly meant); Dio 59.28.11.
According to Dio, those demonstrating were killed by soldiers (uno XCOV oxpaxicoxcov). It is possible
that Suetonius, Caligula 41.1 also refers to this incident.

111
Tacitus, Annals 6.13.1.

112 Yavetz (1969),10. Cf. also Cameron (1976), 174. See, for example, Dio 59.13.3-5 where he
records dissension between Caligula and the people at the games, and the subsequent arrests of
those opposing the emperor.
113
Suetonius, Claudius 21.3. For a similar incident under Nero, see Dio 61.9.1.
 207

individual guard members to gain honour in a public exhibition. 114 An

appearance in the arena may have been seen as a quasi-military exercise, like the

parades of the praetorians which the emperors held for the public, but in this

instance, the contest in the arena replaced combat in the field. It should not be

viewed as a way of debasing or humiliating the soldiers, since even men of high

standing had been involved as hunters and as charioteers in the reign of

Augustus. 115 Subsequent emperors continued this trend, allowing senators and

knights to participate not only in beast hunts, but also in gladiatorial contests. 116

It has been noted that "what attracted [senators and knights] was the

opportunity to display their military prowess, their courage and their skill, plus

the desire for victory, and the shouts of the crowd", and no doubt, the same

could be said of the guard. 117 The involvement of praetorians in such events,

therefore, while not necessarily conveying distinction on the individual soldier,

allowed an opportunity to display skills not often allowed these men.

114
Ville (1981), 170, however, considers this display a cost-saving measure, referring to it as an
innovation which was "more spectacular than expensive." Cf. Balsdon (1969), 310; Plass (1995),
72; Ville (1981), 258-9.
115
Suetonius, Augustus 43.2; Dio 56.25.7-8. The practice of equites taking part in gladiatorial
contests is attested under Caesar as well; cf. Suetonius, Caesar 39.2; Dio 43.23.4-5. Cf. Hopkins
(1983), 12.

116
Tiberius: Dio 57.14.3. Caligula: Suetonius, Caligula 18.3; Dio 59.10.2. Cf. also Barrett (1990), 45:
"prominent citizens took part in the [gladiatorial games], reputedly forced to do so but probably
voluntarily." Nero: Tacitus, Annals 14.14.5; Dio 61.17.3; Suetonius, Nero 12.1.

117
Hopkins (1983), 21.
 208

Claudius also gave gladiatorial games at the Castra Praetoria on the

anniversary of his accession; these are described by Suetonius as sine venatione

apparatuque.118 It is unknown whether members of the guard would have

participated in these games. While the use of the camp may seem to indicate that

these were private celebrations, it is difficult to know exactly where these games

would have been held, for there does not seem to be a large enough space in the

camp itself.119 It is possible, therefore, that the games would have been held

outside the walls and be attended by the public as well. If so, it would have

provided Claudius with another opportunity to parade the praetorians before

the citizens.

One occasion where the guard was used not only to protect the audience

from the participants but also as part of the spectacle was the naumachia staged

by Claudius in AD 52.120 The sources record that nineteen thousand men took

part and that the emperor used double cohorts of praetorians on rafts

surrounding those participating in the battle; it was the duty of these soldiers to

launch catapults at the participants. 121 Given the number of men involved in the

118
Suetonius, Claudius 21 A; cf. also Dio 60.17.9. Ville (1977), 170 remarks on the lack of expense in
putting on such a show.

119
See Appendix 3, "The Castra Praetoria", 272, note 13.

120
Augustus had staged a naumachia in 2 BC, but it is not recorded whether the praetorians took
part in that event. Cf. Augustus, Res Gestae 23.
121
Tacitus, Annals 12.56.2; cf. Suetonius, Claudius 21.6; Dio 60.33.3-4. See Grant (1974), 158 who
comments on the use of the praetorian cavalry in addition to infantry, chosen because they were
good shots.
 209

event, there was a need for additional protection for the audience as well, and

this no doubt also would have been the responsibility of the guard.

If the praetorians were being employed as security at these events, the

urban cohorts were not idle. We know that soldiers had been utilized by

Augustus to monitor the streets during the spectacles. 122 There was ample

opportunity for theft and vandalism at those times since a great number of

citizens were at the venues. It was presumably members of the urban cohorts

that were used, since patrolling the city was one of their regular duties. 123 The

same unit likely was employed during the reign of Caligula to quiet the

neighbourhood where the games were to take place in order to prevent his horse,

Incitatus, from being disturbed. 124 It was also under this emperor that several

people, having arrived at the circus in the middle of the night to procure free

seats, were driven away because they were disturbing the emperor's sleep. Many

people were killed in the confusion.125 Though the responsibility of removing

122
Suetonius, Augustus 43.1: quibus diebus custodes in urbe disposuit, ne raritate remanentium
grassatoribus obnoxia esset. In the same passage, he mentions that Augustus sometimes provided
shows in all areas of the city and on very many stages: fecitque nonnumquam etiam vicatim ac
pluribus scaenis per omnium linguarum histrioiies. Given such a large number of venues, there would
be a need for a great number of soldiers to act as security at these sites, and the guard, as well as
the urban cohorts, must have been distributed throughout the city.

123 Wiedemann (1992), 176 assigns this task to the vigiles, but there is no reason for this
responsibility to fall to them.

124
Suetonius, Caligula 55.3.

125
Suetonius, Caligula 26A: inquietatus fremitu gratuita in Circo loca de media node occupantium,
omnis fustibus abegit; elisi per eum tumultum viginti amplius equites R., totidem matronae, super
innumeram turbam ceteram.
 210

the crowd probably fell to the urban cohorts since they would have been

patrolling the streets anyway, it is possible that the praetorian cohort on duty at

the palace could have been used as well. As was noted above, there was always a

possibility of riots with large public gatherings, and this was probably the reason

for the evacuation of the crowd rather than the sheer annoyance from the noise,

for on another occasion, Caligula granted impromptu games when they were

demanded of him by those in the same area.126

People came from all over Italy to attend events at the theatre and circus

in Rome. An increase in the population of the city meant that the emperors had

to take greater measures for public safety at such times. It was not only the basic

maintenance of order at such venues, but also matters such as the prevention of

crime in the streets on these occasions that were of concern. Moreover, the

potential for public demonstrations getting out of hand at such times posed a

problem. The use of the guard as police at the spectacles in the first part of the

first century AD can be discerned from the sources, though it must be noted that

the language of the passages rarely specifies from which contingent these

soldiers come, and so it is primarily from the context that any, albeit tentative,

conclusions can be drawn. 127 Since the urban cohorts were responsible for

policing the city as a whole, and that duty would continue to be necessary when

126
Suetonius, Caligula 18.3; cf. Hurley (1993), 110.
127
Cf. Nippel (1993), 93.
 211

the games were on, it is unlikely that their numbers would have allowed them to

act as security both at crowded events and in the city. We know that praetorians

were being used early in the reign of Tiberius to police the games, and it may be

inferred from this that the references to milites elsewhere indicates members of

the guard. No doubt it would be the praetorians whom the citizens of Rome

would most clearly identify with the term "soldiers", since they were the most

visible military presence in the city. Their use for security at these venues, even

when the emperor himself was not present, also reinforced for the audience that

they were enjoying the event by his munificence, and reminded them that these

soldiers were his personal armed troops. Moreover, the additional need for the

emperor to have access to information regarding the mood of the populace at the

theatre and the games also may have been a factor in the use of his personal

guard as police there.

Taxation

It was under Caligula that we have the first and only evidence that the

guard was used to collect taxes. The precedent for the military to be involved in

such a task comes from the provinces. Soldiers had been sent occasionally by

Augustus and Tiberius to gather the tribute which was owed by inhabitants of

the empire, for example, in 25 BG from the Salassi and in AD 29 from the
 212

Frisians. 128 Suetonius records that late in Caligula's reign, the emperor used the

praetorians instead of the publicum for levying taxes in Rome apparently because

the profit to be made was so great (quia lucrum exuberabat).129 But a more

plausible reason for the involvement of the guard is the hostility of the citizens

towards the imposition of additional taxation, for not only had taxes been levied

on almost everything, and their proclamation only made orally, they also later

were doubled. 130 This was the first time that direct taxation had been imposed in

Rome and the additional payment was bound to be very unpopular. 131 In fact,

the anger of the people became evident at the chariot races where they petitioned

to have the amount reduced; the emperor ordered those who were persistent in

their shouting to be hauled off and executed. 132

Immediately after his report of this incident, Josephus records the

employment of the guard as tax collectors. 133 Since there was no method in place

128
Augustus: Dio 53.25.4. Augustus also had men of military age arrested and sold. He then took
the best land and settled three thousand praetorians there in what later became known as
Augusta Praetoria; cf. Strabo, Geography 4.6.7. Tiberius: Tacitus, Annals 4.72.1. The demands
for payment of the levy from the Frisians resulted in a confrontation that ended with many
Roman losses; cf. 72.2-74.1.

129
Suetonius, Caligula 40. For details concerning the publicani, see Crook (1967), 233-36.

130
Dio 59.29.8; Josephus, A] 19.28.
131
Cf. Barrett (1990), 228. The new taxes were abolished by Claudius; see Dio 60.4.1.

132
Josephus, A] 19.24-26; cf. also Suetonius, Caligula All; Dio 59.28.11. See Barrett (1990), 228. It
fell to the praetorians to perform the executions. Balsdon (1934), 103 assigns the demonstration at
the circus to "the Ludi Circenses (on or before 5 January, A.D. 41)", but there is no evidence for
that particular date, and he has reversed the order of events in Josephus by having Chaerea being
remiss in collecting the taxes before the demonstration took place. Wiseman (1991), 49 suggests
the Ludi Romani in September of AD 40.

133
Josephus, A] 19.28.
 213

to manage the collection of the new taxes and the resentment of the citizens had

been shown to be considerable, the employment of the emperor's personal guard

to enforce payment was the easiest solution. 134 Among the officers assigned to

the task was Cassius Chaerea, who is said to have taken his time in collecting the

taxes because he pitied those who suffered under the strain of paying. 135 But the

real reason for the delay may have been the amount of time the collection

entailed. Suetonius records that the centurions and tribunes were assigned to this

duty, and even if they simply were overseeing the work of their soldiers, the

magnitude of the task would have been enormous given the widespread nature

of the taxation.

Construction Projects

One area where the guard was used in the city and elsewhere was on

construction projects. Yet, what at first appears to be an insult to such an elite

unit may not, in fact, have been at all debasing. For the Julio-Claudian period,

there are two examples in the sources of such enterprises. 136 Under Caligula, the

134
Hurley (1993), 153 argues that the transference to the guard was a move away from the
publicani, but there is no evidence that praetorians continued to collect taxes beyond this very
brief period, and under Nero, we again hear of complaints against the excessiveness of the
publicani; see Tacitus, Annals 13.50.1-51.2.

135
Josephus, A] 19.29. See Gage (1969), 278; Barrett (1990), 161.

136 The engineering expertise for the artificially constructed bridge between Puteoli and Baiae
built during the reign of Caligula also may have come from among the ranks of the praetorians;
see Dio 59.17.7-8.
 214

praetorians worked on the construction of stables for the horses of the Green

faction of charioteers. 137 The emperor was devoted to that group and one of the

drivers, Eutychus, was a particular favourite. Josephus records that the soldiers

were worn out because they were forced to construct these stables, but the

inclusion of the story among the details of the aftermath of Caligula's

assassination casts doubt on the insinuation, for the purpose seems to be to show

that the emperor had debased his guard by making them do menial tasks. 138 It is

possible that the major contribution of the praetorians to the project was not the

physical labour of construction but rather the planning of the building. It is

known from inscriptions that, by the second century at least, each cohort had its

own surveyor, and architects associated with the guard are also attested. 139 It is

conceivable, then, that the guard was involved in the design of the building

instead of being used for menial drudgery.

The second example falls under the reign of Nero. One of the assignments

which fell to those guardsmen who accompanied the emperor to Greece was the

beginning of the building of a canal at the isthmus of Corinth. 140 This assignment

137
Josephus, AJ 19.257.
138
Durry (1938), 276 remarks that the emperor did not fear "to abuse" the guard in this task,
clearly an uncritical reading of Josephus.
139
Surveyors: Sherk (1974), 549-550. He claims that there is "sufficient evidence to show that at
least one [surveyor] was attached to each of the . . . cohorts." Architects: Watson (1969), 144; 214,
note 497 (the inscription of an architect of the guard dated to the late first century AD). The
inclusion of such skilled personnel among guard members would not be surprising, for the
legions each had similar positions associated with them.

140
Suetonius, Nero 19.2; cf. also Dio 62.16.1-2. The project also had been conceived by both Caesar
and Caligula; cf. Suetonius, Julius 44.3, Caligula 21. Nero himself inaugurated the work. Griffin
 21
5

should not be viewed as a demeaning task, since it appears that their

responsibility may have had more to do with the engineering and surveying for

the project rather than with physical excavation. The text of Suetonius may

provide support for this interpretation: in Achaia Isthmum perfodere adgressus

praetorianos pro contione ad incohandum opus cohortatus est. The inclusion in the text

of what would seem to be a minor detail in the construction of the canal - Nero

holding a meeting of the soldiers to discuss the project and encouraging them to

begin the work - perhaps indicates that they were to be involved in the design

and layout rather than the actual digging. In fact, there would not have been

great numbers of soldiers available for physical labour because they would need

to be employed in other tasks as well. 141 It may be, rather, that the majority of

the work force was comprised of prisoners, and if this report is true, the soldiers

would be needed as well to oversee the work and act as security. 142 Whatever

their responsibility, the work had progressed for approximately half a mile

before it was halted. 143

(1984), 162 suggests that it may have been timed to follow the Isthmian Games. A
commemorative relief of the proposed canal still exists; see Vermeule (1968), 211; 434.

141
We do not know how many praetorians accompanied Nero on the trip to Greece, but not all of
them would have been available for excavation, since some would be needed to guard the
emperor and to perform other tasks such as executions; cf. Dio 63.17.3-5.

142
Josephus, B] 3.540 (six thousand Jewish prisoners from Galilee); ps.-Lucian, Nero 3-4;
Philostratus, Life ofApollonius 5.19 (possibly political prisoners used as well. Cf. Rudich [1993],
292-3; Bradley [1978], 116-7). One source does describe the soldiers, however, as working where
there was flat ground and no rock; cf. ps-Lucian, Nero 3.

143
The distance is given in Philostratus, Life ofApollonius 4.34; the time spent was calculated by
Gerster (1884), 225-232 to be three to four months duration. Cf. also Pausanias (Guide to Greece
2.5) who comments that he was able to see clearly where the digging had started. When the
 216

Judicial

One other issue which should be considered here is the development of

the juridical function of the praetorian prefects. While this responsibility slowly

devolved on them throughout the first two centuries of the imperial period and

is of particular importance by the end of the second century, there has been much

discussion about the early period, especially as to when we first can discern their

use in this way. 144 Under Tiberius, Sejanus no doubt was instrumental in

bringing certain people to trial, and although there are no obvious examples

where juridical responsibility had been delegated to him, it is likely that when

Tiberius was on Capri, the prefect had a hand in such issues. 145

We have no evidence either concerning Sejanus' direct involvement in

interrogations and executions; he seems to have preferred to work behind the

scenes. His successor, on the other hand, is known to have participated

personally in the questioning of witnesses, and rumours of fabricated evidence

modern canal was excavated, traces of the ancient work still were visible and it followed the same
line. As Bradley (1978), 115 points out, this shows the acuteness of the ancient engineers'
planning, not surprising if the surveyors had been trained in the military.

144
See Durry (1938), 171-6; Passerini (1939), 246-51 (arguing for the prefects to have had these
responsibilities from the beginning, with Macro as his example); Crook (1955), 140 (who chooses
Hadrian, against Mommsen's choice of Marcus Aurelius); (1967), 70-72. Cf. also Howe (19662),
32.

1 4 5 Grant (1974), 133-4 argues, however, that Sejanus was responsible for many of the treason
trials which occurred in the reign of Tiberius: " . . . once a conviction had been secured, it was
convenient that he personally controlled the praetorian officers and guardsmen who could detain
or execute the condemned." Cf. also Levick (1976), 195; Rogers (1935), 86. One such example may
be the case of Cremutius Cordus, who was charged by two of Sejanus' clients, though his
connection seems to end there; cf. Tacitus, Annals 4.34-5!
 217

place Macro in a rather unfavourable light.146 The case against Albucilla, and her

alleged lovers in AD 37 is one such instance. 147 According to the information

submitted to the senate, Macro had supervised the torture of Albucilla's slaves

and the interrogation of witnesses, and Tacitus admits the possibility of forged

evidence against them because one of the defendants, Lucius Arruntius, was a

personal enemy of the prefect.148 Despite the suspicion that the evidence had

been fabricated, and the absence of any correspondence from the emperor, the

senate proceeded with the trials, perhaps because of its reluctance to challenge

Macro. As Levick notes, the use of letters from Tiberius to initiate charges against

citizens presented a problem for the senate, and was easily abused by the

prefects (both Macro and Sejanus before him) who could conceivably forge or

adapt instructions from the emperor to meet their own needs. 149 The role of the

guard in these cases is not known, but it is likely that one of the responsibilities

146
Dio 58.21.3; cf. 24.2. Cf. Bauman (1972), 124. Tacitus (Annals 6.29.3) records that Macro used
techniques similar to those of his predecessor, but more insidiously: [Macro] easdem artes occultius
exercebat.
147
Tacitus, Annals 6.47.3; for discussion of this incident, see Forsyth (1969), 204-207; Bauman
(1972), 130-34; Barrett (1996), 49-50. Albucilla was the former wife of Satrius Secundus whose
name is associated in Tacitus with the exposure of the "conspiracy" of Sejanus. This case was not
the first time that Macro had been associated with judicial matters. In AD 34, he had taken part in
the trial of Mamercus Aemilus Scaurus. Tacitus (Annals 6.29) records that the charges then were
adultery and dabbling in magic, though the real reason was alleged to be the hatred which the
prefect felt for him.

148
See also Dio 58.27.2. Cf. Seager (1972), 239; Barrett (1990), 40. The supervision of the torture by
the praetorian prefect suggests that it was members of the guard who were performing this task.

149
Levick (1976), 198.
 218

of the soldiers was to assist in the interrogation of witnesses, as happened with

Quintilia under Caligula. 150

Prefects continued to take part in the interrogation and torture of

witnesses and the accused, for example, under Claudius after the exposure of the

plot by Lucius Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus and Annius Vinicianus, and

under Nero when Faenius Rufus and Tigellinus took part in the examination of

the Pisonian conspirators. 151 A passage in Seneca may provide one of the earliest

examples we have of the delegation of judicial affairs to the prefect:

animadversurus in latrones duos Burrus praefectus tuus . . . exigebat a te, scriberes, in

quos et ex qua causa animadverti velles; hoc saepe dilatum ut aliquando fieret,

instabat.152 Burrus also had the power of execution over Agrippina when he was

put in charge of her interrogation after she had been accused of inciting Rubellius

Plautus to revolution. 153 This, despite the fact that Nero was rumoured to want

not only both Agrippina and Plautus killed, but also Burrus replaced with Gaius

150
Cf. Josephus, A] 19.32-36; Dio 59.26.4; Suetonius, Caligula 16 A. Chaerea had been given the job
of supervising the torture of this woman, but it seems clear from the context that he was not alone
in this task. Cf. above, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 159, note 130.

151
Claudius: Dio 60.16.3; 7; Suetonius, Claudius 42.1 Nero: See above, "The Guard as a
Specialized Military Unit", 206.
152
Seneca, De dementia 2.1.2; cf. Griffin (1984), 78: "[Burrus] is shown fulfilling one of the routine
duties of the Praetorian Prefect, presenting execution orders to be annotated and signed . . . ". See
also Bradley (1978), 78. Contra Crook (1967), 301, note 20 who comments that Burrus was only
"carrying out orders." But see Dio (52.24.3) on the prefects having the power of capital
punishment.

153
Tacitus, Annals 13.19-21; cf. Koestermann (1965), vol. 3, 274; Waltz, (1909), 227.
 219

Caecina Tuscus. 154 Since, however, it was the prefect who, on the same night,

convinced Nero to allow his mother the opportunity to defend herself, the report

of his planned replacement is most likely inaccurate. In fact, it was because of

Burrus' intervention that Agrippina not only was acquitted, but also was able to

secure the destruction of those who had accused her, and rewards for some of

her supporters. 155 The presence of Seneca and of imperial freedmen as witnesses

during the questioning has been attributed to Nero's mistrust of his prefect to

deal firmly with the defendant. 156 Burrus' role here as interrogator clearly

anticipates the participation of future prefects in the hearing of evidence. 157

Shortly thereafter Burrus himself was charged with plotting to replace

Nero on the throne with Faustus Cornelius Sulla Felix, and was brought to

trial. 158 The proceedings were held before the emperor, not in the senate, with

154
For Tuscus, see Demougin (1992), #671. The origin of the story is Fabius Rusticus. Tacitus does
not subscribe to it, since both the elder Pliny and Cluvius Rufus record that the loyalty of Burrus
was not called into question. McDermott (1949), 250-51, however, refers to the plan to remove
Burrus as "a likely one".

155
See Furneaux (1896), vol. 2,179-80; Griffin (1984), 75; Bauman (1974), 211-13.

156
Cf. Barrett (1996), 175-76; Griffin (1976), 79; Cizek (1972), 92. It appears that Burrus in fact took
his responsibility seriously; Bauman (1974), 212 remarks on the adverb (minaciter) that Tacitus
uses in connection with the interrogation of Agrippina.

157
McDermott (1949), 251: "Burrus appeared much more prominently in this action than did
Seneca because he was exercising one of the judicial functions which later made this prefecture a
notable legal office." Bauman (1974), 212 denies that there was a trial: "The proceedings
conducted by Burrus were a preliminary interrogation... The dossier forwarded to Nero
persuaded him that there was no case for [Agrippina] to meet."

158
Tacitus, Annals 13.23; cf. Dio 61.10.6. Sulla was exiled in AD 58 and murdered in AD 62.
 220

the prefect himself acting as one of the judges. 159 He was acquitted of the

charges. 160 Burrus' presence on the panel undoubtedly was dictated by the fact

that he belonged to the emperor's inner council, though it is hard not to see irony

in Nero's decision to allow him to hear his own case, given the nature of the

charges. 161 The prefect's involvement in legal affairs, in fact, can be viewed as

part of the increased administrative responsibility which had been delegated

under Nero. 162

The assignment of juridical powers to the prefects, then, seems to have

begun much earlier than usually is accepted. 163 A passage in Tacitus may

159
Cf. Barrett (1996), 178; McDermott (1949), 251; Oost (1958), 135-6; Rudich (1993), 21; Rogers
(1955), 201. Griffin (1984), 254, note 39 does not believe that Burrus served as a judge at his own
trial.

wo Tacitus, Annals 13.23; Dio 61.10.6, who attributes the acquittal to Seneca's influence. Cf.
Koestermann (1965), vol. 3, 279.

161
As Bauman (1974), 213 puts it, "on a manifestly false charge there was no need for a member
of the consilium to vacate his seat." He later (1992), 198 argued that Burrus was able to vote "only
on a preliminary point", though this is not expressed in the sources. Cf. also Crook (1955), 47;
Rudich (1993), 21; McDermott (1949), 251. If, however, the emperor was mistrustful of Burrus as
has been claimed recently by Barrett (1996), 161, he could have used this trial as a means of
disposing of the prefect without pretense.

162
Passerini (1939), 248 argues that although the praetorian prefect was not a magistrate, the
judicial responsibilities nevertheless were separate from the duties as a military commander,
since as the latter, they had no jurisdiction over citizens in Rome. Yet it was exactly because the
prefect had military power that the emperor could delegate responsibility for arrest,
interrogation, and execution at an early date, and the development of judicial power derived
from that. Cf. Waltz (1909), 236; Howe (19662), 32: "As commander of the bodyguards and
personal defender of the emperor, the praetorian prefect had probably been summoned to sit on
the council from a very early date, whether it met as an advisory council of state or as a court of
law."

i63 Cf. Brunt (1966), 473.

 221

provide evidence that it was under Claudius that the prefect began to have some

responsibility in judicial matters:

eodem anno saepius audita vox principis, parem vim return habendam a
procuratoribus suis iudicatarum, ac si ipse statuisset. ac nefortuito
prolapsus videretiir, senatus quoque consulto cautum plenius quam antea et
uberius. nam divus Augustus apud equites illustres, qui Aegypto
praesiderent, lege agi decretaque eorum proinde haberi iusserat, ac si
magistratus Romani constituissent; mox alias per provincias et in Urbe
pleraque concessa sunt, quae olim a praetoribus noscebantur.164

"In the same year, the princeps was heard to say quite often that the decisions in

cases judged by his procurators must be treated the same as if he himself had

made them. And lest it seem to have slipped out by chance, the senate also

decreed on it more fully and comprehensively than before. The divine Augustus

had granted jurisdiction to the knights who governed Egypt and provided that

their decrees be treated as if they had been decided by Roman magistrates. Soon,

in the other provinces and in Rome, knights were ceded very many cases which

used to be investigated by the praetors." The phrase equites alias per provincias et

in Urbe has been understood to mean that, along with others of their class, the

praetorian prefects "had already acquired in some degree the jurisdiction which

is otherwise attested only at a much later date." 165 It seems, therefore, that by the

mid first century AD, the praetorian prefects were part of the emperor's consilium

164
Tacitus, Annals 12.60.1-2.

165
Brunt (1966), 473.
 222

and provided input when cases were heard before the princeps. 166 Burrus'

presence, then, at any trial held intra cubiculum would not be out of the ordinary,

and one might assume that there were other instances when he took an active

part in the examination of evidence.

By the end of the second century AD, the prefects had developed their

judicial skills to such an extent that jurists of that period were associated with the

office. Millar argues that "these wider juridical functions should be seen as

extensions of the essential role of the praetorian prefects as protectors of the

emperor and commander of the cohorts." 167 It is easy to see that the early stages

in the development of this role for the praetorian prefect dealt with the

interrogation of witnesses in the reign of Tiberius, and grew from there. The use

of the praetorians in confinements and executions may, in fact, have generated

this additional duty for the prefects, the next step in the progression from

overseeing the arrests of those accused, to taking part in interrogations, to having

significant responsibility for judicial affairs in the capital.

166
Eden (1984), 142: "Under the early Empire the amid Caesaris constituted an unofficial but not
unconstitutional advisory panel consulted by the emperor as and when he saw fit."

167
Millar (1977), 125.
 223

X. Conclusion

The praetorian guard was an elite military force, in existence for over

three hundred years. Adapted from a republican institution by Augustus, it was

in essence the personal army of the emperor, and, within a very short time, was

responsible also for specialized military tasks and for various administrative

duties. This development occurred primarily because of the relationship between

the praetorians and the emperor, who saw that such a large number of men in

Rome, answering only to himself, could be put to good use for his own benefit,

and for the advantage of the city. Not only would they assist in the management

of the capital, they also would serve as a constant reminder of the armed force

that he had supporting him. It is, therefore, a mistake to consider the praetorians

as simply the bodyguard of the emperor. From the very beginning, they played a

much larger role and had a far greater impact on life in Rome because of their

close affiliation with the machinery of state.

In the late stages of the republic, there first appeared a unit that is referred

to as a praetorian cohort, whose purpose was to provide protection for the

commander in the field. Provincial governors (as military commanders of their

provinces) had similar units, but with a broader mandate: to provide

administrative assistance as well as personal protection. This model of cohort is

best illustrated by the observations of Cicero, in his letters and in his speech

against Verres, where the praetorians are seen to be involved primarily in a

 224

judicial capacity. It is not known what other responsibilities these soldiers might

have had, but they appear to be functioning as much more than a military unit.

The civil wars of the mid first century BC saw the emergence of praetorian

cohorts for individuals who used these soldiers for their own personal gains,

rather than for state business, that is, for intimidation as well as protection. It was

undoubtedly with such precedents in mind that Augustus formed his own

personal army, the imperial praetorian guard, from those soldiers of the

republican praetorian cohorts not discharged after Actium.

The date for the establishment of the guard is given by Dio as 27 BC. From

the very beginning, the praetorians formed a privileged unit, with a higher rate

of pay, better living conditions because of the proximity to Rome, and a shorter

term of service than the average legionary. Organized into nine cohorts of a

thousand men each, they initially were dispersed throughout the city and nearby

areas in an attempt to avoid the appearance of having so many armed men in the

capital. Since this was the first time that soldiers had been stationed in Rome,

Augustus was careful not to offend the citizens by clearly advertising how he

had come to power and was maintaining his principate. In reality, however, the

praetorians would have been increasingly visible to those in the city because of

their growing involvement in its administration, and before long, all of the

cohorts were brought into the capital to facilitate the coordination of their duties.
 225

The organization of the guard did not change much under the Julio-

Claudian emperors; the original arrangement by Augustus needed little

improvement. Nevertheless, under Tiberius, one of the most important changes

in the entire history of the guard occurred, when he brought all of the cohorts

together into a single camp, the Castra Praetoria. The establishment of a

permanent military base for the praetorians marked an unmistakable change

from the years of Augustus. Now the basis of imperial power was clearly evident

to all. The reason for the move is given by Tacitus: there had been a problem

with discipline, and having all the soldiers together would allow for better

control. But there was probably another reason not recorded in the sources: the

expanded use of the praetorians in a variety of tasks, primarily in Rome, which

went well beyond providing security for the emperor and his family. Having all

the soldiers together would allow for better use of the manpower of the guard,

since assignments could be coordinated more easily. Yet it would have been

obvious to those in the capital that a change had occurred, since the camp

dominated the heights north of Rome, and its message could not have been more

obvious: the fortress provided a clear manifestation of imperial power and it was

there to stay.

Around the same time as the construction of the camp, the number of

cohorts was increased from nine to twelve. The date of this change is not

recorded in the sources, but inscriptional evidence shows that it occurred during
 226

the reign of Tiberius, and it is likely that it happened in conjunction with the

building of the Castra Praetoria. The greater number of soldiers would allow for

increased efficiency in performing the various responsibilities which the guard

now had. Moreover, the additional forces would also provide a stronger show of

military support for the emperor at a time when Tiberius was becoming

increasingly concerned for his safety. It is instructive, however, that the layout of

the camp allowed for the total strength of the praetorians to be disguised, in its

use of cells along the wall, and double-storeyed barrack blocks. Apparently,

Tiberius did not want to advertise that his private army had grown to a force of

approximately twelve thousand men.

In the sources, the praetorian guard is often overshadowed by its

commanders, the praetorian prefects. The office was created in 2 BC, possibly

because of the increasing difficulty in coordinating the soldiers in their many

assignments. The prefects had control of the day-to-day administration of the

soldiers, working alongside their tribunes and centurions. But their close

relationship with the emperor meant that they were perceived as having

inordinate influence in the running of the state. In fact, the power that would

later be associated with the office is not in evidence in this period, for the most

part. Many of the men who held the prefecture in the Julio-Claudian period are

known only by name, if at all. The exception, of course, is Sejanus. His career has

been closely examined by scholars, and his influence greatly exaggerated. The
 227

aspirations that have been attributed to him, especially his pursuit of imperial

power, is a misinterpretation of the activities that brought him into the political

arena, and which were later exploited by anti-Tiberian propaganda. The

praetorian prefecture had not yet been firmly fixed when Sejanus held the

position, and any action undertaken by him must be viewed in light of his

dedication to the emperor, and to the welfare of the principate, rather than to

personal ambition.

It should be noted that, from the very beginning, it was rare for these

prefects to be career military men, even though they were put in charge of the

emperor's personal troops. A few had served in some capacity in the army, but

more often these appointments were the result of imperial patronage, which

meant that they were chosen because of their affiliation with the imperial

household, rather than for any particular ability to manage such a large military

force. The reason is clear: the emperor needed to know that someone he could

trust implicitly was in command of his guard, for the greatest danger he could

potentially encounter would come from the armed men who were sworn to

protect him. In the end, however, the prefects proved ineffective at stopping any

conspiracy against the princeps, and on occasion, joined in themselves.

That the praetorians occasionally became caught up in the political life in

Rome should surprise no one. Their duties placed both the officers and the

regular soldiers in close proximity to the centre of power, and they obviously
 228

took an interest in the affairs of state. Perhaps the most discernible illustration of

this involvement in politics was during transitions of power. The grant of sizable

donatives to the guard provides the strongest evidence of a tacit understanding

that the soldiers had to be well rewarded for their acceptance of the new regime.

When the praetorians took the initiative in political affairs, however, it was

invariably the officers and the prefects who were at the forefront. Their close

association with the emperor, and thus with the affairs of state, and the greater

possibility of reward, encouraged some to take the risk of conspiring against the

regime. On the other hand, the average soldier probably remained ambivalent

for the most part about the various machinations of power, as long as his needs

were looked after. The praetorians on the whole were pragmatic about their

relationship with the emperor, and realized that they stood to gain little by

challenging the status quo. Although not usually directly involved in

conspiracies, the rank and file generally fared well: if the conspiracy failed, they

were well rewarded for their loyalty; if it succeeded, they would be offered

incentives to follow the new emperor. Despite their numbers, it was not the main

body of soldiers that represented the clearest danger to the emperor, but rather

those men whom he himself had placed in a position of trust.

The view of the imperial praetorian guard has long been restricted to its

role as the personal guard of the emperor. But a closer examination of the

various tasks which these troops performed reveals that they were much more
 229

than a mere bodyguard. These other responsibilities have received virtually no

scholarly attention, but they provide us with a more comprehensive

understanding of the role of the guard in the state. The duties can be divided into

two groups: the use of the praetorians in specialized military assignments, and

their contribution to the civil administration of the city of Rome.

The use of the guard as a specialized military force was an extension of its

role to ensure the safety of the emperor and, in connection with that duty, to

provide assistance when required for the security of the state. The assignments

were varied, but praetorians were usually sent only when previous attempts to

find other solutions to a serious problem had failed. In each instance, the security

of the emperor could have been compromised had the situation not been

resolved. The guard was especially employed in cases where there was a need

for covert action, or for additional security. Often such sensitive tasks were

assigned to a special branch of praetorians known as the speculatores. There is

little specific information about this unit in the Julio-Claudian period, however,

because of the nature of their activities. But their very presence betrays the

vulnerability of a regime based on maintaining control through intimidation and

armed force.

Perhaps the most sinister of the duties assigned to the guard was the

confinement, and often the execution, of those whom the emperor considered a

risk. Generally these people came from the nobility, and most cases are clearly
 230

political in nature. There are numerous examples of the use of praetorians to

detain individuals who were simply thought to be a threat, and those who had

actually been charged and were waiting to be tried. In several instances, the

intimidating presence of the soldiers was enough to force the individual to

commit suicide. Such an act would remove the responsibility from the emperor,

and allow him to claim that he would have interceded on behalf of the accused

and been lenient towards him, if only he had not killed himself. Members of the

imperial family were also spied upon by those guardsmen who were ostensibly

assigned to them for protection and prestige, but who clearly were reporting

back to their superiors the conversations and events which they witnessed.

Whether this was something that happened routinely with all who were

provided with a contingent of guards is not certain, but it is possible that one of

the principal duties for those soldiers assigned to family members was to keep

apprised of their activities. The reason for the choice of the praetorian guard for

such an onerous task was that it owed its allegiance to the emperor alone and

could be relied upon to act in his best interests, regardless of how repulsive the

job was. In fact, this reliability is seen in particular in the executions of members

of the imperial family; there is seldom any hesitation to obey the orders of the

emperor, despite the unpleasantness of the task.

In addition to acting as a tactical military unit, the guard was also

employed in the routine civil administration of the capital. In fact, Augustus was
 231

instrumental in providing a framework that enabled the city of Rome to be

managed in a more professional manner, and it is in the context of this

reorganization that one should include the duties assigned to the praetorians. In

the republican period, the tendency had been to allocate tasks to individuals as

the need arose, a very inefficient and piecemeal method of urban management.

Augustus created numerous permanent positions, such as the positions of the

curatores, which were filled by men from both the senatorial and equestrian

classes, and together these offices formed the basis of a civil service in Rome.

Similarly, he realized the benefits that could be gained from making use of his

personal army, and so assigned a wide variety of tasks in the city to the guard,

which, as a military unit, was efficient in handling such administrative

responsibilities.

One of these duties was helping fight fires, no doubt because of the

number of soldiers available to assist the vigiles, and in particular, the inadequacy

of ancient fire-fighting. It is likely that the guard had had a much larger role in

the prevention and suppression of fire in Rome and the surrounding areas before

the creation of the vigiles in AD 6, and may have continued to function in the

same capacity after this date. The presence of the imperial soldiers at fires would

have reminded the populace that the emperor was looking out for them, and this

concern was often reinforced by the attendance of the emperors themselves, or

members of the imperial family, at these disasters. It should be remembered that

 - . 232

the praetorians were the personal force of the princeps and, since he was

responsible for the welfare of the state, it is not surprising that they should be

called upon to help in these instances, it also was in the emperor's best interest to

keep his personal guard in the public eye, both to deter any challenges to his rule

and for public relations, which their participation at the fires would have helped

to foster.

The guard also was present as security at the many spectacles held in

Rome each year. The potential for disturbances was great at the circus, the arena,

and especially at the theatre where, on occasion, spectators had been killed. It is

only reasonable to assume, therefore, that there would have been some system in

place to ensure the protection of the crowd. We know that soldiers had been at

the games providing security from early in the reign of Augustus, and that it

became the regular practice to have a contingent there to maintain order. The

urban cohorts would have been kept busy policing the city during these events;

with the majority of citizens in attendance, there needed to be adequate

protection against theft and vandalism in the city streets. The assignment of the

praetorians to the games, then, provided a practical solution to the problem of

maintaining control among the crowd. It is instructive that, on the one occasion

when the soldiers were relieved of this duty at the theatre under Nero, they were

back within a very short time because of fights in the stands.

 233

A major concern of the emperor at these events was the potential for

demonstrations against him or his policies. It is clear that the stationing of troops

at the games would also ensure that such protests remained peaceful, and would

allow the emperor to keep track of the disposition of the crowd. In connection

with this responsibility, the more ominous task of spying on individuals at the

events was also carried out by guard members, possibly by speculators, since the

atmosphere at the spectacles - so many people gathered together in one place,

without restriction on conversation - encouraged greater freedom of speech than

was usually possible. The use of the guard for security at these venues probably

evolved from its responsibility to protect the emperor whenever he was in

attendance. When he was not there, however, the presence of his personal

soldiers would have served as a reminder to those in the stands that this was an

imperial event, presented under the auspices of their princeps, and that they

were being entertained through his munificence.

The praetorian guard of the Roman empire developed into a multifaceted

unit that not only looked after the personal safety of the emperor, but also

participated in the care of the state. Although the general view has been that

these soldiers merely served as the imperial bodyguard, that notion must be

revised to encompass the many other tasks that this personal army had.

Augustus obviously saw the need to have adequate protection for his principate

in the capital, but he also had a rather large number of soldiers whom he had to
 234

organize after Actium, and he must have realized very quickly that such a force

needed to be kept occupied if he was to maintain control. As a result, the

utilization of the praetorians branched out into other areas of administration

where their presence could be advantageous, both to the emperor and to the city,

and where the benevolence of the princeps could be promulgated. Yet it must

have been obvious to the citizens of Rome, with so many soldiers engaged in a

wide variety of tasks, that the principate was, in reality, nothing other than a

military dictatorship. The guard existed for the protection of the emperor and,

through him, for the benefit of the state, but it always presented a threat of force,

and that formed the basis of imperial rule.

 235

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Timpe (1962): D. Timpe, Untersuchungen zur Kontinuitat desfruhen Prinzipats

(Wiesbaden, 1962)

Toynbee (1971): J.M.C. Toynbee, Death and Burial in the Roman World (New
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Tuplin (1987): C.J. Tuplin, "The false Drusus of AD 31 and the fall of
Sejanus", Latomus 46 (1987), 781-805

Vermeule (1968): C.C. Vermeule, Roman Imperial Art in Greece and Asia Minor
(Cambridge, 1968)

Vessey (1971): D.W.T.C. Vessey, "Thoughts on Tacitus' portrayal of Claudius",

AJPh 92 (1971), 385-409
 254

Veyne (1976): P. Veyne, Le Pain et le Cirque (Paris, 1976), translated by Brian

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(1910), 73-100

Villers (1950): R. Villers, "La devolution du principat dans la famille

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Vogel (1973): L. Vogel, The Column of Antoninus Pius (Cambridge, 1973)

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 255

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(Cambridge, 1977)
 256

Woodman (1975): A.J. Woodman, "Questions of date, genre and style in

Velleius: some literary answers", CQ 25 (1975), 272-306

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Tacitus Ann. 4.57-4.67", CQ 22 (1972), 150-58

Woodman & Martin (1996): A.J. Woodman & R.H. Martin, The Annals of
Tacitus, Book 3 (Cambridge, 1996)

Yavetz (1969): Z. Yavetz, Plebs and Princeps (London, 1969)

Zehnacker (1987): Hubert Zehnacker, "Tensions et contradictions dans l'Empire

au l e r siecle. Les temoignages numismatiques", in Opposition et
Resistances a l'Empire d'Auguste a Trajan, edited by Adalberto
Giovannini (Geneva, 1987), 321-358
 257

Appendix 1
The Sources for the Julio-Claudian Period

References to the praetorian guard in sources for the period of the Julio-

Claudians are not numerous. The scarcity may be simply explained: by the time

that the authors were writing, the presence of the guard in Rome had become

commonplace and its activities not noteworthy. Moreover, since it was the

personalities that attracted the attention of the authors, we have greater

knowledge of men such as Sejanus and Burrus than of the soldiers they

commanded.

The problems of sources for the first century AD have been well

documented and only a brief overview need be made here. 1 The three main

authors for the period - Tacitus, Suetonius, and Cassius Dio - clearly made use of

those writers who had lived during the reigns of the early emperors, but the

extent of the debt to each is difficult to ascertain, especially since it is only rarely

that a named citation is provided. The praetorians appear in all three of these

authors, to varying degrees, but the references often are incidental, most

commonly in passages which record events directly connected with the emperor.

It is rare that a passage deals only with the praetorians. 2 Other sources such as

Josephus, the younger Seneca, and the elder Pliny provide occasional glimpses

1
See, for example, Syme (1958), passim; Baldwin (1983), passim; Millar (1964), passim.

2
One such exception is the background provided by Tacitus concerning the construction of the
Castra Praetoria, but even there, his focus is more on the character of Sejanus than the guard
itself; cf. Annals 4.2.1.
 258

into the workings of the guard, but without much comment on the significance of

the praetorians in the events that they narrate, ft is also the case that previous

reigns suffered from negative propaganda put out by the new regime, and the

praetorians often were caught in this backlash. 3

The reigns of the individual emperors each had their own historians, but

most of these works are lost.4 Of those we have, Augustus' autobiographical Res

Gestae does not mention the guard at all, though it is possible that general

references to milites included the praetorians. 5 The absence from the text of such

an important event as the establishment of the guard probably results from

Augustus' attempts to downplay the character of his personal troops, evident as

well in his reluctance to locate all of the cohorts in Rome initially. Velleius

Paterculus, who wrote a concise history of Rome published in AD 30, includes

the reigns of Augustus and of Tiberius to the date of publication, but the guard

does not figure at all, though the second book contains a lengthy section on

Sejanus.6 Velleius tends to concentrate on individuals rather than comprehensive

3
For example, rumours after the fire of AD 64 placed the guard in an unfavourable light. Dio
records that the soldiers stopped people from rescuing their belongings, but it is likely that these
actions were actually part of measures intended to halt the advance of the fire. Cf. Dio 62.17.1. See
above, "The Guard in Civil Administration", 186.

4
For the reign of Tiberius, for example, we know of works by Aufidius Bassus and Servilius
Nonianus, but nothing remains of their histories, and they are not cited in the works that we
have.

5
Cf. Passerini (1939), 210.

6
Histories 2.126-31. On the question of whether the discussion of the prefect shows Velleius to be
an adherent of Sejanus, or is rather a justification of Tiberius' treatment of him, cf. Woodman
(1977), 247-48. See also Sumner (1970), 257-298; Hellegouarc'h (1980), 148-51; Hennig (1975), 133-
34; Syme (1986), 436.
 259

discussion of events, but the absence of the praetorians in the section on the

prefect is surprising, especially the omission of any reference to their

concentration of the praetorians into a single camp, one of the most significant

events in the principate of Tiberius, and in the career of Sejanus. Velleius is

usually overlooked in any assessment of the reign of Tiberius, however, because

of his positive portrayal of the emperor.

For the reigns of the remaining Julio-Claudian emperors, the works of

contemporary historians are completely lost, though it is thought that their

histories would have provided details for later accounts of the period. One of

these first-century historians is Marcus Cluvius Rufus, who narrated the events

of the period from Caligula to Nero, and who may have been present at the

assassination of Caligula. 7 His contemporary, Fabius Rusticus, is another whose

name is preserved, though we know very little about the work that he produced.

He, along with Cluvius Rufus, is cited by Tacitus, as is the elder Pliny. 8 Biases

which would have been present in these authors, for example, as a result of

personal friendships or animosity, no doubt were reproduced in the later works,

though it is almost always impossible to distinguish these tendencies. One such

instance concerns the rumour that Burrus was to be replaced by Gaius Caecina

Tuscus; according to Tacitus, the story originated with Fabius Rusticus, who

7
Barrett (1990), 168-69.
8
See Tacitus, Annals 13.19-21; 14.2.1-2; 15.61.2.
 260

wanted to emphasize the role that Seneca had played in the prefect retaining his

position, since Seneca and Rusticus were friends. 9

We do possess some writings from later in the Julio-Claudian period,

though these are not histories. The younger Seneca was closely associated with

the reign of Nero and a prolific writer, but references to contemporary history in

his letters and essays make no mention of the guard for the most part. The Jewish

historian Josephus was in Rome during the reign of Nero, but his greatest

contribution to the history of the Julio-Claudian period, namely the detailed

report of the assassination of Caligula, is a confusing pastiche of detail. 10 He

does provide some information about the praetorians and their role in the event,

but it is difficult to discern the chronology of, and general reaction to, the

murder.

Without question, the best account of the Julio-Claudian emperors comes

from Tacitus, who was writing in the early part of the second century AD. His

history covered the period from the accession of Tiberius to the end of the reign

of Nero, though the loss of the concluding portion of the work means that we do

not know the exact end point. The last part of the reign of Tiberius, all of that of

Caligula, and the beginning portion of the principate of Claudius are missing.

9
Ibid, 13.20.2. See above, "The Guard in Civil Administration", 218-219.

10
Barrett (1990), 173. Josephus would have made use of the histories of the period that were
available to him, and it is probably his lack of synthesis of this material that accounts for the
garbled version. On his sources, see Wiseman (1991), xii-xiii.
 261

Despite his claim of impartiality, bias is evident in Tacitus' work, in particular,

his dislike of the corruption which he saw imbued the principate, and his account

of events should always be considered in light of this prejudice. 11

The praetorians appear in Tacitus' work in conjunction with various

events throughout the period, though often only in passing. Given the interest of

the historian in portraying the events of the early principate in a harsh light, it is

perhaps surprising that more was not made of the role of the emperor's personal

guard as an instrument of the state. It is impossible to know how much

prominence they might have had in the works of his sources. Tacitus gives very

few citations and it is often difficult to assess his reliance on their work. One

place where we are provided with names of sources concerns the praetorian

prefects in the reign of Nero. Tacitus reports two variations concerning the

loyalty of Burrus when Agrippina was charged with inciting revolution: Fabius

Rusticus recorded that Burrus was to be replaced, but Tacitus notes that neither

the elder Pliny nor Cluvius Rufus mention the uncertainty about the prefect's

loyalty. 12 More often, however, there is no acknowledgment of the individual

11
The claim to impartiality is found in Annals 1.1.6: hide consilium mini pauca de Augusto et extrema
tradere, mox Tiberii principatum et cetera, sine ira atque studio, quorum causas procul habeo.

12
Tacitus, Annals 13.20.1. Cf. Syme (1958), 289-90. Other places where authors are cited for the
reign of Nero include the question of incest between Agrippina and Nero {Annals 14.2.2), and
events of the Pisonian conspiracy (Annals 15.53.4; 61.3).
works consulted, though there must have been variations in Tacitus' sources on

numerous occasions. 13

Tacitus also used primary sources of information such as the senatorial

archives, collections of speeches, memoirs, and eyewitness accounts. 14 One place

where there may be vestiges of an oral tradition concerns the Pisonian

conspiracy. The historian is well informed about the activities of the praetorian

officers who were involved in the plot, and especially the role of Subrius Flavus;

he provides the exact words Flavus replied to Nero when he was asked why he

had joined the conspiracy. 15 Still, there are sometimes major gaps in the

information that Tacitus provides, and one in particular concerns the guard,

namely the increase in the number of cohorts from nine to twelve, which seems

to have been associated with the construction of the Castra Praetoria. 16

A different sort of examination of the Julio-Claudian period is provided

by Suetonius, who also published in the early second century. 17 His positions in

13
Despite Tacitus' claim that he would provide individual sources where they vary, he does not
follow through with his promise; cf. Annals 13.20.2: /70s consensum auctorum secuturi, quae diversa
prodiderint sub nominibus ipsorum trademus. Elsewhere Tacitus refers to scriptores and auctores,
always in the plural, and without further reference. Cf. Walker (1952), 139. It has been argued
that the reason for the inclusion of the names in the Neronian books is that this section was never
revised by Tacitus; cf. Griffin (1984), 235; Syme (1958), 291, note 4.

14
Syme (1958), 280-86. On the use of memoirs, see Barrett (1996), 198.

15
Tacitus, Amials 15.67.2. Syme (1958), 300 suggests that the information may have come from
friends or family.
16
See above, "Tiberius", 43-47.

17
For the date, cf. Mottershead (1986), ix.
 263

government under Trajan and Hadrian gave him access to archival materials

such as letters and poems/though it is not clear how thoroughly he used them. 18

Suetonius wrote biography rather than history. 19 The Lives, therefore, focus more

on the individual's actions in events than on the events themselves. The author

tended to group together details in a broad framework without regard for

chronology. 20 As a result, references to the guard are extremely scarce, and

usually appear only by chance, though sometimes they are frustratingly

tantalizing. 21

Another historian vital to our understanding of the Tulio-Claudian period

is Cassius Dio, who composed his work in the early third century. 22 Dio

provides many details, though often not much analysis of the events he records.

He is especially important for his account of the reign of Caligula because of the

lacuna in Tacitus, though some of Dio's account - including the final year of

18
For his career, see Baldwin (1983), 1-65. Suetonius served as a studiis, a bibliothetis, and ab
epistulis, probably from 113-122. Cf. Mottershead (1986), vii-ix. One place where Suetonius clearly
had made use of the archival information available to him concerns the fall of Sejanus, for he
refers to the explanation of the event given by Tiberius in his autobiography; cf. Tiberius 61.1.

19
On ancient biography in Rome, see Baldwin (1983), 66-100. As with the historians, ascertaining
the sources which he may have used is difficult; in the Lives from Tiberius to Domitian, only five
writers are cited, though it is thought that he also would have made use of Fabius Rusticus,
Cluvius Rufus and the elder Pliny for those lives which their works covered. Cf. Mottershead
(1986), xii; Hurley (1993), viii.

20
Mottershead (1986), xii; Hurley (1993), v.
21
See, for example, Suetonius, Tiberius 60: two incidents concerning guard members which
occurred on Capri and which defy logical explanation. Cf. above, "Tiberius", 51, note 56.

22
Dio was consul in AD 229, and completed his history shortly thereafter.
 264

Caligula's principate - exists only in epitomes from the Byzantine period. 23 It is

simply impossible to ascertain which sources were used for the section on the

Julio-Claudians, though it is thought that Dio must have known both Tacitus and

Suetonius, among others. 24 The guard is mentioned frequently by him, and he

provides general information about the praetorians that is extremely useful in

any examination of their history: details about their strength, numbers, and pay.

The praetorians figured more prominently in the Julio-Claudian period

than might be surmised from a preliminary reading of the extant sources. While

this lack of detail in the sources can be explained partly by the date at which the

authors were writing - the guard having become firmly entrenched in Roman

society by the end of the first century AD - a reluctance to promote the activities

of such a unit which, by its very existence in Rome, represented the change from

the republic to the imperial system may also help to explain why the praetorians

are not given as much attention as might have been expected for the emperor's

personal guard. The loss of the account of Tacitus for the murder of Caligula is

one of the most troublesome gaps in the history of the praetorians, for the

motivation and execution of the plot is not well documented in the extant

sources. Other events that are not mentioned at all leave us with questions

23
On these Byzantine epitomators, cf. Millar (1964), 1-4.
24
On Dio's sources in general, see Millar (1964), 34-38. Syme (1958), 690 argues that Tacitus was
"at the best, a subsidiary source for Dio", and that Suetonius was not used at all. Most scholars
attribute the similarities in the three authors to their use of common sources; cf. Barrett (1996),
204; Griffin (1984), 235. For a detailed comparison of Dio's and Tacitus' use of sources, specific to
the year AD 33, see Syme (1983).
 265

regarding intent and public reaction to them, such as the increase in the number

of cohorts under Tiberius, or the early history of the unit under Augustus. The

gaps in the knowledge of the guard can be partly filled by inscriptional evidence,

though the late date of most of this material means that it is of limited use in

assessing careers of the praetorians in the 1st century AD. Chance references in

authors such as Juvenal and Plutarch also provides some information, but even

putting together all the fragmentary evidence, we are left without much of an

idea of how the guard was received in the city. It was the nature of the principate

to maintain an aura of secrecy concerning several aspects of the workings of the

state, and details about the praetorians may have been concealed from the

beginning, such as their role in political executions. Although the soldiers must

have been a constant presence in Rome as they gained more and more

responsibility in civil administration, and their reputation no doubt extended far

beyond the walls of Rome, our knowledge of them in the Julio-Claudian period

is limited to scant references scattered throughout the sources.

 266

Appendix 2
Republican Terms for the Praetorian Cohort

SOURCE DATE COMMANDER TERM USED

Uvy 2.20.5 c496 Postumius cohorti suae

Livy 29.1.1 205 Scipio Africanus trecentos iuvenes

Appian, Hisp 84 134 Scipio Aemilianus \kr\v (pitaov

Appian, BCiv 1.25 122 Gaius Gracchus •0710 TCGV covGeuevcov

5optxpopo'6nevoc,

Sallust, BJ 98.1 106 Marius turma sua

Cicero, In Verrem 70 Verres de sua cohorte; ex

passim cohorte praetoria;
cohorti praetoriae

Sallust, Cat. 60.5 63 Petreius cohortem praetoriam

Cicero, Ad Q. f. 59 Q. Cicero ex cohorte praetoris

1.1.12

Caesar, BG 1.40; 58 Caesar praetoriam cohortem

1.42

Catullus 10.10 57 C. Mummius nee praetoribus. .. nee

cohorti

Cicero, Ad Fam. 51 Cicero cohorte praetoria

15.4.7

Cicero, Ad A tt. 50 Cicero cohortis praetoriae

7.2.3

Caesar, BC 1.75 49 Petreius praetoria cohorte

Cicero, Ad Att. 45 Caesar a militibus

13.52
 267

SOURCE DATE COMMANDER TERM USED

Suetonius, Divus ? Caesar custodias Hispanorum

Iulius 86

Appian, BCiv 44 Antony eiq cupopufiv (ppcopocq

3.40 7iA,eiovo<;

Appian, BCiv 44 Octavian ec, ixovriv xoi) ocofxaxoq

3.40 q)t)^aKT)V

Appian, BCiv 44 Antony oxpaxriyiSa airetpav

3.45

Appian, BCiv 44 Antony xou cconotxoq (ppot>pa

3.46

Appian, BCiv 43 Antony 1) arcetpocv (3aoiA,iKfiv

3.52 2) ai8ripo(popoiovxe(;
avSpeq eSop-ocpopouv

Appian, BCiv 43 Octavian, Antony, oi)v xouq oxpctxTyyicn

4.7 Lepidus x&^ecn

Cicero, Ad Fam. 43 Antony cohortis praetorias duas

10.30

Appian, BCiv 43 Octavian oxpocxr|Yi8a xd^iv

3.66

Appian, BCiv 43 Antony axpccxr|Yi.<; xa^iq

3.67

Appian, BCiv 43 Octavian CTXpaxTiYi-9 T] Kocioccpcx;

3.69

Appian, BCiv 43 Octavian fiCTXpaxriYK;f| Kcaoapoq

3.70 arcaaa

Appian, BCiv 43 D. Brutus cj(0)xaxo(pt)^aKcov

3.97 i7t7I£(OV KeA/ctov
 268

SOURCE DATE COMMANDER TERM USED

Horace, Satires 43 D. Brutus cohortem

1.7.23-5

Appian, BCiv 42 Octavian ec, oxpaxriyiSaq

5.3 Antony T&^£i<;

Appian, BCiv 42 Octavian axpaxriYiSa CT7tetpav

4.115

Appian, BCiv 41 Octavian jtepi at>xov a i

5.24 crxpaxriYi8e<;

Appian, BCiv 41 Octavian at>v xocu; axpaxriYicn

5.34 CTTtetpaiq

Appian, BCiv 41 L. Antonius <yoA,A,£Y6|xevo<;

5.18;20 cppcropav xcp odojxaxi

Appian, BCiv 41 Octavian 8ia xr|V ocpxfiv

5.21 8op-0(popo\)(i,evov

Appian, BCiv 40 Antony axpaxriyiSei; at>xot>

5.59 xd^Eiq

Plutarch, 36 Antony xpetc, oxpaxTiYiSai;

Antony 39 oTtetpaiq

Appian, BCiv 36 Antony Xi^ioiq X,OYaci

5.95 cco(j,axo(p\)X,a^iv

Plutarch, 35 Antony SvCTXi^iotx; eiq

axpaxtiYiKotq a7teTpoc<;
Antony 53
Messalla cohors
Tibullus 1.3 31-29
Octavian absque cohortibus
Orosius 6.19.8 31 quinque praetoriis
 269

Appendix 3
The Castra Praetoria

The effective of the praetorian cohorts has caused much controversy. Dio

records that they were milliary in his catalogue of the troops under Augustus. 1

But, because the same passage also refers to ten cohorts, which is in conflict with

the nine cohorts listed by Tacitus, the evidence for their strength has been

dismissed. 2 Yet, further proof that the praetorians were organized into units of a

thousand men may be found in the archaeological remains of the Castra

Praetoria, built by Tiberius in the early AD 20s, which housed not only the guard

but also the urban cohorts under the Julio-Claudians.

Tacitus records that Tiberius constructed the camp for the praetorians at

the urging of Sejanus.3 Since the building record of Tiberius was not extensive

and the Castra Praetoria was a major undertaking, the need for the intervention

of the prefect is understandable. The reason given by Sejanus for the

concentration of the guard into a single location was the improvement of

discipline. The billetting of the soldiers throughout the city and surrounding area

by Augustus had become impractical, since the responsibilities of the praetorians

required that they be able to receive orders as a unit. As a result, by early in the

reign of Tiberius, it appears that most of the cohorts had been moved into Rome,

1
Dio 55.24.6

2
Tacitus, Annals 4.5.3. See, for example, Durry (1938), 36. But, cf. above, "Tiberius", 43.

3
Tacitus, Annals 4.2.1. See above, "Tiberius", 41-42.
though they continued to be scattered throughout the capital. 4 Although ulterior

motives have been attributed to Sejanus for the construction of the camp, namely

that it would allow him to have greater control in the city, it is more likely that

the report of problems -with discipline, and the inefficiency of commanding such

a large force scattered throughout Rome, provides the real reason for the

construction of the camp. The increase in the number of cohorts is probably also

associated with the decision to concentrate them in one place.

Our knowledge of the Castra Praetoria itself is fragmentary, though the

remains are fairly well preserved. 5 The excavations have shown that the camp

changed very little in its 300-year history. The camp is usually described as a

fortress built on a legionary pattern, but the evidence shows that this is not

accurate. 6 In the first century, a standardized plan for legionary fortresses had

not yet been fully developed, but even so, the design of the Castra Praetoria was

unique and its plan had no precedent, nor was it copied. 7 Despite the difficulty

of excavation, the overall plan can be traced from scattered building remains,

4
Cf. above, "Augustus", 26-27.
5
The reason for the lack of cohesive excavation of the camp is that the area is still a military zone
today, and therefore much work has been restricted to salvage excavation. See, most recently,
Richardson (1992), 78-79.

6
Cf. Nash (1961), 221; Platner and Ashby (1965), 106: "The camp was constructed on the usual
Roman m o d e l . . . "
7
On the development of a fortress plan in the first century, see Johnson (1983), 222-290.
 271

road surfaces and drains which ran down the centre of the streets, though the

north end of the camp remains relatively unexcavated. 8

Situated on one of the highest points around the city, the Castra Praetoria

was carefully located to guard the northern approaches to Rome. The circuit wall

is roughly rectangular in shape, with gates on each of the four sides perhaps

intended to evoke triumphal arches. 9 It is clear that the walls were not expected

to withstand attack, for not only are their battlements not conducive to defense,

but there is no ditch system in place. 10 The size of the camp is rather small, but

the emphasis everywhere is on maximizing the number of soldiers that could be

housed there. 11 Though the plan of the interior is far from complete, what has

been excavated allows some interpretation of the number of the guard and its

organization. The layout of the interior space is not at all like legionary camps of

the first century. The Castra Praetoria is divided by four major streets along its

north-south axis into five distinct areas, and is dominated by two rows of barrack

blocks, the remains of which run almost the entire length of the camp. A narrow

strip down the centre of the camp contains structures arranged around central

8
For the plan, see figure 9. Claudius issued coins that depict a stylized exterior of the camp; see
figure 4.

9
Blake (1959), 15.

10
Ibid, 14. The camp was intended to evoke a strong military fortress but was not built with
defense as a priority.
11
The area of the camp is 16.72 hectares. A typical legionary fortress was 20-25 hectares. Cf.
Johnson (1983), 31.
 272

courts and impluvia (A on the plan); these perhaps are centurions' quarters, since

there are no large living spaces attached to the barracks themselves. 12 There is no

structure that clearly can be identified as the principia, nor is there evidence for

such buildings as the praetorium, hospital, fabrica, or baths. 13 The absence of these

typically large buildings is not surprising since the camp was situated so close to

Rome, but the implications for the amount of space that could be saved and thus

used for housing more troops are important.

One area for which we have evidence is at the major north-south, east-

west intersection where the Shrine of the Standards probably was located. A

large amount of votive materials was found, which seems to indicate the

existence of an area of ritual significance, although there is no indication of a

principia here, as would be expected (B on the plan). As well, we know from

literary evidence that there was a prison in the camp, used for holding

defendants, or those condemned to execution. 14 There was also an armoury; in

AD 69, the praetorians overreacted to the removal of arms at night by one of

12
Similar structures were uncovered at the extreme northwest end of the camp, although they
were not completely excavated. The absence of evidence of housing for the tribunes and the
prefects is easily explained by the proximity to Rome; it is likely that they had quarters in the city.

13
Josephus (A] 18.228) records that, when Agrippa was being held prisoner in the camp, he was
allowed to go out to use the baths: KCCI KataXaPcbv ev e^oSon; ovxa ['Aypi7t7tav] eiq to paXavetov.
This seems to suggest that there was no such structure in the Castra Praetoria itself, and that the
amenities of Rome were used instead. It is also unclear where the games celebrating the
anniversary of the accession of Claudius were held, since there does not appear to be an area
large enough for such an event within the walls of the camp. It is possible that the event occurred
in the campus which was adjacent to the camp.

14
See above, "The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit", 152.
 273

their tribunes, Varius Crispinus, who had been assigned to provide weapons to

the 17th urban cohort which had been ordered to move to Rome from Ostia. 15 A

structure located in the southeastern corner of the camp, usually identified as a

granary, may well be this armoury, for its design better suits the storage of

weapons (C on the plan). 16 The remains of the building consist of eight semi-

subterranean cells, which had doubled walls to guard against damp, and also

had opus signinum floors. These cells open onto a hall which leads to a stairway at

the east end. The layout of the building and its location in the camp lends

support to the idea that this is, in fact, not a granary at all, but the armoury

mentioned by Tacitus. 17

Scholars have used the small size of the camp as evidence that the cohorts

housed within were quingenary. 18 The archaeological evidence for the barracks,

however, reveals that some of these were two-storeyed structures (D on the

plan), and led at least one scholar to the conclusion, on the basis of this evidence

alone, that the praetorian cohorts were milliary from their inception. 19 These

15
Tacitus, Histories 1.80. Cf. also 1.38. Two inscriptions also mention this building: CIL 6.999;
6.2725.
16
Granary: The Carta Archaeologica di Roma Tavola III identifies building C as a granary, as does
Caronna (1993), 253. Since Rome was so nearby, it is unlikely that bulk storage of grain would
even be necessary.

17
Movement of grain into such a storage space would be very difficult because of the stairway
and the narrow hall, and the structure itself is placed away from the gates, which would make
transport more problematic.

18
See, for example, Durry (1938), 47; Le Bohec (1994), 21.
19
Richmond (1927), 13. The barracks, oriented north-south, formed two rows of vaulted cells.
Evidence of stairways at regular intervals was found. Cf. Caronna (1993), 253. Since the
 . 2 7 4

barracks are restricted to the western portion of the camp, where there is

evidence to suggest two rows of them oriented north-south. The majority of the

barracks in the camp, however, are single storey, though these too are peculiar in

that they were built back-to-back and without the typical storage area which one

associates with legionary contubernia. The design was obviously intended to

maximize troop numbers within a small amount of space. The unusual method

of construction of the circuit wall also provides evidence for the strength of the

cohorts housed within, and has not been adequately considered in any

discussion of the effective. The walls of the Castra Praetoria, unlike any other

camp at the time and not seen again until the later empire, were designed with

cells for the soldiers. Excavation of the rooms uncovered decorated plaster walls

with black and white floors.20

It must be asked why there were two different methods of housing the

troops in the Castra Praetoria, and why the design for the lodging was unique.

Since the camp could have been expanded, it was not entirely a question of

space. Most likely the need to downplay the number of soldiers kept near the

city, most of whom formed the emperor's personal guard, provides the reason. 21

excavations were carried out towards the end of the 19th century and reports are sketchy, the
exact location of the barracks is not fixed with any certainty. Other double-storeyed barrack
blocks are found in the quarters of the vigiles in Ostia, dating to the reign of Hadrian, and in the
Castra Nova in Rome which housed the equites singulares, dating to the reign of Severus; cf.
Hermansen (1981), 224; Speidel (1994), 128.

20
Richmond (1927), 106. The dimensions of the rooms, at 23.6 square metres, are well within the
range of legionary contubernia; see Caronna (1993), 253.
21
Richmond (1927), 13.
 275

It could also be the case that the different style of barracks divided the praetorian

and urban cohorts, a practical consideration given the distinct commands and

responsibilities of the troops. An examination of the distribution of soldiers in

the camp shows that it is likely that the urban cohorts were quartered in the two-

storeyed barrack blocks, while the praetorians occupied the remaining areas.

Moreover, the numbers of men that each area could hold provides evidence for

the cohorts of both units to have been milliary from the beginning. The best-

preserved single-storey barrack contains 34 contubernia. At eight men per room,

each block would house 272 men. From what has been excavated thus far, there

is enough evidence to suggest that there were at least 30 of these blocks, for a

total of 8,160 men. The four shorter barrack blocks in the southeast of the camp

would hold approximately 204 men each, for a total of 816 men. The two-storey

barracks revealed at least 104 contubernia per floor; if one assumes another

similar group to the west of these, the total is 3,328 men. In addition, there were

82 cells in the north wall and 87 in the east wall. Given an equal number in the

south and west walls, with nine more in the corners, the total number of

contubernia in the walls is 347, or 2,776 men. Therefore, the number of soldiers

that could be housed in the camp was approximately 15,000. Thus, the strength

of each of the praetorian and urban cohorts was closer to 1,000 men than the 500

postulated in the past, probably averaging 800 soldiers per cohort. 22

22
The effective of the urban cohorts is uncertain, but Fries (1967), 38-42 put it at either five
hundred or 1500 men per cohort.
 276

Appendix 4
Confinement and Executions

The following is a list of arrests, confinements or executions in which the

guard may have taken part which are additional to those given in the section on

confinement and executions above ("The Guard as a Specialized Military Unit",

142-175). In most, there is no mention of the praetorians in the sources, but given

the severity of the cases and the prominence of those accused, it is likely that

they were involved.

Augustus

Aulus Terentius Varro Murena - executed for allegedly plotting against

Augustus (Tacitus, Annals 1.10.5)

Marcus Egnatius Rufus - executed for allegedly plotting against Augustus

(Tacitus, Annals 1.10.5)

lullus Antonius - executed (or persuaded to commit suicide) for adultery with
Julia, daughter of Augustus (Tacitus, Annals 1.10.5; 4.44.3; Dio 55.10.15)

Tiberius

Vibius Serenus - brought back from exile to stand trial for treason; slaves
tortured; after trial, returned to exile (Tacitus, Annals 4.28-30)

Lygdus and Eudemus - slaves who were tortured for evidence regarding the
death of Drusus (Tacitus, Annals 4.11.2; cf. Suetonius, Tiberius 62.1)

Votienus Montanus - charged with slander; the tribune of the fourth praetorian
cohort was one of the witnesses; Montanus was banished (Tacitus, Annals
4.42.1-2)

Cremutius Cordus - charged with seditious writing, but thought to have

 277

fallen because he incurred the wrath of Sejanus; forced to commit suicide

(Seneca, Cons. adMarcia 1.2; 22.4-7; Tacitus, Annals 4.34-5; Suetonius,
Tiberius 61.3; Dio 57.24.2-3)

Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus - charged with treason; forced to commit suicide

(Tacitus, Annals 6.9.2-4; Dio 58.24.4)

Publius Pomponius - imprisoned and maltreated for treason (Tacitus, Annals

5.8.1; Dio 59.6.2)

miscellaneous victims - held in prison and denied contact with others

(Suetonius, Tiberius 61 A)

Caligula

Avillius Flaccus - former prefect of Egypt; exiled to Andros in 38; assassins sent
to kill him a year later (Philo, in Flaccum 185-91)

Anteius - exiled by Caligula; assassins sent to kill him shortly thereafter

(Josephus, A] 19.125)

Claudius

Gaius Appius Silanus - manipulated by Messalina and Narcissus, he was charged

with plotting to kill the emperor and executed (Suetonius, Claudius 37.2;
Dio 60.14.3-4)

Poppaea Sabina - destroyed by Messalina, she was threatened with imprisonment

and forced to suicide (Tacitus, Annals 11.2.2)

Julia Livilla - sister of Agrippina destroyed by Messalina (and/or Claudius); she

was exiled (? to Pandateria), and starved to death (Dio 60.27.4; Suetonius,
Claudius 29.1)

Nero

Decimus Junius Silanus Torquatus - charged with plotting revolution; his

slaves were arrested and he was forced to commit suicide (Tacitus,
Annals 15.35; Dio 62.27.1)
 278

Figure 1

Sestertius issued by Augustus

Three standards with the legend COHOR. [PRAETORIARUM] PHIL.

Figure 2

Denarius of Antony.
The coin honours his praetorian cohorts and shows a legionary aquila between
two standards, with the legend C(0)HORTIUM PRAETORIARUM.
 279

Figure 3

Sestertius of Caligula.
On the reverse, the emperor, bareheaded and wearing a toga, stands on a
platform and addresses five soldiers, who hold between them four standards.
The legend reads ADLOCUT. COH.

Figure 4

Aureus of Claudius.
On the reverse, the praetorian camp; above, shrine containing military standar
and image of Fides, seated. The legend reads IMPER. RECEPT.
 280

Figure 5

Aureus of Claudius.
The emperor clasping the hand of a sigiiifer of the praetorian guard. The legend
reads PRAETOR. RECEPT.

Figure 6

Sestertius of Nero.
The emperor, escorted bv a horseman, gallops to the right. The legend reads
DECURSIO.
 281

Figure 7

;.•£«£

Sestertius of Nero.
The emperor, accompanied by an officer, stands on a low platform addressing
three praetorians. The legend reads ADLOCUT. COH.

Figure 8

Denarius of Antony.
The coin honours the cohors speculatomm, and shows three identical standards.
The legend reads C(0)HORTIS SPECULATORUM.
 282

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