Domestic Politics and International
Relations
Kim Dong Jung
Korea University
Overview
• Domestic politics and IR
• Domestic politics and foreign policy
• Example: economic cooperation
• Neoclassical realism
Domestic politics and IR
• Structural theories (structural realism, international institutionalism, and
constructivism) consider domestic politics as “black box” or assume states as
unitary actor that is functionally undi erentiated
For parsimonious theorization: Domestic politics vary widely across time and
space
The Cold War context
The dominance of security studies
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Domestic politics and IR
• Need to reconsider the “black box” approach
Rise of issue areas where domestic politics matter, especially IPE
The post Cold War context: US as the only great power. Then, US domestic
politics matter a lot.
Empirical anomalies in structural explanations
We know it’s there: If there are systemic domestic e ects that operate among
states, then failure to examine them leads to a biased analysis
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Domestic politics and foreign policy
• Interest/preference of domestic groups is analytically prior to other factors
Di erent from structural theories that assume homogenous preferences
among states (or assume preferences as given), considers state preferences
(what a state wants) are de ned and rede ned domestically
Foreign policy decisions re ect the preference of and interaction between
societal actors
“states represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose
interests state o cials de ne state preferences and act purposively in world
politics” (Moravcsik)
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Domestic politics and foreign policy
• Key considerations Foreign Policy of
the Government
Domestic groups are engaged in
competition over the resources within the
country
In foreign relations, each tries to ensure Domestic Institutions
that their interests are better represented
in leaders’ decisions than those of others
Interest 1 Interest 2 Interest 3
Institutions (executive and legislative)
mediate domestic interaction, and
leaders respond to stay in o ce Domestic Competition
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Domestic politics and foreign policy
• Domestic interests/actors Foreign Policy of
the Government
Groups within the state have di erent
policy preferences because they are
di erently a ected by government
policies
Domestic Institutions
Foreign policy has domestic distributional
consequences
Interest 1 Interest 2 Interest 3
Some societal actors (those who make
gains) support and others who lose the
policy oppose Domestic Competition
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Domestic politics and foreign policy
• Domestic interests/actors Foreign Policy of
the Government
Some groups “win” in the domestic
competition, or more successfully
in uence (i.e. lobby) the government
Leaders are pushed to follow what the Domestic Institutions
supporters want
Also pursue policies that will enhance Interest 1 Interest 2 Interest 3
their likelihood of retaining o ce
Domestic Competition
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Domestic politics and foreign policy
• Domestic institutions Foreign Policy of
the Government
Determine how policy is chosen
A ect or mediate development of
domestic competition: (i) initiate and set
the agenda, (ii) amend any proposed Domestic Institutions
policy, (iii) ratify or veto policy, and (iv)
propose public referendums
Interest 1 Interest 2 Interest 3
Interactions between executive and
legislative branches
Domestic Competition
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Domestic politics and foreign policy
• Bottom-up process explaining international behavior
What we observe—e.g. degrees of economic openness, size of trade,
nancial ties, etc—is an outcome or equilibrium of interaction between
domestic interests of each country
Shown strength in explaining international economic exchanges (IPE), e.g.
why governments adopt trade barriers or provide subsidies
Security a airs traditionally conducted independent of domestic politics (or
expected to be done so), but domestic politics matter in certain issues
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Domestic politics and foreign policy
• The in uence of domestic interests diverge across countries and over time
State-society relationship: In some parts of the world, or during some periods
of time, state enjoys large degree of autonomy from the society. US was an
example of “weak state, strong society,” while Japan was “strong state, weak
society.” States also likely to enjoy some autonomy during crisis.
Leaders can mobilize interests, rather than functioning as simple agents
Multiple interests of individuals/groups: Division within the country might not
be determined by one issue. Competitors in one area can be partners in
another. In some countries, domestic cleavages might be more clear-cut than
in others.
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Example: economic cooperation
• Milner on international economic cooperation
Cooperation among nations is a ected less by fears of other countries’
relative gains or cheating than it is by the domestic distributional
consequences of cooperative endeavors
Cooperative agreements create winners and losers domestically, and
therefore they generate supporters and opponents.
The internal struggle between these groups—mediated by domestic
institutions—shapes the possibility and nature of international cooperative
agreements.
Cooperation is a continuation of domestic political struggles by other means.
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Example: economic cooperation
• Sino-US trade war
Agreement that open trade increases overall wealth of the country; US
promotion of open trade
Yet, distributional consequences within the country: American labor (low- and
semi-skilled) loses over time, while capital, land, and high-skilled labor gains
Economists and pro-open trade leaders explained it as a consequence of
technological development (i.e. automation) rather than trade with the
developing economies, but controversies continued
Example: economic cooperation
• Sino-US trade war
Leaders to remain in o ce respond to interest group politics
Low- and semi-skilled labor=large # of votes
Negative consequences of inter-industry trade:“China is stealing American
jobs” as a powerful political slogan
China’s currency policy, treatment of intellectual property rights, and large
trade imbalances further strengthened the case against China
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Example: economic cooperation
• Sino-US trade war
Trump campaigned on this logic in 2016 (“Rust Belt”)
Yet, a perspective shared by both sides of the aisle
Divergence in magnitude and content of response, but all US administrations
have problematized trade with China and prescribed active political
measures
TPP failed in important part because of American labor’s protest. Biden
couldn’t advance a new open trade arrangement
Trump now
Neoclassical realism
• For many realism-oriented scholars,
Systemic stimuli à Foreign policy
Neoclassical realism
• For neoclassical realists, this approach is problematic:
States frequently do not recognize systemic stimuli correctly or fail to
mobilize resources to respond
Decision makers often do not respond rationally (and optimally) to external
stimuli
The external condition (threats and opportunities) might not be so clear
Neoclassical realism
• Neoclassical realists agree with structural realists that states construct their
foreign security policies primarily with an eye to the threats and
opportunities that arise in the international system
Since survival is at stake, the incentives are high for states to focus on
external stimuli and craft foreign policies to respond to them appropriately
Nonetheless, they reject the implication that states necessarily respond as
uidly to changing international circumstances
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Neoclassical realism
• Supplement structural realist theory with domestic variables
Account for why states respond inconsistently (not consistent with the
predictions of structural realism) with systemic imperatives, even when those
imperatives are signi cantly clear
Focus on domestic politics to account for variations in state responses
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Neoclassical realism
• Schweller’s argument on aggression and balancing
Neoclassical realism
• Snyder’s theory of
overexpansion
Neoclassical realism
• A neoclassical realist model of foreign policy (Ripsman 2011)