Small Arms Survey

A Heavy Hand The Use of Force by India’s Police

Author(s): Sonal Marwah
Small Arms Survey (2012)
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 INDIA ARMED VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT

Issue Brief
Number 3 August 2012

A Heavy Hand
The Use of Force by India’s Police

There are many circumstances in Indian law grants extraordinary Any democratic society experiences,
which the use of force by the police is discretionary powers of arrest to to varying degrees, tension between
considered a legitimate action. police officers. the need for safeguards by the police
Indeed, even in a democratic society, Although there is no independent and safeguards from the police.
police are distinguished by their legal data available on police violence Order and liberty are both essential.
authority to use force to coerce citizens and abuses, frequent use of force An authoritarian state can have
(Klockars, 1985). Given the high poten­­ is demonstrated by the occurrence virtually complete order without
tial for the police to abuse force, of encounter killings1—a severe liberty, but it is impossible to have
checks and balances are needed to symptom of police malfeasance. liberty without a minimum degree
minimize the use of force and make The most important reforms for con­ of order enforcement. Democratic
officers accountable when they resort trolling the misuse of force by the societies seek to avoid the extremes
to it. police have come from the 1993 Na­­­ of both anarchy and repression
India has approximately 2.4 million tional Human Rights Commission. (Manning, 2010). The police in India
men and women in official policing Incidents of excessive use of force are faced with a similar challenge.
(IISS, 2011; NCRB, 2011). Their work is by police are unlikely to be The need for coercive policing to
regulated by the Indian Constitution, addressed until major reforms in maintain order has been a constant
by statute and case law, and by the the criminal justice system are put theme of Indian rule (Rai, 1999).
internal rules and procedures that in place. Skewed economic development
regulate the use of force and govern
the circumstances in which official
violence is permissible. But there is
growing consensus within India that
police reform should be elevated on
the national agenda.

The key findings of this Issue Brief are:

Police are not sufficiently trained

to deal with violence and chal­
lenges to their authority. Their sal­
aries are low, with few perks,
which helps foster a culture of
corruption.
Reported incidents of police firing
on civilians rose from 791 in 2004
to 1,421 in 2010. The number of
civilians killed in these incidents
fell, but reported injuries grew.
Police officers salute during a wreath laying ceremony for a police officer killed by unidentified gunmen in Srinagar,
April 2012.  © AFP Photo/Tauseef Mustafa

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 generates feelings of neglect, exclu­ Section 144 permits the issuing of a police officer knowing of a
sion, and injustice, which commonly directions to members of the public to design to commit any cognizable
bring people onto the streets to abstain from certain acts which may offense may arrest ... the person so
protest. Demonstrations against cause ‘a disturbance of public tran­ designing, if it appears to the police
government policies, rallies against quility, or a riot, or an affray’ (Ratanlal officer that the commissioning of
development projects, and frequent and Dhirajlal, 2006). These legal pro­ the offense cannot be otherwise
sectarian, caste, and communal riots visions thus provide a wide array of prevented.
regularly lead to confrontations with powers to the police, including the
the police (Shah, 2002, p. 18; Verma, right to use force to disperse any In addition, the courts have acknowl­
2007). A prominent scholar once unlawful assembly and maintain edged that:
called this a ‘crisis of governability’ order.
(Kohli, 1990). Over 20 years later, little Indian law grants extraordinary [i]t is not open to the Honourable
has changed. Maintaining order, discretionary powers of arrest to police Court exercising jurisdiction …
to support the stability of the state, officers. General powers of arrest are, to go into the question whether in
remains more important for Indian for example, provided to the police in fact the police officer was justi­­fied
policing than service to society. As a the CrPC (Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, in concluding that the necessity
previous study concludes, ‘the ideal 2006). Section 41 states that a police contemplated by this section really
of a civilian police force has not officer may arrest a person without existed. The discretion is vested
materialized’ (yet) in the country obtaining a warrant if there is reason­ solely in the police officer and that
(Das and Verma, 1998, p. 365). able suspicion exists of their being discretion cannot be questioned
concerned in a ‘cognizable offense’. (Gupta, 1949).
Section 54 CrPC states that:
The legal basis of law The judgment whether a person is
enforcement any police officer may arrest … likely to commit an offence is thus left
For hundreds of years the colonial without a warrant … such person entirely up to the police officer con­
rulers of India were apprehensive who has been concerned in any cerned (Verma, 1997, pp. 68–69).
about the large population that never cognizable (indictable) offense or Nevertheless, Indian Courts have
accepted their hegemony. The threat … against whom … reasonable been strict on the use of force by the
of mob protest has been a distinctive sus­picion exists of his being so police. Indeed, some authors argue
feature of Indian governance ever concerned … [or] in whose posses­ that the Courts make unrealistic
since. For the British, the risk of losing sion anything is found which may demands upon the police:
power in 1857 directly affected sub­ ­reasonably be suspected to be
sequent policing, and the Police Act ­stolen property. Should they [the police] happen to
of 1861 established a colonial model use less force, they would be accused
of policing to maintain the British Raj. The law thus leaves the determination of dereliction of duty; should they
In the Indian Penal Code (IPC) of of grounds for arrest entirely at the use lethal force, they could be
1860 the British enacted ­provisions to discretion of the police officer involved. accused of murder (Asthana and
facilitate police action against unruly What constitutes ‘reasonable suspicion’ Nirmal, 2010).
crowds. The legal authority to disperse is not spelled out and is said ‘to
what was defined as an unlawful depend upon circumstances of the How legal powers should be used to
assembly comes from Section 129 of particular case’ (AIR, 1950). Further­ dis­­perse an unruly crowd was pre­
the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) more, Clause 4 of the CrPC extends scribed in Karam Singh v. Hardayal
of 1898 (Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, 2006). this discretion and has stipulated that Singh (CLJ 1979, 1211). The court held
Section 268 of the IPC defines public no formal complaint is necessary for that three prerequisites must be satis­
nuisance as any act ‘which must an officer to make an arrest under fied before a magistrate can order the
­necessarily cause injury, obstruction, this clause (Verma, 1997). Nor is it use of force to disperse a crowd:
danger or annoyance to persons who necessary that an offence be commit­
may have occasion to use any public ted before an arrest can be made. First, there should be an unlawful
right’. In addition, Section 143 of the Police even have the authority to assembly with the object of com­
CrPC empowers an executive magis­ make preventive arrests in order avert mitting violence or an assembly of
trate to prohibit the repetition or suspected future offences. Section 151 five or more persons likely to cause
­continuation of public nuisance, and of the CrPC states that: a disturbance of the public peace.

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 Second, an executive magistrate Armed Forces (­Special Powers) Act of denying officers the right to self-
should order the assembly to 1958, the armed forces, including cen­ defence (Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, 2006).
disperse. tral paramilitary forces, can be given
Third, in spite of such orders, the blanket authority to arrest without
people do not move away. warrant and to fire to kill with impu­ Police administration
nity (Verma and Subramaniam, 2009; The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)
In democratic India, the use of force NCHR, 2012, p. 10). This Act remains is the nodal agency for law enforce­
against political agitators almost in force in “disturbed areas” such as ment and domestic security in the
invariably becomes controversial. Jammu & Kashmir and the North- country. However, the constitution
­Frequently, magistrates have refused Eastern States, ‘conferring an impu­ has placed Public Order and Police
to give orders to use force (Buch, 2007). nity that often leads to the violation within the State List of the Seventh
Such situations affect police action of human rights’ (NHRC, 2011, p.2). Schedule (GoI, 2010b)—giving the
since large crowds can quickly over­ There is no evidence that fear of states (provinces) responsibilty for
whelm police o
­ fficers. For example, two police violence has diminished. Dis­ policing—while the central govern­
policemen were killed as a result of trust of the police remains a serious ment is responsible for dealing with
mob violence by a Gujjar community public issue. As shown here, the external aggression and internal
who were protesting over govern­ courts and even the central govern­ disturbances. Both state and central
ment reservation policy in Rajasthan ment have repeatedly questioned governments maintain a variety of
(Sify News, 2008). 2
police powers. For example, in an security agencies. Since issues of
However, some police agencies, for unusual case, the Andhra Pradesh internal order and peacekeeping
example the Central Industrial Security High Court found that in the case of a are not geographically isolated, the
Force, are empowered to arrest without death caused in the course of police central government—through the
warrant people who are seen as likely action, a murder case must be regis­ MHA—has assumed a significant role
to commit offences against public tered against the police personnel in formulating policies at national
­sector property. Under the well-known involved. This has had the effect of and even at state level. Constitutional

Indian police hold back demonstrators during a protest in New Delhi on 21 May 2012.  © Sajjad Hussain /AFP Photo

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 provisions in List I of the Seventh
 Box 1 India’s law enforcement agencies
Schedule of the Constitution
allow the central govern­ment to The principal face of law enforcement in India is the Civil Police. This is made up mainly of state police
develop a variety of police forces forces serving in police stations, and includes the District Armed Police. In 2010 the number of Civil
for law and order maintenance and Police stood at 1,223,319 personnel. The Civil Police have grown in recent years, but numbers still remain
below authorized strength due to recruitment difficulties, with only 75 per cent of their sanctioned
internal security (GoI, 2010b).
strength of 1,618,198 personnel. The same is true of the country’s other major policing category, the
Over the years, specialized police Armed Police. These numbered 356,992 in 2010, an increase of 4.2 per cent over 2009, but almost 20 per
forces have been added to cover cent below their sanctioned strength of 426,879 (NCRB, 2011, p. 167).
investigation, intelligence, and the The quality—in terms of both educational background and intellectual skills—of police recruits
is also a problem. The highest levels of police leadership are the preserve of the 4,720 Indian Police
problems of specific groups. All 28
Service (IPS) officers (MHA 2010, p. 131). Chosen by competitive examination, these officers are a widely
states have their own armed police respected elite. The same is seldom said of the 1.2 million ordinary police constables, who have a
battalions, organized as paramilitary reputation for being poorly educated, and poorly paid.
forces.3 The tendency is towards The density of policing varies dramatically across the country. According to the National Crime
militarization of the police as seen Records Bureau, police per population averages 133 police for every 100,000 people (NCRB, 2011, p. 171).
But this national average conceals enormous regional variations. Policing density is highest in regions
in Bihar, for example, where these
affected by separatism, especially Kashmir and the Northeast; the highest levels are 1,065 police per
units are called Bihar Military Police. 100,000 residents in Mizoram, and 871 per 100,000 in Manipur. Even states with serious Naxalite
Even within the Civil Police, armed ­prob­lems have much lower levels of policing—a revealing commentary on official priorities. The ­lowest
units—the so-called reserve police rate is found in Bihar, with just 64 police per 100,000 people in 2010 (NCRB, 2011, p. 168).
battalions—exist in every district In addition to the Civil Police and Armed Police, under the authority of India’s 28 states and 7 union
terri­tories, there are seven national police forces, the Central Police Forces (CPFs), which fall under
(Verma and Subramaniam, 2009).
the Ministry of Home Affairs. The ministries of Defence and of Railways also maintain independent law
enforcement agencies. In all, India has approximately 2.4 million men and women in official policing
(see Table 1).
Situational factors in use of A complete accounting should also consider the Civil Defence Reserve Organization and the Home
force by police Guard Reserve Organization, the first falling under the Ministry of Defence and the second under
the Ministry of Home Affairs. These are citizen groups—each with roughly 500,000 volunteers—which
In parts of the country, Indian police ­support the military and police in times of national emergency (IISS 2011, p. 242; Badri-Maharaj, 2001).
have to confront riots and disorder on (Box by Aaron Karp)
a large scale. Religious, ethnic,
regional, language, caste, and class
divisions are frequently exploited to
Table 1 Major police agencies of India, 2010 Sources: IISS 2011, pp. 241–2; NCRB, 2011, pp. 167–8

foment violence; political parties do Agency Ministry Personnel

not hesitate to call for strikes, closures, Civil Police State and municipal 1,223,319
and mass demonstrations (Rediff News, Armed Police State and municipal 356,992
2010). In Kashmir, for example, sepa­ Assam Rifles Ministry of Home Affairs 63,883
ratists groups have provoked violence Border Security Force Ministry of Home Affairs 208,422
and police have initiated or responded Central Industrial Security Force Ministry of Home Affairs 94,347
with live fire against agitated mobs Central Reserve Police Force Ministry of Home Affairs 229,699
(Swami, 2010), and, as a result, the
Indo-Tibetan Border Police Ministry of Home Affairs 36,324
region, along with the Northeast and
National Security Guards Ministry of Home Affairs 7,357
Jammu, has become a symbol of
Sashastra Seema Bal (or Special Service Bureau) Ministry of Home Affairs 31,554
excessive state power (OHCHR, 2012).
Defence Security Corps Ministry of Defence 31,000
Unruly crowds and violent demon­
Railway Protection Forces Railways Ministry 70,000
strations are so common that people
Rashtriya Rifles Ministry of Defence 65,000
have begun to see them as an
appendage of Indian democracy Total police personnel 2,417,897

­(Telegraph, 2010). All these situations

treatment, such as free meals and ser­
frequently result in the police using Culture of impunity
vices, are brazenly extorted without
force. This in turn exacerbates public While the police face violent con­ fear of disciplinary action.4 Further,
anger against the police (Kumar and
fronta­tions and challenges to their cash-­­strapped state governments fail
Verma, 2008).
authority daily, their salary to provide adequate resources. Police
and perks are low, fostering a culture lack adequate stations, vehicles, com­­
of corruption (Verma, 1999). Special munication equipment, and even basic

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protective gear. Rural areas especially
lack proper roads, so communication
is poor, and they tend to be thinly
policed as a result. This inaccessibility
allows militants to operate largely free
from police surveillance (Mitra, 2007).
The isolation, institutional poverty,
and lack of communication encourage
‘short cut’ solutions.
A major contributing factor to
use of force by the police appears
to be an organizational culture that
tolerates and promotes its misuse. The
Indian police forces were designed to
avoid local accountability. The British
colonial model advocated rule of India
‘with a firm hand and ruthlessly, if
necessary’ (Gupta, 1979, p. 3). The
Police Commission of 1860, entrusted
Policemen attend a ceremony for their outgoing chief Kuldeep Khoda at Zewan police academy near Srinagar on
with the design of a new police system 31 May 2012. A local court earlier this week dismissed a petition filed by the relatives of three civilians who had
for British India, convened while accused Khoda of being involved in alleged extra-judicial killings.  © Tauseef Mustafa /AFP Photo

memories of the 1857 revolt were still

governance allowed selected officers theory, the judiciary controls police
sharp. The Commission was told to
to make many decisions for the people action, but this is itself even more
bear in mind that the ‘functions of a
(Griffiths, 1971). With administrators remote and cumber­some. Conse­
police are either protective and repres­
above the rule of law, there was no quently, police personnel are gener­
sive or detective’ and that ‘the line
avenue for complaint against the bru­ ally not well supervised, and are
which separates the protective and
talization and corruption of the insti­ often wary of being called to account
repressive functions of a civil force
tution. This organizational ethos, the by their superiors.
from functions purely military, may
indifferent styles of a­ dministration,
not always, in India be very clear’
and the deliberate alienation from the
(Hunter, 1907, p. 380). The existence
citizens have all contributed to misuse
Inadequate training
of a ‘people’s police’ in India would
of force by the police. The training of police personnel is
have undermined the British Raj.
This remoteness, and the emphasis generally in a dismal state. There are
The resulting organizational
on serving the state rather than the no consistent standards and most
culture and norms emphasized the
training institutions lack both basic
unquestioned authority of British rule people, continued after independence
amenities and sufficient instructors.
and encouraged venality within the in 1947. Even today almost all police
Some states, for example Bihar, have
ranks. The antecedents of contempo­ personnel continue to live in isolation
yet to establish a training academy and
rary policing culture can be found in from civilian communities. Police
most police academies are neglected.
the lifestyles of the Raj’s rulers, in buildings remain imposing structures,
The instructions in the use of force,
which sahibs and memsahibs lived in designed not for efficient service to the
legal procedures, and interaction with
sprawling bungalows with retinues people but to keep them at a distance
the citizens are rudimentary and
of servants (Verma, 1999, p. 271). The (Verma and Subramaniam, 2009).
unsatisfactory. The present training
British built few hospitals and schools Police leadership is provided by the of police personnel tends to be milita­
but police buildings were numerous Indian Police Service (IPS), the civil ristic, stressing how to use force rather
and imposing (Metcalf, 1994, pp. 177–9). service responsible for managing the than the responsibilities of police to
The pageantry and grandeur of the functions, behaviour and use of force civil society (Mukerjee, 2003).
senior officers was a visible form of by the hundreds of thousands of per­ Training in the Central Police
authority. The morning parade and sonnel under their command. Within Forces (CPFs) is of a higher standard,
salute, the armed guards and escorts the IPS, too, a culture of impunity has largely because the CPFs have better
were symbols that placed officers on developed (National Project on Pre­ resources and function more like the
a pedestal. In addition, paternalistic venting Torture in India, 2008). In army, where training receives greater

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 attention. The Central Industrial lay in petty tyranny, corruption, and Table 2 Police firings and civilian casualties,
Security Force established a National brutality (Kumar and Verma, 2008). 2004—2010, as reported to NCRB
Industrial Security Academy to pro­ The Indian police, at both central and
Year Total Number Number
vide training in security at major state levels, emerged as armed hands incidents killed injured
facilities, in industrial law and in of the government, distinguished 2004 791 420 257
human right issues. Intelligence pro­ ­primarily by their ability to use force
2005 777 355 373
cesses, hand­ling sophisticated weap­ against civil strife and violations of
2006 1,363 472 432
onry, and electronics training also are laws.
2007 865 250 616
provided. Special programmes to
2008 1,529 317 758
impart security awareness and skills
in handling security at airports, par­ Use of deadly force by police 2009 1,280 184 490

liament and other sensitive facilities Indian police are often accused of 2010 1,421 239 713

have been developed. using unnecessary force. Anecdotal Source: NCRB, 2011, p. 155

Similarly, the Indo-Tibetan Border evidence suggests that this impression

Table 3 Police firings by type of incidents,
Police Academy organizes courses is not without justification. Official data 2004—2010, as reported to NCRB
on conventional warfare, intelligence, about police use of force is supplied
Operation Civilians Police

Year
field engineering, VIP security, by the National Crime Records Bureau killed killed
commando operations, and counter- (NCRB), the nodal agency for the Riots 26 1
insurgency operations. The Border ­collection and publication of statistics
Crime operations 239 12

2004
Security Force Academy at Gwalior pertaining to police personnel, crime,
Extremist operations 85 51
has developed expertise in the field arrests and police–citizen interac­
of border security and its manage­ Other* 70 17
tions. However, the NCRB relies on
ment, as well as in the conducting of Riots 44 4
the different state governments to
counter-insurgency oper­ations and Crime operations 78 1

2005
provide the data—and many states
human resource development. It has delay submission or report in an
Extremist operations 166 36
also developed courses on resettle­ Other 67 4
extremely care­­less manner. There is
ment and rehabilitation since the Riots 41 7
little scrutiny for veracity and there
force frequently has to operate in Crime operations 112 8
are frequent glaring discrepancies.
2006

areas affected by insurgency and Extremist operations 246 48

The doubts surrounding NCRB data
disturbed situations (BSFA, 2012).
have been elaborated on in a previous Other 63 1
Training syllabi can instil greater
IAVA Issue Brief (Kohli, Karp and Riots 52 5
professionalism, but syllabi alone
Marwah, 2011, p. 3). Nevertheless, the Crime operations 90 12
2007

cannot counter the basic attitudes in

NCRB remains the only available Extremist operations 54 42
which excessive force is encouraged
source of systematic national data on Other 54 0
(Austin, 1999, p. 600). A major con­
the use of police force. Riots 77 3
sequence of training is, rather, to
The numbers do suggest that Indian Crime operations 85 5
­foster a culture in which police con­
2008

police appear to resort frequently to

sider themselves agents of the state Extremist operations 79 126
the use of deadly force. In fact, ‘35% of
more than servants of the public. Other 76 31
There is a paradox in this system in complaints to the National Human
Riots 20 2
which training to serve the people Rights Commission annually are
Crime operations 57 6
2009

­supports service of the state, some­ against the police’ (NHRC, 2011).
Extremist operations 44 97
times against the people. The police Table 2 shows deadly incidents have
Other 63 26
are institutionally powerful, the strong increased dramatically from 2004 to
2010, as did the number injured, Riots 97 2
arm of the state; citizens regard the
although the number killed is down. Crime operations 37 1
khaki with dread. The absence of
2010

The NCRB breaks down these inci­ Extremist operations 48 147

accountability plus extraordinary
­dis­­­cretionary power encourages mis­ dents by the type of police operation Other 57 16

use of authority. in which they happened, as shown in Source: NCRB, 2011, p. 155

From the inception of Indian Table 3. *For NCRB’s ‘other’ category there is no definition for the types of incident it
encompasses, yet it is relevant as it includes a significant number
policing, its power could not be fully The number of citizens being killed of the reported police and civilian deaths.

controlled by law makers and magis­ in the name of order maintenance and
trates. Much of the impact of the police anti-crime operations is high, though

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such operations can also result in the Table 4 Deaths in police custody, 2006—2010, as reported to NCRB
deaths of police personnel. The con­
Year All custodial deaths Suicide Attempting escape Officers charged
tinuing occurrence of such deaths is a
2006 89 24 7 1
matter of concern and calls into ques­
2007 118 31 7 7
tion the professionalism of the force
2008 81 38 6 3
in dealing with civilian unrest and
2009 84 21 8 12
criminal behaviour. The large number
2010 70 18 7 n/a
of police casualties in anti-extremist
Source: NCRB, 2011, pp. 151–4
operations presents another picture—
the strong challenge being posed to
the Indian state by terrorists and Police perceive the practice as stan­ suggest the actual total is much
armed militants. dard operating procedure for crimi­ higher. In contrast to the 38 custodial
There is no data available regard­ nal investigations, many of which end deaths reported by the police in 2006,
ing the application of non-lethal force with a confession obtained through the Nation Human Rights Commis­
by the police, but it is revealing to torture or intimi­dation (Mohan, 2008). sion received complaints of 119 deaths
note that there were 66,018 registered Human Rights Watch (HRW) has in police custody, 89 deaths in faked
incidents of rioting during 2008, in reportedly found evidence of the wide­­ encounters, and 15 disappearances
which three police personnel lost spread use of torture and illegal force during the period from 1 April 2006
their lives and 2,129 were injured by the Indian police, concluding that to 31 March 2007 (NHRC, ­2006–7, p.
(NCRB, 2009, pp. 58, 158). Smaller inci­ ‘the most visible arm of the Indian 296).
dents are recorded in a police station state is as lawless and ineffective as The Commonwealth Human Rights
diary for internal management pur­ those that exist in impoverished, post- Initiative (CHRI), too, draws attention
poses and are unavailable to outsid­ colonial states around the world’ to a culture of impunity that exists
ers. A sense of the problem comes (HRW, 2009, p.5). Police are widely regarding wrongful acts perpetrated
from a study of a small district, in believed to rely on illegally elicited by the police. Abuse of power, bias,
South India. The study revealed that, con­fessions from suspects as their corruption, illegal methods, and
although more than 2,000 order main­ primary investigative tactic, rather excessive use of force, even when well
tenance events occurred in this dis­ than gathering forensic evidence and documented, are left unattended and
trict from March 2003 to December witness accounts. Officers function in un­­punished. Common forms of abuse
2004, police intervened in almost 750 an environment that condones such include extrajudicial ‘encounter’ kill­
instances, and deadly force was used practices, and sometimes compels ings (see below), widespread torture
in less than one per cent of these them to resort to violence and to ignore as a method of investigation, unjusti­
(Kumar, 2009). the people’s rights—especially those fied arrests, refusal to register First
Failure to record the use of force is of traditionally marginalized groups. Information Reports, excessive deten­
highly problematic in cases of unlaw­ Although Table 4 relates only to tions, reluctance to accept complaints
ful coercion. Police have a reputa­ reports made by the police themselves, or investigate them, and giving false
tion for threatening illegal force to and should be assumed to be incom­ evidence (CHRI, 2011).
extort money from vendors, drivers plete, it raises uncomfortable questions.
and even from those seeking police The small number of officers charged
assistance. These go undocumented, suggests that state investigations are Encounter killings
except some­times as false cases to not thorough—or that officials are Perhaps the most worrisome phenom­
harass people who refuse to accede to possibly not concerned about these enon in the police’s use of force is the
illegal demands. The media regularly incidents. In the cases of custodial prevalence of ‘encounter killings’
report on this common phenomenon: death and death due to excessive use (extra-judicial killings), in which police
‘There’s an unmistakable swagger in of force ‘criminal investigation and kill a suspect and report it as self-
modern day cops as they increasingly prosecution against the perpetrators is defence.5 Such executions have long
turn into a brutal and brutalizing force’ rarely initiated’ (OHCHR, 2012). The been part of the Indian socio-political
(ToI, 2010). Few would challenge the umbers of suicides and deaths while landscape. Fake encounters occurred
conclusion that torture is still widely attempting ‘escape from police cus­ during the years of colonial rule
practised in India by the police, as tody’ are equally troublesome. While ­(Saxena, 1997), and returned after inde­
well as by para­­military units and even official data substantiates claims pendence. In the 1960s, the euphemism
other law enforcement agencies. of police brutality, other sources encounter killings began to be used to

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 describe extrajudicial killings in Chief Minister, began a campaign that Statistics reinforce this impression.
‘encounters’ with police. led to hundreds of encounter deaths, The NCRB has begun reporting the
Police encounters in India are sometimes killing obvious criminals, total number of complaints received
­officially portrayed as spontaneous, sometimes the obviously innocent, against police personnel and the
unplanned shoot-outs in which the neither with due process (NPC, 1981). number of officers being criminally
criminal or perpetrator is almost This approach was even more blatant charged for these complaints. Table 5,
invariably killed and there are hardly in Punjab, where Sikh separatist which presents national data over the
any injuries to the police (Belur, 2007; ­violence grew in the 1980s. The Punjab past few years, shows that only a frac­
Belur, 2010). There is considerable police, under the leadership of K. P. S. tion of complaints result in officers
acceptance, by citizens, politicians Gill, reportedly killed thousands in being charged.
and the media, of this use of deadly the name of counter-terrorism The fluctuations in the number
force. Encounters are seen as a (Kumar et al., 2003). The policy suc­ of police officers charged, which
response to organized crime, terror­ ceeded spectacularly in wiping out increased nine times between 2004
ism, and lawlessness. ‘Encounter spe­ Sikh terrorism, but with deaths from and 2005 and then decreased just as
cialists’ have been acclaimed by the 1984 to 1996 estimated at 25,000, it left extraordinarily after 2006, is difficult
media and courted by the establish­­­ questions about the legitimacy of the to explain. It may reflect changes in
ment. In some cases ‘alleged perpetra­ state action. Reports of persons miss­ police reporting practices rather than
tors, belonging to the police or the ing from their home, killed in anything else. Difficulty in analysing
armed forces, have been awarded out encounters, cremated as un­­identified, these trends is further compounded by
of turn promotions, or have in other and having escaped from police cus­ large variations amongst the different
ways been rewarded’ (OHCHR, 2012). tody were common during this states. Judging whether the number
Dayanand Nayak, a police sub- period (Kumar et al, 2003). of complaints is acceptable is impor­
inspector from Mumbai, reportedly Encounters have not been perceived tant, and calls for further research, as
killed more than 50 gangsters during as a major problem in India. Especially does the seemingly arbitrary varia­
his career–which is celebrated in ­several in large cities such as New Delhi and tion in the number of officers
films, including Aan, Ab Tak Chhappan Mumbai, they appear to be a deliberate charged.
and Kagaar (Gupta, 2003; Johar, 2010). short cut, bypassing the delay and
Police Commissioner M. N. Singh un­­certainty of the criminal justice
reportedly praised the phenomenon system (Belur, 2010, p. 71). Research Mechanisms to control
for keeping organized crime in check shows near unanimity in the percep­ police use of force
(Indian Express, 2001). In some cases tion among officers that encounters
Indian police authorities are not
senior-level officials are complicit in are effective (Belur, 2010, pp. 67–78),
un­­aware of the criticism directed
sanctioning encounters. The Central and, barring a few cases, encounter
Bureau of Investigation, India’s premier at them and have tried to respond,
killings have not been labelled offi­
investigative agency, found evidence largely through more effective
cially as ‘deviant acts’. As already
of the involvement of the Home Minis­ crowd control (The Hindu, 2010). To
mentioned, respected media organi­
ter of Gujarat in the staged killing of a minimize the use of force in h
­ andling
zations advocate its use against crimi­
suspect, a case in which several police civil conflicts, a variety of situational
nals and ­terrorism suspects (Sanghvi,
officers were sent to prison (Ghoge and preventive methods has evolved.
2010).
Das, 2007; Outlook India, 2010). Access control over the physical
Not surprisingly, regions facing Table 5 Number of complaints against space is of utmost importance in
widespread violence from crime, gangs, police, 2004—2010, as reported to NCRB handling unruly crowds (Verma,
separatists, extremists, or terrorism 1997, p. 74). Officers are expected to
Year Complaints Officers
appear more affected by encounters received charged apply creative methods to diffuse
than other areas, but a lack of data 2004 51,060 1,191 conflict and to control mobs with
makes reliable comparison impossible. 2005 61,560 9,047
minimal use of force. It is difficult,
Diversity of circumstance further com­ however, to assess how much such
2006 62,822 7,936
plicates understanding. In the 1970s situational prevention methods help.
2007 51,767 941
and 1980s, for example, Uttar Pradesh There have been various attempts
2008 48,939 1,132
was ravaged by dacoit (bandit) gangs to rein in police use of force. The
2009 54,873 1,618
operating with impunity. The police, most important efforts at reform have
2010 58,438 861
with open encouragement from the come from outside the police and the
Source: NCRB, 2011, p. 161

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Home Ministry. In specific instances political interference. These measures
commissions of inquiry were set were, however, not accepted by the gov­
up and police officers found guilty ernment, apparently because of the
were punished (Mohanty, 2011). reluctance of political leaders to dilute
Two initiatives designed for system­ their control over the police apparatus
atic reform deserve special attention: (Verma and Subramaniam, 2009).
the National Police Commission and The National Human Rights Com­
National Human Rights Commission. mission (NHRC) was set up through
The National Police Commission the enactment of the Human Rights
(NPC), set up in 1978, made the first Act of 1993 to address the growing out­
systematic attempt to deal with use cry against violations of citizen rights
of force by police personnel. During by state agents. The commission was
that period dacoity (gang robbery) instructed to inquire into violations of
had become a serious problem in human rights, to promote awareness
some states and the police were of human rights, and to involve NGOs
resorting to massive operations and in this endeavour. The NHRC has
‘encounters’ to deal with the gangs pur­­sued a variety of issues related to
(Khan, 1981). The NPC examined human rights violations by police A police officer shields himself from stones being hurled
during a demonstration following the death of ­protestor
the crimes of dacoity and found that personnel. These include preventive Asif Mehraj, killed by Indian police in Srinagar on 4 August
investigation and prosecution were detention laws, the protection of 2008.  © Tauseef Mustafa /AFP PHOTO
hindered by witness intimidation human rights in areas of insurgency,
and long delays in court proceed­ the power of police to arrest in criminal The denial of fundamental free­
ings. These, together with difficulties cases and, as a preventative measure, doms and human rights by the states
in prosecution, led police to seek the setting up of human rights cells creates conditions of social and politi­
alternatives. Encounter killings thus within state and city police units, and cal unrest’ (NHRC, 2008, p. 28). The
emerged from the perception that taking steps to check custodial deaths, police’s use of force is an unfortunate
criminals were taking advantage of rape and torture by police. consequence of these conditions,
the system to escape conviction. The UN Special Rapporteur on which promote conflict and violence
In a legitimate effort to facilitate extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary in Indian society. The commission
pro­­secution, the NPC proposed inge­ executions has called for a ‘special also acknowledges that some of the
nious solutions such as severe punish­ focus on the areas of the country common and persisting features of
ments for bail violations. If accepted, where specific forms of unlawful kill­ human rights violations in the country
these could have set a precedent for ings take place. In some instances are torture, the disappearance of sus­
other serious crimes such as terrorism some form of transitional justice may pects, deaths in fake encounters, and
and organized crime. The NPC also be required, to ensure justice to the deaths in police custody.
proposed greater police accountability victims, break the cycle of violence,
through Security Commissions and and to symbolize a new beginning’
by shielding the police from direct (OHCHR, 2012). The path of reform
The misuse of force casts a dark
shadow over India’s police establish­
Figure 1 Total violent deaths of Indian police on duty, 2001—2010 Source: NCRB, 2011, p.567
ment. In a democracy, police are
1000
954 expected to function with cooperation

900
from citizens and to be accountable to
876 872
828 827 830 841 them for their actions. Both coopera­
805
800 781
763
tion and accountability are missing in
India. The police have a reputation for
700
brutality and extortion, and citizen
600 distrust of them is widespread. Little
is being done to restrain police excess.
500 Police academies lack courses for
training officers in minimizing the
400
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 use of force. The organizational

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 Jammu Kashmir policewomen detain Kashmiri women during a demonstration in Srinagar, September 2006.  © AP Photo/Dar Yasin

culture, too, does not promote law. The nation’s political leadership question is resolved, police use of
restraint on the part of officers. There must focus upon proper training and force will remain unregulated.
is acceptance, and even sanction at the provision of adequate resources to
the highest level of leadership, of handle serious situations. Events that
encounter killing. lead to the use of force, particularly Notes
Indian police routinely confront dangerous force, must be examined This Issue Brief was written by Dr Arvind
the danger of violence, which results and lessons drawn. However, the lack Verma, Associate Professor in the Depart­­
ment of Criminal Justice at Indiana Uni­
in many deaths on duty (Figure 1). of comprehensive data on such inci­
versity, Bloomington, Indiana, USA. It was
Dangers range from the special risks of dents—the inadequacy of state sub­
anonymously peer reviewed by experts on
domestic violence to mobs, organized missions to the NCRB—and the
the subject. It was fact checked by Sonal
crime, insurgency, terrorism and seeming indifference even to reliable Marwah, who was also responsible for
especially accidents while on official crime statistics show that basic man­ data and tables, and Katherine Aguirre
duty. In 2010, 857 Indian police died agement is being ignored. It is impor­ provided additional research. The manu­
while on duty (NCRB, 2011, p. 157). In tant to develop and use outcomes- script was edited by Aaron Karp and
comparison, in the United States, based metrics to define operational copy edited by Biddy Greene.
1 Encounter killings, or custodial or
with one-quarter the population, 157 success and to evaluate managerial
encounter deaths, describe extrajudicial
police died on duty that year , a com­ performance (Wilson, 2006, p.174). killings in ‘encounters’ with the police,
parison that deserves careful com­ Progress can be made, as illus­ which are often considered to be ‘fake’,
parative analysis (Reuters, 2011). trated by the efforts of the NHRC. effectively cases of ‘arbitrary street jus­
tice’ (Belur, 2010, p.9).
Since police presence in India is India is fortunate to have an active
2 The Gujjars are a small community, based
generally thin, situations arise where judiciary that shows great concern for largely in Rajasthan, who launched vio­
a small number of police officers are the rights of the citizens. The media, lent agitation to force the government to
caught amidst large and hostile too, is independent and willing to accept their status as a ‘backward caste’
crowds, and incidents of police offi­ confront the government. There is a so that they might become eligible for
reservations in government jobs and
cers murdered or injured by mobs are strong civic and human rights lobby
educational institutes. The government
not infrequent. that pursues police excesses. Yet the acquiesced to their demands.
Police must continue to have outcome remains less than ideal. 3 Author’s observation during his service
recourse to force to maintain order The puzzle of Indian democ­ as an officer in the Indian Police Service,
and protect the innocent. But this use racy is why the rule of law has not 1978-1991.
4 Author’s observation during his service
of force must be subject to the rule of been firmly established. Until that

10 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 3 August

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About the India Armed Violence Credits

Assessment Copy editor: Biddy Greene
The Indian Armed Violence Assessment (IAVA) promotes Proofreader: John Linnegar (johnlinnegar@[Link])
research and supports India’s social science communities Design and layout: Frank B. Junghanns (fbj@[Link])
dedicated to studying the causes and consequences of
armed violence. Developed in coordination with Indian
partners, the IAVA explores wide-ranging issues related Contact details
to the instruments, actors, and enabling institutions that Sonal Marwah, IAVA Project Coordinator:
shape security. It intends to catalyze evidence-based [Link]@[Link]
debate in India and facilitate Indian contributions to Aaron Karp, Senior Consultant, Small Arms Survey:
global policy and programming on related issues. The akarp@[Link]
project is supported by the Small Arms Survey.
India Armed Violence Assessment
IAVA Issue Briefs review the state of knowledge on key EP-16/17 Chandragupta Marg, Chanakyapuri,
themes associated with armed violence. Commissioned New Delhi12 – 110021, India
by the Small Arms Survey, Issue Briefs summarize Small Arms Survey
major findings and insight into issues related to conflict 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland
and crime-related violence, perpetrators and victims,
t +41 22 908 5777 f +41 22 732 2738
prevention and reduction, and strategies to contain
violence. They stress data-based research findings on
the scale, forms, and severity of armed conflict, con­
tributing forces, and the impact of policy responses.

All IAVA Issue Briefs are available in English and Hindi.

They can be downloaded at [Link].
Print copies are available from the Small Arms Survey. A project of the Small Arms Survey

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