Principles of Sentencing

S.S. Upadhyay
Former District & Sessions Judge/
Former Addl. Director (Training)
Institute of Judicial Training & Research, UP, Lucknow.
Member, Governing Body,
Chandigarh Judicial Academy, Chandigarh.
Former Legal Advisor to Governor
Raj Bhawan, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow
Mobile : 9453048988
E-mail : ssupadhyay28@[Link]
Website: [Link]

1. Meaning of ‘Penalty’: The word ‘penalty’ is an elastic term with

different shades of meaning. Penalty always involves an idea of
punishment. See:
(i) Sova Ray Vs. Gostha Gopal Dey, (1988) 2 SCC 134
(ii) N.K. Jain Vs. C.K. Shah, (1991) 2 SCC 495 and
(iii) Shiv Dutt Rai Fateh Chand Vs. Union of India, (1983) 3 SCC
529.

2. Object of Sentencing Policy : Object of sentencing policy should be to

see that crime does not go unpunished and victim of crime as also the
society has satisfaction that justice has been done to it. See: Purushottam
Dashrath Borate Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 6 SCC 652 (Three-
Judge Bench)

3. Object of Penology: The object of penology is to protect the society

against the criminals by inflicting punishment upon them under the
existing criminal law. Social defence is the criminological foundation of
punishment. See: M.H. Hoskot Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC
1548

4. Different Theories of Punishment: Following are the main theories of

punishments to offenders:
(i) Deterrent: (capital punishment or such other exemplary / severe
punishments which deter others to commit offences)
(ii) Preventive: (disabling the offender from committing crimes again
by detaining or imprisoning him for life or for other terms)
(iii) Retributive: (returning evil for evil, eye for eye, tooth for tooth,
limb for limb, life for life)

Page 1 of 50
 (iv) Reformative: (probation, TRC, admonition etc.)
(v) Expiatory: (repentance, penance etc.)

5. Punishments awardable to offenders: Section 53 of the IPC provides

for following punishments which can be awarded to offenders:
(i) Death
(ii) Imprisonment for life
(iii) Rigorous imprisonment
(iv) Simple imprisonment
(v) Fine
(vi) Forfeiture of property
(vii) Transportation: (Section 53A IPC, now omitted w.e.f. 01.01.1956)
(viii) Externment: (zilabadar under UP Control of Goondas Act, 1970)

6. A penalty not prescribed under law cannot be imposed: In the case

noted below, the Supreme Court has held that in a civilized society
governed by the rule of law, the punishment not prescribed under the
statutory rules cannot be imposed. See: Vijay Singh Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh & others, (2012) 5 SCC 242.

7. Rehabilitary & reformative aspects in sentencing: Crime is a

pathological aberration. The criminal can ordinarily be redeemed and the
state has to rehabilitate rather than avenge. The sub-culture that leads to
ante-social behaviour has to be countered not by undue cruelity but by re-
culturization. Therefore, the focus of interest in penology in the individual
and the goal is salvaging him for the society. The infliction of harsh and
savage punishment is thus a relic of past and regressive times. The human
today vies sentencing as a process of reshaping a person who has
detetiorated into criminality and the modern community has a primary
stake in the rehabilitation of the offender as a means of a social defence.
Hence a therapeutic, rather than an 'in terrorem' outlook should prevail in
our criminal courts, since brutal incarceration of the person merely
produces laceration of his mind. If you are to punish a man retributively,
you must injure him. If you are to reform him, you must improve him
and, men are not improved by injuries. See...Mohd. Giasuddin Vs.
State of AP, AIR 1977 SC 1926.

Page 2 of 50
8. Reformative approach as object of criminal law: The reformative
approach to punishment should be the object of the criminal law. In order
to promote rehabilitation of the offenders without offending their
communal conscience and to secure social justice to them, the courts
should prefer reformative approach towards the offenders instead of
subjecting them to harsher punishments. See: Narotam Singh Vs. State
of Punjab, AIR 1978 SC 1542.

9. Psychiatric assistance for bringing reforms in offender: In the matter

of probability and possibility of reform of a criminal, it is seen that a
proper psychological and psychiatric evaluation is hardly done. Without
the assistance of such a psychological or psychiatric assessment and
evaluation of the criminal, it would not be proper to hold that there is no
possibility or probability of reform. The State has to bear in mind this
important aspect while proving by evidence that the convict cannot be
reformed or rehabilitated. See: Chhannu Lal Verma Vs. State of
Chhattisgarh, AIR 2019 SC 243 (Three-Judge Bench).

10. Rigorous and simple imprisonments: difference between?: Rigorous

imprisonment is one which is required by law to be completed with hard
labour. While a person sentenced to simple imprisonment has the option
of choosing to work, a person sentenced to rigorous imprisonment is
required by law to undergo hard labour. See: Phool Kumari Vs. Office
of the Superintendent, Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi, (2012) 8 SCC
183.

11. Relevant considerations for determining quantum of sentence: The

courts should take into consideration the following factors while
determining the quantum of sentence to be awarded against the convicts:
(i) nature and gravity of offence
(ii) penalty provided for the offence
(iii) manner of commission of offence
(iv) proportionality between crime & punishment
(v) age and sex of the offender
(vi) character of the offender
(vii) antecedents (criminal history etc.)
(viii) possibility of reforms
(ix) impact of offence on social order and public interest

Page 3 of 50
 (x) The personality of the offender as revealed by his age, character,
antecedents and other circumstances and the tracebility of the
offender to reform must necessarily play the most prominent role in
determining the sentence. A judge has to balance the personality of
the offender with the circumstances, situatiions and the reactions
and choose the appropriate sentence to be imposed. See....
(i) Sushil Murmu Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 2 SCC 338
(ii) Surjit Singh Vs. Nahar Ram, (2004) 6 SCC 513

12. ‘Proper sentence’: what is?: Sentence should not be either excessively
harsh or ridiculously low. While determining the quantum of sentence,
the court should bear in mind the principle of proportionality. Sentence
should be based on facts of a given case. Gravity of offence, manner of
commission of crime, age and sex of accused should be taken into
account. Discreton of Court in awarding sentence cannot be exercised
arbitrarily or whimscally. See: Deo Narain Mandal Vs. State of UP
(2004) 7 SCC 257

13. Duty of prosecution & courts to collect past criminal history etc. of
the convict before awarding sentence: The investigating agency and
courts are duty bound to collect additional evidence regarding past
criminal history etc. of the convicted accused before imposing sentence
on him. The courts are further duty bound to collect additional evidence
relating to possibility of reformation, rehabilitation and criminal past of
the convict to impose appropriate sentence u/s 354(3) CrPC. The state is
obliged to furnish such materials to court. See : Anil Vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2014) 4 SCC 69.

14. Past criminal antecedents of convict not to be taken into

consideration for purposes of determining quantum of sentence: In
the case noted below which related to rape and murder of three years old
girl child, the DNA sample was taken from the bodies of the accused and
the victim u/s 53-A and 164-A CrPC and was sent to the Forensic
Sciences Laboratory for DNA test and DNA profiling but the same was
not produced before the trial court and the accused was awarded death
sentence. The Supreme Court converted the death sentence into life
imprisonment by holding that non-production and non-explanation for
not producing the DNA profiling report before the court was not
justified. The convict was however directed to remain in jail for his
Page 4 of 50
 entire normal life. Criminal history of the convict, including recidivism,
cannot, by itself, be a ground for awarding the death sentence. There
could be a situation where a convict had previously committed an
offence and had been convicted and sentenced for that offence and
thereafter he commits a second offence for which he is convicted and
sentence is required to be awarded against him. This does not pose any
legal challenge or difficulty. But there could also be a situation where a
convict has committed an offence and is under trial for that offence.
During pendency of the trial, he commits a second offence for which he
is convicted and in which sentence is required to be awarded. Section 54
of the Evidence Act prohibits the use of previous bad character evidence
except when the convict himself chooses to lead evidence of his good
character. The implication of this clearly is that the past adverse conduct
of the convict ought not to be taken into consideration for the purposes of
determining the quantum of sentence except in specified circumstances.
See: Rajendra Prahladrao Wasnik Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR
2019 SC 1 (Three-Judge Bench).

15. Awarding lesser sentence than prescribed improper --- If the

legislature has provided for a minimum sentence, the same should
ordinarily be imposed save and except some exceptional causes which
may justify awarding lesser sentence than the minimum prescribed (It was
a case u/s. 3/7 of the E.C. Act, 1955). See---Harendra Nath
Chakraborty vs. State of W.B., 2009(1) Supreme 272.

16. Sentences which High Courts and Sessions Judges may pass (Section
28 CrPC): Section 28 CrPC reads as under:
(1) A High Court may pass any sentence authorized by law.
(2) A Sessions Judge or Additional Judge may pass any sentence
authorized by law; but any sentence of death passed by any such Judge
shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court.
(3) An Assistant Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorized by law
except a sentence of death or of imprisonment for life or of
imprisonment for a term exceeding ten years.

17. Sentences which Magistrates may pass (Section 29 CPC): Section 29

CrPC reads as under:

Page 5 of 50
 (1) The Court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate may pass any sentence
authorized by law except a sentence of death or of imprisonment for
life or of imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years.
(2) The Court of a Magistrate of the first class may pass a sentence of
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or of fine not
exceeding (ten thousand rupees) or of both.
(3) The Court of a Magistrate of the second class may pass a sentence of
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or of fine not
exceeding (five thousand rupees) or of both.

18. Sentences in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial

(Section 31 CrPC): Section 31 CrPC reads as under:
(1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the
Court may, subject to the provisions of section 71 of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860), sentence him for such offences, to the several
punishments prescribed therefor which such Court is competent to
inflict; such punishments when consisting of imprisonment to
commence the one after the expiration of the other in such order as the
Court may direct, unless the Court directs that such punishments shall
run concurrently.
(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not be necessary for the
Court by reason only of the aggregate punishment for the several
offences being in excess of the punishment which it is competent to
inflict on conviction of a single offence, to send the offender for trail
before a higher Court: Provided that:
(a) in no case shall such person be sentenced to imprisonment for a
longer period than fourteen years;
(b) the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of
punishment which the Court is competent to inflict for a single
offence.
(3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted person, the aggregate of the
consecutive sentences passed against him under this section shall be
deemed to be a single sentence.

19. 20 years RI awarded for different offences in violation of Sec. 31

CrPC set aside by the Supreme Court: Interpreting the provisions of
Section 31 CrPC, it has been held by the Supreme Court that where the
accused was convicted for several offences and 20 years aggregate
sentence was consecutively awarded by the M.P. High Court, the same
Page 6 of 50
 was illegal as u/s 31 CrPC the convict/accused could not have been
sentenced to imprisonment for period longer than 14 years and sentence
of 20 years rigorous imprisonment being illegal was set aside by the
Supreme Court. See: Chatar Singh vs. State of M.P., AIR 2007 SC 319.

20. Delay in disposal of appeal no ground for awarding sentence below

minimum prescribed : In the matter of conviction of an accused under
Section 7 & 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act, 1988, it has been ruled by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that delay in disposal of appeal is no ground for
awarding sentence below minimum prescribed. See A.B. Bhaskara Rao
Vs. Inspector of Police, CBI, 2011 (75) ACC 619 (SC)

21. Loss of service due to conviction no ground for awarding sentence

below minimum prescribed : In the matter of conviction of an accused
under Section 7 & 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act, 1988, it has been ruled by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court that delay in disposal of appeal is no ground
for awarding sentence below minimum prescribed. Loss of job by the
delinquent due to conviction and the quantum of amount taken as graft is
also immaterial for reduction of sentence below the minimum prescribed.
See… A.B. Bhaskara Rao Vs. Inspector of Police, CBI, 2011 (75)
ACC 619 (SC)

22.1 Awarding meagre sentence counter productive and against the

interest of the society: Awarding meagre sentence by courts is counter
productive and against the interest of the society. See... State of UP Vs.
Kishan, 2005(1) SCJ 390
Note : It was a case of conviction by trial court under section 304, part II
of the IPC by the Sessions Judge, Sitapur (UP) who had awarded 7 years
R.I. In appeal, the Lucknow Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court
reduced the sentence to period already undergone in Jail wihtout
indicating as to what the period already undergone was. On appeal being
filed by the State before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court set aside the order of the Hon'ble High Court with the
direction to re-hear on the question of sentence.
22.2. In the event of compromise, sentence can be reduced by court even
in non-compoundable offences: Section 320(9) CrPC explicitly
prohibits any compounding except as permitted under Section 320 CrPC.
But in the event of a settlement or compromise between the parties,
quantum of sentence can be reduced by the court even in serious non-
Page 7 of 50
 compoundable offences. See: Murali Vs State, (2021) 1 SCC 726
(Three-Judge Bench)

23. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence to harm the judicial

system & undermine public confidence : Undue sympathy to impose
inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to
undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and the society
can not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of
every court to award proper sentence by having regard to the nature of the
offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed.
Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order
in many cases may in reality be a futile exercise. The social impact of the
crime, e.g. where it relates to offences against women, dacoity,
kidnapping, misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences
involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact
on social order and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se
require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meager
sentences or taking too sympathetic a view merely on account of lapse of
time in respect of such offences will be result-wise counter productive in
the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for and
strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system. See-
--
(i) State of Punjab Vs. Bawa Singh, (2015) 3 SCC 441
(ii) State of M.P. Vs. Najab Khan & Others, (2013) 9 SCC 509
(iii) Gopal Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545
(iv) Guru Basavaraj Vs. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 734
(v) Sahdev vs. Jaibar, 2009 (67) ACC 483 (SC)
(vi) State of M.P. vs. Sheikh Shahid, AIR 2009 SC 2951 (Three-
Judge Bench)
(vii) Sevaka Perumal vs. State of T.N., AIR 1991 SC 1463

24. Awarding inadequate sentence illegal : The Supreme Court, in many

recent decisions, has declined to follow the theory of reformation of the
accused persons as propounded by the former Supreme Court Judge
Hon'ble Krishna Iyer in Phul Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (1979) 4 SCC
413 and has ruled that awarding lesser sentence than the minimum
prescribed is illegal. See..... State of MP Vs. Balu, (2005) 1 SCC 108
25. Long pendency of case not a ground to award lesser sentence : Just
and appropriate sentence should be imposed by courts after giving due
Page 8 of 50
 consideration to the facts and circumstances of each case. Long pendency
of case is no ground to award lesser sentence. See..... State of MP Vs.
Ghanshyam Singh, AIR 2003 SC 3191

26. Undue sympathy not to be shown to the convict in awarding sentence

: Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentince would do more harm to
the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of
law, and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is,
therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard
to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or
commited etc. See.....Union of India Vs. Devendra Nath Rai, (2006) 2
SCC 243
Note: In this case the trial court had sentenced the convit/accused u/s 307,
324, 504 IPC to undergo ten years imprisonment which was reduced by
the High Court to period already undergone.

27. Showing Undue sympathy to accused in awarding lesser sentence to

harm the society and the judicial system : Undue sympathy to impose
inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to
undermine public confidence in the efficacy of law and the society could
not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, duty of every
court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence
and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc. See:
Shailendra Jasvantbhai Vs. State of Gujarat, (2006)2 SCC 359

28. Sentence for offence u/s. 376 IPC: An offence which affects the morale
of the society should be severely dealt with. Socio-economic status,
religion, race, caste or creed of the accused and the victim, should be
eschewed, particularly when Parliament itself had laid down minimum
sentence. Rape, being a violation with violence of the private person of a
woman, causes mental scare. Thus, not only a physical injury but a deep
sense of some deathless shame is also inflicted. Sentenc less than the
minimum prescribed under Section 376(1) & (2) of the IPC can only be
awarded with special and adequate reasons. Mere existence of a
discretion by itself does not justify its exercise. In the facts of the case,
minimum sentence ought to have been maintained. See--- State of M.P.
vs. Bablu Natt, 2009 (1) Supreme 131

Page 9 of 50
29. Marriage by rapist with the victim not a ground to award sentence
less than 07 years : In a case of offence of rape for purposes of awarding
sentence u/s 376(1) of the IPC, in the case noted below where the age of
the victim girl was 14 years, it has been held by the Supreme Court that
conduct of the accused at the time of commission of the offence of rape,
age of prosecutrix and consequences of rape on prosecutrix are some of
the relevant factors which the court should consider while considering the
question of reducing sentence to less than minimum sentence of 07 years.
Fact that the rapist had since got married, was the sole breadwinner, had a
family etc are not adequate and special reasons to reduce sentence of rape
below statutory minimum. See : Parminder Vs. State of Delhi, (2014)
2 SCC 592.

30. Court cannot award less than minimum sentence provided by

statute: Offence of atrocity was committed by the accused u/s 3(1)(x) of
the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The trial court had
convicted and sentenced the accused with imprisonment for six months
and Rs. 500/- as fine. On appeal, the High Court reduced the minimum
sentence of six months to the period already undergone by the accused in
jail and enhanced the fine from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 3000/-. The Supreme
Court set aside the said penalty awarded by the High Court and restored
the penalty awarded by the trial court. The Supreme Court further held
that court cannot impose less than minimum sentence contemplated by
the statute. Even the provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution of India
cannot be resorted to impose sentence less than the minimum sentence
provided by law. See: State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Vikram Das, AIR
2019 SC 835.

31. Sentence u/s 376 IPC less than minimum prescribed not to be
awarded--- Sentence u/s 376 IPC less than minimum prescribed cannot
be awarded on the ground that the accused was rustic and illiterate
labourer belonging to scheduled tribe. Impact of offence on social order
and public interest cannot be lost sight of while exercising such
discretion. See--- State of M.P. vs. Basodi, AIR 2009 SC 3081 (Three-
Judge Bench)

32. Illiteracy not a ground for awarding lesser sentence : Sentence u/s 376
IPC less than minimum prescribed cannot be awarded on the ground that
the accused was rustic and illiterate labourer belonging to scheduled tribe.
Page 10 of 50
 Impact of offence on social order and public interest cannot be lost sight
of while exercising such discretion. See--- State of M.P. vs. Basodi, AIR
2009 SC 3081 (Three-Judge Bench)

33. Discretion in awarding sentence must be justifiably exercised : Mere

existence of a discretion by itself does not justify its exercise. Discretion
in awarding sentence should be exercised in a justified manner. See---
State of M.P. vs. Bablu Natt, 2009 (1) Supreme 131

34. Penalty when the same act punishable under two different statutes---
Where the accused was convicted for the offences u/s 111 & 135 of the
Customs Act, 1962 and also u/s 85 of the Gold Control Act, 1968, the
Supreme Court has held that if the ingredients of the two offences are
different, the accused should be punished for both the offences under both
the Acts and the bar of principle of double jeopardy contained u/s 300
CrPC as interpreted in V.K. Agarwal, Asstt. Collector of Customs vs.
Vasantraj, AIR 1988 SC 1106 & P.V. Mohammed vs. Director, 1993
Suppl. (2) SCC 724 would not attract. If the offences are distinct, there is
no question of the rule of double jeopardy as embodied in Art. 20(2) of
the Constitution. See---
(i) A.A. Mulla vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 1441
(ii) State of Bombay vs. S.L. Apte, AIR 1961 SC 578 (Four Judge
Bench)

35.1. POCSO Court to try both the cases where accused charged under
SC/ST Act also :
A perusal of Section 20 of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
and Section 42-A of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act, 2012 reveals that there is a direct conflict between the two non
obstante clauses contained in these two different enactments. If Section
20 of the SC/ST Act is to be invoked in a case involving offences under
both the Acts, the same would be triable by a Special Court constituted
under Section 14 of the SC/ST Act and if provisions of Section 42-A of
the POCSO Act are to be applied, such a case shall be tried by a Special
Court constituted under Section 28 of the POCSO Act. Dealing with an
issue identical to the case on hand, the Apex Court in Sarwan Singh Vs.
Kasturi Lal, AIR 1977 SC 265 held thus : "When two or more laws
operate in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause stating
that its provisions will override those of any other law, stimulating and
Page 11 of 50
 incisive problems of interpretation arise. Since statutory interpretation has
no conventional protocol, cases of such conflict have to be decided in
reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration. For
resolving such inter se conflicts, one other test may also be applied
though the persuasive force of such a test is but one of the factors which
combine to give a fair meaning to the language of the law. That test is
that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one. Bearing in mind
the language of the two laws, their object and purpose, and the fact that
one of them is later in point of time and was enacted with the knowledge
of the non-obstante clauses in the earlier. In KSL & Industries Limited
Vs. Arihant Threads Limited & Others, AIR 2015 SC 498, the Apex
Court held thus :In view of the non obstante clause contained in both the
Acts, one of the important tests is the purpose of the two enactments. It is
important to recognize and ensure that the purpose of both enactments is
as far as possible fulfilled. A perusal of both the enactments would show
that POCSO Act is a self contained legislation which was introduced with
a view to protect the children from the offences of sexual assault,
harassment, pornography and allied offences. It was introduced with
number of safeguards to the children at every stage of the proceedings by
incorporating a child friendly procedure. The legislature introduced the
non obstante clause in Section 42-A of the POCSO Act with effect from
20.06.2012 giving an overriding effect to the provisions of the POCSO
Act though the legislature was aware about the existence of non obstante
clause in Section 20 of the SC/ST Act. Applying the test of chronology,
the POCSO Act, 2012 came into force with effect from 20.06.2012
whereas SC/ST Act was in force from 30.01.1990. The POCSO Act
being beneficial to all and later in point of time, it is to be held that the
provisions of POCSO Act have to be followed for trying cases where the
accused is charged for the offences under both the enactments." See :
State of A.P. Vs. Mangali Yadgiri, 2016 CrLJ 1415 (Hyderabad High
Court)(AP) (paras 14, 15, 16, 17, 19 & 20).
35.2 Seven years imprisonment for attain to commit rape held proper
under POCSO Act, 2012 : Where the accused had tried to commit rape
on a seven years old child while she was coming from school and her
testimony was also supported by other students studying in her school
and the medical evidence, the Supreme Court held that conviction of the
accused for the offence u/s 9 and 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and seven
years imprisonment was proper. See: Kumar Ghimirey Vs. State of
Sikkim, AIR 2019 SC 2011.
Page 12 of 50
35.3. Sentence awardable for the offences under POCSO Act:
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the queries
raised in the case noted below has clarified the sentence of
imprisonment to be awarded by the court for the offences
under the POCSO Act, 2012 as under.
(a) Pass an order clarifying that pursuant to the Judgment of

this Hon'ble Court dated 19.04.2022 in Criminal Appeal No.

612 of 2018, the sentence to be served by the Applicant is life
imprisonment simplicitor for the offence under Section 302,
5(m), (i) and 6 of the Protection of Children under Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO), imprisonment for a term of 20
years for the offence under Section 376A, IPC, rigorous
imprisonment for 10 years for the offence under Section 366,
IPC and rigorous imprisonment for 7 years for the offence
under Section 363, IPC.
(b) Pass an order clarifying that the sentence imposed by the Ld.

Sessions Judge, Seoni under Sections 376(2)(m) and 376(2)(i),

IPC has been substituted/subsumed by this Hon'ble Court in
Judgment dated 19.04.2022 in Criminal Appeal 612 of 2018
by imposing a sentence of imprisonment for 20 years under
Section 376A, IPC.
(c) Pass an order clarifying that the sentence to be served by the

applicant for the offence under Sections 5(m) and (i), 6,

POCSO is life imprisonment and not life imprisonment for the
reminder of natural life.
(d) Pass an order directing the Ld. Sessions Judge Seoni to

modify the order of supersession in accordance with the

Prayers A to C.
(e) Pass any other orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in

the facts and circumstances of the case.

Punishments prescribed for the offences under Sections

376(2)(i), 376(2)(m) and under Section 376(A) of IPC as also
for the offence under Section 5(i) and Section 5(m) read with
Section 6 of the POCSO Act, for which the petitioner-accused
has held guilty and punished, and to the observations made by
this Court in the judgment dated 19.04.2022, it appears that the
Court, while commuting the sentence of death for the sentence

Page 13 of 50
of life imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section
302 of IPC, and while imposing sentence to undergo
imprisonment for 20 years and not imprisonment for the
remainder of his natural life for the offence under Section
376A, IPC, had tried to balance the scales of retributive justice
and restorative justice. The Court, at the same time had
confirmed the conviction and sentence recorded by the Courts
below for the other offences under the IPC and the POCSO
Act which included offence under Sections 376(i) and 376(m)
of IPC and Section 5(i) and 5(m) read with Section 6 of POCSO
Act. Hence, as rightly submitted by the learned Senior Advocate
Mr. Marlapalle, if the sentence of life imprisonment imposed by
the Sessions Court and confirmed by the High Court, is also
confirmed by this Court for the offence under Sections
376(2)(i) and 376(2)(m), IPC and for the offence under
Section 5(i) and 5(m) read with Section 6 of POCSO Act,
then the life imprisonment would mean imprisonment for the
remainder of the petitioner's (original appellant's) natural life,
and in that case, the very purpose of the court in not imposing
the sentence of life imprisonment for the remainder of
petitioner's life for the offence under Section 376(A) of IPC,
would be frustrated. The Court had consciously imposed the
sentence of twenty years for the offence under Section 376A for
the reasons stated in the judgment. The Court therefore is
inclined to accept the submissions of Mr. Marlapalle, and to
modify the sentence imposed for the offence under Sections
376(2)(i) and 376(2)(m) of IPC and for the offence under
Section 5(i) and 5(m) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act,
so as to commensurate the said sentences with the sentence
imposed for the offence under Section 376(A) of IPC, and
accordingly imposes sentence directing the appellant/petitioner
to undergo imprisonment for a period of twenty years instead of
life imprisonment for the said offences.(Para 6)
The upshot of this order would be that the appellant-petitioner
shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 20 years
for the offence under Sections 376(2)
(i) and 376(2)(m) of IPC, and for a period of 20 years for the
offence under Section 5

Page 14 of 50
 (i) and 5(m) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The
judgment and order dated 19.04.2022 passed by this
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 612 of 2019 stands
corrected and modified to the aforesaid extent. The rest
of the judgment shall remain unchanged. (Para 7).
See: Mohd. Firoz Vs. State of M.P., 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1474 (Three-Judge Bench)

35.4. Quashment of FIR and Charge-sheet by High Court for

offences under POCSO Act held improper: The facts of the
case noted below were that during the investigation,
Superintendent of the hostel and four others, namely, Narendra
Laxmanrao Virulkar, Sau Neeta alias Kalpana Mahadeo
Thakare, Sau Lata Madhukar Kannake, Venkateswami
Bondaiyaa Jangam were arrested and arraigned as accused in
the crime. During the investigation, it was found that 17 minor
girls were abused by the accused and on their medical
examination rupture of hymen was found. The respondent
herein is the Medical Practitioner appointed for treatment of
girls admitted to the said Girls' hostel and the victim girls were
taken to him. The investigation revealed that the respondent
had knowledge about the incidents occurred, from the victims
themselves as the victim girls revealed in their statements
recorded under Section 161 of CrPC about their divulgation
of sexual assault on them to the respondent. In fact, some of
the victims had specifically revealed it in their statements
recorded under Section 164 CrPC. The respondent who was
under a legal obligation in terms of the provisions under Section
19(1) of the POCSO Act upon getting the knowledge about
committing of an offence under the POCSO Act to provide
such information either to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or
the local police remained silent and did not provide such
information to help the accused is the gist of the allegation
against him. As already stated, after investigation, a charge
sheet was also filed. The Respondent has been arraigned as
accused No. 6 in the aforesaid crime. Apprehending arrest in
connection with the said crime, the respondent herein filed
an anticipatory bail application before the Ld. Sessions Judge
on 10.06.2019 and the same was rejected on 25.06.2019. The
Page 15 of 50
said order was challenged before the High Court and the High
Court allowed the appeal and granted him protection from
arrest. Thereafter, the respondent herein filed Criminal
Application (APL) No. 841/2019 under Section 482 of the
CrPC seeking quashment of the FIR dated 12.04.2019 and the
charge-sheet dated 08.06.2019 to the extent they are against
him. The High Court passed the impugned judgment and
quashed the FIR as also the charge-sheet qua the respondent.
Hence, this appeal. Exercise of power under Section 482
CrPC is an exception and not the rule and it is to be exercised
ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone Courts exist. This position has
been stated and reiterated by the Supreme Court time and again.
The Supreme Court in the decision in R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 held that the High Court could not
embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence is reliable
or not while exercising the power under Section 482 CrPC.
In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
(Para102) it has been held that quashing may be appropriate
where the allegations made in the First Information Report or
the complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused and where the allegations in
the First Information Report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
which are statements of some of the victims recorded under
Section 161/164 CrPC recorded much prior to the impugned
judgment dated 20.4.2021 viz., in the year 2019 itself. We do
so solely to verify the verity of the finding of the High Court
to the effect that such statements do not disclose anything
suggesting knowledge of the respondent about the
commission of the crime. In truth, those statements did mention
about divulgation of sexual assault on them by victims to the
respondent. We may hasten to add, at the risk of repetition, that
such statements recorded under Section 161/164 CrPC are
inadmissible in evidence as held in M.L. Bhatt's case (supra)
Page 16 of 50
 and in Rajeev Kourav's case (supra). In the light of the
circumstances available as above and in the light of Section 59
of the Evidence Act, the High Court was not justified in
bringing abrupt termination of the proceedings qua the
respondent. The position revealed from the discussion above
constrains us to hold that there was prima facie case against the
respondent for the offence referred above and hence, the appeal
is liable to succeed. (Paras 7,8 & 26) See: State of
Maharashtra and Another Vs. Dr. Maroti 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1503
35.5. Tying of Rakhi, apology of accused and rendering community service
etc. not substitute to penalty for offences against women: Using tying
Rakhi as a condition for bail transforms a molester into brother by a
judicial mandate. This is wholly unacceptable and has the effect of
diluting and eroding the offence of sexual harassment. The act
perpetrated on the survivor constitutes an offence in law and is not a
minor transgression that can be remedied by way of an apology.
Rendering community service, tying a Rakhi, presenting a gift to the
survivor, or even promising to marry her, as the case may be. The law
criminalizes outraging the modesty of a woman. Granting bail, subject to
such conditions, renders the court susceptible to the charge of re-
negotiating and mediating justice between confronting parties in a
criminal offence and perpetuating gender stereotypes. The use of
reasoning language which diminishes the offence and tends to trivialize
the quakes is especially to be avoided under all circumstances. To say
that the survivor had in the past consented to such or similar acts or that
she behaved promiscuously, or by her acts or clothing, provoked the
alleged action of the accused, that she behaved in a manner unbecoming
of chaste or Indian women, or that she had called upon the situation by
her behavior, etc. These instances are only illustrations of an attitude
which should never enter judicial verdicts or orders or be considered
relevant while making a judicial decision, they cannot be reasons for
granting bail or other such relief.
Similarly imposing conditions that implicitly tend to condone or diminish
the harm caused by the accused and have the effect of potentially
exposing the survivor to secondary trauma, such as mandating mediation
processes in non- compoundable offences, mandating as part of bail
conditions, community service or requiring tendering of apology once or

Page 17 of 50
 repeatedly, or in any manner regretting or being in touch with the
survivor, is especially forbidden.
The law does not permit or countenance such conduct, where the survivor
can potentially be traumatized many times over or be led into some kind
of non-voluntary acceptance, or be compelled by the circumstances to
accept and condone behavior what is a serious offence. On basis of
foregoing discussion, directions issued that bail conditions should not
mandate, require or permit contact between the accused and the victim.
Such conditions should soak to protect the complainant from any further
harassment by the accused. Where circumstances exist for the court to
believe that there might be a potential threat of harassment of the victim,
or upon apprehension expressed, after calling for reports from the police,
the nature of protection shall be separately considered and appropriate
order made. In addition to a direction to the accused not to make any
contact with the victim. In all cases where bail is granted, the complainant
should immediately be informed that the accused has been granted bail
and copy of the bail order made over to him/her within two days. Bail
conditions and orders should avoid reflecting stereotypical or patriarchal
notions about women and their place in society, and must strictly be in
accordance with the requirements of the CrPC. In other words, discussion
about the dress, behavior, or past conduct or morals of the press, should
not enter the verdict granting bail. The courts while adjudicating cases
involving gender related crimes, should not suggest or entertain any
notions towards compromises between the press and the accused to get
married, suggest or mandate mediation between the accused and the
survivor, or any form of compromise as it is beyond their powers and
jurisdiction.
See: Aparna Bhat Vs. State of M.P., AIR 2021 Supreme
Court 1492
35.6. Death penalty awarded by the Trial Court and High Court
for offences u/s 302 IPC read with Section 6 of POCSO Act
commuted to life imprisonment by Supreme Court : In the
case noted below, the appellant had approached the Supreme
Court being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur dated 17th
November 2017, thereby dismissing the appeal preferred by
the appellant challenging the judgment and order dated 17th
June 2016, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast

Page 18 of 50
 Track Court, Raigarh (hereinafter referred to as the “trial
judge”) vide which the trial judge convicted the appellant for the
offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(i), 377,
201, 302 read with Section 376A of the IPC and Section 6
of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012 (hereinafter referred to as the “POCSO Act”). Vide the
same judgment and order, the appellant was sentenced to death
for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.
For the other offences for which the appellant was found guilty,
sentences of rigorous imprisonment of 3 years, 5 years, 7 years
and life imprisonment had been awarded to the appellant. The
trial judge had also made a reference being Criminal.
Reference. No. 1 of 2016 to the High Court under Section 366
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for confirmation of death
penalty. Vide the impugned judgment and order, the High
Court while dismissing the appeal of the appellant, has
confirmed the death penalty. The Supreme Court adopted the
reasoning and followed the course as ruled in the case of Sunil
Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC 205. The
appeals were therefore partly allowed. The judgment and order
of conviction for the offences punishable under Sections 363,
366, 376(2) (i), 377, 201, 302 read with Section 376A of the
IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act was maintained.
However, the death penalty imposed on the appellant under
Section 302 IPC was commuted to life imprisonment. The
sentences awarded for the rest of the offences by the trial court
as affirmed by the High Court were maintained. See: Lochan
Shrivas Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC
1249

36. When same offence punishable under two penal laws or under special
Act also... When same offence is punishable under two penal laws or
under special Act also, it has been held that bar of Sec. 26 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 to second prosecution and punishment for the same
offence would arise only where the ingredients of both offenses are the
same. Initial burden is upon the accused to take necessary plea of
autrefois convict and establish the same. See... 2011 CrLJ 427 (SC)

Page 19 of 50
37. When the ingredients of the offence are different under two Acts---
Where in the matter of killing of an elephant, the police, after due
investigation had filed a final report to the effect that no offence was
made out u/s 429 IPC but the Range Forest Officer filed a complaint for
the offences u/s 9(1) & 51 of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972, it has
been held by the Supreme Court that an offence u/s. 51, 56, 9(1), 2(16), of
the 1972 Act and u/s 429 IPC is not the same or substantially the same, as
the offence envisaged by Sec. 91 r/w Sec. 2(16), 51 of the Wild Life
Protection Act, 1972 in its ingredients and content, is not the same or
substantially the same as Sec. 429 of the IPC. The ingredients of an
offence u/s 9(1) r/w Sec. 51 of the 1972 Act require for its establishment
certain ingredients which are not part of the offence u/s 429 IPC & vice-
versa. Therefore, in the case of killing of an elephant, the fact that the
police after due investigation, had filed a final report that no offence was
made out u/s 429 IPC, would not bar the initiation of fresh proceedings
u/s 9(1) r/w Sec. 51 of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972. See--- State of
Bihar vs. Murad Ali Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1.

38. Special Court of Gangster to try offences under NDPS Act along with
offences under the UP Gangsters Act, 1986: The present provision is to
be tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid constitutional principle. The
provision clearly mandates that the trial under this Act of any offence by
the Special Court shall have precedence and shall be concluded in
preference to the trial in such other courts to achieve the said purpose.
The legislature thought it appropriate to provide that the trial of such
other case shall remain in abeyance, It is apt to note here that “any other
case” against the accused in “any other court” does not include the
Special Court. The emphasis is on speedy trial and not denial of it. The
legislature has incorporated such a provision so that an accused does not
face trial in two cases simultaneously and a case before the Special Court
does not linger owing to clash of dates in trial. It is also worthy to note
that the Special Court has been conferred jurisdiction under sub-section
(1) of Section 8 of the Act to try any other offences with which the
accused may, under any other law for the time being in force, have been
charged and proceeded at the same trial. See: Dharmendra Kirthal Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2013) 8 SCC 368 (Para 32) .
Note: Rule 22 of the UP Gangsters Rules, 2021 provides for including
the offences under NDPS Act with the offences under the UP Gangsters
Page 20 of 50
 Act, 1986 and empowers the Special Court of Gangster to try the NDPS
offences along with the offence under the UP Gangsters Act, 1986.

39. Sec. 409 IPC & P.C. Act--- By virtue of Sec. 23 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897, the accused can be convicted and punished for the offence u/s
5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 despite acquittal for the
offence u/s 409 IPC even if the accused was prosecuted in the same trial
for the two offences named above. See--- State of M.P. vs. Veereshwar
Rao Agnihotri, AIR 1957 SC 592

40. When Central & State Legislation declare the same act as offence---
The question of punishment for an offence which is a penal offence both
under the Central and the State Act would depend upon as to whether it
constitutes a single subject matter and cannot be split up and on this
principle rests the rule of construction relating to statutes that “when the
punishment of penalty is altered in degree but not in kind, the later
provision i.e. the Central Act would be considered as superseding the
earlier one i.e. the State Act. On a question under Artcle 254(1) of the
Constitution, where an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the
State, no question of repeal arises; but the principle on which the rule of
implied repeal rests, namely, that if the subject-matter of the later
legislation is identical with that of the earlier, so that they cannot both
stand together, then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, will be
equally applicable to a question under Art. 254(1) when the further
legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the
State law. See--- Zaverbhai vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752
(Five-Judge Bench)

41. Punishment when the ingredients of the two offences are the same---
Both in the case of Art. 20(2) of the Constitution as well as Sec. 26 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 to operate as a bar the second prosecution and
the consequential punishment thereunder must be for “the same offence”
i.e. an offence whose ingredients are the same. The Vth amendment of the
American Constitution which provides that no person shall be subject, for
the same offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, proceeds on
the same principle. See--- Manipur Administration vs. Thokechom
Bira Singh, AIR 1965 SC 87 (Five-Judge Bench)
42. Effect of irregularity in taking cognizance of offences punishable
under Special Act as well as IPC : In the case noted below, a Single
Page 21 of 50
Judge of the High Court of Karnataka dismissed two petitions instituted
by the appellants for quashing the criminal proceedings initiated against
them in Special CC No.599/2015 (arising out of Crime No.21/2014) for
offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 409 and 420 read
with Section 120B IPC, Sections 21 and 23 read with Sections 4(1) and
4(1)(A) of the Mines and Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act
1957 and Rule 165 read with Rule 144 of the Karnataka Forest Rules
1969. Upholding the cognizance taking order passed by the Special Judge
by setting aside the order of the High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
ruled as under:
(i) The Special Court does not have, in the absence of a specific
provision to that effect, the power to take cognizance of an offence
under the MMDR Act without the case being committed to it by
the Magistrate under Section 209 CrPC. The order of the Special
Judge dated 30 December 2015 taking cognizance is therefore
irregular;
(ii) The objective of Section 465 is to prevent the delay in the
commencement and completion of trial. Section 465 CrPC is
applicable to interlocutory orders such as an order taking
cognizance and summons order as well. Therefore, even if the
order taking cognizance is irregular, it would not vitiate the
proceedings in view of Section 465 CrPC;
(iii) The decision in Gangula Ashok (supra) was distinguished in
Rattiram (supra) based on the stage of trial. This differentiation
based on the stage of trial must be read with reference to Section
465(2) CrPC. Section 465(2) does not indicate that it only covers
challenges to pre-trial orders after the conclusion of the trial. The
cardinal principle that guides Section 465(2) CrPC is that the
challenge to an irregular order must be urged at the earliest. While
determining if there was a failure of justice, the Courts ought to
address it with reference to the stage of challenge, the seriousness
of the offence and the apparent intention to prolong proceedings,
among others;
(iv) In the instant case, the cognizance order was challenged by the
appellant two years after cognizance was taken. No reason was
given to explain the inordinate delay. Moreover, in view of the
diminished role of the committal court under Section 209 of the
Code of 1973 as compared to the role of the committal court under

Page 22 of 50
 the erstwhile Code of 1898, the gradation of irregularity in a
cognizance order made in Sections 460 and 461 and the seriousness
of the offence, no failure of justice has been demonstrated;
(v) It is a settled principle of law that cognizance is taken of the
offence and not the offender. However, the cognizance order
indicates that the Special Judge has perused all the relevant
material relating to the case before cognizance was taken. The
change in the form of the order would not alter its effect.
Therefore, no ‗failure of justice‘ under Section 465 CrPC is
proved. This irregularity would thus not vitiate the proceedings in
view of Section 465 CrPC;
(vi) The Special Court has the power to take cognizance of offences
under MMDR Act and conduct a joint trial with other offences if
permissible under Section 220 CrPC. There is no express provision
in the MMDR Act which indicates that Section 220 CrPC does not
apply to proceedings under the MMDR Act;
(vii) Section 30B of the MMDR Act does not impliedly repeal Section
220 CrPC. Both the provisions can be read harmoniously and
such an interpretation furthers justice and prevents hardship since
it prevents a multiplicity of proceedings;
(viii) Since cognizance was taken by the Special Judge based on a police
report and not a private complaint, it is not obligatory for the
Special Judge to issue a fully reasoned order if it otherwise appears
that the Special Judge has applied his mind to the material;
(ix) A combined reading of the notifications dated 29 May 2014 and 21
January 2014 indicate that the Sub-Inspector of Lokayukta is an
authorized person for the purpose of Section 22 of the MMDR Act.
The FIR that was filed to overcome the bar under Section 22 has
been signed by the Sub-Inspector of Lokayukta Police and the
information was given by the SIT. Therefore, the respondent has
complied with Section 22 CrPC; and
(x) The question of whether A-1 was in-charge of and responsible for
the affairs of the company during the commission of the alleged
offence as required under the proviso to Section 23(1) of the
MMDR Act is a matter for trial. There appears to be a prima facie
case against A-1, which is sufficient to arraign him as an accused
at this stage. See: Judgment dated 29.11.2021 of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court delivered in Criminal Appeal No. 1288 of 2021,
Pradeep S. Wodeyar Vs. The State of Karnataka.
Page 23 of 50
43. Implied repeal of inconsistent or repugnant subordinate legislation---
Where a later enactment or a subordinate legislation is so inconsistent
with or repugnant to an earlier enactment or subordinate legislation that
the two cannot co-exist then the later one would effect repeal of the
former by implication. See---Dharangadhra Chemical Works vs.
Dharangadhra Municipality, (1985) 4 SCC 92

44. PFA Act, 1954 & the EC Act, 1955 & penalty thereunder---The object
and purpose of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is to
eliminate the danger to human life and health from the sale of
unwholesome articles of food. The Essential Commodities Act, 1955 on
the other hand has for its object the control of the production, supply and
distribution of, and trade and commerce in, essential commodities. In
spite of this difference, the two provisions may have conterminous fields
of operation. The provisions of the Adulteration Act and of the Food
Order are supplementary and cumulative in their operation and they can
stand together. If the Adulteration Act or Rules impose some restrictions
on the manufacturer, dealer and seller of vinegar then they have to
comply with them irrespective of the fact that the Fruit Order imposes
lesser number of restrictions in respect of these matters. The Parliament
did not intend by enacting the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the
Rules in respect of the vinegar. Both the statutes can function with full
vigour side by side in their own parallel channels. Even if they happen to
some extent to overlap, Sec. 26 of the General Clauses Act fully protects
the guilty parties against double jeopardy or double penalty. See---
Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Shiv Shanker, AIR 1971 SC 815
(Three-Judge Bench)

45. Award of compensation to victim u/s 357 CrPC mandatory : It is

mandatory duty of Criminal Court to apply its mind to question of
awarding compensation u/s 357 CrPC in every case. This power is not
ancillary to other sentences but in addition there to. Use of the word
“may” in section 357 CrPC does not mean that court need not consider
applicability of Section 357 CrPC in every criminal case. Section 357
CrPC confers power coupled with duty on court to mandatorily apply its
mind to question of awarding compensation in every criminal case. Court
must also disclosed at it has applied its mind to such question by
recording reasons for awarding/refusing grant of compensation. Power
Page 24 of 50
 given to courts u/s 357 CrPC is intended to reassure victim that he/she is
not forgotten in criminal justice system. Very object of Section 357 CrPC
would be defeated if courts choose to ignore Section 357 CrPC and do not
apply there mind to question of compensation. Courts are directed to
remain careful in future as to their mandatory duty u/s 357 CrPC. Copy
of order directed to be forwarded to Registrars General of all High Court
for its circulation amongst judges handling criminal trials and hearing
criminal appeals. See : Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad Vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 770.

46. Default sentence can be awarded against non-payment of

compensation u/s 357(3) CrPC---Whether default sentence can be
imposed for non-payment of compensation u/s 357(3) of the CrPC ? It
has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Sec. 357(3) and 431
CrPC, when read with Sec. 64 IPC, empower the court, while making an
order for payment of compensation not part of fine, to also include a
default sentence in case of non-payment of the same. If recourse can only
be had to Sec. 421 CrPC for enforcing the same, the very object of Sec.
357(3) CrPC would be frustrated and the relief contemplated therein
would be rendered somewhat illusory. The provision for grant of
compensation under Sec. 357(3) CrPC and the recovery thereof makes it
necessary for the imposition of a default sentence. While awarding
compensation u/s 357(3) CrPC, the court is within its jurisdiction to add a
default sentence of imprisonment u/s 64 of the IPC. See:
(i) Vijayan vs. Sadanandan K., (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 296
(ii) AIR 1988 SC 2127
(iii) K.A Abbas Vs. Sabu Joseph, (2010) 6 SCC 230.
Note: For contrary law on the subject, See: Ahammedkutty vs.
Abdullakoya, (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 302.

47. Special provision for compensation to the victims belonging to SC/ST

community: Section 357 CrPC as amended in Uttar Pradesh since
1992: Section 357 CrPC as amended in Uttar Pradesh since 1992
provides for special provision for compensation to the victims of offences
belonging to the SC/ST community.

48. Fine imposed against accused convicted for rape or gang rape to be
paid to the victim: Sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D,
376DA, 376DB, 376E as amended w.e.f. 21.04.2018 provide that any
Page 25 of 50
 fine imposed by the Court against the convicts found guilty of rape or
gang rape shall be paid to the victims of such offences.

49. Life imprisonment is the rule and death penalty an exception: In a

case of conviction u/s 302/34, 201, 148, 452, 323 IPC, the Supreme Court
had ruled that life imprisonment is the rule and death penalty an
exception. Death penalty can be awarded only in rarest of the rare cases.
Each case of murder is gruesome. Right of life of even an accused has to
be respected. See : Bimla Devi Vs. Rajesh Singh, 2016 (92) ACC 902
(SC).

50. Answers to two questions should be sought to satisfy the test of

"rarest of rare" case for awarding death penalty : Answers to two
questions should be sought to satisfy the test of "rarest of rare" case for
awarding death penalty. The two questions are to be asked and answered:
(i) Is there something uncommon about crimes which regard sentence
of imprisonment for life inadequate ?
(ii) Whether there is no alternative punishment suitable except death
sentence. Where a crime is committed with extreme brutality and
collective conscience of society is shocked, courts must award death
penalty, irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability of
death penalty. By not imposing death sentence in such cases, courts may
do injustice to society at large. See : Mukesh Vs. State for NCT of
Delhi & Others, AIR 2017 SC 2161 (Three-Judge Bench)

51. "Rarest of rare" case for award of death sentence when to be

presumed ? : A brutal gang rape in Delhi on December 16, 2012 took
place and in that incident the victim was not only raped in a running bus
but quite serious inner injuries in her private part was caused by the
accused persons with iron rod with the result the victim girl died during
the course of medical treatment. Large scale public agitation all over the
country and especially in Delhi took place against the said barbaric act.
The incident continued to be reported and commented upon not only in
Indian Media but also abroad. The said incident is known as "Nirbhaya
Gang Rape & Murder". Taking into consideration the large scale public
anger against the said ghastly rape and murder and the inadequacy of
penalty provided therefore in the IPC, the Central Government on
23.12.2012 constituted a Three-Member Committee headed by Justice
J.S. Verma, former Chief Justice of India, to make recommendations for
Page 26 of 50
amendments in Criminal Laws so as to provide for quicker trial and
enhanced punishment for accused having committed sexual offences
against women. The Committee submitted its report to the Govt. of India
on 23.01.2013. For the offence of rape or gang-rape with murder, the
Committee made recommendation of awarding following penalty to the
convict :
"On death penalty 16. Justice Stewart in Furman v. Georgia157,
seminally noted that: “The penalty of death differs from all other forms of
criminal punishment, not in degree, but in kind. It is unique in its total
irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict
as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its
absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity”.
17. These words have formed the broad foundation for the evolution of
modern jurisprudence on ‘death penalty’ and have prompted us to
deliberate at length on this issue. 18. The Indian law on punishment with
death has been concretized in a few leading judgments which narrow
down the award of death sentences to the ‘rarest of the rare’ cases. The
criteria for determining whether a given case is so rare can be found in
Bachhan Singh v. State of Punjab158, which was later cited with approval
in Macchi Singh v. State, (1983) 3 SCC 470 160, and recently in Mulla v.
State of U.P. (2010) 3 SCC 508. The said criteria are as follows (see
Macchi Singh): “I. Manner of commission of murder 33. When the
murder is committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical,
revolting or dastardly manner so as to arouse intense and extreme
indignation of the community. For instance,
(i) when the house of the victim is set aflame with the end in view to
roast him alive in the house;
(ii) when the victim is subjected to inhuman acts of torture or cruelty
in order to bring about his or her death; (iii) when the body of the victim
is cut into pieces or his body is dismembered in a fiendish manner; II.
Motive for commission of murder 34. When the murder is committed for
a motive which evinces total depravity and meanness. For instance when
(a) a hired assassin commits murder for the sake of money or reward (b) a
cold-blooded murder is committed with a deliberate design in order to
inherit property or to gain control over property of a ward or a person
under the control of the murderer or vis-à-vis whom the murderer is in a
dominating position or in a position of trust, or (c) a murder is committed
in the course of betrayal of the motherland. III. Anti-social or socially
abhorrent nature of the crime 35. (a) When murder of a member of a
Page 27 of 50
Scheduled Caste or minority community, etc. is committed not for
personal reasons but in circumstances which arouse social wrath. For
instance when such a crime is committed in order to terrorise such
persons and frighten them into fleeing from a place or in order to deprive
them of, or make them surrender, lands or benefits conferred on them
with a view to reverse past injustices and in order to restore the social
balance. (b) In cases of ‘bride burning’ and what are known as ‘dowry
deaths’ or when murder is committed in order to remarry for the sake of
extracting dowry once again or to marry another woman on account of
infatuation. IV. Magnitude of crime 36. When the crime is enormous in
proportion. For instance when multiple murders say of all or almost all
the members of a family or a large number of persons of a particular
caste, community, or locality, are committed. V. Personality of victim of
murder 37. When the victim of murder is (a) an innocent child who could
not have or has not provided even an excuse, much less a provocation, for
murder (b) a helpless woman or a person rendered helpless by old age or
infirmity (c) when the victim is a person vis-à-vis whom the murderer is
in a position of domination or trust (d) when the victim is a public figure
generally loved and respected by the community for the services rendered
by him and the murder is committed for political or similar reasons other
than personal reasons. 38. In this background the guidelines indicated in
Bachan Singh case [(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] will have to
be culled out and applied to the facts of each individual case where the
question of imposing of death sentence arises. The following propositions
emerge from Bachan Singh case [(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri)
580] : (i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in
gravest cases of extreme culpability. (ii) Before opting for the death
penalty the circumstances of the ‘offender’ also require to be taken into
consideration along with the circumstances of the ‘crime’.
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In
other words death sentence must be imposed only when life
imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having
regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only
provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot
be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances.
(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to
be drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances have to be
accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the
Page 28 of 50
 aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is
exercised. 39. In order to apply these guidelines inter alia the following
questions may be asked and answered: (a) Is there something uncommon
about the crime which renders sentence of imprisonment for life
inadequate and calls for a death sentence? (b) Are the circumstances of
the crime such that there is no alternative but to impose death sentence
even after according maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances
which speak in favour of the offender? 40. If upon taking an overall
global view of all the circumstances in the light of the aforesaid
proposition and taking into account the answers to the questions posed
hereinabove, the circumstances of the case are such that death sentence is
warranted, the court would proceed to do so.”

52. Death Penalty awarded for rape and murder of three-years old girl
child converted into life imprisonment till death in jail for non-
production of DNA report u/s 53-A & 164-A CrPC: In the case noted
below which related to rape and murder of three years old girl child, the
DNA sample was taken from the bodies of the accused and the victim u/s
53-A and 164-A CrPC and was sent to the Forensic Sciences Laboratory
for DNA test and DNA profiling but the same was not produced before
the trial court and the accused was awarded death sentence. The Supreme
Court converted the death sentence into life imprisonment by holding
that non-production and non-explanation for not producing the DNA
profiling report before the court was not justified. The convict was
however directed to remain in jail for his entire normal life. See:
Rajendra Prahladrao Wasnik Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2019
SC 1 (Three-Judge Bench).

53. No death penalty for rape and murder of girl child if mitigating
circumstance exists: Accused had dragged a girl of nine years into the
sugarcane field, raped her and dumped her in a well. Manner of
commission of crime of murder and rape was extremely brutal. The
accused was of young age and there was possibility of reformation.
Murder was not committed in a pre-planned manner. His case did not fall
within the rarest of rare cases. The death penalty imposed by the trial
court and affirmed by the High Court was held by the Supreme Court as
not proper as the mitigating circumstance viz young age of the accused
existed. The accused was sentenced to imprisonment for period of 30

Page 29 of 50
 years without remission. See: Raj Jagdish Paswan Vs. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 2019 SC 897 (Three-Judge Bench).

54. No death penalty if mitigating circumstances exist--- There have to be

very special reasons to record death penalty and if mitigating factors in
the case are stronger then it is neither proper nor justified to award death
sentence and it would be sufficient to place it out of “rarest of rare
category.” See--- Sushil Kumar vs. State of Punjab, 2009 (6) Supreme
228.

55. Death penalty awarded for child rape and mother commuted to
minimum 20 years in jail without remission etc. as there was
possibility of reformation in the convict : Death penalty should be
imposed only when alternative of life imprisonment is totally inadequate
and after balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the
crime committed by the accused falls in “rarest of rare” category. In the
present case, the appellant aged 22 years was seen following the victim
aged 13 years on her way back from school day before the incident. He
kidnapped her, took her to a secluded area, raped her, murdered her by
strangulation and buried her dead body in the field. The Supreme Court
held that though the crime committed was of abnormal nature but it was
not so brutal, depraved, heinous or diabolical in nature as to fall into the
category of “rarest of rare cases” and invite death penalty. Besides, the
convict was not menace to the society, had no criminal antecedents and
his conduct post-incarceration was good and hence, possibility of reform
was not ruled out. Fact that he lacked remorse after committing the crime
or at the time hearing was inconsequential and does not preclude
reformation. Hence, the death penalty was commuted to life
imprisonment out of which the appellant was directed to serve a
mandatory minimum 20years without claiming remission which would be
proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed and would also
meet need to respond to the crimes against the women and children in
stringent manner. See: Viran Gyanlal Rajput Vs State of Maharashtra
(2019) 2 SCC 311 (Three- Judge Bench)

56. Period of imprisonment already undergone when to be reduced from

the total sentence imposed ? The wording of Sec. 428 CrPC is clear and
unambiguous. The heading of the Section 428 CrPC itself indicates that
the period of detention undergone by the accused is to be set off against
Page 30 of 50
 the sentence of imprisonment. The Section makes it clear that the period
of sentence on conviction is to be reduced by the extent of detention
already undergone by the convict during investigation, enquiry or trial of
the same case. It is quite clear that the period to be set off relates only to
pre conviction detention and not to imprisonment on conviction. See :
(i) State of Punjab Vs. Bawa Singh, (2015) 3 SCC 441
(ii) Atul Manubhai Parekh vs. CBI, 2009 (7) Supreme 659

57. Sentence undergone when and how relevant in determining the

quantum of sentence : In a murder trial where the accused persons were
convicted for the offences under Section 302 and 304 part II of the IPC
and the accused persons were ordered to serve only the sentence which
they had already undergone during the trial of the case, it has been held
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in awarding punishment to the
convicts, discretion conferred upon the courts is not absolute or
whimsical discretion. The Supreme Court depricated the increasing
tendency of courts at revisional and appellate stage regarding reducing the
sentence to "Sentence undergone" wihtout even taking note as to what
was the period of sentence already undergone. See...State of Rajasthan
Vs. Dhool Sing, 2004 (48) ACC 595 (S.C.)

58. Reduction of Sentence to period already undergone : In reducing the

sentence awarded by the lower court, it has been held by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that while reducing the sentence to period already
undergone, courts should categorically notice and state the period actually
undergone by the accused. See....Ajmer Singh Vs. State of Punjab,
(2005) 6 SCC 633
Note : It was a case of police personnel as accused convicted u/s 458,
393 IPC where they were ordered by the High Court to serve the
sentence already undergone by them in jail.

59. Set off u/s 428 CrPC of previous term in jail in the same case :
Section 428 CrPC provides following two pre-
conditions for set off :
(i) During investigation, enquiry or traial of a particular case the
prisoner
should have been in jail for certain period.

Page 31 of 50
 (ii) He should have been sentenced to term of imprisonment in that
case. See...Maliyakkal Abdul Azeez Vs. Asst. Collector, Kerala,
(2003) 2 SCC 439
(iii) It is immaterial that the prisoner was undergoing sentence of
imprisonment in another case also during the said period.
See....State of Maharashtra Vs. Najakat alias Mubarak Ali,
AIR 2001 SC 2255.

60. 'Sentence undergone' order reversed by the Supreme Court : Where

the trial court had awarded a sentence of 07 years R.I. to an accused for
offence u/s 376 of the IPC and the High Court, in appeal, had maintained
the conviction but had reduced the sentence from 07 years to sentence
already undergone (nearly 03 years), it has been laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that awarding sentence below the menimum prescribed
sentence is illegal. See : Amar Singh Vs. Balwinder Singh (2003) 2
SCC 518.

61. Period of sentence already undergone in any other case can also be
reduced or set off in any other case--- Period of imprisonment
undergone by an accused as an under-trial during investigation, inquiry or
trial of a particular case, irrespective of whether it was in connection with
that very case or other cases, could be set-off against the sentence of
imprisonment imposed on conviction in that particular case. The words
“same case” used in Sec. 428 CrPC do not suggest that the set-off would
be available only if the period undergone as an under-trial prisoner is in
connection with the same case in which he was later convicted and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The said expression merely denotes
the pre-sentence period of detention undergone by an accused and nothing
more. See—
(i) State of Punjab vs. Madan Lal, 2009 (5) SCC 238 (Three-Judge
Bench)
(ii) State of Maharashtra vs. Najakat Alia Mubarak Ali, (2001) 6
SCC 311 (Three-Judge Bench)

62. A penal statute when not to be applied retrospectively ? A penal

statute (in this case Sec. 19B & 47A of the Registration Act, 1908), as is
well known, unless expressly provided, cannot be given retrospective
effect. See---
(i) C.J. Pal vs. District Collector, 2009 (6) Supreme 151
Page 32 of 50
 (ii) Ritesh Agarwal vs. SEBI, (2008) 8 SCC 205

64. Proportion between crime & punishment--- Proportion between crime

and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant
notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences.
The practice of punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is now
unknown in civilized societies, but such a radical departure from the
principle of proportionality has disappeared from the law only in recent
times. Even now for a single grave infraction drastic sentences are
imposed. Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any serious
crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is unwarranted
and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those considerations that make
punishment unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the crime,
uniformly disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable
practical consequences. See--- Sahdev vs. Jaibar, 2009 (67) ACC 483
(SC)

65. Principle of Proportionality to be observed in determining the

quantum of sentence : Sentence must be appropriate and proportionate
to the gravity of the crime. Where the accused was convicted for several
offences, he cannot be sentenced to imprisonment for period longer that
14 years. Sentence of 20 years R.I. imposed on accused was set aside.
when the court convicts an accused for more than one offence and directs
the sentences to run consecutively and not concurrently, the aggregate
sentence cannot exceed 14 years. See...
(i) Alister Anthony Pareira Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2012 (76)
ACC 660 (SC)
(ii) Chatar Singh Vs. State of MP, AIR 2007 SC, 319
Note : In this case 20 years aggregate sentence was consecutively
awarded by MP High Court which was set aside by Supreme Court.

66. Court of first instance must direct u/s 31 CrPC whether sentences
awarded to the accused at one trial for several offences would run
concurrently or consecutively : It is legally obligatory upon the court of
first instance that while awarding sentence at one trial for several offences
to specify u/s 31 CrPC in clear terms in the order of conviction as to
whether sentences awarded to the accused would run concurrently or
consecutively. See :
(i) Gagan Kumar Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2019 SC 1009.
Page 33 of 50
 (ii) Nagaraja Rao Vs. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 302.

67. Court has power & discretion u/s 31 CrPC to direct for concurrent
running of sentences : Court has power & discretion u/s 31 CrPC to
direct for concurrent running of sentences when the accused is convicted
at one trial for two or more offences having regard to the nature of
offences and attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances. See :
O.M. Cherian Vs. State of Kerala, 2015 (89) ACC 62 (SC)(Three-
Judge Bench)

68.1. All sentences for several offences to run only concurrently and not
consecutively--Proviso to Section 31 (2) CrPC : As per Proviso to
Section 31(2) CrPC, if the accused is convicted and sentenced for several
offences and one of the sentences is life imprisonment, then all sentences
would run concurrently and not consecutively. See : Duryodhan Rout
Vs. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 783.

68.2. Discretion of court to direct subsequent sentence to run concurrently with

the previous sentence has to be exercised judiciously depending upon the
nature of offences committed by the accused. Court should not exercise
its discretion u/s 427 CrPC in favour of the accused who is found to be
indulged into illegal trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances and should not direct running of sentences concurrently. See:
Mohd Zahid Vs. State through NCB, LL 2021 SC 722

69. Inadequate sentence against the interest of Society : Punishment

awardedby courts for crimes must not be irrelevant. It should conform to
and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which crime was
committed. It must respond to society's cry for justice and criminals.
See... State of MP Vs. Kashiram, AIR 2009 SC 1642

70. Duration & meaning of “imprisonment for life”---There is no provision

of law whereunder a sentence for life imprisonment, without any formal
remission by appropriate Government, can be automatically treated as one
for a definite period. Section 57 does not say that transportation for life
shall be deemed to be transportation for twenty years for all purposes; nor
does the amended section which substitutes the words “imprisonment for
life” enable the drawing of any such all embracing fiction. A sentence of
transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated
Page 34 of 50
 as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of
the convicted person’s natural life. Sentence of imprisonment for life is for
indefinite period. Government alone can remit sentence. Remission earned
by convict are of little help. See---
(i) Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC
600 (Five-Judge Bench) (Known as Mahatma Gandhi murder case)
ii) State of Haryana vs. Balvant Singh, AIR 1999 SC 3333

71. “Life imprisonment” does not mean 14 or 20 years--- Interpreting the

provisions u/s 53, 53-A, 55, 57 of the IPC, the Supreme Court has held
that the expression “life imprisonment” is not equivalent to imprisonment
for 14 years or 20 years. “Life imprisonment” means imprisonment for
the whole of the remaining period of the convicted persons natural life.
There is no provision either in IPC or in CrPC whereby life imprisonment
could be treated as 14 years or 20 years without their being a formal
remission by the appropriate government. See--- Mohd. Munna vs.
Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 417

72. Sentence of Life imprisonment not to be reduced below 14 years--- If

the accused has been awarded life imprisonment, he has to undergo
imprisonment for atleast 14 years. Actual period of imprisonment may
stand reduced on account of remissions earned u/s 432, 433, 433-A CrPC.
But in no case, sentence of life imprisonment can be reduced below 14
years except under Article 72 of the Constitution by the President of India
and under Article 161 by the Governor. See--- Ramraj vs. State of
Chhatisgarh, 2010 (68) ACC 326 (SC)

73. Concurrent running of two or more sentences : When two sentences

are directed to run concurrently, they do merge into one sentence and they
are to run togather. See....K. Ventaka Reddy Vs. I.G. Prisons, 1982
CrLJ 1844 (AP)

74. Direction for consecutive or concurrent running of sentences

discretionary with the court : The direction by the court for the sentence
to run concurrently or consecutively is in the discretion of the court and
that does not affect the nature of the sentence. See...P. Prabhakaran Vs.
P. Jayarajan, AIR 2005 SC 688

Page 35 of 50
75. Accused not to be sentenced exceeding 14 years for different offences
: According to Section 31 CrPC, if an accuse is sentenced for several
offences in the same case, he cannot be awarded a total sentence
exceeding 14 years.

76. No consecutive sentence with life imprisonment can be imposed due

to the bar of proviso to Section 31(2) CrPC : From the aforesaid
decisions rendered by this Court, it is clear that a sentence of
imprisonment for life means a sentence for entire life of the prisoner
unless the appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion to
remit either the whole or a part of the sentence under the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code. Sentence 31 of CrPC relates to sentence in
cases of conviction of several of fences at one trial. Proviso to sub-
section (2) to Section 31 lays down the embargo whether the aggregate
punishment of prisoner is for a period of longer than 14 years. In view of
the fact that life imprisonment means imprisonment for full and complete
span of life, the question of consecutive sentences in case of conviction
for several offences at one trial does not arise. Therefore, in case a person
is sentenced of conviction of several offences, including one that of life
imprisonment, the proviso to Section 31(2) shall come into play and no
consecutive sentence can be imposed. See : Duryodhan Rout Vs. State
of Orissa, AIR 2014 SC 3345.
77. Discretion of court to order sentences to run concurrently has to be
exercised as per Section 31 CrPC : Section 31, CrPC relates to the
quantum of punishment which may be legally passed when there is (a)
one trial and (b) the accused is convicted of "two or more offences".
Section 31, CrPC says that subject to the provisions of Section 71, IPC
Court may pass separate sentences for two or more offences of which the
accused is found guilty, but the aggregate punishment must not exceed
the limit fixed in the proviso (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 31,
CrPC. In Section 31(1) CrPC since the word "may" is used, in our
considered view, when a person is convicted for two or more offences at
one trial, the Court may exercise its discretion in directing that the
sentence for each offence may either run consecutively or concurrently
subject to the provisions of Section 71, IPC. But the aggregate must not
exceed the limit fixed in provisions (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of
Section 31, CrPC that is -(i) it cannot exceed twice the maximum
imprisonment awardable by the sentencing court for a single offfence.
The words "unless the court directs that such punishments shall run
Page 36 of 50
 concurrently" occuring in sub-section (1) of Section 31, make it clear that
Section 31 CrPC vests a discretion in the Court to direct that the
punishment shall run concurrently, when the accused is convicted at one
trial for two or more offences. It is manifest from Section 31, CrPC that
thr Court has the power and discretion to issue a direction for concurrent
running of the sentences when the accused is convicted at one trial for
two or more offences. Section 31, CrPC authorizes the passing of
concurrent sentences in cases of substantive sentences of imprisonment.
Any sentence of imprisonment in default of fine has to be in excess of,
and not concurrent with, any other sentence of imprisonment to which the
convict may have been sentenced. See : O.M. Cherian alias
Thankachan Vs. State of Kerala & Others, AIR 2015 SC 303 (paras
10 & 11)

78. Meaning of Double or successive punishments for life imprisonment :

If an accused is punished with second time or successive punishments for
imprisonment for life, then according to Section 427 CrPC the subsequent
conviction and sentence for imprisonment for life means that the previous
imprisonment for life can only be superimposed by the subsequent one
and certainly added to it since extending life span of the offender or for
that matter of any one is beyond human might. See.... Ranjit Singh Vs.
Union territory of Chandigarh, AIR 1991 SC 2296

79. Awarding of fine mandatory where penal Section contains words

"shall also be liable to fine" : Import of words "shall also be liable to
fine" with a specified fine amount is that levy of fine is mandatory.
Judicial discretion thereunder only empowers the court to reduce sentence
of imprisonment for any term lesser than six months. Court is not
empowered to levy no fine or a fine of less than what is specified in the
Statute. See : Employees' State Insurance Corporation Vs. A.K.
Abdul Samad & Another, (2016) 4 SCC 785.

80. Awarding fine u/s 302 IPC not mandatory but only discretionary
....The words “shall also be liable to fine” u/s 302 IPC merely empowers
the court to impose fine and does not mandate it. To impose or not to
impose fine is in the discretion of the court. See...Santosh Kumar
Baranwal Vs. State of U.P., 2010(4) ALJ(NOC) 530 (Allahabad High
Court)(DB)

Page 37 of 50
81. Extent of powers of President/Governor under Articles 72/161 for
remission of sentence....There is no dispute to the settled legal
proposition that the power exercised by the President and the Governor
under Articles 72/161 respectively could be the subject matter of limited
judicial review. In Epuru Sudhakar's case, AIR 2006 SC 3385, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the orders under Art. 72/161 could
be challenged on the following grounds:
(a) That the order has been passed without application of mind
(b) That the order is mala fide
(c) That the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant
considerations
(d) That relevant materials have been kept out of consideration
(e) That the order suffers from arbitrariness. See.... State of Haryana
Vs. Jagdish, AIR 2010 SC 1690.

82. Order of President and Governor under Articles 72/161 may be

questioned on certain considerations : There is no dispute to the settled
legal proposition that the power exercised by the President and the
Governor under Articles 72/161 respectively could be the subject matter
of limited judicial review. In Epuru Sudhakar's case, AIR 2006 SC
3385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the orders under Art.
72/161 could be challenged on the following grounds:
(a) That the order has been passed without application of mind
(b) That the order is mala fide
(c) That the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant
considerations
(d) That relevant materials have been kept out of consideration
(e) That the order suffers from arbitrariness. See : State of Haryana
Vs. Jagdish, AIR 2010 SC 1690.

83. Probation of offenders : Probation is a part of reformative process of the

offenders. Many offenders are not criminals but circumstances make
them criminals and through misfortunes are brought within the operation
of judicial system. By extendeing the benefit of probation as per Section
360 CrPC, courts encourage there own sense of responsibility for future
of the accused and save him from the stigma and possible development of
criminal propensities. Probation is thus in tune with the reformative trend
of modern criminal justice to rehabilitate the young offenders as useful
citizens. See....Panchu Vs. State of Orissa, 1993 CRLJ 953(Orissa).
Page 38 of 50
84. Reasons must be recorded for not releasing the convict on probation
: Trial court must record reasons why it is not possible to release the
convict on probation. Similarly, grant of compensation to the victim is
equally a part of just sentencing. Reason should be recorded for not
granting compensation. A Trail Judge must be alive to alternate methods
of mutually satisfactory disposition of a case. See : State Vs. Sanjiv
Bhalla, 2014 (86) ACC 938 (SC).

85. Probation not to be awarded where court has no discretion to lower

the minimum mandatory sentence: Probation cannot be awarded by the
Court where the court has no discretion to lower the minimum prescribed
sentence. See: Mohd. Hashim Vs. State of UP, (2017) 2 SCC 198.

86.1. Probation where minimum sentence has been provided with

discretion to court to lower it: Minimum sentence means a sentence
which must be imposed without leaving any discretion to court i.e. a
quantum of sentence which cannot be reduced below the period fixed. A
provision that gives discretion to court not to award minimum sentence
cannot be equated with a provision which prescribes minimum sentence
without any discretion, and consequently, it has different implications
with respect to the applicability of the Probations of Offenders Act, 1958.
In cases involving offence u/s 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961,
there being no minimum sentence, the provision of the PO Act, 1958
would apply. See: Mohd. Hashim Vs. State of UP, (2017) 2 SCC 198.

86.2. Suggestions received by Supreme Court from various Amicus Curiae

and NALSA, SALSA etc. for grant of bail, probation, remission and
commutation of sentences and jail reforms: The suggestions made are
as under:—
“7.1 There are convicts in jails who are undergoing fixed term sentences.
In such cases where the convict has been sentenced upto 10 years'
imprisonment and is a first time offender and has undergone half the
sentence, the State Government can consider whether the remaining
sentence can be commuted under Section 432 CrPC. as a onetime
measure. The State Government can obviously provide certain exceptions
where this benefit would not be available to the convicts (especially
heinous crimes rape, dowry death, kidnapping, PC Act, POCSO, NDPS,
etc.). The State Government can impose conditions of good conduct upon
Page 39 of 50
the convict. In this regard, the provisions of Model Prison Manual, 2016,
especially the Chapter XX dealing with “premature release’ can be
considere d by the State Government, which lays down broad parameters
for dealing with such cases. The Model Prison Manual was drafted by a
very high Committee, including the officers of the Central Government,
State Government, NALSA, NHRC and also the Civil Society and is a
fairly progressive document, aimed at standardising prison administration
throughout the country. Chapter XX of Model Prison Manual is enclosed
as Annexure A2.
In this behalf the following suggestions have been made:—
“6.1 The following mechanism can be adopted as one-time measure to
convicts who have been convicted for sentence of imprisonment for 10
years' or less and have no other criminal antecedent.
6.2 The High Court along with the High Court Legal Services Authority
can make a list of cases with the following details:
i) Offences for which a convict has been sentenced and sentence
imposed;
ii) Sentence undergone by the convict;

6.3 If the convict is in jail and has undergone 40% of the sentence, his
case can be taken up by the District Legal Services Authority. The
District Legal Services Authority, through a lawyer of sufficient
seniority, can counsel the accused that if he is willing to accept his guilt,
request can be made to the High Court to reduce the sentence or for
releasing the convict on probation of good conduct for the remainder of
the sentence. It should be clearly disclosed that the said acceptance of
guilt is only for the purposes of closing the matter and in case the High
Court is not inclined to accept the plea, then the matter would be
considered by the High Court of its own merits and his plea would not
come in the way of hearing of the appeal on merits.
6.4 The District Legal Services Authority would also facilitate the
interaction of the convict with his lawyer so that an informed decision is
taken by the convict.
6.5 If the accused is willing to accept the plea and make an application to
the High Court, then the list of such accused should be forwarded to the
Director General of Police to ascertain the criminal antecedent of the
convict.
6.6 Such plea bargaining at post-conviction level would not be available
to such offences which are notified by the Central Government/State
Page 40 of 50
 Government. The said plea bargaining will not be available where the law
provides for a minimum sentence to be undergone by the accused, for
example under the NDPS Act or UAPA Act similar such Acts (State
Law/Central Law). See: Interim order dated 14.09.2022 of the
Supreme Court passed in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Crl) No. 4/2021 In
Re : Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail With MA 764/2022 in Criminal
A. No. 491/2022 (II)

87. Meaning of ‘minimum sentence’: Where legislation prescribes

minimum sentence without any discretion to the court, such sentence
cannot be reduced by the court. Imposition of minimum sentence in such
cases, be it imprisonment or fine, is mandatory. However, there may be
cases where legislation prescribes a minimum sentence but grants
discretion to the court to award a lower sentence or not to award a
sentence of imprisonment, which discretion includes discretion not to
send the accused to prison. In such latter cases, the minimum prescribed
sentence cannot be construed as a minimum sentence. See: Mohd.
Hashim Vs. State of UP, (2017) 2 SCC 198.

88. Law of Probation : The law relating to probation of offenders is as under

:
(i) Sec. 360 & 361 CrPC
(ii) Probation of offenders Act, 1958
(iii) U.P. First Offenders’ Probation Act, 1938
(iv) U.P. First Offenders’ Probation Rules, 1939

89. Relevant considerations for release of convict on Probation:

Following are the relevant factors to be considered by the courts while
releasing a convict on probation:
(i) Conduct of the accused
(ii) Criminal antecedents
(iii) Effect on the family members of the victim
(iv) Propensity of the accused to commit more offences
(v) Manner of commission of crime (brutality)
(vi) Other relevant facts and circumstances of the case. See: Arvind
Yadav Vs. Ramesh Kumar, (2003) 6 SCC 144

Page 41 of 50
90. Hearing of accused before awarding sentence mandatory: Section
235(2) CrPC: Providing opportunity of hearing to the accused u/s 235
(2) CrPC after conviction and before awarding sentence is mandatory.
Merely because the accused or his counsel remained silent on question of
sentence and did not make submissions before the trial court or the
appellate court, it does not debar the accused from agitating the existence
of mitigating circumstances before the Supreme Court. Principles of
constructive res judicata do not apply to the matters relating to life and
death. See: Md. Mannan Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2019 SC 2934
(Three-Judge Bench) (Para 83).

91. Recording of reasons for awarding sentence mandatory: (Section 354

CrPC): Sub-sections (3) and (4) of the CrPC provide as under:
(3) When conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the
alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term
of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence
awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons
for such sentence.
(4) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with
imprisonment for a term of one year or more, but the Court
imposes a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three
months, it shall record its reasons for awarding such sentence,
unless the sentence is one of imprisonment till the rising of the
Court (TRC) or unless the case was tried summarily under the
provisions of this code.

92. Adjourning the case and providing opportunity to both prosecution

& defence to place material before the court and providing
opportunity of hearing u/s 235(2) CrPC on the point of sentence is
mandatory : Even a casual glance at the provisions of the Indian Penal
Code will show that the punishments have been carefully graded
corresponding with the gravity of offences; in grave wrongs the
punishments prescribed are strict whereas for minor offences leniency is
shown. Here again there is considerable room for maneuver because the
choice of the punishment is left to the discretion of the Judge with only
the outer limits stated. There are only a few cases where a minimum
punishment is prescribed. The question then is what procedure does the
Judge follow for determining the punishment to be imposed in each case
to fit the crime? The choice has to be made after following the procedure
Page 42 of 50
set out in sub-section (2) of Section 235 CrPC. The requirement of
hearing the accused in the sub-section (2) is intended to satisfy the rule of
natural justice. It is a fundamental requirement of fair play that the
accused who was hitherto concentrating on the prosecution evidence on
the question of guilt should, on being found guilty, be asked if he has
anything to say or any evidence to tender on the question of sentence.
This is all the more necessary since the Courts are generally required to
make the choice from a wide range of discretion in the matter of
sentencing. To assist the Court in determining the correct sentence to be
imposed the legislature introduced sub-section (2) to Section 235 CrPC.
The said provision therefore satisfies a dual purpose; it satisfies the rule
of natural justice by according to the accused an opportunity of being
heard on the question of sentence and at same time helps the Court to
choose the sentence to be awarded. Since the provision is intended to give
the accused an opportunity to place before the Court all the relevant
material having a bearing on the question of sentence there can be no
doubt that the provision is salutary and must be strictly followed. It is
clearly mandatory and should not be treated as a mere formality. In a case
of life or death as in the case of punishment for murder, the presiding
officer must show a high degree of concern for the statutory right of the
accused and should not treat it as a mere formality to be crossed before
making the choice of sentence. If the choice is made without giving the
accused an effective and real opportunity to place his antecedents, social
and economic background, mitigating and extenuating circumstances,
etc., before the Court, the Court's decision on the sentence would be
vulnerable. It need hardly be mentioned that in many cases a sentencing
decision has far more serious consequences on the offender and his
family members than in the case of a purely administrative decision; a
fortiori, therefore, the principle of fair play must apply with greater
vigour in the case of the former than the latter. An administrative decision
having civil consequences, if taken without giving a hearing is generally
struck down as violative of the rule of natural justice. Likewise a
sentencing decision taken without following the requirements of sub-
section (2) of Section 235 CrPC in letter and spirit would also meet a
similar fate and may have to be replaced by an appropriate order. The
sentencing Court must approach the question seriously and must
endeavor to see that all the relevant facts and circumstances bearing on
the question of sentence are brought on record. Only after giving due
weight to the mitigating as well as the aggravating circumstances placed
Page 43 of 50
 before it, it must pronounce the sentence. As a general rule the Trial
Courts should after recording the conviction adjourn the matter to a
future date and call upon both the prosecution as well as the defence
to place the relevant material bearing on the question of sentence
before it and thereafter pronounce the sentence to be imposed on the
offender. Where the trial Court treated the requirement for giving of
opportunity to accused as a mere formality in that after recording finding
of guilty on charge of murder, on the same day before the accused could
absorb and overcome the shock of conviction were asked if they had
anything to say on the question of sentence and immediately thereafter
pronounced the decision imposing the death penalty the trial Judge must
be deemed not to have attached sufficient importance to the mandatory
requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 235 CrPC. See :
1. Chhannu Lal Verma Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2019 SC 243
(Three-Judge Bench).
2. Allauddin Mian Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 1456 (Para 10)

93. Court competent to adjourn hearing on sentence after pronouncing

judgement of conviction : Where the judgement of conviction and the
sentence both was pronounced by the trial court on the same day, it has
been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that there was no illegality
in doing so. Court may adjourn the case u/s 309 CrPC for hearing on
sentencing. Interpreting Section 53 CrPC, it has been held by the
Supreme Court that bifurcated hearing for conviction and sentence is a
necessary condition before awarding death sentence for offence of murder
u/s 302 IPC. See....
1. Chhannu Lal Verma Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2019 SC 243
(Three-Judge Bench).
2. Ram Deo Chauhan Vs. State ofAssam, AIR 2001 SC 2231
3. Motilal Vs. State of M.P., 2004 (48) ACC 504 (S.C.)

94. Hearing of both the accused and his counsel must u/s 248 CrPC on
quantum of sentence : Where the Magistrate (during traial) and the
Sessions Judge (in appeal) had given opportunity of hearing to accused on
question of sentence only to the counsel of the accused and no such
opportunity of hearing was given to the accused himself, it has been held
by the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court that the procedure adopted by the
Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge was wholly agaisnt the spirit and
the object of the provisions of section 248 CrPC and non-hearing of the
Page 44 of 50
 accused on sentence after his conviction had caused prejudice to him.
See. Bhirug Vs. State of UP, 2001 ALJ 2337 (Allahabad High Court).

95. Special provisions for commitment of case and imposition of sentence

u/s 323, 324, 325 CrPC: Sections 323, 324, 325 CrPC, in brief, provide
as under:
Section 323 CrPC: After commencement of enquiry or trial by
Magistrate, Commitment of case by Magistrate to the court of sessions
for trial.
Section 324 CrPC: Commitment of case by Magistrate involving
offences against coinage, stamp law or property to CJM or Sessions Court
for trial and adequate sentence.
Section 325 CrPC: Power of Judicial Magistrate to refer the case after
recording conviction to the CJM for awarding more sentence than the one
which the Judicial Magistrate is empowered to award.

96. Penalty not awardable against juvenile : According to Sec. 16 of the

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, no sentence
of death or imprisonment of any term can be passed against a juvenile. A
juvenile cannot be sent to jail for his default of payment of fine or
furnishing security.

97. Penalty awardable against Juvenile : Sec. 15 provides for different

orders which may be passed by the JJ Board regarding a juvenile on
recording findings that the juvenile had committed an offence. A juvenile
may be required to render community service as enumerated under Rule
2(e) of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Rules, 2007.

98. Rulings on sentencing of juvenile---The Hon'ble Supreme Court has

eleborately considered the penalties awardable to juveniles.
See....Dharambir Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344 (paras 17
&18)

99. Place of detention of juvenile becoming major during pendency of

case Where the accused had gone into juvenile home when he was juvenile
but during the pendency of case (appeal) he had attained the age of
majority (nearly 35 years), interpreting the provisions of Sec.2(k), 2(l), 7-
A, 20, 49 of the JJ Act of 2000 r/w rules 12 and 98 of the Rules, 2007, it
has been held by the Supreme Court that it may not be conducive in the
Page 45 of 50
 environment in the special home and to the interest of other juveniles
housed in the special home to refer him to the board for passing orders for
sending him (accused) to a special home or for keeping him at some other
place of safety. See---Dharambir Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5
SCC 344.

100. Death penalty when can be awarded ?: In the cases noted below,
awarding death penalty u/s 53 CrPC for the offence of murder u/s 302 IPC
has been held to be constitutionally valid. Death punishment can be
awarded for murder in rearest of the rare cases. See...
1. Chhannu Lal Verma Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2019 SC 243
(Three-Judge Bench).
2. Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898 (Five-Judge
Bench).

101. Certain important decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 'death

penalty' are as under:
(i). Jagmohan Singh Vs. State of UP, AIR 1973 SC 947
(ii). Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980
SC 898
(iii) Machhi Singh Vs. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCR 413
(iv) Gopal Vinayak Godse Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1961) 3 SCR 440
(v) State of MP Vs. Ratan Singh, (1976) 3 SCC 470
(vi) Dalbir Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1979) 3 SCC 745
(vii) Maru Ram Vs. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107
(viii) Naib Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 454
(ix) Bhagirath Vs. Delhi Administration, (1985) 2 SCC 580
(x) Ashok Kumar Vs. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 498
(xi) State of Punjab Vs. Kesar Singh, (1996) 5 SCC 495
(xii) Laxman Naskar Vs. State of W.B., (2000) 7 SCC 726
(xiii) Zahid Hussein Vs. State of W.B., (2001) 3 SCC 750
(Xiv) Subhash Chander Vs. Krisha Lal, (2001) 4 SCC 458
(xv) Shri Bhagwan Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296
(xvi) Ram Anup Singh Vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 686
(xvii) Delhi Administration Vs. Manohar Lal (2002) 7 SCC 222
(xviii) Nazir Khan Vs. State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461
(xix) Mohd. Munna Vs. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 417
(xx) Aloke Nath Dutta Vs. State of W.B., 2006 (13) SCALE 467
(xxi) C.A. Pious Vs. State of Kerala, (2007) 8 SCC 213
Page 46 of 50
102. TRC: Awarding sentence of TRC (till rising of court) has been
depricated by the courts by observing that the punishment by
imprisonment under IPC means that the offender shall go to jail and TRC
would be illegal and ultra vires the jurisdiction of the court, such a
sentence violates distinct provisions contained in CRPC, IPC and the
Prisons Act and also the rules made in jail manuals under the provisions
of the Prisons Act. See: Assam Musa Lierakeh Kunhi Bava In re AIR
1929 Mad. 226. A contrary view has been taken in Muthu Nadar In re,
AIR 1945 Mad. 313 (DB)

103. TRC upheld by Allahabad High Court: In the case noted below, award
of TRC has been held by the Allahabad High Court as adequate sentence
of imprisonment. See: State of UP vs. Dev Dutt Sharma, 1984 ALJ
1229 (Allahabad)(DB) (case u/s 409 IPC).

104. TRC when not justified?: The punishment till the rising of the court
(TRC) for the offence of grievous hurt and the related offences
committed conjointly by an accused person which had resulted in the
hospitalization of the victim for four weeks has been held by the Kerala
High Court not to be in conformity with the rational legal theory or
behavior, much less the reformatory theory of punishment. See: Raman
Vs. Francis, (1988) CRLJ 1359 (Kerala).

105. Recording of reasons for awarding sentence mandatory: Section 354

(4) CrPC reads as under:
“When the conviction is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for
a term of one year or more, but the Court imposes a sentence of
imprisonment for a term of less than three months, it shall record its
reasons for awarding such sentence, unless the sentence is one of
imprisonment till the rising of the Court (TRC) or unless the case was
tried summarily under the provisions of this code.”

106. Admonition: The Supreme Court, in the case noted below relating to
District Unnao of Uttar Pradesh, while referring to Section 3 of the
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, has clarified that the court has power
to admonish the accused after his conviction. Section 3 of the Probation
of Offenders Act, 1958 reads as under:

Page 47 of 50
 "Section 3: Power of court to release certain offenders after admonition.-
When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence
punishable under section 379 or section 380 or section 381 or section 404
or section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860) or any offence
punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine,
or with both, under the Indian Penal Code, or any other law, and no
previous conviction is proved against him and the court by which the
person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the
circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence, and the
character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court
may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on
probation of good conduct under section 4 release him after due
admonition." See: Mohd. Hashim Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2017) 2
SCC 198

107. Sentencing under Section 304-A IPC: Where the accused had caused
death of five persons by rash and negligent driving and his sentence was
reduced to 15 days custody already undergone by the accused by
enhancing fine to Rs. 25,000/- each by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in the cases
of death by rash and negligent driving, deterrence should be prime
consideration in determining the quantum of sentence. Holding the order
of the High Court as improper, the Hon'ble Supreme Court modified the
same to a sentence of RI of 6 months with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each. See
: State of Punjab Vs. Balwinder Singh & others, AIR 2012 SC 861.

108. Sentencing under Section 304-A IPC : In a case where death was caused
by rash and negligence driving, the High Court of MP while maintaining
conviction had reduced the sentence of two years RI with a fine of Rs.
2500/- had reduced to the period already undergone in jail and granted
further compensation of Rs. 2000/- payable to the widow/mother of the
deceased, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the said order of the High
Court by restoring the penalty of two years RI and Rs. 2500/- as fine as
awarded by the trial court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed
that the High Court had shown undue sympathy by modifying the
sentence awarded by the trial court. See : State of MP Vs. Surendra
Singh, (2015) 1 SCC 222.

Page 48 of 50
109. Other cases on sentencing u/s 304-A IPC are :
(i) B. Nagabhushanam Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2008 SC 2557
(ii) Prabhakaran Vs. State of Kerala, AIR 2007 SC 2376
(iii) State of Karnataka Vs. Sharanappa Basnagouda, 2002 (45)
ACC 39 (SC)
(iv) Satnam Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (2000) 1 SCC 662
(v) Dalbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 1677
(vi) Rattan Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1979 ACrR 485 (SC)

110. Sentencing under Special Act : If any special Act provides for any
specific punishment for the offences enumerated thereunder, the offender
can be punished only in accordance with the penalty provided under that
Special Act and not under various penal sections of the general criminal
law i.e. the IPC.

111. Lok Adalat not to decide a case involving non-compoundable

offences--- Where a Chief Judicial Magistrate in U.P. had decided a
criminal case as Lok Adalat involving non-compoundable offences u/s.
205, 419, 468, 471 of the IPC by awarding TRC (Till Rising of Court) to
the accused on the basis of confession made by him, it has been held by
the Allahabad High Court that in view of the provisions u/s. 19(5) of the
Legal Services Authority Act, 1987, the CJM as Lok Adalat had no
jurisdiction to decide the case involving offences which are non-
compoundable under Cr.P.C. or under any other law. See: Sukhlal vs.
State of U.P., 2002 (44) ACC 185 (All)

112. Cases involving non-compoundable offences not to be placed before

Lok Adalats: The Allahabad High Court vide its C.L. No. 10/Admin.'G-
II' dated: Allahabad 14.03.2018 has directed all the Judicial Officers of
the State of Uttar Pradesh not to place before the Lok Adalats cases
involving non-compoundable offences for disposal.

113. Quantity of narcotic substance recovered is a relevant factor for imposing

higher than the minimum punishment under the NDPS Act, 1985. Court
has a wide discretion to impose the sentence of imprisonment ranging
between 10 to 20 years and while imposing such sentence may also take
into consideration the factors as it may deem fit other than the factors

Page 49 of 50
enumerated in Section 32-B(a) to (f) of the NDPS Act, 1985. See:
Gurdev Singh Vs. State of Punjab, LL 2021 SC 196

*****

Page 50 of 50