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Introduction

Leopoldo Nuti & Christian Ostermann

To cite this article: Leopoldo Nuti & Christian Ostermann (2016) Introduction, Journal of Strategic
Studies, 39:4, 477-483, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2016.1168011

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Published online: 06 Jun 2016.

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THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2016
VOL. 39, NO. 4, 477–483
[Link]

Introduction
Leopoldo Nutia and Christian Ostermannb
a
Department of Political Studies, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy; bWoodrow Wilson
Center, Washington, USA

ABSTRACT
The new nuclear history can make a critical contribution by forcing us to
reconsider or reframe the theoretical premises of the concepts we apply to
our understanding of the present – and with which we try to navigate the
future. It bears on fundamental questions, such as: How should the US manage
its alliances? Should it establish a multilateral nuclear policy dialogue in Asia?
In what depth should it discuss issues of doctrine and targeting with its Asian
allies? What capabilities might reassure European allies in light of current
Russian revisionism? Could nuclear war be limited and controlled in an East
Asian maritime arena? Do nuclear weapons strengthen an alliance, or do they
introduce a divisive bone of contention? Is extended nuclear deterrence (END)
stabilizing or is it on the contrary pushing the allies to ask for more? What is
the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces in END credibility?
How do nuclear alliances contribute to international security and international
order? The lessons and insights from these papers, which look at five historical
cases of US extended deterrence during the Cold War, should help us think
about crucial current issues, and be of use both to historians who want to
have a better understanding of the Cold War past and to policymakers who
are currently grappling with these issues.

KEYWORDS Nuclear weapons; extended deterrence; US alliances; Japan; Australia; South Korea; Italy;
Germany

Introduction
After the end of the Cold War, the utility of nuclear weapons seemed to
fade. Scholars began to question the relevance of nuclear weapons for the
new international scenario that was unfolding.1 Within just a few years,
however, the bomb had re-emerged at the top of the international agenda.
By the mid-1990s it had become clear that nuclear proliferation was likely to
pose one of the gravest dangers in the post-Cold-War era. The combination
of the spread of nuclear weapons with the rise of a multipolar and multi-
actor order constituted formidable new challenges for the international
system.

1
Richard Rhodes, The Twilight of the Bombs: Recent Challenges, New Dangers, and the Prospects for a
World without Nuclear Weapons (New York: Knopf 2010).
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
478 L. NUTI AND C. OSTERMANN

Hence the rapid comeback of deterrence to center stage of the interna-

tional debate. Would the basic principles of rational deterrence theory
developed during the Cold War still apply to this new world, or would the
rules of the new game be entirely different from the old ones?2 Would the
new strategic environment be so radically different as to require a major
rethinking of the basic tenets of the first nuclear era?3 In a study in which
she called for a renewed intellectual effort to assess the impact of nuclear
weapons in the post-Cold-War world, the late Therese Delpech concluded
that deterrence remains the safest way to deal with nuclear weapons – at
least until they are banished forever.4 But who and what is to be deterred,
and with what means? And do Cold War era strategic concepts, such as US
extended nuclear deterrence (END), still have any role in international
security?
Undoubtedly, after almost two decades of sitting in the dark, US END has
come into new focus as the credibility of US alliances is probed globally. In
the Asia–Pacific, China’s rise has been accompanied by a massive build-up,
expansion, and modernization of its military capabilities. With growing
fervor it has asserted sovereignty claims in both the South China Sea and
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In Europe, Russia has violated the sovereignty
of Ukraine, trampling the 1994 Budapest Accord in which Ukraine had
surrendered its nuclear weapons and prompting new fears in Central and
Eastern Europe over territorial integrity. Moscow has also reiterated the
importance of a strong and diverse nuclear arsenal to defend Russian
sovereignty and its interests. Both China and Russia have been demonstrat-
ing their power by testing new nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, conducting
submarine patrols out of their territorial waters, and sending military forces
to either violate or challenge their neighbors’ sovereignty. These are pro-
found challenges to the regional order in both Europe and Asia. It is there-
fore not surprising that US allies are once again debating the credibility of
US extended deterrence.
There are sharp differences in allies’ attitudes towards this security guar-
antee. The extent to which nuclear weapons are integral to its credibility; the

2
Paul J. Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age. Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Times
Books 2012).
3
Keith B. Payne has consistently made this point through a series of books, the latest of which is The
Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century
(Washington: National Institute Press, 2008).
4
Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century. Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of
Strategic Piracy (Santa Monica CA: RAND 2012). More recently, Jeffrey Larsen and Kerry Kartchner
have followed up her call for updating strategic thinking by actually examining under what
conditions a limited nuclear war might be fought in the twenty-first century: Jeffrey A. Larsen and
Kerry M. Kartchner (eds), On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century (Stanford CA: Stanford University
Press 2014). Tom Nichols, on the other hand, has argued about the need to develop a realistic
minimum deterrent: Thomas Nichols, No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security (Pittsburgh:
University of Pennsylvania Press 2014).
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 479

role of “tactical” versus “strategic” nuclear weapons; how many nuclear

weapons and which types should be stationed in which country (especially
within NATO); how much “control” should allies be given over these; what
concepts should guide nuclear weapons employment policies; and the
extent to which END helps curbs allies’ appetite for their own nuclear
capabilities. These issues are currently being discussed in the context not
only of new Chinese and Russian assertiveness, but also of evolving ballistic
missile defense systems and US President Barack Obama’s ambitions for
further reductions in the US nuclear arsenal. Disputes over these issues are
at the core of new questions about the future of Washington’s alliances in
both Europe and Asia.
The large bulk of policy discussion on contemporary US END issues so far
has been dominated by policy analysts in government and think-tanks.
However, as Frank Gavin has written, many of our theoretical assumptions
of how deterrence works are based on the historical evidence from the Cold
War era.5 That evidence is at best incomplete, and a renaissance in historical
research is unearthing new findings that may challenge some of the basic
tenets on which our understanding of nuclear history – and of nuclear
deterrence – is based. The authors in this special issue (all members of the
Nuclear Proliferation International History Project) are trying to contribute to
the current debate by presenting updated historical approaches on the
value, influence, desirability, practicality, credibility, and durability of US
security commitments in Germany, Italy, South Korea, Japan, and Australia.
Using hitherto unpublished archival materials, the authors present new
perspectives on national and regional nuclear issues, and the implications
for policy today. Gaining a fuller understanding of the complexities of that
nuclear history is critical to comprehending how national attitudes towards
nuclear weapons and END might change in what is clearly a rapidly shifting
security environment.
Andreas Lutsch provides an historical examination of how END credibility
was managed in nuclear consultations during the Cold War. His research
makes a new contribution by providing historical insights into how END
might be managed under the circumstances of a multipolar and more
complex nuclear era. He begins by canvassing contemporary nuclear issues
in NATO – the recent decision to retain US B-61 atomic bombs as a core
element of NATO’s deterrence posture, and how this is supplemented by
nuclear sharing of US sub-strategic nuclear weapons with host countries
supplying dual-capable aircraft (DCA) to deliver them. He highlights the
importance of consultations in NATO to achieving alliance cohesion, political
compromise, helping allies understand each other’s interests, and educating

5
Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft. History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca NY: Cornell
University Press 2012), Chapter 1.
480 L. NUTI AND C. OSTERMANN

non-nuclear allies about the role nuclear weapons play in alliance security.
Lutsch then provides an historical overview of the Nuclear Planning Group
(NPG), and the historical lessons we may draw from the West German
experience. For instance, achieving a say in the decision to use nuclear
weapons in the defense of Germany was one way to enhance West
German security. There were debates in Bonn about establishing a
European force based on the strategic nuclear capabilities of at least one
of the two Western European nuclear powers, but not by acquiring a
national nuclear capability. There were also debates over doctrine: the
“battlefield” use of nuclear weapons. Among other points, Lutsch reveals
that at no point were nuclear weapons described as “unusable” or
“unnecessary”.
We see some of these themes in the Italian case, presented by Leopoldo
Nuti, who focuses on the climax of the NATO nuclear-sharing debate
between 1957 and 1962. Leaders in Rome were far from having a blind
faith in the US nuclear umbrella. In fact, the primary motivations behind
Italy’s decision to accept US nuclear weapons on its soil were based on
security considerations, the desire to be consulted in the event of a major
crisis, and the aspiration to enhance Italy’s profile inside any Western multi-
lateral forum. There was no intention to build a national nuclear capability,
but Rome saw the hosting of US nuclear weapons as an intermediate step
towards the acquisition of a more substantial form of access and control
either in an Atlantic or in a European context. Extended deterrence, in other
words, was not seen as the best possible solution for Italy’s security or for
the role its government aspired to play inside NATO, but as a means to an
end. Paradoxically, at least in the time period the author analyzes, this had a
perverse effect: rather than curbing Italy’s desire to gain a nuclear status,
extended deterrence was perceived as an opportunity to get more, not less,
access to nuclear weapons.
US END was never really tested in the Asia-Pacific region as it was in
Western Europe. The Asian region never developed security institutions
similar to those in Europe. For instance, in spite of attempts to develop
collective security arrangements like Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)
and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), they never achieved the
same cohesion and effectiveness that NATO did, because of the sheer
disparities in both geography and strategic interests between the member
states. In addition, deep mutual mistrust has persisted between the main
players in the arena – China, Japan, and South Korea. It is thus little wonder
there never was, nor is today, an Asian NATO. Consequently, and because
neither Japan, South Korea, nor even Australia was directly in the firing line
of a confrontation between the US and USSR, the operational aspects of
END (such as doctrine, targeting, command and control) were never for-
mally discussed either bilaterally with the United States or in a multilateral
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 481

forum. So US END played different roles for different countries here, even
though the common denominator in terms of adversaries was China.
The interesting conundrum for Japan was its “nuclear duality” – espous-
ing anti-nuclear sentiments while simultaneously relying on America’s
nuclear umbrella for its ultimate security. Whilst most other scholars point
to END as preventing Japan from going nuclear, Fintan Hoey provides us
with new historical material that shows how END has been a much more
significant factor in Japanese strategic calculations and alliance policy than
most scholarship has so far appreciated. It was a far less provocative option
that acquiring a national nuclear capability that would upset regional
neighbors: an independent Japanese deterrent would serve as a destabilis-
ing force and could potentially be viewed as a threat in Washington as well
as in Moscow and Beijing and other Asian capitals.
In contrast to the situation in Japan, tactical nuclear weapons deployed
on national soil were important in reassuring South Korea that the US would
intervene on its behalf against North Korean or even Chinese conventional
aggression. However, as with Japan, there was never any nuclear burden-
sharing mechanism or formal consultation agreement between Washington
and Seoul. And, unlike Japan, South Korea was much more intent on having
a posture of defence “self-sufficiency”, which included attempts to obtain a
national nuclear capability. As Se Young Jang argues, South Korean belief in
the so-called US nuclear umbrella waxed and waned, particularly after the
Nixon doctrine which saw a declining US role in global affairs. This in spite of
US tactical nuclear weapons remaining on South Korean soil.
Australia, for its part, has always had a conflicted relationship with
nuclear weapons, as Christine Leah demonstrates. After abandoning its
attempts to procure and develop nuclear weapons within the British
Empire, Australia turned to the US, at the same time requesting that
Washington provide Canberra with specific declarations of support regard-
ing the use of US nuclear forces in the defence of Australia. No such
assurances were ever forthcoming, and, in a highly threatening and unstable
security environment, Canberra decided that it should continue its quest for
the bomb. It was not until the late 1960s that China, Indonesia, and even
Japan were dismissed as serious existential threats. Governments from 1973
onwards concluded that no major conventional or nuclear threat to
Australia would occur outside the context of a general world war. As such,
Canberra was happy to accept whatever Washington thought was good
enough to deter both Moscow and Beijing; no effort was made to know or
challenge the operational aspects of the so-called US security umbrella to
Australia. But this tacit “acceptance” of US END has been premised on a
stable Asian regional order, which today is coming under increasing pres-
sure from a rising China.
482 L. NUTI AND C. OSTERMANN

Finally, Joe Pilat compares and contrasts the nature of current nuclear
debates in Europe and Asia. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were
much more central to the security issues facing US allies in both regions.
However, their value has not gone away, and they are still considered
essential to deterring unwelcome aggression by potentially hostile states
with the means to threaten mass destruction, which have grown in number
since the end of the Cold War. This trend prompted the United States to
invest a lot more into missile defense technologies. This, coupled with the
deployment of installations to America’s allies in Eastern Europe and in the
Pacific, has antagonized the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of
China, complicating negotiations over non-strategic nuclear force reductions
and other bones of contention, including US troops in Europe, space weap-
ons, conventional strategic weapons, and conventional force imbalances.
These are some of the issues complicating Washington’s existing extended
deterrence commitments, which seem to have had some non-proliferation
effect, so far. Can NATO and the Asian allies find a balance between main-
taining a strategy of deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and
conventional capabilities, on the one hand, and promoting arms control and
disarmament and non-proliferation, on the other?
Most analysts tend to overlook the complexities of the history of this very
young nuclear age. They see the history of nuclear weapons, the Cold War,
and missiles as one and the same. We are only beginning to grapple with
the dynamics of nuclear strategy outside that so-called “familiar” Cold War
[Link] archival sources and findings have opened up cracks in the
intellectual architecture of nuclear policy. Clearly there is a serious need to
rethink the role of nuclear weapons and missiles, outside the formative
context of the Cold War. As one analyst already noted many years ago:

One cannot but observe a relative decline in the last few decades of the
influence of superpower alliances as determinants of the foreign policies of
small states, as well as the emergence of many new international actors in the
wake of the post-war demise of European colonial systems. It follows that, to
an extent considerably greater than in the immediate post-war years, foreign
and defense policy in smaller states is largely influenced by the idiosyncrasies
of their local or regional situation … There is little reason to assume that a
“nuclear allergy” will be any more prevalent in the third world than it has been
among the governments of industrialized states.6

The new nuclear history can make a critical contribution by forcing us to

reconsider or reframe the theoretical premises of the concepts we apply to
our understanding of the present – and with which we try to navigate the
future. It does bear on fundamental questions, such as: How should the US
manage its alliances? Should it establish a multilateral nuclear policy
6
John Weltman, “Managing Nuclear Multipolarity”, International Security32/2 (1981/82), 2.
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 483

dialogue in Asia? In what depth should it discuss issues of doctrine and

targeting with its Asian allies? What capabilities might reassure European
allies in light of current Russian revisionism? Could nuclear war be limited
and controlled in an East Asian maritime arena? Do nuclear weapons
strengthen an alliance, or do they introduce a divisive bone of contention?
Is END stabilizing, or is it on the contrary pushing the allies to ask for more?
What is the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces in END
credibility? How do nuclear alliances contribute to international security and
international order? The lessons and insights from these papers should help
us think about crucial current issues, and be of use both to historians who
want to have a better understanding of the Cold War past and to policy-
makers who are currently grappling with these issues.

Notes on contributors
Leopoldo Nuti (Siena, 1958) is Professor of History of International Relations at Roma
Tre University, Co-Director of the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project,
and President of the Italian Society of International History. He has published in
Italian, English, and French on US–Italian relations and Italian foreign and security
policy. His latest books are La sfida nucleare. La politica estera italiana e le armi
nucleari, 1945–1991 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008) [The Nuclear Challenge: Italian Foreign
Policy and Atomic Weapons, 1945-1991] and, as a co-editor, The Euromissiles Crisis and
the End of the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015)

Dr Christian F. Ostermann directs the History & Public Policy Program of the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and in that capacity has co-
directed the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project since 2010.

Bibliography
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Century (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 2014).
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University of Pennsylvania Press 2014).
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