RYAN-MUN Clubs
Presents
8 RIS-MUN
th
Conference
Ryan Model United Nations Conference
World Health
Organization
(WHO)
Delegate Preparation Guidelines & Document Submissions
1. We are expecting 3 types of individual documents for 8th RISMUN Conference:
a. Position Papers (It is mandatory for every delegate to prepare a position
paper & submit it to the Executive Board before the RISMUN Conference)
b. Working Papers
c. Press Release
2. Final Document for the committee
Draft Resolution - On the final day of the conference, delegates will draft a Resolution
3. This background is not meant to be and should not be treated as an alternative to
further research and analysis. This background guide, as the name suggests, is only a
starting point to your research.
4. Evidences/Sources and Proofs of Information accepted in the committee: Articles
from Reuters, State - operated news agencies, government reports and websites, UN
Reports, Subsidiary and affiliated bodies to the UN, multilateral organizations like NATO,
WHO, etc and Treaty based organisations like the ICC will be preferred and widely rec-
ognized. Under no circumstances would sources including and reminiscent of Wikipedia
be accepted in the committee.
5. Kindly watch the video linked below before you begin reading the background guide.
It provides a simple and easy-to-understand summary of the topic, which will help you
grasp the core issues more effectively.
[Link]
Background Guide Credit: Ms. Hemanshi Dedhia, Head of MUN
Hrydhaan Khanna, Ryan International School, Mayur Vihar
Contents of the Background Guide
World Health Organization (WHO)
About the Committee:
The World Health Organization (WHO) is the UN agency that
spearheads international public health efforts. Its primary
activities include developing partnerships with other global
health initiatives, conducting medical research, setting norms,
providing technical support, and monitoring health trends
around the world.
Over its nearly seventy-five years, the WHO has logged
successes, such as eradicating smallpox, and perceived
failures, such as its delayed response to the Ebola outbreak in
2014. The agency also has the exclusive authority to declare
global health emergencies, which it has done several times
since its members granted it the power in 2007. At present,
the WHO’s work includes combating the COVID-19 pandemic
and other emergencies, as well as promoting refugees’
health. However, the WHO is in an uphill battle to loosen its
rigid bureaucracy, and it faces an increasingly troublesome
budget. The COVID-19 pandemic has proved to be another
monumental challenge for the health agency, sparking fresh
debate over its effectiveness.
WHO Funding and Donor Influence
For the 2022–23 period, the World Health Organization (WHO) set
a funding target of $6.1 billion, with a major focus on addressing
the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Only about 16% of this
budget comes from mandatory member contributions, while the
rest comes from voluntary donations by governments and private
partners. Major donors include Germany, the U.S., the U.K., and
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. However, voluntary funds
are often tied to specific programs, limiting WHO’s flexibility to set
its own priorities
Over the past decade, the WHO has become increasingly
dependent on voluntary contributions, which puts pressure on
the organization to align its goals with those of its donors. For
instance, President Donald Trump reportedly threatened to cut
U.S. contributions in 2018 if other member states proceeded
with a resolution to encourage breastfeeding. And in 2020, amid
the COVID-19 pandemic, Trump announced he would cut all
U.S. ties with the WHO, arguing it failed to take steps to reduce
China’s influence over the body. Usually the top contributor, the
United States fell to the second-largest donor, providing $680
million in 2020–21, or about 12 percent of the WHO’s budget.
However, upon taking office in 2021, President Joe Biden issued
an executive order to halt the withdrawal and re-engage with the
agency.
About the Agenda
Beyond COVID: Are We Ready for the Next
Global Health Crisis?
In recent decades, the world has faced many disease
outbreaks and natural disasters, causing serious health,
economic, and humanitarian problems. In response, global
organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO)
introduced important changes—such as updating the
International Health Regulations in 2005 and launching the
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015.
After the Ebola outbreak in West Africa (2014–2016) and
later the COVID-19 pandemic, global health security became
a top priority. WHO and other international groups took
steps to improve pandemic preparedness through better
disease tracking, faster responses, and stronger international
cooperation. However, these crises also revealed gaps in
global coordination, leading to a push for stronger regional
and national public health systems. It became clear that local
communities are key to stopping outbreaks at the source.
By 2025, global health faces new challenges like emerging
diseases, climate-related health issues, and antibiotic
resistance. While the WHO has taken on a bigger role and
new technologies like AI and better disease tracking have
improved global readiness, problems like unequal vaccine
access, lack of funding, and weak health systems still remain.
To ensure global health security in today’s connected world,
countries need to keep improving their own disease detection
and response systems.
COVID-19
In January 2020, the world experienced the outbreak of
COVID-19 (also known as SARS-CoV-2). The World Health
Organization (WHO), as the lead global agency, worked
closely with countries and partners to manage all aspects of
the pandemic. This included guiding research, issuing safety
protocols, coordinating vaccine development and distribution,
and tracking global case trends.
To speed up the global response, the WHO and its partners
launched the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator in
April 2020. It became one of the fastest and most coordinated
international efforts to fight a disease. One of its main
branches, COVAX, aimed to ensure fair and equal access to
COVID-19 tests, treatments, and vaccines worldwide. WHO
led global coordination on vaccine safety, helped define
vaccine development standards, and worked to improve
oxygen supply for patients across the world.
Cont. on next page
Though WHO announced the end of the emergency phase of
COVID-19 in May 2023, it continues to coordinate international
efforts and support countries in their recovery.
LESSONS LEARNT FROM COVID-19
1. COLLABORATIVE SURVEILLANCE
Strong surveillance and lab systems are crucial for quickly
identifying new respiratory threats. Health and care workers
(HCWs) at both community and hospital levels play a key role
in spotting and responding to such events early.
It’s also important to build strong connections between
human and animal health sectors for early detection. Health
professionals should work with animal health experts to track
and study new or unusual respiratory viruses that could lead
to pandemics. The COVID-19 pandemic showed that every
country should invest in systems to monitor animals—both wild
and domestic—that may carry viruses that can infect humans,
especially those often in contact with people.
When a dangerous virus is found, the information must be
shared quickly with public health labs, animal health agencies,
and healthcare centers so that more cases can be detected
and responded to effectively.
2. Emergency Coordination
Handling respiratory pandemics requires well-prepared
teams and strong coordination between different agencies,
sectors, and regions. Using an all-hazards approach (as
guided by WHO’s Emergency Response Framework) helps
create essential systems like communication methods, control
structures, and logistics that can be used in many kinds of
emergencies.
However, pandemics also require special skills—especially
in disease monitoring and patient care. Good coordination
is vital during a pandemic. While coordination alone doesn’t
guarantee success, poor coordination almost always leads to
problems.
3. Access to Countermeasures
The COVID-19 pandemic showed how fragile global supply
chains can be and how hard it is to quickly shift manufacturing
in a crisis. To improve this, countries should work toward
building permanent facilities for producing MCMs (Medical
Counter Measures) and other medical supplies at both
national and regional levels. This would create more reliable
supply chains and quicker access to essential tools during
emergencies.
Governments should also consider offering financial incentives
to manufacturers to keep some capacity available for quick
conversion to MCM production in case of a global health
emergency. Cont. on next page
Understanding Difference Between Endemics, Pandemics
and Epidemics
1. Endemic diseases: A disease outbreak is endemic when it
is consistently present but limited to a particular region. This
makes the disease spread and rates predictable. Malaria,
for example, is considered endemic in certain countries and
regions
2. Epidemic diseases: An epidemic is an unexpected increase
in the number of disease cases in a specific geographical
area. Yellow fever, smallpox, measles, and polio are prime
examples of epidemics. Epidemics can refer to a disease or
other specific health-related behavior (e.g., smoking) with rates
that are clearly above the expected occurrence in a community
or region.
3. Pandemic diseases: The World Health Organization
(WHO) declares a pandemic when a disease’s growth is
exponential. This means the growth rate skyrockets, and each
day, cases grow more than the day prior. In being declared a
pandemic, the virus has nothing to do with virology, population
immunity, or disease severity. It means a virus covers a wide
area, affecting several countries and populations.
Current Legal framework
The current framework of pandemic management is built
on lessons from past outbreaks like COVID-19, SARS, and
Ebola. It involves global, national, and local strategies for
preparedness, response, and recovery. The framework is
structured around key components:
a) International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005)
The revised International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) provide
a global framework to improve public health security. They set
new rules to help countries work together more effectively when
responding to health emergencies. The IHR takes advantage of
modern advances in biotechnology, surveillance, and information
technology, including faster data sharing. With these tools,
countries can now detect, assess, and respond to health threats
more quickly and efficiently.
Cont. on next page
Challenges: The implementation of International Health
Regulations (IHR, 2005) faces several challenges:
1. Delayed Disease Reporting (Article 6) – Some countries fail
to report outbreaks to the WHO on time, slowing down global
response efforts.
2. Weak Public Health Systems (Article 5 & Annex 1) – Many
nations lack proper surveillance, laboratories, and healthcare
infrastructure to detect and respond to outbreaks effectively.
3. Non-Compliance with WHO Recommendations (Articles 15
& 16) – Some governments ignore WHO’s advice due to political,
economic, or national interests, affecting global cooperation.
4. Funding and Resource Gaps (Article 54) – Many low-income
countries lack sufficient funding, trained personnel, and equipment
to fully comply with IHR requirements.
5. Lack of Enforcement Mechanisms (Article 56) – The WHO
has no power to enforce IHR rules, relying solely on voluntary
cooperation from countries.
b) Pandemic agreement (under negotiation)
Member states of the World Health Organization (WHO) are in the
process of negotiating a new international ‘pandemic agreement’
(also referred to as a ‘pandemic accord’ or ‘pandemic treaty’).
Since 2021, member states have held a series of meetings to
draft this new agreement. Earlier last year it was expected the
process would culminate with a vote on a final text at this year’s
World Health Assembly (WHA) in May 2024 but due to a lack of
consensus on several articles, member states chose to extend the
timeline for negotiations until this year, with an expectation that
a final vote on any agreement would take place at the May 2025
WHA (potentially earlier if agreement is reached before then)
c) Trade and Intellectual Property Laws
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and Access to Medical
Supplies
IPR laws can sometimes limit the widespread availability of
essential medical supplies, especially during global health crises.
Key documents in this area include:
1. WTO’s TRIPS Agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights) sets international standards for
protecting intellectual property, including patents on medicines
and vaccines. While it gives patent holders exclusive rights, it also
allows exceptions—like compulsory licensing—to protect public
health.
Cont. on next page
2. TRIPS Waiver (COVID-19 Proposal) was a temporary measure
suggested during the COVID-19 pandemic to suspend patent
protections on vaccines and related technologies. This aimed to
help more countries produce vaccines without legal restrictions,
improving global access. However, the proposal faced resistance
from some high-income countries concerned about impacts on
innovation and economic interests.
The Declaration on the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Public Health
was adopted on 14 November 2001 by the 4th World Trade
Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting at Doha, Qatar. The
declaration was made by the highest decision-making body of
the WTO, with the aim of promoting a balanced interpretation
and implementation of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in
a manner that is supportive of a WTO Member’s right to protect
public health and promote access to medicines for all.
The Doha Declaration reaffirmed that WTO members can
make use of the public health related flexibilities of the TRIPS
Agreement. However, there is considerable difficulty faced by
developing and least developed countries in implementing these
flexibilities in practice.
Response to Pandemic
Flaws in the Past
Historically, pandemics have exposed major weaknesses in
technology and resource distribution. The 1918 Spanish Flu
lacked real-time communication tools, leading to slow response
times and poor public awareness. Medical infrastructure was
primitive, with limited ICU capacity and no advanced respiratory
support. Even during more recent outbreaks like SARS and Ebola,
diagnostic tools were slow, vaccine development took years, and
global coordination was inefficient. Supply chains were fragile,
leading to shortages of critical resources like masks, ventilators,
and essential medicines.
Current Availability
The COVID-19 pandemic pushed technological advancements
at an unprecedented pace. mRNA vaccine technology was
developed in record time, with Pfizer and Moderna rolling
out vaccines within a year. AI and big data improved tracking
and early detection, while telemedicine expanded access to
healthcare. Work-from-home tools, online education platforms,
and cloud computing kept economies and learning systems
running. However, resource distribution remained unequal—while
some countries had excess vaccines, others struggled to secure
basic medical supplies. Supply chain disruptions showed that
even with advanced logistics, dependence on a few manufacturing
hubs (like China for PPE) was a weak point.
Cont. on next page
What We Need for the Future
Future pandemic preparedness must focus on faster and more
equitable resource distribution. Universal genomic surveillance
can help detect viruses before they spread, and AI-driven models
should predict outbreaks more accurately. Vaccine production
needs decentralized hubs worldwide to prevent reliance on a few
countries. Stockpiling critical medical supplies and diversifying
supply chains will reduce shortages. Telemedicine should be
integrated more deeply into healthcare systems to ensure
treatment accessibility. Finally, international cooperation must be
strengthened, ensuring that poorer nations aren’t left behind in
future crises.
Status of Healthcare Institutions
During COVID-19, the global healthcare workforce experienced
extreme burnout, with over 80% of healthcare workers reporting
stress-related issues (WHO). Hospitals faced staffing shortages
due to infections and increased patient loads, while non-
emergency medical services saw job losses. Telemedicine and
remote healthcare services surged, enabling virtual consultations
but also increasing digital fatigue among professionals.
Economically, healthcare institutions faced financial strain due to
increased operational costs and reduced revenue from elective
procedures. Governments invested billions into healthcare
funding, with the U.S. alone allocating over $178 billion in provider
relief funds (HHS). Wage incentives and mental health support
programs were introduced to retain workers. Automation and AI-
assisted diagnostics gained traction, reducing workload burdens.
Strengthening healthcare infrastructure, expanding workforce
training, and ensuring better crisis preparedness are essential to
safeguarding healthcare jobs and improving resilience in future
pandemics.
Plugging Global Gaps in Pandemic Prevention,
Preparedness, and Response
Introduction: The COVID-19 pandemic revealed significant
shortcomings in global health systems and highlighted the urgency
of strengthening Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and
Response (PPR). Despite remarkable scientific achievements, the
world remains vulnerable to future pandemics. A proactive and
coordinated global strategy is essential.
Cont. on next page
Five Key Gaps to Address:
1. Global disease surveillance and research: How to prevent and
detect new infectious diseases
We can greatly lower the risk of diseases spreading from animals
to humans and causing outbreaks. To do this, we need stronger
global cooperation to stop these “spillovers” before they happen.
This means:
• Protecting natural habitats
• Controlling the trade of wild animals
• Managing livestock farming near wildlife areas
Using a One Health approach — which looks at the connection
between human, animal, and environmental health — is essential.
We also need to greatly increase global disease surveillance and
early warning systems. These systems can help us:
• Spot diseases that jump from animals to humans
• Send alerts quickly
• Respond fast with public health measures
• Speed up the development of treatments and vaccines
To make this work, we need a global program for tracking viruses
and diseases (genomic and epidemiological surveillance), with the
WHO leading the effort. This program should connect existing and
new research centers at global, regional, and national levels.
Countries also need to strengthen their own basic disease-
tracking systems, working with regional health organizations like
the CDC and regulatory agencies. These systems help protect
public health every day and are crucial for stopping outbreaks that
could spread across borders.
Finally, this large-scale surveillance must be paired with much
more research on both known and new infectious diseases. We
should focus on identifying “prototype pathogens” — viruses that
could potentially cause human outbreaks — and prepare medical
tools early that can work against a wide range of similar viruses.
2. Strong National Health Systems: A Key to Global Pandemic
Readiness
Strong and resilient national health systems are the foundation for
stopping new outbreaks before they spread. This includes having
enough healthcare workers, strong policies to guide action during
a crisis, and the ability to deliver care and supplies quickly.
National disease monitoring and preparedness are essential for
global health efforts. Organizations like UNICEF help countries
deliver critical supplies — not just vaccines, but also life-saving
treatments and oxygen equipment — even to the most remote
areas.
Cont. on next page
To be truly prepared, countries need to improve their health
systems and develop full government plans for health
emergencies. These plans should help countries meet the
requirements of the WHO’s International Health Regulations
(IHR). Public health strategies must be in place to quickly
identify and care for people during a pandemic and ensure a full,
coordinated response.
Countries also need to be ready to use non-medical measures —
like lockdowns, quarantines, and social distancing — while making
sure that social safety nets protect the people affected by such
restrictions.
International Financial Institutions (like the IMF, World Bank, and
Regional Development Banks) must provide stronger support to
low-income and lower-middle-income countries. These countries
need funding to prepare in advance and to respond quickly when
a pandemic hits.
Preparedness investments should be aligned with ongoing efforts
to fight diseases that are already common, like HIV, TB, and
malaria. Global health organizations like The Global Fund and
Gavi should receive more support and a clear role in helping
countries strengthen their health systems for future pandemics.
UNICEF and similar organizations are also essential in helping
countries deliver health supplies where they are most needed —
especially in emergencies.
3. Faster and Fairer Access to Medical Tools in a Pandemic
COVID-19 showed us how much damage a pandemic can cause
— and how important it is to quickly provide the world with the
right tools like tests, vaccines, treatments, and protective gear
(PPE).
Scientists moved quickly during COVID-19. They identified the
virus and developed vaccines in record time. But we struggled
with producing enough, making sure all countries had fair access,
and getting the vaccines to people efficiently.
To avoid the serious impact of fast-spreading and dangerous
diseases in the future, we must be able to reach most of the global
population much faster. Our goal should be to develop vaccines,
treatments, and high-quality tests within 100 days of detecting a
new threat.
We also need:
• Bigger and always-ready factories to make medical supplies
quickly
• Flexible technologies that can be scaled up fast when needed
• Manufacturing spread out across different regions to avoid
supply chain disruptions and make sure all parts of the world can
access what they need
Cont. on next page
These factories should also be used between pandemics to help
fight other ongoing diseases.
To make this possible, we need a global network of partnerships
— bringing together governments, private companies, and
foundations — to ensure enough supply and fast delivery during a
pandemic.
Countries must also share investments in this system, both
nationally and globally. We need to learn from the ACT-Accelerator
experience during COVID-19 and build a permanent, end-to-end
supply system that’s ready before the next crisis hits.
One key lesson from COVID-19: not investing in manufacturing
and supply early made the response slower and less effective. We
can’t afford to make that mistake again.
4. Stronger Global Governance: For a Better, Faster, and
Fairer Pandemic Response
Right now, the world’s health system isn’t strong or coordinated
enough to prevent or respond quickly to a major pandemic. As
pointed out by the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, the
system is confusing, disconnected, and lacks clear leadership
and accountability—especially when it comes to funding
preparedness.
To fix this, we don’t need to create new organizations. Instead, we
need a better way to coordinate the many existing global health
institutions — with the World Health Organization (WHO) at the
center.
What’s needed:
• A new global governance system that brings together all major
players in health and finance, including:
• WHO and its One Health partners (FAO, OIE, UNEP)
• Global financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, regional banks
• Health agencies like Global Fund, Gavi, CEPI, FIND, Unitaid
• Organizations like UNICEF for on-the-ground delivery
• Regional bodies like the African Union and Africa CDC
This system should clearly define each organization’s role, make
sure funding is used effectively, and allow quick and efficient
action during a health emergency.
Include Everyone — Governments, Private Sector, NGOs
We also need to fully involve:
• The private sector — which helps with healthcare, transport,
logistics, communication, and data
• NGOs, scientists, and local organizations — who are often the
first to spot new threats and help communities respond
Funding should support not only global institutions but also local
and non-government actors, who are critical on the ground.
A New “Global Health Threats Board”
A proposed Global Health Threats Board would:
• Oversee global pandemic funding and coordination
• Make sure resources go where they are needed, on time
• Match each organization’s efforts to its strengths
• Connect funding directly with action — with proper oversight
Pandemic Preparedness is an Investment — Not Charity
We must understand that supporting countries to prepare for
pandemics is not about giving aid — it’s an investment in global
public safety that benefits everyone.
If one country remains unprotected, the whole world is at risk. As
seen with COVID-19, new variants can emerge in one region and
affect even vaccinated populations globally. That’s why everyone
must have access to testing, vaccines, and treatments — it’s
not just fair, it’s necessary.
Two Types of Global Health Investments:
1. Pure global public goods (like disease surveillance and
research):
• Provide benefits worldwide, not just to individual countries
• Should be funded by global partnerships, especially for
low-income countries
2. National and regional health systems (like hospitals and
emergency response):
• Mostly benefit the countries themselves, but also help
globally
• Should be supported by domestic funding, with extra
international help when needed
[Link] Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and
Response: A Basic Plan
To stop future pandemics, we need a smarter, fairer way to fund
prevention and response. Since pandemics are a global threat,
the funding must be reliable, shared, and fair.
Key Principles:
• Prevention and preparedness need steady, long-term funding
that doesn’t run out or depend on sudden donations.
• Response during a pandemic needs fast, flexible funding that
reaches every country quickly — without delays or red tape.
• All money spent should be tracked carefully, with clear
accountability for how it’s used and what results it achieves.
Cont. on next page
Where the Money Should Come From:
• A strong international funding system (multilateral funding)
should be the foundation.
• This should be supported by:
• Country-to-country aid (bilateral funding)
• Donations from foundations and philanthropies
• We need a predictable system with countries agreeing in
advance how much they’ll contribute and how much money
can be quickly accessed in a crisis.
This kind of agreement has been missing. For example, during
COVID-19, the ACT-A initiative struggled to raise enough money
because governments delayed their commitments, expecting
others to step in. That delay cost lives.
The WHO must also be more consistently funded. An independent
expert panel (IPPPR) has suggested that:
• Countries should cover two-thirds of WHO’s core budget
through mandatory contributions.
• The rest of the budget should come from a clear and organized
fundraising system (called replenishment).
Other international organizations, including development banks
and aid agencies, should also play a bigger role in pandemic
funding.
What About Aid for Low-Income Countries?
• Foreign aid (Official Development Assistance or ODA) should
help poorer countries get ready for pandemics — for example, by
improving healthcare systems and training workers.
• But aid should not be the main way we fund pandemic
preparedness. It needs to be part of a larger, global system that
ensures fairness and avoids letting some countries do nothing
while others pay the bill.
How Much Money Is Needed?
To truly prepare for the next pandemic, we need to invest much
more than we have before — especially compared to the massive
cost of COVID-19.
Here’s what’s needed:
• Low- and middle-income countries should increase their public
health spending by 1% of GDP over the next five years.
This money should go into stronger health systems and better
pandemic readiness.
• The world as a whole should commit to investing $75 billion
over five years — about $15 billion per year.
Cont. on next page
This money would support global systems and help poorer
countries strengthen their own preparedness.
This investment is essential. For years, pandemic readiness has
been underfunded. Now is the time to catch up — and to invest
early to reduce the much bigger costs of future pandemics.
COVID-19 was a warning, not an anomaly. Future pandemics
may be more frequent and severe. The global community must
act now—through sustained investment, governance reform,
and equitable resource sharing—to ensure a safer future for all.
Pandemic PPR is not just aid; it is a global public good from which
every nation benefits.
Question To Consider
What measures should be taken to ensure a sufficient supply of
ventilators, ICU beds, and essential medicines?
How can we strengthen primary healthcare systems to reduce the
burden on tertiary hospitals?
What role should telemedicine and digital healthcare play in future
pandemic responses?
How can vaccine research and development be accelerated for
new variants and future viruses?
What strategies should be implemented to ensure equitable global
vaccine distribution?
What policies can be introduced to counter misinformation and
vaccine hesitancy?
How can global and national disease surveillance systems be
improved for early detection?
What role should AI and data analytics play in pandemic
forecasting and management?
How can supply chain disruptions for medical supplies, PPE, and
medicines be minimized?
How can local production of medical essentials be encouraged to
reduce dependency on imports?
How can international collaboration be improved to prevent and
manage future pandemics?
What strategies can be implemented to ensure transparent and
timely communication from governments?
Further Links to Research
Outlook of pandemic preparedness in a post-COVID-19 world
Nature
[Link]
Lessons From COVID-19 for Pandemic Preparedness
Journal of Infectious Diseases
[Link]
Pandemic Preparedness: A Scoping Review of Best and
Worst Practices
Journal of Public Health
[Link]
Global pandemic preparedness: learning from the COVID-19
experience
Expert Review of Vaccines
[Link]
546
Learning from post-COVID-19 condition for epidemic
preparedness
International Journal of Infectious Diseases
[Link]
S1198743X24005871
A scoping review of key concepts for future pandemic
preparedness
Journal of Public Health
[Link]
COVID-19 preparedness and response: Implications for future
pandemics
The BMJ
[Link]
Preparing for Future Pandemics and Public Health
Emergencies
Annals of Internal Medicine
[Link]
Assessing pandemic preparedness, response, and lessons
learned in South America
Frontiers in Public Health
[Link]
fpubh.2023.1274737/full
Unleashing the global potential of public health: Lessons
from pandemics
Journal of Infection and Public Health
[Link]
S1876034123003751
Cont. on next page
Optimization Modeling for Pandemic Vaccine Supply Chain
Management: A Review and Future Research Opportunities
arXiv preprint
[Link]
Genomic Analysis and Artificial Intelligence: Predicting Viral
Mutations and Future Pandemics
arXiv preprint
[Link]
Review of Interpretable Machine Learning Models for Disease
Prognosis
arXiv preprint
[Link]
Future Smart Connected Communities to Fight COVID-19
Outbreak
arXiv preprint
[Link]
Interoperability of statistical models in pandemic
preparedness: principles and reality
arXiv preprint
[Link]
Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP)
Wikipedia
[Link]
Research_and_Policy
The future of vaccines is needle-free
Vox
[Link]
flu-needles-public-health
Country Matrix
Essential Portfolios Pakistan
United States of America Philippines
China Malaysia
India Ghana
United Kingdom Senegal
Germany Norway
France Sweden
Japan Ireland
Canada United Arab Emirates
Australia Additional Portfolios
South Korea Republic of Korea
Brazil Albania
South Africa Benin
Nigeria Cambodia
Democratic Republic Costa Rica
of Congo
Thailand Cyprus
Singapore Djibouti
Italy Estonia
Spain Fiji
Netherlands Guatemala
Switzerland Iceland
Saudi Arabia Jamaica
Indonesia Kuwait
Mexico Latvia
Russia Madagascar
Argentina Nepal
Bangladesh Oman
Ethiopia Paraguay
Kenya Rwanda
Togo
Vietnam
Uzbekistan
Egypt