Table of Contents

Effect of Repeal of Statute ...................................................................................................................... 2

Legal Maxims ......................................................................................................................................... 4
Internal aids to interpretation of statutes ................................................................................................. 7
Difference Between .............................................................................................................................. 10
Golden Rule .......................................................................................................................................... 12
Purposive Rule ...................................................................................................................................... 13
Case I [Retrospective] ........................................................................................................................... 23
Case II [Difference between Penal and Civil Statute] .......................................................................... 26
Case III [Retrospective Statute] ............................................................................................................ 28
Case IV [Remedial Statute] .................................................................................................................. 30
Case V [Harmonious Rule of Construction] ......................................................................................... 33
Case VI [Remedial + Beneficial Statute] .............................................................................................. 35
Case VII [Beneficial Legislation] ......................................................................................................... 37
Case VIII [Literal + Purposive Statute] ................................................................................................ 40
Case IX: Ejusdem Generis and Noscitur a Sociis ................................................................................. 42

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 Effect of Repeal of Statute

General Clauses Act, 1897

6. Effect of repeal

Where this Act, or any 13[Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this
Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different
intention appears, the repeal shall not-

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or

(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or
suffered thereunder; or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any
enactment so repealed; or

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed
against any enactment so repealed; or

(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right,
privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;

and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or
enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing
Act or Regulation had not been passed.

Comment: Applying the Golden Rule of construction as stated by this Court in Garikapatti
Veeraya (AIR 1957 SC 540) (supra) in the amending Act there was nothing to show that the
Act would have retrospective effect. As "the essential idea of a legal system is that current law
should govern current activities". We hold that rate of compensation shall have to be
determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act which was in force at the time
compensation was payable i.e. unamended sub-section (4) of Section 25 of the Act would
apply. Moreover, the amending Act affects the substantive right of the appellant, therefore, it
would have prospective operation. There is also no express or implied provision in the
amending Act to indicate that the Act will have retrospective effect. We, therefore, hold that
the amending Act would apply prospectively. Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo ,
Appellant v. State of Bihar AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 3609.

Under General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 6 “Repeal” connotes abrogation or obliteration of
one statute by another, from the statute book as completely “as if it had never been passed.”

When an Act is repealed “it must be considered (except as to transactions past and closed) as
if it had never existed.”

There are two types of repeal:

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 1. Express repeal
2. Implied repeal

Express repeal: Express repeal is an expression that means the abolition of the previously
enacted statute by the newly enacted provisions of a statute through expressed words embedded
under the new statute enacted

Implied repeal: The courts will treat matters as repealed by implication only if the earlier and later
statutory provisions are clearly inconsistent. When a repealing provision is itself repealed, this does
not revive any provision previously repealed by it, unless intent to revive is apparent, but it may allow
common law principles again to apply.

A statute is either perpetual or temporary. It is perpetual when no time is fixed for its

duration, and such a statute remains in force until it is repealed which may be expressed or
implied. A perpetual statute is not perpetual in the sense that it cannot be repealed; it is
perpetual in the sense that it is not abrogated by efflux of time or by non-user. A statute is
temporary when its duration is only for a specified time, and such a statute expires on the
expiry of the specified time unless it is repealed at earlier.

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 Legal Maxims

1. Ut res margis valeat quam pereat: Ut res magis valeat quam pereat is a Latin legal
maxim that translates to “let the thing be more valued than it perishes” or “it is better
for a thing to have an effect than to be made void.” This principle is commonly
applied in the interpretation of statutes and legal documents. In simple terms, ut res
magis valeat quam pereat means that when interpreting laws or legal provisions,
courts should strive to give them a meaning that allows them to be effective and
operational rather than interpreting them in a way that renders them useless or void.
The goal is to ensure that laws and legal instruments serve their intended purposes and
that they are not nullified due to overly restrictive or narrow interpretations. This
principle underscores the importance of interpreting laws in a manner that upholds
their practicality and usefulness
2. Reddendo singular singulis: As a legal principle, Reddendo Singula Singulis instructs
that qualifying words or phrases in a legal document should be applied only to the
specific items to which they logically refer. This approach prevents the misapplication
of qualifiers and ensures coherence in interpretation. For example, consider the
following sentence: “Pets, such as dogs, cats, and fish, must be kept in cages, on
leashes, or in aquariums.” Using Reddendo Singula Singulis, “on leashes” would
logically refer to dogs, while “in aquariums” would refer to fish. The principle avoids
absurd results, such as requiring fish to be kept on leashes. The purpose of Reddendo
Singula Singulis is to provide clarity and consistency in legal interpretation by:
a. Preserving Legislative Intent: The principle helps align interpretations with
the drafters’ original intent, ensuring statutes and contracts are applied as
intended.
b. Avoiding Absurdity: By logically matching phrases to their relevant
antecedents, Reddendo Singula Singulis prevents interpretations that lead to
nonsensical or absurd outcomes.
c. Enhancing Precision: Legal documents often involve complex language. This
principle ensures the precise application of modifiers and qualifiers.
d. Reducing Ambiguity: When multiple interpretations are possible, Reddendo
Singula Singulis provides a systematic approach to determine the most logical
and contextually appropriate reading.
3. Expressio unis est exclusion alterius: The principle Expressio Unius Est Exclusio
Alterius asserts that when a statute expressly mentions certain things, it is assumed
that anything not mentioned is excluded. This approach helps in legal clarity,
ensuring that judicial interpretation does not extend beyond the legislature’s explicit
intent. The Supreme Court of India, in GVK Industries Ltd. vs. ITO [2011] 332 ITR
130 (SC), provided a succinct definition of the maxim:“The express mention of one
thing implies the exclusion of another.” In practice, this means that if a statute lists
certain rights, obligations, or exemptions, anything not included in the list is
presumed not to apply. The rationale behind this principle is to prevent courts from
reading into a statute provisions that were intentionally omitted by the legislature. For
this principle to be applied, two primary conditions must be met:
a. The statute must list specific terms or categories.

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 b. The list should not be followed by general words that broaden its scope.
If these conditions are fulfilled, the maxim is applicable, and anything not included
in the list is assumed to be deliberately excluded.
4. Generalia specialisbus non derogant: Generalia specialibus non derogant is a Latin
maxim which means universal things do not detract from specific things. This maxim of law
says that when a matter falls under any specific provision, then it must be governed by that
provision and not by the general provision. The general provisions must acknowledge to the
specific provisions of law. It is a basic principle of statutory interpretation. Maxims relating
to the interpretation of written instruments occupy (with the comments upon them) a
lot of space in books connecting to statutory interpretation[1]. But if these maxims,
standing alone and taken as absolute statements, are liable to gross misuse. Most of
them are, at the greatest, only prima facie rules; “good servants, but bad masters.” A
rule of construction should constantly be understood as containing the saving clause,
“unless a contrary intention appears by the instrument.” Parliament in passing a
Special Act devotes its entire consideration to a particular subject. When General Act
is then passed, it is logical to believe that Parliament has not altered the former
Special Act. When legislature has given its deliberation to a separate subject and
made provision for it, the presumption is that a following general enactment is not
intended to interfere with special provision unless it exhibits that intent very
noticeably. Only by the definite provision, earlier and special legislation is repealed or
derogated or altered form. The maxim is regarded as a ‘cardinal principle of
interpretation’ in State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai[4] and is characterized as a
well-recognized principle. The general provision, however, controls cases where the
special provision does not apply as the special provision is given effect to the extent
of its scope[5]. Thus, a particular or a special provision controls or cuts down the
general rule[6].
5. Ex Visceribus Actus: Statutory interpretation is a critical tool in understanding,
applying, and enforcing the law in India. One such significant principle is the Latin
maxim Ex Visceribus Actus, meaning “from the very words of the Act.” This maxim
emphasises that statutes should be interpreted as a whole, drawing the meaning from
within the text of the legislation itself. In this article, we will explore the concept of
Ex Visceribus Actus, its application in Indian law, relevant case laws, and its
implications in the broader context of legal interpretation. The term Ex Visceribus Actus
comes from Latin and literally translates to “from the very bowels of the Act.” This principle
stresses that every word or section of a statute should be understood in the context of the
entire document. No part of the statute should be read in isolation; instead, its meaning must
be gathered from the overall legislative intent conveyed by the entire Act. When interpreting
a statute, courts often face provisions that might appear ambiguous or contradictory
when viewed in isolation. The doctrine of Ex Visceribus Actus requires judges and
legal practitioners to derive the meaning of any section, clause, or phrase in light of
the statute as a whole, thereby ensuring a more coherent and purposeful interpretation.
Key Aspects of Ex Visceribus Actus:
a. Holistic Interpretation: Courts should interpret laws by considering the
entire statute and not just individual sections in isolation. This ensures the law
is applied in line with its overall purpose.
b. Legislative Intent: The principle helps in determining the true intent of the
legislature by taking into account the broader context of the statute.

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c. Avoidance of Contradictions: By reading the Act as a whole, contradictions
between sections or provisions are minimised or reconciled.
d. Clarity and Purpose: The statute’s purpose becomes clearer when interpreted
from within its own framework, eliminating the need for extraneous
interpretative tools unless absolutely necessary.
e. Harmonious Construction and Ex Visceribus Actus: Ex Visceribus Actus
is closely linked to the doctrine of harmonious construction, another important
principle of statutory interpretation. When courts encounter provisions within
a statute that appear to be in conflict with each other, the doctrine of
harmonious construction is used to interpret the provisions in such a way that
they work together rather than contradict each other. By applying the principle
of Ex Visceribus Actus, courts are better able to reconcile conflicting sections
and uphold the statute’s intended effect.

6
 Internal aids to interpretation of statutes

Meaning of Internal Aids to Interpretation of Statutes

Internal aids to the interpretation of Statutes refer to the tools or elements inherent within a statute.
These aids allow the court to derive the statute’s meaning without relying on external references. By
examining the content within the statute, such as specific provisions or clauses, it becomes possible to
interpret its intended meaning. The following are examples of internal aids that can assist in the
interpretation of a statute:
Titles of Statutes
Within statutes, titles play an essential role in providing reference and a general understanding of the
purpose of the legislation. There are two types of titles commonly used:
Short Title
The short title of an Act serves as a concise name given to the legislation for easy reference and
identification. It is typically stated in Section 1 of the Act and includes the year of its enactment.
For example, Section 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) states, “This Act may be cited as the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.” Similarly, Section 1 of the Indian Contract Act states, “This Act may
be called the Indian Contract Act, 1872.”
The short title is a convenient way to refer to the Act without mentioning its full name and details.
Long Title
The long title is included in certain acts to provide a general description of the objective or purpose of
the legislation. It offers an overview of the intended scope and purpose of the Act. However, it is
important to note that the long title is not considered a conclusive aid for interpreting statutes. It does
not resolve ambiguities that may arise within the statutory provisions but rather provides a broad
understanding of the Act’s subject matter.
For instance, the long title of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) states, “An act to consolidate and
amend the laws relating to the criminal procedure.” Similarly, the long title of the Code of Civil
Procedure (CPC) states, “An act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the
courts of civil judicature.”
Preamble
The preamble of an Act serves as an internal aid to interpretation as it outlines the main objectives and
reasons behind the legislation. When the language of a provision within an Act is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble generally does not play a significant role. However, if multiple
interpretations are possible, the preamble can assist in ascertaining the true meaning of the provision.
The preamble is typically located on the first page of the Act, although it is worth noting that modern
acts are often drafted without a preamble, diminishing its importance.
In the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, the constitutionality of Section 5 of the West
Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 was challenged on the grounds of violating Article 14 of the
Constitution. This provision empowered the state government to select specific cases to be tried by
special courts with distinct procedures. The Supreme Court referred to the preamble of the Act and
determined that the state government had the discretion to choose such cases.

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Marginal Notes
Marginal notes, or side notes, are brief explanations placed at the side of sections within an Act. They
express the section’s effect but do not form a part of the statute. Drafters, rather than legislators,
usually insert marginal notes.
In the past, marginal notes were sometimes considered for interpretation when the clear meaning of a
provision was uncertain. However, according to the modern view of the court, marginal notes do not
play a significant role as legislators neither insert them nor are they part of the statute itself.
Nevertheless, marginal notes are occasionally referred to when interpreting the constitution because
the constituent assembly creates them.
In the case of Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court held that the marginal
notes of Article 286, which addresses restrictions on the imposition of taxes on the sale or purchase of
goods, are considered part of the Constitution of India. Therefore, they could be relied upon to
provide insights into the purpose and meaning of the article.
While marginal notes may have limited significance in the interpretation of statutes, they can still
offer valuable context in interpreting constitutional provisions.
Chapter Headings
Headings are prefixed to sections or groups of sections within a statute. Courts have treated these
headings as preambles to the corresponding sections or sets of sections. However, it is important to
note that headings cannot control the plain words of the provision. Headings serve as internal aids to
interpretation of statutes.
Their role is limited to cases where the plain reading of the section allows for more than one
interpretation. In such situations, the court may seek guidance from the headings to understand the
legislative intent.
In the case of Tolley v. Giddings, the interpretation of Section 217 of the Road Traffic Act was in
question. The heading of the provision was “Miscellaneous and general,” with the subheading
“Penalisation of taking a motor vehicle without authority.” The court held that the headings clearly
explained the legislature’s intention, and therefore, the passenger could be held liable for an offense.
Illustrations
Illustrations are appended to statute sections to provide examples that illustrate the law explained in
the provision. They manifest the legislature’s intention and can be referred to in cases of ambiguity or
repugnancy. However, it is emphasised through various judgments that illustrations do not explain the
entire principle contained in the section, nor do they limit the scope of the section. In case of a conflict
between the section and an illustration, the section will prevail.
For example, Section 378 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) has 16 illustrations.
Explanations
Explanations are inserted in statutes to clarify the meaning of a particular provision and to remove any
doubts that might arise if the explanation had not been included. The purpose of explanations is to
explain the meaning and intention of the Act, to clarify obscurities or vagueness and to provide
additional support to the objective of the Act.
Hence, explanations also serve as internal aids to interpretation of statutes.

8
However, explanations do not expand or curtail the provision’s meaning; they only aim to remove
uncertainty. The court must harmonise the two in case of a conflict between an explanation and the
main section.
For example, Section 108 of the IPC defines the word “abettor,” which has five explanations attached.
Saving Clauses
Saving clauses are typically appended in cases of repeal and reenactment of statutes. They are inserted
in the repealing statute to ensure that rights already established under the repealed enactment are not
disturbed, and new rights are not created. In case of a conflict between the main part of a statute and a
saving clause, the saving clause is rejected.
Provisos
A proviso to a section is presumed to be part of the section and is an internal aid to the interpretation
of statute. It is meant to qualify or exempt certain provisions, impose mandatory conditions for the
enactment to be workable, serve as optional addenda or become an integral part of the enactment.
The rule of interpretation regarding provisos is that they cannot nullify the main enactment’s
implications nor expand its scope. Provisos can only be referred to in case of ambiguity in the section.
They must be harmoniously construed in case of a conflict between the main enactment and a proviso.
However, some jurists argue that the proviso prevails as it represents the legislature’s latest intention.
For example, Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India is considered a proviso to Article 16(1) as held
in T. Devadasan v. Union of India.
Exceptions
Exceptions are included in statutes to exempt certain matters that would otherwise fall within the
scope of the main provision. The latter should be relied upon in case of a conflict between an
exception and the main enactment. However, in many cases, exceptions are considered the last
intention of the legislature and may be given aid in the interpretation of statutes.
For example, Section 300 of the IPC has five exceptions attached to it.

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 Difference Between
Disjunctive and Conjunctive Reading:
Prima Facie it may seem that interpretation of the words “and” and “or” need not been
considered essential, are be subsidiary and do not need much attention. However, several times,
it is just through the interpretation of the words “and” and “or” that the whole meaning of the
Statute has been changed and the Judicature has evolved a new principle altogether which was
never expected.

The aim of this article is to lay light on the importance and the need for correct interpretation
of the words “and” and “or”, as an aid to interpretation to ensure that effect is given to the true
intent of the Legislature.

The word “or” is normally disjunctive and “and” is normally conjunctive but at times they are
read as vice versa to effectuate the manifest intent of the legislature as disclosed from the
context. As stated by SCRUTTON L.J, ‘You do sometimes read “or” as “and” in a statute. But
you do not do it unless you are obliged because “or” does not generally mean “and” and “and”
does not generally mean “or”.

However, the rule is that “or” is normally disjunctive and “and” is normally conjunctive and a
departure from the same is not available unless the very aim and purpose of the Statute so
requires. The rationale being that if the Legislature wishes to use “and” in a particular statutory
provision, then it has every right to do and nothing prevents them for doing so. So if the word
“and” has not been used and instead the word “or” has been used, it is obvious that the
Legislature has purposively used the word “or”. Unless, it is not proved, that there was some
reason or difficulty that prevented the Legislature from using the “and”, literal interpretation
has to be applied to the statutory provision and the rule - “or” is normally disjunctive and “and”
is normally conjunctive has to be given effect to.

In my opinion, this rule is an extension of the “Purposive Interpretation Rule.” Purposive theory
is a theory of statutory interpretation that holds that Courts should interpret legislation in light
of the purpose behind the legislation. According to this theory Courts are not want to bound by
the text. It is a pragmatic approach or rather a functional aspect of interpreting law, wherein
deviation from literal rule is permitted for the larger interest of the society.

A Judge must be a jurist endowed with the legislator's wisdom, historian's search for truth,
prophet's vision, capacity to respond to the needs of the present, resilience to cope with the
demands of the future and to decide objectively disengaging himself/herself from every
personal influence or predilections. Therefore, the judges should adopt purposive interpretation

10
of the dynamic concepts of the Constitution and the Act with its interpretative armoury to
articulate the felt necessities of the time.

I strongly feel that the rule which permits deviation from the usual and ordinary interpretation
of the words “and” and “or”, is an extension of the Purposive Theory wherein Courts have
conferred upon themselves the power to extend the meaning of the “and” and “or” and give
them a meaning and interpretation, which though not directly stated by the Legislature, yet,
aims at achieving the real purpose of Legislature.
Construction and Interpretation:

The term ‘interpretation of the statute’, means an understanding of the law. It is

the process adopted by the courts to determine the meaning of legislature, by way
of legislative form. It is used to ascertain the actual connotation of the act or
document along with the intention of the legislature. It tends to clarify the
meaning of those terms and writings which are difficult to understand.

In law, ‘construction’ means the process of legal exposition which determines

the sense and explanation of abstruse terms, writings etc. in the statute and
draws a conclusion on the basis of logical reasoning, with respect to the subject
that lies above the direct expression of the legal text.

The basic principle of construction of a statute is to read it in a literal manner,

meaning that by elucidating the words used in the statute, ordinarily and
grammatically, if it results in ambiguity and is likely to convey another meaning
then the court can opt for its literal meaning. However, if no such absurdity is
possible, the fundamental rules of interpretation can be adopted.

The difference between interpretation and construction can be drawn clearly on

the following grounds:

1. In law, interpretation refers to, understanding the words and true sense in
the provisions of the statute. On the other hand, construction is described
as drawing conclusions, in relation to the case, that lie beyond the
outright expression of the legal text.
2. While interpretation is all about the linguistic meaning of the legal text,
Construction determines the legal effect of the words and writings of the
statute.
3. When the simple meaning of the legal text is to be drawn, then that will
be called an interpretation. Conversely, when the literal meaning of the
words used in the legal text results in ambiguity, then construction is
opted, so as to decide whether the case is covered by it or not.

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 Golden Rule
The golden rule of interpretation is an expansion or extension of the literal rule, allowing
judges to deviate from the strict literal meaning of words to prevent absurd outcomes.
According to the golden rule, when interpreting a statute, the Court must generally
adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used.
The golden rule can be applied in both a narrow and wider sense.
In the narrow approach, the judge employs this rule when the word used in the statute
is ambiguous, meaning it has multiple possible meanings. It is then up to the judge to
choose the most appropriate meaning in the case context.
In the wider approach, the golden rule is often utilised when there is only one literal
meaning of a word, but using that meaning would lead to an absurd result. Therefore,
the Court may modify the interpretation of the word to avoid such absurdity.
The golden rule holds significant importance in the field of interpretation. It imposes a
duty upon the Court to give effect to the intended meaning of the law when following
the literal interpretation would lead to absurdity or defeat the purpose of the
enactment. In such cases, the Court may need to modify the grammatical and ordinary
sense of the words used in the law.
However, the Court must exercise caution and not deviate from the provision of a law
that has a reasonably plain and clear meaning on its face. This means that the Court can
only partially redefine or rewrite the law. The Court must strive to find the intended
meaning within the words used in the statute.
Unless the words of the law are absurd, ambiguous or lack a proper meaning, it is
generally preferable to interpret them based on their natural and ordinary meaning. This
approach ensures consistency and maintains the integrity of the legislative intent.

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Financial Company (1967) – Case on “Shall and
May”.

In the case of the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Financial Company
(1967) case, a transport vehicle belonging to the defendant was found to be carrying a
parcel of opium during a routine check by authorities. The defendant presented an
invoice indicating that the parcel contained crates of apples as the sole item. As per
Section 11 of the Opium Act of 1878, all vehicles transporting contraband articles were
to be impounded and the articles confiscated.
The transport company argued that they did not know the opium present in their vehicle.
The main issue was whether the magistrate was obligated to confiscate the vehicle based
on the wording of Section 11 of the Opium Act of 1878.
The High Court ruled that it would be unjust to confiscate the vehicle of an individual
who did not know of the presence of opium. Considering that the statute in question
was penal, it should be interpreted in a manner that does not penalise someone who has
not committed an offence. The word “shall” in “shall be confiscated” was interpreted
to mean “may” in the context of such cases.

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Therefore, the golden rule of interpretation was applied to remove the obligation under
Section 11 of the Act. If the literal rule had been followed, it would have resulted in a
grave injustice by penalising an innocent person.

Purposive Rule
The purposive rule of interpretation is usually interchanged with the mischief rule by some
authors because the mischief rule of interpretation looks at the purpose of a statute which is
suppressing and providing a remedy for a particular mischief while some other believe that it
is an extension of the mischief rule because the rule not only facilitate the remedy of mischief
but also works to give effect to the legislative intention of all kinds of statutes including the
Constitution. The mischief rule of interpretation was evolved with a departure from the literal
rule of interpretation where the words of the statute are construed in a strict sense yet there is
no fulfilment of the legislative object. It has been seen in a number of cases that the literal rule
or the plain letter meaning of the textual language has caused absurdity and hardship, to remedy
these demerits of the literal rule the golden rule and mischief rule has been devised. They help
in situations where there exists a legislative vacuum. The purposive interpretation or purposive
construction sometimes also referred to as the modern principle of construction was devised to
replace the literal rule, golden rule and the mischief rule.9 The reason why it is believed to be
the most appropriate rule is that unlike all other rules it focuses on adopting that meaning or
construction which furthers the purpose of the enactment. Also it is to be noted that the mischief
rule as coined in the Heydon’s case in 1584 is anarchaic which needs to be adopted to the
present times. Therefore, the purposive rule of construction is appropriately the extension of
the mischief rule. The purposive rule of interpretation adopts the use of external aids such as
the draft of objects and reasons, legislators debates and history of the act etc. It provides space
for judicial discretion and application of judicial mind over the construction of a specific
statute. This judicial discretion helps rule out the absurdity and hardship caused by the plain
reading of the text. The same judicial discretion is seen as the abuse of judicial powers by the
judges causing hindrance to the separation of powers. The judicial discretion created by the
purposive interpretation is the bone of contention in the interpretation of statutes. The judges
are able to fill the legislative vacuum owing to this judicial discretion. The liberal interpretation
or the beneficial construction is also made out owing to the application of judicial mind and
discretion. It prevents the legislations from dying out in changing times by giving it a life each
time it is interpreted considering the changed social dimensions of the society.
Case Law: Bangalore Water Supply Vs A. Rajappa (1978)
The court interpreted “industry” broadly to align with the statute’s social purpose.
Jurisprudence:
Ensures laws remain relevant and adaptable, supporting a dynamic legal system

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 Penal Statutes/Rule of Strict Interpretation
Definition:

It is a legislative enactment that impose criminal liability on individuals found guilty of

committing an offense. The term "penal" denotes the imposition of punishment by the State
against the offender. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, a penal statute is one that is
primarily intended to be enforced through the imposition of fines, imprisonment, or other forms
of punishment. A statute is considered penal if it imposes a fine, penalty, or forfeiture, except
for liquidated damages or other civil remedies. According to Crawford, criminal and penal
statutes must be strictly construed, meaning they cannot be enlarged or extended through
inference, implication, or equitable considerations. In other words, the language of the statute
cannot be stretched beyond its ordinary meaning in order to achieve the general purpose for
which it was enacted. In Lalita Jalan vs Bombay Gas Company Ltd (AIR 2003 SC 3157) the
Supreme Court has observed that according to section 630 of the Companies Act 1956, the act
of wrongfully withholding a company's property is subject to a fine as punishment. However,
it is only considered an offense when a court orders the defaulter to return or refund the
property, and if this court order is not complied with. Consequently, this provision cannot be
classified as a penal provision since it lacks the typical elements of a crime and punishment.
Therefore, it should not be interpreted strictly.

Penal vs. Remedial Statute:

If the legislative body solely declares an act as invalid and offers compensation as a means of
rectification for the affected individual, it will be categorized as a remedial statute. However,
if the statute additionally includes penalties for non-compliance with the law, such as
imprisonment or fines, it will be classified as a penal statute. A remedial statute should be
interpreted in a broad and generous manner. In instances where there is uncertainty regarding
its meaning, the interpretation should lean towards favoring the group of individuals intended
to benefit from the statute. Conversely, a penal statute should be interpreted strictly. In
situations where doubt arises, the interpretation should lean towards favoring the accused. A
statute can possess both penal and remedial characteristics, and these aspects may be present
within the same legislation. In such instances, the guiding principle of interpretation is as
follows: “it is important to remember that while the statute and its accompanying rules aim to
provide protection for a specific group of individuals, any violation of these provisions will
result in penal repercussions. Therefore, when penalties are imposed, it is not permissible to
distort the language of the rule, regardless of its well-intentioned purpose, beyond its fair and
ordinary meaning.”

GENERAL RULES GOVERNING INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES

It causes less misery to be sheltered in a jail, than to be shelterless without - A.S. Sulochana
vs. C. Dharmalingam

1. Strict Interpretation – “No Addition/Subtraction/Expansion of words”; and

2. No Retrospective Operations.

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Why to Follow Strict Rule of Interpretation in Case of Penal Statutes

The principle of strict construction of penal statutes is rooted in the law's concern for protecting
individual rights and the fundamental principle that the authority to define a crime and establish
its punishment lies with the legislature, not the judiciary. It is reasonable to expect that the
legislature will clearly express its intent in penal statutes. It is not within the court's jurisdiction
to create an offense through interpretation, as this could potentially ensnare unsuspecting and
uninformed individuals and jeopardize the rights of the general public. The rule of strict
construction in penal statutes originated in England during a time when English law imposed
excessively severe penalties and extreme sentences for minor offenses. For example,
pickpocketing was punishable by public hanging, cutting down a cherry tree in an orchard was
a capital offense, and flicking a handkerchief could result in deportation to Australia.1 The
purpose of strict construction was to mitigate the severity of such harsh sentences and broad
condemnations. According to Maxwell, the rule of strict construction of penal statutes
manifests itself in following ways:

1. Express language is necessary for the creation of criminal offenses, therefore, no act is to
be deemed criminal unless it is clearly made so by words of the statute concerned. However,
it is not necessary that a particular penalty be specified in order that an act or omission may
constitute an offense.
2. The words setting out the elements of an offense are to be strictly construed. And if there
is any reasonable doubt or ambiguity it will be resolved in favour of the person charged.
3. A reasonable interpretation that will avoid the penalty must be adopted.
4. If there are two reasonable constructions, the court must give the more lenient
interpretation.
5. The court must always see that the person to be penalized comes fairly and squarely within
the plain words of the enactment.
6. Punishments can be imposed only if the circumstances of the case fall clearly within the
words of the enactment.
7. The principle of strict construction of a penal statute dictates that it should be interpreted
narrowly, with a bias towards the person being prosecuted. This rule reflects a preference
for protecting the individual's freedom when there is ambiguity in the language of the
statute.

Case laws on strict interpretation:

In Babu Manmohan Das vs. Bishun Das the court observed that as long as literal meaning of
any word in a statute is clear and unambiguous and does not leads to absurdity it should be
given its literal meaning. Therefore, the word “or” if interpreted as “and” will not only change
the meaning of the section in the UP Rent Control Act but also lead to absrurdity. Therefore,
the court refused to disown the strict rule of interpretation.

EXCEPTIONS TO STRICT INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES

Previously, it was commonly held that penal statutes should be interpreted strictly in favor of
the accused. However, two opposing developments have since influenced the interpretation of
such statutes. Firstly, the reduction of punishments has alleviated the pressure on courts to
1
Until the 1820s, there were some four hundred criminal offences which carried the death penalty including
picking someone’s pocket of anything worth one shilling (5p) or more and stealing anything worth £2. The number
of capital offences was gradually reduced by successive governments until 1861 when the Offences Against the
Persons Act specified that only wilful murder and treason were punishable by death.

15
strictly construe statutes in favor of the accused. Secondly, the modern imperative of crime
control has led to a legislative intention for rigorous implementation, prompting courts to
emphasize strict interpretation of statutes, regardless of whether it favors the accused. The
intention of the legislature is now recognized as the driving force behind statutory
interpretation. The following are some exceptions to the general rule of interpretation of penal
statute:

1. Beneficial Construction: In M.V. Joshi vs. M.U. Shimpi (AIR 1961 SC 14940)-, The
appellant was found guilty under section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954
for the sale of adulterated butter. The appellant argued that the product sold did not fall under
the definition of butter as per the rules established under the Act, as butter is defined as a
product made from milk, whereas the appellant had sold butter made from curd. Additionally,
the appellant contended that as the Act is a penal statute, the term butter must be strictly
interpreted in favor of the accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's argument,
stating that the strict construction of a penal statute requires that the conduct of the accused
must fall within the plain words of the statute without distorting their natural meaning. The
appellant's argument that butter made from curd is not covered by the rules established under
the Act is unfounded, as butter remains butter regardless of whether it is made from milk or
curd. The legislature's intention is evident from the language used, leaving no room for doubt.
2. Purposive Interpretation of Penal Statutes (Suppression of the Mischief): It is not
imperative for courts to consistently favor interpretations that are advantageous to the accused
rather than the prosecution. Instead, they may opt for interpretations that align with the
objectives outlined in the law. In Murlidhar Meghraj Loya vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977
SCR (1) 1) When addressing the provisions of the Food Adulteration Act, it was emphasized
that the interpretative process should be guided by the social mission of food laws (i.e.
purpose). This approach ensures that legal measures are effectively applied to all individuals
involved in adulteration practices. It is important to discourage any narrow, pedantic, literal,
or lexical interpretations that may create loopholes for these dangerous criminals to evade
legal consequences. The new criminal jurisprudence must deviate from the old principles that
favor accused individuals and hinder the enforcement of criminal statutes designed to safeguard
public health and national wealth. The language utilized in the penal statute may be subject to
interpretation that effectively addresses any gaps and thwarts any potential harm in accordance
with the principles established in Heydon's Case.(3 Co Rep 7a) In Igbal Singh Marwah v.
Meenakshi Marwah (AIR 2005 SC 2119)- The Supreme Court has observed that Section
195(i)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) is applicable only
when the offenses listed in the provision are committed in relation to a document after it has
been presented or submitted as evidence in a court proceeding, specifically during the period
when the document is under the custody of the court. It is important to note that the principle
of strict interpretation of statutes that establish offenses or impose penalties is not universally
applicable and may not be necessary in every case. Instead, penal provisions should be
interpreted in a manner that suppresses any wrongdoing and promotes the objectives intended
by the legislature. In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi vs. Jitendra Bhimraj - (1990) 4
SCC 76 ) The Court was deliberating on the application of the Terrorists and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act 1987 in relation to a dispute between two opposing factions in a
village. One of the parties had made references to gaining dominance in the criminal
underworld by eliminating their rival faction. However, the Court dismissed the application of
the TADA in this particular situation and made the following observation: "The utilization of
the Act is unnecessary if the accused's activities can be controlled and regulated under the
existing laws of the country. The Act should only be employed in cases where the law
enforcement agencies find the ordinary laws insufficient or ineffective in addressing the threat

16
posed by terrorist and disruptive activities. When invoking a criminal statute, such as the Act,
it is the duty of the prosecution to demonstrate, based on the case record and collected
documents during the investigation, that the facts presented prima facie constitute an offense
as defined by the law. When a statute imposes special or enhanced punishments compared to
those prescribed for similar offenses under the regular penal laws of the country, the judge
bears a higher responsibility and duty to ensure that there is prima facie evidence supporting
the charges brought by the prosecution. Therefore, when a law imposes severe penal
consequences on an individual, extra caution must be exercised to prevent those whom the
legislature did not intend to be covered by the explicit language of the statute from being
implicated by stretching the interpretation of the law. In the case of Kanwar Singh vs. Delhi
Administration the court while interpreting MCD Act’s section relating to impounding of cattle,
interpreted the word “abandoned” to include not only permanent loss of ownership but also
temporary loss of ownership. Otherwise, the legislative intent of controlling the mischief would
have failed.
3. Golden rule of interpretation: When literal rule of interpretation leads to absurdity
one may disown the strict interpretation and adopt golden rule of interpretation. In the case of
Azad Bharat Fin. Corp. vs. State of MP, the court while interpreting section 9 & 11 of the
Madhya Bharat Opium Act, held that the word “shall” falling under the aforementioned section
if interpreted literally (shall means something mandatory) will lead to absurdity. The court
followed the golden rule of interpretation and changed the meaning of “shall” to “may” having
regards to the facts of the case.

OPERATION OF STATUTE

Types of Operation of Statutes:

Prospective Operation

which seeks to lead current and future activities, events which are deemed to organize the
regulatory system intact. prospective with reference to statutes shows that it is concerned with
or applying the laws in future or at least from the date of commencement of the statute

Retrospective Operation

Which seeks to govern past acts, events as to impair an existing right or obligation. A
retrospective statute contemplates the past and gives to a previous transaction some different
legal effect from that which it had under the law when it occurred or transpired.

PROSPECTIVE VS RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES

The future activities and events of the law are been decided to analyze and articulate the all
the amendments made with respect to the fundamental rights till the day of the decision in the
case would continue to remain valid and effective. All the provisions made in the purview of
the future are meant to be prospective statutes.

Doctrine of Prospective Overruling vs. Retrospective Legislation

The doctrine of Prospective Overruling originated in the American Judicial System. It dictates
that a decision made in a particular case would have operation only in the future and will not
carry any retrospective effect on any past decisions. Retrospective legislations are barred under

17
article 20(1) of the Constitution of India but in some cases a penal statute may have
retrospective operation. Such legislation may:

1. Recognize a new offence

2. Decriminalize offence
3. Reduce/Increase Punishment

Substantive Statute: The usual understanding is that a statute cannot have retrospective effect
on the vested rights on individuals.

Procedural Statute: As far as procedure is concerned, it is permissible that a statute may have
retrospective effect and make the matters which are pending and the fresh cases which are to
be filed subject to new procedure.

Declaratory/Explanatory Statute: A declaratory law is one which seeks to remedy any doubt or
confusion with respect to an existing statute. Such declaratory statues can have retrospective
effect.

Ratan Lal vs. State of Punjab the court awarded a rigorous imprisonment to accused aged 17
years for outraging modesty of 7-year-old girl and also imposed fine upon him. Later the
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, came into force which stated that no person below the age
of 21 years shall be imprisoned. The court quashed the award of punishment against the accused
in the light of new legislation and gave it a retrospective effect for the benefit of the accused.

In Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries ltd vs. Director of Income Tax section 9 of the
Income Tax Act, 1995, was given a whole new meaning. In this case a company incorporated
in Japan was selling products in Indian market. Question arose with respect to the tax on fees
paid on services by NR companies in India. The court held that for section 9 to be invoked the
services from which the company is earning money must be rendered as well as utilized in
India, in such cases the income is accrued in India. This judgement reversed the general
understanding that if services are provided by a company in India they will be liable to pay
taxes even if the services are rendered outside India or not.

Case laws covered:

1. A.S. Sulochana Vs. C. Dharmalingam

2. Azad Bharat Fin. Corp. vs. State of MP
3. Babu Manmohan Das vs. Bishun Das
4. Heydon's Case.(3 Co Rep 7a)
5. Igbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah
6. Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries ltd vs. Director of Income Tax
7. Kanwar Singh vs. Delhi Administration
8. Lalita Jalan vs Bombay Gas Company Ltd
9. M.V. Joshi vs. M.U. Shimpi
10. Murlidhar Meghraj Loya vs. State of Maharashtra
11. Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi vs. Jitendra Bhimraj
12. Ratan Lal vs. State of Punjab

18
 Delegated And Conditional Legislation

LEGISLATION
The term ‘legislation’ is derived from latin word legis meaning law and latum which mean “to
make” or “set”. Thus the word legislation mean ‘making of law’. Legislation is that source of
law which consists in the declaration of legal rules by the competent authority.
Legislation has been used in different senses. In its broadest sense, it includes all method of
law making. It includes both, the process of law making and the law evolved as a result of this
process.
There are two obvious reason for legislation being regarded as one of the most effective source
of law. Firstly, it involves laying down of legal rules by the legislature which the state
recognised as law. Secondly, it has the force and authority of the State.
Delegated Legislation
It may be reiterated that legislation by executive is a kind of subordinate legislation.
Undoubtedly, the main function of executive is to enforce law, but for the regulation of his
departments, the power of rule making is delegated to them. Strictly speaking, delegated
legislation is a legislation made by any authority other than the legislature. It denotes the rules,
orders, notifications, bye-laws or directions made by the executive authorities under the law
passed by the parliament.
The term ‘delegated legislation’ is generally used in two senses. In one sense, it means the
exercise of power of rule making by the executive under the authority delegated to it by the
legislature. In the other sense, it means the output of the exercise of that power. In other words,
when the function of legislation is entrusted to organs other than the legislature itself, the
legislation made by the such organ is called delegated legislation, which may be in the form of
rules, regulation, bye-laws, orders, schemes, directions, circulars or notifications, etc.
It is significant to note that there has been enormous increase of delegated legislation in India
in recent time. The situation today has reached a point where delegated legislation out-numbers
the legislative enactments.
The factor which contributed to the growth of delegated legislation are as follows:-
1) The newly evolved concept of welfare state has caused tremendous increase in the work of
the government which necessitated a huge bulk of legislation. The parliament hardly has time
to deal with this wide range of legislation efficiently and, therefore, it concentrates only on
defining the essential legislative principle and leave the detail to be worked out by the
executive.
2) Besides the pressure of work on the Parliament and lack of adequate technical knowledge
about certain subjects, delegated legislation is also deemed necessary to meet unforeseen
contingencies. It provides for a power of constant adapation to unknown future conditions
without the necessity of amending the legislation.
3) Delegated legislation is further deemed necessary to meet the cases of emergency arising
out of war, insurrection, floods, economic depression, epidemics etc. The executive must

19
therefore, be armed with rule-making power so that it may initiate appropriate remedial action
immediately without waiting for law to be passed by the legislature which is lengthy process.
4) In certain specific areas such as rationing schemes, imposition of import or export duties,
exchange regulations, etc. expediency demand that law should not become public till it finally
come into operation. Some kind of confidentiality become necessary in the public interest and
therefore, the legislation prefers to delegate power of legislation on such matter to the
concerned executive authorities.
5) The parliament found it difficult to lay down details especially in certain field of technical
nature and therefore, entrusted this task to the departments and ministers concerned. Members
of legislature may be seasoned politicians but the lack expertise and adequate knowledge to
deal with highly technical matters such as nuclear energy, electricity, gas, atomic energy etc.
which can be efficiently handled only by the experts in the respective field.
6) The complexities of modern public administration and expending dimensions of the socio-
economic function of the state have necessitated the delegation of legislative power so as to
enable the executive to device new forms of laws for the effective realization of the goal of
socio- economic justice and implementation of the welfare schemes of the State.
Conditional Legislation
Conditional delegation take place where the legislature empowers the executive to:
1 ) Extend the operation of an existing law to a particular area or territory;
2) Determine the time of application of an Act to a given area;
3) Extend the duration of a temporary Act, subject to maximum period fixed by the legislature;
4) Determine the extent and limit within which it should be operative;
5) Introduce a special law if the contemplated situation has arisen in the opinion of the
Government.
Conditional legislation has proved to be very useful in implementing the modern socio-
economic welfare scheme. The legislature usually formulates the development scheme, and
leave it to the administrative authority as to when and where to implement them. Thus it confers
ample discretion to the government to implement various welfare legislations.
Difference Between Delegated Legislation and Conditional Legislation
When a legislature confers law making power up on some other body, the legislative power is
said to be delegated and it is a case of delegated legislation. But when the legislature itself
enacts the law and give to some other body only the power of determining when it should come
into force or when it should be applied to a particular area or territory of the state, there is no
delegation of legislative power. Instead, it would be a case of conditional delegation.
Thus in delegated legislation, power of legislation are transferred or delegated which is not the
case with conditional delegation.
” In Conditional legislation, the delegate’s power is that of determining when a legislative
declared rule of conduct shall become effective, and the Delegated legislation involves
delegation of rule- making power to administrative agent. That means the legislature after
having laid down the broad principles of its policy in the legislation, can leave detail to be
supplied by the administrative authority.”

20
The above distinction was reiterated by the Patna High court in “Raghunath Pandey Vs State
of Bihar (1982) pat.1”, wherein the Court observed that in a conditional legislation, the law is
complete in itself and certain condition are laid down as to ‘how’ and ‘when’ the law would be
applied by the delegate.

21
 Disclaimer

Dear all,

Please be informed that the

analysis drawn in the cases
hereinbelow are just for the
sake of understanding. You all
are expected to follow the
FIRAC pattern in your exam
answers. And also add to the
analysis your own
understanding.

22
 Case I [Retrospective]
Facts:

The appellant, a resident of Palwal in Gurgaon District, committed house trespass and tried to
outrage the modesty of a girl aged 7 years. He was sent up for trial before the Magistrate, First
Class, Palwal. The said Magistrate, on May 31, 1962, convicted him under Sections 451 and
354 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment under
each count and directed that the sentences should run concurrently. He further imposed a fine
of Rs. 200/- on the appellant under s. 451 of the Indian Penal Code and ordered that, in default
of payment of fine, he should undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. The appellant
was 16 years old at the time of his conviction. The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereafter
referred as the Act), was extended to Gurgaon District on September 1, 1962 and, therefore, at
the time the appellant was convicted by the Magistrate, the Magistrate had no power or duty to
make any order under the Act. The appellant preferred an appeal against his conviction and
sentences to the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon, who by his judgment dated September
22, 1962, dismissed the appeal. Though by the time the Additional Sessions Judge disposed of
the appeal the said Act had come into force, neither the appellant relied upon the provisions of
the Act nor did the learned Additional Sessions Judge exercised his power thereunder. The
revision filed in the High Court by the appellant was dismissed on September 27, 1962. The
revision petition was dismissed in limine, but no ground was taken in the revision petition that
the Additional Sessions Judge should have acted under s. 6 of the Act. After the revision
petition was disposed of, it appears that the appellant filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.
793 of 1962 requesting the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under s. 11 of the Act and to
pass orders under Sections 3, 4 or 6 thereof. The said application was also dismissed.
Unfortunately the said application is not on the record and we are not in a position to know the
exact scope of the relief asked for in the application and the reasons for which it was dismissed.
The appellant filed a petition in the High Court under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution for a
certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court. That petition having been dismissed, the appellant
has preferred the present appeal to this Court by obtaining special leave. Learned counsel for
the appellant contends that, having regard to the admitted facts in the case, the High Court
should have acted under s. 11 of the Act and released the appellant on probation of good
conduct instead of sending him to prison. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State
argues that the Act is not retrospective in operation and, therefore, it will not apply to the
appellant, as he was convicted before it came into force in Gurgaon District. You are the judge.
Decide.

Relevant sections:

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

6. Restrictions on imprisonment of offenders under twenty-one years of age: —

(1) When any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an
offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the court by which
the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that,
having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the
character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under section 3 or section
4, and if the court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its
reasons for doing so.

23
(2) For the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal under section
3 or section 4 with an offender referred to in sub-section (1), the court shall call for a report
from the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other information available
to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender.

11. Courts competent to make order under the Act, appeal and revision and powers of
courts in appeal and revision: —

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, an order under this Act,
may be made by any court empowered to try and sentence the offender to imprisonment and
also by the High Court or any other court when the case comes before it on appeal or in revision.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, where an order under section 3 or section
4 is made by any court trying the offender (other than a High Court), an appeal shall lie to the
court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former court.

(3) In any case where any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having
committed an offence and the court by which he is found guilty declines to deal with him under
section 3 or section 4, and passes against him any sentence of imprisonment with or without
fine from which no appeal lies or is preferred, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code or any other law, the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former
court may, either of its own motion or on an application made to it by the convicted person or
the probation officer, call for and examine the record of the case and pass such order thereon
as it thinks fit.

(4) When an order has been made under section 3 or section 4 in respect of an offender, the
Appellate Court or the High Court in the exercise of its power of revision may set aside such
order and in lieu thereof pass sentence on such offender according to law:

Provided that the Appellate Court or the High Court in revision shall not inflict a greater
punishment than might have been inflicted by the court by which the offender was found guilty.

SOLUTION

Follow the [Facts]IRAC method to frame your answer.

• Facts: Begin with stating relevant facts of the case [do not reproduce everything
verbatim, be precise and re-state only the relevant facts].
• Issue: Frame the issue, having regard of the facts of the case. Here the issue is as
follows:

“Whether the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, can be given retrospective application?”

• Rule of Law: Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India is relevant to solve the issue
involved in this case [Just try to reproduce article 20(1). Do not do analysis here, save it for the
next part].
• Analysis: Discuss article 20(1) in detail and explain that penal statutes do not have
retrospective application. Once done, start with the next stage, i.e. identifying the nature of the
statute [Probation of Offenders Act, 1958]. If the legislation involved in issue is a penal
legislation, then article 20(1) will be applicable otherwise not. The objective of the Act is pretty

24
much clear that it seeks not to punish [objective of penal statutes] people but to reform and
rehabilitate people back to the society where they belong.
• Conclusion: This implies that the statute is not a Penal statute and thus article 20(1) is
not applicable.

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25
 Case II [Difference between Penal and Civil Statute]
Facts:
Bombay Gas Co. Ltd., respondent No. 1, had taken on lease a flat in a building known as "Hari
Bhavan", 64, Pedder Road, Bombay. Shri N.K. Jalan, in his capacity as Director of the
Company, was allotted the said flat. Ashok Kumar Jalan (accused No. 1 and respondent No. 2
in the present appeal) is son of Shri N.K. Jalan. Appellant No. 1, Smt. Lalita Jalan (accused
No. 2) is wife of Ashok Kumar Jalan and appellant No. 2, Siddharth Jalan (accused No. 3) is
his son. Shri N.K. Jalan died in 1967. The company purchased the flat and became owner
thereof in April, 1991. It filed a criminal complaint under Section 630 of the Companies Act,
1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') against Ashok Kumar Jalan, Smt. Lalita Jalan and
Siddharth Jalan on March 16, 1994. The proceedings of the complaint case were stayed in a
company petition and finally sometime in the year 2001, the learned Magistrate issued process
against the accused. The appellants moved an application for recall of the process issued against
them and for their discharge, which was rejected by the Metropolitan Magistrate, 14th Court,
Girgaum, Mumbai by order dated December 1, 2001. Thereafter, the appellants preferred a
petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 227 of the Constitution in the High Court of
Bombay, which was dismissed by the impugned order dated January 18, 2002. Shri Ashok
Desai, learned senior counsel for the appellants, has submitted that in view of the plain
language used in Section 630 of the Act, the said provision can apply only to an officer or
employee of the company. The flat was given to Shri N.K. Jalan for his residence but he died
when he was still functioning as Director of the company. The appellants, are neither officers
nor employees of the company and, therefore, they cannot be prosecuted under the aforesaid
provision and the complaint filed against them is an abuse of the process of the Court which is
liable to be quashed.
DECIDE
Annexure
Section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956, provides:
Penalty for wrongful withholding of property –
(1) If any officer or employee of a company -
(a) wrongfully obtains possession of any property of a company; or
(b) having any such property in is possession, wrongfully withholds it or knowingly applies it
to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by this Act;
he shall, on the complaint of the company or any creditor or contributory thereof, be punishable
with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.
(2) The court trying the offence may also order such officer or employee to deliver up or refund,
within a time to be fixed by the court, any such property wrongfully obtained or wrongfully
withheld or knowingly misapplied, or in default, to suffer imprisonment for a term which may
extend to two years."

26
 Solution
Follow the same FIRAC format.
• Facts:
• Issue: Whether legal heirs of dead officer or employee of a company can be brought
under the purview of Sec. 630 of Companies Act, 1956?
• Analysis: In the analysis part, explain that penal statutes need to be given strict
interpretation. A judge cannot add, subtract, or expand the meaning of any word in a penal
statute.
o Step 1: Next, try to determine the nature of section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956 –
is it Penal or just Civil in nature? If it is penal then language of section 630 cannot be
expanded to include legal heirs of a dead officer or employee.
o Step 2: Ensure that strict interpretation is not causing any injustice, or the interpretation
is not such which is absurd or unreasonable. If strict interpretation is causing injustice,
absurdity, or unreasonableness then disown the Strict [Literal Interpretation] and adopt some
other interpretation which helps to achieve:
▪ Purpose of the legislation, e.g. control a mischief [Purposive interpretation], or
▪ Benefit of the legislation [Beneficial interpretation].
Though Section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956, provides for fine [a type of punishment]
which may extend to 10,000/- but
In Amrit Lal Chum v. Devoprasad Dutta Roy, the court has held that Section 630 can be
expanded to include Ex-Officers and Employees as well. Therefore, it is possible to give
section 630 a wide interpretation. It is also relevant to note that Companies Act is different
from Indian Penal Code. The objective of Companies Act is to regulate the functioning of the
Company which does not affect the whole society at large. Therefore, the Companies Act
cannot be called a Penal Statute. Now referring to Section 630, it true that it provides for a fine
under clause (1) but that fine is imposed upon an application made by the Company itself
(Company Order). It is only upon the failure of compliance with company order that that Clause
(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, will come into force. Once the order of the court u/s 630(2) –
recovery of property – is not complied with that the provision of penalty of imprisonment which
may extend to 2 years will come into force.
• Conclusion: Therefore, Section 630 is not essentially a penal statute, moreover, the
Companies Act, 1956, is not a penal statute. It may be given a wider interpretation and even
legal heirs of company officers and employees can be included in the ambit of section 630.

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27
 Case III [Retrospective Statute]
Facts: On 18.9.1993, FIR No. 386 for offences under Sections 148, 307, 323, 325, 326/149 of
Indian Penal Code and Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act 1959 was registered against Nafe Singh,
respondent No. 1. One of the injured persons in the incident, died after the registration of the
F.I.R. and the offence was converted into one of murder under Section 302 I.P.C. and other
accused persons were arrested. Later on Nafe Singh was released on bail. On 10.5.1996 while
the charges against Nafe Singh and other accused persons were being tried, elections took place
in the State of Haryana. Nafe Singh contested elections and on 10.5.1996 he was declared
elected as Member of Legislative Assembly.
Constituency: Kuthuparamba Assembly Constituency
Candidates: 3 candidates in total, including K. Prabhakaran (APPELLANT) and P. Jayarajan
(RESPONDENT)
Nomination filing date: 24/04/2001
Poll held on: 10/05/2001
Election result: 13/05/2001
Winner: P. Jayarajan (RESPONDENT)
Date of crime committed by RESPONDENT: 9/04/1991
Date of award of punishment: 9/4/1997
Offences and corresponding punishments awarded:
[Link] Sections Imprisonment awarded
1 S.143 r/w 149 (IPC) 1 Month
2 S.148 r/w 149 (IPC) 6 months
3 S.447 r/w 149 (IPC) 1 Month
4 S.353 r/w 149 (IPC) 6 months
5 S.427 r/w 149 (IPC) 3 months
6 S.3(2)(e) PDPP Act r/w 149 1 Year
(IPC)
Total Period of Imprisonment 2 years 5 months
(Consecutively)2
Constitution of India
Article 191. "Disqualification for membership –
(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the
Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State
xxx

2
Consecutive vs. Concurrent Sentencing:
Consecutive sentencing: The defendant serves sentences back-to-back, one after the other.
Concurrent sentencing: The defendant serves sentences at the same time.
Consecutive sentences add to the total duration, while concurrent sentences are served simultaneously.

28
(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament."
xxx
Section 8(3) in The Representation of the People Act, 1951

(3)A person convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two
years other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be
disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a further
period of six years since his release.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

Section 31. Sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial.-

(1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the Court may, subject
to the provisions of Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), sentence him for
such offences, to the several punishments, prescribed therefore which such Court is
competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting of imprisonment to commence
the one after the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct, unless
the Court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently.

Comment on validity of nomination filed by the RESPONDENT.

Issue:

Q1. Whether suspension of execution of a sentence [conferred in return of an appeal filed u/s
389 of crpc.] has retrospective effect making the disqualification non-existent even at the time
of scrutiny of the nomination?

Q2. Whether the phrase under section 8 of Representative of Peoples Act, 1951, "sentence to
imprisonment for not less than 2 years" should be construed so as to mean the sentence should
run consecutively or concurrently?

***************************************************************************

29
 Case IV [Remedial Statute]
Facts:
• Smt. D. Anuradha, the respondent No.1 in the Civil Appeals is the wife of D. Saibaba,
the appellant. The marriage has broken down and the spouses have fallen apart. On 25.8.1999,
the wife filed a complaint under Section 35 of the Act (See Annexure) complaining of
professional misconduct committed by the appellant, alleging that in spite of his being a duly
enrolled advocate, he was running a telephone booth allotted to him in the handicapped person's
quota. After hearing the appellant's response the State Bar Council of India (respondent No.2),
vide its order dated 6.11.1999, directed the complaint to be dropped forming an opinion that
no case for proceeding against the appellant was made out. On 30.12.1999, the wife lodged yet
another complaint making almost identical averments. The appellant filed a detailed reply. He
submitted that the complaint was malicious, originating from a disgruntled wife who has even
lodged criminal case against him and was out to harass the appellant. The appellant's defence
was that he is a handicapped person. Pressed by family circumstances, including financial
stringency, he applied for a STD booth being licensed to him in the handicapped persons quota,
which, on consideration of the merits of the prayer, was allowed to him. He did operate the
STD booth. On 4.12.1997 he was married to the respondent no.1. Thereafter, sometime in mid-
1998, he applied for his enrolment as an advocate and commenced apprenticeship under a
senior lawyer. Ever since that day he stopped sitting at the telephone booth which was
thenceforth operated by his parents. His father had retired by that time.
• By order dated 20.2.2001, the Bar Council of India directed the appellant to surrender
the STD booth, presumably forming an opinion that whosoever might be conducting the STD
booth actually, yet the booth was allotted in the name of the appellant and the surrender would
bring to an end the controversy so far as the appellant's conduct as an advocate is concerned.
• The appellant sought some time for surrendering the licence of telephone booth because
certain dues were to be realised from customers which would be difficult to do in the event of
the business being suddenly discontinued.
• As the appellant failed to surrender the STD booth, the Bar Council of India passed an
order dated 31.3.2001 advising the State Bar Council to delete the name of the appellant from
the rolls of advocates.
• On 26.4.2001, the appellant surrendered the booth. The appellant sought for a review
of the order of the Bar Council of India based on the subsequent event of the telephone booth
having been surrendered.
• Vide order dated 26.8.2001, the Bar Council of India has rejected the petition for review
on the ground that the same was barred by time.
• As against the order dated 26.8.2001 the appellant has filed appeal by special leave.
• As against the order dated 31.3.2001 the appellant has filed a statutory appeal under
Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961(See Annexure) and also an appeal by special leave.

Exercise
Appellant:
Respondent(s):
Year/date of allotment of STD booth:
Year/date of enrolment as advocate:

30
Complaint:
BCI order date (directing appellant to surrender the STD booth):
BCI order date (deletion of appellant from Bar list):
Date of surrender of booth by appellant:
Date of review petition:
Dates of appeals:
Sections involved:
Possible objections:
Annexure
Section 35 in The Advocates Act, 1961
35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct
(1)Where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that
any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the
case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.
[(1-A) The State Bar Council may, either of its own motion or on application made to it by any
person interested, withdraw a proceeding pending before its disciplinary committee and direct
the inquiry to be made by any other disciplinary committee of that State Bar Council.] [
Inserted by Act 60 of 1973, Section 24 (w.e.f. 31.1.1974).]
(2)The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council [* * *] [ The words " if it does not
summarily reject the complaint" omitted by Act 60 of 1973, Section 24 (w.e.f. 31.1.1974).] shall
fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice thereof to be given to the advocate
concerned and to the Advocate-General of the State.
(3)The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council after giving the advocate concerned and
the Advocate-General an opportunity of being heard, may make any of the following orders,
namely:(a)dismiss the complaint or, where the proceedings were initiated at the instance of the
State Bar Council, direct that the proceedings be filed;(b)reprimand the advocate;(c)suspend
the advocate from practice for such period as it may deem fit;(d)remove the name of the
advocate from the State roll of advocates.
(4)Where an advocate is suspended from practice under clause (c) of sub-section (3), he shall,
during the period of suspension, be debarred from practising in any Court or before any
authority or person in India.
(5)Where any notice is issued to the Advocate-General under sub-section (2), the Advocate-
General may appear before the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council either in person
or through any advocate appearing on his behalf.[Explanation [ Inserted by Act 21 of 1964,
Section 17.].In this section, [section 37 and section 38], the expressions Advocate-General and
Advocate-General of the State shall, in relation to the Union territory of Delhi, mean the
Additional Solicitor General of India.]
Section 37 in The Advocates Act, 1961

37. Appeal to the Bar Council of India.

31
(1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council
made [under section 35] [ Substituted by Act 21 of 1964, Section 18, for " under sub-section
(3) of section 35." ] [or the Advocate-General of the State] [ Inserted by Act 60 of 1973, Section
27 (w.e.f. 31.1.1974).] may, within sixty days of the date of the communication of the order to
him, prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India.

(2) Every such appeal shall be heard by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India
which may pass such order [(including an order varying the punishment awarded by the
disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council)] [ Inserted by Act 60 of 1973, Section 28
(w.e.f. 31.1.1974).] thereon as it deems fit:

[Provided that no order of the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council shall be varied
by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India so as to prejudicially affect the person
aggrieved without giving him reasonable opportunity of being heard.] [ Inserted by Act 60 of
1973, Section 28 (w.e.f. 31.1.1974).]
Section 38 in The Advocates Act, 1961
38. Appeal to the Supreme Court
- Any person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of
India under section 36 or section 37 [or the Attorney-General of India or the Advocate-General
of the State concerned, as the case may be] [ Inserted by Act 60 of 1973, Section 28 (w.e.f.
31.1.1974).], may, within sixty days of the date on which the order is communicated to him,
prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may pass such order [(including
an order varying the punishment awarded by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of
India)] [ Substituted by Act 60 of 1973, Section 29 (w.e.f. 31.1.1974).] thereon as it deems
fit:[Provided that no order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India shall be
varied by the Supreme Court so as to prejudicially affect the person aggrieved without giving
him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.] [ Substituted by Act 60 of 1973, Section 29 (w.e.f.
31.1.1974).]
Section 48AA in The Advocates Act, 1961
48AA. [ Review. [ Inserted by Act 60 of 1973, Section 37 (w.e.f. 31.1.1974.]
- The Bar Council of India or any of its committees, other than its disciplinary committee, may
of its own motion or otherwise review any order, within sixty days of the date of that order,
passed by it under this Act.
SOLUTION
Issue: Whether the limitation period to seek review u/s 48AA of Indian Advocates Act, 1961,
should commence from the “date of the order” or from the “date of communication of order”
?
Solution: “Communication of Order” is very important before we can expect a person to know
that his interest has got affected. A decision made w.r.t. a person’s interest should be
communicated otherwise he/she will bever come to know that his interest has got affected.
Therefore, the phrase u/48AA “date of the order” should be read as “date of communication”
as it appears u/s 37 & 38. Moreover, section 48AA is a remedial legislation (right to appeal),
therefore, any interpretation which leads to failure to provide the remedy should be avoided.

32
Case V [Harmonious Rule of Construction]
Facts:
On 25 June, 1975 the President in exercise of powers conferred by Clause (1) of Article 352 of
the Constitution declared that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is
threatened by internal disturbances. On 27 June, 1975 in exercise of powers conferred by
Clause (1) of Article 359 the President declared that the right of any person including a
foreigner to move any Court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article
21 and Article 22 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any Court for the
enforcement of the above-mentioned rights shall remain suspended for the period during, which
the Proclamations of emergency made under Clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on 3
December, 1971 and on 25 June, 1975 are both in force. The Presidential Order of 27 June,
1975 further stated that the same shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any Order
made before the date of the aforesaid Order under Clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution.
The respondents filed applications in different High Courts for the issue of writ of habeas
corpus. The State raised a preliminary objection that the Presidential Order dated 27 June, 1975
made under Article 359 of the Constitution suspending the detenus right to enforce any the
rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and the continuance of emergency
during which by virtue of Article 358 all rights conferred by Article 19 stand suspended are a
bar at the threshold for the respondents to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution and to ask for writs of habeas corpus.
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
Article 352. Proclamation of Emergency
(1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or
of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or
armed rebellion, he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect in respect of the
whole of India or of such part of the territory thereof as may be specified in the Proclamation.
Article 359. Suspension of the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III during
emergencies
(1)Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President may by order declare
that the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III
as may be mentioned in the order and all proceedings pending in any court for the
enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which
the Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in the order.
Article 51. Promotion of international peace and security
The State shall endeavour to--(a) promote international peace and security;(b) maintain just
and honourable relations between nations;(c) foster respect for international law and treaty
obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another; and(d) encourage
settlement of international disputes by arbitration.
UNITED NATION DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (UDHR)
Article 8

33
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
Article 9
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.
***************************************************************************
How will you resolve the conflict between provisions in the Constitution of India and UDHR.

Issue: Whether courts are bound to protect citizen’s right to life and personal liberty even
though National Emergency is in force and article 352 provides for suspension of Fundamental
rights?
Analysis:
In ADM Jabalpur vs. Shivkant Shukla, the dissenting opinion delivered by Justice Khanna
suggested that whenever there exists a conflict between International Law and Municipal Law
and a word has two possible constructions:
1. One is in favour of International Law; and
2. One is against International Law
The court must adopt the first construction [in favour of International Law]. This is called the
rule of Harmonious Construction which tries to harmonize conflicting laws, e.g. conflict
between Municipal Law and International Law.

34
Case VI [Remedial + Beneficial Statute]
Facts:
On 3.4.2007, Kusum Narottam Harsora (Petitioners 1) and her mother Pushpa Narottam
Harsora (Petitioners 2) filed a complaint under the 2005 Act against Pradeep (Respondent),
the brother/son, and his wife (Respondent), and two sisters/daughters (Respondent),
alleging various acts of violence against them. The said complaint was withdrawn on 27.6.2007
with liberty to file a fresh complaint. Nothing happened for over three years till the same duo
of mother and daughter filed two separate complaints against the same Respondents in October,
2010. An application was moved before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate for a discharge of
Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 stating that as the complaint was made Under Section 2(a) read with
Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, it can only be made against an adult male person and the three
Respondents not being adult male persons were, therefore, required to be discharged. The
Metropolitan Magistrate passed an order dated 5.1.2012 in which such discharge was refused.
In a writ petition filed against the said order, on 15.2.2012, the Bombay High Court, on a literal
construction of the 2005 Act, discharged the aforesaid three Respondents from the complaint.

Pushpa
(MOTHER -
aggrieved person)

Sister 2/Daughter Pradeep

Kusum (aggrieved Sister1/Daughter1( Wife of Pradeep
2 (Brother/Son -
person) RESPONDENT) (RESPONDENT)
(RESPONDENT) RESPONDENT)

Kusum and Pushpa (aggrieved person) filed a complaint against the sisters/daughters
(respondent), Pradeep – brother/son – (respondent), and his wife (respondent).
Definitions:
Aggrieved person: Any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the
respondent & who alleges to have been subjected to any kind of violence by respondents.
Respondents: Any adult male member who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the
aggrieved person & against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief:
Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage
may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner.
***************************************************************************
Decide whether the complaint is maintainable?
Issue: Whether the phrase “any adult male person” u/s 2(q) of the Protection of Women against
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, would include “female” as well?
Analysis:
Step 1: Identify the word which needs interpretation – “any adult male person.”

35
Step 2: Identify the nature of statute – Protection of Women against Domestic Violence Act,
2005, is a remedial statute which seeks to control the mischief operating in the society i.e.
domestic violence against women.
The idea of limiting domestic violence only to males is outdated. In fact, the framers of
PWDVA, 2005, lagged behind the progressive approach adopted by the amenders of section 6
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which got amended in 2005 and the gated community of
male relatives (coparcenary) was opened for daughters as well. Therefore, if daughters have
equal share in father’s property just like sons then daughters have equal interest to guard.
Therefore, the word “any adult male person” would include female as well.

36
Case VII [Beneficial Legislation]
Facts Of the Case

The group of hospitals, here in question are the five group of hospitals It seems that in 1835
Sir Robert Grant, the then Governor of Bombay, desired to begin an group for the purposes of
imparting medical schooling in the Presidency of Bombay. His thought in that behalf used to
be sanctioned by means of the Board of Directors of the East India Company and dollars
amounting to Rs 44,000 were accrued for the purpose and an equal amount was contributed by
means of the Directors to defray the price of development of the College building.

In 1843 the foundation of the Medical College building was once laid and the equal was once
completed in 1845. About that time an notion of building a medical institution for the ill
humans of all training and castes used to be mooted and Sir Jamsetjee Jeejibhoy offered
donation and some contribution used to be made by means of the Government with which the
JJ. Hospital was once constructed and it used to be formally opened on 15-5-1845.

Similarly the different 4 hospitals in the group have been built in path of time from donations
Except for a small amount of Rs 10,000 the relaxation of the expenditure which is in the
neighbourhood of Rs 27 lakhs is totally met by using the appellant out of the furnish sanctioned
in the finances beneath the head "38-Medical".

The team is below the administrative control of the Surgeon-General of the appellant and its
daily affairs are performed and controlled via the Superintendent who is a full -time worker of
the appellant; the residential personnel which include the Resident Medical Officers, Assistant
Medical Officers, Housemen, Nurses and others are all full-time personnel of the appellant and
their salaries are drawn on the institution pay bills each and every month and paid completely
by the appellant.

This group serves as a medical coaching ground for students of the Grant Medical College
which is a Government Medical College run and managed by way of the appellant for imparting
scientific sciences main to the Degrees of Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery of
the Bombay University as nicely as a range of Post-Graduate qualifications of the stated
University and the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Bombay; the crew is consequently run
and managed via the appellant to provide clinical alleviation and to promote the fitness of the
people of Bombay.

• There were two employees, Miss Vatsala Narayan and Mrs. Ruth Isaac who were
employed in the JJ Hospitals group as ward servants in Bombay. A notice was served
to them for their termination by JJ Hospital reason being the retrenchment from civil
supplies department and in order to accommodate them in their place.

• Mrs. Isaac and Ms. Narayan being the defendants of this case filed a writ of mandamus
in Bombay high court against the termination notice. They contested the notice to be
improper hence termination stands invalid.

• High court of Bombay examined their contentions and adjudged that hospital did not
fall under the ambit of 'industry' as defined under section 2 J of industrial disputes act,
1947. Therefore the termination notice held to be proper and termination of Miss

37
 Narayan and Mrs. Isaac stands valid, presided by justice Tendolkar.

• An appeal was made in the court of appeal where the judgement of Justice Tendolkar
was reversed and given in the favour of respondent. the appellate court said that the
termination made in regards to the retrenchment in the civil department and the notice
served for the same were not in compliance to section 25H and 25F of Industrial
Disputes act, Therefore the termination is questionable and stands invalid.

• State of Bombay applied and obtained a certificate of fitness from the Bombay high
court to appeal against the orders in the supreme court of India.

Contentions made by Appellant:

• Was the appellate court justified in deciding the termination and its non-compliance to
the section 25F of the Industrial Disputes act 1947.
• The provisions of section 2J i.e. the definition of industry applies to the hospital.

Contentions made by Defendant:

• Their termination was made in order to secure another government employee because
of the retrenchment in the civil supplies department and whose service has been longer
comparatively. This is a wrongful preference given to them.

• They have not even paid the retrenchment compensation

Issues Raised Before The Court

1. Whether the definition of industry u/s 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, applies
to the hospital or not?

Definition of industry under section. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:

Industry means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture of calling of employers and
includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of
workmen.

Undertaking: According to Webster means" anything undertaken; any business, work, or

project which one engages in or attempts, an enterprise

Trade: According to Halsbury, in its primary meaning, is " exchange of goods for goods or
goods for money ", and in its secondary meaning it is " any business carried on with a view to
profit whether manual or mercantile, as distinguished from the liberal arts or learned
professions and from agriculture

Business: A wide term not synonymous with trade and means practically anything which is
an occupation as distinguished from a pleasure.

38
Calling: Again, a wide term; it means one's usual occupation, vocation, business or trade,

Service: Again, very wide in its import.

Prima facie, if the definition has deliberately used words of such wide import, it would be
necessary to read those words in their wide denotation.

Analysis:

The term industry is of very wide import and has three elements:

1. Cooperation between Capital and Labour;

2. Production/Manufacturing of Service or Product; and
3. Satisfaction of Human wants.

Any establishment having cooperation between Capital (employers) and Labour (workers)
which produces or manufactures products or services and leads to the satisfaction of human
wants is an Industry.
As far as a Hospital is concerned the kind of cooperation which an Industry wants is not present
in a Hospital. The Capital in case of Hospital is “Intellectual Capital” of the Doctors which is
different from the Capital in case of Industry i.e. more like Financial Resources, Raw Material,
etc. Similarly, the Labour (workers) working in a Hospital is not directly involved in the kind
of Service rendered by Hospital. A Doctor can operate, in emergency situations, even in the
absence of Hospital workers.
Therefore, a Hospital is not an Industry.

39
Case VIII [Literal + Purposive Statute]
Facts
Rajendra Kumar’s 1st marriage got annulled with a decree of divorce as on April 8, 1963.
Thereafter, on May 25, 1963, he contracted a second marriage. Rajendra died on May 7, 1965.
Dispute arose between appellant claiming to be widow of Rajendra and respondents (brothers
and brother’s sons of Rajendra Kumar) w.r.t. succession to Rajendra’s share in property. The
respondents challenged the status of widow on the ground that her marriage with Rajendra was
in contravention with the proviso to section 15. You are the judge. Decide.
Relevant Provisions
Section 5:
A marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are
fulfilled, namely:
(i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage;
(ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party:
(a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind;
or
(b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder
of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of
children; or
(c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity ***;
(iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of twenty-one years and the bride, the age of
eighteen years at the time of the marriage;
(iv) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or
usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two;
(v) the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each
of them permits of a marriage between the two.
Section 15:
When a marriage has been dissolved by decree of divorce and either there is no right of appeal
against the decree, or if there is such a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired
without an appeal having been presented, or an appeal has been presented but has been
dismissed, it shall be lawful for either party to the marriage to marry again;
Provided that it shall not be lawful for the respective parties to marry again unless at the date
of such marriage at least one year has elapsed from the date of the decree in the court of the
first instance.
Section 18:
Every person who procures a marriage of himself or herself to be solemnised under this Act in
contravention of the conditions specified in clauses (iii), (iv), and (v) of section 5 shall be
punishable

40
(a) in the case of contravention of the condition specified in clause (iii) of section 5, with
rigorous imprisonment which may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to one
lakh rupees, or with both;
(b) in the case of a contravention of the condition specified in clause (iv) or clause (v) of section
5, with simple imprisonment which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend
to one thousand rupees, or with both;
Status of Rajendra’s II Marriage:
The Act is conspicuously silent on the effect of a marriage solemnised in contravention or
breach of the time bound prohibition enacted in Section 15. A further aspect that stares into the
face is that while a marriage solemnised in contravention of clauses (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) of
Section 5 is made penal, a marriage in contravention of the prohibition prescribed by the
proviso does not attract any penalty. Such a marriage is not expressly declared void nor made
punishable though marriages in breach of conditions Nos. (i), (iv) and (v) are expressly
declared void and marriages in breach of conditions Nos. (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) of Section 5
are specifically made punishable by Section 18. The net effect of it is that at any rate Parliament
did not think fit to treat such marriage void or that it is so opposed to public policy as to make
it punishable.
In the Act under discussion there is a specific provision for 'treating certain marriages
contracted in breach of certain conditions prescribed for valid marriage in the same Act as void
and simultaneously no specific provision have been made for treating certain other marriages
in breach of certain conditions as void. In this background even though the proviso is couched
in prohibitory and negative language, in the absence of an express provision it is not possible
to infer nullity in respect of a marriage contracted by a person under incapacity prescribed by
the proviso. Does the inhibition for a period indicate that such marriage would be void? While
there is a disability for a time suffered by a party from contracting marriage, every such
disability does not render the marriage void.
Undoubtedly, where a prohibition is enacting in public interest its violation should not be
treated lightly. That necessitates examination of the object and purpose behind enacting the
proviso:
A decree of divorce breaks the marriage tie. Incapacity for marriage of such persons whose
marriage is dissolved by a decree of divorce for a period of one year was presumably enacted
to allay apprehension that divorce was sought only for contracting another marriage or to avoid
dispute about the parentage of children. At the time of the divorce the wife may be pregnant.
She may give birth to a child after the decree. If a marriage is contracted soon after the divorce
a question might arise as to who is the father of the child viz., the former husband or the
husband of the second marriage.
No, incident of such dissolved marriage can bridge and bind the parties whose marriage is
dissolved by divorce at a time posterior to the date of decree. An incapacity for second marriage
for a certain period does not have effect of treating the former marriage as subsisting. During
the period of incapacity, the parties cannot be said to be the spouses within the, meaning of cl.
(i), sub-s. (1) of s. 5. The word 'spouse' has been understood to connote a husband or a wife
which term itself postulates a subsisting marriage.

41
 Case IX: Ejusdem Generis and Noscitur a Sociis
Estate of Thakur
Jadu (in Heavy
Debts)

Thakur Jadu 2nd Wife

1st Wife Charan Singh (Thakurain
(Dead 1924) Jagarnath Kuari)

Thakur
Ramdhan Singh
Jibdan Singh Bindeshwari
(Dead 1920)
Charan Singh

Thakur
Bhageshwari
Singh

Estate of Thakur Jadu was in heavy debts and thus, in 1894, a manager was appointed u/s 2 of
the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estate Act, 1876. The estate continued to be under manger’s
control till 15th May, 1909, and finally was restored in the name of Thakur Jadu. On 17th May,
1909, Thakur Jadu passed a Gift Deed in favour of 2nd wife.
Upon death of Thakur Jadu, dated 21st February, 1924, his grandson – Thakur Bhageshwari
Singh – (from 1st wife) filed a suit recovery of property against Jagarnath Kuari. It was
contended that Jagarnath Kuari has been in continuous possession of the property since 1909
and the suit is filed after 16 years, therefore, the suit is barred because of adverse possession
(12 years).
However, the court made a sound observation and opined that the Gift Deed to Jagarnath Kuari
was a non-testamentary document which requires registration as per section 17(1)(b) of the
Registration Act, 1908.3 Therefore, by admitting the Gift Deed as evidence will give it sanctity
of court’s stamp and amount to “declaring right/title/interest” in favour of Jagarnath Kuari. The
court also cited that the gift deed required prior sanction from the commission as per section
12A of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estate Act, 1876.
Decide whether the Gift Deed amounts to declaration of right/title/interest and whether it
requires registration?

3
Section 17 (1) The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a
district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act XVI of 1864, or the Indian
Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act
came or comes into force, namely:
(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish,
whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred
rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property.

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Hint – Apply rules of constructions (noscitur a sociis + ejusdem generis) to the term “declare”
falling u/s 17(1)(b).
The term declare has two possible constructions:
1. Declaration of a mere statement of fact; or
2. Declaration of change in legal relations – w.r.t. a right/title/interest.
The court held that the Gift Deed is a non-testamentary document and usually require registration.
However, in the present case the gift deed also requires previous sanction from the commissioner,
therefore, without those sanctions the document has not resulted into any change in legal relationship.
The court finally held that the document does not require registration.

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