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SAPMS and FPGA Development Insights

The document contains a series of technical questions related to various aspects of nuclear reactor systems, sensor technologies, FPGA development, and safety management systems. It covers topics such as seismic trip recommendations, sensor qualifications, and differences between various reactor types. Additionally, it addresses specific challenges and considerations in electronics development and accident management in nuclear contexts.

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vikasyadav100
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
35 views2 pages

SAPMS and FPGA Development Insights

The document contains a series of technical questions related to various aspects of nuclear reactor systems, sensor technologies, FPGA development, and safety management systems. It covers topics such as seismic trip recommendations, sensor qualifications, and differences between various reactor types. Additionally, it addresses specific challenges and considerations in electronics development and accident management in nuclear contexts.

Uploaded by

vikasyadav100
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

1. Tell us about your significant contributions.

(Stopped immediately )
2. Post Fukushima recommendations?
3. Any plant where seismic trip was there previously?
4. How many parameters are there in SAPMS?
5. Selection criteria of SAPMS signals?
6. Why SAPMS is required?
7. Significance of caldaria level measurement
8. Sensor type for calandria level measurement is 700 and 220
9. ADC resolution and accuracy, why these two are different
10. Different type of noise
11. Thermal and Johnson noise
12. Any sensor type based on Johnson noise (I could not answer)
13. FPGA development lifecycle
14. VnV steps with respect to FPGA and with respect to overall system
15. Improvements in RnD –ES boards
16. Explain board wise
17. Diagnostics in IAIM board
18. From Sensor/ transmitter to CBS, what could be different failures, how you have taken
care those in design
19. Why red colour is used in OWS for showing any accident or urgent situation
20. Any HMI guidelines international (I could answer internal guideline, not international)
21. Difference between ASIC development vs FPGA development
22. Why we can’t go for ASIC development
23. How SAPMS is different from other systems
24. Sensor qualification types in SAPMS
25. Basis of selecting the qualifications
26. Any redundancy is there in SAPMS sensor, if yes then how to take care in software if one
goes bad?( Ans : DASP block )
27. Why new CPU board development is carried out
28. What is benefit ,
29. Obsolescence, how do you take care
30. Qualification of this inhouse developed CPU board
31. What is meaning of DEC
32. What are DEC-A and DEC-B conditions
33. What is mitigative domain of Accident Management?
34. Philosophy of mitigation and prevention in DEC conditions?
35. Starting from normal operation come to Severe Accident, What are the system for
defense?
36. Difference between Shutdown system of PHWR vs LWR
37. Any system in VVER which is not in PHWR ? (Expecting core cather, but question
context during interview was not clear, so went round and round)
38. What is snubber , Mechanical point of view?
39. Snubber monitoring circuit?? (I could not answer completely)
40. Can we use neutron monitoring instruments of PHWR in PFBR? (Partially answered)
41. What is type of fuel in PFBR
42. Can I make a reactor with U-238, although it is fissionable? (Partially answered)
43. What is the residence time of fuel in VVR vs PHWR?
44. How it affects the plutonium production? (Tried answering but I think not 100 percent
satisfactory )
45. Spent fuel of VVER vs PHWR, which can be used in PFBR, or what could be the
difference? (Tried answering but I think not 100 percent satisfactory).

(Note: FPGA, Electronics and CPU related questions are specific to Electronics domain, rest all
are general)

Common questions

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The philosophy of mitigation and prevention in Design Extension Conditions (DEC) involves proactively planning and implementing measures that go beyond standard design-based accident scenarios. It focuses on enhancing the safety margins through additional systems and procedures to manage accidents more severe than those anticipated in the plant design. Mitigation strategies aim to contain or reduce the consequences of such accidents, while prevention strategies are designed to avoid or minimize the onset of severe accidents, ensuring the protection of public and environmental safety .

ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit) development involves designing a chip specifically tailored for a single task, offering high performance and efficiency but with little flexibility. It is cost-effective in mass production but entails high initial design costs and long development times due to the need for custom fabrication. FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate Array) development, on the other hand, offers reprogrammable chips that can be configured for different tasks. This provides flexibility and faster development cycles, allowing for design changes without new hardware production, but often at the expense of performance and power efficiency compared to ASICs .

Improvements in R&D for Electronics Systems Boards have involved the development of more robust, reliable, and accurate systems that enhance the automation and safety management of nuclear operations. These improvements enable better data acquisition and processing, allowing for more precise monitoring and control, which directly impacts the nuclear safety by minimizing the risks of operational failures and enhancing the response capabilities during abnormal situations .

In electronic systems, thermal noise and Johnson noise are common types of noise. Thermal noise is generated by the thermal agitation of charge carriers inside an electrical conductor, while Johnson noise is a specific form of thermal noise occurring in resistors. These noises can affect sensor accuracy by introducing random fluctuations that obscure the true signal, reducing measurement precision and reliability .

The measurement of calandria level is crucial for maintaining a reactor's safety and efficiency. It involves accurately measuring the coolant level in the calandria, ensuring that the reactor core remains adequately submerged to prevent overheating and potential meltdown. This is vital for both operational stability and preventing accidents in nuclear reactors, thus serving as a key safety parameter .

The selection of signals in SAPMS is based on parameters critical to assessing seismic activity and the reactor's response. These criteria include sensitivity to seismic-induced forces, the system's ability to measure changes accurately in real-time, and redundancy to ensure continuous monitoring even if one signal source fails. This ensures the reliability of the safety system during seismic events .

The residence time of fuel in a VVER reactor is generally longer than in a PHWR (Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor). This prolonged residence time allows for more burnup, meaning more fissile material, including plutonium, can accumulate. In a PHWR, the shorter residence time results in less plutonium production, affecting the fuel's end-of-life composition and the management of spent fuel .

SAPMS is specifically designed to automatically execute protective responses during seismic events, ensuring nuclear plant safety by measuring specific parameters to assess seismic activity. Unlike general monitoring systems, it is tailored to detect and mitigate issues arising from earthquakes, using specialized sensor qualification types and redundancy measures. This specialization in seismic parameter monitoring makes it distinct from other broader safety systems .

Despite the high performance benefits ASICs provide through custom-designed circuits, their lack of flexibility and re-programmability is a significant limitation for nuclear reactors. The high cost and time associated with ASIC development are impractical for the frequently updated and evolving safety standards and regulations typical in nuclear engineering. FPGAs, in contrast, offer the flexibility needed for iterative design modifications and updates without needing new hardware fabrication .

The red color is universally recognized as a signal for danger, urgency, or alert, making it an effective choice for Operator Workstations (OWS) to denote accidents or critical conditions. This choice is based on human psychology and design standards aimed at ensuring operators can quickly identify and react to crises, minimizing response times in urgent situations .

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