Class Guide:

1. Sources of PH Laws and when they take effect:

Tanada v. Tuvera (1986)

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not
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become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as
a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required
of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details"
of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare
on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.

PNB vs. CA (SC used a DICTIONARY to construe “week”)

Ruling:

It must be conceded that Article 17 is completely silent as to the definition of what is a "week".
In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36 O.G. 3139 [1938]; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Ed.,
1972, p. 660), this term was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive
days — a definition which dovetails with the ruling in E.M. Derby and Co. vs. City of Modesto, et al.
(38 Pac. Rep. 900 [1984]; 1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Twelfth Ed., 1989, p. 88;
1 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on th Civil Code, 1990, p. 46). Following the
interpretation in Derby as to the publication of an ordinance for "at least two weeks" in some
newspaper that:

. . . here there is no date or event suggesting the exclusion of the first day's
publication from the computation, and the cases above cited take this case out of the
rule stated in Section 12, Code Civ. Proc. which excludes the first day and includes
the last;

the publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as sufficient advertisement for
the second week because the period for the first week should be reckoned from March 28,
1969 until April 3, 1969 while the second week should be counted from April 4, 1969 until
April 10, 1969. It is clear that the announcement on April 11, 1969 was both theoretically and
physically accomplished during the first day of the third week and cannot thus be equated
with compliance in law. Indeed, where the word is used simply as a measure of duration of
time and without reference to the calendar, it means a period of seven consecutive days
without regard to the day of the week on which it begins

Certainly, it would have been absurd to exclude March 28, 1969 as reckoning point in line with the
third paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code, for the purpose of counting the first week of
publication as to the last day thereof fall on April 4, 1969 because this will have the effect of
extending the first week by another day. This incongruous repercussion could not have been the
unwritten intention of the lawmakers when Act No. 3135 was enacted. Verily, inclusion of the first
day of publication is in keeping with the computation in Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals (125 SCRA
122 [1983]) where this Court had occasion to pronounce, through Justice Guerrero, that the
publication of notice on June 30, July 7 and July 14, 1968 satisfied the publication requirement under
Act No. 3135.

Vir-Jen v. NLRC: How did the Court construe Art 223 (DAYS) in the labor code? Working/calendar.
Facts: Seafarers asking 50% increase, counter-offer of 20%

We shall deal first with the jurisdictional issue (No. VII above) to the effect that the
appeal of private respondents from the decision of the National Seamen’s Board against
them was filed out of time, considering that copy of said decision was received by them
on July 9, 1980 and they filed their memorandum of appeal only on July 23, 1980 or
fourteen (14) days later, whereas under article 223 of the Labor Code which governs
appeals from the National Seamen’s Board to the National Labor Relations Commission
per Article 20(b) of the Code provides that such appeals must be made within ten (10)
[Link]

In this connection, it is contended in the comment of private respondents that petitioner

has overlooked that under Section 7, Rule XIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code, the ten-day period specified in Article 223 refers to working days and that
this Court has already upheld such construction and manner of computation in Fabula v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 54247, December 19, 1980. Now, computing the number of working
days from July 9 to July 23, 1980, We find that there were exactly ten (10) days, hence,
if We adhere to Fabula, the appeal in question must be held to have been made on
time.

But petitioner herein maintains that the Minister of Labor may not, under the guise of
issuing implementing rules of a law as authorized by the law itself, go beyond the clear
and unmistakable language of the law and expand it at his discretion.

After mature and careful deliberation, We have arrived at the conclusion that
the shortened period of ten (10) days fixed by Article 223 contemplates
calendar days and not working days. We are persuaded to this conclusion, if only
because We believe that it is precisely in the interest of labor that the law has
commanded that labor cases be promptly, if not peremptorily, dispose of. Long periods
for any acts to be done by the contending parties can be taken advantage of more by
management than by labor. Most labor claims are decided in their favor and
management is generally the appellant. Delay, in most instances, gives the employers
more opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious defenses, what with well-paid
talented lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out the efforts and meager resources
of the workers, to the point that not infrequently the latter either give up or compromise
for less than what is due them.

Jabique - 5 working days to work on my appeal

THE CONSTITUTION

 Nitafan v. CIR, 152 SCRA 284 (1987)

-Salary of judges
Ruling: Taxable

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary
taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting
it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
10

assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
11

mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

What did the SC use in interpreting? The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention.

Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan (1996)

Issue: extrajudicial confession

Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of the Morales and Galit rulings
because he executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30,
1982, or before April 26, 1983. The prospective application of "judge-made" laws was underscored
in Co vs. Court of Appeals where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa that in
68

accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that "(j)udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines," and
Article 4 of the same Code which states that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided," the principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to
judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
law means. 69

Petitioner's contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive
effect for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that "(p)enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal," what is being construed here is a
constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal
statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which
the Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or
groups of individuals. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of
the state. Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an
70

offense committed against the state which the executive of the state has the power to pardon. In
other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or
offense against its law.

Hence, petitioner's vigorous reliance on People vs. Sison to make his extrajudicial confession
72

inadmissible is misplaced. In that case, the extrajudicial confession was executed on May 19, 1983,
clearly after the promulgation of Morales on April 26, 1983.
Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez
Construction of Mineral lands
Ruling:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be
given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions prohibits the
alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land. It seems likewise clear
that the term "natural resources," as used therein, includes mineral lands of the public domain, but
not mineral lands which at the time the provision took effect no longer formed part of the public
domain. The reason for this conclusion is found in the terms of the provisions itself. It first declares
that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, etc., and other natural
resources of the Philippines, belong to the State. It then provides that "their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution." Next comes the prohibition against the alienation of natural
resources. This prohibition is directed against the alienation of such natural resources as were
declared to be the property of the State. And as only "agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain" were declared property of the State, it is fair to conclude that mineral lands which at
the time the constitutional provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain, do not
come within the prohibition.

Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public
domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come
within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the right to a
patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.

The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public
domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent
therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. "Where there is a valid
location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of
the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co., 171 U. S., 650, 655; 43 Law.
ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the
United States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except
as limited by the extralateral rights of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well
as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of
his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent
issues."

Fransisco v. HRET

About: Second impeachment of CJ Davide:

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of
the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political
crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of
conscience.

Ruling:

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available.

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential

application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a
political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident
arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.

In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation
by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is
contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the
privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." 67 Both are
integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures
that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint.

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who
was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article
XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an
action to set the complaint moving.
Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the
term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the
Senate.

The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for
trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding,
namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on
the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been
done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and
referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of
steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding
but rather the filing of a complaint does.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By
his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to
initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both
ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning
into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3
(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
Sarmiento v. Mison

Facts:
Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its
not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other
hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments.

Ruling:

The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the
executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they
say and provide.

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.

It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four
(4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law; 3

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
4

the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5

The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be
appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.

Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word "also" as used in the
context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the
first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of
appointment by the President.

The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a careful study
of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after the
word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip
or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision
appears at the end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof —

...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [Emphasis supplied].

The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision which makes
practically all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
thus-

3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the
rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint; ...

In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an
exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,

In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a
literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to
be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot
prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential
appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
JM Tuason v. The Land Tenure Administration

Facts:

Expropriation of Tatalon Estate

Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary

declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
on July 25, 1987

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind
the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 11

The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of
the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time legislative powers
in this country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law
authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and government-
owned and controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of presidential
issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as
members of the board with the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances and
other perquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities have remained up to the present time.

This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by
unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment.

But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a
blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government
subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it
fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or
employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.

Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in
question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or
elsewhere is concerned.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of
the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts
22

do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. To characterize these
23
posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences, among which are: The President of the
Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115
(December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries
of National Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Government sit in this Council,
which would then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be prohibited.

CONCLUSION

It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987 Constitution seeks to
prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions
of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate
and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as
mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution's manifest intent and the people'
understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

Alba v. Evangelista:

January 1957 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

Philippine Supreme Court

Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1957 > January 1957 Decisions > G.R.
Nos. L-10360 & L-10433 January 17, 1957 - JULIANO A. ALBA v. JOSE D. EVANGELISTA

100 Phil 683:

 EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. L-10360 & L-10433. January 17, 1957.]

JULIANO A. ALBA, in his capacity as Acting Vice Mayor of Roxas

City, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE JOSE D. EVANGELISTA, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Capiz and VIVENCIO C. ALAJAR, Respondents.

VIVENCIO C. ALAJAR, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JULIANO A. ALBA, Respondent-

Appellant.

Nicolas V. Villaruz, Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio

Quiazon, Jr. for Juliano A. Alba.

Alvarez, Cacnio, Pamatian & Associates, Abeleda & Amores, Antonio J. Beldia,
Pedro M. Bermejo, Jose M. F. Belo, Atila R. Balgos and Alfonso V. Legaspi for
Vivencio C. Alajar.

SYLLABUS

1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; TENURE OF OFFICE MADE DEFENDANT UPON PLEASURE OF

PRESIDENT; CESSATION IN OFFICE MAY BE WITH OR WITHOUT CLAUSE. — Where, as in
the case at bar, the tenure of office of the vice-mayor has been made by law expressly
defendant upon the pleasure of the President of the Philippines, the person thus
appointed to such office by the Chief Executive has to leave it when the President in the
exercise of his power legally appoints another person in his stead. Whereas the power
of the President to remove at pleasure city officials under Section 2544 of the Revised
Administrative Code should be preceded by legal cause (De los Santos v. Mallari, 48 Off.
Gaz., 1791).

DECISION

FELIX, J.:

On January 1, 1954, the President of the Philippines appointed Vivencio Alajar as Vice-
Mayor of the City of Roxas (Annex D). He took his oath and assumed office on January 6,
1954; on March 31 of that year, his appointment was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointment (Annex D-1) and he continued holding office until November, 1955, when
he received a communication from Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema
informing him that the President had designated Juliano Alba in his stead as Acting Vice-
Mayor of the City of Roxas and requesting him to turn over his said office to Mr. Alba
effective immediately. This communication wherein the President directed the writer
thereof to convey to Mr. Alajar his appreciation for the invaluable services he had
rendered as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas (Annex C), was confirmed by a telegram
that Alajar received from the President dated November 23, 1955 (Annex B).

On the other hand, Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro addressed Juliano A. Alba a
communication through the Mayor of the City of Roxas wherein Alba was informed that
the President has designated him as Acting Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas vice
Vivencio Alajar, and instructed him to qualify and enter upon the performance of the
office, furnishing the Commissioner of Civil Service with the copy of his oath (Annex A).
On November 19, 1955, Juliano A. Alba took his oath and assumed office (Annex A-1).

Not satisfied with the action of the President, Vivencio C. Alajar instituted quo warranto
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Capiz against Juliano A. Alba (Civil Case No.
V-2041), contending: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) That he was appointed Vice-Mayor of Roxas City on 1 January 1954 and his
appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on 31 March 1954 and
that on 19 November 1955, Juliano A. Alba usurped the office of Vice-Mayor of Roxas
City;

(b) That there existed no vacancy of said office at the time of the designation by the
President of the Philippines of Juliano A. Alba as Acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City; and

(c) That there existed no legal cause or reason whatsoever for the removal or
disqualification of said Vivencio C. Alajar by the appointment of Juliano Alba by the
President of the Philippines as Acting Vice Mayor of Roxas City.

After proper proceedings and hearing, the parties submitted the case for decision on
the only issue of whether the alleged removal of the petitioner and the designation in
his place of respondent as Vice-Mayor of Roxas City was legal or illegal. On this point,
the lower court held that the petitioner (Vivencio C. Alajar) was "entitled to remain in
office as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas with all the emoluments, rights and privileges
appurtenant thereto until he resigns, dies or is removed for cause. Without costs."
(Decision, Annex C).

From this decision, Juliano A. Alba appealed to Us by filing a notice of appeal dated
February 3, 1956. Four days later, the appeal notwithstanding, Vivencio Alajar filed a
petition (Annex D) praying for immediate execution of the judgment, and despite the
strong opposition of appellant, the motion was granted by the Court on February 18,
1956 (Annex E), based on the special reasons adduced by the petitioner and

"Moreover, to uphold the supremacy of the law and constitution, which is the supreme
and fundamental authority, pertinent provisions of which are involved in this case, and
considering that the immediate and positive effect of the motion, if the same is denied,
is to prolong the status of illegality of the appointment of the second appointee and
present incumbent to the position of Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas and the question of
who is entitled to occupy the same and to exercise the public function of the office
which affects public interest and public service, this Court, if it is to be consistent with
its pronouncement, conclusion or judgment, as it should be, is constrained to grant said
motion."cralaw virtua1aw library
The decision, however, was not executed because the herein petitioner, Juliano A. Alba,
brought the matter up to this Superiority praying: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) That pending the determination of the validity of the order of immediate execution,
a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, upon previous filing of the bond fixed by this
Honorable Court by the herein petitioner, restraining the herein respondent Vivencio C.
Alajar from discharging the duties and functions of the Vice-Mayor of Roxas City in order
that the herein petitioner shall continue unmolested as acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City
until the final determination of the question of the validity of the order for the
immediate execution of the decision of the trial court;

(2) That after hearing, judgment be rendered declaring null and void the order of
respondent, Hon. José D. Evangelista, dated 18 February 1956 for the immediate
execution of his decision in the Quo Warranto Case (Alajar v. Alba) on the ground that
the same was improperly issued as there existed no good reason for its issuance as
contemplated and provided by Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

(3) For such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.

In this instance, the Solicitor General requested permission to intervene in

the certiorari case (G. R. No. L-10360), alleging that the order of immediate execution
issued by the trial judge deprived him of the opportunity to be heard and defend the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 603 in the lower court and he desires to be heard
by this Court before We proceed to determine the constitutionality of section 8 of
Republic Act No. 603 by the affirmative vote of 8 Justices thereof (section 23, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court — I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1953 ed., p. 111). The
stand of the Solicitor General is that said section 8 is constitutional (Article VI, section 1
and Article XII, section 1 of the Constitution of the Philippines; Jover v. Borra, 49 Off.
Gaz., 2765 and enactments of Congress subsequent to the case of Santos v. Mallare, 48
Off. Gaz., 1793, etc., declaring certain position to be terminable at the pleasure of the
appointing authority — section 2545 Revised Administrative Code; Commonwealth Act
Nos. 39, 51, 520, 547 and 592; Republic Acts Nos. 162, 170, as amended; 179, as
amended; 183, 288, as amended; 305, 306, 327, 328, 521, 523, 525, as amended; 537,
and 603). The motion for intervention of the Solicitor General was granted by this Court.

In the meanwhile, the appeal of Juliano A. Alba in said case V- 2041, was given due
course and reached this Court. In this instance the parties have already filed their
respective briefs and the case was submitted for decision at the hearing held on August
3, 1956.

Appellant’s counsel maintains that the trial Court erred: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. In predicating its decision on the mistaken assumption that the petitioner-appellee

belongs to the unclassified civil service, an assumption which begs the very issue;
whether the vice-mayor of Roxas City belongs to the unclassified service as claimed by
the petitioner-appellee;

2. In not declaring without the necessity of making a pronouncement of its validity, that
section 8 of Republic Act 603 was precisely intended by the Congress to exclude the
office of vice-mayor of Roxas City from persons belonging to the unclassified service
under section 671 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended;
3. In not declaring that in the case of Jover v. Borra (49 Off. Gaz., 2767) the Supreme
Court passed upon the validity of section 8 of Republic Act No. 603;

4. In holding that the office of vice-mayor of Roxas City is neither primarily confidential
nor policy-determining, and

5. In not holding that section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 is a valid exercise of the broad
legislative powers vested in the Congress of the Philippines by our Constitution.

As the petition for certiorari was admitted and given due course by this Court and the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued, We shall confine ourselves to the
statement that appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance in quo warranto
proceedings is perfected by the mere presentation of the notice of appeal (sections 16
and 17, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court), and from that moment "the trial court losses its
jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of
the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, and to
approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on
appeal (which is not required in cases of quo warranto) to the appellate court" (section
9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court). Hence, in the case at bar, the trial court had no
jurisdiction to provide for the issuance of the writ for the advance execution of its
judgment, as it did by order of February 18, 1956 (Annex E). Consequently, We have to
declare that said order is null and void and of no force and effect and to make
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction We have issued at the instance of the
herein petitioner.

We will now consider the merits of respondent’s appeal in Case G. R. No. L-10433. The
solution of the controversy hinges on the main question at issue, which may be
propounded as follows: jgc:[Link]

"Section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 creating the city of Roxas provides that the Vice-
Mayor shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments and shall hold office at the pleasure of the President. In
view of this provision of the law, could the President of the Philippines legally replace
respondent Vivencio C. Alajar, with or without cause, by petitioner Juliano A. Alba?"

Vivencio C. Alajar and judge Jos� D. Evangelista maintain of course the negative side
alleging that in the case of De los Santos v. Mallare, 48 Off. Gaz., 1791, a similar
provision of the Administrative Code which prescribes: jgc:[Link]

"SEC. 2545. Appointment of City Officials. — The President of the Philippines shall
appoint, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of the
Philippines, the mayor, the vice-mayor . . . and he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the
said officers . . .",

has been declared incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that "no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law", because the two provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely
irreconciliable. In express terms, one permits what the other in similar manner prohibits.
And the Supreme Court then said "that the particular provisions of law (section 2545 of
the Revised Administrative Code) which gives the Chief Executive power to remove an
officer at pleasure (though not unconstitutional) have been repealed by the Constitution
and ceased to be operative from the time the latter went into effect." cralaw virtua1aw library

On the other hand, the Solicitor General in his reply memorandum considers the matter
from a different angle. The views expressed by him therein refer to the tenure of office
of public officials. We quote from said memorandum the following: jgc:[Link]

"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign junction of government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer" (7 Mechem, Public Officers, section 1).

"The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good
behavior, had any vested interest or contract right in his office, of which Congress could
not deprive him. The question is not novel. There seems to be but little difficulty in
deciding that there was no such interest or right (Grenshaw v. United States, 134, U. S.
99, 104).

x x x

"Admittedly, the act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers,
functions and fixing the "term" or the period during which the officer may claim to hold
the office as of right and the "tenure" or the term during which the incumbent actually
holds the office, is a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power (Article VI,
section 1, Constitution of the Philippines; Jover v. Borra, G. R. No. L-6782, July 25, 1953;
Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil., 12; Francia v. Pecson and Subido, 47 Off. Gaz., 12 Supp. p.
296). In the exercise of that power, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 603 on April 11,
1951, creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for the position of Vice-
Mayor and its tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at
the pleasure of the President (section 8, article II, Republic Act No. 603).

"In Jover v. Borra, supra, this Court through Mr. Justice Padilla, held that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘The legislative intent to provide for a fixed period of office tenure for the Mayor of the
City of Iloilo and not to make him removable at the pleasure of the appointing authority
may be inferred from the fact that whereas the appointment of the Vice-Mayor of the
same city, as provided for in an amendatory act (Republic Act No. 365), and those of the
Mayors and Vice-Mayors of other cities (section 2545, Rev. Adm. Code; Commonwealth
Acts Nos. 39, 51, 338, 520, 547 and 592; Republic Acts Nos. 162, 170, as amended,
179, as amended; 183, 288, as amended; 305, 306, 327, 328, 521, 523, 525, as
amended; 537 and 603) are at pleasure, that of the Mayor of the City of Iloilo is for a
fixed period of time, as provided for in the original charter (Commonwealth Act No. 57),
and in this continued unchanged despite subsequent amendatory acts (Commonwealth
Act No. 158; Republic Act Nos. 276 and 365).’.

"So, the logical inference from the above quoted excerpt of the decision of this Court
promulgated long after the decision rendered in the case of De los Santos v. Mallare,
supra, is that Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain
officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President.

x x x
"The pervading error of the respondents lies in the fact that they insist on the act of the
President in designating petitioner Alba in the place of respondent Alajar as one of
removal. The replacement of respondent Alajar is not removal, but an expiration of its
tenure, which is one of the ordinary modes of terminating official relations. On this
score, section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code which was declared inoperative
in the Santos v. Mallare case, is different from section 8 of Republic Act No. 603, Section
2545 refers to removal at pleasure while section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 refers to
holding office at the pleasure of the President.

"Clearly, what is involved here is not the question of removal, or whether legal cause
should precede or not that removal. What is involved here is the creation of an office
and the tenure of such office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the
pleasure of the President.

"The cases relied upon by respondents are, therefore, in opposite to the instant
proceedings. For all of them relate to removal of officials in violation of laws which
prescribe fixity of term.

"Even assuming for the moment that the act of replacing Alajar constitutes removal, the
act itself is valid and lawful, for under section 8 of Republic Act No. 603, no fixity of
tenure has been provided for, and the pleasure of the President has been exercised in
accordance with the policy laid down by Congress therein.

"Thus, in Lacson v. Roque (49 Off. Gaz., 93, 101-102), this Court made clear that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘The most liberal view that can be taken of the power of the President to remove the
Mayor of the City of Manila is that it must be for cause. Even those who would uphold
the legality of the Mayor’s suspension do not go so far as to claim power in the Chief
Executive to remove or suspend the Mayor at pleasure. Untramelled discretionary
power to remove does not apply to appointed officers whose term of office is definite,
much less elective officers. As has been pointedly stated: "Fixity of tenure destroys the
power of removal at pleasure otherwise incident to the appointing power; the reason of
this rule is the evident repugnance between the fixed term and the power of arbitrary
removal. . . .

‘An inferential authority to remove at pleasure cannot be declared, since the existence
of a defined term, ipso facto, negatives such an inference, and implies a contrary
presumption, i.e., that the incumbent shall hold office to the end of his term subject to
removal for cause’. (State ex rel. Gallaghar v. Brown, 57 Mo. Ap., 302, expressly
adopted by the Supreme Court in State ex rel. v. Maroney, 191 Mo., 548; etc.) ‘It is only
in those cases in which the office is held at the pleasure of the appointing power and
where the power of removal is exercisable at its mere discretion, that the officer may be
removed without notice or hearing.’"

"Thus, in Jover v. Borra, supra, the same rule was reiterated: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘The legislative intent to provide for a fixed period of office tenure for the Mayor of the
City of Iloilo and not to make him removable at the pleasure of the appointing authority
may be inferred from the fact that whereas the appointment of the Vice-Mayor of the
same city, as provided for in an amendatory act (Republic Act No. 365), end those of the
Mayors and Vice-Mayors of other cities (section 2545, Revised Administrative Code;
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 39, 51, 338, 520, 547 and 592; Republic Acts Nos. 162; 170,
as amended; 179, as amended; 183, 288, as amended; 305; 306; 327; 328; 521; 523;
525, as amended; 537; and 603) are at pleasure, that of the Mayor of the City of Iloilo is
for a fixed period of time, as provided for in the original charter (Commonwealth Act No.
57), and this continued unchanged despite subsequent amendatory acts
(Commonwealth Act No. 158; Republic Acts Nos. 276 and 365).’

"It is an established rule that when the law authorizes a superior officer to remove a
subordinate at pleasure his discretion in the exercise of the power of removal is
absolute. As long as the removal is effected in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law, it may not be declared invalid by the courts, no matter how
reprehensible and unjust the motives of the removal might be (State v. Kennelly, 55 Atl.
555).

"For respondent judge to ignore these judicial doctrines brought to his attention by
petitioner Alba even during the quo warranto proceedings and in the face of their
impressive clarity to rashly resolve his doubt against the constitutionality of section 8 of
Republic Act No. 603 is to exert his discretion with the greatest measure of abuse as to
amount to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos, v. Tarlac, 38 Off. Gaz., 830).

‘After all the foregoing circumstances are round to be present, it must be shown that
the statute violates the constitution clearly, palpably, plainly, and in such manner as to
leave no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the court (Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. 147).
The court presumes that every statute is valid. This presumption is based upon the
theory of separation of powers which makes the enactment and repeal of laws
exclusively a legislative function. As Chief Justice Marshall said: "It is but a decent
respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body, by
which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the
constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt." (Darmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheat, 625.) .

"It should be remembered in this connection that before a legislature passes a bill, it is
presumed that it has decided the measure to be constitutional; and when the executive
approves that bill it is also presumed that he has been convinced of its validity. Under
these conditions, therefore, if a statute is reasonably susceptible of two interpretations,
one making it unconstitutional and other valid, it is the duty of the court to adopt the
second construction in order to save the measure. (U. S. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213
U. S. 366.) Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 10 ed., pp. 525-526; Emphasis supplied.’"

We certainly agree with the foregoing views of the Solicitor General because they
constitute a clear and fair exposition of the law on the matter. Anyway, the provision of
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 empowering the President of the Philippines to
appoint, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the Vice-Mayor of Roxas
City, the latter to hold office at the pleasure of the President, can not by any stretch of
imagination be considered unconstitutional and void.

Morfe V. Mutuc
Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute 32 was
precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public
administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the
goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of
such character. The times demanded such a remedial device.

The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive in character, sufficiently detailed
and explicit to make clear to all and sundry what practices were prohibited and penalized. More than
that, an effort was made, so evident from even a cursory perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug
loopholes. One such feature is the challenged section. Thereby it becomes much more difficult by
those disposed to take advantage of their positions to commit acts of graft and corruption.

While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible,
there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns,
the statute allows. More specifically, since that is the only question raised, is that portion of the
statute requiring periodical submission of assets and liabilities, after an officer or employee had
previously done so upon assuming office, so infected with infirmity that it cannot be upheld as valid?

Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a valid exercise of the police power? In the
aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel decision, 33 there is a reaffirmation of its nature and scope as
embracing the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. It has been negatively put forth by Justice Malcolm as
"that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." 34

 Villena v. Spouses Chavez, 415 SCRA 33 (2003)

Stare decisis simply means that a judgment reached in one case should be applied to successive
ones in which the facts are substantially identical, even though the parties may be different. Like
cases ought to be decided alike.

Ruling:

We stress that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts,
it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.
25

Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should
be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
26

considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. 27

Having ruled that the MTC had indeed no jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case in the first
place, we see no more need to address the other issues raised by petitioners.

Facts:

VIOLATION of contract – cause of action, not within jurisdiction of MTC but RTC
now accusing [petitioners] for violating the agreement and on the basis of such breach of the
agreement by [petitioners], demands for the latter to vacate the lots were made by

The contract can be declared rescinded only when its nature has been clarified and the eventual
violation thereof, if any, has been established. Upon such rescission, in turn, hinges a
pronouncement that the possession of the realty has become unlawful. Thus, the basic issue is not
possession but interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the contract -- a matter that is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court to hear and determine.

An allegation of a violation of a contract or agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by the

presentation of competent evidence, upon which an MTC judge might make a finding to that effect.
But certainly, that court cannot declare and hold that the contract is rescinded, as such power is
vested in the RTC

When respondents alleged that the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners’ Association made
arrangements with them to allow petitioners and other members of the association to continue to
occupy and ultimately to acquire ownership of the lots in question, respondents explicitly admitted
that a contract had indeed been entered into. The eventual transfer of ownership of real property
evidenced that obligation. What is clear is that in their Complaint, respondents alleged that
petitioners had violated the stipulations of their agreement as follows:

Parts of a decision:

Velarde v. SJS
A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law
is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be valid, decisions should comply with the form, the
procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and
relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court
hereby discusses these forms, procedures and requirements.

In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case;
(2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a
rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion. The ponente may also
opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially in cases in which
controversial or novel issues are involved.