Warrior Spirit: What it is

and How to Make it Happen

A Monograph
by
Major Robert C. Johnson
Field Artillery

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
First Term AY93-94
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
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 ABSTRACT

WARRIOR SPIRIT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW TO MAKE IT HAPPEN

by Major Robert C. Johnson, USA, 57 pages.

A review of Army leadership doctrine exposes a

disconnect. Army doctrine states that development of
the "warrior spirit" in soldiers, leaders, and
organizations is vital to the Army's success. However,
the Army does not have a uniform definition for the
term "warrior spirit" in its leadership doctrine.

This monograph defines and discusses techniques

that a tactical level leader can use to foster the
development of a "warrior spirit" in his unit. The
monograph fulfills the requirements discussed above
through an examination of theory, doctrine, and
history. The discussion on theory and doctrine is the
basis to develop a "straw-man" definition for warrior
spirit as a point of departure. The discussion on two
historical cases offers insight into techniques
tactical commanders used to develop the warrior spirit
in their units. Finally, analysis of the historical
cases through the framework of the "straw-man"
definition captures the essence of developing the
warrior spirit.
The monograph concludes that actions a leader can
take to develop an organizational identity, to promote
unit cohesion, to decentralize command and control, and
lead by example are the keys to developing the warrior
spirit. The monograph ends with a recommendation that
the Army provide focus to leader development programs
Army-wide by modifying leadership doctrine to reflect
the following definition for warrior spirit:

Warrior Spirit: the psychological

perspective present in individuals, groups,
organizations, and institutions that
underpins the will to fight, the willingness
to take calculated risks, and a commitment to
duty exhibited through actions directed
toward mission accomplishment regardless of
the odds or conditions.
 SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Robert C. Johnson

Title of Monograph: Warrior Spirit: What It Is and

How to Make It Happen.

Approved by:

Monograph Director
LTC George P. Ritter

Deputy Director, School of

Robert H. Berlin, Ph. D, Advanced Military Studies

/ \/ /JrarUu—. Director, Graduate Degree

Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D. Program

Accesion For
NTIS CRA&I
DTIC TAB □
Unannounced D
Justification

By
Distribution/
Accepted This 17th Day of December, 1993
Available ,' (V '••;<:

Uis*

/W
 ABSTRACT

WARRIOR SPIRIT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW TO MAKE IT HAPPEN

by Major Robert C. Johnson, USA, 57 pages.

A review of Army leadership doctrine exposes a

disconnect. Army doctrine states that development of
the "warrior spirit" in soldiers, leaders, and
organizations is vital to the Army * s success. However,
the Army does not have a uniform definition for the
term "warrior spirit" in its leadership doctrine.
This monograph defines and discusses techniques
that a tactical level leader can use to foster the
development of a "warrior spirit" in his unit: The
monograph fulfills the requirements discussed above
through an examination of theory, doctrine, and
history. The discussion on theory and doctrine is the
basis to develop a "straw-man" definition for warrior
spirit as a point of departure. The discussion on two
historical cases offers insight into techniques
tactical commanders used to develop the warrior spirit
in their units. Finally, analysis of the historical
cases through the framework of the "straw-man"
definition captures the essence of developing the
warrior spirit.
The monograph concludes that actions a leader can
take to develop an organizational identity, to promote
unit cohesion, to decentralize command and control, and
lead by example are the keys to developing the warrior
spirit. The monograph ends with a recommendation that
the Army provide focus to leader development programs
Army-wide by modifying leadership doctrine to reflect
the following definition for warrior spirit:
Warrior Spirit: the psychological
perspective present in individuals, groups,
organizations, and institutions that
underpins the will to fight, the willingness
to take calculated risks, and a commitment to
duty exhibited through actions directed
toward mission accomplishment regardless of
the odds or conditions.

11
 TABLE. OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction.. 1
II. Theoretical Concepts 3
Physical Domain 6
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Moral Domain. 11
III. Review of Doctrine 17
IV. Historical Vignettes. .22
V. Analysis, Conclusions, and Recommendations 38
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111
Warrior Spirit: What It Is and How to Make It Happen.

I. INTRODUCTION

A review of Army leadership doctrine exposes a

disconnect. The Army seeks to develop the "warrior
spirit" in soldiers, leaders, and organizations.
Development of the warrior spirit is vital to the
Army's success in peacetime, conflict, and war:
"... our warfighting doctrine, training,
force development, special operations forces,
initiatives, and programs are dependent on
soldiers1 possessing a healthy warrior
spirit."
However, the Army does not have a uniform definition
for the term ."warrior spirit" in its leadership
doctrine.2
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary says that to
define is the action of describing, explaining, or
making definite and clear.3 The monograph will define
the term "warrior spirit." A suitable definition must
clearly describe and explain the nature, properties,
and capture the essence of the term. For the
definition to be useful it must be consistent with
historical experience and capture the common threads
from historical examples for application purposes.
The monograph will also offer ways in which a tactical
level leader can develop warrior spirit consistent with
this "new" definition. Fulfilling these two purposes
corrects a deficiency in the Army's leadership doctrine
and provides a standard definition that can then serve
as a unifying agent for the leader development process
Army-wide.
The monograph will fulfill the requirements
discussed above through an examination of theory,
doctrine, and history. Theoretical and doctrinal
concepts are the basis from which to develop a "straw-
man" definition for warrior spirit as a point of
departure. Next, an investigation of two historical
examples offers insight into techniques tactical
commanders used to develop the warrior spirit in their
organizations. Analysis of the historical examples is
through the framework established by the "straw-man"
definition. Finally, [Link] concludes by
recommending the Army adopt the proposed definition for
warrior spirit and recommendations for the modification
or improvement of current Army leadership doctrine.
 II. THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

Theory is a means to discuss the process that

results in the disintegration of the human will in
battle. By gaining an appreciation of the factors
working against sustainment of will, one is better able
to understand the foundations of Army leadership
doctrine.
Clausewitz wrote that "military activity is never
directed against material forces alone; it is always
aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it
life, and the two cannot be separated." He regarded
the principal moral elements to be the "skill of the
commander, the experience and courage of the troops,
and their patriotic spirit." He concluded that "in the
engagement, the loss of morale has proved the major
decisive factor."4 Since his time, other military
theorists, including Ardant du Picq, Lord Moran, S. L.
A. Marshall and Anthony Kellett, have written about the
role of man in battle and the effects of battle upon
man. In an era of highly lethal technology for waging
war, the moral element of combat remains decisive
inasmuch as combat remains a clash of wills. Dr. James
J. Schneider, a Professor of Military Theory at the
School of Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. Army's
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, uses the metaphor of lead transforming from a
solid state of cohesion, to a liquid state of
disorganization, and finally to a gaseous state of
disintegration to illustrate the processes leading to
the destruction of the human will. Dr. Schneider
describes this process using the physical, cybernetic,
and moral domains. The "Physical Domain" concerns the
entire process of destruction: the effects of weapons,
munitions, terrain, weather, logistics, and other
physical factors. The "Cybernetic Domain" concerns the
processes of organization, command, control,
communications, computers, information flow, and human
systems. The "Moral Domain" concerns the
disintegration and breakdown of will, inspiring,
sustaining, and revitalizing trust and morale.5 He
uses the model at Figure 1 to illustrate the
relationship between these elements, the rate of
destruction, and casualty rates.6
In Dr. Schneider's model, a unit entering combat
is a solid, cohesive force. Over time, the process of
destruction, especially the tempo of destruction,
exerts an influence that begins to transform the unit's
nature. Casualty rates increase and unit cohesiveness
decreases due to the destructive process. At this
point the destructive process has started to change the
unit from a solid to a liquid, a cohesive organization
to ä disorganized organization. The loss of cohesion
impacts oh command, control, communications, and
intelligence functions. These functions provide the
means to keep the unit organized. As these functions
erode further, the unit moves from the liquid to the

1.0 ■
f DISINTEGRATED
C (MORAL DOMAIN)
A

: /
L DISORGANIZED
T (CYBERNETIC DOMAIN)

E /
S
/

COHESIVE

B DESTRUCTIVE TEMPO
(PHYSICAL DOMAIN)

Figure 1. Destruction, Disorganization,

Disintegration.

gaseous state, from being a disorganized unit to a

disintegrated unit. The total breakdown of
cohesion and organization result in disintegration
which is the gaseous state. To deal with the phenomena
of destruction, several military theorists have written
about the destructive process and the effect it has on
the sustainment of will.
 THE PHYSICAL DOMAIN
Trevor N. Dupuy, a U. S. Army officer and military
theorist of the Twentieth century, wrote on the effects
of weapons and munitions as elements of destruction.
Dupuy developed the Theoretical Lethality Index to
provide a means of measuring the relative effectiveness
of weapons based on such things as range, rate of fire,
accuracy, reliability, and rate of damage, etc.7
According to Dupuy, increases in lethality make
dispersion a requirement for survival. Looking back at
history to develop his theory, Dupuy posited that
fires, shock action, or a combination of the two, are
the primary means of destruction. To obtain the
maximum effect from these means required concentrating
the maximum number of forces in a small area. This
requirement led to the development of close-order
formations such as the phalanx.8 As advances in
technology made weapons and munitions more lethal,
close-order formations became obsolete. Survival
therefore became more dependant on dispersion.9 As
dispersion increased, cohesion decreased.
Ardant du Picq, a French Army officer and military
theorist of the nineteenth century, wrote on the
importance of cohesion as the means to control the
soldier's instinct for self-preservation.10 He argued
that individually, man will go to great lengths to kill
without being killed and that the individual strength
which allows the soldier to kill comes from the
perception that he is stronger than his enemy.11
Should the soldier believe that the enemy is superior,
the internal stresses of standing in the face of danger
exert such an influence that the soldier feels
compelled to flee. The force that urges the soldier to
flee is his instinct for self-preservation.12 Du Picq
believed that discipline and organization are the
solutions to this problem:
"This is the reason for tactics which
prescribe beforehand proper means of
organization and action to give unanimity to
effort, and for discipline which insures
united efforts in spite of the innate
weakness of the combatants."13
The effects of weapons and munitions mandate the need
for dispersion as a means for survival. The loss of
cohesion created by dispersing complicates the
leadership challenge. The leadership challenge of
sustaining the will to fight through retention of
cohesive organizations becomes more difficult when one
factors in the effects from terrain and weather.
Terrain and weather reduce unit cohesion by
impacting primarily on movement, intervisibility, and
engageability. Within the phalanx soldiers could see
and touch their comrades and their enemies. Increases
in weapons1 lethality and the resultant dispersion made
it more difficult for the soldier to remain in contact
7
with his comrades and the enemy. Dispersion reduces
cohesion by isolating the soldier. Dispersion also
increases uncertainty as the soldier no longer sustains
visual or physical contact with his enemy. Conditions
of isolation and uncertainty increase the soldier's
difficulty in coping with his instinct for self-
preservation.
Tactical leaders had less trouble in commanding
and controlling close-order formations. Close-order
formations allowed the unit to remain cohesive despite
the battlefield conditions. The effects from improved
weapons, more destructive munitions, and weather as
elements of the destructive process reduced cohesion by
creating the requirement for dispersion as a means for
survival. Elimination of the close-order formation
increased the difficulty for a force to remain
cohesive. Elimination of the close-order formation
also complicated the leader's ability to execute
command and control functions.
In short, improvements in weapon and munition
lethality made the destructive process more effective.
Adjustments to the increased effectiveness of the
destructive process included dispersion and elimination
of close-order formations. Increased dispersion meant
decreased cohesion and increased command and control
problems. •

8
 THE CYBERNETIC DOMAIN
According to Dr. Schneider's model, the physical
domain is primarily concerned with weapon systems and
their destructive effect. The cybernetic domain is
concerned with the effects of disorder that result from
the physical process of destruction.
Martin van Creveld, a Professor of History at the
Hebrew University in Jerusalem, wrote in 1985 on the
historical evolution of the command, control, and
communications (C3) function.14 He believes that C3
functions have remained unchanged throughout the
history of warfare.15 However, van Creveld does admit
that the manner in which contemporary leaders execute
these functions has grown in complexity.16
Essentially, the change was a shift from a single
leader's ability to control a close-order formation in
ancient times to that of a commander and large staff in
the Post-Industrial Revolutionary period. Dispersion
was one of the key causes for change.
Improved weapons' lethality made dispersion a
requirement for survival. Dispersion required
commanders to develop processes by which they could
command and control their distributed forces. Part of
this solution was organizational. Commanders began to
organize their units for decentralized operations. An
increase in decentralization also meant an increase in
the amount of uncertainty to which the commander, his
soldiers, and his units became subject.
The degree to which a leader can reduce
uncertainty impacts directly on sustainment of the will
to fight. When fighting from a close-order formation,
a soldier could see his enemy. Being able to see the
enemy allowed the soldier to derive a certain degree of
comfort. The leadership challenge in employing the
close-order formation centered on keeping the unit
aligned in its combat configuration. Under these
conditions, cohesion was the factor that helped
soldiers and units sustain the will to fight. In
modern war dispersed units must not only find the
enemy, but also remain in contact with other friendly
units, neither of which are they usually able to see.
Cohesion is one of the factors that helps sustain the
will to fight under these conditions. However, there
are other elements that a leader must consider.
S. L. A. Marshall, U. S. Army officer and military
historian, wrote in 1947 on the human dimension of
warfare as the central element holding the cybernetic
domain together. Marshall notes that victory in battle
is the result of numerous smaller victories found in
the engagement and that success in the engagement comes
from the application of massed firepower (small arms
fire primarily) at the decisive point.17 The essence

10
of his argument is that success in battle is the result
of numerous smaller distributed actions. Therefore,
success on the distributed battlefield depends on the
effectiveness and cohesion of numerous small elements.
Increased unit dispersion caused a shift in the
way tactical leaders executed their command and control
functions. The new command arid control process had to
be capable of performing three functions: controlling
decentralized units; reducing uncertainty; and focusing
the action of multiple distributed units. Small unit
cohesion, and more importantly, self-discipline of the
individual soldier are essential to making the new
command and control system work. Therefore, the
tactical leader must understand how the process of
destruction impacts on individual self-discipline and
sustainment of the will to fight.

THE MORAL DOMAIN

The preceding discussions within the cybernetic
and physical domains have focused on how the physical
process of destruction affects cohesion and
disintegration. The moral domain extends the
examination by discussing the physical process of
destruction and its impact at the individual level. In
particular, the moral domain focuses on the battlefield
dimension intimately linked to human performance.

11
 Lord Moran, a British Army Officer, surgeon, and
military theorist, wrote in 1945 on the effects of war
on man and on how courage (will) is born and
sustained.18 He suggests that the battlefield
environment wears down an individual's capacity to
act.19 To illustrate his argument, Moran uses a bank
account metaphor. Before entering combat every person
has a certain amount of will in his "bank account."
The individual makes periodic "withdrawals" from his
account to sustain himself in combat. Moran believes
that anger, boredom, individual character, casualties,
displays of courage, fatigue, fear, and stress are some
of the factors that require an individual to make a
withdrawal.20 Each of these emotional responses and
the degree to which they are displayed tie to the
battlefield environment. Eventually, if the individual
remains in combat long enough, he will diminish his
account to a zero balance. Upon achieving a zero-
balance, the individual is no longer effective. Moran
also suggests that an individual can have his account
replenished. In Moran's view, the quality of the
soldier's leaders, the soldier's ideology, the presence
of unit esprit de corps, the strength of unit
discipline, and most importantly, the soldier's
relationships with other soldiers (comraderie) are the
means to replenish the individual soldier's account.21

12
Moran is arguing that although individual attributes
are important in an individual's performance,
ultimately the individual must rely on other soldiers
to sustain an acceptable level of performance. In
support of Moran's argument, other theorists offer the
following views.
S. L. A. Marshall looks at individual performance
in much the same light.22 Marshall believes that the
primary group is the key to a soldier's maintaining an
acceptable level of performance in combat.23 Marshall
also discusses the impact that feelings of isolation
have on the individual soldier and points to the role
of the primary group in providing the support necessary
for the soldier to cope with this problem. Another
military theorist, Anthony Kellett, supports the work
of both Lord Moran and S. L. A. Marshall.
Anthony Kellett, a Canadian soldier and military
theorist, published a multidimensional study in 1982 on
the same problem that both Moran and Marshall
address.24 Instead on focusing on either the
individual or the group, Kellett takes a holistic
approach. His contribution is the connection he draws
between the role of the primary group and the
"identity" provided to the group from the greater
organization. There is a reciprocal relationship
between the individual, group, and organization.

13
Each, through demonstrated behavior, ensures the
survival of the other.25 From a leader's perspective,
there are two problems in depending on primary groups
in this type of relationship. Primary groups do not
regenerate themselves without external assistance.
Also, primary groups are less effective when the
primary groups have a different identity or purpose
than that of the greater organization. In short, the
contribution Moran, Marshall, and Kellett make is
identifying the primary group as the key to sustaining
the individual will to fight. Therefore, the task for
the tactical leader is twofold. The tactical leader
must develop primary groups. Once he has formed
primary groups, the tactical leader must then focus the
behavior of the primary groups toward accomplishment of
objectives that support the organization.
In Dr. Schneider's model the casualty measurement
along the "Y" axis represents individuals, groups, and
organizations. Therefore, the destructive process
itself is the cause of the loss of the will to fight.
The destructive process is an unchangeable battlefield
condition. The leadership task under unchangeable
battlefield conditions is to create, sustain, and
regenerate primary groups as the means to maintain the
will to fight. Since individuals make-up groups, the •■
leadership process must take this into consideration.

14
 Shamir Boas, a Professor of Sociology and Social
Anthropology at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem,
Israel, wrote on the dynamics of individual self-
concept and motivation. Professor Boas makes five
points in explaining his theory of individual self-
concept and work motivation. People are not only goal-
oriented but also self-expressive. People are
motivated to maintain or enhance their self-esteem and
self-worth. People are motivated to retain and
increase their sense of self-consistency. Self-
concepts are composed in part of identities. Self-
concept based behavior is not always related to clear
expectations or to immediate and specific goals.26 In
summarizing his argument Professor Boas said:
"People derive meaning from being linked to
social collectives through their identities.
Further, identities are expressed in
activities27that are congruent with the
identity."
The crux of his argument, in a military sense, is that
given the following four conditions, a tactical leader
could enhance individual motivation: the job-related
identities are salient in the person's self-concept;
the job offers opportunities for self-esteem
enhancement and for increased self-worth; job
performance requires actions consistent with the
person's self-concept; and career opportunities are
congruent with the person's possible selves.28

15
In other words, soldiers derive meaning from being
associated with groups that both accept and reinforce
their identities. By understanding that soldiers seek
work that either reinforces or helps them to change
their self-concept, the leader can create the
conditions that influence soldier behavior. Therefore,
the leadership challenge faced by the tactical level
leader is to articulate the behavior he expects his
soldiers to display and to create the conditions from
which to support development of the desired behavior.
An examination of the battlefield environment from
a theoretical perspective yields at least four
leadership challenges. Army leaders need to develop a
means to build,.sustain, and regenerate cohesive
organizations. Army leaders must also develop a C3
system that can focus small unit actions on the
distributed battlefield. In addition, Army leaders
must work toward creating and articulating an
organizational self-concept that either reinforces or
is congruent to that of the individual. Additionally,
the Army approach must be holistic. It must develop
individuals, groups, and organizations oriented toward
a common objective. In developing a doctrine to do
this, the Army will have provided a means to help
tactical leaders to overcome the battlefield
environment.

16
 III. REVIEW OF DOCTRINE

Army leadership manuals form a hierarchy. That

is, the manuals respectively address individuals, teams
(groups), and organizations. Doctrinal publications
developed as part of a hierarchy provide the means to
look holistically at the existing leadership concepts.
The concept of developing the warrior spirit in
both individuals and organizations is an absolute
requirement for the Army's success in combat. However,
before-the Army can do this, its leadership doctrine at
the individual and organizational levels must define
and discuss how to develop the warrior spirit.
Field Manual 22-100 Military Leadership, addresses
company grade officers, warrant officers,
noncommissioned officers, and junior leaders at the
battalion level and below. It describes the warrior
spirit with the following comments:
"...[the] will to fight and win. Some people
call this «winning spirit' or 'warrior
spirit.• It is the ability to forge victory
out of the chaos of battle—to overcome fear,
hunger, deprivation, and fatigue. The
soldier who can overcome these physical
factors and continue to apply his skill and
knowledge learned in training will ultimately
have the ability to overcome any opponent in
combat."29

FM 22-100 states that the development of the warrior

spirit depends on four things: the example the leader

17
sets; the attitudes he expresses; the expectations he
establishes; and the standards he enforces.30 In
short, the manual describes the warrior spirit as the
"will to win" developed through the leader's proper
application of the principles of leadership and his
integration of the BE-KNOW-DO leadership
characteristics into an effective personal leadership
style.31 In terms of building on the theoretical
foundation, FM 22-100's contribution is the development
of individual skills to form the basis for forming and
leading teams.
Field Manual 22-102 Soldier Team Development,
focuses on leaders at company level and below. This
manual describes warrior spirit in the following
narratives
"When we try to determine the probable winner
of a sports contest, we weigh the
participant's strengths arid weaknesses. We
add them up and normally choose the strongest
as the probable winner. But experience shows
that this system does not always work. A
team, outnumbered and overpowered, can
overcome lack of strength and win when it has
a strong desire to do so. That strong desire
is called spirit—a most critical element of
a combat ready-ready team. Soldiers in a
unit with spirit believe in the cause for
which they are fighting, they believe in
themselves, and they fight for one another.
They have a will to win and believe they are
winners.32 "
FM 22-102 builds on the BE-KNOW-DO characteristics
addressed in FM 22-100 and discusses how a leader can
use them as the framework to guide unit members through
18
the stages of team development.33 FM 22-102 echoes FM
22-100's description of warrior spirit again referring
to it as the "will to win." In both manuals the
development of the warrior spirit depends on the
personal actions of the leader. Again, there is a
reciprocal relationship. The actions of an individual
(the leader) bear directly on the performance of the
group. In addition, both manuals clearly articulate
the behavior desired in soldiers.34
Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-888 The
Professional Development of Officers Study addresses
the officer corps. The study states that officers with
the warrior spirit act as follows:35
"Officers accept the responsibility of being
entrusted with the protection of the Nation;
are prepared physically and mentally to lead
units to fight and support in combat; [are]
skilled in the use of weapons, tactics, and
doctrine; inspire confidence and an eagerness
to be a part of the team; have the ability to
analyze, the vision to see, the integrity to
choose, and the courage to execute. ,,3°
DA PAM 360-888 states that the Army will develop the
warrior spirit in officers through the following five
actions. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
education system's common core curricula will include
blocks of instruction and readings about
professionalism and warrior spirit. The TRADOC schools
will systematically and progressively stress confidence
and competence in basic tactics, current doctrine, and

19
weapons employment. The Army will provide officers
with the opportunity to participate in challenging and
stressful training experiences (e.g., Airborne, Air
Assault, and Ranger Schools). Officers will continue
to undergo semiannual physical fitness readiness
testing. Officers will qualify annually with their
individual weapons.37 DA PAM 360-888, though not a
doctrinal publication, has made a significant
contribution toward the development of the warrior
spirit within the officer corps by affecting the Army's
institutional approach to officer development.38
Implicit in the payoff from the success of DA PAM 360-
888's recommended institutional approach is the
development of skills that complement those discussed
in FM 22-100 and FM 22-102. Between all of the manuals
previously discussed, there exists a certain degree of
mutual support. However, the mutual support begins to
break down when one looks at the doctrine directed at
those concerned with leading large (battalion size or
greater) organizations.
The last doctrinal publication that addresses
warrior spirit is Field Manual 22-103 Leadership and
Command at Senior Levels. FM 22-103 does not define
warrior spirit. Instead, it implies that warrior
spirit is the creative, innovative, risk-taking
behavior displayed in a senior leader's subordinates.

20
The manual suggests that a senior leader develop this
type of behavior by resolving the conflict between
leading and managing.39 FM 22-103 further states that
"Professional excellence is anchored in a warrior
spirit developed through emphasis on: distinctive
appearance; rigorous training; high performance
standards; unit importance; and rites of passage."40
The meaning of warrior spirit in the context of FM 22-
103's argument could take one of several forms. The
manual could be implying that warrior spirit is
creative, innovative, risk-taking behavior or
professional excellence or a combination of the two.
The methods to develop warrior spirit could be the
resolution of the conflict between leading and managing
or working within the framework prescribed by the
factors mentioned above or a combination of the two.
The Army's doctrinal leadership manuals focus on
developing the warrior spirit in individuals, teams,
officers, and units. However, the inconsistencies in
defining or describing the warrior spirit causes one to
question the manuals' recommended approaches.
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the
theoretical and doctrinal elements of leadership as
related to defining and developing the warrior spirit.
The previous discussion laid the foundation from which
to develop a "straw-man" definition for warrior spirit.

21
The following definition emerges from the synthesis of
the theoretical and doctrinal concepts previously
discussed:
The psychological perspective present in
individuals, groups, organizations, and
institutions that underpins the will to
fight, the willingness to take calculated
risks, and a commitment to duty exhibited
through actions directed toward mission
accomplishment regardless of the odds or
conditions.

IV. HISTORICAL VIGNETTES

Armed with a "straw-man" definition and the

preceding discussion, this chapter continues by
discussing historical examples where a leader's
actions influenced the development of the warrior
spirit. The intent in each case is not to narrate
details, but to address those aspects that bear
directly on a discussion of warrior spirit.
Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen, Commander of
the First Infantry Division in North Africa and Italy
in World War II, used several techniques to develop the
warrior spirit in his unit.41 History records that
the First Infantry Division when employed intact never
lost a round of combat during,the North African and
Sicilian Campaigns.42 The actions taken by General
Allen are among the chief reasons for the First
Infantry Division

22
remaining a cohesive, effective fighting force
throughout the war.
General Allen assumed command at Camp Blanding,
Florida in 1942 as the Division trained for overseas
deployment.43 One of his first actions was to
emphasize to his soldiers the heritage, traditions, and
responsibilities each man assumed upon joining the
Division. This action had the effect of laying the
foundation for an organizational self-concept rooted to
the Division's past. By linking the soldiers to the
Division's historical reputation for excellence,
General Allen gave each man a benchmark from which to
measure their performance. Emphasizing a unit identity
tied to past unit history also serves as a means to
foster vertical and horizontal cohesion between members
of the organization.
General Allen's next action occurred following the
Division's amphibious assault near Oran, Algeria on 8
November 1942.44 In a conversation with his chief of
staff, General Allen coined a phrase that would later
become the Division's slogan.45 When asked, just
before the Division attacked, if he had any
instructions for the units, General Allen answered by
saying "Nothing in H ■ must delay or stop the
attack."46 General Allen's phrase underwent slight
revision to read "Nothing in H ■ must stop the

23
First Division."47 The slogan captured the essence of
the mental attitude General Allen wanted within the
Division. Developing distinctive slogans or mottos
further enhances cohesion by strengthening or
reinforcing the organization's identity. The
development of a unit distinctive slogan also promotes
esprit de corps.
Upon reaching Oran, the Division spent the next
few months preparing for the Sicily invasion. During
this period the Division had some of its units stripped
away to support combat operations in Tunisia. In
return, the Division received attachment of some
British and French units.48 General Allen's action in
this instance was to complain to his higher
headquarters. Unfortunately, General Eisenhower's
tactical priorities prevented resolution of this
issue.49 The practice of shifting units from one
organization (task-organizing) to another breaks down
unit cohesion. For a unit to function effectively when
separated from the larger organization, the unit should
have an individual identity besides the shared identity
of the larger organization. The other challenge
created by the process of task-organizing is that the
receiving tactical commander must lead troops who could
sometimes have an organizational identity rooted in
values and principles that are not congruent to

24
his own. One solution to this problem is to develop an
institutional level self-concept or identity that
contains values and principles common to all units. In
terms of coalition warfare, the value of having a
shared organizational self-concept depends on the size
of the force undergoing task organization; the smaller
the force, the more important that it has a solid
organizational concept.
Major General George S. Patton Jr., took command
of II Corps, the First Infantry Division's parent
headquarters, on 6 March 1943.50 Upon assuming
command, General Patton issued the famous necktie-and-
helmet-at-all-times policy as a means to improve
discipline throughout II Corps.51 General Allen did
not support this policy but instead allowed the First
Infantry Division to maintain a uniform different from
the other II Corps units. In doing so, the First
Infantry Division further solidified its own
organizational identity.52 General Allen's decision
to not follow the higher headquarters * order raises
several discipline issues. Of particular interest is
General Allen's view of discipline. The essence of his
thought is that discipline should contribute toward the
functioning of units in combat. General Allen did not
create or support policies that did not make a material
contribution to the conduct of combat operations.53

25
 The First Infantry Division reunited in Morsott,
Algeria in March of 1943 for a general rest and refit
period. General Allen used this time to establish the
"Battle School" for incoming replacements.54 The
school's training program included instruction on
traditions of the division, weapons, patrolling, night
combat operations, physical conditioning, and first
aid. As a result of this school, the Division
increased its level of combat efficiency, had fewer
casualties, and increased morale among the new
replacements. Establishment of the "Battle School"
served several purposes. The school fostered the
development of individual identification with the
organization. The school served as a rite of passage
for incoming replacements. Graduation from the "Battle
School" was a reguirement to be part of the First
Infantry Division team. The school's rigorous training
program prepared the soldier for combat, provided him
with a sense of achievement, and gave him a source of
commonality with other soldiers in the division.
Attendance at the "Battle School" gave the soldier an
opportunity to learn about his unit and the importance
of the Division's mission. The school allowed for
informal exchanges between the cadre (combat veterans)
and the replacements. The opportunity to pass on "war
stories" and other philosophical discussions further

26
enhanced the significance of being a member of the
team. Attendance at the school allowed the
replacements to begin forming small, cohesive groups.
From these small groups, the nucleus was in place from
which to build larger groups (i.e., squads). The
school allowed the noncommissioned officer corps to
apply their combat experiences in preparing the
schools curriculum. In doing so, the Division ensured
that the new soldiers could benefit from the veterans'
experience. Between the synergistic effect of the
Battle School program and other actions taken by
General Allen, the First Infantry Division developed a
very distinct attitude. Some have called it cocky,
aggressive, and even arrogant.55 However, few would
dispute the fact that the First Infantry Division was
an effective combat organization in the early part of
the North African Campaign. The Division would sustain
a high level of performance during the second part of
the North African campaign.
The review of theory discussed the importance of
creating a command and control system that could focus
the effort of numerous small elements on the
distributed battlefield. The requirement to do this
led to the creation of staffs through which the
commander could exercise command. The relationship
between the commander and staff is very important,

27
especially at the higher levels. One of the realities
of the distributed battlefield is that the commander
cannot grasp the entire situation without assistance
from his staff. The commander also relies on his staff
to take action as needed in his absence. Therefore,
the commander and staff must be of like mind in terms
of exercising command functions. General Allen's
relationship with his staff during the latter part of
the North African Campaign is a good illustration of
this concept in practice.
The First Infantry Division conducted a successful
night attack on objectives north of Gafsa on 16-17
March 1943.56 Much of the credit for the success in
this operation is due to excellent work by General
Allen's staff and his relationship with them. General
Allen believed that the place for the commander was at
the critical point of action. The implication is that
General Allen would not be available to work with the
staff for extended periods of time. To compensate for
his absence, General Allen imbued his staff with what
he called "cavalry style—that is—quick orders, tell
somebody to do something, maybe duplicate effort, but
go, go, go."57 General Allen believed that he should
tell the staff what he wanted to do, not how. The
decentralized manner in which the staff operated was
the key to taking advantage of opportunities on the

28
distributed battlefield. By showing confidence in his
staff and allowing them to work with minimal guidance,
General Allen ensured that the staff could display the
same aggressive behavior he expected in his other
soldiers» A side-benefit to the decentralized approach
in working with the staff is that staff morale remained
high throughout the remainder of the campaign. The
manner in which General Allen worked with his staff
reinforces that not only must the commander lead his
unit but that he must also lead his staff. General
Allen's layered approach to leadership firmly
established an organizational identity throughout the
division. However, there are times when an
organization's identity becomes a problem.
After completion of the fighting in Tunisia the
Division moved back to the Oran area for rest and
relaxation. Upon arrival in Öran, soldiers of the
First Infantry Division found that clubs and other
facilities had been placed off-limits to them by the II
Corps headquarters.58 This had the effect of creating
open hostilities between the First Infantry Division
soldiers and the rear-echelon troops. General Bradley,
commander of II Corps, said:
Thus the woolen uniform in Oran became the
unmistakable badge of troops from the
Tunisian Front. As long as bands of the 1st
Division hunted-down khaki-clad service
troops in Oran, those sweaty woolens were the
only assurance of safe conduct in the city's
29
 streets. ... It also indicated a serious
breakdown in discipline with the division.
Allen's troops had now begun to strut their
toughness while ignoring regulations that
applied to all other units.
General Bradley's comments affirm the degree to which
the soldiers of the First Infantry Division had become
a cohesive fighting force. Their identity as members
of the "Big Red One" had firm roots in their
distinctive appearance and shared experiences. The
foundation laid by General Allen would allow the First
Infantry Division to remain a cohesive fighting force
throughout the remainder of the war, as the invasion of
Sicily clearly demonstrates.
The First Infantry Division conducted an
amphibious assault onto the island of Sicily on the
morning of 10 July 1943. The initial assault forces
encountered light enemy resistance. Enemy air strikes
and rough seas delayed the arrival of supporting
artillery and armor. By the afternoon of 10 July,
three battalions of artillery were ashore, despite
having suffered high personnel and equipment losses.60
Enemy opposition stiffened throughout the day and into
the night. By late evening, the First Infantry
Division realized that it had encountered a significant
enemy force.
On the morning of 11 July, sixty tanks of the
Herman Goering Panzer Division penetrated the First

30
Infantry Division. Without armor support, the
Division's infantry allowed themselves to be overrun by
enemy tanks. After allowing the German tanks to pass
through, the Division's infantry were able to stop the
German infantry which had accompanied the tanks.
General Allen placed his artillery units between the
Division's rear area along the beach and the advancing
German tanks. The artillery units firing from direct
fire positions and supported by naval gunfire were able
to stop the German attack. The Germans attempted
another counterattack later in the day using less
armor. The Division was able to stop this attack as
well.61
On 11 July 1943, General Allen received
information that German reinforcements were occupying
assembly areas in front of the First Infantry
Division.62 From this information he deduced that the
Germans were preparing for an attack, more than likely
on the morning of 12 July 1943. General Allen believed
that "this situation necessitated immediate positive
action by the First Division."63 General Allen issued
orders that the Division would attack at midnight.
Division artillery and naval gunfire preparatory fires
preceded the First Division's attack. The First
Infantry Division- attack surprised the Germans and by

31
the following morning the Division had seized all
objectives.64 General Allen's action demonstrated the
creative, risk taking behavior discussed in FM 22-103.
That the Division remained a cohesive force despite
facing significant odds is ample testimony of the
quality of General Allen's leadership and the degree to
which he fostered the development of warrior spirit in
his organization. The following quotation explains
General Allen's leadership philosophy, the intent
behind his actions and the essence of building the will
to fight:
"The average American soldier is ä self
thinking individual with basic motives of
patriotism and love of country. But, once
his own unit is committed to battle, his most
urgent incentive is the fact that he is
fighting for his unit. When American
soldiers are imbued with an intense belief in
their outfit, they will never let their units
down regardless of their fatigue or -battle
weariness. They wear their division insignia
with a fierce pride and will fight for their
outfit at the drop of a hat. Units that have
this pride of accomplishment have a cocky
self-assurance, all their own, which pays off
in battle."65

The First Infantry Division continued to fight

successfully throughout the remainder of the Sicilian
Campaign. The most brutal fighting during the campaign
occurred in the battle for the town of Troina.
After six days of continuous fighting in which the
Germans counterattacked twenty-four times, the First

32
Division captured the town of Troina.66 Immediately
following the battle of Troina, Major General Clarence
R. Huebner replaced General Allen as the Division's
commander.67
General Huebner faced a different challenge than
General Allen. Whereas General Allen had to create the
will to fight, General Huebner's task was to sustain
the First Infantry Division's will to fight.68 The
next historical vignette describes the actions taken by
General Huebner to sustain the Division's will to fight
throughout the remainder of the Sicilian and in the
initial days of the Normandy Campaigns.
One of the means by which General Huebner
sustained the will to fight was to improve discipline
within the Division. General Huebner began by setting
the standard for leading by example. He made a point
of personally instructing his chief of staff, division
artillery commander, regimental commander, and
commander of special troops on the proper methods for
saluting and conducting close-order drill.69 General
Huebner accomplished several purposes through this
action. He set the standard for leading by example
throughout the Division and communicated his
expectations and performance standards to his
subordinates. General Huebner was additionally able to
measure the effectiveness of the Division's chain-of-

33
command in passing information from the division down
to the squad level.
Taking action again, General Huebner directed the
staff to rigidly adhere to the provisions of Field
Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations.70
General Huebner would continue to allow the staff to
operate decentralized. However, by making them adhere
to the doctrinal staff procedures in FM 101-5, he would
improve their effectiveness. General Huebner's action
in dealing with his staff should serve as a reminder
that the commander must not only train his soldiers,
but also his staff.
Upon completion of the fighting in the Troina
area, the First Division returned to Gela, Sicily, for
additional training and rest.71 During this period
General Huebner sought to improve the quality of rifle
marksmanship within the Division.72 General Huebner
had received information from his staff which indicated
that the infantry over-relied on their supporting
artillery. Further analysis revealed that over 2,000
men had not qualified with their weapons since the
Division left North Africa.73 To correct the problem,
General Huebner personally led the division's rifle
marksmanship program. General Allen also expected each
leader down to squad level to personally instruct their
subordinates in rifle marksmanship. General Huebner's

34
action reinforced the importance that he placed on
leading by example. The result is that the officers
and noncommissioned officers took an immediate interest
in the training of their men and individual confidence
in the use of personal weapons increased. The chain-
of-command *s emphasis on rifle marksmanship served
other purposes. Leaders at each level of command could
instill confidence in their subordinates by
demonstrating tactical and technical proficiency when
presenting instruction. Leaders at each level of
command could establish and enforce training standards
expected from their next lower level. In turn,
soldiers could observe the type of behavior they would
have to exhibit upon becoming noncommissioned officers
and officers.
General Huebner also made rifle marksmanship a
rite of passage for infantrymen within the Division.
His policy was that any infantrymen who could not shoot
at the expert level could not serve in a rifle platoon.
General Huebner's policy had the effect of making
assignment to a rifle platoon the most sought after
position within the Division.74 By making assignment
to a rifle platoon something that the soldier must
earn, General Huebner increased the morale of those
already serving in the coveted position. Those
soldiers who could qualify as expert and get assigned

35
to a rifle platoon were more readily accepted by the
soldiers already in the unit, thus improving cohesion
and fostering the development of teams.
General Huebner continued with his rigorous
training program until the time the Division began
preparing to participate in the Normandy invasion. The
Division would be among the first units to land on
Omaha Beach during the invasion. General Huebner
sought a means to provide for continuous command and
control given that units can guickly lose orientation
following an amphibious landing« To that end, General
Huebner had each infantry battalion commander memorize
the missions of the other infantry battalions
participating in the operation.75 His intent was to
provide the maximum amount of flexibility in executing
combat operations under decentralized conditions. His
action had the effect of reducing uncertainty between
the units that would ultimately participate in the
operation.
Another of General Huebner*s methods to sustain
the will to fight was to reward acts of heroism on the
spot. To do this, he carried around various awards
that he could present upon encountering deserving
individuals. The burden for submitting the paperwork
to support the award fell to the awarded soldier's
unit.76 Similarly, General Huebner wanted to improve

36
the aggressiveness of his troops. His policy was that
he would award the Silver Star to any man who killed a
tank with a bazooka.77 In rewarding performance
immediately, General Huebner increased morale down to
the individual level.
On D~Day, 6 June 1944, the First Infantry Division
landed in the initial assault wave onto Omaha Beach.
The Division met strong opposition as they tried to
cross 300 meters of open beach. Initial intelligence
reports showed that the Division would face a defending
German regiment. By chance, the German mobile 352d
Division, on training maneuvers, had reinforced the
regiment defending the beach.78 In doing this, the
German's defense significantly reduced the tempo of the
First Division's attack. From his floating command
post General Huebner attempted to monitor the battle.
For the most part, he was unable to establish radio
contact with units ashore. Eventually, he decided to
come ashore and observe the battle for himself. Upon
arriving ashore General Huebner took control of the
situation. He established radio contact with each of
his regimental commanders and to add momentum to the
battle he committed his reserve regiment. Slowly, the
Division moved inland, eventually overcoming the
defending forces. Of the Division's performance, a war
correspondent wrote:

37
 "In all its battles in Africa, Sicily,
France, Belgium, and Germany, there never was
one quite like the battle at Omaha Beach. In
that battle alone the Fighting First won a
niche among the immortals of American
history. Huebner's men smashed the main
strength of the Germans and by doing so
turned the key that79unlocked the door to
victory in Europe»"

Despite suffering high casualties, the Division

sustained the will to fight and successfully completed
this operation. Under General Huebner's leadership,
the First Infantry Division remained an effective
fighting force for the remainder of 1944.

V. ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, and RECOMMENDATIONS

Evaluation of General Allen's actions against the

"straw-man" definition shows that the warrior spirit
was a key factor in allowing the First Infantry
Division to withstand the process of destruction during
World War II. General Allen created a psychological
perspective (attitude) in his Division that sustained
the will to fight. He created this psychological
perspective by creating an organizational identity and
self-concept rooted to the Division's history. He also
created a division slogan that imbued the Division with
an offensive-minded spirit. General Allen enhanced the
organization's identity by having the division adopt an
appearance different from the rest of the corps.
38
General Allen sustained the will to fight and the
commitment to duty by building, sustaining, and
regenerating cohesive organizations. He was able to
build and sustain vertical and horizontal cohesion
through the development of an organizational identity«
Creation of the "Battle School" allowed General Allen
to regenerate cohesion upon the unit's subjection to
the destructive forces of combat. The Division
reflected a commitment to duty through sustained
performance excellence in combat. General Allen
nurtured creative, innovative, risk taking behavior in
the Division. He achieved this through training his
staff to operate decentralized.
Evaluation of General Huebner's actions against
the "straw-man" definition also proves favorable.
General Huebner worked hard to sustain the Division's
warrior spirit created by his predecessor. He
sustained the Division's will to fight by leaving
intact several initiatives established by General
Allen. He also sustained the will to fight through
improving the effectiveness of the chain-of-command in
leading the Division's units at all levels. General
Huebner improved the Division's ability to take
calculated risks through training and awards. General
Huebner trained the staff on the use of standard
doctrinal procedures while continuing to let them

39
operate decentralized. He also articulated and
rewarded the type of aggressive behavior he wanted
within the Division. General Huebner sustained the
Division's commitment to duty by placing emphasis on
leading by example. Leaders at all levels became more
actively involved in training their soldiers for combat
and positions of increased responsibility.
Though different in thought and manner, both
General Allen and General Huebner were effective. What
becomes readily apparent is not the importance of
personality in developing the warrior spirit, but the
importance of actions a leader takes to create the
warrior spirit. In short, actions that a leader can
take to develop organizational identity, to promote
unit cohesion, to decentralize command and control, and
lead by example are the keys to developing the warrior
spirit.
Tactical level leaders can affect the development
of the warrior spirit within their units. For a leader
interested in developing the warrior spirit in his
unit, Army leadership doctrine would be a good place to
start. Army leadership doctrine is valid in terms of
describing actions that tactical leaders can take to
develop the warrior spirit. However, Army doctrine
requires a common definition for warrior spirit in
order to make the doctrine holistic and mutually

40
supportive. The Army's adoption of the following
definition for warrior spirit would make the leadership
doctrine holistic and mutually supportive:
Warrior spirit is the psychological
perspective present in individuals, groups,
organizations, and institutions that
underpins the will to fight, the willingness
to take calculated risks, and a commitment to
duty exhibited through actions directed
toward mission accomplishment regardless of
the odds or conditions.

The implication from adopting the above definition is

slight. The doctrinal publications discussed earlier
would require the addition of the new definition. Upon
including the new definition in doctrine, the Army will
provide a single comprehensive focus for leader
development Army-wide.

41
 ENDNOTES

1
United States Army, Field Manual 22-103: Leadership
and Command at Senior Levels (Washington D.C.:
Department of the Army, 1987), p. 45.
2
The third chapter of the monograph discusses the
doctrinal inconsistency in detail. In short, of the
four leadership manuals, none uniformly defines or
describes warrior spirit. For example: Field Manual
22-100. Military Leadership, defines the warrior spirit
as the will to fight and win. FM 22-102. Soldier Team
Development. describes the warrior spirit as an intense
desire to win. Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-
888. Commanders Call Special Issue: The Professional
Development of Officers Study, describes the behavior
associated with the warrior spirit but does not define
warrior spirit. FM 22-103. Leadership and Command at
Senior Levels, implies that warrior spirit could be on
or two different concepts. However, the manual does
not come to closure by deciding on which of the two
descriptions is the basis for the doctrine.
3
Henry B. Wolf, Ed., Websters New Collegiate Dictionary
(Mass: G & C Merriam and Co., 1975), p. 295.
4
Carl von Clauswitz, On War. (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1976), pp. 186, 231. Clausewitz was
the son of a retired Prussian Army officer. He entered
the Prussian Army as a cadet at the age of 12 in 1780.
One year later Clausewitz fought in the War of the
First Coalition against France, 1793-1794. It was
during this war that he received his officer's
commission. In 1803, Clausewitz graduated from the top
of his class at the Military School of Berlin. He then
became the Aide to Prince August of Prussia.
Clausewitz fought again in 1806 in the Jena Campaign
where he was captured by the French. After the war,
Clausewitz assisted in the reorganization of the
Prussian Army. He also taught at the Prussian Military
School and was assigned as the Military Instructor of
Frederick William IV, Crown Prince of Prussia. In 1812
Prussia aligned with France against the Russians.
Clausewitz saw this as traitorous and as a result
resigned his commission to join the Russian Army. He
served with the rear guard covering the Russian retreat
and later in the pursuit of Napoleon. He served as a
liaison officer during the campaign of 1813 and Corps
Chief of Staff during 1814. Clausewitz reentered the
Prussian Army in 1815. In the Waterloo Campaign of
1815, Clausewitz served as Corps Chief of Staff.
42
Clausewitz did most of his writing from 1815-18 3 0 while
a Major General and Director of Administration at the
Prussian War School. He stopped writing in 1830 upon
his transfer to the artillery and assignment as Army
Chief of Staff. He died in 1831 at the age of 51.
His major writings consisted of seven books
published by his widow after his death. These books
are: ON War. The Italian Campaign (1796-1797). The
Campaigns of Switzerland and Italy. 1799. The Wars of
1812. 1813. and 1814. The Waterloo Campaign, and two
volumes describing several campaigns conducted by
leading generals and strategists.
His most important work has been On War. In it,
Clausewitz developed his theory of war. On War
concerns strategy at the strategic and operational
levels.
5
William J. Wansley, "American Spirit: A Leadership
Philosophy for U.S. Tactical Forces, (Fort Leavenworth,
KS, 1991), p. 6; James J. Schneider, "The Theory of the
Empty Battlefield," Journal of the Royal United
Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence Studies.
(September, 1987), pp. 6-9.
6
Schneider, "Theory of the Empty Battlefield," (Journal
of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for
Defence Studies. September, 1987), p. 6
7
Ibid, p. 9.
8
Ibid, p.37
9
Ivan S. Jean de Bloch, The Future of War. (Boston:
The World Peace Foundation, 1914), p. xxvii;
Christopher Bellamy, The Future of Land Warfare (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 274-275.
10
Ardant Du Picg, Battle Studies. (Harrisburg, 1987),
p. 72. Colonel Ardant Du Picq was a career French Army
officer and military theorist who was well-qualified to
write about the human dimension in war in Battle
Studies. He was born in 1831 and commissioned a sub-
lieutenant after graduating from Saint-Cyr in 1844. He
died as a colonel in 1870 from wounds received while
leading his regiment in the Battle of Borney during the
Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). His other major
combat experiences were the Crimean War (1853-1856)
where he was captured and held for three months and the
Syrian Campaign (1860-1861).
Du Picq's purpose for writing Battle Studies was
to instruct the French officer corps on the key element
in war. He states "Nothing can be wisely prescribed in
43
 an army . . . without exact knowledge of the
fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his
morale, at the instant of combat (p. 65). Du Picq
believed that through instruction based on historical
analysis of human performance in battle he could
educate, mature, and inspire the next generation of
French Officers.
Du Picq used historical examples and personal
experiences (his and others) to discuss a variety of
major ideas on the human dimension in war, especially
on the topic of cohesion. For example, he used the
Battle of Cannae to show that cohesion, when present on
one side and lacking on the other allows a small force
to defeat a much larger one (Hannibal attacked with a
force of 36,000 and defeated the Roman force of
70,000). Du Picq started his argument by explaining
how man will take extraordinary steps to avoid getting
killed and that the instinct for self-preservation is
so strong that without some way to overcome this
instinct there could be no unity of effort. Du Picq
then offered a solution for overcoming fear. He stated
"Discipline has for its aim the domination of that
instinct by a great terror" (p. 77). Du Picq believed
discipline could help man overcome the fear of death.
He also stated that discipline has limitations and that
something else is needed to induce men to fight in the
face of death. Du Picq then offered the solution of
cohesion. He believed that when all else fails men
will fight for each other. This is why the wise leader
should take steps to create an environment where
soldiers bond with their comrades. He showed „how
Hannibal employed forms of cross-training and
maintenance of unit integrity to keep his multi-ethnic
force unified. Du Picq concluded by showing the chain
of events surrounding the collapse of cohesion. He
demonstrated how Hannibal's strategy of isolating the
Roman forces reduced their unit cohesion and then
caused a breakdown in discipline which enabled Hannibal
to defeat the much larger force.
11
Ibid, p. 72.
12
Ibid, pp. 71-72.
13
Ibid, p. 73.
u
Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, (Massachusetts,
1985), p.l. Martin Van Creveld is an internationally
renowned military historian. He has no military
background, but has been an observer of modern warfare,
to include several of the Middle East wars, the, Vietnam
War, and the war in Afghanistan. He received a PhD
44
from the London School of Economics. He is also a
Fellow of War Studies at Kings College, Cambridge. He
has also taught and lectured at the United States
Marine Corps Command and Staff College in the period
1991-1992.
He is a prolific writer who applied Hans Delbruck
methods of Sachkritik to modern warfare to assess the
relevance of traditional ways of thinking about
warfare. His study of the factors leading to success
in battle throughout history formed the basis for
Fighting Power: German Military Performance. 1914-
1945. and Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army
Performance. 1939-1945. a striking comparison of the
masters of the profession with the amateurs who did
them in. He wrote Military Lessons of the YoM Kippur
War: Historical Perspectives in 1975. In this work he
discusses the tremendous lethality on the modern
battlefield. He suggests that the defense is the
dominant form of battle. The implications of this
realization is a return to longer and more total wars.
He also concludes that modern warfare reinforces the
importance of the relationship between society and the
military. As with the U.S. experience in Vietnam, the
Middle East experience showed that a nation cannot win
a war with just its military arm—it must have the
support of the totality of society. Supplying War:
Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. written in 1977,
is an in-depth look at the importance of logistics to
warfare—in fact it is the most critical leg of warfare
according to Van Creveld. Command in War, written in
1985, outlines the development of command since ancient
Greeks. Van Creveld discusses the importance of
commanding, staff organization, communications,
weaponry, and logistics, in not only theory, but
practice, through an in-depth study of many battles.
One of his important conclusions, is that while
technology brought on many new possibilities, it has
brought new limitations as well.
15
Ibid, p. 9.
16
Ibid, p. 9.
17
S. L. A. Marshall, Men Under Fire. (New York:
William Morrow & Co., ), p. 23.
18
Blake, Lord and C. S. Nichols, Eds, Dictionary of
National Biography. 1971-1980. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), pp. 913-914. Lord Moran was
born Charles McMoran Wilson at Skipton in Craven,
Yorkshire, on 10 November 1882. Educated in London,
Lord Moran entered St. Mary's Medical School in 1902
45
and graduated as a medical doctor with honors
in 1913. His first position was as the medical
registrar of St. Mary's Hospital.
When England entered the World War I, Lord Moran
enlisted in the Royal Army Medical Corps and was
assigned to the 1st Battalion of the Royal Fussiliers.
He spent two years on the front lines and was
drastically affected by the horrors and heroism of
trench warfare. He was awarded the Military Cross in
1916 for bravery during the battle of the Somme, as
well as the Italian silver medal. Moran ended his
service in the war with the rank of major.
During his years on the front line Moran kept a
diary chronicling the stresses affecting soldiers.
This diary inspired him to write the Anatomy of Courage
in 1945. This work described how courage could either
become strengthened or spent in combat. For may years
Moran lectured at the British Army Staff College at
Camberley on how courage and fear affected soldiers.
19
Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage. (New York:
Avery, 1945) pp. xvi, 17, 64.
20
Ibid, pp. 62, 64, 69, 81, 102, 146.
21
Ibid, ppe 156, 162, 174, 180.
22
Roger J. Spiller, Ed., Dictionary of American
Military Biography. (Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1984), pp. 737^741. Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall born
in Catskill, New York, on 18 July 1900, was a military
writer, journalist and Army officer who pioneered
combat history techniques in during World War II.
Marshall enlisted in the Army in 1917 and saw
combat in World War I while assigned to the 90th
Division fighting at Soissons, St. Mihiel, the Meuse-
Argonne, and Ypres-Lys. In 1919, while still in
France, he was commissioned as an infantry lieutenant.
In the period between 1922 and 1940 Marshall worked as
a journalist for various news organizations. During
this period Marshall opened a correspondence with
J.F.C. Fuller. Fuller strongly influenced Marshall's
views on the future of mechanized war. Marshall
captured the ideas in his first book Blitzkrieg.
Publication of this book brought Marshall to the
attention of Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War.
Marshall initially worked for Stimson as major
assigned to the Office of War Information. Later,
Marshall joined the historical service. Now a
Lieutenant Colonel, Marshall observed and reported on
several battles. During one of these he noted that no
two soldiers could offer the same view of the battle.
46
Intrigued, Marshall began to investigate in detail the
dynamics of tactical operations, a subject that became
his life's work.
In 1946 Marshall wrote Men Against Fire to provide
an account of all that he had learned in war. His
experiences taught him that the soldier is ill prepare
for what awaits him on the battlefield, despite the
training he may have had. He concluded that the gap
between the soldier's training and the soldier's battle
meant that fewer than 25% of all infantrymen ever fired
their weapons in combat. The crux of the solution is
in the degree to which soldiers could band together,
forming groups for mutual survival. Marshall noted
that where soldiers were close to one another, for
example in a tank crew, artillery piece, or machinegun,
their performance was not a problem. From this
observation Marshall deduced that the proximity of
comrades allowed the soldier to withstand the horrors
of war.
Marshall continued to write on military subjects.
His writings cover the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli
War, and the Vietnam War. He died in El Paso in 1977.
^Marshall, Men Under Fire, pp. 42, 123-124, 149, 161,
170. S.L.A. Marshall believes that "... one of the
simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an
infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the
near presence or presumed near presence of a comrade."
Therefore, the formation of a group tends to improve
the individual's chance for survival. Once formed, the
primary group exists as long as needed to support the
needs of the members.
24
Anthony Kellet, Combat Motivation. (Boston: Kluwer-
Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 19-58, 79-117, 133-163, 217-269.
Anthony Kellet is a Canadian who has served for a
period of time with the Royal Canadian Hussars. The
book, Combat Motivation, is based largely on a study
prepared for the Canadian Department of National
Defence and published in 1980. The purpose of the
study was to review the subject of combat motivation
for the purpose of improving the leadership,
administration, and training of the Canadian armed
forces. The result is a mixture of. behavioral science
and military history. The examples are taken largely
from the Twentieth century's wars and from British,
Canadian, and American actions in particular.
At one time or another during their careers, most
military commanders speculate about what motivates
their men to fight. George Washington, for example,
wrote to the Congress that, "Three things" prompt men to
a regular discharge of their duty in time of action:
47
natural bravery, hope of reward, and fear of
punishment." Other military writers such as Ardant Du
Picq and S.L.A. Marshall have maintained that soldiers
are motivate primarily by feelings of comradeship.
Speculations as to what motivates men to fight and
a variety of other aspects of motivation are covered in
Combat Motivation. Since much of the book goes well
beyond what a behavioral scientist would call
motivation, the book's subtitle, The Behavior of Men in
Battle. is actually a more accurate description of the
contents than the title itself. There are, for
example, sections on training, military discipline,
organizational policies such as troop rotation and
descriptions of combat in addition to discussions of
such standard motivators as patriotism, religious
beliefs, punishments, and rewards.
25
Ibid, pp. 97, 100, 102, 103, 104. Kellet«s argument
mirrors that of S.L.A. Marshall. Kellet states that
the moral support provided by the group has been a
feature of both close-order and open-order warfare and,
quoting S.L.A. Marshall, that "one of the simplest
truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry
soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near
presence or presumed near presence of a comrade. The
point Kellet makes is that groups are made up of
individuals. The reason why individuals form groups is
for comraderie, group solidarity, mutual risk, and
leadership. Therefore, individuals join for their own
survival and once the group is formed, the purpose of
the group is to ensure the survival of the members.
26
Boas Shamir, "Meaning, Self and Motivation in
Organizations," Organization Studies, (1991), p. 411.
27
Ibid, p. 413.
28
Ibid, p. 416.
29
U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-100. Military
Leadership. (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army,
1983), p. 54.
30
Ibid, p. 54.
31
U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-100. Military
Leadership, p. 53. The BE-KNOW-DO leadership framework
is the means by which the Army stresses those things
that a leader must BE (a person of strong and honorable
character; committed to the professional Army ethic; an
example of individual values; and able to resolve
complex ethical dilemmas), those things a leader must
48
KNOW (the four factors of leadership and how they
affect each other; standards; yourself; human nature;
your job; your unit), and those things a leader must DO
(provide purpose; provide direction; and provide
motivation).
32
U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-102, Soldier Team
Development, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army,
1987), p. 2.
33
Ibid, p. iv.
^See discussion in notes 23 and 25.
35
Department of the Army, Pamphlet 360-888, Commanders
Call Special Issue: The Professional Development of
Officers Study. (Washington DC, 1985), p. 5. This
publication uses the term "warrior spirit," but nowhere
in the manual is there a clear definition for warrior
spirit.
^Ibid, p. 5.
37
Ibid, p. 17
^Ibid, pp. 8, 14-24. On 2 May 1985, the Army Chief of
Staff received an assessment by the Army Staff of 116
base policies and supporting actions recommended by the
Professional Development of Officers Study Group. The
Army Chief of Staff approved in principle the
implementation of all base policies (p. 14-24) subject,
in some cases, to an identification of resource
requirements and or review of specific issues. The
effect of these initiatives has been a restructuring of
the officer development process Army-wide.
39
U.S. Army, Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and
Command At Senior Levels. (Washington D.C.: Department
of the Army, 1987), p. 43.
40
Ibid, p. 55.
41
Spiller, p. 23. Terry de la Mesa Allen was born 1
April 1888 at Fort Douglas Utah. His father was a
career Army officer and his maternal grandfather a
Spanish Colonel who fought for the North during the
U.S. Civil War. He entered West Point in 1907 and
remained there for five years. After failing gunnery
in his fifth year he transferred to Catholic University
of America and graduated in 1912. On 30 November 1912,
he was commissioned a second-lieutenant in the cavalry.
For most of the time until World War I, he served in
49
the Southwest along the Mexican border and was involved
in several skirmishes.
During World War I, he transferred to the Infantry
where he commanded the 3d Battalion of the 358th
Infantry, 90th Division. He was wounded in action three
times while leading his units in several battles that
earned him a reputation as an aggressive leader. He
returned to the U.S. following the war. He graduated
from the Command and General Staff School in 1926 and
the Army War College in 1935.
He was promoted to brigadier general in 1940
without ever having been a colonel. He was promoted to
Major General in 1942. With this promotion came his
assignment to the First Infantry Division which he led
in the North Africa Campaign and in the invasion of
Sicily. Following the attack on Troina, Sicily, in
September of 1943, Allen was relieved of command by
General Bradley, the II Corps Commander. General
Bradley stated "...by now Allen had become too much of
an individualist to submerge himself without friction
in the group undertakings of war. The 1st Division,
under Allen's command, had become too full os self-pity
and pride. To save Allen both from himself and from
his brilliant record and to save the Division from too
much success [emphasis added], I decided to separate
them" (p. 24). Following his relief,^General Allen
returned to the United States where he took command of
the 104th Infantry Division.
He fought the 104th Division in Europe from
September of 1944 to April of 1945. Allen became the
only general in World War II to lead a second division
into combat after being relieved of command. Allen
retired as a Major General in 1946. He died in El Paso,
Texas in 1969.
42
Terry de la Mesa Allen, "Situation and Operations
Report of the First Infantry Division During the Period
of Its Overseas Movement, North African and Sicilian
Campaigns, from 8 August 1942 to 7 August 1943."
(Unpublished paper, not dated), p. 21.
43
R. J. Rogers, "A Study of Leadership in the First
Infantry Division During World War II: Terry de la
mesa Allen and Clarence Ralph Huebner," (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and
General Staff College, 1965), p. 11.
u
Allen, p. 2.
45
Rogers, p. 15.

50
46
H. R. Knickerbocker, Danger Forward. (Nashville: The
Battery Press 1947), p. 46.
47
Allen, p. 21.
48
Rogers, p. 17.
49
Ibid, p. 17.
50
Howe, George F, United States Army in World War II.
The Mediterranean Theater of Operations North West
Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West.
(Washington DC, Office of the Chief of Military
History, 1957), pp. 487-492.
51
Rogers, p. 18.
52
Ibid, p. 17.
53
Ibid, p. 19.
54
Ibid, p. 22.
55
Ibid, p. 22.
56
Howe, pp. 547-548,
57
Rogers, p. 25.
58
Ibid, p. 32.
59
0mar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story. (New York, Henry
Holt & Co), pp. 110-111.
60
Rogers, p. 40.
61
Ibid, p. 42.
62
Ibid, p. 46.
ß
Ibid, p. 46.
^Ibid, p.28.
65
Rogers, p. 35.
^Allen, p. 22.
67
Rogers, pp. 53-56. Clarence Ralph Huebner was born
24 Noyember 1888 at Bushton, Kansas. He spent two
years at Bushton High School and then transferred to a
business college at Grand Island Nebraska.
51
He graduated in 1908 and enlisted in the Army. By 1916
he had achieved the rank of master sergeant. In 1916
he passed the examination for a commission. He was
then commissioned a lieutenant of infantry.
During World War I, he fought as a member of the
1st Infantry Division in the Sommerville sector of
France. He was wounded in action twice while leading
his units in several battles. He returned to the U.S.
and led the victory parades in New York as a regimental
commander. He graduated from the Command and General
Staff School in 1925 and the Army War College in 1929.
He was promoted to brigadier general in 1941.
With this promotion he served as the director of
training for the Army Service Forces until 1943. He
served in North Africa as the theater G-3 and later as
the deputy chief of staff for General Alexander's 21st
Army Group headquarters. Huebner remained in this
assignment until September of 1943 when he replaced
General Allen as commander of the 1st Infantry
Division.
He fought the 1st Division in Europe until 1944.
Later, he would go on to command the V Army Corps. He
remained in the Army until 1950. He retired as a
lieutenant general. He died in Washington DC, in 1972.
^Rogers, p. 61.
69
Bryce F. Denno, "Allen and Huebner: Contrast in
Command/' Army (June 1984): p. 69.
^Rogers, p. 60.
71
Denno, p. 69.
72
Ibid, p. 69.

^Ibid, p. 65.
74
Rogers, p. 64.

^Denno, p. 69.
76
Ibid, p., 71.

^Rogers, p. 72.
78
Denno, p. 70.
79Knickerbocker, p. 190.

52
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57