0% found this document useful (0 votes)
9 views7 pages

Definite Descriptions in Formal Logic

The document discusses definite descriptions in formal logic, particularly how they can be analyzed using Bertrand Russell's framework. It outlines the symbolization of sentences in first-order logic (FOL) and provides practice exercises for symbolizing various statements. Additionally, it covers the concepts of terms, formulas, and the semantics of identity within FOL.

Uploaded by

6tz8kvfbkf
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
9 views7 pages

Definite Descriptions in Formal Logic

The document discusses definite descriptions in formal logic, particularly how they can be analyzed using Bertrand Russell's framework. It outlines the symbolization of sentences in first-order logic (FOL) and provides practice exercises for symbolizing various statements. Additionally, it covers the concepts of terms, formulas, and the semantics of identity within FOL.

Uploaded by

6tz8kvfbkf
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

forallx, chapters 27, 28, and 30

28 Definite descriptions
Consider sentences like:

1. Nick is the traitor.

2. The traitor went to Cambridge.

3. The traitor is the deputy.

These are definite descriptions: they are meant to pick out a unique object. They
should be contrasted with indefinite descriptions, such as ‘Nick is a traitor’. They
should equally be contrasted with generics, such as ‘The whale is a mammal’
(when it’s inappropriate to ask which whale). The question we face is: how should
we deal with definite descriptions in FOL?
28.2 Russell’s analysis
Bertrand Russell offered an analysis of definite descriptions. Very briefly put, he
observed that, when we say ‘the F ’ in the context of a definite description, our
aim is to pick out the one and only thing that is F (in the appropriate context).
Thus Russell analyzed the notion of a definite description as follows:

the F is G iff there is at least one F , and


there is at most one F , and
every F is G.

In FOL:

∃xF (x) ∧ ∀x∀y((F (x) ∧ F (y)) → x = y) ∧ ∀x(F (x) → G(x))

Or, equivalently and more concisely:

∃x[(F (x) ∧ ∀y(F (y) → x = y)) ∧ G(x)]

Symbolization key:
domain: people
T (x): x is a traitor.
C(x): x went to Cambridge.
D(x): x is a deputy.
n: Nick

1
Adapted from Magnus, P. D., Button, Tim, Trueman, Robert, and Zach, Richard; with contributions by Loftis, Robert J. and
Thomas-Bolduc, Aaron. 2023. For all x: Calgary remix: An introduction to formal logic. Fall 2023 edition. Licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ([Link]
forallx, chapters 27, 28, and 30

1. Nick is the traitor.


∃x[(T (x) ∧ ∀y(T (y) → x = y)) ∧ x = n]

2. The traitor went to Cambridge.


∃x[(T (x) ∧ ∀y(T (y) → x = y)) ∧ C(x)]

3. The traitor is the deputy.


Paraphrase: There is exactly one traitor, x, and there is exactly one deputy,
y, and x = y.
∃x∃y(([T (x) ∧ ∀z(T (z) → x = z)] ∧ [D(y) ∧ ∀z(D(z) → y = z)]) ∧ x = y)

Practice exercises
Using the following symbolization key, symbolize the following sentences in FOL:
domain: animals in the world
B(x): x is in Farmer Brown’s field.
H(x): x is a horse.
P (x): x is a Pegasus.
W (x): x has wings.

1. There are at least three horses in the world.

2. There are at least three animals in the world.

3. There is more than one horse in Farmer Brown’s field.

4. There is a single winged creature in Farmer Brown’s field; any other creatures
in the field must be wingless.

5. The Pegasus is a winged horse.

6. The animal in Farmer Brown’s field is not a horse.

7. The horse in Farmer Brown’s field does not have wings.

27 Sentences of FOL
27.1 Expressions

1. Predicates: A, B, C, . . . , Z, or with subscripts, as needed

2. Names: a, b, c, . . . , r, or with subscripts, as needed

3. Variables: s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z or with subscripts, as needed

2
Adapted from Magnus, P. D., Button, Tim, Trueman, Robert, and Zach, Richard; with contributions by Loftis, Robert J. and
Thomas-Bolduc, Aaron. 2023. For all x: Calgary remix: An introduction to formal logic. Fall 2023 edition. Licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ([Link]
forallx, chapters 27, 28, and 30

4. Connectives: ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔

5. Brackets: ( , )

6. Quantifiers: ∀, ∃

We define an expression of FOL as any string of symbols of FOL.


27.2 Terms and formulas
A term is any name or any variable.
Definition of atomic formula:

1. Any sentence letter is an atomic formula.

2. If R is an n-place predicate and t1 , t2 , . . . , tn are terms, then R(t1 , t2 , . . . , tn )


is an atomic formula.

3. If t1 and t2 are terms, then t1 = t2 is an atomic formula.

4. Nothing else is an atomic formula.

Recursive definition of formula:

1. Every atomic formula is a formula.

2. If A is a formula, then ¬A is a formula.

3. If A and B are formulas, then (A ∧ B) is a formula.

4. If A and B are formulas, then (A ∨ B) is a formula.

5. If A and B are formulas, then (A → B) is a formula.

6. If A and B are formulas, then (A ↔ B) is a formula.

7. If A is a formula and x is a variable, then ∀xA is a formula.

8. If A is a formula and x is a variable, then ∃xA is a formula.

9. Nothing else is a formula.

3
Adapted from Magnus, P. D., Button, Tim, Trueman, Robert, and Zach, Richard; with contributions by Loftis, Robert J. and
Thomas-Bolduc, Aaron. 2023. For all x: Calgary remix: An introduction to formal logic. Fall 2023 edition. Licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ([Link]
forallx, chapters 27, 28, and 30

The main logical operator in a formula is the operator that was introduced most
recently, when that formula was constructed using the recursion rules.
The scope of a logical operator in a formula is the sub-formula for which that
operator is the main logical operator.
27.3 Sentences and free variables
An occurrence of a variable x is bound iff it falls within the scope of either ∀x or
∃x. An occurrence of a variable which is not bound is free.
A sentence of FOL is any formula of FOL that contains no free variables.
27.4 Bracketing conventions
A convention to deal with conjunctions and disjunctions of more than two sen-
tences:

A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧ An is to be interpreted as (. . . (A1 ∧ A2 ) ∧ . . . ∧ An )

A1 ∨ A2 ∨ . . . ∨ An is to be interpreted as (. . . (A1 ∨ A2 ) ∨ . . . ∨ An )

You cannot mix conjunctions and disjunctions with each other or with other con-
nectives. So the following are still not allowed :

A∨B∧C ∧D

B∨C →D

Practice exercises
Identify which variables are bound and which are free.

1. ∃xL(x, y) ∧ ∀yL(y, x)

2. ∀xA(x) ∧ B(x)

3. ∀x(A(x) ∧ B(x)) ∧ ∀y(C(x) ∧ D(y))

4. ∀x∃y[R(x, y) → (J(z) ∧ K(x))] ∨ R(y, x)

4
Adapted from Magnus, P. D., Button, Tim, Trueman, Robert, and Zach, Richard; with contributions by Loftis, Robert J. and
Thomas-Bolduc, Aaron. 2023. For all x: Calgary remix: An introduction to formal logic. Fall 2023 edition. Licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ([Link]
forallx, chapters 27, 28, and 30

30 Extensionality
30.1 Symbolizing vs translating
TFL is a truth-functional language. Its connectives are all truth-functional, and
all that we can do with TFL is assign particular truth values to sentences. TFL
cannot handle differences in meaning that go beyond mere differences in truth
value.
FOL has some similar limitations. It gets beyond mere truth values, since it enables
us to split up sentences into terms, predicates and quantifiers. This enables us to
consider what is true of a particular object, or of some or all objects. But that’s
it.
Consider the symbolization key:

C(x): x teaches Logic III in Calgary

This stipulation does not carry the meaning of the English predicate across into
our FOL predicate. We are simply stipulating something like this:

‘C(x)’ and ‘ x teaches Logic III in Calgary’ are to be true of exactly the
same things.

The things a predicate is true of are known as the extension of that predicate.
We say that FOL is an extensional language because FOL does not represent
differences of meaning between predicates that have the same extension.
30.2 Extensions
We can stipulate the extension of a predicate in one of two ways:

1. By enumeration, i.e., we simply list the objects in the extension of a pred-


icate, for example, ‘H(x)’ should be true of, and only of, the following ob-
jects:

Justin Trudeau
the number π
every top-F key on every piano ever made

2. By giving an English predicate, such as ‘ x teaches Logic III in Calgary’.

5
Adapted from Magnus, P. D., Button, Tim, Trueman, Robert, and Zach, Richard; with contributions by Loftis, Robert J. and
Thomas-Bolduc, Aaron. 2023. For all x: Calgary remix: An introduction to formal logic. Fall 2023 edition. Licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ([Link]
forallx, chapters 27, 28, and 30

Note that some predicates of English are not true of anything. In this case we say
the extension of the predicate is empty.
30.3 Many-place predicates
Indirect stipulation:

L(x, y): x loves y.

Direct stipulation: ‘B(x, y)’ is to be true of, and only of, the following pairs of
objects:

⟨Lenin, Marx⟩

⟨de Beauvoir, Sartre⟩

⟨Sartre, de Beauvoir⟩

For both kinds of stipulation, the order matters.


30.4 Semantics for identity
Identity is a special predicate of FOL. We write it a bit differently than other
two-place predicates: ‘x = y’ instead of ‘I(x, y)’ (for example). More important,
though, is that its interpretation is fixed, once and for all. If two names refer to
the same object, then swapping one name for another will not change the truth
value of any sentence.
30.5 Interpretations
An interpretation consists of:

1. the specification of a domain;

2. for each sentence letter we care to consider, a truth value;

3. for each name that we care to consider, an assignment of exactly one object
within the domain;

4. for each predicate that we care to consider (apart from ‘=’), a specification
of what things (in what order) the predicate is to be true of.

Following the discussion of section 30.2, we now also allow extensions specified by
enumerations on the right side:

6
Adapted from Magnus, P. D., Button, Tim, Trueman, Robert, and Zach, Richard; with contributions by Loftis, Robert J. and
Thomas-Bolduc, Aaron. 2023. For all x: Calgary remix: An introduction to formal logic. Fall 2023 edition. Licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ([Link]
forallx, chapters 27, 28, and 30

domain: heads of state, numbers


H(x): Justin Trudeau, Angela Merkel, π

domain: 0, 1, 2
L(x, y): ⟨0, 1⟩, ⟨0, 2⟩, ⟨1, 2⟩

It is sometimes also convenient to present an interpretation diagrammatically.


Suppose we want to consider just a single two-place predicate, ‘R(x, y)’. Then we
can represent it just by drawing an arrow between two objects, and stipulate that
‘R(x, y)’ is to hold of x and y just in case there is an arrow running from x to y
in our diagram.

1 2

4 3

7
Adapted from Magnus, P. D., Button, Tim, Trueman, Robert, and Zach, Richard; with contributions by Loftis, Robert J. and
Thomas-Bolduc, Aaron. 2023. For all x: Calgary remix: An introduction to formal logic. Fall 2023 edition. Licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ([Link]

You might also like